# Publications

2011
Tingley, D. (2011). The Dark Side of the Future: An Experimental Test of Commitment Problems in Bargaining. International Studies Quarterly , 55, 521-544.Abstract
While most existing theoretical and experimental literatures focus on how a high probability of repeated play can lead to more socially efficient outcomes (for instance, using the result that cooperation is possible in a repeated prisoner's dilemma), this paper focuses on the detrimental effects of repeated play--the Dark Side of the Future". I study a resource division model with repeated interaction and changes in bargaining strength. The model predicts a negative relationship between the likelihood of repeated interaction and social efficiency. This is because the longer shadow of the future exacerbates commitment problems created by changes in bargaining strength. I test and find support for the model using incentivized laboratory experiments. Increases in the likelihood of repeated play leads to more socially inefficient outcomes in the laboratory.
Milner, H., & Tingley, D. (2011). Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy. International Organization , 65 (Winter), pp 37–68.
2010
Imai, K., Keele, L., Tingley, D., & Yamamoto, T. (2010). Causal Mediation Analysis Using R. In Advances in Social Science Research Using R (pp. 129-154) . New York, Springer.
Tingley, D., & Wang, S. (2010). Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model. Quarterly Journal of Political Science , 5 (3), 243-255.Abstract
We investigate theoretically and experimentally the "crisis bargaining model", a dynamic game of two-sided incomplete information with player types drawn from a commonly known distribution. Within the experiment we elicited beliefs from players about their opponent's type using a quadratic scoring rule. We implement two treatments that vary a fixed terminal node payoff in the game, generating sharp comparative static predictions in both beliefs and strategies. We examine the relationship between beliefs and actions, which is not well understood in the empirical literature. We find that most beliefs and strategies are responsive to our treatments in the way predicted by theory, and that beliefs track departures from theoretical predictions about strategy choice. We highlight evidence for two deviations from Bayesian beliefs: conservative updating and motivated beliefs. We also consider other important roles for beliefs in strategic choice including the extent of rational expectations and best response to beliefs.
Tingley, D. (2010). Donors and Domestic Politics: Political Influences on Foreign Aid Commitments. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance , 50, 40-49.
Milner, H., & Tingley, D. (2010). The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Politics of Donor Countries. Economics and Politics , 22 (2), 200-232.
Imai, K., Keele, L., & Tingley, D. (2010). A General Approach to Causal Mediation Analysis. Psychological Methods , 15 (4), 309-334.Abstract
Traditionally in the social sciences, causal mediation analysis has been formulated, understood, and implemented within the framework of linear structural equation models. We argue and demonstrate that this is problematic for three reasons; the lack of a general definition of causal mediation effects independent of a particular statistical model, the inability to specify the key identification assumption, and the difficulty of extending the framework to nonlinear models. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach that overcomes these limitations. Our approach is general because it offers the definition, identification, estimation, and sensitivity analysis of causal mediation effects without reference to any specific statistical model. Further, our approach explicitly links these four elements closely together within a single framework. As a result, the proposed framework can accommodate linear and nonlinear relationships, parametric and nonparametric models, continuous and discrete mediators, and various types of outcome variables. The general definition and identification result also allow us to develop sensitivity analysis in the context of commonly used models, which enables applied researchers to formally assess the robustness of their empirical conclusions to violations of the key assumption. We illustrate our approach by applying it to the Job Search Intervention Study (JOBS II). We also offer easy-to-use software that implements all of our proposed methods.
Chaudoin, S., Milner, H. V., & Tingley, D. H. (2010). The Center Still Holds: Liberal Internationalism Survives. International Security , 35, 75-94. Publisher's Version
2009
Tingley, D., & Walter, B. (2009). Experimental Evidence for Reputation Building and Deterrence. In Reputation and Civil War . Cambridge University Press.
Tingley, D., & Walter, B. (2009). Experimental Evidence for Reputation Building and Deterrence. In Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent . Cambridge UP.
McDermott, R., Tingley, D., Cowden, J., Frazzetto, G., & Johnson, D. D. P. (2009). Monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA) predicts behavioral aggression following provocation. Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences , 106, 2118-2123.Abstract

Monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA) has earned the nickname “warrior gene” because it has been linked to aggression in observational and survey-based studies. However, no controlled experimental studies have tested whether the warrior gene actually drives behavioral manifestations of these tendencies. We report an experiment, synthesizing work in psychology and behavioral economics, which demonstrates that aggression occurs with greater intensity and frequency as provocation is experimentally manipulated upwards, especially among low activity MAOA (MAOA-L) subjects. In this study, subjects paid to punish those they believed had taken money from them by administering varying amounts of unpleasantly hot (spicy) sauce to their opponent. There is some evidence of a main effect for genotype and some evidence for a gene by environment interaction, such that MAOA is less associated with the occurrence of aggression in a low provocation condition, but significantly predicts such behavior in a high provocation situation. This new evidence for genetic influences on aggression and punishment behavior complicates characterizations of humans as “altruistic” punishers and supports theories of cooperation that propose mixed strategies in the population. It also suggests important implications for the role of individual variance in genetic factors contributing to everyday behaviors and decisions.

2006
Tingley, D. (2006). Evolving Political Science: Biological Adaptation, Rational Action, and Symbolism in Political Science. Politics and Life Sciences , 25, 23-41.Abstract
Political science, as a discipline, has been reluctant to adopt theories and methodologies developed in fields studying human behavior from an evolutionary standpoint. I ask whether evolutionary concepts are reconcilable with standard political-science theories and whether those concepts help solve puzzles to which these theories classically are applied. I find that evolutionary concepts readily and simultaneously accommodate theories of rational choice, symbolism, interpretation, and acculturation. Moreover, phenomena perennially hard to explain in standard political science become clearer when human interactions are understood in light of natural selection and evolutionary psychology. These phenomena include the political and economic effects of emotion, status, personal attractiveness, and variations in information-processing and decision-making under uncertainty; exemplary is the use of ‘‘focal points’’ in multiple-equilibrium games. I conclude with an overview of recent research by, and ongoing debates among, scholars analyzing politics in evolutionarily sophisticated terms.
Tingley, D. (2006). Neurological Imaging as Evidence in Political Science: A Review, Critique, and Guiding Assessment. Social Science Information , 45, 5-33.