The core of my theoretical work is a model of presumed conformity, in which members of a group are motivated to signal that their preference matches what they believe is the majority group preference. Equilibrium dynamics can result in a perverse failure of collective action in which individuals act in a way they mistakenly believe is cooperative, or `pluralistic ignorance'.
In lab experiments Michael Hiscox and I tested the role of social expectations in decisions to influence and be influenced by others to act pro-socially. In an online experiment and a field experiment (with Sam Asher) I use national primes to test how social expectations over donating to co-regionals and co-nationals interact.
In terms of my field work, I have partnered with a Mexican NGO with which I design and implement experiments. Ben Golub, Evan Sadler and I were recently awarded a grant from the Foundations of Human Behavior to test the impact of playdate group composition on social expectations and neurodevelopment.