

When do Political Parties Deliver? Politics, Voice and Responsiveness in Urban Pakistan

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1. Introduction

Why do some citizens receive more or better public services than others? Comparative political economy literature has started to concern itself more and more with the fact that development failures are not consistent across communities. Regardless of levels of development, some people enjoy better access to public goods and services than others. Why is this so? The usual answers have concerned themselves with economic inequality and income levels, with proximity to centres of power, and more recently, with political clientelism. Richer citizens, those that live in large cities, and those of greater strategic electoral importance to politicians receive more state largesse, while poorer, rural and less strategically important voters remain deprived.

However, it has become increasingly apparent that even within low-income urban neighbourhoods or remote villages, service delivery and its quality is variable. Not all citizens are equally deprived, and not all citizens that live in the heart of a city — close to both the state's development infrastructure and centres of political power — receive adequate levels of quality public services. What explains such differences in delivery?

We asked this question in a group of union councils in Pakistan's second largest city, Lahore. Punjab, Pakistan's majority province, has witnessed a significant demographic shift of population to cities and towns during the past forty years. This demographic shift has caused significant increase in densification of its metropolitan areas and has led to the proliferation of large cities. Today the province is home to five cities with more than a million people, including its capital, the mega-city of Lahore. The process of densification has intensified public service delivery challenges for citizens in these cities. Yet, little is known about how responsive the state is to these citizens in terms of providing access to quality provision of public services. For example, there is little evidence on which agents of the state mediate service delivery between it and the citizenry in cities. We also know little about the determinants of state responsiveness in terms of the supply of provision.

This paper helps build the emerging literature on nuancing how clientelism functions, and which aspects of it may help explain variations in service delivery. The variant of political clientelism that we are interested in is a more protracted relationship than the act of vote or turnout buying at the time of the election, though that also exists. Political parties, and not just individual patrons, are an integral part of these clientelistic relationships, especially the structure of local party networks that organise workers within communities. Recent literature has emphasised the role that such workers (or local brokers) can play in determining levels and quality of service provision (Stokes *et. al* 2013, Auerbach 2016, Auerbach and Thachil 2016). What we do not understand, however, is the relationship between

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party organisational networks, political competition, and public service delivery. This gap in our understanding is especially salient in the context of urban growth and an increasing demand for public services.

Based on recent advancements in the political economy literature on the effects of political competition on development outcomes (Keefer and Khemani 2004, Auerbach 2016), we believe that political responsiveness in such locations is connected to levels of competition. But what kind of competition matters for service delivery? Is it competition between politicians at higher tier seats that matters, or is it localised competition between party operatives within localities that work with voters on a daily basis? This is an important nuancing of the usual questions about political contestation because levels of competition at the level of a national or regional constituency do not always match those within smaller neighbourhoods and communities — intense competition between local, community-based brokers may feed into non-competitive higher tier contests, and similarly, intense national level competition may operate on the basis of only a few strategic swing districts, while most other parts of the country provide more assured and stable votes to political parties.

In this paper, we examine the effect of competition both between higher tier politicians, and between local party workers that operate within specific communities, on service delivery outcomes. We are able to do this because we selected a mix of competitive and non-competitive national assembly constituencies that directly border one another in the city of Lahore. Two of the three constituencies are where the ruling party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N),⁴ has won easy victories in recent elections, including in 2013. The third constituency is a hotly contested seat, to the extent that the Supreme Court ordered re-polling here in 2015 after intense contestation of the results of the 2013 election. The PML-N won both times against its main contender in Punjab, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf⁵ (PTI), but its already slim margin of victory of about 8800 votes in 2013 became even slimmer in 2015, with the winning candidate managing only about 2500 votes more than the runner up (compared to margins of about 77,000 and 46,000 in the two other constituencies in 2013).

Within these constituencies, we worked in four neighbouring provincial assembly seats — two of which are highly competitive and two that are less competitive — and in 43 union councils that fall within these. Our main measure of competition captures contestation between local party workers at the level of these union councils, where we look at both the number of party workers present in each union council, and their partisan balance. Both measures are adapted from Auerbach (2016), and they allow us to unpack the structure of party organisational networks at the local level. We are thus able to examine the association between service delivery and political competition as it exists both at higher tiers and within communities.

Our main question is, under what conditions are politicians responsive to voter needs and preferences? To answer this, we test two hypotheses in this paper. First, that the number of party workers present in a union council, and their particular distribution across different competing parties, is associated with better service delivery. In other words, the structure of machine politics at the local level underpins politician responsiveness to voters. Second, that this association is stronger when higher tier politics is

⁴ The PML-N is Pakistan's dominant party right now, and is in government both at the centre and in Punjab province.

⁵ The name of the party translates roughly as the Pakistan Justice Party.

also competitive, so that it is a combination of higher and lower tier competition that matters for service delivery.

Using survey data collected from 2150 randomly selected respondents in the 43 union councils, and from about 40 interviews with local brokers and party officials, we find that there is considerable variation in the extent to which both municipal and non-municipal service delivery improves between the last general election in 2013 and our survey in early 2017. The density and competitiveness of party structures at the local level explain this variation for locally provided municipal services, but not for centrally allocated non-municipal services, such as electricity, gas and roads. In particular, we find that both the density of party networks and the extent to which the number of party workers present in a locality are proportional across parties are both positively correlated with improvements in the delivery of municipal services. In other words, what matters is not only how many brokers are operating within a locality, but also whether or not they belong to different parties that are actively competing with each other for the vote.

In terms of magnitude, worker density matters more than the partisan balance across workers, but the latter has a more consistent association with service improvements. Furthermore, this correlation is stronger in national constituencies that are more competitive, measured as the margin with which the winning party/candidate won the seat. Essentially, competition between higher tiers of politicians appears to be a necessary condition that combines with localised competition between workers to produce better delivery outcomes. These findings remain even after we control for a number of other factors that could potentially explain the difference in improvements across households — respondent demographics (such as age, gender, education and income), social centrality of the respondent within the community, and the political participation, views and partisan politics of each respondent.

This paper is organised as follows. In the next section we explore the problem of access to variable levels and quality of public services in Lahore's middle and lower-income urban neighbourhoods. In Section 3 we look at how the literature has explained uneven development, and identify the gap that remains in terms of our understanding of how electoral competition impacts the effect of party organisational networks on improvements in service provision. We then set up our methods and variables in Section 4, and present the findings in Section 5. In Section 6, we comparatively analyse two case union councils to better understand the mechanisms and sequencing of the relationship between political competition and improvements in service delivery.

2. Defining the problem of access to public service delivery

Lahore is one of two mega-cities in Pakistan with an estimated population of close to 10 million people. It is the capital city of Punjab and accounts for 4.8% of its National Assembly seats. The city has historically been the focus of intense political activity by all of Pakistan's major political parties. It is also home to the top leadership of Pakistan's two largest parties, PML-N and PTI. PML-N is the party of government at the Federal level and in Punjab. In spite of the city's political importance, households in Lahore reveal considerable divergence in access to quality public services.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on access to important government provided services⁶ by a random sample of 2,150 respondents that live in formal settlements in the heart of the city, in four⁷ out of 25 provincial assembly constituencies in Lahore. It provides self-reported measures of access and quality of services before the 2013 general elections for a set of municipal⁸ and non-municipal services⁹, as well as perceptions of change in the quality of services between 2013 and today. Our respondents report having almost universal access to non-municipal services in 2013. They also report having universal access for some categories of municipal services such as modern sanitation and piped water (Table 1 column 1). However, we find remarkable variation in access to functional services¹⁰ – a sizeable proportion reports access to poor quality services in 2013 (Table 1 column 2). It also shows considerable variation in improvements in the provision of public services between the 2013 general elections and today (Table 1 column 6).

Table 1: Service Delivery: Access and Condition (% of Respondents)

Services	Access to Government Provided Services (1)	Dysfunctional Service in 2013 (2)	Functional Service in 2013 (3)	Worsened (4)	No Improvement (5)	Improved (6)
Municipal Services	68.3	32.1	11.5	18.6	55.3	26
Street Lights	68.9	32.2	11.4	10.0	80.0	10.0
Garbage Removal	57.2	34.6	12.5	13.0	78.0	9.0
Dumpsters	26.9	36.5	13.3	8.0	77.0	15.0
Modern Sanitation	87.3	31.7	11.0	11.0	80.0	8.0
Drinking Water	73.5	32.7	13.6	6.0	70.0	24.0
Piped Water	97.3	29.3	9.2	11.0	80.0	9.0
Non-Municipal Services	81.4	25.9	12.6	11.3	58.8	29.9
Electricity	98.9	28.8	9.4	5.0	71.0	24.0
Gas	98.2	27.1	13.3	9.0	82.0	9.0
Roads	95.6	24.5	14.2	9.0	79.0	12.0

Citizens' uneven access to functional public good provision is increasingly being recognized as an important puzzle in the literature on clientelism (Stokes 2005, Stokes et. al. 2013, and Auerbach 2016). However, most of

⁶ We did not ask about health and education as a large proportion of the population (65% and 63% respectively) in Lahore accesses these through the private market. In our sample less than 10 percent report getting provision through private suppliers for the services given in Table 1. The only reported service in which reliance on private provision is high in our sample is garbage removal. This suggests that government is the most important channel for the delivery of the services given in Table 1.

⁷ In 2013 our sample constituencies consisted of approximately 700,000 registered voters.

⁸ These are local public goods and services.

⁹ These are centrally provided public goods and services.

¹⁰ We define a service as being functional when it receives an average rating of at least 3 on a 1-5 scale of service quality in our surveys, where 1 means 'very bad condition', 2 means 'bad condition', 3 means 'reasonable condition', 4 means 'good condition' and 5 means 'very good condition'.

the literature has raised this puzzle for slums, villages and settlements on the periphery of cities. We find that the puzzle of uneven access to functional services is not just a problem in slums and peripheral settlements; it is equally pervasive in formal settlements in the heart of the city. Table 2 shows that uneven provision particularly hurts low income groups. It shows that access to services of poor quality is much higher for respondents at the bottom 20% of the expenditure distribution.

Table 2: Access to Poor Quality Services by Expenditure Quintile (% of Respondents)

Services	Bottom 20%	Middle 20%	Richest 20%
Municipal Services	42.1	26.7	26.5
Street Lights	40.9	26.5	28.4
Garbage Removal	50.4	26.6	24.9
Dumpsters	46.8	27.4	27.9
Modern Sanitation	39.9	28.1	24.8
Drinking Water	40.9	27.3	26.5
Piped Water	33.4	24.5	26.4
Non-Municipal Services	32.7	22.4	20.7
Electricity	30.1	22.9	22.3
Gas	33.4	24.0	24.2
Roads	34.4	20.3	15.7

There is considerable debate in the literature about how citizens gain access to public services in developing country cities. A set of studies emphasize the role played by political party workers and local party leadership in cities around the world (Gay 1990, Auyero 2000, Chatterjee 2004, Auerbach 2016, and Thachil and Auerbach 2016). Auerbach (2016) argues that in the provision of public services, the iterative, dyadic relationship is between the politicians and urban citizens. Others highlight the role played by community leaders who lack partisan affiliation (Manor 2000, Krishna 2007, Jha, Rao and Woolcock 2007, Diaz-Cayeros *et al.* 2014). There is also recognition of the role played by private-sector providers and non-government organizations (Duflo *et al.* 2012, Ahlers *et al.* 2014).

It seems that in the settlements we studied, citizens access services mainly through national and provincial politicians and local party workers (Table 3), and that they make demands on the state through party machines instead of through civic organizations or user associations. To understand the puzzle of uneven access to the provision of functional public services, it is therefore important to understand the determinants of responsiveness of politicians and their machines. Who are politicians responding to? What are the mechanisms that induce politicians to become responsive and deliver better quality provision to citizens? We answer these questions in the rest of this paper.

Table 3: Improvement Initiative

Services	Politicians	Local Party Workers	Others	Don't Know
Municipal Services	40.3	34.4	4.0	21.4
Street Lights	23.8	58.8	2.5	15.0
Garbage Removal	34.5	45.1	10.6	9.7
Dumpsters	40.0	27.8	8.9	23.3

Modern Sanitation	33.8	43.3	8.3	14.7
Drinking Water	53.9	19.6	1.0	25.5
Piped Water	35.4	33.3	1.6	29.7
Non-Municipal Services	23.0	25.3	20.3	31.4
Electricity	12.0	25.5	29.6	32.9
Gas	20.0	21.7	9.4	48.9
Roads	44.3	31.3	6.1	18.3

3. Politicians, Party Machines and Uneven Provision

What makes politicians responsive in terms of delivering service provision to citizens? Standard political economy models focus on electoral contestability as providing high powered incentives for politicians to deliver services (Przeworski *et al.* 1999, Stokes 2006, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Khemani *et al.* 2016). These models argue that electoral competition helps to align the incentives of politicians with the interests of their voters, as it acts as a disciplining device for unresponsive politicians. The literature is less clear whether the effect of electoral competition as a disciplining device is blunted in weakly institutionalized settings. The evidence here is mixed. La Ferrera and Bates (2001) study the case of political competition in weak states and find that voter loyalty and identity politics dull the effectiveness of electoral competition in the delivery effective provision. However, Ferraz and Finan (2009) examine the variation in corruption associated with public service delivery across municipalities within Brazil when directly elected mayors face term limits versus when they are eligible for reelection. They show that reelection incentives reduce corruption associated with provision.

Corstange (2010) also argues that politician-based targeting responds to competitive electoral pressures. His model assumes that regardless of the degree of electoral competition, politicians prefer to target voters with low reservation prices. In constituencies with low competition, the politician is able to act as a price discriminating monopolist and deliver to the reservation price of the voter. However, in competitive constituencies politicians facing competition have high powered incentives to widen the relevant electorate that is targeted as well as ensure that delivery is above an average voter's reservation price. These models focus on the actions of politicians and abstract from the incentive compatibility problems that plague the functioning of political machines (Stokes 2011, Larreguy 2013, Stokes *et. al.* 2013, Auerbach 2016).

Recent political economy research observes the centrality of political machines in mobilizing votes and monitoring turnout for politicians running for elected office (Chandra 2004, Stokes 2005, Nichter 2008). It has also documented the role played by machines in aggregating the demand of different types of voters and transmitting it to elected politicians who have the authority to make decisions about the allocations of resources and investments (Auerbach 2016). The literature recognizes the incentive compatibility problems that are inherent in the functioning of political machines. At the helm of the machines are elected politicians who are taking allocation decisions based on information provided by networks of local party workers that constitute the base of the machines. Similarly, the electoral success of politicians is based on the effort made by party workers to mobilize voters. Given that the actions of party workers are unobservable, there is an inherent incentive compatibility problem between politicians and their network of party workers, especially since the returns to worker effort are not fully internalized by them (Stokes *et. al.* 2013 and Larreguy 2013). Information

asymmetry allows party workers to increase private benefits by minimizing their effort or by targeting allocation in a manner that maximizes their rents even if it comes at the expense of voters and politicians.

This literature hypothesizes that the structure of local party organizational networks is an important determinant of improvements in service provision. Auerbach (2016) provides empirical evidence from urban India in supports of this hypothesis. In particular, he analyses the effect of “party network density” (measured as the density of political party workers in a local area) and “the partisan balance of party organizational networks” (measured as the degree to which political workers in a local area are balanced across parties) on differences in public service provision across urban slum settlements. He argues that these factors are expected to positively impact differences in provision by strengthening competition, informal accountability and political connectivity.

Dense party networks are expected to strengthen accountability by giving residents choice in deciding which party workers to support within and across parties. The underlying mechanism is the increase in intra- and inter-party competition among political workers in their local jurisdiction. It is also expected to strengthen accountability by generating rich information about party workers for constituency politicians, which enables them to monitor the actions of their workers better. The availability of many workers from the same party in a local area is also expected to strengthen citizens’ political connectivity to higher tier politicians who are contenders for parliament and government. As Auerbach (2016) puts it, in settlements with “... dense party networks, then, the electoral compulsions of political parties, material self-interest of party workers, and daily needs of residents converge to generate an incentive structure that encourages development.” (pg. 123).

The presence of multiparty networks in settlements is expected to increase accountability by intensifying cross-party competition at the local level. However, Auerbach (2016) argues that the impact of multiparty competition may get attenuated because it creates noisy signals for voters about which politician and political worker delivered the provision, and this dulls effort incentives for party workers. He argues that the direction of the effect of multiparty networks on the provision of public services at the local level is unclear.

Auerbach (2016) finds that there is considerable variation in the “density of party networks” and the “partisan balance of multiparty networks” across India’s urban slums. His quantitative research shows that the “density of party networks” is an important and significant determinant of the provision of local public services and goods. However, he also finds that multiparty competition has no direct effect on provision and can attenuate the positive impact of density.

In spite of the emphasis on electoral competition as a determinant of politician responsiveness there is little research on whether competition at the electoral constituency level impacts the effect of party organizational networks on improvements in service provision. We would expect that the effect of party organizational networks will get amplified in constituencies facing greater electoral competition as the politician will be more responsive for given levels of effort by party workers.

In this paper, we test two hypotheses:

H1: Whether improvements in public service provision for citizens between the 2013 general election and today are correlated with “party network density” and the “partisan balance of party organizational networks”. The aim is to test whether an important channel underpinning politician responsiveness is the structure of machine politics at the local level. In particular, we are interested in examining whether the correlation is stronger between improvements in provision and density or between it and partisan balance. As mentioned, earlier


Auerbach (2016) finds a strong correlation between provision and party network density for India, but he does not find a significant correlation with partisan balance.

H2: Whether the correlations between improvements in service provision and party network density and between it and party representational balance are stronger in more competitive electoral constituencies. The aim is to test whether the degree of competition faced by contenders for electoral office matters by making them more responsive to demands emanating from the local machine.

4. Data and Variables

The main data for this project comes from a survey conducted with 2,150 registered voters in 43 union councils¹¹ within four provincial assembly constituencies in Lahore, Pakistan. The four provincial assembly constituencies were selected to reflect a mix of competitive and non-competitive neighbouring constituencies in the heart of Lahore. The two highly competitive provincial constituencies are PP-147 and PP-148 within national assembly constituency NA-122, while the two constituencies with less competition at the provincial and national assembly levels are PP-146 in NA-121, and PP-149 in NA-124. The four constituencies are adjacent to each other in the heart of Lahore.

Figure 1: Victory Margin by PP



Within each provincial constituency, we included all Union Councils (UCs) in our sample, with two exception rules stated below. A UC is an electoral unit with an average of 14,000 registered voters. Under the first exception rule, we excluded two UCs in PP-147 that had very high income and wealth levels, and composed predominantly of elite government or private housing. Under the second exception rule, we excluded four UCs where only a minority of polling stations fell inside our sample provincial constituencies while a majority fell outside our sample provincial constituencies.¹² The excluded Union Councils constitute only 9.3% of the

¹¹ The union council is the lowest unit of local government in metropolitan cities of Punjab.

¹² The boundary of a union council can cut a provincial or national assembly constituency.

registered voters in our sample constituencies, with vote shares of dominant parties and voter turnout rates within 1 percentage point and 2 percentage points of included UCs respectively.

Within a UC, our sampling strategy was as follows. We dropped five random GPS points within each UC's boundary and equipped our surveyors to accurately reach these points in the field. Once the surveyors reached a point, they surveyed five households around that point using a right-hand rule to ensure randomization. Within each household, a female and male surveyor conducted an interview with a randomly selected female and male registered voter respectively. The survey was conducted on tablets using SurveyCTO software and extensive field and remote monitoring was conducted to ensure high quality accurate survey data.

The main outcomes we are interested in are service delivery improvements. We ask respondents about the provision and quality of six municipal and three non-municipal services listed in Table 1 at the time of general elections in 2013 and at the time of the survey (February-March 2017). The quality questions ask respondents to rank the quality of a service on a 1-5 scale, where 1 is non-functional and 5 means a fully functional service. Based on their answers about the quality, we then ask a question confirming whether the quality of the service has worsened, remained the same or improved in the period between the 2013 general elections and the time of the survey. This improvement question serves as our main outcome variable in the regression analysis discussed in the next section.

Our main explanatory variables include Party Representational Balance (PRB), Party Network Density (PND) and an interaction of the two. Party Network Density (PND) is defined as the total number of party workers operating in a UC for every thousand registered voters. Data on the number of registered voters was collected from the Election Commission of Pakistan. We cap the number of workers at 20 workers per party for these calculations but our results are robust even without this capping exercise. There is significant variation in PND, with a mean of 0.6 workers per 1,000 registered voters and a standard deviation of 0.5. As shown in Table 4, we calculate PND in two ways: considering only the two main parties (PML-N and PTI), and considering additional parties as well. The negligible difference between the two reflects the extremely sparse networks of the additional parties.

Party Representational Balance (PRB) is a variable indicating the degree of competition at the UC level. This is constructed as follows:

$$PRB = \left(1/\sum p_j^2\right) - 1$$

Here, p is the proportion of workers of each party p in the Union Council j . Higher numbers indicate a higher degree of competition in terms of party workers – a PRB of 1 means that parties have exactly balanced party networks – and lower numbers close to 0 indicate one party dominance. Our PRB measure also shows a high degree of variation across UCs. When we calculate PRB considering only the two main parties, which is our preferred method, it has a mean of 0.71 with a standard deviation of 0.30. A PRB of 0.71 indicates a fairly high degree of competition. When we calculate PRB using all parties, it has a mean of 0.8 and a standard deviation of 0.37 in our sample of 43 UCs.

Our PND and PRB measures are constructed using survey questions about the presence of party workers from different parties in the resident's neighbourhood. Using these responses, we construct the number of party workers of each party in each UC. The summary statistics on these are shown in Table 4. Predictably, the two main parties are PML-N, which forms the government at the provincial and federal level, and PTI, which is the

main opposition party in Punjab province. The PML-N has an average of 5 workers in each UC while the PTI has an average of 3 workers in each UC. Given that we construct these UC-level variables using an average of ten reports from a total of five random points each in the Union Council, we have confidence that this variable represents the true number of effective party workers at the local level.

Table 4: Union Council Level Party Densities

	Male		Female	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Party Network Density (2-party)	0.60	0.51	0.61	0.53
Party Representational Balance (2-party)	0.71	0.30	0.71	0.30
Party Network Density (All parties)	0.61	0.53	0.62	0.54
Party Representation Balance (All parties)	0.80	0.37	0.80	0.37
PML-N Workers	5.06	3.72	5.14	3.81
PTI Workers	2.99	2.65	3.05	2.76
PPP ¹³ Workers	0.13	0.29	0.12	0.29
PML-Q ¹⁴ Workers	0.05	0.19	0.05	0.18

The individual level controls that we use in our regressions to control for alternative individual level explanations for service delivery improvements fall into three categories: demographic, social network and individual political factors. Table 5 provides the basic statistics on these variables. Demographic variables include gender, age, education levels and the household monthly expenditure. We include education levels because some researchers have suggested that it is a critical determinant of access to provision. Auerbach (2016) hypothesizes that this is because better-educated citizens may be better informed about how to navigate government procedures, are more likely to engage in collective action and may be better able to use civil society networks to demand development. The average education level of respondents is 10 years of schooling with a standard deviation of 3 years.

The clientelism literature suggests that political machines are more likely to target low income voters (Thachil 2011, Stokes *et. al* 2013, Khemani 2013, Diaz Cayeros *et. al* 2016). This is because they are argued to be less demanding as they have a lower marginal utility of income compared to wealthy voters. As opposed to this, elite capture theories would predict a positive correlation between household income and access to provision, especially in unequal contexts (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes 2004, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006 and 2012, Platteau 2008). We use monthly expenditure to proxy for household income. Table 5 reports an average household monthly expenditure of Rs. 36,000 (USD 350) with a very large standard deviation. The average household monthly expenditure per capita is approximately Rs. 6,300 (USD 60).

For measuring social networks, our qualitative fieldwork indicated that the two main indicators of an individual's social centrality are the number of individuals in the neighbourhood that a person can refer to as a close relative or friend, and the number of weddings the individuals has attended in the local area in the last three months. We use both these responses as controls for an individual's social centrality. We control for this measure because social capital is considered an important determinant of access to state services (Putnam 1994,

¹³ Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

¹⁴ Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid (PML-Q)

Krishna 2002, Varshney 2003). The average number of friends reported in the neighbourhood is between 5 and 7 (Table 5). Our respondents report having attended around 1 wedding in the neighbourhood in the last three months.

Finally, we control for the following individual level political indicators: which party the individual supports, an index of questions related to the respondent's perception of democratic inclusion, and an index of questions related to the individual's participation in political activities. We add controls for political support because there is considerable debate in the clientelism literature on whether political machines target core versus swing voters (Cox and McCubbins 1986, Dixit and Londregan 1996, Stokes 2005, Nichter 2010, Diaz-Cayeros *et al.* 2010, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2012). Table 5 reports high support for the incumbent party PML-N in our data. The perception of democratic inclusion index is the sum of four questions about the extent to which respondents believe that the state, politicians and political parties are responsive to the preferences of citizens and how attuned they are to citizen needs. The political participation index is the sum of seven questions about whether the respondent has participated in various political activities, including attending rallies and protests, and aiding campaigns through monetary and non-monetary means. Both these indices are scaled from 0 to 5. The inclusion of these indices for political inclusion and participation help us control for politically active citizens receiving more provision than others within their neighbourhood, either because they make more demands on politicians, or because they are more visible to political actors than their neighbours. Table 5 shows that while perceptions of inclusion are high for both male and female respondents on a 5-point scale, political participation is generally low.

Table 5-Panel A: Demographics

	Male		Female	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Age	41.0	13.38	38.7	11.18
Education	9.7	3.09	10.1	3.31
Expenditure	36468.7	28693.5	36378.4	22148.9

Table 5-Panel B: Social Centrality

	Male		Female	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Friends	7.4	6.69	5.1	5.26
Weddings	1.4	1.97	0.8	1.30

Table 5-Panel C: Political Engagement

	Male	Female
	(%)	(%)
PML-N Support	65.0	58.9
PTI Support	19.6	16.4
Other Party Support	1.1	1.7

No Support	9.8	21.0
Perception of Democratic Inclusion (1-5 scale)	3.84	4.14
	(0.966)	(0.866)
Political Participation Index (1-5 scale)	1.32	1.29
	(0.254)	(0.173)

5. Estimation Strategy and Results

5.1 Estimation Strategy:

The main aim of this paper is to test whether uneven improvements in public service provision in a mega-city context are explained by the density of local party organizational networks and their partisan balance. To estimate the relationship between party network density, party representational balance and service delivery estimates, we run regressions of the following form:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 PRB_j + \beta_2 PND_j + \beta_3 PRB_j * PND_j + \gamma X_i + \delta_k + \varepsilon_i \text{-----}(1)$$

where y_{ij} is the improvement in the service or set of services under consideration between 2013 and 2017 for individual i in UC j ; PRB and PND are calculated using the 2-party definitions at the UC-level, as described above; X_i is a set of individual-level demographic, social network and political controls; and δ_k is provincial constituency fixed effects. In all our regressions, standard errors are clustered at the UC-level. We put in provincial constituency fixed effects to control for differences in the improvement of provision that are explained by time-invariant political constituency level factors, such as the strength of the politician's network, their types, and so on. The results are given in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 reports the results for indices of all services, municipal services and non-municipal services. Table 7 reports the results for individual municipal services and non-municipal services. All regressions here use PRB and PND measures that are constructed using data for only the two main parties, while those in the appendix use measures that consider all four parties that we asked about in our survey.

5.2 Main Results:

In this section, we present our main results using the specification outlined above. We do this separately for municipal services, in which we expect to find effects, and for non-municipal services, where we do not expect to find any effect.

The results in Table 6 diverge from Auerbach (2016) in that we find that *party representational balance* (PRB) is statistically significant in explaining the variation in improvement of municipal services, while having no statistically significant correlation with improvements in non-municipal services. The magnitude of the effect on municipal services is large. The outcome variable, improvements in service delivery, is scaled from -1 to 1 in every case, with -1 indicating that every service being considered has worsened in quality, 0 indicating that there is no change and 1 indicating that every service being considered has improved in quality. A coefficient of 0.14 on PRB in the municipal services regression shows that within the same provincial constituency and given a certain level of PND and several individual characteristics, as PRB moves from 0 to 1, the average response about *each* of six services moves up by 0.14, or the average response about *one* of these services moves

up by 0.84 while the others remain the same, or any linear combination of the two. In a two-party context, PRB moving from 0 to 1 implies a move from one party dominance to full balance between two parties. Given that the standard deviation of PRB in our sample is 0.3 (Table 4), a one-standard deviation increase in PRB is associated with an increase in the average response about *each* service of about 0.04, or about 0.13 standard deviations. In the appendix, we show results using measures of PRB and PND constructed with workers of all parties, and we also see a highly significant correlation between PRB and service delivery improvements, albeit with somewhat smaller coefficients given the mechanical increase in PRB in UC's with any workers from more parties.

Similar to Auerbach (2016), we also find that *party network density* has a significant positive effect in explaining the variation in municipal services. For every additional worker per 1,000 voters, the average response about *each* service moves up by 0.66 or the average response about *four* services moves up by 1 full point, or any linear combination of the two. Given that the mean number of workers per 1,000 voters is 0.6 with a standard deviation of 0.5 (Table 4), we can say that a one standard deviation increase is correlated with an increase in average response about each service of about 0.33, or about 1.01 standard deviations. We do not find a statistically significant association between an interaction of the two and service delivery improvement. Why does a per capita increase in the number of local party workers have positive effects? This is possibly because a higher density of workers offers greater opportunities for connectivity between citizens and politicians.

These findings indicate that both PND and PRB are important correlates of the variation in the improvement in municipal service provision, and that PND has a greater magnitude of association with the outcome. Table 6 shows that improvements in the provision of non-municipal services are not statistically correlated with either measure of the structure of party organizational networks. This makes sense as we would expect competition between local networks of party workers to influence the provision of local public goods, but not that of centrally allocated goods.

Table 6- Party Networks and Service Improvement

	(1) All Services	(2) Municipal	(3) Non-Municipal
PRB	0.0540 (0.0518)	0.141** (0.0673)	-0.0304 (0.0522)
PND	0.151 (0.147)	0.376** (0.171)	-0.116 (0.184)
PND * PRB	-0.134 (0.177)	-0.331 (0.202)	0.0986 (0.206)
Constant	0.121 (0.0804)	0.0189 (0.0913)	0.188** (0.0845)
Observations	2,104	2,097	2,103
R-squared	0.143	0.130	0.125
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Centrality Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political Engagement Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All specifications include provincial constituency fixed effects.

Standard errors are clustered at the Union Council Level

5.3 Results by Service

Table 7 shows that the association between *party representational balance*, *party network density* and improvements in municipal service provision are driven by improvements in the provision of sanitation, piped water and garbage removal. While the coefficients on street lights are also of similarly large magnitude, they are not statistically significant. In the case of PRB, the coefficients here can be interpreted as implying that within a provincial constituency, at a certain level of PND and controlling for several individual characteristics, as PRB moves from 0 to 1, the average response about improvement in garbage removal, sanitation, and piped water and moves up by 0.17, 0.22, and 0.15 and respectively. Furthermore, every additional worker per 1,000 voters is associated with average response increases of 0.58, 0.39 and 0.61 on the same scale. Interestingly, while we do not a significant interaction effect for municipal services overall, we do see this in the case of these services individually, which is a similar result to that of Auerbach (2016).

Table 7 - Party Networks and Municipal Service Improvement

	(1) Street Lights	(2) Dumpsters	(3) Garbage Removal	(4) Modern Sanitation	(5) Drinking water	(6) Piped water
PRB	0.140 (0.127)	0.0390 (0.0815)	0.168* (0.0949)	0.221** (0.0954)	-0.0174 (0.107)	0.148** (0.0695)
PND	0.519 (0.332)	-0.228 (0.252)	0.582* (0.302)	0.392* (0.210)	0.114 (0.289)	0.612*** (0.214)
PND * PRB	-0.454 (0.370)	0.222 (0.259)	-0.718** (0.329)	-0.435* (0.234)	0.0772 (0.309)	-0.579** (0.221)
Constant	1.947*** (0.228)	2.221*** (0.177)	2.132*** (0.195)	2.118*** (0.164)	2.480*** (0.192)	2.203*** (0.148)
Observations	1,526	580	1,278	1,874	1,588	2,066
R-squared	0.086	0.097	0.106	0.062	0.127	0.084
Demographic Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Centrality	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political Engagement	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All specifications include provincial constituency fixed effects.

Standard errors are clustered at the Union Council Level

5.4 Results for Different Levels of Electoral Competition:

A second aim of the paper, is to test whether the association between improvements in service provision and *party network density*, and between it and *party representational balance* are stronger in more competitive electoral constituencies. This is a question that has not been adequately addressed in the literature so far. The political economy literature suggests that politicians will be more responsive in competitive rather than non-competitive constituencies. We can test this hypothesis because our constituency sample consists of four neighbouring competitive and non-competitive provincial assembly constituencies. We run the same regression separately

for the competitive and non-competitive provincial assembly constituencies, and present the results in Table 8 for the index of municipal services only.

Table 8- Does Electoral Competition at Higher Tiers matter?

	(1) Overall	(2) Competitive constituencies	(3) Non-Competitive constituencies
PRB	0.111 (0.0843)	0.198** (0.0708)	0.128 (0.0853)
PND	0.169 (0.149)	0.358 (0.403)	0.176 (0.154)
PND * PRB	-0.249* (0.135)	-0.274 (0.442)	-0.259* (0.140)
Constant	0.105 (0.0797)	-0.0214 (0.133)	0.101 (0.103)
Observations	2,097	1,125	972
R-squared	0.149	0.170	0.163
Demographic Control	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Centrality	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political Engagement	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All specifications include provincial constituency fixed effects.

Standard errors are clustered at the Union Council Level

We find that *party representational balance* has a positive association with improvements in the provision of municipal services in both competitive and non-competitive constituencies. This suggests that local-level competition between networks of local party workers is an important channel underpinning the responsiveness of political machines. This association is much larger in magnitude in competitive constituencies and is only statistically significant in that sample, and not in non-competitive constituencies. Further, in competitive constituencies, the magnitude of the coefficient on *party network density* is about twice that in non-competitive constituencies. Neither of these effects are statistically significant, possibly because of a reduced sample size. This indicates that while the association that PND has with service delivery improvement is of a larger magnitude, there is also more noise in this effect compared to that of PRB.

Interestingly, like Auerbach (2016) we also find that there is a statistically significant negative effect between *party representational balance* and *party network density*, except that we find this effect in non-competitive constituencies. The effect in competitive constituencies is of a similar magnitude but is not statistically significant. This suggests that in both competitive and non-competitive constituencies the marginal effect of *party network density* on improvements in municipal service provision, conditional on *party representational balance*, decreases as the value of the representational balance goes up. This is possibly because politicians in competitive constituencies put pressure to induce greater effort from local party workers, which creates attribution problems for voters in localities that have a balanced representation from competing parties.

6. How does political competition function? Evidence from two case unions

We use qualitative case observations and interviews to nuance our findings, and to better understand how the structure of party organisational networks, in particular partisan competition between party brokers, can help lead to better service delivery. We conducted interviews with local political workers and with residents in two union councils — UC-123, which covers a neighbourhood known as Garhi Shahu, and UC-172, known as the locality of Bibi Pak Daman. Both UCs were strategically selected. UC-123 and UC-172 lie less than a kilometre from one another within the same national and provincial assembly constituencies — NA-122 and PP-147, which are the most competitive constituencies within our sample. Both localities have low to middle income, densely packed, residential housing, with medium to large scale commercial activity along their main roads, and a variety of smaller shops, workshops and enterprises along their inner streets.

Both UCs had a comparable level of service provision in 2013, measured as an index of municipal services (Table 9). The index records a spectrum that runs from 2.28 in the least provided union council to 3.64 in the most provided council. UC-123 and UC-172 register very similar index scores of 2.522 and 2.520 that represent the average score on the index for all union councils in our sample. At the time of our survey in 2017, conditions in UC-123 had registered only a very slight improvement, as evidenced by its improvement score of only 0.009, well below the average of 0.1 across all our UCs. UC-172, on the other hand, had registered a significant improvement in citizens' perception of the delivery and quality of municipal services, with an above average score of 0.194.

Table 9 – Union Council Profiles

UC	PRB	PND	Municipal Services	
	(all parties) (normalised)	(all parties) (normalised)	Condition (2013)	Improvements (2017)
123	0.999	0.831	2.522	0.009
172	1.233	2.251	2.520	0.194
Average	1.116	1.541	2.521	0.101

Interestingly, both UCs had very different numbers of political party workers and a somewhat different partisan balance. The surveys suggested that UC-123 had a total of 9 party workers from the two main political parties — 4 from the PML-N and 5 from the PTI — giving it a PND score of 0.83, while UC-172 had a total of 17 party workers — 9 from the PML-N, 7 from the PTI and 1 from the PPP — giving it a high PND score of 2.25. These numbers give UC-172 a slightly higher partisan balance score (PRB) at 1.23, than UC-123 where the parties are almost evenly split, with a PRB score of almost 1.

These two union councils allow us to explore in greater detail the relationship we found in our quantitative tests between party organisational networks, partisan competition and service delivery. In particular, our detailed qualitative work allows us to answer three specific questions: (a) how exactly does greater competition between the local brokers of different political parties lead to better service delivery, or at least to its perception among residents; (b) is it greater partisan competition that leads to service delivery improvements, or do provision improvements bring party workers from different parties to the locality (in other words, we are able to solve to some extent for the problem of endogeneity inherent in our quantitative findings); and (c) why might our findings on the role of PRB in these constituencies of Lahore differ from that of Auerbach (2016) in Jaipur and Bhopal in India? We deal with each of these questions below.

(a) Mechanism for improvement in provision:

Our findings show that greater worker density and competition between party workers allows for better service provision. How exactly does this work? This section traces the mechanism that connects higher competition between brokers with perceptions of better service provision. To show that this mechanism exists and works, we would need to provide evidence that: (i) such competition does indeed exist; (ii) that it actively defines the way in which local workers function, and conditions their behaviour; and (iii) that this behaviour includes service delivery functions.

Our interviews with local party workers provide evidence for each component of this mechanism. Respondents in UC-172 pointed out that the union council had a very active political scene, with workers from the PTI, PML-N and the PPP working in the area. People also seemed to have a clear idea of how many political workers operated in their neighbourhoods, and connected this with efficient service provision. As one respondent explained, “more than one party being active in the area keeps their people efficient. A single party has the potential to get lazy”.

People made regular references to increased competition being linked to increased pressure for delivery, which emanates from two sources — from higher tier politicians that need to be associated with good performance in a competitive environment, and from local competitors. Most party workers we spoke with said they were in touch with party officials and politicians on a daily or weekly basis, mainly to communicate community needs to the top, and receive directives on how to deal with these. At the same time, local workers foster and maintain individualised contacts with government departments in order to quickly resolve emergent issues, and build personal reputations in the process. As one party worker put it, “contacts with higher-tier politicians are very important, but the most important thing is to have your own good relations with the *thana-katcheri* (police and local courts) and departments. This means that you can get work done even without having contacts with the ruling government”. More brokers operating within a locally competitive environment thus equates to more and varied channels of communication and interaction with government departments.

An office holder within the PML-N explained the link between greater competition across workers on the ground and improved service delivery in the following way: “Competition among workers helps in service provision as the workers themselves work hard enough in order to stand out from the rest, and this results in better provision. Politicians respond to this by providing more funds to their workers in order to get more things done than the rival camp in order to secure votes. If the MPA¹⁵ [from the other party] in my constituency is able to install 5 street lights in a union council, I will have to and try my best to install 10 street lights in order to prove that I’m more effective”.

This had meant that UC-172 had had both new water pipes and sewage lines installed since the 2013 election, which corresponds to the services driving improvement in Table 7. A new gas pipeline had also been laid out, though a large area of the union council was still without gas supply, and drinking water was available through filtration plants and a new tube well that the government had set up. The PTI, which controlled the MPA seat, was also actively providing services. Its leaders had set up health schemes for free medical treatment for the needy, and were working towards providing clean drinking water to the constituency through smaller water filtration plants at the ward level.

¹⁵ Member of Provincial Assembly

In UC-123, on the other hand, services were of a lower quality and did not cover the needs of the community. There were almost no street lights, to the extent that these were self-provided by the residents outside their houses. Piped water remained unsuitable for drinking and its pressure was very low. Though new public filtration plants had been set up, they were not sufficient to serve the needs of the community. Our interviews revealed that though there were party workers in the community, they did not seem to be as active as those in UC-172. When people spoke of political activity and competition, it was with reference to higher tier politics of the MNA¹⁶ (who was from the PML-N) and the MPA (who was from the PTI), rather than competition between workers within the union council. Competition on the ground seemed to be far less intense, with fewer local actors running between government departments to meet the needs of the community.

Why this had not led to greater improvements in delivery was explained to us by one worker in the following way, “most work is done on the local panel’s [workers of the same party] initiative. They have to propose projects and push them because the MNA and MPA are more involved in other work in the whole constituency”. In other words, service delivery within smaller units suffers if the local network of brokers is weakly organised without strong linkages with the party structure, and all political activity revolves around higher tier politicians. Furthermore, as indicated in Section 5.4, the perfectly balanced partisan affiliations of local workers in UC-123 (giving it a PRB score of 1) provides disincentives for delivery by higher tier politicians, since attribution may be less clear. This is also the case made by Auerbach (2016).

(b) Solving for reverse causality:

Does greater competition between political party workers lead to better service delivery, or is it the other way around — greater service delivery and flow of resources into a locality attract more workers, and make competition between them more intense as brokers use the visibly increased delivery to build or strengthen their political reputation?

The qualitative interviews with politicians and brokers in the two union councils (as well as in some others within our sample) provide evidence that the sequence of events can be defined quite carefully, at least in the case of our current observations. The most important factor here is that our observations cover a fairly short period of time. Our baseline records perceptions of service delivery in 2013, at which point both union councils reported a fairly similar level of service provision and quality. We then asked about improvements in these same services in 2017 at the time of our surveys, and found that there was improvement in one union council but not in the other. Our interviews revealed that this is too short a period for political brokers to move to a new locality, establish a base there and build a political reputation.

All the party workers that we spoke with have been local residents over a long period of time, and have built their careers as party workers slowly through different political contests and positions. Some have been elected to office from these localities previously, while others have worked closely with higher tier national or provincial politicians. The main party worker of the PML-N in UC-172 had a history of doing social work in the community, and had previously run for local government office in this locality in 2001. His PTI counterpart was the proprietor of a small local catering business, ran a welfare society for widows, and had been elected as a councillor from this area in the 1980s. He strongly believed that it was the strength of his personal support base within this union council that had brought him to the PTI’s attention. Both believed that this was true of most prominent party workers around the city, the fact that their positions within parties were dependent on their local reputations and the support bases that they had carefully cultivated over time. A female party worker

¹⁶ Member of National Assembly

explained, “the social work you do in the community is the most important factor because the party will choose people who can mobilise local voters”. This was supported by a party official, who said, “many of our community coordinators are from the old lot whose families have stuck with us in the past and their successive generations are also interested in politics. The new lot comprises of those workers who have proved themselves in terms of putting in effort, keeping contacts and building a reputation in their respective areas”.

(c) Why does PRB matter in Lahore?

At the end of this analysis, a question that arises is why partisan balance (PRB) matters in Lahore but not in Jaipur and Bhopal, where Auerbach (2016) conducted his research? We can offer only a tentative answer here, pending more comparative research in this area. An important difference between urban politics in India and Pakistan is the structure and strength of political parties. In India, an old and consolidated democracy, political parties are better established, have more extensive machines and networks, and more cohesive and autonomous internal structures. Pakistan, on the other hand, is an emerging democracy where political parties are internally weak — on account of having been manipulated, neutralised, and repressed by many years of military rule — and are dependent on the power, influence and resources of individual politicians.

This difference in the consolidation of party structures and machines may provide part of the explanation. Where these are consolidated through extensive and well-established networks that have operated over many years within neighbourhoods and have built voter bases, as in India, what matters most is that party workers exist and operate to connect this voter base to higher tier politicians. Where these are not consolidated, such as in Pakistan, incentives to connect with citizens are conditioned by competition, rather than by the internal functioning and delivery structures of political parties. If local competition exists, local brokers work hard to ensure that delivery happens. Where local political competition is less intense, internally weak political parties have few natural incentives to deliver, as well as few established channels for effective information collection and communication.

In other words, a lack of competition on the ground offers autonomy to the higher tier politician in a context of weak political parties. This is evidenced by some of our interviews, especially in UC-123. The lead broker here expressed great disillusionment with his political party, but said that this did not matter much to him since everything was dependent on the individual politician, with whom he had good links and considered his leader. “I am under the party’s banner because of him, not the party. I only need to contact him and no one else for whatever work needs to be done”. This is not unlike the literature on political accountability, which draws links between service delivery, the strength (or weakness) of political channels, and the ability of voters to hold politicians accountable (Bratton and Logan 2006, Selee 2009, Keefer 2009). Overall, while Auerbach’s (2016) work emphasises variations in clientelism in explaining uneven development, our findings point to the role of political competition, both at the local and higher tiers of politics.

7. Conclusion

Using a mix of survey and interview data, and of quantitative regression analysis and qualitative case study work, we argued in this paper that the considerable variation that we find in the extent of improvement in municipal services can be explained by the density and competitiveness of party structures at the local level. This is true even after we control for a number of other potential explanations, including respondent demographics, the social centrality of respondents, and their political participation, views and partisan politics.

We find that both the density of party networks and the extent to which the number of party workers present in a locality are proportional across parties are both positively correlated with improvements in the delivery of municipal services. Worker density appears to matter more than the partisan balance across workers in terms of the magnitude of the association, but the latter has a more consistent association with service improvements. Furthermore, this correlation is stronger in national constituencies that are more competitive. Essentially, competition between higher tiers of politicians appears to be a necessary condition that combines with localised competition between workers to produce better delivery outcomes. An exploration of this mechanism in two case unions reveals the importance of political competition in affecting service delivery improvements, and that brokers respond to pressure from both party leaders and from the performance of their local competitors — once again, a combination of higher and local tier competition. Our case work also reveals that the direction of the association between political competition and service delivery improvements is easily established. Given that local workers are selected by parties on the basis of their established local support bases and political reputations, and such actors do not frequently move between neighbourhoods, it is clear that it is the structure of local organisational networks that leads to service delivery improvements, and not the other way around.

Previous research has highlighted the significance of party organisational networks. Auerbach (2016) finds that what matters is worker density within a community, and not their partisan balance. We provide evidence that party networks are not enough to explain differences in provision, and that local competition between party networks also matters. In other words, what matters is not only how many brokers operate within a locality, but also whether or not they belong to different parties that are actively competing with each other for the vote. In explaining this difference between Auerbach's findings in India and ours in Pakistan, we argue that electoral competition between local workers may be a very good disciplining device for politicians operating in weakly institutionalised settings.

With this paper we make an important contribution to the literature on clientelism by looking at variations in machine networks, and on political responsiveness by exploring the conditions under which politicians respond to citizens, and why even citizens who are not peripheral to state infrastructure receive variable delivery. Further work remains to be done in establishing more robust causal relationships between responsive, competition and delivery, but our findings advance the study of political structures and processes in newer democracies, especially where increasing political competition coincides with the growth of urban populations and a growing demand for public services.

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Appendix

Table A1- Party Networks and Service Improvement

	(1) All Services	(2) Municipal	(3) Non-Municipal
PRB	0.0389 (0.0292)	0.112*** (0.0403)	-0.0323 (0.0293)
PND	0.0809 (0.150)	0.250 (0.174)	-0.104 (0.162)
PND * PRB	-0.0521 (0.114)	-0.175 (0.139)	0.0789 (0.125)
Constant	0.264** (0.104)	0.0238 (0.0931)	0.192** (0.0859)
Observations	2,104	2,097	2,103
R-squared	0.143	0.130	0.126
Demographic Control	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Centrality	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political Engagement	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All specifications include provincial constituency Fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the Union Council Level.

Table A2-A- Party Networks and Municipal Service Improvement

	(1) Street Lights	(2) Dumpsters	(3) Garbage Removal	(4) Modern Sanitation	(5) Drinking water	(6) Piped water
PRB	0.0934 (0.0772)	-0.0222 (0.0520)	0.0547 (0.0809)	0.168*** (0.0605)	0.0745 (0.101)	0.137*** (0.0475)
PND	0.324 (0.280)	-0.337** (0.156)	-0.211 (0.255)	0.0595 (0.195)	0.647** (0.276)	0.311 (0.201)
PND * PRB	-0.219 (0.228)	0.289** (0.122)	0.116 (0.243)	-0.0713 (0.166)	-0.438* (0.219)	-0.242 (0.178)
Constant	1.977*** (0.234)	2.238*** (0.173)	2.312*** (0.201)	2.075*** (0.151)	2.340*** (0.199)	2.233*** (0.154)
Observations	1,526	580	1,278	1,874	1,588	2,066
R-squared	0.084	0.099	0.093	0.062	0.133	0.082
Demographic Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Centrality	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political Engagement	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All specifications include provincial constituency Fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at UC level.

Table A2-B- Party Networks and Non-Municipal Service Improvement

	(1) Roads	(2) Electricity	(3) Gas
PRB	0.0562 (0.0587)	-0.265*** (0.0473)	0.0641 (0.0401)
PND	-0.00592 (0.283)	-0.529*** (0.152)	0.165 (0.151)
PND * PRB	0.00488 (0.218)	0.439*** (0.126)	-0.184 (0.128)
Constant	2.010*** (0.144)	2.836*** (0.130)	2.281*** (0.175)
Observations	2,054	2,095	2,079
R-squared	0.039	0.141	0.079
Demographic Control	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Centrality	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political Engagement	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All specifications include provincial constituency Fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the Union Council Level

Table A3- Does Electoral Competition at Higher Tiers matter?

	(1) Overall	(2) Competitive constituencies	(3) Non-Competitive constituencies
PRB	0.165* (0.0869)	0.143*** (0.0380)	0.180* (0.0884)
PND	0.0755 (0.199)	0.510** (0.213)	0.0972 (0.204)
PND * PRB	-0.170 (0.202)	-0.366** (0.168)	-0.193 (0.208)
Constant	0.227** (0.110)	-0.0171 (0.135)	0.0719 (0.112)
Observations	2,097	1,125	972
R-squared	0.153	0.177	0.164
Demographic Control	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Centrality	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political Engagement	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All specifications include provincial constituency Fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the Union Council Level