Research
Publications
Mass political information on social media: Facebook ads, electorate saturation, and electoral accountability in Mexico
(with Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Alberto Simpser), Journal of the European Economic Association, 2024
[download_pdf] [slides] [replication] [pre-registration]
Abstract
Working Papers
Crime, violence, and political representation
Democracy under Assault: Electoral Reform and Political Violence
[download_pdf]
Abstract
When do criminal organizations use violence to influence political outcomes? Using an asymmetric information model, I show that criminal groups use violence when other channels of influence, namely bribes, are no longer available to them. I test the model predictions in the context of an electoral reform in Mexico that increased politicians’ cost of accepting bribes. I use confidential administrative reports of suspicious financial transactions in retail banking to measure bribes and an original dataset of attacks on politicians to measure violence. Results from a difference-in-differences design indicate that the reform differentially decreased the number of suspicious financial reports by 4 percentage points (∼650 fewer reports) and increased the number of attacks by 2 percentage points (∼44 more attacks) in places with the presence of drug trafficking organizations. Consistent with the model, additional evidence suggests that (1) criminal organizations resort to violence when they fail to reach an agreement with politicians, and (2) the effects of the reform are driven by municipalities where politicians have tighter campaign spending limits and less information about the criminal group(s).These findings have implications for our understanding of local governance and call for attention to the design and implementation of transparency-enhancing electoral reforms.
A Theory of Criminal Bribes and Punishment in Elections
(with Martín Castillo Quintana)
[download pdf]
Abstract
Information, polarization, and political accountability
Accountability under Polarization
(with Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Alberto Simpser)
[slides] [pre-registration]
[draft available upon request]
Abstract
How social media reinforces or ameliorates political polarization
(with Horacio Larreguy and Octavio Lujambio)
[draft available upon request]
Abstract
Coordination across levels of government
Confounding, spillovers, and interactions influence estimates of social distancing policy effects
(with Horacio Larreguy and Alberto Simpser) R&R at PLOS ONE
[download_pdf] [slides]
Abstract
Moral Hazard and Corruption in Driving: Evidence from Speeding Tickets
(with Daniel Ramos-Menchelli)
[draft available upon request]
Abstract
Speeding ticket cameras (AST) are commonly used devices in many cities around the world. However, there is still limited evidence regarding their effectiveness. Using the universe of speeding tickets and car plates registered in the Metropolitan area of Mexico City, and exploiting variation in timing and jurisdictional reach, we evaluate the effectiveness of an AST program. We show that installation of speeding cameras is related to an increase in risky driving behavior by drivers with out-of-the-state plates as measured by driving speed and traffic accidents. This occurs because of the lack of coordination between different state-level governmental authorities that makes it impossible to ticket out-of-the-state drivers. This effect is driven by more expensive and sporty cars, which are registered outside Mexico City to avoid a progressive motor vehicle excise. Additional estimates, based on the universe of violations reported by traffic officers, indicate that the AST program changes the geographical location and profile of non-automated ticket violators, as seen per the vehicle characteristics, suggesting changes in petty corruption patterns and distributional effects of the policy.
Political Dynasties
Identification of Dynastic Power in Contexts with Spanish Naming Conventions
(with Alonso Ahumada and Emilio Gutiérrez)
[draft available upon request]
Abstract
We propose a simple measure of dynastic power that may be applied to any context with Spanish naming conventions, where each person uses a paternal and a maternal surname. Using our measure, we characterize the evolution and distribution of dynastic power across Mexican municipalities and over time, and test for differences in dynastic power between genders. We show that male mayors' paternal last name is significantly more likely to reappear as future office holders' paternal last name than as their maternal last name, suggesting that mayors' direct descendants have a higher probability of holding office than other individuals with similar ability. However, female mayors' paternal last names are not more likely to reappear as future office holders' maternal last names than as paternal last names.
Political Dynasties in Democracies
(with Daniel M. Smith)
[draft available upon request]
Abstract
Families with multiple members in elective political office are common in democracies around the world. The past decade has witnessed a renewed interest in these "democratic dynasties," and the emergence of a robust research agenda aimed at investigating the causes and consequences of dynastic politics. In this review article we explore two core sets of questions motivating the existing research. First, when and why do democratic dynasties emerge? Members of democratic dynasties are believed to enjoy political advantages, but to what extent is membership in a dynasty beneficial and what are the sources of these bonuses? Second, what are the political and economic consequences of representation by members of democratic dynasties? Drawing on a variety of contemporary and historical cases in a selection of countries, the emerging literature has made rapid progress in tying together sophisticated theoretical explanations with robust empirical evidence to answer these questions. Key challenges and opportunities for this research agenda include measuring family ties across levels of government (as well as links to influential political actors outside of legislative and executive bodies), disentangling the many potential advantages enjoyed by democratic dynasties, and further identifying the effects of institutional variables—such as electoral rules, term limits, and features of party organization—on the recruitment and behavior of dynastic politicians in both developed and developing democracies.