@workingpaper {682887, title = {The mobilization machine: how Xi Jinping{\textquoteright}s corruption campaign strengthens the Party}, year = {Working Paper}, abstract = { How do corruption investigations affect regime support? I argue the answer is conditional on mobilization strategies employed by the regime. Using time-series cross-sectional data from the China General Social Survey (2009-2016), I compare the effect of corruption investigations under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping on regime attitudes. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, I find that provinces which came more scrutiny from Hu are more trusting and more liberal; these relationships are precisely reversed under Xi. I argue this is caused by the end of Deng-era developmental mobilization and new, Xi-era narratives of mobilization for {\textquotedblleft}common prosperity." Presented at BU-MIT-Harvard Contemporary Chinese Politics Research Workshop 10/21 }, author = {(with Katharin Tai)} }