Chapter Four

Notes for an analysis

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‘Writing on psychoanalysis always runs the risk of reducing the efficacy of its scene.’

Luce Irigaray

Imagine the scene. For just a while you do not have to fight to stand up on your own two feet. You are lying down on your back. Now ‘say—and only say—everything that comes into your head. As it comes to you, there, now. Don’t leave anything out. Don’t worry about contradictions, conventions. Don’t organize what you say...’ Say everything now, here. Silence. ‘What are you thinking about?/How much I hate this! How frightening it is!’ There is a voice —double—it floats towards the ceiling where there is nothing to see, fading halting, unsure. ‘The impossibility of the fundamental rule is to say now, that.’ Nothing but the accent, the inflexion, the intensity, the volume, the duration. ‘The beginning [is] before you, the goal and end behind you.’ You are not the subject-source. There is someone in back of you, behind you; the couch is behind your back. (Is someone under the bed? Old terrors.) Right is left, left is right. Her right is your right, left your left—as if you were looking in the same mirror. When you are standing on your own two feet, ‘in representation’, you have a front and a back, an up and a down. Now you are dizzy, the cardinal points of your being in sway. The only support: two voices, double-voiced, your object behind you. In front of you: profusion, excess, where do I begin? Who ‘I’? Who ‘you’? But I want an author, an agent, an object, a mirror—a theory, a pedagogue, a magician, a master, a slave, a guarantee!/Silence. Try again. Cross over, diversely, inside, outside, enter, leave, weave, knit your way in and out. Luce Irigaray has taught us that this ‘practicable’, of this scene, is not just ‘one empirical element among others, one form of application of psychic logic among others, one experience among others. But...[rather] a practicable which derails, disconcerts, deassures the scene of representation’—which is always based on a kind of logophono-phallo-centrism privileging the being-up-front, so you can see it, be sure whether the ‘I’ has got one or not—for example, as in the university. Of course, that’s true on the couch too. If you’re on your back.
These are notes; that is, what follows. Fragments, footnotes, memoranda; mine, the analyst’s, the analysand’s, the woman writer’s. A professor’s notes. Student notes—their grades; and how much is the bill? Glyph notes...Lou Andreas-Salomé was always the only woman present on those Wednesday nights in Vienna. ‘Sometimes she and Freud would exchange notes when they sat side by side. She knit, but never spoke.’ Marie Bonaparte listened intently and noted all of Freud’s words until he told her to write nothing more concerning her analysis because it would keep her from exploring the deepest layers of her-self. She later, as an analyst, took up knitting rather than noting behind the couch. And H.D., too, was forbidden to take notes. She did though. A Second Coming.

Notes—*tones* is its anagram. Tone of voice. Musical notes. In a note to Lou, Freud remarked on that which in Lou’s writing he could not follow because ‘not yet subordinated to speech’—always an octave above his melody, he said. Bell tones—high octave notes. Class Bells. Doorbells. Regulating the two spaces—academic and psychoanalytic—that I am supposed to be addressing here; two spaces that I have in fact been addressing over the past few years, now in speech, now in writing, now lying down, now standing up ...running out-of-time.

If we bring these two spaces—academia and psychoanalysis—together as psychoanalysis in the university, we arrive at a place where something is happening that deserves our notice. And/In—no simple opposition or analogy. I hope you will grant me the benefit of the doubt, even if not demonstrated now, that I am conscious of the fact that there are no simple inside/outside dichotomies here: on this note, we could perhaps re-member and be guided by the ins and outs of transference between ‘Literature’ and ‘Psychoanalysis’ orchestrated so beautifully and influentially for us by Shoshana Felman over ten years ago.

Also, we will not demonstrate here—even if we must never and can never leave behind—the macropolitics organizing the ins and outs, interior and exterior frontiers of these two mental institutions (psychoanalysis and the university): first, money of course; and second, an organization, conception of the mental, of the mental apparatus which psychoanalysis and the university mirror constantly in each other: a particular figuration of the highest faculties, constructed at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Berlin. And, of course, both psychoanalysis and the university are institutions with schools, and as David Carroll has pointed out recently and succinctly, ‘Institutions and schools exist to occupy positions of power, to neutralize dissent, and to domesticate all oppositional forces and foreign bodies; their authority depends on it.’ How can we possibly forget that both of these institutions finally report to the state? Note Nietzsche on the professor’s speaking mouth with many ears, the university culture machine, and so-called academic freedom—as in *On The Future of Our Educational Institutions*; or, more visibly, let us not forget the collaboration of institutions of psychoanalysis with certain
Latin American or Soviet states as noted, for example, in Derrida’s ‘Géopsychanalyse—“and all the rest of the world”’.\(^{11}\)

For now, all of these difficult questions will simply have to underwrite what I want to voice here—haltingly, tentatively—about two particular political problems currently preoccupying me—and a few others I think.

The first problem is sometimes referred to in working shorthand as the dilemma of short-term vs. long-term political effects, of working fast vs. working slow. This debate, in literary critical circles, is most often articulated in traditional binary fashion as: (1) construction vs. deconstruction; (2) the drive to name vs. disarticulation; (3) unity vs. heterogeneity; (4) the Cartesian ‘I’ vs. complex subjectivity; (5) Anglo-American vs. French; and, increasingly, as (6) a return to literary history vs. literary theory—there is even the question of ‘politically correct texts of pleasure’ vs. ‘politically wrong texts of jouissance’. The dis-ease associated with these ultimately epistemological battles currently continues to spread on the international scene in several different forms: for example, critical legal studies people are attacked because of anxieties about how endless deconstruction of the legal text leaves no room for legal definition; activists argue that the ‘undecidable’—as the very definition of the political—evoked by Barbara Johnson’s stunning essay on ‘Apostrophe, animation, and abortion’ probably did not, after all, get very many people out to vote no (which meant yes) in the Massachusetts Abortion Referendum in November 1986.\(^{12}\) In a different scene, and in Richard Rorty’s words, we see such twisted battles as where ‘the French critics of Habermas [are] ready to abandon liberal politics in order to avoid a universalist philosophy, and…Habermas [is] trying to cling to a universalist philosophy, with all the problems that involves, in order to prop up a liberal politics’.\(^{13}\)

Or, for example, we hear debates over whether in the United States we must take the time to think through the paleonomic and tropological implications of ‘Apartheid’ and ‘Solidarity’ or rather, go out and do/write/say whatever is necessary to provoke immediate US divestment from South Africa.\(^{14}\) That is, there seems to be growing political impatience with the debate over how politically patient one should be. And the solution of ‘one always does both anyway’—i.e., act conservatively and radically at the same time—seems to be wearing thin, when it’s not wrapped up in pluralist giftwrap and handed over to the powers that be. I am particularly concerned in this context by what I have analysed elsewhere as a kind of territorializing of more specifically feminist versions of these questions by paranoia and fetishism.\(^{15}\) While both participate in what I call ‘a demand for doubling’, paranoia is about deciding, defining, making strong cases; fetishism about the both, neither/nor, refusal to decide, define, or go to court. I am referring here, for example, to the difference between asserting that ‘women are different from men’ (implying we know what women are) and saying (in the same breath) ‘Women are different. No they are not’—implying we do not know what they are. I have suggested that the current period of tense coexistence of these two states is
about living and thinking in a mode of *impossibility* sometimes referred to in other contexts as ‘postmodernism’, a state within which women are caught like everyone else…. But we will return to the impossible in a moment.

The second immediate political problem with which I am concerned as a feminist teaching in the university is with the problems and questions arising now that there are at least two generations of explicitly and politically feminist women professors in the academy: let us say those who received their Ph.D. between 1968 and 1978 and those who received it after 1978. Now I want to emphasize ‘at least two generations’ and ‘explicitly and politically feminist’ here for two reasons. First because, of course, there are technically three (soon to be four) generations of women professors in the United States today. Most significantly, there is an important generation of women who received their Ph.D. (often long) before 1968. Secondly, however, what is more important here than the question of ‘generation’ is the question of one’s discursive, political positioning *vis-à-vis* the women’s liberation movement. Before 1968 it was difficult, if not impossible, to be an explicitly political feminist scholar in the institution. And I think it is safe to say that the majority of those women who were allowed access, before the late 1960s, to full status as professors were not explicitly political feminists. Many were, in fact, resistant when not hostile to feminism even as they were fighting feminist battles every day of their lives. Those extraordinary few women full professors who were explicitly and politically feminist before 1968 were most extraordinary indeed and I would include them within the first post-1968 generation. (It is perhaps important to remember that these women often did not receive recognition for their (feminist) work until relatively late in their careers—that is to say, until *after* 1968.) Let us just say that it is the two generations of explicitly and politically feminist women who have come to intellectual/academic age since 1968 that will be of primary interest to me here.¹⁶

Now, first of all, there is the question of what the institution has done/is doing to all of these generations of women: that is a long story. What happens to women ‘constrained to transport the discourse of men and the body of women’,¹⁷ has, of course, been analysed for a long while. Alternatives include: be alone, isolated, and asexual; get sick; at least act, look, and speak neuter; or leave. I am talking about the power of the desire of the homosocially patriarchal academy to force women to relinquish ‘the feminine’ —in the strong Irigarayan force of the term, what Juliet Mitchell describes as ‘the Other’ for both sexes¹⁸—so as to make them, first, ‘undesirables’ within dominant heterosexual ideology and, then, eventually, *ne-euter* (neither one nor the other) in the terms of male representations. This desire creates either (as Mary Ann Doane puts it) ‘an asexual…perfect and unthreatening mate for the “good old Americano”’¹⁹—or else has you kicked out. This situation has raised a lot of questions—especially on the part of an upcoming generation, the young women Ph.D. students I know—about what price they are willing...
to pay, how much they are willing to give up, for a place in the academy. That is, a lot of them—those who are politicized at least—do not want to live like the first generations of academic women have had to live.

But there is also the perhaps even more difficult question of the relationships between the two post-1968 generations of feminist women in the academy. I would like to avoid the mother/daughter paradigm here (so as not to succumb simply to miming the traditional father/son, master/disciple model), but it is difficult to avoid at this point being positioned by the institution as mothers and daughters. Structures of debt/gift (mothers and increasingly daughters control a lot of money and prestige in the university), structures of our new institutional power over each other, desires and demands for recognition and love—all of these are falling into place in rather familiar ways. Accusations fly about on both sides as to who is really feminist or not; who has been recuperated or not; who is just miming the masters (is it the often more history-minded mothers or more theory-minded daughters?); whose fault is it that there is a general perception that feminism has become facile, tamed while, precisely, the humanities are being feminized? People are asking—or should be—how did we get to the intellectual and political point where one of the reigning topics of discussion among supposedly politicized women is often quite exclusively hiring/firing and chances for tenure? It sometimes sounds, as Patricia Baudoin has put it, as if the political has become the personal—as if our professional status has even become our personal status. And throughout all of this, no one, neither mother nor daughter, can ever seem to accomplish enough....

At this point, I would like to suggest that, with a slight change of optic, it is in fact feminist women, of both of these post-1968 generations in the academy, who are in a special, strategic position as new kinds of subjects to think through and act upon these problems, together, in potentially new and radical ways. I think this potential exists because feminism, psychoanalysis, and the institution are, today, triply implicated in a major historical, archaeological, epistemological mutation: a mutation of the public and private spheres, a new kind of interference between the polis and ta olkeia. At the same time, there is a massive oedipalization as privatization of the public sphere and a massive publification (in Latin, democritization) of the private sphere. More specifically (and narrowly given the contexts and texts which interest us here), there is a reconfiguration of public and private spaces throughout our institutions; in the university, for example, (a particular scene of representation), concurrent with the entry of women into that scene. Further, both women and psychoanalysis are entering that scene together, disrupting it—which is logical since women are psychoanalysis’s reason for existence, its history and stories: we are its cases (as Mary Ann Doane reminds us: the text of the unconscious is the female hysteric). In fact, many of the same women who are disrupting the institution work in psychoanalysis, a lot of them are even in analysis (usually with women). Even more specifically, this
mutation of the public and private, the contamination of the classic scene of representation with and through ‘the other scene’ (scene of the other), has a lot to do (as you might guess) with writing and the voice: this is a dichotomy perhaps intellectually problematized years ago but which has continued to structure our energies and affects in specific ways. We have learned how writing and the voice weave together, overlap, are exchanged—through the voice’s writing and writing’s voice—always, but differently. At the same time, we have thought less perhaps about what this new kind of knowledge is doing to the patriarchal institution and its systems of representation: public writing (scientific, academic, and literary publishing) and the public voice (lecturing and teaching) have traditionally been gendered as male; private writing (diaries and letters) and private voice (intimacy; the analytic space) have been gendered as female. That has begun to change with women’s history-making move from the private to the public (their massive publification) and the creation of certain chiasmatic and paradoxical situations such as writing being gendered as feminine in the male public sphere; or, as Juliet Mitchell has pointed out, the fact that feminism and psychoanalysis share a central paradox which is shaking up the pedagogue in all of us: they are both humanist (concerned with how the ‘I’ is constructed) and, at the same time, and often through the same moves, dramatically counter-humanist (decentering the Man in each of us).  

What I am trying to get to here is a new and different scene, at a new intersection of psychoanalysis, feminism, and the institution, where a radical deconstruction of the academic subject is taking place; where a radically new kind of knowledge is being produced; and where women are becoming radical agents of that new knowledge and of political change if and when they actualize freely the mutations and paradoxes I have been referring to. In order to think just a bit more about all of this—especially about the two specific problems I raised concerning (1) short-term and long-term political effects and (2) generations of women—I would like to suggest returning to this intersection briefly from two other, different directions: first, more ‘abstractly’, in terms of the radical differences between the ‘analytic’ and ‘pedagogic’ scenes (to which women have had special access) and secondly, more ‘concretely’, by thinking about two other generations of women—those at the beginning of this century and those at its end who have somehow, in some form, for some reason, written about their own psychoanalysis—a very odd thing to do.

Jane Gallop has come close to defining the institution as massive group transference. I would add: if that institution is the university, it is the very site of the ‘being-up-front’ mentioned earlier on. The traditional institutional scene at least is anywhere the scene of representation is based on the mirror and where women’s discourse is carefully controlled, sometimes by her own narration. It is a ‘life-trap’ (in Rilke’s phrase), where there are ‘practical demonstrations’ of pre-packaged knowledge, the ‘object of university
diplomas’. Again, without wanting to forget that there are no easy oppositions here, no pure spaces, I do think there is another scene, a scene of psychic logic tentatively evoked in my opening notes: an analytic scene between two, increasingly between two women. An entire issue of a feminist journal in Europe, BIEF, has recently been devoted to the twentieth-century analytic space as a female space to which women have increasingly turned in much larger numbers than men (especially with a certain democritization of analysis under the influence of feminism). Women have done this not just as (or not only just as) victims in search of an other private space because access to a public voice and public writing is still, historically, very difficult for women; but they have turned to this other space also as artists and agents of change who can there let go of the all-powerful fantasmatic other holding them back.

The institutional scene is to the analytic scene as assurance is to the lack thereof; as self-mastery is to the relinquishing of control; as fast is to slow; as product is to process; certainty to doubt; as emphasis on success is to failure; gaining time to losing and wasting it; as project is to projection; reason to unreason; la gestion (bureaucracy) to gestation (nurturing); as solutions are to dissolutions; progressions to regressions; required good humor and social smiles to tantrums and tears; as consolidate is to ana-lyein (to break up or to loosen); as memorizing is to anamnesis; the voluntary to the involuntary; gain to loss; as that which has already been said is to that which language does not yet know how to say. In the institutional scene, what is important is the best possible performance. In the analytic scene, what is important is to dream. In the pedagogical scene, one must make known an object, make it universally knowable; whereas, of course, the dream is not reproducible, can never be made universally accessible. In short, the bodies of teaching and bodies of the unconscious were never supposed to meet. But they have and it is women who know about that.

Especially women who have been in analysis. When I asked several analysts about the idea of women writing about their own analysis, many found it a contradiction in terms. As the blurb on Erika Kaufmann’s book Transfert puts it: ‘An analysis stays secret. It voices itself, it listens to itself, it does not write itself. What is voiced is drowned in silence, even if sometimes capitalized upon by the analyst.’ But Kaufmann also continues: ‘[But then] the unconscious [is] once again chased away, there is loss of revolt Of struggle. My unconscious was demanding speech, writing. [So] I wrote letters to my analyst.’ And she is not the only one. Erika Kaufmann’s book, published in France in 1975, is just one of many, many books, published by women in the 1970s and 1980s, devoted to analysis, often to their own analysis. In terms of psychoanalysis, this is a second generation of women crossing over from the private into the public, the voice into writing, in ways which fundamentally confuse the genres: in both senses, in terms of gender and in terms of the ways literary, autobiographical, autoanalytic, psychoanalytic narratives are...
being recombined to confound the boundaries between private and public discursive spaces.

As a kind of ‘popularization’ of psychoanalysis, this recent outpouring of texts would seem to send us back to the first wave of popularization of psychoanalysis in the 1910s and 1920s and on through the 1940s (especially through surrealism) and its attendant first generation of remarkable women. These women, born in the 1860s and 1880s, came to analysis primarily through Freud, and if their textual moves between the private and the public, voice and writing, often superficially resemble those of the second generation, there are great differences. Their steps toward public vulnerability are more measured and, for the moment, that measure and resistance to public vulnerability is what I am interested in. These extraordinary women were all caught in the passionate crosscurrents of Freudian transferences. For example, most women around Freud who eventually became analysts—such as Helene Deutsch or Marie Bonaparte—explicitly admit (or rather their dreams do) their desires to be, at the same time, the Father’s ‘most beautiful daughter and his most intelligent son’. Of Deutsch’s analysis with Freud in 1918, we learn very little from her own hand. She insists upon and defends in her autobiography, *Confrontations with Myself*, the difference between an autoanalysis and the memoires of an analyst, only once mentioning in passing one precious titbit: how she, having just given birth and while in analysis with Freud, provided his wife with milk. As Julia Kristeva suggests in her introduction to the French edition of Deutsch, we can only read such a woman’s ‘secret autobiography’ as metamorphized in each of her interpretations.

Marie Bonaparte’s written records of her analysis with Freud, her steps from the private to the public, are also carefully guarded—but this time by her family: the notes she took during 1925–6 (in spite of Freud’s admonishment) are hidden away in the archives of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, not to be released until the year 2000. Her biographer, Celia Bertin, gives us a few notes nevertheless—for example, this passage from Bonaparte’s analysis notebooks: ‘This reflex to flee into writing has stayed with me: the chagrin, the pain, far from keeping me from writing, push me more immediately toward the refuge of literary and scientific creation.’

It is, perhaps predictably, Lou Andreas-Salomé and H.D. who give us the most written access to (their own) analysis even if, again, fictional, theoretical, and biographical boundaries are often kept clear. From Lou, the first woman shrink, with regard to her autoanalysis of 1911 and work with Freud, we have little public voice but much private writing: especially her 1912–13 journal and, of course, her rich correspondence with Freud.

H.D. followed a three-month cure with Freud in 1933 with two texts: one, her private daily notes (the 1933 ‘Advent’) and one ‘more destined for publication’ as she put it (the 1944 ‘Writing on the wall’). These texts are goldmines for testing the limits in the beginning of this century between voice
and writing, private and public, for women; the constructions of self and its demise. H.D., who was never satisfied by any of her books, whether published or not, sometimes lying on the couch in Freud’s office or ten years later, sitting in her room in London, never shrank away from writing the entire difficult process: ‘This writing is, in any case, coherent; it is the composition of one person; it is written, designed by the same hand. What remains to be known is whether this hand or this person is me.’

Here I can only evoke the second generation of women writing in and through psychoanalysis, through different degrees of autobiographical fiction: Elizabeth Wilson’s *Mirror Writing*, published in 1982, for example, where what she calls the ‘identity split between public and private life’ is written through the juxtaposition of an analytic experience (‘the opposite of an explanatory, synthesising or theorising one’) and the women’s movement demanding an identity and a voice for women. Or there are the immensely popular novels like *August* by Judith Rossner or *Other Women* by Lisa Alther; or, in France, one finds transcriptions of autoanalysis (Marie Bellour’s *Le Jeu de l’Origine*), written letters (Kaufmann’s *Transfert*), or fluid semi-autobiographical reflections on analysis by analysts (like Jacqueline Rousseau-Dujardin’s *Couché par écrit*). Maria Torok, in her introduction to Claudie Cachard’s *L’Autre histoire*, even explicitly links this kind of work back to the early part of the century.

In thinking here about these two psychoanalytic generations of women in relation to the two academic generations of women mentioned earlier, certain analogies come to mind. I will mention here only those which will help me bring these notes to an end.

First, there is the privileged place of male mentors in the intellectual lives of both of the first generations: from Freud, Abraham, and Ferenzi to those male new critics, structuralists, etc., who served as male mentors and models to women over 40 in the academy. Whereas, for the women of the two second generations, while those male sources are obviously historically important, most often—either consciously or unconsciously—it is women who have been their most influential teachers, models and—yes—analysts. At least as they have written it down. Is it possible that the first generations idealized their intellectual fathers; the second, their intellectual mothers? Second, there would seem to be some correspondence between the ways in which our two first generations dealt with the challenges of the major new discoveries confronting them in their young intellectual lives (psychoanalysis for the first psychoanalytic generation; feminism for the first academic generation): there was a seduction, combined with a resistance to the full implications of those two discourses. Whereas our two second generations would seem to be in full transference with both discourses. Third, the two first generations would seem to correspond to some combination of Kristeva’s first two generations of feminists evoked in her article ‘Women’s time’: the first psychoanalytic and academic generations of women often fell either into the category of
those women wanting a secure place in linear history or those women wanting to affirm a different, monumental time outside of men’s history and story. Our two second generations would seem to want to correspond (at least some of the time) to Kristeva’s third generation: those who want a place in male history and male stories but only in order to affirm their radical, singular differences.39

Finally, and this will bring me to the end of these notes: it seems to me that the two first generations are involved in a politics and an ethics of the possible (where the public and private are kept comparatively separate and transfers between the two are highly coded); whereas both of the second generations seem to be involved in a politics and ethics of the impossible, where they are attempting to confound and live the public and private differently, based, in large part, on the first generation’s lives and work.

So now what scene are we left in? Is the only answer to these public and private, generational, short- and long-term dilemmas, to be an activist, analyst, professor, writer of both generations all at once!? Impossible for most of us. And that is the note upon which I would end: these notes were taken because it seems to me that feminism has not yet thought through what we shall call here the function of the radical feminist intellectual, teacher, and writer in the way other radical movements have at least tried to do. It seems to me that if we could do that by looking carefully at (instead of avoiding) the new and strong tensions between and within psychic and representational spaces—as well as between and within generations of women—then the radical political potentials located at the intersections we have been criss-crossing here could begin to be orchestrated in new ways. Feminist women could then assume together a renewed and privileged political position as the agents of radical change evoked earlier on.

I would just add a few measures to that note. First, I think that this new kind of feminist intellectual must fully inscribe herself within an ethics of impossibility. Second, she might do so through an acute attention to something other than past, present, or future: the future anterior, the privileged modality, as we know, of the psychic, the poetic, the feminist, and the postmodern. Lacan:

What is realized in my history [my story] is not the past definite of what was, since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming.40

Moving from an individual to a collective analytic perspective, the future anterior incorporates the possibility of understanding the history/story we are, through and from the perspective of the generation before us, in so far as that perspective becomes or is now our own—and is realized in the future. Further, to the extent that each generation is necessarily in a transferential
relation to the other, what one generation criticizes in the other may (and probably must) echo the difficulties within itself. In other words, to place ourselves within a generation of women, while paying attention to the multiple projections inherent to the scene of psychoanalysis, might help us to identify our own blindspots. So that, finally, to place ourselves, as feminist women—across the generations—together, at the very place of the most chiasmatic, most paradoxical intersections of the future (post) anterior (modo) can allow us to do away with paranoia (and its publics); fetishism (and its privates); and the concept of ‘generation’ altogether.

But then perhaps you should just consider what I have been writing here as but some notes upon a mystic writing pad….

Notes

1 Luce Irigaray, ‘Le praticable de la scène’, in Parler n’est jamais neutre (Paris: Minuit, 1985), p. 240. This first double-voiced scene of my notes is obviously indebted to Irigaray’s brilliant essay. See also her contribution to this volume.
2 Luce Irigaray, ‘Le Sexe fait comme signe’, in Parler n’est jamais neutre, p. 169.
3 ibid., p. 169.
4 ‘Le praticable de la scène’, p. 240.
5 ibid., p. 239.
For the sake of clarity, from here on in I shall refer to these two post-1968 generations as generations one (Ph.D. 1968–78) and two (Ph.D. 1978–88). Obviously, the notion of ‘generation’ is ultimately a very frustrating one (biological age does not always correspond to academic age, etc.) and is used here only as a tentatively useful, almost hypothetical device for raising certain issues. Given this, it is especially important not to bracket the word ‘political’. There are today, for example, women across all the generations in the academy who do ‘feminist this and that’ but maintain no historical or current political relationship to the women’s movement.


Juliet Mitchell, ‘Psychoanalysis and the humanities: old endings or new beginnings?’, in the Dalhousie Review 64, 2 (Summer 1984), p. 221.


Even those in the same academic generation are more and more positioned this way. Since writing these notes, an essay written in a different vein but very much concerned with these questions has appeared. See Evelyn Fox Keller and Helene Moglen, ‘Competition and feminism: conflicts for academic women’, in Signs 12, 3 (1987).

This was discussed during a personal conversation following a feminist seminar at Harvard University in Fall 1986.

My thanks to Otto Steinmayer for this formulation.

Mary Ann Doane, op. cit., p. 152.

Juliet Mitchell, op. cit., p. 222.


Cf. Luce Irigaray’s discussion of the dangers of reducing the analytic process to this state as well: ‘Misère de la psychanalyse’, in Parler n’est jamais neutre, pp. 257–8.


Jean-François Lyotard, Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants (Paris: Galilée, 1986), p. 98. I am indebted to this little book for helping me make many of the initial connections between these two scenes.


For example, see Helene Deutsch’s chapter entitled ‘Freud’ in Confrontations with Myself (New York: Norton, 1973).


H.D., The beginning of Section 33 of ‘Writing on the Wall’, ibid.

Elizabeth Wilson, Mirror Writing (London: Virago, 1982).

38 Analogies are always problematic as we know. For example, to analyse thoroughly the following ones, it would be necessary to bring in biology: for the most part, the second psychoanalytic generation to which I have been referring (born in the 1920s–1940s, publishing in the 1970s–1980s) corresponds in terms of age, roughly to the ‘biologically’ first (Ph.D. pre-1968) and second (Ph.D. 1968–78) academic generations. This leaves the ‘biologically’ third academic generation (Ph.D. 1978–88) — and the fourth (Ph.D. 1988–98) — without analogies....
