Party over Person:

Preferences for Leaders in a Pakistani Megacity[*]

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1   Introduction

On what basis do voters in developing democracies choose their local leaders? The traditional answers both in the literature and in policy circles focus on shared caste or ethnic ties or more recently on the connections forged by leaders with higher-tier politicians and the bureaucracy. In weakly institutionalized settings, voters are thought to align themselves with leaders from their own identity groups or with leaders who have personally developed connections that facilitate targeted delivery to their own communities. Parties are considered weak and co-partisanship is considered a weak predictor of preferences for leaders. These studies are usually conducted in rural areas or in informal settlements in urban areas.

In this paper, we examine citizens preferences for local leaders in the Pakistani megacity of Lahore. With a population of 11.1 million, Lahore is the 14th most populous city in the world, comparable to Mumbai that houses 12.4 million people. We conduct a conjoint experiment with 2,150 male and female voters in Lahore to examine the characteristics they prefer in local leaders,

and find that these urban voters have preferences for their local leaders that considerably differ from the rural residents and slum-dwellers highlighted in the literature.

Co-Partisanship trumps all other characteristics: voters who support the ruling party (PML-N) are 50 percentage points more likely to choose a leader who belongs to the PML-N, compared to a leader who is similar in all other respects but belongs to the main opposition party, PTI. Voters who support the PTI are 49 percentage points more likely to pick PTI leaders over PML-N who are similar on other characteristics. The only other leader trait that comes even close to co-partisanship is education, with voters being 14 percentage points more likely to support college graduates over uneducated leaders.

Political connections formed on a personal basis lose the importance they assume in rural settings and in informal urban settings. While those supporting the government party and those who are undecided voters do not have a discernible preference for connected or unconnected leaders, those supporting the opposition party actually penalize local leaders for having worked in election campaigns for parliamentarians. Voters do not exhibit the preference for a leader being born and raised in the community, contrary to findings from slum settings in urban India (Auerbach and Thachil, 2014). Contrary to the co-ethnicity preference that is often considered the hallmark of South Asian politics, voters do not have a preference for leaders from the same caste group as themselves.

This paper focuses on voters' preferences for local leaders, who populate the layers of political space between the voter and the elected parliamentarian. These actors are referred to as brokers, workers or influencers in the literature (Larreguy et al., 2016, Schneider 2014, Stokes et al., 2013). Some politicians prefer to refer to these actors as organizers or activists. Some of these brokers refer to themselves as 'local leaders' or 'social workers'. This diversity in titles is reflective of the diversity in the profile of these actors, the roles they perform in society and how they come to perform these roles in the first place.

A growing literature that attempts to deepen our understanding of the profile of political brokers, what motivates them and how they strategize (Rizzo, 2016). In a recent paper, Auerbach and Thatchill (2014) examine the question of how informal leaders emerge in Indian slums. As develop-

ing countries undergo rapid infrastructure development, urbanization and accelerating migration, the role of the broker in dense formal urban settings in developing countries is central to how the lives of citizens in developing country megacities shape up. This paper is the first attempt, to the best of our knowledge, to understand the emergence of local leaders in a formal urban setting in a developing country.

2   Context

2.1   Democracy in Pakistan

Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy that has seen extended periods of military rule and periodic judicial interruptions to democratic rule in its 70 year history. The current democratically elected government was only the first to take over from a democratically elected government that had completed its tenure. The most popular party is Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N) that holds 48% of the seats in the National Assembly and forms a government in the center and in the largest province Punjab, with the support of several independent candidates. The other two main parties are Pakistan People's Party with 12 percent of the seats and Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf with 10 percent of the seats, forming coalition governments in Sindh and Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa provinces respectively.[1] Punjab province and in particular Lahore, which is the focus of this paper, has two major political players: PML-N and PTI. The PML-N has been a major national party since the late 1980's while the PTI is a more recent entrant.

The country is divided into 272 national assembly (NA) constituencies, 147 of which are in Punjab province. Each NA constituency has between 0.3-0.4 million voters. Each NA constituency has two to three provincial assembly (PA) constituencies housed within it on average, and the Member of National Assembly (MNA) candidate may or may not be politically aligned with the Member of Provincial Assembly (MPA) candidates of their party. Local elections are held at the level of the Union Council (UC) which is a unit housing between 20,000 to 30,000 voters. Elections

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[1]The first-past-the-post system implies that both these parties get 10-12 percent of the seats after having secured 15-17 percent of the popular vote, while the PML-N secured 48 percent of the seats with only 33 percent of the popular vote.

were based on a party basis for the first time in 2015.

Lahore, which is the focus of this paper, is a city of 11 million residents and a highly contested political space. As the capital of the largest province in Pakistan and the headquarters of both PML-N and PTI, Lahore functions as a key battleground in national elections. Election campaigns in Lahore are very energetic and visible, but are not typically as violent as those in Karachi or in other developing countries such as certain Sub-Saharan African countries (Straus and Taylor, 2009).

2.2 Local Leaders

There is enormous diversity in the profile of local leaders. They may have a clear party affiliation or may be non-partisan, with party affiliation being a transitory transactional concept for them. Auerbach and Thatchill (2014) report similar dynamics in urban India. Politicians in both rural and urban Pakistan report that their political machines consist of brokers who have been part of their machine for decades and those who have switched over to their side or away from their side frequently.[2]

The power relationship between brokers / local leaders and politicians may be clearly asymmetric in favor of the politician or more symmetric with the broker having a lot of leverage due to their personal local following. The broker usually have some local following and to the extent that this following is loyal to his person, they exercise some influence over the higher tier politician.

Higher-tier politicians tend to be heavily dependent on local leaders not only during campaign time but also for the implementation and monitoring of development projects. One MNA candidate commented during an interview that one of his main headaches is to keep together factions of local leaders who are aligned with him but are sometimes inclined to switch allegiance due to internal factionalism.[3]

They may have a range of occupations including local business owners[4], lawyers or government employees. The nature of their role typically involves them spending a lot of time in their locality,

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[2]Interview with Zain Qureshi, PML-N MNA Candidate from Multan, 07 July, 2017 and with Ali Ayaz, manager of PML-N MNA from Lahore, February 2017

[3]Interview with Khwaja Muhammad Waseem Butt, PML-N MPA from Narowal, June 2017

[4]The modal occupation of Lahore local leaders interviewed

and in cases where their work takes them out of the UC on a regular basis, they tend to feel the political costs[5]. For some such as shopkeepers, their occupation is such that it can be integrated with their role as political brokers. Government workers typically end up acting as brokers for the incumbent, which is a dynamic also found in Mexico by Larreguy et al. (2015).

Political machines tend to operate at the level of the NA constituency, with each major candidate for the MNA seat piecing together local level coalitions to bring together various political factions under their banner in order to mobilize voters and win elections. Candidates for local elections are typically nominated by the party's MNA and MPA candidates for the area that houses the UC. This may allow the MNA and MPA to exercise significant influence over these local leaders.

According to the estimates made by several local politicians in Lahore and Narowal, there are anywhere between 30 to a hundred active 'political workers', though only some of these would be considered local leaders by voters. According to survey data from three NA constituencies in Lahore, there are about 0.85 political worker for every thousand residents, giving us between 17-25 political workers in each union council. This number is a little lower than the estimate by Auerbach (2016) from urban slums in Jaipur and Bhopal in India. The difference could be explained by India's longer experience with democracy, but more likely by the difference by the difference in the political environment of a slum versus a formal settlement as in the case of our Lahore sample.

Close to twenty individuals in each Union Council can be considered local politicians at a minimum: Eleven of these are sitting on the Council, usually a higher number contested for the Council but lost, and some either chose not to contest or did not receive tickets. With the introduction of elected local governments in 2015, the importance of local politicians viz-a-viz unelected political workers has increased.

The 'blocs' formed within these active political workers are usually not aligned on party lines, but have current party affiliations in place, e.g. there may be four 'blocs' in a UC along *biraderi* lines and three of these may be aligned with the PML-N, while still harboring some animosity or competition amongst themselves. On occasion, the same bloc may split up with a brother defecting and joining another party. At the time of the local election in 2015, the dominant party

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[5]Interview with Abid Meer, UC Chairman from Lahore, July 2017

in Punjab (PML-N) avoided awarding official party tickets in many UC's (10% in Sargodha and 40% in Narowal), because multiple local factions / blocs affiliated with the PML-N politicians wanted tickets but the higher tier politicians did not want to pick sides, since doing so might hurt them in elections for the national or provincial assemblies.

They allocate a significant proportion of their time to politics (although they may not see all of this work as political). This includes: (i) trying to get citizens' municipal services problems fixed through the relevant political and bureaucratic channels, (ii) supervising the infrastructure / development projects being undertaken in their Union Council - typically with MNA / MPA funding but they will start getting their own limited funding soon, (iii) dispute resolution - people typically expect them to act as arbitrators, (iv) attending weddings, funerals and related events, and (vi) during election time, campaign for their candidate. Their primary source of income is their business, agricultural or professional income but it seems they do typically expect to derive some rents from politics as well - these may come in the form of direct payments from politicians, but more frequently in the form of indirect rents from projects in their area.

3 Data

The data on citizen preferences for local leaders and citizens' political affiliations for this paper comes from an original survey conducted with 2,150 registered voters in 43 union councils within four provincial assembly constituencies in Lahore, Pakistan. The four provincial assembly constituencies were selected to reflect a mix of competitive and non-competitive neighboring constituencies in the heart of Lahore. The two highly competitive provincial constituencies are PP-147 and PP-148 within national assembly constituency NA-122, while the two constituencies with less competition at the provincial and national assembly levels are PP-146 in NA-121, and PP-149 in NA-124. The four constituencies are adjacent to each other in the heart of Lahore.

Within each provincial constituency, all Union Councils (UCs) [6]were included in the sample, with two exception rules stated below. Under the first exception rule, two UCs in PP-147 are excluded that had very high income and wealth levels, and composed predominantly of elite gov-

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[6]A UC is an electoral unit with an average of 14,000 registered voters.

ernment or private housing. Under the second exception rule, four UCs are excluded where only a minority of polling stations fell inside the sample provincial constituencies while a majority fell outside the sample provincial constituencies. The excluded Union Councils constitute only 9.3% of the registered voters in the sample constituencies, with vote shares of dominant parties and voter turnout rates within 1 percentage point and 2 percentage points of included UCs respectively.

Within a UC, the sampling strategy was as follows. Five random GPS points were dropped within each UC's boundary. The surveyors were equipped to accurately reach these points in the field. Once the surveyors reached a point, they surveyed five households around that point using a right-hand rule to ensure randomization. Within each household, a female and male surveyor conducted an interview with a randomly selected female and male registered voter respectively. The survey was conducted on tablets using SurveyCTO software and extensive field and remote monitoring was conducted to ensure high quality accurate survey data.

4 Experiment

In order to estimate the causal effect of various local leader attributes on citizens' choice of these leaders, we use a forced choice conjoint experiment design (Hainmueller et al., 2013). Respondents were presented with the profiles of two local leaders and asked to choose which one they would rather have as a local leader in their area. These profiles varied randomly, with each attribute taking on one of a possible number of pre-specified values with a set probabilities. This design allows us to isolate the causal effect of a particular value of an attribute, which we estimate as the 'average marginal component effect' of that characteristic.

The attributes and the particular values each could take were designed after extensive qualitative fieldwork in the same constituencies of Lahore using interviews with local leaders and with voters, as well as hypothesis formed from previous work undertaken by the authors in rural areas of Pakistan (Liaqat et al., 2017) and in comparison to similar work in Indian slum settlements (Auerbach and Thatchill, 2014). The tables below list the attributes of local leaders we varied in our conjoint experiment along with the probabilities that were assigned to each of the particular values that the attributes took. The probabilities are not equal in all cases: for the attributes where we had

a strong initial hypothesis that local leaders disproportionately exhibit certain characteristics, we overweighed those attributes. For instances, local leaders are almost exclusively male, leading to our decision to assign a 90 percent probability to the hypothetical leader being male. A large proportion of leaders we interviewed were college graduates, which led to our decision to assign a 50 percent probability to the leader having graduated from college.

The primary attributes we wanted to test were party affiliation, political connections, caste and the degree of embeddedness within a community. Our previous work in rural Punjab province in Pakistan highlighted the strong preference for politically connected local leaders, even within the same constituency and the same party. This highlighted the relatively weak role that parties play in rural settings, with political connections forged at the personal level by local leaders playing a much more significant role in garnering support for local leaders. We wanted to test how the importance of party links versus political connections changes in a highly urbanized context.

Caste dominates the literature on South Asian politics; voters are thought to deviate from voting for their own caste in very rare circumstances. In the presence of alternate support structures and the weakening of ethnic ties in urban settings, we wished to test whether there is a preference for co-ethnic leaders among the voters of Lahore or whether there are some strategic ethnic preferences beyond the caste or *biraderi* preferences that are often seen in rural areas.

Another critical attribute is the degree of embeddedness within a community. If a leader is born within the community, voters might be expected to prefer them on account of being more familiar with the problems of the community and being more invested in the community. This preference however is also reflective of the status quo: those who are more satisfied with the government may be more likely to reflect this preference for more embedded leaders.

Finally, we wanted to test one of the main factors that voters referred to in interviews and surveys as the characteristic they look for in a leader: education.

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Table 1: **Candidate Gender**

Gender	Frequency
Male	9/10
Female	1/10

Table 2: **Candidate Ethnicity**

Ethnicity	Frequency
Same Ethnicity	1/5
Sayed	1/10
Arayin	1/10
Kashmiri	1/10
Rapjut	1/10
Khawaja	1/10
Jutt	1/10
Ethnicity Unknown	1/5

Table 3: **Candidate Residence**

Residence	Frequency
New Local Resident	1/4
Became Resident a few years back	1/4
Became Resident a few decades back	1/4
Local born	1/4

Table 4: **Candidate Party**

Party	Frequency
Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N)	1/4
Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI)	1/4
Pakistan People Party (PPP)	1/4
Independent Candidate	1/4

Table 5: **Candidate Political Connections**

Political Connection	Frequency
No Political Connection	1/6
Worked in MNA's campaign	1/6
Public Support from MNA	1/6
Both MNA campaign participation and MNA support	1/6
Family Connection with Politicians	1/6
No Family Connection with Politicians	1/6

Table 6: **Candidate Partisanship**

Partisanship	Frequency
Strong Partisanship	1/3
Moderate Partisanship	1/3
Weak Partisanship	1/3

Table 7: **Candidate Public Office/Social Work Experience**

Experience	Frequency
No Government Post held	1/4
Government post held	1/4
Engaged in social activities for community	1/4
Have not engaged in social activities for community	1/4

Table 8: **Candidate Education**

Education	Frequency
Uneducated	1/6
Primary Education	1/6
Secondary Education	1/6
College Graduate	1/2

Table 9: **Candidate Occupation**

Occupation	Frequency
Factory Worker	1/10
Doctor	1/10
Industrialist	1/10
Real Estate Agency Owner	1/10
Trader	1/10
Retired Government Officer	1/10
Lawyer	1/10
Realtor	1/10
Retired Government Clerk	1/10
Retired Doctor Compounder	1/10

5 Results

5.1 Partisanship

In a country such as Pakistan that has only ever seen one democratically elected government complete its term and complete a peaceful transition to the next elected government, party structures are not expected to be strong and voters are often thought to rely on other sources of power in order to get things done. Weak structures and identification is especially expected of opposition

parties in new democracies, who have not had the chance to form a government and respond to its voters through programmatic or clientelistic means.

Lahore contradicts both these expectations. Among all the attributes we tested, the leader's party consistently has the largest effect on whether the leader was chosen by a voter in a binary comparison. The results on the overall sample are shown in Figure 1. The omitted category for the party attribute is the party currently in government: PML-N. Leaders that belong to the PML-N are heavily preferred to those belonging to the main opposition party (PTI), another opposition party (PPP) and also to the leaders who do not belong to any party.

While this overall result may be seen as just a case of incumbent bias, hidden beneath this result are the preferences of opposition voters.[7]. As Figure 3 shows, PTI voters' propensity to choose a leader increase in 50 percentage points if the leader happens to be from the PTI. This is almost exactly the size of the treatment effect in favor of PML-N leaders in the subset of voters who support the PML-N, as shown in Figure 2. Supporters of both parties prefer independent leaders to those from their opposition party, but significantly less so than leaders from their own parties.

Preference for the incumbent party shows up clearly in the case of undecided voters. While these voters are not so swayed by the incumbent party to declare that they will vote for it in the upcoming general elections, their response to the party of local leaders is virtually identical to that of PML-N supporters, as shown in Figure 4.

5.2 Caste

In settings where communities are strongly segregated on the basis of caste or other identity markers, and there is out-group discrimination across the board, we expect to find in-group favoritism. We do not find any evidence for a preference for leaders from the respondent's own caste among the overall supporters, in either gender or the supporters of any party. It is only among respondents who have recently migrated to Lahore that we see marginally positive support for leaders from their own caste, in comparison to leaders from castes that are currently less privileged in the current

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[7]We asked for respondents' voting intentions in the upcoming 2018 general elections. Less than half (44 percent) stated they intended to vote for the PML-N, 16% intended to vote for the main opposition party while 32% stated they had not yet decided who they would vote for or if they would vote. The rest intended to vote for other opposition parties or refused to answer

context (including Jatts, Araiyns, Rajputs and Khawajas). Even these undecided voters, however, have a weak preference for leaders from the currently privileged castes (Sayeds and Kashmiris) compared to leaders from their caste.

Almost all subgroups have a statistically significant positive preference for leaders from the privileged castes compared to the less privileged castes. The privileged castes include the Sayeds who are thought to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad and tend to enjoy a high status in society and the Kashmiris who, while not traditionally a very high caste, currently enjoy many positions of power in the country and in Lahore specifically. It is also the caste of the Sharif brothers, who head the PML-N. It is noteworthy that even among the opposition voters who strongly penalize PML-N leaders, we see a preference for the Kashmiris and Sayeds. Caste runs deep even in the city, but as a way of relying on the privileged and not in terms of sticking to your own.

Another interesting comparison to make is that between the less privileged castes and the cases in which we mentioned to the respondent that we do not know what caste the leader belongs to. Among migrants and PTI voters, there is enough of a preference against the less privileged caste to result a statistically significant positive preference for leaders with unknown castes in comparison.

5.3 Connections

The value of local leaders depends critically on the extent to which they are able to access higher tiers of the state and political machinery to be able to negotiate for better services for citizens in their localities. Evidence from local government elections in 2015 in rural Punjab (Liaqat et al., 2017)shows that voters' support for local government candidates has a causal relationship with the extent of political connections the local candidates have with higher tier politicians and the petty state bureaucracy.

We test whether political and personal connections with higher tier politicians affect the choices of local leaders for Lahori voters. Each of the figures show these results in the third-from-bottom panel. The omitted category is candidates who have no political connections, while the 'MNA Work' bars show the marginal preference for leaders who worked for the electoral campaign for a higher tier politician, the 'MNA Support' bars show the same for local leaders who have received public

endorsements from higher tier politicians and 'MNA Both' bars for those who have both kinds of connections mentioned above. These kinds of connections were selected because our work in both rural and urban Punjab indicated that politicians use these as short hand signals for connections among lower and higher tier politicians. A more direct connection is, of course, familial:

Our results show that the political connections that sway voters heavily in rural Punjab (Sargodha) do not sway voters in the metropolitan capital of the province, Lahore. In fact, we see a somewhat negative effect of the local leader having campaigned for a higher tier politician; this effect being statistically significant for PTI voters. The difference in this negative effect is not statistically different between PTI voters and PML-N voters, however.

Perhaps even more strikingly, voters preferences are not swayed even by a direct familial connection with a sitting parliamentarian. The bars for 'Political Family' show the difference in preferences for candidates with no connections and those who have a direct familial connection with a sitting parliamentarian.

5.4   Length of Residence

How long a leader has been living in a community is a proxy for how deeply embedded a leader is in the area and how invested they are in solving the community's problems. Auerbach and Thatchill (2014) find that in Indian urban slums, the length of residence is a positive predictor of support for leaders. On the contrary, we find that for the average respondent, the length of residence has no effect on the probability of choosing a leader. If anything, there is a weak negative effect among non-poor respondents (Figures 8 and 9), but this effect is statistically insignificant.

5.5   Education

Education is widely considered a proxy for the competence of local leaders, with more educated leaders often considered better able to strategically address the concerns of citizens in their area and also to access state institutions that uneducated citizens find it hard to access. This hypothesized effect bears out strongly in all subsamples, with a statistically significant positive average marginal component effect of leaders being college educated versus being uneducated.

5.6 Public Sector Employment

Another result from the slum setting of Auerbach and Thatchill (2014) that does not bear out in our formal urban settlements is that of public sector employment. In the informal slum setting, the access to the state that is provided by a leader having a job in the public sector does not hold the same significance in Lahore. The reasons for this may be manifold: this access could be thought to be provided more directly through the party, or residents could be less reliant on personal connections to public sector employees for accessing the state.

6 Conclusion

We present the first evidence on preferences for local leaders in a developing country metropolitan city. Using a forced choice conjoint experiment design with a random sample of 2,150 voters in Lahore, we find that despite the infancy of democracy in Pakistan, party identity is the strongest and most consistent factor affecting the choice of a leader. Same caste preference does not exist, but there is evidence of a preference for leaders from more privileged castes and a bias against leaders from less privileged castes. The strong preference for political connections with higher tier politicians that is seen in rural Pakistan is not observed in the metropolitan context of Lahore. Contrary to findings from informal slums in India, having public sector jobs or being deeply embedded in the community does not affect voters choice for local leaders.

The results suggest first and foremost that formal urban settlements are very different from rural areas and from urban slums, and given the rapid rates at which developing countries are urbanizing, the grass-level politics of formal urban settlements merit further careful study. Second, the results suggest that party identity is very strong among urban voters in this context and that both government and opposition voters exhibit robust preferences for co-partisan leaders, with undecided voters shown an incumbent bias. Thirdly, in the presence of rapid urbanization, much of the conventional wisdom around caste politics in South Asia may need to be re-examined.

Figures

Figure 1: Overall Results

Figure 2: PML-N Voters

Candidate Preference by PMLN Voters

Figure 3: PTI Voters

Candidate Preference by PTI Voters

Figure 4: Undecided Voters

Candidate Preference by Undecided Voters

Candidate Preference by Migrant Respondents

Figure 6: Non-Migrants

Candidate Preference by Resident Respondents

Figure 7: Poor Respondents (Bottom Tertile)

Candidate Preference by Poorest Respondents

Figure 8: Middle Class Respondents (Middle Tertile)

Candidate Preference by Middle Income Respondents

Figure 9: Richer Respondents (Top Tertile)

Candidate Preference by Richest Respondents

Table 10: **Main Results from Overall Sample**

	Overall Candidate Preference
	(1) Preference
Male	0.00
	(.)
Female	-0.01
	(0.03)
Recently Moved	0.00
	(.)
Became resident a few years back	-0.00
	(0.02)
Became resident a few decades back	-0.01
	(0.02)
Local Born	-0.01
	(0.02)
PML-N	0.00
	(.)
PTI	-0.20***
	(0.03)
PPP	-0.41***
	(0.02)
Independent Candidate	-0.12***
	(0.02)
Low Caste	0.00
	(.)
High Caste	0.08***
	(0.02)
Same Caste	0.00
	(0.02)
Unknown Caste	0.04*
	(0.02)
Strong Partisanship	0.00
	(.)
Moderate Partisanship	0.02
	(0.02)
Weak Partisanship	-0.01
	(0.02)
Uneducated	0.00
	(.)
Primary Education	0.05*
	(0.03)
Secondary Education	0.04
	(0.03)
College Graduate	0.14***
	(0.03)
Public Sector Job	0.00
	(.)
Entrepreneur	-0.02
	(0.02)
Private Sector Job	0.02
	(0.02)
No Political Connection	0.00
	(.)
MNA Work	-0.05*
	(0.03)
MNA Support	0.02
	(0.03)
MNA Both	0.02
	(0.03)
Political Family	0.03
	(0.03)
No Political Family	-0.00
	(0.03)
R-Squared	0.11
N	2979

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: **Results by Economic Class**

	Candidate Preference by Economic Class of Respondents		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Poor Respondents	**Middle Class Respondents**	**Richer Respondents**
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.04	0.01	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
New local resident	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Became resident a few years back	0.02	-0.10**	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Became resident a few decades back	0.06*	-0.09**	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Local Born	0.04	-0.07	-0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
PML-N	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
PTI	-0.19***	-0.23***	-0.16***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)
PPP	-0.38***	-0.49***	-0.43***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Independent Candidate	-0.15***	-0.16***	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Low Caste	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
High Caste	0.07**	0.08	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Same Caste	-0.02	-0.03	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Unknown Caste	0.02	0.08*	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Strong Partisanship	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Moderate Partisanship	0.03	0.00	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Weak Partisanship	0.02	-0.03	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Uneducated	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Primary Education	0.03	0.10	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Secondary Education	0.05	0.05	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
College Graduate	0.16***	0.11**	0.16***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Public Sector Job	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Entrepreneur	-0.02	-0.03	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Private Sector Job	0.01	0.02	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
No Political Connection	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
MNA Work	-0.04	-0.09	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
MNA Support	0.06	0.01	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
MNA Both	0.05	0.04	-0.10
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Political Family	0.07	-0.07	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
No Political Family	0.04	0.00	-0.09
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
R-Squared	0.10	0.16	0.14
N	1479	762	718

* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01

Table 12: **Results by Respondent Party**

	Candidate Preference by Respondent Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	PMLN Voters	**PTI Voters**	**Undecided Voters**
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.02	-0.10	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)
New local resident	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Became resident a few years back	-0.00	-0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Became resident a few decades back	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Local Born	0.08**	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)
PML-N	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
PTI	-0.50***	0.49***	-0.16***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)
PPP	-0.63***	-0.10	-0.29***
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Independent Candidate	-0.26***	0.25***	-0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Low Caste	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
High Caste	0.09***	0.11*	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Same Caste	-0.00	0.08	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Unknown Caste	0.01	0.15***	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Strong Partisanship	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Moderate Partisanship	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Weak Partisanship	-0.02	0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Uneducated	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Primary Education	0.09**	0.12*	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Secondary Education	0.06	0.17**	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)
College Graduate	0.10***	0.21***	0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Public Sector Job	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Entrepreneur	0.01	0.10	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Private Sector Job	0.04	0.11*	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)
No Political Connection	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
MNA Work	-0.02	-0.19**	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)
MNA Support	0.04	-0.10	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)
MNA Both	0.02	-0.12	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Political Family	0.07	-0.13*	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.05)
No Political Family	0.04	-0.17**	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)
R-Squared	0.25	0.27	0.08
N	1288	478	1041

* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01

Table 13: **Results by Migration Status**

	Candidate Preference by Migration Status of Respondent	
	(1)	(2)
	Migrants	**Local Residents**
Male	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.04	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.03)
New local resident	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)
Became resident a few years back	-0.02	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Became resident a few decades back	0.00	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Local Born	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.03)
PML-N	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)
PTI	-0.20***	-0.19***
	(0.05)	(0.03)
PPP	-0.49***	-0.39***
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Independent Candidate	-0.16***	-0.10***
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Low Caste	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)
High Caste	0.08*	0.07***
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Same Caste	0.08*	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Unknown Caste	0.12**	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Strong Partisanship	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)
Moderate Partisanship	0.03	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.02)
Weak Partisanship	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Uneducated	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)
Primary Education	0.04	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.04)
Secondary Education	0.04	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.04)
College Graduate	0.08	0.16***
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Public Sector Job	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)
Entrepreneur	-0.07	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Private Sector Job	0.05	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.03)
No Political Connection	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)
MNA Work	-0.05	-0.06*
	(0.06)	(0.03)
MNA Support	-0.01	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.03)
MNA Both	0.02	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.04)
Political Family	-0.01	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.03)
No Political Family	-0.05	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.03)
R-Squared	0.15	0.10
N	727	2252

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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