Among contemporary political theorists, there would be little doubt that cosmopolitanism is a philosophy of peace. The values informing cosmopolitanism are directed towards reducing and preventing conflict between persons as persons, not as the citizens or subjects of bounded nations or states. Tolerance demands respect for the practices and beliefs of others as rational, autonomous agents. Dialogue based on the mutual recognition of common humanity allows the consensual settlement of disputes. A commitment to global justice, giving each individual her due, likewise acknowledges similarity rather than difference with the aim of preventing potential conflict.¹

The overarching aim of contemporary cosmopolitanism is to bring about ‘the substantive utopian ideal of a polis or polity constructed on a world scale, rather than on the basis of regional, territorially limited states.’ Within that global polis, the lower-level attachments that have traditionally animated antagonism—nationalism, tribalism and other forms of divisive prejudice—would give way to comprehensively cosmopolitan commitments. Because cosmopolitanism’s imagined community would be tolerant, egalitarian and universalist, the motivations for contention would evaporate and peace would prevail, ‘Till the war-drum throbbed no longer, and the battle-flags were furl’d/ In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.’² By striving for the highest common factor rather than the lowest common denominator, cosmopolitanism would be a prophylactic against the

† Forthcoming in Joan-Pau Rubiés and Neil Safier, eds., Cosmopolitanism and the Enlightenment (Cambridge, 2016). For comments on earlier versions of this chapter, I am especially grateful to audiences at the Huntington Library, the London School of Economics and the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
narcissism of minor differences. Interpersonal and international disputes could be resolved by rational discussion and determined according to norms of universal justice.

Modern cosmopolitanism in both its individual and collective strains has become programmatically pacifist by virtue of its anti-nationalism, universalism and teleological orientation toward global justice. Under such a regime of cosmopolitan right, the Kantian goal of perpetual peace might at last be realised. And yet, as Kant himself pointed out at the beginning of ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’ (1795), it was unclear whether perpetual peace was ‘to hold for human beings in general, or for heads of state in particular, who can never get enough of war, or only for philosophers, who dream that sweet dream.’ Kant may have been a cosmopolitan but he certainly ‘was no pacifist,’ if by that we mean someone wholly opposed to war and convinced that nothing productive has, or could ever, come from it. His conception of cosmopolitanism was progressive and developmental but it was also fundamentally conflictual. Its motor was the ‘unsocial sociability’ (ungesellige Geselligkeit) that compelled humans to seek peace even as they experienced destructive forms of competition. Kant took the title of his essay from an ironic tavern sign depicting a cemetery: the only truly perpetual peace might be the quiet of the graveyard. The goal of his cosmopolitanism might be tranquility, among

---

persons and between states, but the pathway to peace would still be strewn with corpses.

Kant’s observation indicates that the connection between cosmopolitanism and peace is not essential or natural but contingent and accidental. Only recently have scholars acknowledged that cosmopolitanism might have something to say about war or that war might shed light on the limits and possibilities of cosmopolitanism. The waves of war around the world since 1989 have inspired some theorists to ask what cosmopolitanism might have to offer to mitigate conflict and to question whether it is theoretically robust enough to face the challenges of unconventional warfare in the twenty-first century. The first moves in this direction offer the promise of a political realism with a cosmopolitan intent, much as Kant himself might have envisaged. They might also help to answer the recent call for ‘a wounded cosmopolitanism that takes up into its own vision—rather than repudiating or claiming to resolve—the most damaging elements of both history and who we are’.

This essay offers historical sustenance for that effort by focusing on what might seem to be the least likely of all conceptual companions for cosmopolitanism: civil war. Most contemporary cosmopolitans would find any relationship between cosmopolitanism and civil war to be at best paradoxical, at worst non-existent. After all, what could cosmopolitanism, ‘the view that transnational borders are morally

---


arbitrary ... possibly tell us about conflicts occurring within borders,’ or what are conventionally thought of as ‘civil’ wars? The only recent political theorist to have broached that question, Cécile Fabre, has argued that ‘cosmopolitanism does have something interesting to say about civil wars’ for two main reasons: first, because it condones the ethics of self-determination even in the extreme case when it must be fought for; and, second, because there is no moral difference between the rights and responsibilities of combatants in civil wars and those in conflicts of an international character. Fabre’s ‘individualist, egalitarian, and universal’ cosmopolitanism, when applied to the ethics of war, does not entail that cosmopolitans should necessarily be pacifists in all cases.\(^8\) Hers is a normative conclusion but there are also historical grounds for believing that cosmopolitanism and civil war are not wholly estranged or conceptually incompatible.

Modern cosmopolitanism sprang from Enlightenment roots: it is in the European Enlightenment that the proximal origins of cosmopolitanism’s entanglement with civil war can be found. Enlightened cosmopolitanism culminated with Kant but it emerged from an earlier combination of Thomas Hobbes’s conception of human nature with Samuel Pufendorf’s more optimistic vision of human sociability associated with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theorists of natural law in commercial society.\(^9\) This amalgam produced the teleologically pacifist cosmopolitanism, suited to an age of competing global empires, that Emer de Vattel classically expressed in his Droit des gens (1758):

Nations would communicate to each other their products and knowledge; a profound peace would prevail over all over the earth, and enrich it with its invaluable fruits; industry, the sciences, and the arts, would be employed in promoting our happiness, no less than in relieving our wants; violent methods of deciding contests would be no more heard of: all differences would be terminated by moderation,

---

justice, and equity; the world would have the appearance of a large republic \[une grande république\]; men would live every-where like brothers, and each individual be a citizen of the universe.\textsuperscript{10}

For Vattel, as for Kant almost forty years later, this was a dream to be achieved in the future rather than a reality to be enjoyed in the present, precisely because individual self-interest always collided with the common good. The hand of violence was not invisible; its dispensation was not always virtuous.

Many features of Vattel’s vision—a transnational community enhanced by worldwide peace; human equality derived from universal reciprocity; an end to war, especially between states; and a reign of enlightened equity—developed and flourished as defining characteristics of cosmopolitanism as both a philosophical and a political stance in the Enlightenment and since. Their victory was not inevitable: just how they won out over cosmopolitanism’s more contentious strains is an untold story but one whose origins can be found in eighteenth-century Europe. Vattel did not assume that there was a necessary connection between cosmopolitanism and peace: indeed, he was not only one of the Enlightenment’s most influential theorists of commercial cosmopolitanism, but also its most innovative and most lastingly influential analyst of civil war, as we shall see.\textsuperscript{11} Like many Enlightened thinkers, Vattel had to \textit{argue} for cosmopolitan pacifism in the face of equally strong statements of conflictual cosmopolitanism with profound classical roots.\textsuperscript{12}

Enlightened cosmopolitanism was shadowed historically by internal and external conflict during Europe’s ‘Second Hundred Years’ War’ (1688–1815). As Franco Venturi noted more than fifty years ago, the eighteenth century’s wars were


\textsuperscript{12} On the classical roots of conflictual cosmopolitanism, see Owen Goldin, ‘Conflict and Cosmopolitanism in Plato and the Stoics,’ \textit{Apeiron}, 44 (2011), 264–86.
decisive events for European intellectual history: the War of the Austrian Succession galvanised the first generation of *philosophes* (Diderot, Rousseau, La Mettrie, D’Holbach and Condillac), just as the Seven Years’ War inspired the historiography of Gibbon, Raynal, Robertson and Hume, the political economy of Turgot and Smith and the jurisprudence of Vattel. Without the intellectual challenges posed by worldwide wars, there might have been no ‘cosmopolis of the Enlightenment’.\(^{13}\)

Enlightenment cosmopolitanism was in this way the product of conflict as well as a means of reflecting upon it. It was not a single body of doctrine but rather a suite of arguments: for example, the stateless universalism of Anacharsis Cloots was only distantly related to the statist republicanism of Kant.\(^{14}\) Cosmopolitans’ debates, as much as their conclusions, have endured the present. In the eighteenth century, as in the twenty-first, pacifist cosmopolitanism had to be actively imagined and promoted against a conflictual cosmopolitanism which implied a world of war, and a world of *civil* war at that.\(^{15}\)

* * * * *

The Enlightened engagement between cosmopolitanism and civil war drew upon classical traditions of thinking about civilisation and its most destructive discontents. That longer history is a tale of two cities—or, rather, of two classical conceptions of the city as *polis* or *civitas* and their later fortunes. In its metaphorical,


even metaphysical, sense, the Greek and Roman city marked the boundary between human and animal, culture and nature, the ordered and the disorderly elements in the cosmos.\textsuperscript{16} Even the most rudimentary etymological knowledge is a reminder that the Greek word \textit{polis} lies at the root of ‘politics’ and that the Latin term \textit{civitas}, the artfully constructed dwelling-place of the citizen or \textit{civis}, is the home of ‘civility’ and the matrix of ‘civilisation’.\textsuperscript{17} The city was where humans could flourish and achieve their full humanity in cooperation and peace, under the rule of law and increasingly distant from the perils and incivility of wild nature. It kept the threats of irrationality, savagery and animality at bay: when they returned, civilisation itself was under threat.

Yet for the last two thousand years, the city has also frequently been the stage for civil war, that struggle between citizens (\textit{cives}) who are also, as the name suggests, city-dwellers.\textsuperscript{18} That is one reason why ‘civil’ wars—armed conflicts within the \textit{civitas}—would long be called ‘intestine’ and ‘unnatural,’ and why so much of the imagery of civil war, from classical times to the present, has dwelt on its barbarism and bestiality.\textsuperscript{19} It is also the reason why civility, civilisation and civil war were connected not just etymologically but historically in the European cosmopolitan tradition itself founded on the idea of the world city or cosmopolis.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} David Harvey, \textit{Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution} (London, 2012).
\item \textsuperscript{19} David Armitage, \textit{Civil War: A History in Ideas} (New York, 2016).
\end{itemize}
The tale of two cities is also a story of two oxymorons, of a city that was not a city and a war that was hardly warlike. The terms *cosmopolis* and *bellum civile* were each coined to be internally contradictory and remained conceptually unstable. When Diogenes the Cynic described himself as *cosmopolites*, or a citizen of the world, he displayed his contempt for the boundedness and intimacy of the *polis* and denied the attachments of any community upon him. To be a citizen of a polity as indeterminate as the *cosmos* was not to be a citizen in any meaningful sense at all: to claim to be a citizen of the world was in this sense originally ‘a snub, an insult to all forms of civility, not an expression of universalism’. In similar fashion, *bellum civile* subverted the reigning Roman conception of war (*bellum*) as a condition of justified hostility against an external enemy (*hostis*). The opponents in a ‘civil’ war were, by definition, fellow-citizens: according to Roman just war theory, combat among citizens could not be a war because it was neither just nor fought against outsiders. *Bellum civile* was a deliberately paradoxical expression of revulsion against the idea of formal hostilities between members of the same *civitas* and a recognition that such warfare destroyed civility itself. It was also an elastic concept whose bounds would expand and ultimately intersect with those of cosmopolitanism itself.

The Romans had been the first to experience political violence and internal discords as civil wars. Tumults and seditions implied to the Romans episodic and non-recurrent expressions of political violence. Civil wars, by contrast, increasingly

---

came to appear sequential and cumulative across the course of Roman history. Sulla’s first war against Marius in 88–87 BCE led to a second in 82–81 BCE. Catiline’s conspiracy was quashed before Caesar had brought his army from Gaul to confront Pompey. That led in turn to the cycle of intermittent and transnational violence that spanned the Mediterranean (and beyond) in the years from 49–31 BCE. In these decades, it became increasingly easy to believe that Rome was cursed by civil war, and that it was doomed to reiterate citizens’ conflicts cumulatively and endlessly in a dreadfully debilitating series. As the boundaries of the Roman *civitas* expanded along with grants of Roman citizenship, so did the space occupied by *bellum civile* among Rome’s ever-growing body of citizens.

When the Roman Empire expanded, the ambit of civil war increased to include allies (*socii*) as well as citizens. Although civil wars were battles for control of the city itself, they could not easily be distinguished from ‘social’ wars or foreign wars, because they spilled over to arenas throughout the Roman world and later drew in actors from across the empire. Like some implacable natural force, civil war no longer respected the boundaries of the Roman *civitas* but became something much more destructive because potentially universal in scope. As Florus had noted, “The rage of Caesar and Pompey, like a flood or a fire, overwhelmed the city and Italy, tribes and nations, and finally the empire, so much so that it could not be rightly called either a civil, social or external war, but rather one with elements of all, and yet more than a war.”

Cosmopolitanism expanded the imaginable setting for civil war by extending the limits of the city itself as a setting for human interaction. Those limits relaxed to include the Mediterranean ecumene, the Roman Empire, its successors in the form of varied conceptions of Europe and later in Europe’s overseas empires, as well as ultimately to imagine the world as a city and hence the whole globe as the stage for civil conflict.

After the death of Augustus, the cycle of civil war—and the sequence of writing about civil war—remained unbroken. Of making books about civil war,

---

there would be almost no end. The greatest surviving treatments of Rome’s civil wars were written between the 60s and the 160s CE: most notable were Lucan’s epic poem, the *Bellum Civile* (60–65), Tacitus’s *Histories* (c. 109), Plutarch’s Roman lives of the Gracchi, Marius, Sulla, Caesar, Pompey and Antony (c. 100–25), Florus’s *Epitome* (c. 117–38 or 161–69), and the surviving books of Appian’s *Roman History* treating the *Civil Wars* (c. 145–65). Tacitus covered the wars of succession that followed the death of the emperor Nero, in the so-called Year of the Four Emperors (69). Florus retailed Rome’s history in the seven centuries from Romulus to Augustus as a sequence of wars, foreign, servile, social and civil. Appian made his comprehensive attempt to encompass all Rome’s civil wars from Sulla to Octavian in the surviving books of his *Roman History*. And the great culmination of that tradition was Augustine’s *City of God* (413–26), a catalogue of ‘those evils ... which were more infernal because internal,’ a series of ‘civil, or rather uncivilised, discords’ at Rome.

These accounts formed the matter of Rome’s civil wars into sequences both genealogical and teleological that probed Romans’ moral failings, diagnosed civil war as the city’s seemingly unshakeable curse, and prescribed remedies for the disease or condemned its victims. Such narratives shaped understandings of Roman history and of civil war throughout the Enlightenment. ‘Should I not have deduced the decline of the Empire from the civil Wars, that ensued after the fall of Nero or even from the tyranny which succeeded the reign of Augustus?’ Edward Gibbon asked himself after completing the *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776–88). Editions of Florus, along with that of the 4th-century epitomist

---

Eutropius (whose Roman history Adam Smith studied as a schoolboy in the 1730s), appeared almost annually across the eighteenth century.²⁹ It was only in the nineteenth century that a script of political history as a sequence of revolutions replaced the Roman repertoire of serial civil wars.³⁰

One major lesson of Roman narratives of civil war was that to be civilised, in the sense of city-dwelling, was to be capable of civil war as well as fatally susceptible to it. To inhabit a civitas at all was to be in danger and indeed a likelihood of suffering not just tumults and seditions but full-blown civil war, as Rome had repeatedly across its history. Only by falling prey to the disease of civil war was it often possible to discern the boundaries of the commonwealth itself, whether within the pomerium that marked the original limits of the city of Rome, across the entire Italian peninsula after Rome’s expansion, or even throughout the whole eastern Mediterranean as the Roman Republic grew to cover territories and peoples soon to be encompassed under the sway of Rome’s emperors. Following this tradition, any reader of Machiavelli’s Discorsi knew that the price of empire would be domestic disturbances: as Montesquieu remarked in 1734 in his reflections on the grandeur and decline of the Roman empire, ‘Whilst Rome was conquering the world, a hidden war was carrying on within its walls; these fires were like those of volcanos, which break out the instant they are fed by some combustible substance.’³¹

If to be civilised inevitably risked civil war, then it also followed that only the civilised had civil wars, while the less civilised (or barbarians) might never ascend to that form of conflict. The European inheritors of Rome’s traditions would see their own internal troubles as the culmination, or repetition, of a sequence of similar wars that followed the pattern of Rome’s civil wars and that had played out across Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire. There was plentiful evidence for this

series being played out in recognisably Roman colours beyond Europe. For example, in the 1530s and early 1540s the Spanish conquerors of Peru, led by the two fast friends who had turned into bitter enemies, Francisco Pizarro and Diego de Almagro, fought a series of wars along with their families and followers for the spoils of conquest. In the following decades, the Spanish historians Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, Agustín de Zarate and Pedro Cieza de León each narrated the struggles of the Pizarros and the Almagros, their Spanish armies and indigenous allies, with categories and language drawn from Sallust, and Plutarch, Livy and Lucan. Oviedo alluded to Lucan in describing ‘this war, worse than civil war, and no less hellish’ (\textit{esta guerra mas que civil e no menos infernal}) while Cieza de Léon mordantly noted that ‘[t]he wars that are most feared and that are fought with the greatest cruelty are civil wars.’\textsuperscript{32} The indigenous historian Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, writing in the early seventeenth century, likewise described ‘the civil wars that took place between the Pizarros and Almagros’ in the second volume of his chronicle of Peruvian history.\textsuperscript{33} Yet these historians did not use the term ‘civil wars’ to describe the contentions of indigenous peoples in the Americas. It was evident that, in the course of empire, Europeans had exported civil wars to a wider world as a paradoxical but distinctive mark of their own alleged civility.

The boundary between barbarism and civility could also mark the frontier between justice and injustice in warfare conceived of as either civil or uncivil. For example, in his \textit{Controversiarum illustrium ... libri tres} (1572), the Spanish jurist Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca had argued that, because civil wars were by definition unjust, it was not legitimate for the victors in them to claim booty from the vanquished. Vázquez generalised this conclusion into a ban on prize-taking in all

\textsuperscript{32} Sabine MacCormack, \textit{On the Wings of Time: Rome, the Incas, Spain, and Peru} (Princeton, NJ, 2007), pp. 15, 72, 76. Oviedo alluded to the opening lines of Lucan’s \textit{Bellum Civile} (1, 1–2), ‘bella per Emathios plus quam civilia campos,/ ... canimus ...’.

\textsuperscript{33} Garcilaso de la Vega, \textit{Historia general del Peru trata el descubrimiento del; y como lo ganaron los Españoles: Las guerras cives que huvo entre Piçarros, y Almagros} (Cordova, 1617).
wars among fellow Christians because every such war was effectively a civil war.\textsuperscript{34} This may be the earliest instance of a trope that would become characteristic of Enlightened cosmopolitanism and which inspired a groundbreaking response from one of the greatest transmitters of Roman traditions to the Enlightenment, Hugo Grotius. In his \textit{De Jure Praedae} (1604), Grotius responded—in the context of a legal dispute over the rights of European penetration into the East Indies—that Vázquez’s reasoning was faulty: ‘who will acquiesce in [the] assumption that the wars of Christians are civil wars, as if to say, forsooth, that the whole of Christendom constitutes a single state?’ (\textit{bella Christianorum esse civilia, quasi vero totius Christianus Orbis una sit republica}).\textsuperscript{35} Prizes could indeed be seized legitimately in civil wars as in any other just wars yet, for Grotius, whether a war was civil or foreign, fought among Christians or against non-Christians, was irrelevant to deciding the legitimacy of prize-taking: that depended solely on whether the war was just or unjust.

The admission that there might be civil wars among pagans as well as among Christians opened up the possibility of a universalist conception of civil war. Grotius himself did not develop such a cosmopolitan idea in his own brief treatment of the subject in 1604; his dispute with Vázquez remained a false start, as Grotius’s manuscript reflections on the question remained unknown until they were rediscovered in the late nineteenth century. By that time, two other cosmopolitan conceptions of civil war had emerged. The first, similar in form to Vázquez’s but more comprehensive in its reach, was the idea that, because all humans are related, all wars are civil. The other, building on Roman conceptions, was that civil wars could expand across communities larger than nations or states to engulf civilisations, empires or even the whole of humanity in a global civil war. Both cosmopolitan


conceptions of civil war had Enlightened instances as well as enduring afterlives up to the present.

****

The classic expression of the idea that, because all ‘men’ are brothers, all wars are civil, appeared in Victor Hugo’s *Les Misérables* (1862), where Marius Pontmercy, son of a noble veteran of the battle of Waterloo, reflects on the meaning of civil war. As Marius heads towards the barricades in Paris to battle against the restored Bourbon monarchy in 1832, he knows that ‘he was to wage war in his turn and to enter on the field of battle, and that that field of battle which he was about to enter, was the street, and that war which he was about to wage, was civil war!’.

He shudders at the thought, wondering what his heroic father might have made of his actions, before asking himself what kind of war he was about to join alongside his friends and comrades on the barricades:

Civil war? What does this mean? Is there any foreign war? Is not every war between men, war between brothers? War is modified only by its aim. There is neither foreign war, nor civil war; there is only unjust war and just war. ... War becomes shame, the sword becomes a dagger, only when it assassinates right, progress, reason, civilization, truth. Then, civil war or foreign war, it is iniquitous; its name is crime.36

Pontmercy’s musings reflected Hugo’s own apprehensions about the blurred boundaries between civil war and other kinds of conflict that he had experienced in the 1830s and 1840s and that he would later examine, during the aftermath of the suppression of the Paris Commune, in his novel about the 1793 counter-

---

revolutionary massacre in the Vendée, Quatrevingt-treize (1874). Their applications were contemporary but their origins can be found in the Enlightenment.

In his immensely popular work of advice for a young prince, the Dialogues des morts (1712), the French archbishop and political writer, François de Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon, had the character of Socrates offer an eloquent pacifist argument based on the cosmopolitan principle of common humanity:

All Wars are properly Civil Wars [Toutes les guerres sont civiles], ‘tis still Mankind shedding each other's Blood, and tearing their own Entrails out; the farther a War is extended, the more fatal it is; and therefore the Combats of one People against another, are worse than the Combats of private Families against a Republick. We ought therefore never to engage in a War, unless reduced to a last Extremity, and then only to repel our Foes.38

Fénelon’s motivation was pacifist but the implications of his cosmopolitan conception were double-edged: the closer the world approached to the cosmopolitan ideal of universal humanity, the more intimate would international and even global wars become. More acute pain, not more assured peace, might be the unintended outcome of the world’s progressive shrinkage. Enlightened thinkers like Fénelon who believed in Europe’s cultural unity feared what Grotius had denied more than a century earlier: that all wars between Europeans would become civil wars, because they were fought within the bounds of a mutually recognising community of fellow citizens. Under Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan right, the sphere of affective mutuality became global, as ‘the (narrower or wider) community

---

of the nations of the earth has now gone so far that a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all.\textsuperscript{39}

In a century of near-constant warfare among the European powers and in their imperial outposts, the trope of European civil war proliferated as an index of cultural unity as well as a reassurance of civilisational difference from the rest of the world. In this mode, Rousseau, in his \textit{Projet de paix perpétuelle} (1761), judged the wars between the powers of Europe to be ‘much the more deplorable, as their combinations are intimate; ... their frequent quarrels have almost the cruelty of civil wars.’\textsuperscript{40} Four decades later, Napoleon reportedly told Charles James Fox, during the negotiations for the Treaty of Amiens in 1802, that, ‘Turkey excepted, Europe is nothing more than a province of the world; when we battle, we engage in nothing more than a civil war.’\textsuperscript{41} Writing after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1826, the early nineteenth-century French philosopher Théodore Jouffroy affirmed Napoleon’s point by negating it: ‘The civil wars of Europe are over.’\textsuperscript{42} And in 1866, the French historian Henri Martin saw no end to these European civil wars, which for him included Russia as part of a common civilisational conflict that had recently erupted in the Crimean War (1853–56).\textsuperscript{43} The saying that all European wars were civil wars again became popular in the moment between the twentieth century’s two great wars and was usually attributed to Napoleon, perhaps recalling his bon mot of 1802.\textsuperscript{44} This particular strain of cosmopolitan reflection on civil war culminated on United Nations Day (24 October) 1949, when the then director of

\begin{itemize}
    \item\textsuperscript{40} Jean-Jacques Rousseau, \textit{A Project for Perpetual Peace}, Eng. trans. (London, 1761), p. 9 (‘... presque la cruauté des guerres civiles’).
    \item\textsuperscript{41} Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne, \textit{Mémoires de M. de Bourrienne, ministre d’état; sur Napoléon, le Directoire, le Consulat, l’Empire et la Restauration}, 10 vols. (Paris, 1829–30), V, p. 207: ‘La Turquie exceptée, l’Europe n’est qu’une province du monde; quand nous battons, nous ne faisons que de la guerre civile.’
    \item\textsuperscript{43} Henri Martin, \textit{La Russie et l’Europe} (Paris, 1866), p. 106: ‘Toutes les guerres entre Européens sont guerres civiles ...’.
    \item\textsuperscript{44} See, for example, G. K. Chesterton’s contribution to Paul Hymans, Paul Fort and Arnoud Rastoul, eds., \textit{Pax Mundi: Livre d’or de la Paix} (Geneva, 1932); Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{Europe Must Unite} (Glarus, 1939), title-page.
\end{itemize}
UNESCO, the Mexican poet, scholar and diplomat, Jaime Torres Bodet, pronounced in Paris, ‘All European wars, said Voltaire, are civil wars. In the twentieth century his formula applies to the whole earth. In our world, which shrinks progressively as communications become swifter, all wars are civil wars: all battles are battles between fellow-citizens, nay more, between brothers.’ Torres Bodet’s sympathies were sounder than his scholarship. Voltaire had indeed famously argued, like Vattel, that Europe was a ‘kind of great republic divided into several states,’ all with ‘the same principle of public law and politics, unknown in other parts of the world,’ but he did not stretch his vision of European cultural unity to imagine its wars as civil wars. Nonetheless, Torres Bodet was right to locate this cosmopolitan vision of Europe-wide civil war in the Enlightenment.

Europe was not the only transnational community that could be conceived as the stage for civil war in the eighteenth century. Because an empire could then ‘refer to a single civitas, which included both territory in Europe and beyond,’ what were later conceived of as revolutions—for example, in British and later in Spanish America—were conceived at the time as imperial civil wars. In this vein, commentators around the Atlantic world saw the crisis in the British empire of the 1770s as a ‘civil’ war fought among fellow Britons. Following other Roman precedents, observers such as William Bolan, the agent for Massachusetts Bay, Richard Price and Adam Smith (in the Wealth of Nations) had initially thought of it as a ‘social war’ among members of a common confederacy. Yet after the first

---

45 Jaime Torres Bodet, ‘Why We Fight,’ UNESCO Courier, 11, 10 (1 November 1949), 12. My thanks to Glenda Sluga for this reference.
shots of the conflict were fired at Lexington and Concord in April 1775, both sides turned to the language of civil war to describe the militarisation of the transatlantic dispute. For example, the Dutch-born surveyor and cartographer, Bernard Romans, published a chart of Massachusetts with the title, a ‘Map of the Seat of Civil War in America’ and other writers soon called it a ‘civil war,’ a ‘civil war with America’ and even an ‘American civil war’. By July 1775, the Continental Congress threatened the British Parliament with armed resistance but still claimed to hope for ‘reconciliation on reasonable terms, ... thereby to relieve the empire from the calamities of civil war.’ The conflict only ceased to be imaginable as a civil war a year later when, by the Declaration of Independence of July 1776, Congress constituted the former British American colonies as ‘the United States of America’. Civil war within a transoceanic empire was thereby transformed—at least for the new United States and its potential allies—into an international war between states.

The eighteenth-century’s Age of Revolutions was an age of civil wars which posed multiple challenges for contemporary cosmopolitanism. Vattel was the Enlightened cosmopolitan most stimulated by the intellectual problems posed by civil war and he proved to be the most influential in shaping others’ responses to the conflict.

---


similar questions in the American, French and Spanish American revolutions. Vattel had adopted Grotius’s definition of war as ‘that state in which we prosecute our right by force’ but nonetheless agreed with Rousseau, *contra* Grotius, that the exercise of war was confined to states alone: ‘Public war ... which takes place between nations or sovereigns and which is carried on in the name of the public power, and by its order.’\(^{52}\) Vattel’s crucial innovation was to argue that rebels against a sovereign or ‘public power’ could legitimately be recognized as belligerents: ‘When a party is formed in a state, who no longer obey the sovereign, and are possessed of sufficient strength to oppose him,—or when, in a republic, the nation is divided into two opposite factions, and both sides take up arms, this is called *civil war.*’ This could be distinguished from a rebellion by the fact the insurgents have justice on their side: if the cause of opposition is just, then the sovereign (or divided authority in a republic) must wage war against the opposition: ‘Custom appropriates the term of “*civil war*” to every war between the members of one and the same political society.’\(^{53}\)

Vattel’s cosmopolitan re-definition of civil war under the *jus gentium* opened the way to the application of the laws of war to civil conflicts. He argued that the two sides stand ‘in precisely the same predicament as two nations, who engage in a contest, and, being unable to come to an agreement, have recourse to arms.’ It followed that, if the two independent bodies were equivalent in this manner, the law of nations should regulate their contentions: a ‘civil’ war had become an international war. Sovereigns should, therefore, treat their rebellious subjects according to the law of war if they have just cause and have raised arms. By this point, the unitary nation or state has already ceased to exist; the conflict became ‘a public war between two nations’ and no longer fell under internal domestic law but instead under the law of nations or *ius gentium.*\(^{54}\) Using this logic, the American


Continental Congress had turned to Vattel as a major source when drafting their Declaration of Independence in 1776.  

Vattel’s vision raised a potentially radical doctrine of intervention by outside powers in the affairs of other sovereign states. For example, Edmund Burke appealed to Vattel’s authority to argue that France after 1789 had fissured into two warring nations, each of which claimed sovereignty: one in the name of the King, the other on behalf of the people. Burke invoked Vattel to show that Britain and its allies could—indeed, should—intervene in revolutionary France on the side of the king and his supporters and used his work explicitly to prove that, ‘[i]n this state of things (that is in the case of a divided kingdom) by the law of nations, Great Britain, like every other Power, is free to take any part she pleases.’ France was a divided nation in a state of civil war; indeed, it was effectively two nations, and Britain was free to decide which had justice on its side.

Vattel had not wanted his ‘maxim’ to be abused, to ‘make a handle of it to authorise odious machinations against the internal tranquillity of states,’ but hard-headed arguments in such circumstances might easily support any act of intervention, as Burke’s deployment of his reasoning showed. Reasons of state like this, soothing as they were to established rulers, led Kant to include Vattel among his roster of ‘sorry comforters’ (leidige Tröster), those modern proponents of natural law who encouraged amoral political action with their expedient ethics, in Perpetual Peace. Nonetheless, Kant’s own restrictive account of the possible grounds for external intervention in a civil war, in his fifth preliminary article of perpetual peace, could have been taken straight from Vattel’s Droit des gens:

---

... if a state, through internal discord, were to split into two parts, each putting itself forward as a separate state and laying claim to the whole; in that case a foreign state could not be charged with interfering in the constitution of another state if it gave assistance to one of them (for this is anarchy). But as long as this internal conflict is not yet critical, such interference of foreign powers would be a violation of the right of a people dependent on no other and only struggling with internal illness; thus it would itself be a scandal given and would make the autonomy of all states insecure.58

In the context of the French Revolutionary Wars, such a doctrine could still present a license for perpetual war rather than for perpetual peace. A year after Kant had written, Burke argued in his second Letter on a Regicide Peace (1796) that the French proponents of popular sovereignty had turned their ‘armed doctrine’ against the rest of Europe, and that for these Jacobins the ensuing conflict ‘in it’s spirit, and for it’s objects, ... was a civil war; and as such they pursued it. ... a war between the partizans of the antient, moral, and political order of Europe against a sect of fanatical and ambitious atheists which means to change them all.’59 All states were now undoubtedly insecure, Burke believed, as what had begun as a French revolution had mutated, first, into an civil war internal to France and then into a civil war for all the inhabitants of Europe. Burke was no cosmopolitan, of course, but

---


his application of one cosmopolitan’s conception of civil war to conflict in Europe foreshadowed later apprehensions, among cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans alike, that communities larger than the original classical *civitates* could be theatres of civil war.

* * *

Enlightened cosmopolitanism in all its varied forms had expanded the conceptual boundaries of the communities within which civil wars might be held to take place, from the cosmopolitan community of Europe to the global cosmopolis encompassing all of humankind. The implications of this cosmopolitan conception of conflict would not be fully realised until the twentieth century, when, as in the Enlightenment, the proliferation of warfare across the world spurred philosophical reflection on the ever-extending boundaries of civil conflict. The century’s great transnational conflicts, from the First World War to the Cold War and thence to the ‘Global War on Terror’ of the early twenty-first century, were often seen as civil wars cast onto broad continental, and even global, screens. The communities within which civil wars were imagined as taking place became ever wider and more capacious, expanding from ‘European civil war’ to various conceptions of ‘global civil war’ early in our own century.

As the imaginative limits of civil war grew, they coincided with the knowledge that civil wars were themselves becoming more transnational in their form and global in their impact. In this manner, the rueful cosmopolitanism of Fénelon found belated echoes in the words of the Italian anti-fascist writer Gaetano Salvemini who warned his readers in September 1914 they were now witnessing not a war among nations but a ‘global civil war’ (*una mondiale guerra civile*) of peoples, classes, and parties in which no-one could remain neutral.  

60 Five years later,

---

in 1919, John Maynard Keynes recalled the common civilization in which France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Holland, Russia, Romania, and Poland ‘flourished together, ... rocked together in a war, and ... may fall together’ in the course of ‘the European Civil War’.  

Later in the century, intimations of enmity on the eve of the Second World War raised the fear of an ‘international civil war’ between ‘reds and blacks’ that cut across Europe’s countries. After the conflict arrived, this ‘gigantic civil war on the international scale’ presented an opportunity for national liberation, according to the Indian Marxist, M. N. Roy, writing in 1941–42.

The Cold War further fostered such an expansion of the boundaries of the idea of civil war as that conflict would be called ‘a global civil war [that] has divided and tormented mankind,’ as U. S. President John F. Kennedy put it in his second State of the Union address in January 1962. Two months later, in March 1962, the distinctly anti-cosmopolitan Carl Schmitt had spoken in a lecture in Spain about ‘the global civil war of revolutionary class enmity’ unleashed by Leninist socialism. More sympathetic to the heritage of revolutionary universalism were the American Students for a Democratic Society, whose Port Huron Statement in June 1962 had predicted that ‘the war which seems so close will not be fought between the United States and Russia, not externally between two national entities, but as an international civil war throughout the unrespected and unprotected civitas which spans the world.’ Hannah Arendt argued in On Revolution (1963) the following year that the twentieth century had seen a new phenomenon arising from the

---

interrelatedness of wars and revolutions: ‘a world war appears like the consequences of a revolution, a kind of civil war raging all over the earth, as even the Second World War was considered by a sizeable portion of public opinion and with considerable justification.’

‘Global civil war’ has more recently been used to denote the struggle between transnational terrorists like the partisans of Al Qaeda against established state-actors like the United States and Great Britain. In the hands of some of its proponents, this post-9/11 usage of ‘global civil war’ means the globalisation of an internal conflict, especially that within a divided Islam, split between Sunnis and Shiites, that has been projected onto a world scale. As a broader metaphor for terrorism, ‘global civil war’ has also been used to imply an unbridled struggle between opposed parties without any of the constraints placed on conventional forms of warfare, a return to a state of nature in which there are no rules for a war of all against all, and a peculiar species of conflict in which the boundaries between ‘internal’ and ‘external,’ intra-state and inter-state, conflict are utterly blurred. In this way, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri wrote in 2004 that, ‘our contemporary world is characterized by a generalized, permanent global civil war, by the constant threat of violence that effectively suspends democracy.’ ‘Faced with the unstoppable progression of what has been called a “global civil war”,’ observed Giorgio Agamben in 2005, ‘the state of exception tends increasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics,’ a paradigm he has

---

elsewhere traced back via Hobbes to Thucydides but whose more immediate
genealogy lies in eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism.\textsuperscript{70}

Such metaphorical expansions of the ambit of civil war carry with them
recognizable features from past ideas of civil war: for example, the idea of a defined
community, a struggle for dominance within it and an aberration from any normal
course of politics or ‘civilisation’. The idea of ‘global’ civil war carries with it an idea
of universal humanity and, like all conceptions of civil war, it helps to illuminate the
boundaries of inclusion and commonality at the moment of division and antagonism
become apparent. Humanity can affirm its unity by discerning conflict within a
single capacious community, that world city or cosmopolis peopled by hostile fellow
citizens. In these regards, the recent language of global civil war appears as an
intensification of long-standing, originally Roman, ideas of civil war that were later
broadened and intensified by cosmopolitanism’s expansion of empathy and extension of horizons.

Conceptions of global civil war are one unexpected (and unintended)
consequence of Enlightened cosmopolitanism. That body of thought has usually
been assumed to be determinedly pacific, universally integrative and cumulatively
progressive, at least in the asymptotic manner in which Kant viewed the prospects
for perpetual peace. However, as we have seen, Kant was the heir to a variety of
cosmopolitan conceptions of conflict and saw peace as their partner not simply
their product. Kantian cosmopolitanism, like Enlightened cosmopolitanism more
generally, was conflicted as well as conflictual; its ambivalence, as much as its
optimism, continues to inform our own hopes and fears for universal human
community. As Anthony Pagden has noted, ‘although the central Enlightenment
belief in a common humanity, the awareness of some world larger than the
community, family, parish, or patria, may still be shakily primitive or incomplete, it
is also indubitably a great deal more present in all our lives ... than it was even fifty
years ago.’\textsuperscript{71} His examples of the Enlightenment’s persistence are mostly benign:

\textsuperscript{70} Giorgio Agamben, \textit{State of Exception}, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago, 2005), pp. 2–3;
Agamben, \textit{Stasis. La guerra civile come paradigma politico} (Turin, 2015).
\textsuperscript{71} Pagden, \textit{The Enlightenment—And Why It Still Matters}, p. 413.
global governance; constitutional patriotism; multiculturalism; and international institutions such as the United Nations or foundational documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet just as the Enlightenment as a whole had its shadows,\textsuperscript{72} so there is a dark side to Enlightened cosmopolitanism. Among its legacies is the unsettling conception of cosmopolitanism as a philosophy of conflict as well as compromise, of war as well as peace and of civil war as well as of civilisation and civility.