FORUM
Round Table on David Armitage
The Declaration of Independence: A Global History
Mario Del pero

Introduction

Last year, the Italian publisher UTET did something very rare: it translated into Italian from English a recent scholarly work that was neither highly contemporary nor politically controversial: David Armitage’s *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History*. The translation was rigorous and precise (again, far too often not the case) and the Italian version of Professor Armitage’s study was enriched by a detailed introduction written by Professor Guido Abbattista.

In our view, the volume deserved such a treatment. Brief but ambitious and original, it offers a sophisticated interpretation of the Declaration of Independence, treated both as a document and as the “beginning of a genre” (140), destined to be studied, admired, and replicated in the world. In Armitage’s reading, the meaning of the declaration of independence was global from its very announcement because it “introduced the United States of America to the world” and “inaugurated the very genre of a declaration of independence” (22).

Following this dual element of radical innovation, Armitage structures his analysis of the declaration, and of its historical relevance, on three distinct levels. The first, dedicated to “The World in the Declaration of Independence,” focuses on the announcement of “the entrance of a new actor … onto the world stage” (28). The declaration is here treated as an act of foreign policy: a “declaration of interdependence” (30), and not just of independence, whose audience was “the collective public opinion of the powers of the earth” (30). The second chapter — “The Declaration of Independence in the World” — reverses the terms of the first part. Here Professor Armitage describes the reception of the document outside the United States and “its rapid transmission through the channels of late eighteenth-century print culture” (70-71). The last part of the book examines the “world of declarations” that followed the events of 1776 and the American Revolution (“the first outbreak of a contagion of sovereignty that has swept the world in the centuries since 1776,” 103). While lying sometimes dormant, this pandemic of freedom and
independence never really abated and powerfully resurfaced in the twentieth century. Finally, in the appendix, various declarations of independence, all heavily indebted to the American original, are published.

Given the importance of these themes, RSA has asked four scholars – Prof. Tiziano Bonazzi, Prof. David Hendrickson, Prof. Peter Onuf, and Prof. Arnaldo Testi – to comment on and discuss the book, and Prof. Armitage to offer a rejoinder. We thank them and are sure the readers of RSA will find, as we did, the discussion interesting and illuminating.

TIZIANO BONAZZI, Università di Bologna

Though comprised of three distinct essays, this small volume by David Armitage contains a well-structured and detailed theory starting from two specific points that the authors of a Forum in *William and Mary Quarterly* (2008) rightly consider justify, by themselves, the importance of the book in the endless panorama of publications on the Declaration of Independence (Armitage, Dubois, Ferguson, Hulsebosch, and Hunt). The first consists of shifting the attention from the renowned second part that describes the “self-evident truths,” to the first and last that serve to declare the independence of the American people and of the “united colonies,” by affirming that they were by now “free and independent States.” In this way Armitage draws the attention away from political theory. However, he does not do so to deny its importance – about this he is quite clear – but rather to balance it with the analysis of the part of the Declaration that we often forget was the central aspect of the intentions of the Continental Congress. A praiseworthy action and without doubt overdue. The second consists in the fact that precisely by shifting the attention to independence the author feels he is contributing to the internationalization of American historical studies on the United States, in the wake of a battle fought on the other side of the Atlantic for over twenty years.

If we decide to lay the emphasis on independence and on the birth of a new nation, we would reach the conclusion that the American Revolution was not a historically exceptional act, such that it would place the newborn republic on a different and higher level with respect to the rest of the world, as has been the will of so much American nationalist historiography (usually
called “exceptionalist,” but it is best to call it by its true name). What the Founding Fathers wanted, writes Armitage, was to be acknowledged as members by full right of the existing international community of states and hence not be considered rebels, but legal belligerents with which other nations could form an alliance, as in fact France did in 1778. Consequently – and this is the key phrase of the entire volume – “the Declaration of Independence was … a declaration of interdependence,” the request to enter in the community of the states. The author dedicates the entire second essay to proving this point, which he does through a historical-juridical analysis of the word “independence” and of the Declaration of Independence as a juridical tool within emerging international law, using for this purpose, and quite creatively so, well-known authors such as Emer de Vattel and Jeremy Bentham.

If this small volume were to stop at this point, it would deserve only commendation, in that the demonstration is elegant and successfully expounded. Nonetheless, the author continues further and proposes a third point, in itself unexceptionable, but which excites less enthusiasm among reviewers and which consists in the fact of making the Declaration the start of a literary and political “genre” that did not exist before: that of, to be precise, the declaration of independence of new countries. It is not, however, the aspect of the birth of a new literary genre that interests Armitage – and that gives rise to doubts – but rather the historical-political consequence that he believes he can draw out of it, consisting of placing the Declaration at the root of a “major transition in world history,” when “a world of states emerged from a world of empires,” and which he feels he can adduce as an example of global history, a concept alluded to in the subtitle of the book. Rhetorically and logically we are standing before the culminating moment of the entire book. We are, however, also in the presence of a problem, a signal of which, in my opinion, is the fact that Armitage asserts that the states were an established fact at the time of the American Revolution and that the empires did not disappear in the least with the global victory of the states. Two entirely correct observations, which however, though secondary in the treatment of the subject, contradict it.

As noted by Laurent Dubois in the aforementioned Forum, reviewers always run the risk of criticizing the authors of the volume taken into consideration for not having written the book that they would have wanted to write. This is quite true. Nonetheless, it is a danger I do not wish to avoid, hence, I will
attempt to explain why. As I see it, Armitage did not take full advantage of the possibilities that his innovative approach toward the Declaration offered him. In fact, in his book he does not consider two things. The first is that one cannot treat the explosion of the states outside Europe and therefore the statizing of the world starting from the end of the 700s under a common shield. It is unlikely that the birth of the United States of America and the transformation into state of an Asian kingdom or a former African colony can be traced back to the methodological criteria of global history, and, in any case, this cannot be accomplished by treating them as moments of a univocal historical process. The second is that states and empires are not two political concepts with the same theoretical depth and they cannot be analyzed as such. The state is a political institution that characterizes European history. We could say that from a political viewpoint it created modern Europe. As such, it has been widely studied and theorized by the classics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, it was identified much earlier as a specific political institution, different from all others. This had been done since the sixteenth century by, for example, Niccolò Machiavelli on the level of political analysis and on the theoretical level by authors such as Jean Bodin, who in the second half of the same century identified the concept of sovereignty. The interdependence between European states and therefore the existence of an international system of states was in turn acknowledged in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 and in the writings of the theorists of the reason of state. The empire does not have the same theoretic statute; it is not a true political concept, because there are very few noticeable institutional resemblances among the many political realities that we call empires. The archetype of every empire, the Roman empire, was never an empire for the Romans but rather to the very end continued to call itself res publica. In any case, it has nothing to do with the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, whose claim to being an empire derived from its universalism of theological nature and that it is the only significant empire for the history of the birth of the state in Europe. The state originated when the Holy Roman Empire was not able to assert its claim to universality and the states imposed themselves as territorial realities without the pretense of universality, but rather superiorem non recognoscentes – who do not recognize anyone above them. Some European states, by expanding beyond the boundaries of Europe, founded colonial empires, something that was even more entirely different. In short, the
empire is not a political institution that can be identified as such and the birth or the destruction of the empires does not upset the history of the state, which from the sixteenth to the twentieth century has dominated both the history of European political institutions and that of the international system.

The American Revolution established a nation that intended to enter the existing community of (European) states. The Continental Congress knew well that to be able to do this – and Armitage is correct about this – it was necessary to obtain the recognition of the existing states, and to this end “declaring independence” was useful. The states, not the empires, were the foundation stone of the international system, from the viewpoint that Armitage rightly so places himself, i.e. that of the dawning of international law. When in 1783 Great Britain acknowledged American independence, it did not cease to exist as a state, and it found itself possessing a smaller empire. The same occurred for Spain when the revolutions began in Latin America. The colonial empires are essential when analyzing the balance of power among states and, in the 1700s, that which was being determined by Europe and the rest of the world. Yet the key player in the history of political institutions and the international system in Europe is the state. The Declaration of Independence is undoubtedly an innovative political tool later used quite often, starting from the revolutions in Latin America. Nonetheless in Europe the great majority of states originated without the need for a declaration – with the exception for the Dutch case, which Armitage recalls – and important states continued to emerge without it, suffice it to think of Italy and Germany. The importance of the American Declaration of Independence as an instrument originates rather from the fact that it – juridically and philosophically – places the sovereignty of the people at the base of the new state and is therefore a revolutionary means, that is to say, a means that transforms the foundation of the legitimacy of the state, which before 1776 was always tied to the principle of dynasty. This is not, however, the point that I want to discuss now, because I wish to respect the will of the author not to treat matters of political theory, even if the theme of legitimacy concerns both international law and political theory, so much so that, after the Congress of Vienna, the European monarchies attempted to pass the idea that the juridical legitimacy of the republics was dubious.

The authors of the *William and Mary Quarterly* Forum have noted that the genealogy of the declarations of independence constructed by Armitage,
which begins in 1776 and goes up to Eritrea in 1993, ends up putting together documents that cannot be compared to one another, as they stem from times and contexts that are too different. The objection makes sense; yet I feel it does not go deep enough. From the historical and political point of view it is in fact not enough to note that the context and meaning of the many declarations of independence are entirely not homogeneous, something that Armitage undoubtedly agrees with, but it is also necessary not to consider the “statization of the world” as a unitary process. Something that is not at all true. The Declaration of Independence of 1776 was the innovative tool necessary for creating the first state outside of Europe. A state that was desired by a culturally and ethnically European people, institutionally built like a European state and welcomed in the system of European states. We are therefore before a more condensed and specific case of “statization” because it was an event that extended the existing European system of states to the American continent and gave life to the Euro-American Greater Europe system, to which the states that emerged from the anti-Spanish revolutions were added. This, in my opinion, is what makes it possible to identify a historical process and a theoretic model that eliminate any trace of exceptionalism from the Declaration of Independence as they place the birth of the United States not in a generic genealogy of statization of the world, but rather in the specific history of Greater Europe.

During the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, increasingly more political entities of non-European culture and history were built according to the state model in the attempt to mimic European power. However, this was done under circumstances, with methods and results that were not only extremely different from one another but also from those of Greater Europe, consequently grafting institutions of European origin onto local cultures and societies. In this way, important and original historical processes emerged which, nonetheless, cannot be assimilated with the birth of the United States and of the other American countries that formed the system of states of Greater Europe: a regional, not global, system that, I repeat, is the frame of reference necessary for every anti-exceptionalist interpretation of the history of the United States or, at least, of their political history.
Among the testaments of the American Revolution, the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence holds special appeal to the contemporary generation. The “self evident truths” identified by the drafter of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson – that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by the Creator with rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that for the security of these rights governments are instituted and legitimated – remain as cardinal truths in the American civil religion. In his second inaugural address, President Bush declared it “the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” In support of this policy, he evoked, in what was surely a bow to the Declaration of Independence, “truths we have uttered from the day of our Founding.”

The contrast between what we remember the Declaration to have been and what it was in its historical setting is at the core of David Armitage’s luminous study. The key aim of the framers of the document, he shows, was to justify the independence of the thirteen colonies from the British Empire and to declare them as “FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES,” with the “full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which INDEPENDENT STATES may of right do.” As Armitage notes, the act of separation was also an act of joining, a “declaration of interdependence” that marked the entry of the United States into the society of states. Whereas others have seen the trajectory of modern history in terms of the progressive movement toward liberal democratic norms of governance, Armitage’s “global history” of the Declaration offers the outline of a different narrative, one focused on how the world came to be dominated by independent states. Whereas others, including President Bush, have seen the Declaration as a revolutionary document intended to consign tyrannies to the flame, like the French revolutionaries of 1792, Armitage sees it as “decidedly unrevolutionary.” That is, the authors of the Declaration attested to the importance of observing the law of nations and considered it vital “neither to transgress, nor to fall short of those Maxims” by which states regulated their conduct toward one another.
Armitage’s first chapter highlights the international context in which the Declaration was issued, one that had many dimensions. Congress had previously made fourteen appeals to various members of the British Empire; this was the first that made its audience “a candid world,” symbolizing the movement from empire to independence. The authors of the Declaration drew on the authority of the publicists, especially Emer de Vattel, the Swiss writer who had emphasized independence as the vital norm of international society. The American Congress, as Armitage insists, made such writers key touchstones in deciding the legitimacy of public policy. No foreign state, the Americans believed, would treat with the United States until they had made the transition to statehood, nor would a foreign state treat with the colonies until they had confederated among themselves; hence the congressional resolution authorizing a formal statement of independence had also called for “forming foreign alliances” and preparing a plan of confederation.

Though Armitage emphasizes that the purpose of the Declaration was to establish the international legal sovereignty of the United States, one wishes he had explored further the ambiguities that surrounded this establishment. The confederation reserved to Congress the “external sovereignty” of the United States, but the members of the union retained “internal sovereignty.” If the “firm league of friendship” established by Articles of Confederation were interpreted according to the strictures of Vattel, the grants of authority given by each of the states to Congress could be withdrawn if the other members of the confederation failed to perform their obligations. At a minimum, this left the location of sovereignty uncertain. Armitage notes that the primary intention behind the Declaration was to affirm “the rights of one people organized into thirteen states to enter the international arena on a footing equal to other, similar states,” but the boundary of authority between this one people and these thirteen states remains obscure in his retelling.

In the early decades after 1776, Armitage writes, the Declaration excited more commentary outside the United States than it did at home, and little of that attention was devoted toward the Declaration’s second paragraph. But its rehabilitation after 1815 in the United States, in his view, served to obscure from Americans “the original meaning of the Declaration as an international, and even global, document.” It also ensured “that within the United States only proponents of slavery, supporters of Southern secession, and anti-
individualist critics of rights talk would be able to recall that original meaning.” This seems too strong. While Armitage rightly highlights the vital importance of independence as the primordial motivating force of the Declaration, observers at the time (and subsequently) understood that it had also set forth the principles on which the American governments were being founded; they were to be free and independent states. Both civil freedom and national independence were critical; each was seen as necessary to the other. Armitage cites John Quincy Adams, in his Fourth of July Address in 1821, as registering the primary import of the Declaration as an occasional state paper setting forth the grounds of independence, but Adams placed greater emphasis on the principles of government it proclaimed.

It was the first solemn declaration by a nation of the only legitimate foundation of civil government. It was the cornerstone of a new fabric, destined to cover the surface of the globe. It demolished, at a stroke, the lawfulness of all governments founded upon conquest. It swept away all the rubbish of accumulated centuries of servitude. It announced in practical form to the world the transcendent truth of the unalienable sovereignty of the people.

Armitage cites other Americans to similar effect in the antebellum period, notably Frederick Douglass and David Walker, both of whom noted the inconsistency between the theory of human equality propounded in the Declaration and the practice of domestic slavery. But whereas Armitage seems to regard this contradiction as a sort of dawning discovery of the two or three decades before the Civil War, I would argue that it was embedded in American political thought from the very outset. British opponents of the Declaration, as Armitage notes, highlighted the fact that loudest yelps for liberty came from the drivers of Negroes, in Samuel Johnson’s pungent expression, but a great many American revolutionary leaders saw and deplored the contradiction at the time. It was the strength of their commitment to the union of American states, rather than the tepidness of their antislavery, that explains why slavery was recognized in the 1787 Constitution.

Armitage’s third chapter (“A World of Declarations”) details the some hundred declarations of independence issued since 1776 on behalf of regional or nationalist groups. These came in four distinct phases, the first occurring in the aftermath of the American and French Revolutions and the last three a
byproduct of the great conflicts of the twentieth century (World War I, World War II, and the Cold War). Relatively few, Armitage comments, “contained a declaration of individual rights that paralleled the second paragraph of the American Declaration” and thus were in keeping with the main thrust of that document: “that it was an assertion of the rights of states among other states rather than an enumeration of the rights of individuals against their governors.” Though globalization is often understood as unleashing forces threatening to state sovereignty, Armitage shows that it has been a “great propellant” of independent statehood.

No short summary can do justice to the skill with which Armitage navigates various questions of political thought and international law over the last two centuries. As a work of history, the book renders a series of tumultuous developments in lucid form, and it is not without relevance to the present day. Surely it is useful to recall that among the truths Americans “have uttered from the day of our Founding” is that every people must find its own way to freedom. As America, in its most recent incarnation, took on the role of liberator to the world, it seems to have forgotten that the possession by the various peoples of the rights of independent statehood is an indispensable concomitant of a peaceful international order and the necessary (though not admittedly sufficient) precondition for the achievement of civil freedom.

It is surely appropriate to believe that the principle of independence must be qualified by a commitment to union (what would now be called international cooperation or multilateralism), just as it must be tempered by respect for human rights. But there are certain lines, expressed in classic doctrines of “external self-determination,” that should not be crossed. To invade the territory of others for the purposes of establishing human rights and democracy is a violation of the basic right of independence and concomitant doctrines of sovereignty and self-determination. The United States, as Jefferson wrote, “surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government is founded – that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, & change these forms at its own will.” Heartening to the rise of new nations in the Americas, Jefferson expressed the hope that the South Americans would find their way to “independence and self-government,” but insisted that “they have the right, and we none, to choose for themselves.”
The principle of independence remains a vital building block of a safe and just international order. It promotes the recognition of the right of independent communities to their own existence ("communal liberty") and works out a path to peace in opposition to empire. Its morality, as Robert Jackson has observed, is that of “difference, recognition, respect, regard, dialogue, interaction, exchange, and similar norms that postulate coexistence and reciprocity between independent political communities.”

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David Armitage’s *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* is a small book that packs a big punch. Extricating this iconic document from the conventional narrative of American national history, Armitage restores the Declaration of July 4, 1776, to its proper global context. More than a year after the Revolution began, Congress belatedly declared its intention to withdraw from the British Empire and seek recognition as an independent state from “the Powers of the Earth.” Armitage argues persuasively that the revolutionaries’ challenge to imperial rule initiated the modern world of states, defined by their relations to each other or their “external sovereignty.”

American historians generally focus on the articulation of regime principles in its second paragraph — “all Men are created, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights…” —, overlooking the first and last paragraphs, where the Declaration does its most important work. The Declaration changed the world not by announcing a revolutionary new standard of legitimacy that would justify “democratic” revolutions elsewhere. To the contrary, Congress sought to reassure a “candid world” that Britain’s former colonies were prepared to assume the role of “FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES” in the European state system and would conform to its canons of lawful, civilized behavior. “The American Declaration,” Armitage concludes, “was a document of state-making, not of nation-formation,” a bid for recognition that was also an acknowledgement of interdependence (17).

Armitage’s global perspective enables him to turn conventional readings of the Declaration inside out and thus to recover its original meanings in its own time. Students of early American history, increasingly conscious of the
parochialism of “exceptionalist,” nation-centered historiography, are more than ready to embrace Armitage’s revisionism. Political Scientist David Hendrickson’s influential Peace Pact, published in 2003, initiated the paradigm shift that Armitage’s Declaration consolidates. Hendrickson’s internationalist reading of the U.S. Constitution revolutionizes our understanding of the founding era. Anticipating Armitage, Hendrickson downplays nation-making, emphasizing instead the Founders’ primary concerns with guaranteeing peace among the independent American state-republics and with their collective security in a dangerous post-imperial world. Swedish historian Max Edling draws on the rich literature on European state formation in his superb A Revolution in Favor of Government, also published in 2003. Like Armitage and Hendrickson, Edling gives short shrift to the American reception of “republicanism,” the pre-revolutionary incubator of national identity for generations of ideological historians influenced by J.G.A. Pocock, Bernard Bailyn, and Gordon S. Wood. The Founders, in Edling’s deflationary account, were much less interested in the character of their nation-to-be than in creating an effective – and recognizable – fiscal-military state that could finally vindicate American claims to independence.

Armitage’s great contribution to this historiographical turn is to shift attention away from the role the Declaration came to play in American self-understanding – focusing, in retrospect, on the kind of people Americans had or should become – to the Declaration’s broader, continuing impact on the world it helped bring into being. Armitage thus highlights “the outward-looking rather than the inward-looking face of the state,” situating the Declaration in “a history concerning the relations of states with other states” (p. 19). In 1780 Jeremy Bentham signaled the emergence of this new world of states when he substituted the term “international law” – the positive law that states generate in their reciprocal relations – for “law of nations” and its traditional association with the law of nature (p. 11). The Peace of Paris in 1783 fulfilled the Declaration’s original intention, making one state out of thirteen former British colonies.

Far from being the wave of the democratic future, the Declaration’s invocation of natural rights marked it as a relic of the Enlightenment. Even as “the language of individual natural rights” gained broad popular acceptance in the era of the American and French revolutions, the "philosophical
underpinnings that had made sense of it gave way” (pp. 89-90). Bentham thus had little patience with the Declaration’s sounding platitudes, and particularly the boilerplate social contract theory in its second paragraph. As a statement of abstract principles, the Declaration would fall on increasingly deaf ears, particularly in the wake of the devastation unleashed by the French Revolution. By contrast, the Declaration’s claims to sovereignty and state recognition would have enduring effects on the constitution of the modern world as “students of public law incorporated the Declaration into the modern positive law of nations” (88).

After 1815, as Americans emerged from a second “war for independence,” the Declaration began to take on its modern function as an icon of nationhood. With independence established, “all of substance that remained to be revered was the second paragraph” (93). “Domesticated and Americanized for specifically national purposes,” the iconic Declaration gave Revolutionary natural rights a new lease of life, linking its “abstract truths” to the nation’s founding and to its future (96). Abraham Lincoln’s celebration of Jefferson and the Declaration in the midst of a great crisis that threatened to destroy the American union marked the culmination of this nationalization of natural rights, making them the birthright of an exceptional people, “the last best, hope of earth.” (“Annual message” 537). The great irony was that the union’s savior invoked the Declaration against state-making Southerners who asserted their right to independence and self-government. Seceding Confederates, Armitage suggests, understood the Declaration’s original purposes better than Lincoln.

Armitage’s insistence on the fundamental distinction between “state-making” and “nation-formation” serves his broader purpose of resituating the Declaration in a global context and offers a fresh perspective on the document’s subsequent reception at home and abroad. But the distinction is much too neat. Lincoln’s invocation of the Declaration as a nation-making document in opposition to state-making Southerners suggests that the two concepts are inextricably linked. After all, Confederates would not have sought to make a state if they did not believe they already constituted a “one People,” with a long list of grievances against the federal government that echoed the Declaration’s grievances against the king. For the Revolutionaries of 1776, the process of nation-formation was more radically compressed, even instantaneous. According to an account quoted by Armitage, when the troops
at Ticonderoga in August of 1776 heard the Declaration “the language of every man’s countenance was, Now we are a people!” (17). Not waiting for independence to be “accomplished … through external recognition,” these soldiers instead participated in its performance, as it was announced (81).

Armitage pays little attention to the “inward-looking face of the state,” to the bid for “internal recognition” by a far-flung, loosely aligned patriot leadership. To achieve legitimacy, to make the “fiction” of popular sovereignty seem compelling, these leaders had to convince themselves and their followers that they constituted “one People,” authorized by the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” to govern itself (Morgan). Rebellious subjects were transformed into self-governing citizens by performing independence, bringing natural law – Bentham’s “nonsense upon stilts” (80) – down to earth, making it a “positive” fact. The idea that Americans were a people made good sense, representing an ongoing process of political and military mobilization that culminated in the drafting of state constitutions and of a new federal Constitution in 1787.

The many local declarations that preceded Congress’s Declaration and set forth its major themes – the subject of American Scripture, Pauline Maier’s fine study – reflected the Revolutionaries’ acute consciousness of the need to justify themselves, to ground claims to authority in rehearsals and performances – and subsequently remembrance – of the struggle for independence (Maier; see also Parkinson). Appeals to natural law were thus appeals to the people for extraordinary sacrifices of their lives and fortunes on behalf of the common cause. That the individual rights proclaimed in the Declaration’s second paragraph – the liberties that so many Revolutionaries had died for – should be so central to national self-understanding is thus hardly surprising: state-making and nation-formation were two “faces” of the same process.

The Declaration’s eloquent articulation of the equality principle is its most enduring legacy, notwithstanding the eclipse of naturalism and its “philosophical underpinnings.” Tocqueville’s analysis of American democracy suggests that the logic of equality was irresistible and irreversible, “a providential fact” that would define the political landscape of the modern world (Democracy in America: And Two Essays on America 15). It would do so under the aegis of the national idea. In Armitage’s “world of states,” the world that the Declaration helped to create, the legitimacy of governments would be grounded in claims to represent and embody their respective nations or
peoples. Perhaps it was the nationalization of natural rights that knocked them off Bentham’s “stilts,” for positivists insist that sovereignty is absolute and indivisible, that all national citizens – not “men” in the abstract – are created equal. At Versailles, in 1919, British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour thus dismissed the universalistic claims in the American Declaration “that all men are created equal” as hopelessly archaic, “an eighteenth century proposition which he did not believe was true”: how could anyone imagine “that a man in Central Africa was created equal to a European”? Yet Balfour did believe that “it was true in a certain sense that all men of a certain nation were created equal” (110, my emphasis).

We have never lived in a world wholly defined by states, nor in any meaningful sense do we live in a world of nations or peoples. The discrepancies between these two maps of the world – complicated by the proliferation of regimes and connections that we identify with “globalization” – constitute the subject matter of both national and global histories. The founding of the new American nation previewed the travails of political modernity. The United States was recognized by the “Powers of the Earth” in 1783, but it was by no means clear, as Hendrickson shows, whether Americans had created a state or a state system. If “one people” declared itself independent in Philadelphia in 1776, the separate peoples of the respective states wrote constitutions for themselves over the next decade and beyond. Thomas Jefferson, the Declaration’s principal author, believed that American nationhood was predicated on the union of states. A year before his death on July 4, 1826, he characterized the Declaration “as the fundamental act of union of these States” (Jefferson 479). If there were an “American” people, it could only exist because of this original enactment. That union, and the people whose national identity focused on its perfection and preservation, would be destroyed in the Civil War (Nicholas Onuf and Peter Onuf).

Armitage brilliantly and provocatively turns American independence inside out, underscoring the central importance of external recognition to Jefferson and his fellow authors. Building on Armitage’s fresh perspective, we need to bring the nation back in, for the challenges the Revolutionaries faced in justifying the break with Britain anticipated what those future state-makers would face as they created the modern world.
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Consider what Thomas Jefferson wrote on June 24, 1826, on the immediate eve of his death – and of the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. It is a quotation that David Armitage puts on the very first page of his book. Jefferson called the Declaration “an instrument, pregnant with our own and the fate of the world,” a reminder of “the bold and doubtful election we were to make for our country, between submission or the sword.” And more: “May it be to the world, what I believe it will be, (to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to all,) the signal of arousing men to burst the chains, under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of self government.” In his old age, Jefferson still read the document he wrote as the announcement of a broader revolution in North America and, sooner or later, in the rest of the world. A revolution he understood both as state independence (self-government at home, free of external domination, if necessary conquered by the violence of “the sword”) and as radical social and political transformations (republican self-government by the people, free of old “chains,” ignorance, superstition). The nexus between independence and rights – the rights of individuals to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (against their governors) as well as the rights of citizens to govern themselves (at the very least to “consent” to their form of government) – is not surprising. It is at the core of the American Revolution and all its documents. It is famously at the core of Thomas Paine’s *Common Sense*.

Armitage challenges this nexus. To him, the true message of the Declaration is in the first and last paragraphs: “an assertion of statehood” (18), of state independence; “the rest of the Declaration,” that is the second paragraph with its self-evident truths and unalienable rights, “provided only a statement of the abstract principles upon which the assertion” was made (66, italics mine). For at least four decades after 1776, he contends, this was true at home; Americans valued the fact of independence more than the document that declared it, and they did not bother with its “abstract principles.” The Declaration in its entirety became a national icon, celebrated every Fourth of July, only in the 1820s. In the meanwhile, it had quite a career abroad: it provided the template for similar documents that proclaimed the independence of a host of new states; in fact it invented a genre of political
writing. Before 1848, more than thirty such declarations appeared, mainly in the Americas; then in two later waves, after World War One and World War Two, the pandemic spread elsewhere in the world. Many of those documents drew inspiration from the American one; sometimes they adopted specific phrases; often they adopted its structure. More generally, the Declaration gave shape to the modern concept of a new state breaking away from imperial domination and winning a place of its own among “the Powers of the Earth.” Even in these discussions abroad, says Armitage, claims regarding individual rights were not important, the issue of state sovereignty was. The American Revolution was the first outbreak of “a contagion of sovereignty” that in the last two centuries has created “a world of states” out of “a world of empires” (103-104). It is about time to recover the real meaning of the U.S. Declaration, “a document of state-making, not of nation-formation” (17).

The narrative that Armitage develops from these assumptions, a narrative richer and more nuanced than my crude summary suggests, is illuminating and generally persuasive. He brings plenty of evidence to show the worldwide influence of the U.S. Declaration and its idea of state independence, and of its contribution to the emergence of a modern positive law of nations – in a transatlantic culture that exactly at the time of the American Revolution, and because of the crisis it generated, added to its vocabulary the word international (courtesy of Jeremy Bentham, 1780). This short, fascinating book, which I wish I had written myself, contributes significantly, as the author intended, to internationalize the study of American history, to rethink it in a global context. What I do not find persuasive is that, in order to undertake such a tour de force, one should downplay or dismiss altogether the rights section of the document. Perhaps Armitage does it for analytical and rhetorical purposes, to give a sharp edge to his argument, but also, it seems to me, out of a deep conviction of his own. In his conclusion he tries to soften his claims, without really succeeding. He writes that the traditional historical assessments of the Declaration that emphasize its philosophy of human rights and those that emphasize the rights of states, are “not necessarily incompatible”: the document incorporates both rights. And yet, he adds, “the greater prominence of the Declaration’s assertions of statehood in the history of its global reception and imitation accurately reflects the intentions of its authors and better describes the balance of its intended argument” (139-140, italics mine). I would argue that it
was not a matter of balance, compatibility, or incorporation of two different sets of rights, but rather of a causal relationship: states’ rights being claimed as based on, and legitimized by, people’s rights. This is what made the Declaration a powerful revolutionary document, and a highly controversial and contested one, at home and abroad as well. Much of the evidence to sustain my argument is in the book itself, and this is the beauty of it.

Armitage writes that the rights claims of the Declaration “played little part in American political discourse in the first forty years of the Republic” (90). I am not so sure. Once the issue of independence was settled, the document became a contested item in the vibrant public life of the new republic precisely because of its rights parts. In the partisan strife between Federalists and Jeffersonians, in the long shadow of the French Revolution, the Federalists saw it as a dangerous, anti-British, Francophile call for revolution. Its broad egalitarianism made it an unsettling text; for many (early abolitionists, labor and women activists) it spoke of a promise of what America should have been and was not, and became a combat flag for change. Its principles resonated in some of the state constitutions, with words drawn from documents that predated the Declaration but were clearly part of its genealogy; and to Americans of that age, state charters and politics were more relevant than their federal counterparts. “The language of the Declaration of Independence did not appear in the Federal Constitution” (92), says Armitage, and of course he is right. Still, the process that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights began with James Madison’s proposal to change the text of the Constitution and, as Madison himself put it in 1789, to prefix to it:

> a declaration, that all power is originally rested in, and consequently derived from, the people. That Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their Government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.

Only at the end of the process this language, directly picked up from the second paragraph of the Declaration, gives way to a separate set of discrete amendments.
Because of principles stated in its rights section, the Declaration became a dangerous, contested document in the international arena as well. Of course the founders proclaimed that the new United States desired “neither to transgress, nor to fall short” (James Wilson, 1777) of the rules which governed the relationship among existing states. From those states they wanted diplomatic recognition and possibly help. But to conclude what Armitage concludes is going too far:

In this sense, the Declaration signaled to the world that the Americans intended their revolution to be decidedly unrevolutionary. [...] It would conform as far as possible to the regulatory norms of contemporary politics. Least of all would it be an incitement to rebellion or revolution elsewhere in the world, rather than an inducement to reform. (65)

This may have been the official policy of the revolutionary leadership, but the mere facts of the existence of the new “free and independent states” of America (to quote from the Declaration), and the philosophical bases upon which they were established, were subversive and perceived as such. After all, as Armitage explains, in Anglophone political language the term “free state” had come to signify “republican governments” (38), not a welcome development in ancient-régime Europe. And then the Declaration acquired a life of its own — in its entirety. When word of American independence reached the British colony of Nova Scotia, the governor allowed only the last paragraph of the Declaration to be printed, lest the rest of it “inflame the minds of his Majesty’s loyal and faithful subjects of the Province” (75). The same happened in Spanish America, where the local authorities banned the circulation of all the documents of the American Revolution, in a futile attempt to prevent the spread of anti-imperial propaganda (118). Nevertheless, the documents were translated and circulated.

The Declaration was revolutionary in another sense: it was an act of force, with a powerful new authority behind it. American independence, says Armitage, could formally be accomplished and was indeed accomplished “only through external recognition” (81), by France with the 1778 alliance treaty, and ultimately by Great Britain with the 1783 peace treaty. This may well be true according to the customs and laws of the times: only positive acts by legitimate existing states could constitute new statehood. From this
point of view, their self-styled declaration left the founders in an impossible position: “How could independence be declared, except by a body that was already independent in the sense understood by the law of nations?” (80). The way out of this Catch-22 logical trap resided in the brutal facts of life: thirteen former colonies behaved like independent states, crafted a new loose “constitution” or “firm league of friendship” or “international agreement” (whatever one wanted to call the Articles of Confederation), and acted like a new corporate political formation capable of controlling the land and governing itself. France and Great Britain recognized American independence because it was already there. Armitage himself puts it nicely: “The Declaration had thus to perform American independence in the very act of announcing it” (81); in the act of winning and defending it with the Jeffersonian “sword,” I would add, and announcing it “in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies.” And why could the people claim that authority? Of course because of the “abstract principles” enunciated in the second paragraph of the Declaration.

The connection between independence and rights in the American Declaration is so close that it is troubling when other declarations ignore it. As we know from the U.S. experience, a statement of rights is no guarantee that a polity will not deprive many members of those same rights; and yet no polity was born perfect. And I wonder if a systematic content analysis, from this vantage point, of the many declarations of independence is not going to tell us something about the comparative nature of the independence movements that crafted them, and the regimes they intended to inaugurate. Armitage does not address this issue, but he opens the way to do that, to undertake such new research; and this, to me, is no small additional virtue of his remarkable book. Just to test the waters briefly, consider the first wave of declarations, in the early nineteenth century, and ask very simple questions. How significant is it, for their fate and the fate of their continent, to paraphrase Jefferson, that so many Spanish American countries proclaimed independence as an assertion of state or national rights, but “without any [...] abstract justifications for rebellion or separation” (120), and without acknowledging their citizens’ rights to self-government? How significant is it that the Haitian Declaration of Independence (1804) turned into a passionate ego trip of general J.J. Dessalines, full of bombastic references to
a vague “liberty” of the people and to the very precise merits of “the Chief who commands you,” namely Dessalines himself (197, Appendix)? How significant is it when the absence of rights talk goes hand in hand with a presence of religion well beyond the ceremonial appeals to the designs of the Divine Providence, or to the Supreme Judge, Creator or Arbiter of the World, which were standard fare in all declarations, in fact in all political oaths? The 1811 Venezuelan Declaration of Independence, with its dramatic opening “In the Name of the All-powerful God” and its upfront desire of “believing and defending the holy Catholic and Apostolic Religion of Jesus Christ” (199, 206, Appendix), makes the U.S. Declaration of Independence look like the model of secularism that it indeed was.

David Armitage, Harvard University

A Reply to My Critics

Authors who reflect at a distance on their past publications often express regret: regret that their research agenda could not be fulfilled; regret that constraints of time or space cut short their ambitions; regret that their arguments have been misunderstood or insufficiently appreciated. I have few such regrets about The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (2007). Indeed, as the book developed, it greatly outran the modest hopes I originally had for it. Though its final version was quite short, it still managed to cover a large expanse of time, from 1776 to the present, and a great deal of space, from the Atlantic world to our current global order. I am therefore delighted that it is now being read beyond the anglophone world, and I am especially grateful to Franco Motta and Guido Abbattista for, respectively, their excellent translation and generous introduction to the Italian edition.

My book has also been extremely lucky in finding thoughtful critics. As Oscar Wilde might have said, to have one critical forum devoted to one’s book may be regarded as good fortune; to have two looks like extravagance (Armitage, Dubois, Ferguson, Hulsebosch, and Hunt). I must therefore begin by thanking Tiziano Bonazzi, David Hendrickson, Peter Onuf and
Arnaldo Testi for their generous yet challenging responses. Their earlier work has been both fundamentally inspirational and reassuringly parallel to my own. To receive such rich and varied reactions is a great privilege. My only regret is that I might not be able to address adequately all the many important points they raise.

I certainly cannot complain that these four distinguished historians have failed to grasp my argument. They all recognize that I had two main intentions in writing the book. The first was to see the Declaration of Independence as a declaration of *inter*-dependence, a document that announced not only separation from Great Britain but also integration with the other “Powers of the Earth.” The second was to use this reading of the Declaration to contribute to the internationalization, and even the globalization, of American history. One aim was therefore historical, to recover the meaning of the Declaration in its original context; the other was historiographical, to encourage American historians to set their subject in more cosmopolitan contexts. If the most primally American of all documents could be seen in international and global terms, then what other aspects of American history might be illuminated by such a turn outwards? These two aims gradually led to a third: to try to account for the great many other declarations of independence from around the world I had discovered while writing the book. What was their relationship to the American Declaration? Why were there so many of them? And what did their proliferation signify regarding the impact of America on the world and even about the trajectories of political modernity itself? As this brief account of the book’s genesis suggests, and as my commentators’ acute remarks confirm, the third aim of the book was not entirely continuous with the first two. This discontinuity may account for some of the unease they feel about my third chapter, an unease to which I shall return in the conclusion to these remarks.

First let me respond to the charge made by Professor Bonazzi, and implicitly endorsed by Professors Onuf and Testi, that I downplay the “political theory” of the Declaration. By this Bonazzi means the assertions made in the Declaration’s second paragraph: that all men are created equal; that they possess certain rights, among them life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that legitimate governments derive their authority from the consent of the governed; and that the people have the right to resist, and even
overthrow, any government that does not secure their rights. It is true that I hoped to rebalance what I saw as an over-emphasis in the literature on the Declaration’s political theory. I wanted instead to highlight what might be called its international theory: that is, its conceptions of the rights of states, as well as the rights of individuals; the explicit and implicit understandings of international relations found in the document; and, above all, its purpose as a declaration of sovereignty among other sovereigns written in the language of contemporary international law. Only by doing that, I believed, could I answer both the historical question – what did the declaration declare? – and the historiographical question – what difference would it make to view this most American of documents through non-American spectacles? – which I had initially set myself.

The result was deliberately, and I still think necessarily, polemical. I was arguing a case rather than offering a comprehensive account of all the ideas and arguments to be found in the Declaration. I had little, if anything, new to say about the presence of John Locke or even Francis Hutcheson in the Declaration, though much to say about the presence of the much less well-known figure of Emer de Vattel: perhaps the most globally influential European thinker of the late eighteenth century, and certainly the only one whose work can be shown to have been in the hands of the Declaration’s drafters as they worked on its argument (Vattel; Armitage, *La Dichiarazione d’indipendenza* 12-14).

However, as most of my commentators imply, being provocative comes at a cost. For example, Professor Hendrickson notes that I overlook the constitutive link between the popular sovereignty asserted in the Declaration’s second paragraph and the claims of external sovereignty made for the United States (plural, of course) by the Declaration as a whole. In a similar vein, Professor Testi argues that I have thereby obscured the all-important “nexus between independence and rights” at the very heart of the Declaration. Hendrickson quotes John Quincy Adams’s statement in 1821 that the Declaration “announced in practical form to the world the transcendent truth of the unalienable sovereignty of the people”; he might also have cited Abraham Lincoln who, forty years later at Philadelphia’s Independence Hall, recalled that “[i]t was not the mere matter of the separation of the colonies from the mother land; but something in that Declaration giving liberty,
not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world for all future time” (“Speech in Independence Hall” 240). Like Thomas Jefferson in 1826, Adams and Lincoln implied that the second paragraph was the core of the Declaration, not just for Americans but also for all humanity, and that the message that underpinned emergent American nationhood was also the main international meaning of the Declaration.

The triumph of popular sovereignty, first at the level of the states and then in the federal Constitution, was the major global message of the American experiment as whole. However, the Declaration played little part in disseminating that message to the world. For example, it was quite possible to believe that popular sovereignty and democratic equality were the characteristically novel features that America had brought to the repertoire of modern politics, as Onuf reminds us that Tocqueville did, without once mentioning the Declaration – as Tocqueville did not, at least not in *De la Démocratie en Amérique* (1835-40). Part of the process of making the Declaration American, especially in the nineteenth century, was precisely the effort – by African Americans, as well as white Americans – to make its central message one of popular sovereignty, natural equality, and individual rights rather than of independent sovereignty within the international order.

Peter Onuf notes that the Declaration looked backwards rather than forwards in its espousal of natural rights. It did so also in its assumption that a people could only be free in a free state, or non-monarchical republican government. That nexus characterized the vital strain of early modern political thought that Quentin Skinner has dubbed “neo-Roman.” Yet it was only one contingent argument among others about statehood and liberty. For example, non-republican, “absolutist” theorists denied there was any necessary connection between internal sovereignty, based on popular authority, and external sovereignty (Skinner). This meant that by the nineteenth century independence could just as easily accompany monarchy (for example, in Mexico in 1821-23 or in Brazil after Dom Pedro’s declaration of independence in 1822) as it could republican government. The globalization of popular sovereignty is one story whose beginnings might be found in 1776; the globalization of independent statehood is another. These two narratives have often intersected, but they are manifestly not always and not everywhere the same.
The logic of nationalism implies that every people must have a state, and every state should be based on the sovereignty of a single people. As Max Weber classically defined it, “a nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own” (176). In light of this, Onuf is surely correct to say that the distinction I make in the book between “state-making” and “nation-formation” is “much too neat,” even as he acknowledges its heuristic value for my own argument. I agree with him (and Weber) that state-making and nation-formation are two sides of the same coin, but I would again insist that, although this may be true generally, it is not true universally, even in the American case. Indeed, the mismatch between state and nation is among the most salient and disruptive of what Onuf nicely calls “the travails of political modernity.” Before 1776, it was at the heart of the process we now call the American Revolution as British colonists increasingly found themselves to be outside the British nation even as they struggled to negotiate their sovereignty under the British state (Gould; LaCroix). Between 1776 and 1789, how “one People” could be divided into thirteen states was America’s overarching political dilemma. And after 1789, just how many “peoples” inhabited a single, federal state would be the still more fundamental and destructive dilemma fought over during the Civil War. These American conundrums foreshadowed some of the twentieth century’s greatest political travails: secession, civil war, and the violent break-up of composite states such as empires and federations (Roeder; Armitage, “Secession and Civil War”).

The mismatch between nations, of which there are potentially a great many, and states, which are few, should remind us that most people, for most of world history, have not lived in states, and fewer still have inhabited that peculiar species of polity we call the nation-state. It is here that I must take issue with Professor Bonazzi’s eloquent and multifaceted case for the primacy of states over empires over the last 500 years. I agree with him that the “state is a political institution that characterizes European history,” but I could only agree with him that “states and empires are not two political concepts with the same theoretical depth” by arguing the opposite of what he proposes: that it is in fact empires, and not states, that have the greater theoretical depth and historical persistence. In the past decade, a rich and
expanding historical literature has shown that empires preceded states; that
many of what we think of as classic examples of states (such as France and
Britain) can be better analysed as empires; that the states-system within
Europe came into being alongside an imperial order outside Europe; that
states created empires across both land and sea, but only truly became nation-
states (rather than imperial states) when finally detached from their overseas
dependencies; and that the vast majority of new states since 1815 – 62% to
be exact – emerged from the dissolution of colonial empires. The primacy of
the state now increasingly appears to be a relatively recent illusion created
by, among others, political nationalists, positivist international lawyers, and
realist international theorists, all of whom projected their own ideological
commitments back onto a distant past and called it history.  

The final chapter of The Declaration of Independence: A Global History
perhaps did not take these caveats seriously enough. It may have given the
impression that I am attached to a diffusionist model of political creativity,
in which all innovation has spread outwards to the rest of the globe from the
Euro-American world of the North Atlantic, and that I believe in a smooth,
irreversible transition from a world of empires to a world of states. Both of
those (misleading) impressions could, I think, have been remedied if I had
had my commentators’ remarks to hand when I was completing my book.
In particular, Professors Bonazzi and Testi both suggest that it would have
been better to disaggregate the later declarations of independence from each
other rather than to view them en masse as I did in that closing chapter. I
take this point seriously, not least because many other reviewers of the book
have also made it. I still believe I was not wholly mistaken in treating all
declarations as instances of a single genre distributed across the centuries. To
my knowledge, no-one had attempted any comparative study of declarations
of independence and even the collections of such documents that existed were
either hard to obtain or unknown to historians. By examining declarations
serially and collectively, vivid patterns of state-creation emerged even if (as
Bonazzi rightly notes) the birth of those states which were born without
a declaration of independence was obscured. Detailed contextualization of
every declaration of independence is clearly a desideratum, but would require
a team of historians, each versed in a specific (usually national) history and
historiography, before any larger conclusions could be drawn: Professor Testi’s
suggestive closing remarks about the Haitian and Venezuelan declarations already hint at the rewards to come from such work. In this regard, I am pleased to see that more individual studies are now appearing: for example, of various Latin American declarations, of the Israeli declaration of independence (1948), and of the world’s latest declaration of independence, that of Kosovo in February 2008. The recent rediscovery in the British National Archives of the only surviving printed copy of the Haitian declaration (1804) will surely also inspire further research. In time, these studies will add up to a more persuasive and nuanced account of the processes of declaring independence than I could provide in my own attempt at a survey.

One result of such an account, I predict, will be a reaffirmation of the American Revolution’s place within international and global history (Armitage and Subrahmanyam; Armitage, “The American Revolution”). As the boundaries of historical inquiry have widened in recent years, early American history has increasingly benefited from this expansion of horizons. In the three years since The Declaration of Independence: A Global History was first published, we have already had a global history of the U.S. Constitution (Billias), the first truly Atlantic history of federalism (LaCroix), the first comparative history of the origins of “the legal trinity of nation statehood – sovereignty, jurisdiction, and territory” in early America and early Australia (Ford 1), as well as the first study in more than half a century of the beginnings of American global trade (Fichter). An excellent study of the Constitution and the law of nations has just appeared (Golove and Hulsebosch). The internationalization and globalization of early American history proceeds apace, and I am glad to have made a modest contribution to this salutary turn (Shaffer; Neem; Zagarri). I may not have done so entirely to my critics’ satisfaction, but I can still look back with much pleasure on writing The Declaration of Independence: A Global History and with some pride at the lively debates, like this one, it has helped to inspire.

Notes

1 For the former, see Peter S. Onuf, “A Declaration of Independence for Diplomatic Historians” and Hendrickson; for the latter, Bonazzi and Testi.
There also do not appear to be any references to the Declaration in Tocqueville’s later writings on America, *Tocqueville on America after 1840*.

On the African American contribution to this process, see now Slauter.

For the major discontinuity between pre-modern conceptions of natural rights and contemporary "human rights," see Moyn.

On the first, see Dunn; on the second, Fabry. More generally, see Armitage, “Declaraciones de independencia.”

See especially Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*; Keene; Teschke; Ben-Ghiat; Kumar; Burbank and Cooper; Roeder.

For example, Benton; Dubois; Gibson; Griffin.

For a model of how this can be done, using the similar genre of the manifesto, see Puchner.

For example, Kaempfer; Schachar; Fierstein; Ávila, Dym, and Pani.


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Works cited


