

PRISMATIC METROPOLIS

INEQUALITY IN LOS ANGELES

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RACIAL ATTITUDES AND POWER IN THE WORKPLACE: DO THE HAVES DIFFER FROM THE HAVE-NOTS?

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WITHIN the social sciences there has been a strong tendency to assume that the logic and demands of a competitive industrial economy would, in the long run, work against racial inequality. Many students of race relations, however, argue that racialized social conditions and identities can powerfully affect market dynamics. In light of these differing perspectives, one hypothesis worthy of careful investigation springs from Herbert Blumer's analyses of "Industrialization and Race Relations" (1965a) and "The Future of the Color Line" (1965b). In these essays he argued that the larger social relations of race will carry over into market relations of the economy. Accordingly, it is a mistake to assume that racial inequality and racial dynamics will be undone by some putatively deeper economic reality or dynamic. Although we do not presume to have the data to resolve this perennial debate, we examine several important aspects of Blumer's proposition that are directly related to it.

The broad purpose of this research is to assess whether whites with power in the workplace differ in their racial attitudes from white workers who lack it. We consider four specific empirical questions: Do whites with power in the workplace hold more or less negative stereotypes of African Americans than those lacking power? Do whites with power in the workplace form and express their stereotypes of African Americans in a different way from those lacking workplace power? Does holding stereotypes of African Americans have consequential effects on

other political outlooks among those with workplace power? And, how does this compare to those who lack it?

The answer to each of these questions bears on the deeper issue of whether the presumed rationalizing and productivity-driven demands of the market weaken a sensitivity to factors presumably as unrelated to worker productivity as race. We focus on stereotypes because such expectations of behavior have the closest connections to judgments of potential worker productivity (Jackman and Senter 1983). We focus on whites' views of African Americans because of the many indicators of unique economic disadvantage and vulnerability among African Americans and the many indicators of considerable white advantage and power in the workplace, especially as supervisors and those empowered to make hiring decisions. Before turning to the data and analyses, we develop in detail Blumer's argument.

Theoretical Foundations

Race as Subordinate to Market Dynamics

Scholars from the left and the right, within both economics and sociology, have expected market dynamics to wipe away anachronistic racial attachments, or at least have maintained that what appears racial on the surface only masks a more important underlying economic or class dynamic. As an example of the former line of reasoning, M.D.R. Evans and Jonathan Kelley have argued that:

neoclassical economic theory implies that discrimination cannot exist in advanced industrial societies' largely free and competitive labor markets. . . . Unless discrimination can be enforced on every single employer (e.g., by legislation, boycotts, or threat of violence), it cannot long endure in a competitive market, save in very special circumstances. Discrimination by workers or customers leads to the same result. (1991, 723)

In assessing the large body of literature on urban political economy, Susan Fainstein and Norman Fainstein concluded:

participants in the debates about urban restructuring focus on the interaction between economic processes and social organization. To the extent that political economists examine social groups as actors and mediating forces, they define the relevant groups by those interests that arise directly out of economic processes—for example, the owners of capital, real estate

developers, the professional-managerial class, redundant workers, gentrifiers, displaced households, in-migrants. (1989, 187–88)

Distinctly racial dynamics are pushed to the margins in such analyses.

Certainly within sociology there is a strong tradition of theoretical inattention to race or of subordinating race to market dynamics. For example, none of the founding figures of sociology—Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, or Max Weber—devoted sustained analytical attention to race or posited race as a central theoretical aspect to larger social processes (see reviews in Blauner 1972; Omi and Winant 1986; Stone 1985).¹ Even some of the most eminent figures in the sociology of race and ethnic relations have argued pointedly for viewing "racial dynamics" as having deeper economic foundations. For example, Edna Bonacich writes:

while race and ethnicity may appear to be primordial attachments, in fact they reflect a deeper reality, namely, class relations and dynamics. I believe that class approaches are the most fruitful way to study ethnicity and race. Not only are they more in accord with a "deeper" level of reality that enables us to understand phenomena at the surface of society, but they also provide us with the tools for changing that reality. [1991, 59]

The economist Michael Reich (1981) fashioned a similar analysis, arguing that only capitalists benefit from a racially divided economy. A theoretical emphasis on the power of markets to undo racial and ethnic attachments is also evident in the emerging economic sociology of immigration. As Victor Nee, Jimmy Sanders, and Scott Sernau argue:

market relations encourage open social relationships. For this reason, markets function as an integrative institution. Workers gradually adapt their behavior to gain advantages in the labor market, shopkeepers customize their services and products to meet consumer tastes, and firms seek the best qualified and least expensive workers, regardless of ethnicity. (1994, 870)

It is not our objective here to review in detail the various market dynamic approaches to matter of race. Rather, we wish to explore several testable hypotheses that bear on how and why race might come to assert itself within market relations. A strong version of a market dynamic argument should be uncomfortable with each of the core hypotheses we specify here. But, in order to develop those hypotheses we need to flesh out the theoretical framework and specific reasons why we believe that race is likely to express itself in economic relations.

Markets as Accommodating a Racial Group Dynamic

Students of racial relations often assume that racial prejudice leads to discrimination (Merton 1949)—or as some have put it, that “a taste for discrimination” leads to discrimination (Becker 1957; Arrow 1973). From our vantage point, it is important to be clear about what one means by *prejudice*. Further, it is important to be clear about the reasons racial prejudice is likely to influence economic and market dynamics.

We adopt a view developed in the work of Herbert Blumer (1958a) and subsequently elaborated by Bobo (1999). He believed that there is an intrinsically collective or group-based dimension to racial prejudice. Blumer maintained that racial prejudice was best understood as a general attitude or orientation involving normative ideas about where one's own group should stand in the social order vis-à-vis an out-group.

He argued that the fully developed sense of group position involved a belief that the dominant group was superior to the subordinate group, that subordinate group members were alien and different, that dominant group members were duly entitled to enjoy rights of first access or proprietary claim over a range of valued social resources, and a perception that subordinate racial group members were threatening to infringe on the proprietary claims of dominant group members (Blumer 1958a). This sense of group position is historically rooted and collectively developed, and thus becomes a widely shared set of ideas among dominant group members about appropriate relations to subordinate group members.

Most research has focused on Blumer's argument about the perception of threat (Bobo 1983; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo and Kluegel 1997; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Quillian 1995; Wellman 1977). For the present purposes, there are two features of Blumer's ideas that should be made more explicit in the group position model. The first concerns the nature and effects of racial identities. The second concerns the role of affect and emotions in the sense of group position.

Race as a Fundamental Cleavage Blumer's work indicates that racial identities are quasi-autonomous forces, ranking with economic and other institutional dynamics in shaping human social organization. He makes this point most directly in his essay on “Industrialization and Race Relations” (1965a). After reviewing the transformations in market relations brought about by industrialization and the presumed broader social effects thereof, Blumer's work debunks one of the claims made by many economists and sociologists then and today: namely, that indus-

trialization would inevitably erode the parochial and anachronistic effects of racial-ethnic ties in ordering social life.

Prior modes of social organization constrain the presumed rationalizing force of economic modernization. This is especially likely to happen where patterns of racial identity, belief, and social organization have been institutionalized. Indeed, accommodation to an established racial order may become economically rational under such conditions:

rational operation of industrial enterprises which are introduced into a racially ordered society may call for a deferential respect for the canons and sensitivities of that racial order. This observation is not a mere a priori speculation. It is supported by countless instances of such decisions in the case of industrial enterprises in the Southern region of the United States, in South Africa and in certain colonial areas. . . . It is a mistake, accordingly, to assume that the rational motif of industrialism signifies an automatic undermining of a racial order into which industrialism enters. To the contrary, the rational imperative in industrial operations may function to maintain and reinforce the established racial order. [Blumer 1965a, 233]

Blumer thus credited race with a powerful capacity to influence, shape, and condition the economic and class dynamics of a society. He did so, it should be emphasized, without denying the importance of economic and class dynamics. Instead, he avoided the conventional error of reducing race to merely its economic manifestations.

None of this, however, amounts to adopting a primordial or essentialist view of racial identities. Blumer was explicit about the socially constructed nature of racial identities. That a social process or phenomena rests on constructed meaning in no way reduces its importance as a patterned and recurrent—indeed, structural—dimension of human social experience (Sewell 1992). Blumer was equally explicit about the potential for change in a racial order. He argued that change in a racial order would spring from a direct assault on that racial order from largely noneconomic and political forces: “The evidence seems to me to lead overwhelmingly to the conclusion that such changes do not arise from inner considerations of industrial efficiency. Instead they arise from outside pressure, chiefly political pressures” (1965a, 247).

The Role of Affect in the Sense of Group Position Blumer recognized that racial attachments and the sense of group position have core nonrational or socio-emotional elements. The historical origins and tenacity of racial attachments cannot be accounted for in terms of purely rational, material, and structural forces. First and foremost, attachment to a particular set of socially constructed racial identities cannot be

taken as given in nature or as a purely rational phenomenon (Stone 1985).

Blumer expressly argued that the sense of group position is a normative construct:

Sociologically it is not a mere reflection of the objective relations between racial groups. Rather it stands for "what ought to be" rather than for "what is." It is a sense of where the two racial groups *belong*. . . . In its own way, the sense of group position is a norm and imperative—indeed a very powerful one. It guides, incites, crows, and coerces. It should be borne in mind that this sense of group position stands for and involves a fundamental kind of group affiliation for the members of the dominant racial group. (Blumer 1958a, 5; emphasis in original)

This normative character to the sense of group position immediately separates it from a purely instrumental basis. The normative dimension is also part of the reason prejudice is an active, adaptive social force. It is infused with a moral imperative.

Blumer also argued that the sense of group position functioned along two important axes. One involved the more obvious dimension of domination and oppression, of hierarchical ordering and positioning. A second critical axis, however, involved a dimension of exclusion and inclusion, of socioemotional embrace or recoil. The exclusion and inclusion dimension, again, invokes an affective or emotional basis to the sense of group position. He also held that "on the social psychological side [the sense of group position] cannot be equated to a sense of social status as ordinarily conceived, for it refers not merely to vertical positioning but to many other lines of position independent of the vertical dimension" (1958a, 5).

Part of the point Blumer makes here is that restrictions imposed on a subordinate group reach beyond the conventional status dimensions defined by rank within the economy or polity. His argument was that even profound change in some aspects of a racial order, and the sense of group position surrounding it, may not erode other core aspects of the sense of dominant group position.

He suggested that the color line had many layers. The layers of economic status and political status were themselves complex and multi-layered. Thus, for example, the elimination of racial exclusion policies in access to employment hardly meant that blacks would find an easy route to positions of high pay, authority, and prestige. More important, the economic and political dimensions of the racial order did not exhaust either the forms of restricted life chances facing African Americans or those undergirding racial prejudice as a social force.

Blumer argued that for this reason the civil rights movement had failed to accomplish a fundamental change in "the color line":

The contested area of civil rights is . . . but the outer band of the color line. Inside it lies the crucial area of economic subordination and opportunity restriction—an area of debarment of Negroes which is exceedingly tough because it is highly complicated by private and quasi-private property rights, managerial rights, and organizational rights. Still further inside the color line are the varied circles of private associations from which the Negro is grossly excluded. Thus, the successful achievement of civil rights merely peels off, so to speak, the outer layer of the color line. (Blumer 1965b, 30)

That is, he expected that whites' sense of racial group position would continue to assert itself. There had been only partial success in changing the color line in the political and economic spheres. Moreover, how the color line affected the private spheres of community, friends, home, and family ties had not been touched at all.

Conceptually, Blumer thus recognized an "inner citadel of the color line." The inner citadel involved the exclusion-inclusion dimension of the sense of dominant group position. He held that this inner citadel was "a matter of personal attitudes and thus falls inside the area of individual determination" (1965b, 335). As such, it would prove unusually resistant to external pressure for change.

Implications and Hypotheses

The central implication of the group position framework is that race will assert itself in economic arrangements so long as important status, affective, and social organizational supports (that is, racially segregated communities, friendship networks, and family structures) exist as bulwarks for a racialized social order (see also Sanjek 1994; Gans 1999). The mechanism that Blumer's analysis underscores is that individuals are not merely business owners, line supervisors, or workers, but social beings embedded in an array of relationships, experiences, and ties. As such, they form identities, outlooks, and expectations that accompany them into many different settings, including racialized identities and expectations that they are likely to carry with them into a specific workplace and in the market more generally.

First, the group position framework hypothesizes no meaningful differences in the overall tenor of the racial stereotypes of whites with power in the workplace from those who lack power (hypothesis 1).

Second, the group position framework hypothesizes that racial stereotypes among those with power in the workplace and those lacking

power in the workplace will exhibit a similar degree of rootedness in such indicators of race-relevant cultural exposure and socialization as age, education, and region of upbringing (hypothesis 2).

Third, the group position framework hypothesizes that racial stereotypes among whites with power in the workplace and those lacking it will exhibit a similar degree of rootedness in such other psychological and general value orientations as ideological self-identification and religiosity (hypothesis 3).

Fourth, the group position framework hypothesizes that the effect of racial stereotypes on other political outlooks will be the same among those with power in the workplace and those without (hypothesis 4).

Analysis and Results

Underlying Social Organization of Race

In the group position framework, racial dynamics are likely to assert themselves in the workplace, irrespective of the basic form of economic organization, because a set of racialized identities and status relations permeate many other domains of social life. In particular, if the neighborhood, friendship, and family circles of individuals continue to be organized or circumscribed by race, then those racialized patterns of interaction and likely self-conception should influence preferences and behavior in the work setting. Thus, a basic precondition in order for Blumer's argument to hold is that neighborhood, friendship, and family ties remain sharply divided by race. In order to establish the *prima facie* plausibility of the group position framework, we first examine the racial makeup of these important domains of life.

Residential Space A substantial body of research documents the extreme and slowly changing pattern of black-white residential segregation in the United States (Massey and Denton 1993; Farley and Frey 1994). Los Angeles continues to rank as "hypersegregated," even using 1990 census data (Denton 1994). Only a very small component of the black-white division into separate neighborhoods can be attributed to differences in income or household composition. Camille Zubrinsky's analyses of PUMA data for Los Angeles County, which adjusted residential segregation indices for household income and composition, concluded: "If Black households could be distributed throughout the Los Angeles area on the basis of socioeconomic characteristics alone, Black-White residential segregation would be roughly 5.5 times lower than it actually is. Class or economic resources, most emphatically, are not the

reason for high Black concentration in just a few areas, and severe underrepresentation in others" (Zubrinsky 1996, 102-3).

In addition, it is clear that whites express significantly greater aversion to residential integration when asked about contact with blacks as compared to other racial minority groups (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Zubrinsky and Bobo 1996; Farley et al. 1994). Black-white separation into distinct, segregated neighborhoods remains the common pattern in Los Angeles. This segregation appears to have more to do with race and racial prejudice than with class status differences or other factors.

Social Networks National studies of network ties show substantial racial homogeneity of personal networks. For example, Peter Marsden's analysis of data from the 1985 General Social Survey showed that: "The race-ethnic homogeneity of the networks is most pronounced: only 96 respondents (8 percent of those with networks of size 2 or greater) cite alters with any racial-ethnic diversity" (1987, 126). A recent detailed investigation in the Detroit metropolitan area reports an increase between the late 1960s and the early 1990s in the amount of contact between blacks and whites. However, much of this contact was restricted to very brief, superficial, public encounters. As these researchers explained: "Nearly half of city's black residents do not have a single white friend, and almost the same proportion of whites in the Detroit suburbs have neither a friend nor a social acquaintance who is black" (Sigelman et al. 1996, 1,326).

As for our Los Angeles County data, only 6.6 percent of whites named one or more black persons as a member of their social network. Importantly, there was no difference in the likelihood of having African Americans in the social networks of whites with power in the workplace as compared to whites lacking power in the workplace. The social sphere of friendship ties is even more starkly segregated than the apartheid-like character of residential communities.

Family Ties Black-white intermarriage, although on the rise, remains extremely uncommon, both in absolute and relative terms compared to that observed among other racial minority groups. As Belinda Tucker and Claudia Mitchell-Kernan explained:

Virtually all U.S. subpopulations that might be defined as "ethnic minorities" have interracial marriage rates that are considerably higher than those for the general population or those of Whites. Yet, interracial marriage among Japanese and Native American women is now practically normative (40.6% and 53.7%, respectively) while such behavior is still rather rare among Blacks (1.2% for Black women and 3.6% for Black men). Fur-

thermore, female outmarriage is higher than male outmarriage for every major racial ethnic group *except* Blacks. (Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan 1990, 209; emphasis in original)

They report higher rates of intermarriage among blacks in Los Angeles as compared to the national figures, but both sets of figures remain very low (well below 10 percent of all black marriages). Naturally, the proportion of white marriages involving blacks is lower still.

In sum, race continues to structure where people live and with whom they share residential space, whom they interact with on a close and regular basis, and to whom they have blood ties. The social organization of race has a number of bases above and beyond those extant in the economic market. Indeed, they are so many and profound, as Blumer argued, that one might well develop the strong *a priori* expectation that these patterns would come to shape what happens in workplaces and market relations more broadly.

Blacks, Whites, and Power in the Workplace

Our analysis focuses on two key measures of workplace power. First, we distinguish between business owners and nonowners, or workers. Whites and blacks differ considerably in levels of workplace power. We found that 18 percent of whites in our Los Angeles sample are business owners, compared to 9 percent of blacks, a difference of 9 percentage points (see appendix tables). This gap is perhaps better understood in ratio terms, since whites are twice as likely as blacks to be business owners. Black-owned businesses also differ from white-owned businesses in industrial-sector locations, size of firm, and owner earnings. Blacks are less likely than whites to own retail establishments (5 percent versus 15 percent), to own business and repair services (9 percent versus 13 percent), professional service businesses (18 percent versus 27 percent), and less likely to be involved in durable manufacturing (less than 1 percent versus 6 percent). Black business owners are more likely than whites to be found in construction (22 percent versus 11 percent), finance, insurance, and real estate (12 percent versus 6 percent), personal service (9 percent versus 4 percent), and in entertainment and recreation (21 percent versus 11 percent). The differences in firm size are even more striking, with the average number of workers in white-owned firms being 10 compared with 2 in black-owned firms.

Our second measure of workplace power is supervisory authority (Dahrendorf 1959). As was true of business ownership, blacks are also

less likely to hold supervisory positions compared to whites: 29 percent versus 42 percent, for a white-to-black ratio of 1.45. In terms of firm size, black and white supervisors are in firms of comparable size (480 versus 399 employees, on average). In addition, there is a large difference in average personal income between black and white supervisors (\$62,232 versus \$86,035). However, black and white supervisors do appear to be located in very different types of work. Black supervisors are concentrated in a few industrial sectors, with the majority in just two: professional and related services (41 percent) and retail trade (13 percent). Whites with supervisory authority are more evenly spread across industrial sectors, with the four largest categories being: professional and related services (28 percent), retail trade (13 percent), durable manufacturing (12 percent), and business and repair services (9 percent).

Stereotyping and Power in the Workplace We measure stereotypes of blacks with four bipolar trait rating items: intelligent to unintelligent, prefer to be self-supporting to prefer to live off welfare, easy to get along with to hard to get along with, and speak English well to speak English poorly.² We use stereotype difference scores, which show whether respondents see blacks as no different from whites, superior to whites, or inferior to whites. We calculate stereotype difference scores by subtracting the respondent's rating of blacks from the respondent's rating of whites. The difference scores range from a low of -50 (most inferior in-group rating compared to out-group) to a high of +50 (most superior in-group rating compared to out-group rating). A score of zero indicates no perceived difference between the two groups, while higher scores indicate more negative ratings of blacks relative to whites.

We address three possible sources of the tendency to hold negative stereotypical views of African Americans. First, several factors tap exposure to distinctive forms or eras of cultural learning and socialization with regard to race. Older individuals experienced critical life events and perspectives at a time when very different, more overtly antiblack and segregationist ideas were more common (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Schuman et al. 1997). Individuals with more formal education have been exposed to different norms with regard to race and presumably have been either trained or selected for thinking with greater complexity and sophistication. Individuals who had early socializing experiences in the American South are likely to have been exposed to a more overtly antiblack set of ideas and outlooks.

Second, some psychological orientations, or other bases of social identity, frequently have a connection to views toward subordinate racial groups. Specifically, those with more conservative political identi-

TABLE 13.1 White-Black Stereotype Difference Score Means by Social Background Characteristics

	Not Intelligent	Prefer Welfare	Hard to Get Along With	Poor English Ability	Stereotype Scale
Overall mean	6.37	15.06	5.13	12.39	9.84
Education					
Less than high school diploma	5.51***	11.3***	5.51***	9.26***	7.59***
High school diploma	5.65	16.11	3.98	11.88	9.64
Some college	7.75	16.35	5.58	12.69	10.67
Bachelor's degree	5.64	13.64	6.00	13.16	9.69
Post-graduate	5.34	13.59	3.76	12.01	8.69
Gender					
Female	7.08	16.08	5.84	12.85	10.59
Male	5.65	14.03	4.60	11.92	9.07
Age					
Twenty-one to twenty-nine years	4.42***	12.66***	5.44***	10.61***	8.08***
Thirty to thirty-nine years	5.31	15.13	2.93	11.50	8.72
Forty to forty-nine years	5.03	12.44	3.16	11.43	8.21
Fifty plus years	8.90	17.80	7.76	14.44	12.57
Conservatism					
Liberal	5.04*	10.71***	2.58**	10.13***	7.21***
Moderate or no thought	5.62	15.67	4.68	12.23	9.74
Conservative	8.32	18.44	7.87	14.63	12.36
Religion					
Protestant	7.12*	15.78	4.53	12.42	9.95
Catholic	7.01	14.85	5.76	13.89	10.57
Other religion	6.73	16.70	5.36	12.04	10.54
Agnostic or atheist	2.29	10.91	4.57	10.08	6.93
Religious attendance					
More than once a week	3.93*	13.94*	4.03	10.66	7.59*
Once a week	8.71	17.80	5.57	12.84	11.56
Almost once a week	9.01	20.17	5.39	14.13	12.02
Few times a month	7.21	18.20	3.39	14.01	10.88
Few times a year	5.93	14.40	5.72	13.35	10.03
Never	2.58	13.00	2.08	10.70	8.61
Residence at age sixteen					
Non-South	6.59	15.22	4.84	12.13	9.82
Southern resident	8.28	16.91	8.00	14.48	11.98
Business ownership					
Worker	6.13	14.90	5.48	11.84	9.71
Owner	7.20	15.93	3.93	11.09	9.54
Job authority					
Not supervisor	6.24	15.45	5.23	11.48	9.81
Supervisor	6.42	14.57	5.17	12.01	9.49

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

ties often adopt a traditional, status-hierarchy maintenance orientation that readily embraces more hostile outlooks toward racial minorities (Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996). There are often differences in the level of prejudice attributable to differences in religious denomination and, especially, to religiosity (frequency of church attendance). Third, we also examine whether those with power in the workplace exhibit more or less antiblack stereotyping than those lacking such power.

Table 13.1 presents mean difference scores on the four stereotype trait dimensions—intelligence, welfare dependency, ease of interracial interaction, and poor English-speaking ability—as well as for an average score across the four items.³ Concentrating on the overall mean differences, it is clear that whites rate blacks as inferior to whites on each of the four dimensions. The difference is at its largest on the welfare dependency dimension, with a difference of comparable magnitude also occurring on the English-speaking-ability trait. There is a consistent tendency to see blacks as more likely to possess negative attributes than whites. Education, age, and conservatism exhibit the most consistent connection to the individual trait dimensions and the overall stereotype index. There are less consistent effects for the religion measures. As the table shows, there is no overall mean difference in antiblack stereotyping between those with workplace power and those lacking it, whether considering the supervisory authority dimension or the ownership dimension.

We conducted three further tests to determine whether the pattern of stereotyping among those with workplace power differed from those who neither owned nor exerted control in the work setting. Under a strong version of the market dynamic perspective, we might expect to find that those with power in the workplace less readily engage in negative stereotyping. To assess this possibility we, first, examined whether there was a difference in the likelihood of offering a "don't know" response to any of the stereotype trait rating items by workplace power. Table 13.2 shows there is no difference, with one exception. Owners are significantly more likely than workers to offer a "don't know" response to the intelligence item, although a small cell count indicates that this finding should be interpreted with caution. Second, we examined whether workplace power affected the chances of using the midpoint response of 4 on the original 1 to 7 stereotype trait rating scales. Again, we saw that it did not. Third, we examined interviewer debriefing ratings of respondent behavior concerning the racial attitudes section of the questionnaire. Interviewers were asked to indicate whether a respondent had hesitated during the racial attitudes section, consistently attempted to qualify or justify his or her answers, showed signs of dis-

TABLE 13.2 *Whites' Stereotypes of Blacks by Ownership and Job Authority*

	Ownership		Authority	
	Worker	Owner	No	Yes
Unintelligent				
Neutral response	46%	42%	42%	49%
Non-neutral	54	58	58	51
Do not know	1*	5*	2	2*
Valid response	99	95	98	98
Prefer welfare				
Neutral response	23	20	23	22
Non-neutral	77	80	77	78
Do not know	1*	2*	1*	1*
Valid response	99	98	99	99
Hard to get along with				
Neutral response	38	41	40	37
Non-neutral	62	59	60	63
Do not know	2	1*	1	2*
Valid response	98	99	99	98
Poor English				
Neutral response	23	17	21	22
Non-neutral	77	83	79	78
Do not know	—	1*	1*	1*
Valid response	100	99	99	99

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

* Cell count less than ten.

* $p < .05$

comfort, or objected to the entire section. As table 13.3 shows, only one of the eight tests (four debriefing items by two dimensions of workplace power) met conventional criteria of statistical significance. We find that supervisors are less likely to show discomfort than those without supervisory authority. The summary count mean significantly differs by job authority, indicating that, overall, interviewers rated nonsupervisors as more sensitive to the racial attitudes section of the survey than supervisors, a trend opposite to the pattern that the market dynamics hypothesis would have predicted.

TABLE 13.3 *Interviewer Observations of Whites by Ownership and Job Authority*

	Ownership		Authority	
	Worker	Owner	No	Yes
Interviewer observations				
Paused or hesitated	38%	28%	40%	31%
Justified or qualified answers	21	19	23	17
Showed discomfort	16	12	18*	11
Objected to section	5	3*	5	3
Summary count				
None	51	64	78	61
Yes to one item	27	18	28	22
Yes to two items	15	11	16	12
Yes to three items	6	5*	7	4
Yes to four items	1*	2*	1*	1*
Mean of summary count	.80	.69	.85**	.66

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

* Cell count less than 10.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .001$

In sum, we find not only no difference in the overall level of negative stereotyping by power in the workplace, but no apparent difference in readiness to stereotype. The results of our test of hypothesis 1 favor the group position over the market dynamic framework. The degree and character of whites' stereotypes of African Americans are held largely without regard to the level of power a white individual holds in the workplace.

The analyses shown in table 13.4 involve tests of hypotheses 2 and 3, which speak to the determinants of racial stereotypes. Recall that hypothesis 2 concerned whether the cultural socializing factors of age, education, and region of upbringing had differential effects on negative stereotyping depending on level of workplace power. Hypothesis 3 concerned whether the psychological orientation factors of conservatism and religiosity had differential effects on stereotyping depending on the level of workplace power. To test these hypotheses, we estimated three OLS regression models in nested steps. At step 1, stereotyping is specified as a function of age, education, gender (male = 1), region of upbringing (South = 1), conservatism (high score = extreme conservatism), religiosity, and a series of dummy variables for religious denomination. At step 2, we add dummy variables representing the workplace power measures for ownership (owner = 1) and for supervisory authority (supervisor = 1). At step 3, we test for interactions between each of

TABLE 13.4 *Whites' Stereotyping of Blacks (Difference Score)*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	-3.64 (3.87)	-.27 (3.92)	-5.88 (6.71)
Background characteristics			
Age	.08 (.04)	.10* (.05)	.08 (.07)
Education	.19 (.18)	-.02 (.20)	.39 (.28)
Gender	-1.49 (1.08)	-1.40 (1.04)	-1.49 (1.00)
South at sixteen	1.89 (1.97)	-.52 (1.36)	-.30 (1.64)
Conservatism	1.49* (.40)	1.64* (.39)	1.88* (.57)
Church attendance	.32 (.31)	-.04 (.34)	-.15 (.44)
Catholic	1.82 (1.31)	.99 (1.26)	1.11 (1.25)
Other religion	1.73 (1.34)	1.97 (1.57)	2.56 (1.52)
Agnostic or atheist	-2.04 (2.29)	-1.37 (2.42)	-1.29 (2.29)
Workplace power			
Owner	—	.41 (1.47)	-6.54 (7.12)
Supervisor	—	-.09 (1.10)	12.01 (10.01)
Interactions			
Age × Owner	—	—	.05 (.10)
Age × Supervisor	—	—	.04 (.09)
Education × Owner	—	—	-.32 (.36)
Education × Supervisor	—	—	-.54 (.38)
Conservatism × Owner	—	—	.72 (.71)
Conservatism × Supervisor	—	—	-.82 (.73)
Attendance × Owner	—	—	1.49 (.91)
Attendance × Supervisor	—	—	-.60 (.76)
Region × Owner	—	—	4.76 (3.03)

(Table continues on p. 508.)

TABLE 13.4 *Continued*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Region × Supervisor	—	—	−2.22 (2.49)
R squared	.10	.13	.15
N	613	473	473

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

* $p < .001$

the workplace power measures and age, education, conservatism, religiosity, and region of upbringing.⁴

In the multivariate framework, only age and conservatism prove to be significant direct determinants of antiblack stereotyping. Model 2 shows that older whites and those with more conservative ideological outlooks tend to hold more derogatory views of African Americans. These are important results, especially the effect of ideology, since it underscores that such stereotypes are, at least in part, a reflection of cultural learning and filtered through other psychological predispositions. Model 2 makes it clear that there is no significant difference in the level of stereotyping, net of these other factors, based on either ownership or supervisory authority. Model 3 introduces all the interaction terms. Collectively, adding the interaction terms increases the variance explained from .13 to .15. However inspection of the individual coefficients indicates that none of the interactions is significant.

These results tend to suggest, consistent with the group position framework, that the underpinnings of the racial attitudes of those with power in the workplace do not differ appreciably from those lacking such power. Table 13.1 showed no difference at the bivariate level in the degree of antiblack stereotyping by workplace power. Table 13.4 adds three further pieces of information. No difference in stereotyping emerges after controlling for such other variables as education, age, gender, region of upbringing, conservatism, and religion. In the main, the process of stereotyping does not appear to be contingent on level of power in the workplace.

Our final hypothesis concerned the effects of stereotypes on other outcomes. The other outcomes of interest are, first, perceptions of zero-sum competition with blacks for economic and political resources and, second, level of support for affirmative action. The substantive question is whether those with workplace power are any less likely to translate antiblack stereotypes into other hostile orientations. Once again, we estimated three models in nested steps. The first model contains age, edu-

cation, region of upbringing, gender, conservatism, religiosity, religion, and the stereotyping index. The second model then introduces the workplace power variables. The third model tests for an interaction between stereotyping and workplace power.

Table 13.5 examines the possible differential effect of workplace power and antiblack stereotyping on perceptions of zero-sum group competition with blacks.⁵ As model 1 shows, the more negative a white respondent's stereotypes of blacks, the more likely the individual is to perceive blacks as zero-sum competitive threats. Perceptions of threat also increase with age and political conservatism. Model 2 shows neither workplace power variable exhibiting a significant relationship to perceptions of threat. The introduction of the workplace power measures in model 2 reduces the effects of conservatism to insignificance. However, the individual interaction coefficients are insignificant, indicating that workplace power does not interact with stereotyping to influence perceptions of competitive threat (model 3).

Our second effort to examine the potentially differential consequences of stereotyping involves levels of opposition to affirmative action in the workplace for blacks.⁶ In this case, Model 1 shows that as political conservatism rises, so too does opposition to affirmative action. In addition, opposition to affirmative action is significantly lower among those from "other" religions than among Protestants. Negative stereotyping of blacks has a significant effect on opposition to affirmative action for blacks. Introducing the workplace power variables (model 2) shows that supervisors are significantly more likely than nonsupervisors to oppose affirmative action. Allowing workplace power and stereotyping to interact (model 3) provides more information. In this instance we find a significant interaction between ownership and negative stereotyping: owners are less likely to translate antiblack stereotypes into opposition to affirmative action.

Conclusion

We began this investigation with the general question of whether the racial attitudes of whites with power in the workplace differed from the racial attitudes of those lacking such power. Our results suggest that they do not. At one level, these results can be read as beginning to fill in an important gap in our knowledge. Discrimination by employers and others with power in the workplace may occur, in part, because these individuals tend to hold the same antiblack stereotypes, for the same reasons, and generalize them to other issues in much the same fashion as everyone else. At least for these data and measures, we can find little

TABLE 13.5 *Whites' Perceived Competitive Threat from Blacks and Opposition to Affirmative Action for Blacks*

	Perceived Competitive Threat			Opposition to Affirmative Action		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	1.52* (.74)	.95 (.83)	1.06 (.81)	2.26*** (.32)	2.09*** (.37)	2.13*** (.37)
Background characteristics						
Age	.01* (.01)	.02* (.01)	.02* (.01)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
Education	-.03 (.03)	.00 (.04)	.00 (.04)	-.00 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.00 (.02)
Gender	.09 (.17)	.04 (.19)	.02 (.18)	.10 (.09)	.09 (.11)	.08 (.11)
South at sixteen	-.39 (.36)	-.55 (.33)	-.62 (.36)	.08 (.16)	-.07 (.16)	-.08 (.17)
Conservatism	.14** (.05)	.08 (.06)	.05 (.06)	.17*** (.03)	.19*** (.04)	.18*** (.04)
Church attendance	.05 (.06)	.09 (.06)	.08 (.06)	.01 (.03)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.03)
Catholic	.29 (.21)	.29 (.24)	.27 (.25)	-.03 (.11)	-.02 (.12)	-.03 (.12)
Other religion	.30 (.21)	.20 (.25)	.16 (.26)	-.23 (.09)	-.20* (.10)	-.21* (.10)
Agnostic or atheist	-.12 (.31)	-.22 (.33)	-.26 (.33)	.09 (.16)	.14 (.16)	.14 (.16)
Stereotype scale	.03*** (.01)	.03*** (.01)	.03** (.01)	.01* (.01)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)
Workplace power						
Owner	—	-.05 (.22)	-.33 (.27)	—	-.24 (.14)	-.32* (.16)
Supervisor	—	.09 (.15)	.28 (.18)	—	.25** (.09)	.20 (.13)
Interactions						
Stereotype × Owner	—	—	.03 (.02)	—	—	.01 (.01)
Stereotype × Supervisor	—	—	-.02 (.01)	—	—	.00 (.01)
R ²	.24	.27	.29	.14	.17	.17
N	199	156	156	612	473	473

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

sign that whites with power in the workplace differ in their attitudes toward blacks from those lacking such power.

Does it matter to know that those with power in the workplace adopt and apparently use racial stereotypes in much the same fashion as those without such power? In a context of intense concern about labor market outcomes for subordinate racial groups, especially for African Americans, we think it does. First, there is strong reason to expect such perceptions to exert a diffuse effect on behavior (Schuman 1995). There is now a wide body of social psychological research suggesting that group stereotypes can influence consequential social judgments, even in the presence of important "individuating" information (see reviews in Brewer and Kramer 1985; Brown 1995, esp. 90–99; Duckitt 1992, 81–84).

Second, there is wide latitude for such stereotypes to influence decisions in the workplace in particular. Employers rarely have information to make strong or conclusive judgments about the likely productivity of a potential new hire and are frequently surprised by the outcomes of their choices (Bishop 1993). Hence, as the economist Harry Holzer explained: "Under these circumstances there is considerable room for discriminatory judgments about who will be competent in performing a variety of job-specific tasks" (1996, 83).

Social psychological research on stereotyping provides important leverage here. Perhaps the single most consistent finding of stereotyping research is that stereotypes lead to selective information processing in a manner that tends to confirm the existing stereotype (Duckitt 1992, 82; Stephan 1985). What is more, considerable research suggests that one of the social conditions most likely to activate and encourage reliance on a group stereotype is the arousal of feelings of discomfort (Brown 1995, 104–5). Given the relative infrequency of black-white social interaction generally, especially as status equals or in close casual acquaintances, it is likely that workplace encounters arouse a degree of uncertainty and discomfort for both blacks and whites.

This may be particularly true in the types of encounters that occur at the point of a hiring decision. The African American job applicant may be particularly eager to behave in ways that do not conform to stereotypes and to monitor for any signs of racial bias. The white business owner or supervisor is engaging in a comparatively novel interracial interaction and may be eager to avoid conveying the impression that race is in any way influencing his or her thinking. Ironically, rather than curbing the operation of stereotypes, it is exactly this mix of pressures that may exaggerate the adverse effects of stereotypes.⁷

Third, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that employers probably do act on racial stereotypes. For example, Holzer's large-scale surveys of employers in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles found

that: "even after controlling for racial differences in educational attainment, employer perceptions of racial and gender differences in abilities to perform tasks, in certain credentials, and in the preferences of their customers apparently lead them to hire blacks (and Hispanics) much less frequently in some jobs than others" (1996, 103). The evidence on this point is even more direct from in-depth interview studies of employers. Joleen Kirschenman and Kathryn Neckerman write: "Chicago's employers did not hesitate to generalize about race or ethnic differences in the quality of the labor force. Most associated negative images with inner-city workers, and particularly with black men. 'Black' and 'inner city' were inextricably linked, and both were linked with lower class" (1991, 230-31).

Our research thus helps fill in another important piece of the puzzle of how and why blacks remain disadvantaged in the modern urban labor market. Whites with power in the workplace appear to arrive at and draw inferences from their stereotypes of blacks in much the same fashion as those lacking such workplace power. There is a larger historical and contemporaneous social organization to race that supports a set of racial stereotypes—persistent black-white economic inequality, sharp racial residential segregation, racially homogeneous social networks and family structures—all of which facilitate the likelihood that race and racial stereotypes will operate in the economic arena.

There may, of course, be many who argue that racial stereotypes include a large element of truth (compare Sniderman and Piazza 1993). A number of labor market differences between blacks and whites appear to involve noteworthy differences in skill levels (for reviews, see Ferguson 1995; Holzer 1996). Hence, it is often argued that most of what flows from stereotypes is "statistical discrimination," where, given the costs of obtaining more detailed diagnostic information, it is sensible and legitimate for employers to act on their knowledge of meaningful aggregate differences in key potential productivity-related attributes between blacks and other groups.

We believe this analysis is mistaken at several levels. To be sure, we share with most social psychologists the assumption that stereotypes often reflect the actual distribution of social groups into differently valued social roles and structural positions in society (Eagly and Steffen 1984; Duckitt 1992; Brown 1995). We also share two further assumptions about stereotypes typically made by social psychologists: that this "realistic" social basis to stereotypes provides no more than the kernel of truth to a stereotype; and that the operation of stereotypes, in this case racial stereotypes, remains inherently problematic and thus cannot be excused. This is so because they facilitate categorical and discriminatory treatment and because they usually involve the attribution of group

differences to individual dispositions rather than to social processes and circumstances (Pettigrew 1981; Duckitt 1992). There may well be a meaningful difference, on average, between blacks and whites on such traits as "commitment to work," especially among young, low-skilled African Americans compared to white middle-class expectations. But, such differences neither justify shortchanging a real assessment of individual potential in any particular situation, nor make legitimate the common assumption that the onus for change rests on the stereotyped individual rather than on the social structures and conditions that created the difference. As the economist Ronald Ferguson has cogently argued:

Substantially reducing racial disparity among young adults in the labor market requires supporting *and* holding accountable the institutions that should inspire, educate, and nurture African American children. In addition, it requires continued vigilance against racial bias in the workplace that validates young people's expectations that the game is rigged against them even when they do their part to prepare and perform. Given the complexity of the social forces that affect the acquisition of skill and success in labor markets, and given that social forces are malleable, this author rejects any assertion that the remaining differences in skill among blacks and whites . . . are genetically predetermined . . . or that society should acquiesce and be content to tolerate them. (1995, 39; emphasis in original)

In this regard, it is interesting to note that William Julius Wilson's (1996) interviews with both black and white employers show the former to hire blacks more often, despite sharing with their white counterparts a stereotype of low-skilled blacks. The crucial difference appears to be that for black employers, this stereotype is understood as having malleable social causes as opposed to the more dispositional assumption made by the white employers. Thus, while from the purview of much economic reasoning, there is an important logical distinction between pure and statistical discrimination, it should be equally borne in mind that from the purview of much social psychological reasoning, the categorical treatment of individual members of a socially defined racial group is intrinsically problematic.

Lastly, we should be clear about the scope of the implications to be drawn from these results. Nothing we have found or argued implies that stereotyping or racial dynamics completely overwhelm market forces, situation-specific interactions, or information about an individual. Indeed, phenomena such as the Massachusetts Miracle, which involved such tight labor markets that even segments of the population normally confronting very bleak employment opportunities found work (that is, young, low-skilled, black males), plainly suggest otherwise. The work of

Evans and Kelley (1991) with respect to recent immigrants in the Australian labor market makes the same point. Our point is that as long as stereotypes persist and are widely shared, especially by those with power in the workplace, economic conditions and roles alone are not enough to account for the range of conditions and experiences blacks are highly likely to encounter in the labor market. As a result, meaningful social analyses must engage, directly and substantively, the matter of race.

Our central message, therefore, is that scholars attempting to understand group inequality in modern urban labor markets need to adjust some central or baseline theoretical and empirical expectations. This adjustment involves a reframing of analyses in a manner that the *ex ante* expectation is that—in addition to conventional human capital, class analytic and institutional or organization variables—negative stereotypes of African Americans matter in the workplace, and matter for a variety of labor market dynamics (such as hiring decisions, and raise and promotion decisions). Furthermore, in all likelihood these stereotypes function to create higher, more difficult, and recurrent constraints to black success in the labor market. They are likely to introduce a powerful set of irreducibly race-linked and noneconomic factors into marketplace dynamics.

Appendix

TABLE 13A.1 *Workplace Power by Race of Respondent*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos	Total	F
Business Ownership						
Worker	82%	91%	71%	91%	86%	9.75*
Owner	18	9	29	9	14	
Job Authority						
Not Supervisor	58	71	90	76	67	14.92*
Supervisor	42	29	40	24	33	

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

* $p < .001$

TABLE 13A.2 *Mean Firm Size and Mean Family Income by Race of Respondent*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos	F
Firm size					
Owners	10	2	6	406	4.46**
Supervisors	399	480	193	279	2.85*
Family income					
Owners	\$89,082	\$81,702	\$80,546	\$35,665	5.34***
Supervisors	\$86,035	\$62,232	\$46,126	\$42,987	6.75***

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

TABLE 13A.3 *Industrial Sector for Owners by Race*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos	Total
Agricultural, forestry, fish	4%	2%	1%	—	3%
Construction	11	22	3	17	13
Nondurable manufacturing	1	1	11	17	6
Durable manufacturing	6	<1	3	2	4
Transportation, communication, other public utility	—	<1	2	5	1
Wholesale trade	2	—	7	3	2
Retail trade	15	5	30	15	16
Finance, insurance, real estate	6	12	9	3	6
Business and repair services	13	9	14	7	11
Personal services	4	9	2	19	8
Entertainment and recreation	11	21	2	5	9
Professional and related services	27	18	16	8	20

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

TABLE 13A.4 *Industrial Sector for Supervisors by Race*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos	Total
Agricultural, forestry, fish	1%	<1%	<1%	3%	1%
Construction	8	3	4	11	8
Nondurable manufacturing	3	3	15	16	7
Durable manufacturing	12	6	5	11	10
Transportation, communication, other public utility	8	5	7	11	9
Wholesale trade	1	1	9	2	2
Retail trade	13	13	21	18	15
Finance, insurance, real estate	6	7	5	6	6
Business and repair services	9	8	8	6	8
Personal services	1	1	6	3	2
Entertainment and recreation	6	6	1	<1	4
Professional and related services	28	41	18	11	24
Public administration	4	4	1	3	3

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

TABLE 13A.5 *Occupation for Owners by Race*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos	Total
Managerial and professional	50%	48%	52%	17%	42%
Technical, sales	25	13	35	15	23
Service	12	10	5	28	15
Other	13	29	9	39	20

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

TABLE 13A.6 *Occupation for Supervisors by Race*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos	Total
Managerial and professional	53%	38%	61%	23%	44%
Technical, sales	24	32	29	22	24
Service	8	19	4	11	10
Other	16	11	6	44	22

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

TABLE 13A.7 *Workplace Power of Whites by Gender, Nativity, and Conservatism*

	Ownership		Authority		N
	Worker	Owner	No	Yes	
Gender					
Women	86%	14%	68% **	32%	(324)
Men	79	21	50	50	(344)
Nativity					
Foreign born	69*	31	64	36	(94)
Native	85	15	57	43	(574)
Conservatism					
Liberal	76	24	55	45	(211)
Moderate or no thought	85	15	62	38	(234)
Conservative	85	15	57	43	(220)

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

* $p < .01$, ** $p < .001$ TABLE 13A.8 *Mean Education, Age, Family Income, and Conservatism for Whites by Workplace Power*

	Ownership			Authority		
	Worker	Owner	F	No	Yes	F
Education	14.1	15.0	3.43 ns	14	14.7	7.68 **
Age	41.8	45.6	3.61 ns	41.8	43.4	1.33 ns
Family income	\$61,617	\$89,082	3.87 *	\$52,465	\$86,035	11.70 ***
Conservatism	4.04	3.69	1.85 ns	3.65	4.00	.13 ns

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Notes

1. To be sure, Weber's important conceptual recognition of "status" groups provides a theoretical entrée for a discussion of race, but this did not become a major project for Weber himself.
2. In order to maintain the potential for comparability to other sites in the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, we restrict our analysis to the four trait dimensions that appeared in all four household surveys.
3. The four items constitute a reasonable scale with a Cronbach's alpha of .70.
4. In preliminary analyses, we entered each of the interaction terms into the equation separately. In no instance were there significant effects.
5. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with each of the following statements: "More good jobs for blacks mean fewer good jobs for whites" and "The more influence blacks have in local politics the less influence whites will have in local politics." The two items are highly correlated ($r = .57$), and though composed of only two items, Cronbach's alpha for a simple additive scale of the two items is also quite high ($\alpha = .73$). See Bobo and Hutchings (1996) for analyses of closely similar items. Because of a split-ballot experiment, the perceived group competitive threat items were asked only of a randomly selected third of the sample.
6. Respondents were asked whether they favored or opposed each of two forms of affirmative action for blacks: "Some people feel that because of past disadvantages there are some groups in society that should receive special job training and educational assistance. Others say that it is unfair to give these groups special job training and educational assistance. What about you?" and "Some people feel that because of past disadvantages there are some groups in society that should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that it is unfair to give these groups special preferences. What about you?" The two questions are highly interrelated ($r = .45$) and, though composed of only two items, the Cronbach's alpha for a simple additive scale of the two items is reasonable ($\alpha = .62$).
7. Indeed, this sort of process of stereotypes having heightened effects in an interview situation casts a very different light on the finding of greater racial discrimination by employers in suburban as compared to central-city areas (Holzer 1996). Rather than reflecting more negative attitudes on the part of employers or suburban customers, it may reflect the more infrequent, and therefore anxiety-producing and stereotype-enhancing, character of black-white interactions in suburban work settings. Suburbs are settings that may increase the

correspondence between stereotypes and behavior or likelihood of the expression of underlying stereotypes in overt behavior.

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