

Supplementary Materials

Backlash Against “Identity Politics”: Far Right Success and Mainstream Party Attention to Identity Groups

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1 Summary Statistics and Regression Tables

Table A1: Countries, Elections, and Far Right Parties (Lagged Vote Share) Included in Analysis

Country	Elections Included	Far Right Party?
1. Austria	1986 – 2017	Freedom Party (FPÖ) Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)
2. Belgium	1985 – 2010	Flemish Bloc / Flemish Interest (VB)
3. Czech Republic	2006 – 2017	National Party (NS) Sdružení Pro Republiku - Republikánská Strana Československa (SPR-RSČ) Workers' Party (DSS/DS)
4. Denmark	1984 – 2011	Danish People's Party (DF)
5. Estonia	2007 – 2015	Pro Patria Union (Isamaaliit)
6. France	1986 – 2017	National Front (FN)
7. Germany	1987 – 2017	The Republicans (REP) Alternative for Germany (AfD)
8. Greece	2000 – 2015	Golden Dawn Populuar Orthodox Rally (LAOS)
9. Hungary	2006 – 2014	Jobbik
10. Iceland	2003 – 2013	None
11. Ireland	1992 – 2016	None
12. Italy	1987 – 2008	Italian Social Movement (MSI) National Alliance (AN) Northern League (LN)
13. Luxembourg	1999 – 2013	None
14. Netherlands	1989 – 2017	List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) Party for Freedom (PVV)
15. Norway	1985 – 2013	Progress Party (FrP)
16. Poland	2005 – 2011	League of Polish Families (LPR) Polish National Party (SN)
17. Portugal	1987 – 2015	None
18. Slovakia	2002 – 2016	Slovak National Party (SNS)
19. Slovenia	2008 – 2011	Slovenian National Party (SNS)
20. Spain	1986 – 2016	Democracia nacional (DN) España 2000 Vox
21. Sweden	1985 – 2014	New Democracy (NyD) Sweden Democrats
22. Switzerland	1991 – 2015	Freedom Party of Switzerland (FPS) National Action for People and Fatherland (NA - AN) Swiss Democrats (SD) Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)
23. United Kingdom	1987 – 2017	United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)

Our analysis includes 23 countries with and without far right parties from 1984 to 2017. Availability of election-year manifestos varies by country, according to the timing of elections and the collection of MP manifesto data (as of February 2019, when our dataset was constructed). We exclude several Eastern European countries because of data availability: immigration data (OECD International Migration Database, measured as the log of foreign inflows of asylum seekers) is not available for Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia (before 2011), Malta, and Romania.

Table A1 shows which elections are included for each country in the analysis, whether the country had a far right party during this time, and if so which far right parties are included in our analysis. The categorization of far right parties is controversial. Scholars use different labels – from far right (Golder 2016), to extreme right (Arzheimer 2016) and populist radical right (Mudde 2007) – but a consensus has emerged that a single far or radical right party family exists which is characterized especially by nativism (Muis and Immerzeel 2017). We are interested in measuring the emergence and strength of parties characterized by nativist ideology.

To code parties, we start with the categorizations by Mudde 2007, Mudde 2016, and Bustikova 2014, which all focus on nativism. To make decisions about whether to include some parties that are debated in the literature, we rely on descriptions of the extent to which the party ideology is considered nativist at its core. We do not include Denmark’s Progress Party because Rydgren (2004) makes a strong argument that the party should not be considered radical right because nativism was not central to its ideology (unlike the subsequent Danish People’s Party). Norway’s Progress Party is also debated in the literature. We include it as far right here because critical attitudes towards immigrants and refugee policies were a key determinant of voting for Norway’s Progress Party as early as 1995, around the same time that the Danish People’s Party emerged with the same kind of nativist ideology at its core (Bjørklund and Andersen 2002). Mudde also notes in a media interview in 2017 that while Norway’s Progress Party might not be as extreme as some others, “within Norway they [the Progress Party] function as the radical right party, as being the party that is the most anti-immigrant, most anti-immigration.”¹

We do not code Poland’s Law and Justice party as far right, although it has been considered far right by some in recent years. Law and Justice is not included in far right categorizations by Mudde 2007, 2016 or Bustikova 2014, and it seems likely that if it is now considered far right this ideological shift happens subsequent to the time period covered in our data. We decide not to include Fidesz for the same reason – it is not included in these common categorizations running up to our period of analysis, and even in recent years scholars are ambivalent about whether it is far right (Mudde 2016).

Recall that the main explanatory variable is the lagged vote share of far right parties; this means that data on far right vote shares from the previous election is incorporated into our data. For example, in Austria 1986 the lagged far right vote share is 5% because the FPÖ won 5% of the vote in the 1983 election. Because we lag PRR vote share some far right parties that emerge later in the 2010s are not included in the data (for example, Estonia’s Conservative People’s Party).

¹Schultheis, Emily. “What Right-Wing Populists Look Like in Norway.” *The Atlantic*. September 12, 2017.

Table A2: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Far Right _(t-1)	459	6.180	7.808	0	0	10.1	29
Working Class	459	2.654	3.126	0	0.6	3.5	20
Identity Groups	459	3.891	3.523	0	1.0	5.9	19
Government _(t-1)	459	0.523	0.500	0	0	1	1
Party Size(t-1)	459	20.610	13.092	0.800	8.560	31.100	51.600
Social Democrat	459	0.336	0.473	0	0	1	1
Vote Change	459	-0.767	6.109	-30.740	-3.025	2.135	20.960
Econ. Growth _(t-1)	459	2.305	3.140	-9.132	1.190	3.508	25.163
Unemployment _(t-1)	459	7.871	4.713	1.832	4.476	10.044	26.491
Immigration _(t-1)	459	8.754	1.856	1.946	8.174	9.997	13.490
Far Right Attn. to WC _(t-1)	459	0.617	1.361	0	0	0.3	7
Working Class _(t-1)	459	2.303	2.712	0.000	0.477	3.146	20.455
Identity Groups _(t-1)	459	4.330	3.557	0.000	1.494	6.263	19.183
Western Europe	459	0.895	0.306	0	1	1	1
Party System Salience:							
Working Class _(t-1)	459	2.622	1.706	0.000	1.367	3.625	10.188
Party System Salience:							
Identity Groups _(t-1)	459	4.557	2.899	0.000	2.315	6.287	13.126
Working Class Position (log-ratio scale)	459	1.336	0.984	-2	0.6	2.0	4
Largest Far Right _(t-1)	459	5.857	7.340	0.000	0.000	10.080	28.900

Sources:

Data on party priorities (*Identity Groups*, *Working Class*, *Environment*, *Education*, and *EU Support*), *Far Right Attn. to Working Class*, party family (*Social Democrat*, *Conservative*, *Christian Democrat*), and *L-R Position (composite)* come from MP (Volkens et al. 2016). *Party System Salience* is the mean party attention to the issue within each election year for each party (own party emphasis on the issue excluded).

L-R Position (log-ratio scale) comes from Lowe et al. 2011.

Government and *Party Size* are taken from ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2016), and *Vote Change* derived from this data.

Econ. Growth is from OECD National Accounts, and *Immigration* from OECD International Migration Database, measured as the log of foreign inflows of asylum seekers.

Unemployment rate comes from ILO Labor Statistics.

Table A3: Effects of Far Right Party and Social Democratic Party Family on Mainstream Party Priorities

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Identity groups	Working class
	(1)	(2)
Far Right _(t-1)	-0.067 (0.068)	0.106** (0.046)
Far Right _(t-1) × Social Democrat	-0.142** (0.062)	0.002 (0.076)
Government _(t-1)	-0.143 (0.379)	0.182 (0.272)
Party Size _(t-1)	0.010 (0.026)	-0.046 (0.030)
Econ. Growth _(t-1)	-0.046 (0.091)	-0.135 (0.082)
Unemployment _(t-1)	0.011 (0.094)	0.126* (0.068)
Immigration _(t-1)	0.314 (0.402)	0.100 (0.207)
Party System Salience: Identity Groups _(t-1)	0.027 (0.126)	
Party System Salience: Working Class _(t-1)		0.017 (0.168)
Constant	-0.161 (3.803)	-0.097 (2.569)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Party fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	459	459
R ²	0.510	0.580
Adjusted R ²	0.318	0.411

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.

Table A4: Effects of Far Right Party and Vote Change on Mainstream Party Position

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Identity groups	Working class
	(1)	(2)
Far Right _(t-1)	-0.124* (0.075)	0.127*** (0.041)
Vote Change	0.002 (0.025)	0.012 (0.019)
Far Right _(t-1) × Vote Change	0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
Government _(t-1)	-0.003 (0.377)	-0.033 (0.249)
Econ. Growth _(t-1)	-0.052 (0.089)	-0.125 (0.086)
Unemployment _(t-1)	-0.004 (0.087)	0.162** (0.070)
Immigration _(t-1)	0.283 (0.402)	0.160 (0.211)
Party System Salience: Identity Groups _(t-1)	0.023 (0.125)	
Party System Salience: Working Class _(t-1)		0.019 (0.167)
Constant	0.267 (3.453)	-2.557 (2.444)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Party fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	460	460
R ²	0.504	0.568
Adjusted R ²	0.31	0.401

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.

Table A5: Effects of Far Right Party and Far Right Attn. to Working Class on Mainstream Party Priorities

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Identity Groups	Working Class
	(1)	(2)
Far Right _(t-1)	-0.117* (0.068)	0.086** (0.040)
Far Right Attn. to WC _(t-1)	-0.124 (0.365)	-0.763*** (0.251)
Far Right _(t-1) × Far Right Attn. to WC _(t-1)	0.014 (0.024)	0.051*** (0.017)
Government _(t-1)	-0.142 (0.387)	0.113 (0.261)
Party Size _(t-1)	0.017 (0.026)	-0.036 (0.031)
Econ. Growth _(t-1)	-0.045 (0.090)	-0.170** (0.083)
Unemployment _(t-1)	0.011 (0.093)	0.136** (0.065)
Immigration _(t-1)	0.295 (0.406)	0.053 (0.193)
Party System Salience: Identity Groups _(t-1)	0.032 (0.125)	
Party System Salience: Working Class _(t-1)		-0.038 (0.164)
Constant	-0.595 (3.819)	-0.241 (2.562)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Party fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	459	459
R ²	0.504	0.593
Adjusted R ²	0.308	0.431

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.




Figure A1: Predicted Change in Mainstream Party Priorities as a Function of Far Right Growth and Far Right Attn. to Working Class

Notes: Predicted values are based on regression results shown in Table A5.

Table A6: Replication of Baseline Models, using LDV

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Identity Groups	Working Class
	(1)	(2)
Identity Politics _(t-1)	-0.013 (0.076)	
Working Class _(t-1)		0.163* (0.098)
Far Right _(t-1)	-0.138** (0.056)	0.101** (0.040)
Government _(t-1)	-0.337 (0.371)	0.239 (0.243)
Party Size _(t-1)	0.035 (0.028)	-0.057* (0.030)
Econ. Growth _(t-1)	0.038 (0.074)	-0.044 (0.055)
Unemployment _(t-1)	-0.121 (0.084)	0.077 (0.058)
Immigration _(t-1)	0.037 (0.356)	0.298 (0.190)
Party System Salience: Identity Groups _(t-1)	0.124 (0.105)	
Party System Salience: Working Class _(t-1)		0.128 (0.160)
Constant	3.906 (4.603)	2.335 (2.158)
Year fixed effects	No	No
Party fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	459	459
R ²	0.389	0.472
Adjusted R ²	0.227	0.332

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.

Table A7: Replication of Baseline Models, No Controls

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Identity Groups	Working Class
	(1)	(2)
Far Right _(t-1)	-0.126** (0.064)	0.128*** (0.040)
Constant	2.411 (1.786)	0.137 (1.227)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Party fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	459	459
R ²	0.500	0.559
Adjusted R ²	0.318	0.399

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.

Table A8: Effects of Far Right Party and Region on Mainstream Party Priorities

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Identity Groups	Working Class
	(1)	(2)
Far Right _(t-1)	-0.152 (0.140)	-0.111 (0.081)
Far Right _(t-1) × Western Europe	0.045 (0.149)	0.231*** (0.089)
Government _(t-1)	-0.125 (0.386)	0.191 (0.272)
Party Size _(t-1)	0.015 (0.026)	-0.049 (0.031)
Econ. Growth _(t-1)	-0.042 (0.090)	-0.138* (0.080)
Unemployment _(t-1)	0.012 (0.093)	0.122* (0.065)
Immigration _(t-1)	0.304 (0.411)	0.040 (0.205)
Party System Salience: Identity Groups _(t-1)	0.029 (0.127)	
Party System Salience: Working Class _(t-1)		0.025 (0.167)
Constant	-0.551 (3.847)	0.538 (2.652)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Party fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	459	459
R ²	0.504	0.583
Adjusted R ²	0.309	0.419

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.




Figure A2: Predicted Change in Party Priorities as a Function of Far Right Growth and Western Europe

Notes: Average marginal effects based on regression results shown in Appendix Table A8.

Table A9: Regression Results, DV of Working Class Position

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Working Class Position (log-ratio scale)
Far Right _(t-1)	0.032** (0.013)
Government _(t-1)	0.087 (0.092)
Party Size _(t-1)	-0.003 (0.008)
Econ. Growth _(t-1)	-0.006 (0.019)
Unemployment _(t-1)	0.006 (0.021)
Immigration _(t-1)	-0.060 (0.086)
Party System Salience: Working Class _(t-1)	0.055 (0.051)
Constant	0.498 (0.935)
Year fixed effects	Yes
Party fixed effects	Yes
Observations	459
R ²	0.605
Adjusted R ²	0.452

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.

Table A10: Effect of Largest Far Right Party on Mainstream Party Priorities

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Identity Groups	Working Class
	(1)	(2)
Largest Far Right _(t-1)	-0.134** (0.062)	0.087** (0.039)
Government _(t-1)	-0.131 (0.383)	0.196 (0.271)
Party Size _(t-1)	0.015 (0.026)	-0.051 (0.032)
Econ. Growth _(t-1)	-0.034 (0.089)	-0.138* (0.084)
Unemployment _(t-1)	0.001 (0.093)	0.133* (0.068)
Immigration _(t-1)	0.280 (0.398)	0.104 (0.207)
Party System Salience: Identity Groups _(t-1)	0.014 (0.125)	
Party System Salience: Working Class _(t-1)		0.034 (0.167)
Constant	-0.215 (3.805)	-0.064 (2.628)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Party fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	459	459
R ²	0.508	0.577
Adjusted R ²	0.317	0.413
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table A11: Effects of Largest Far Right Party and Social Democratic Party Family on Mainstream Party Priorities

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Identity groups
Largest Far Right _(t-1)	-0.084 (0.065)
Largest Far Right _(t-1) × Social Democrat	-0.173** (0.068)
Government _(t-1)	-0.163 (0.374)
Party Size _(t-1)	0.010 (0.025)
Econ. Growth _(t-1)	-0.039 (0.090)
Unemployment _(t-1)	-0.001 (0.093)
Immigration _(t-1)	0.275 (0.401)
Party System Salience: Identity Groups _(t-1)	0.013 (0.125)
Constant	0.347 (3.802)
Year fixed effects	Yes
Party fixed effects	Yes
Observations	459
R ²	0.518
Adjusted R ²	0.329
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A12: Effects of Largest Far Right Party and Vote Change on Mainstream Party Position

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Identity groups	Working class
	(1)	(2)
Largest Far Right _(t-1)	-0.146** (0.063)	0.104*** (0.040)
Vote Change	0.001 (0.024)	0.017 (0.021)
Largest Far Right _(t-1) × Vote Change	0.003 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)
Government _(t-1)	-0.007 (0.374)	-0.020 (0.250)
Econ. Growth _(t-1)	-0.044 (0.089)	-0.129 (0.090)
Unemployment _(t-1)	-0.017 (0.087)	0.175** (0.072)
Immigration _(t-1)	0.243 (0.401)	0.169 (0.210)
Party System Salience: Identity Groups _(t-1)	0.009 (0.125)	
Party System Salience: Working Class _(t-1)		0.041 (0.166)
Constant	0.740 (3.445)	-2.772 (2.432)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Party fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	459	459
R ²	0.509	0.574
Adjusted R ²	0.317	0.407
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	




Figure A3: Predicted Change in Party Priorities as a Function of Largest Far Right Party Growth and Mainstream Vote Change

Notes: Average marginal effects based on regression results shown in Appendix Table A12.

2 Matching Procedure and Manifesto Coding Details

The following section provides further details about the statistical matching procedure used to select a paired case for Denmark, including a discussion of similarities and differences between the matched pair countries and a table showing the data used.

Statistical matching clearly sets out the criteria for similarity, ensures that the cases selected really are the most similar on this basis, and is replicable (Nielsen 2014). The data for matching includes country-level data from right before a far right party emerged in Denmark (The Danish People’s Party in 1998). The Danish People’s Party originated as a faction of the Progress Party (which emerged in 1973), with party leader Pia Kjaersgaard breaking away to found a party built around the doctrine of ethno-nationalism (Rydgren 2004). Some scholars consider the Danish Progress Party a radical right party (e.g., Bjørklund and Andersen 2002). While we acknowledge the debate about the Progress Party’s typology in the literature, we follow Rydgren (2004) and Mudde (2007) in excluding it from the category of populist radical right on the basis that, although it exhibited xenophobic, anti-immigrant views, nativism was not central to its ideology. Instead, Mudde considers the Progress Party “neoliberal populist”.

All matching variables are measured in 1997. Before matching, we drop other countries which also had a strong far right party or parties. We operationalize this as far right party vote share of 10% or more, in the years 1998 – 2017. This excludes a considerable number of countries: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The countries of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia are excluded because of missing manifesto data in the 1990s (as explained in the main text, the first three elections after democratization are not included). Malta is excluded because of missing manifesto data after 1998. The eight countries remaining which are potential matches can be seen in Table A13 below.

We match on four variables. As discussed in the main text, all are potential confounders of far right party success and mainstream party attention to different groups' interests – GDP per capita, GDP growth, unemployment, and immigration. We would have matched on proportional electoral system, but all nine countries included for matching (the 'treated' country of Denmark and the eight potential matches) had PR systems in 1997. GDP per capita (current US\$) comes from World Bank data.² GDP growth is from OECD National Accounts, and Immigration from OECD International Migration Database, measured as the log of foreign inflows of asylum seekers. Unemployment rate comes from ILO Labor Statistics.

The matching procedure is carried out using the MatchIt package version 3.0.2 in R version 3.5.2. Nearest neighbor, Mahalanobis matching is used to select the single best control match for the 'treated' unit (i.e., Denmark just prior to far right success in 1998). Matching is done using a distance measure, and here the Mahalanobis option is used because it allows for continuous covariates and weights covariates equally (we have no strong reason to weight some variables more than others) (Ho et al. 2011). The match is selected based on Mahalanobis distance, a generalization of Euclidean distance that accounts for correlations between variables (Rubin 1973). Table A13 at the end of this section presents data used in the matching procedure. The matched pair is in **bold**.

The matching procedure successfully identifies a match for Denmark: Sweden. Sweden and Denmark are both social democratic welfare states, with generous social provision and high levels of (then typically universal) public services (Esping-Andersen 1990; Benner and Vad 2000). They have similar proportional electoral systems which often lead to minority governments, and unicameral parliaments. The party system is also similar: in 1997, both countries were characterized by effective number of parties between 4 and 5, with a relatively centrist Labor party as the dominant group (Rasch 2011). Table A13 shows that the countries both had relatively high levels of economic development and moderate levels of growth before the Danish People's Party gained traction in

²Indicator NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.

1998, although unemployment was higher in Sweden. Both countries were also experiencing moderate levels of immigration (measured in inflows of asylum seekers) at the time.

Table A13: Data for Matching

Country	Unemployment	GDP growth	GDP per capita	Immigration (log)
Denmark	5.4	3.2	32835	8.6
Germany	9.8	1.7	27045	11.9
Greece	9.5	4.4	13427	8.3
Iceland	3.7	5.7	27842	2.8
Ireland	10.2	10.9	22542	8.2
Luxembourg	2.5	5.7	47042	5.6
Portugal	6.5	4.4	11578	5.6
Spain	20.6	3.7	14696	8.5
Sweden	10.3	3.0	29897	9.1

Manifestos were downloaded from either the MP website or the Political Documents Archive. We used Google Translate to translate manifestos. While imperfect, for the purposes of identifying key themes and attention to different groups (rather than sentiment) it is acceptable. The coding process involved pulling relevant sentences or quasi-sentences and coding the in line with the general coding instructions of the Comparative Manifesto Project (5th revised edition). We use our novel manifesto data, supplemented by secondary literature, to discuss the evolution of attention to different groups in both countries over time.

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