@article {632794, title = {Does evaluation change teacher effort and performance? Quasi-experimental evidence from a policy of retesting students}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, volume = {104}, number = {3}, year = {2022}, month = {2022}, pages = {417{\textendash}430}, abstract = { We document measurable, lasting gains in student achievement caused by a change in teachers{\textquoteright} evaluation incentives. A short-lived rule created a discontinuity in teachers{\textquoteright} incentives when allocating effort across their assigned students: students who failed an initial end-of-year test were retested a few weeks later, and then only the higher of the two scores was used when calculating the teacher{\textquoteright}s evaluation score. One year later, long after the discontinuity in incentives had ended, retested students scored 0.03σ higher than non-retested students. Otherwise identical students were treated differently by teachers because of evaluation incentives, despite arguably equal returns to teacher effort. }, url = {https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/104/3/417/97737/Does-Evaluation-Change-Teacher-Effort-and}, author = {Esteban Aucejo and Teresa Romano and Taylor, Eric S.} }