The elephant and the whale: empires of land and sea

Journal Issue: July 2007

David Armitage

Department of History, Harvard University

Originally given as the 2006 Caird Lecture

Behemoth and leviathan

The Trustees and Director of the National Maritime Museum have done me a double honour by asking me to deliver the Caird Lecture and to mark the opening of the Museum’s new Research Centre for Imperial and Maritime Studies. With a double honour comes a double duty. I must both attempt to continue a distinguished tradition of Caird lectures and also seek to inaugurate what will surely become an equally great tradition emanating from this timely new Centre. The theme of my lecture will therefore be a double one: to reflect – and to reflect upon – the two fields covered by the Centre, imperial history and maritime history, their relationships and their differences.
The title I have chosen for my reflections – ‘The Elephant and the Whale’ – might seem better suited to a previous Caird lecturer, Sir David Attenborough. Yet the allusions in my title spring not from natural history but from sacred history, in this case from the Hebrew Bible. If I were here to deliver the Caird Sermon rather than the Caird Lecture, I would take as my text chapters 40 and 41 of the Book of Job, in which the God of the Israelites rebukes Job for his presumption by reminding him of two of His most terrifying and impressive creations: ‘Behold now behemoth, which I made with thee,’ God commands; ‘he eateth his grass as an ox. ... He moveth his tail like a cedar. ... His bones are as strong pieces of brass; his bones are like bars of iron.’ Then He asks the quivering Job, ‘Canst thou draw out leviathan with an hook? ... Canst thou fill his skin with barbed irons? or his head with fish spears? ... Upon earth there is not his like, who is made without fear.’

Behemoth and leviathan, the greatest beasts of land and sea respectively, were sometimes identified in biblical commentary with a crocodile and a bull but, more often, with the elephant and the whale. These two mighty creatures, the one predominant terrestrially and the other oceanically, later became metaphors for power over the land and hegemony over the sea. It was thus in one sense ironic that Thomas Hobbes chose leviathan, the great sea-monster, as the image of sovereign authority in the territorial state. More conventionally, Napoleon Bonaparte compared France and Britain to the two great monsters, the French elephant representing Europe's greatest land-power, the British whale its – and soon the world's – greatest power by sea.
Extirpation of the Plagues of Egypt – Destruction of Revolutionary Crocodiles – or – The British Hero cleansing ye mouth of ye Nile, by James Gillray, H. Himphrey. Published 6 October 1798 My metaphorical use of these mighty creatures will be closer to Napoleon's than to God's, as I will take the elephant as an emblem of empire and the whale as an image from the ocean. My main aim will be to ask just what this new Centre's subjects, Imperial and Maritime Studies, might have in common, as well as where they diverge as approaches to the global past. The two fields have resonances for the present as well as deep roots in the historical thinking of the past. But that is just as it should be for a Centre with ambitions to investigate the role these two vast fields have played in shaping the present-day world.

**Imperial history and maritime history**

Chart of NE Atlantic, Lisbon to Cape Verde (P/8(4)); Oliva, Joan; ca. 1640. Repro ID F1798 © NMM London. When professional history-writing began in Europe and the United States in the nineteenth century, neither imperial history nor maritime history was at the heart of its concerns. Indeed, for almost a century, most of that historiography confined itself to specific nations and their pasts. Until quite recently, the connection between history-writing and the nation state seemed inescapable, perhaps even eternal. Yet with a longer perspective it is possible to see that states, and the nations they have often claimed to contain, were only the central units of historical study for little over a century; their existence as the primary objects of allegiance, identity and political personality extends back little more than twice as far into the past.

The histories created to justify and explain these nations and states often downplayed or ignored historical movements or moments that overflowed national borders. It is only in the last generation that significant numbers of historians have turned to wider horizons, in search of bigger prey. In reaction to the limitations imposed by nation-state historiography, we are now in the midst of a revival of transnational historiography that works at levels above, beyond or outside the conventional histories of states and nations. Indeed, two of the most promising new avenues of research inspired by such
a turn outwards are precisely those the Museum’s new Centre has been created to study: imperial history and maritime, or oceanic, history. The Centre may not yet plan to cover all empires, in all times, but it will surely embrace all the world’s oceans, the Mediterranean and the Indian, as well as the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

On the face of it, imperial history and maritime history have much in common. They are both trans-temporal, in that they are not tied to any specific period and can be pursued across vast expanses of time. They are also both transnational, because they are not confined to nation states and must be treated over great tracts of space. Neither has been limited to the study of Europe, or even to the period of European activity in the world beyond Europe. Indeed, some of the most challenging recent oceanic histories have been written by historians of pre- and ancient history: for example, Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell’s wonderfully multifaceted study of the pre-modern Mediterranean, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* or Barry Cunliffe’s richly expansive *Facing the Ocean: The Atlantic and Its Peoples, 8000 BC–AD 1500*.

Similarly, the study of empires has been the province of archaeology as much as of history, and extends from some of the earliest human societies in Mesopotamia all the way up to the present and the quasi-imperial ventures of contemporary powers in the same region.

The histories of empires and oceans intersect and overlap but they are far from identical. Imperial history treats the complex, often multi-ethnic, polities in which dominant elites have exerted central control over territory, population and resources. By contrast, oceanic history deals with connections and circulations outside centres of control and calculation and usually beyond the limits set by particular national histories. The competition of empires did shape the histories of the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Indian oceans, but so did other forces like commerce, navigation and climate. Oceans were important theatres of imperial activity, but they were not the only such arenas. Even sea-borne empires like the Dutch and the English were territorial entities before they became maritime enterprises, however small the territorial core of the empire was in comparison with the geographical reach of their fleets and settlers. Empires have waxed and waned, but oceanic basins have shifted mostly in the perceptions of the agents who traverse and imagine them. Moreover, empires have tended to operate outwards from sovereign cores surrounded by moving frontiers and marchlands. Oceanic arenas, by contrast, have generally been polycentric, without advancing imperial borderlands but with a multiplicity of zones where populations collided and mingled.

Imperial and maritime history are both vast in size and awe-inspiring to contemplate. In this regard, the most important feature they have in common is the scale on which they operate. Imperial history treats the largest, the most variegated, and the furthest flung of all the political communities human beings have constructed for themselves: empires. Similarly, maritime history investigates the broadest, the most fluid, and the most all-encompassing of the arenas in which humans have conducted their affairs: oceans. Yet if both are dizzying in their extent, they are also now equally fashionable, even imperative, as units for studying human history.
These competing strains of transnational history illuminate the deep past but also spring from quite contemporary concerns. The history of empires has received much encouragement from post-colonial scholarship as well as from more immediate debates over the question of whether recent American foreign policy heralds a revival of neo-imperial ventures across the world. Likewise, the burgeoning historical interest in globalization and its antecedents has invigorated the study of oceanic and maritime history. This is a set of processes that emphasizes exchange and interchange, fluidity and circulation – whether of goods, capital, people or ideas – rather than the fixity and boundedness associated with the classic conception of the territorial state. To take only one example: Atlantic history has recently been well defined in just these terms as ‘the creation, destruction and re-creation of communities as a result of the movement, across and around the Atlantic basin, of people, commodities, cultural practices and ideas’.

Empires of land and sea

Terrestrial table globe, 1731 These contemporary concerns about imperial legacies and the impact of globalization resemble the enduring opposition between empires of the land and empires of the sea. That opposition is at once among the most basic yet also least investigated themes in western historiography and political thought, at least from Herodotus in the fifth century BC to Carl Schmitt in the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, Schmitt seems to have been the only scholar to have examined the relationship between empires of land and sea in any depth, first in his brief child’s history of the modern world, Land and Sea (1942), and then in his magisterial study of space in modern history, The Nomos of the Earth (1950), in which he argued that ‘[w]orld history is the history of the wars waged by maritime powers against land or continental powers and by land powers against sea or maritime powers’.
It is possible to go even further than Schmitt to argue that the opposition of land-
powers and sea-powers – behemoths and leviathans, elephants and whales – is
fundamental both chronologically and ontologically to western historiography. Indeed,
it can be seen to arise simultaneously with historical thinking itself in the works of
Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon and later, Polybius, where it is connected to such
basic oppositions as that emerging between the ‘East’ (Asia) and the ‘West’ (Europe),
and the opposed axes of tyranny (associated with monarchy) and liberty (exemplified
by democracy). That opposition was emblematized in the contention between the
Persian land-empire and the Athenian thalassocracy, with lasting consequences for the
figuration of such empires. In this typology, Athens itself stood at the end of a series
of sea-powers, just as it would stand at the head of such a sequence of empires for
later observers of the *translatio imperii*.10

Athenian naval victory, most notably over the Persians at the battle of Salamis,
nourished the myth of Athens as a specifically maritime democracy, whose triremes not
only defended Athenian freedom (*eleutheria*) but may themselves have been a ‘school
of democracy’ for free Athenians and the slaves who were promised their freedom for
rowing alongside them.11 Athens exported the values and institutions of democracy in
its ships to the archipelago but still remained vulnerable on land, as other later maritime
empires, like Venice, would do. The ‘Old Oligarch’s’ *Constitutions of Athens* from the
fifth century BC remarked:

> Athens has empire on the sea, but as Attica is on the land,
enemies ravage it when it makes expeditions to distant
places. ... But if the Athenians lived on an island and had
also empire on the sea, they would have the power to harm
others and no one would be able to harm them, so long as
they remained masters of the sea.

Nearly two millennia later, Montesquieu quoted this passage in the *Esprit des lois*
(XX.vii) with a contemporary gloss on the continuities between ancient and modern
maritime empires: ‘You might say that Xenophon intended to speak of England.’
Montesquieu also pointed up a major discontinuity by noting that Athens was ‘more
attentive to extending its maritime empire than to using it’, especially for the expansion
of its commerce.12 However, the very vulnerability of Athens on land allowed it to
be portrayed as the benign maritime trading empire to Rome's aggressive territorial
*imperium*. As Montesquieu's heir, the Abbé Raynal, noted that, unlike Athens, Rome
‘promoted intercourse between different nations, not by uniting them by the ties of
commerce, but by imposing upon them the yoke of subordination’.13 In this typology,
Rome's earlier opposite was Athens, just as its immediate rival for the lordship of the
Mediterranean world would be the maritime empire of Carthage.

These oppositions – Persia (or Sparta) and Athens; Athens and Rome; Rome and
Carthage – endured through the translations of empire in early modern and modern
Europe. They added potent moral and political evaluations to what had begun as
historiographical oppositions which were later reinforced by historical examples and self-sustaining myths. European conceptions of empire would draw strength from the positive images transmitted through these typologies and would use their negative aspects as ideological weapons in times of war: for example, during the Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century, the War of the Spanish Succession, and the Seven Years War, in which both France and Britain liberally deployed the metaphors of Rome and Carthage to promote their respective claims to dominance. Thus, the English political economist Charles Davenant, writing in 1700 against the encroaching territorial monarchy of Louis XIV, argued in favour of English naval supremacy by alluding to the Athenian empire of the seas – ‘Their Navy indeed was the occasion of their greatness’ – but also warned his compatriots that maritime hegemony alone would not be sufficient to ensure other kinds of dominance: ‘whatever Nation has the chief Dominion at Land, will in time have the Dominion of the Seas, and they who are strongest at Sea, will have the Trade.’

Davenant spoke here in the political language of modern commercial reason of state. That language had fundamentally redefined the very meaning of the term ‘empire’ as it had been inherited from Rome. By the time of Julius Caesar and Augustus, an originally juridical language of imperium as magistracy had become territorialized, as an abstract conception of imperium as authority had become detached from its more precise association with magistrates and generals and then applied to the whole area over which Rome held authority, the Imperium Romanum. Though the abstract language of empire as authority or sovereignty would of course endure, the Roman inheritance of the term ineradicably associated it with the power to exclude others, and their authority, from specific spaces. Empire thus came to imply control over territory, that ‘bordered political space’ over which the leviathan-like power to overawe and frighten (terreor) is exercised, and ‘from which people are warned off’.

**Territorial and non-territorial empires**

Magellan's track around the world in the Agnese Atlas, p.21 by Battista Agnese Because this space was fastened in the land, and defined by exclusion, territorial empire was the lineal ancestor of the territorial state, the bounded, exclusive, spatially delimited political community that we now recognize as the primary political unit of the modern world. After 1415, these territorialized polities were gradually joined by the fleets, forts and factories of the Portuguese, Dutch and English empires, as well
as by the transoceanic empire of the Spanish monarchy. The ideological justifications for these modern – meaning post-medieval – empires deepened the older distinction between empires of the land on the Roman model and empires of the sea, with their maritime and, increasingly, commercial foundations. However, arguments developed to justify rights of sovereignty and property over land could not readily be transferred to the different medium of the sea.

The *locus classicus* in early modern Europe for the limited application of those territorialist arguments would be Grotius's *Mare Liberum* (1608), in which Grotius determined that land and sea were incommensurable, at least as far as traditional justifications for *dominium* and *imperium* were concerned, because the sea was fluid, not fixed like land. It was indeterminate and not confinable within identifiable boundaries, again unlike land, whose boundaries could in theory be firmly inscribed upon the earth. The sea was also inexhaustible, as were its resources, like fish, while land was not. Finally, the sea's fluidity, changeability and lack of plasticity meant that it could not be transformed by human labour, unlike the soil. For all these reasons, no power could claim exclusive dominion over the sea. Instead, in the words of John Locke later in the seventeenth century, ‘the Ocean’ was ‘that great and remaining Common of Mankind’.

Movement across territorial borders was becoming increasingly restricted, for both people and goods; by contrast, Grotius argued that from the nature of the sea and the activities transacted upon it, travel and commerce across the great common should remain free and undisturbed. It should be open to all humanity to pursue their subsistence and to engage in their natural, even God-given, desire to interact through mutual exchange and interchange.

Grotius's arguments against exclusion from the seas were of course the product of inter-imperial rivalry between the maritime empires of the Dutch and the Portuguese. They were also marked by the emergence of commerce as a fundamental reason of state for the great territorial monarchies of seventeenth-century Europe when they expanded their activities into the extra-European world. Commercial reasons of state added yet another dimension to the opposition of land and sea empires: on the one hand, a vision of free-flowing and unfettered trade that ‘establish[es] between two hemispheres, by the happy art of navigation, a communication of flying bridges’, in Raynal's marvellous phrase; on the other, a nightmare of predatory rulers' ambitions for modern universal monarchy on land, in part as the means to secure dominance at sea.

Seen within this context, even the relatively benign pursuit of maritime expansion could become sinister in intent, as the Prussian natural-law theorist Samuel Pufendorf, writing from a mostly landlocked monarchy with few extra-European ambitions in the 1670s, noted:

> ... on the sea, we stretch our empire much farther [than on earth], by the means of ships, now brought to their highest perfection; which are not only serviceable in transporting burdens, but likewise carry Mars through the Kingdoms of
Yet for a maritime power like England, the association noted by Pufendorf was more likely to be seen as benign rather than threatening. At almost the same moment, the Irish political economist Sir William Petty looked back to the Athenian sea-empire, with the help of a Dutch naval architect, for a more positive assessment of the role of naval technology: ‘Such as Desire Empire & Liberty says Aristotle let Them Encourage the Art of Ship-Building.’

Both Pufendorf and Petty wrote on the eve of an epochal struggle between Britain and France for imperial dominance, first within Europe and then in the extra-European world. That ‘Second Hundred Years War’ (1688-1815) would lend greater ideological urgency to the evaluative distinction between empires of the land and empires of the sea. In the course of that long war, especially within the context of a self-affirming navalist ideology in Britain, commerce would be counterposed to conquest, the virtues of navies pitted against the dangers from armies, and sailors mythologized as vectors of liberty even as soldiers were distrusted as agents of absolutism. This ideology would be fundamental to a conception of the British Empire as a non-territorial, commercial empire of the seas, defended by ships not armies, engaged primarily in commerce not conquest, and whose anthem would be ‘Rule, Britannia’.

The limitations of that British self-image would become starkly clear during and after the Seven Years War. Propagandists on both sides of the English Channel had cast the conflict between Britain and France as a struggle between a new Carthage and a new Rome. ‘The intolerance of the Tyrians and the Carthaginians in commercial matters hastened their destruction’, wrote the French critic Elie Fréron early in the war. ‘The English should fear the same fate, for all Europe reproaches them for the same principles, the same views and the same vices.’ French defeat in the war disconfirmed such predictions, but British territorial conquests in North America and South Asia, and the consequent militarization of the imperial frontier across the globe, saddled Britain with all the responsibilities of a land-empire while trying to maintain an uneasy dominance at sea. At this moment, ‘language and terminology began to change, as those associated with the dominion of the seas based on liberty no longer seemed appropriate’.

Terrestrial and oceanic orders

The period between the end of the Seven Years War and the defeat of Napoleon would be a heyday both for imperial historiography and for a renewed attention to the importance of sea power in history. The two greatest imperial histories from that time – Raynal’s Histoire des Deux Indes and Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire – are the most obvious monuments to these immediate concerns.

Gibbon’s account would stand as the greatest contemporary history of land-empire, while Raynal's Histoire, in its various unfolding versions, offered the first history of commercial globalization, cast in the form of a sequence of sea-empires beginning with the Athenian thalassocracy and progressing through its Phoenician, Carthaginian, Norman and Arab successors until it reached the present-day consequences of the
great revolution wrought by the rise of commerce as a reason of state. ‘It is since this revolution,’ stated Raynal, ‘which hath, as it were, submitted the earth to the sea, that the most important events have been determined on the ocean.’27 This vision would also be shared by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations*, the most enduring of all the histories of commerce hatched in the long shadow of the Seven Years War. Like Raynal and his collaborators, Smith recognized that fierce interstate rivalry for markets and goods had created a single world-wide economic system held together by inter-oceanic communication but threatened by the imperial ambitions of short-sighted companies and land-hungry states.28

According to Carl Schmitt, writing in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the triumph of the British ‘whale’ over the French ‘elephant’ in 1815 confirmed the final emergence of ‘two separate and distinct global orders within the Eurocentric world order’ whose separation had begun in the sixteenth century: a terrestrial order of the land, and an oceanic order of the sea.29 Schmitt wrote at a time when he believed even that fundamental order had been superseded by a novel world order premised on air power that threatened to dissolve the specifically European ordering of the globe based on the division of land and sea. Even if Schmitt’s anxiety now seems incomprehensible, and his defence of that early-modern world order indefensible, both his typology and his genealogy of the competing and exclusive orders of land and sea are immensely suggestive. They are recognizable as but one version of an ancient (and modern) opposition of sea-empires and land-empires, and that the most fully worked through of the twentieth century, both as a theoretical construct and as a historical narrative.

**International and trans-national histories**

The resilience of this fundamental opposition between empires of land and sea underpinned the long narrative of the succession of empires since at least the fifth century BC. I have attempted only a brief sketch of some of its features and high points here and this schematic account could clearly be greatly extended and expanded. Its utility may lie in part in drawing attention to a comparative framework so deeply buried as to be almost unremarked in the burgeoning historiography of empire. Yet it also points to the deeper roots of perhaps the most profound division in contemporary conceptions of global history. The two leading versions of that history might be described as *inter*-national and *trans*-national, a history of competitive but mutually recognizing territorial nation states pitted against and alongside a narrative of globalization predicated, like oceanic history, on borderlessness, fluidity, the absence of overarching sovereignty and a lack of territorial fixity. By being alert to the continuity of the fundamental opposition between empires of land and sea that informs these histories, we may be better able to see the ways in which the opposition of elephants and whales continues to inform post-modern conceptions of world history, just as it had earlier shaped its early-modern and modern antecedents.
Royal opening, 1937 - Royal Family coming out of the Queen's House

A research institution with a remit as wide as that for the Centre for Imperial and Maritime Studies will consider each of these histories – of empires and oceans, the elephants and the whales – separately, but it should also treat their relations, their similarities as well as their differences. The Centre's work will thereby reflect and in turn contribute to the striking expansion in the scope and scale that now marks much of the best contemporary historical writing and research. It will also mark a natural extension of the National Maritime Museum's ever-changing mission. When in 1927 the Society for Nautical Research proposed the founding of the Museum, they did so in terms characteristic of their own times, by calling for a museum at once 'Naval' and 'National'. Ten years later, the Museum's first Director, Sir Geoffrey Callender, stated that its horizons would not be confined 'to this country alone if the history of other countries contributes to an understanding of the development of maritime civilisation in Great Britain'. Thirty years on, we might see the Museum's mission reaching yet further with a centre devoted to imperial and maritime, oceanic and global, history. Those who pursue those histories will need long memories and have the stamina to cover huge distances, of time and space. To adapt an ancient metaphor made famous by Sir Isaiah Berlin, they will need to take inspiration not just from the hedgehog, who knows one big thing, and from the fox, who knows many things, but also from the elephant and the whale.

Footnotes


8. J. H. Elliott, ‘Atlantic History: A Circumnavigation’, in David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds, The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (Basingstoke, 2002), p. 239. David Abulafia, ‘Mediterraneans’, in Harris, ed., Rethinking the Mediterranean, op. cit., pp. 65, 75-6, 91-2, rightly notes that deserts (e.g., the Sahara, the Gobi) and lakes (e.g., Victoria) as well as oceans can be the sites of such circulatory histories.


