Concessions, Violence, and Indirect Rule: Evidence from the Congo Free State

Abstract:

All major colonial powers granted concessions to private compa-nies to extract natural resources during the colonial era. Within Africa, theseconcessions were characterized by (i) violence and (ii) the co-option of localleaders. We use the arbitrarily defined borders of concessions granted in thenorth of the Congo Free State to examine the causal effects of this form ofeconomic organization on cultural and institutional outcomes. Using surveyand experimental data from individuals near a former concession boundary,we find that individuals from the concessions are more pro-social, but that localleaders provide fewer public goods and are less likely to be elected. Finally,we examine the effects on economic development. Historical exposure to theconcessions has led to worse present day economic outcomes in the northernconcessions and for all concessions in Congo. This has broad implications forthe large parts of colonized countries that were allocated to private concessions.

Working Paper

Notes:

Revision Requested, Quarterly Journal of Economics
Last updated on 10/10/2019