# URBAN INEQUALITY

EVIDENCE FROM FOUR CITIES

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**EDITORS** 

A VOLUME IN THE MULTI-CITY STUDY OF URBAN INEQUALITY

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# STEREOTYPING AND URBAN INEQUALITY

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Social inequality is understood and studied as fundamentally involving a set of structural conditions and processes. Whether the main analytical perspective emphasizes Marxian class dynamics, distinct labor markets and sectors, major institutional actors, or key social policy decisions, supra-individual factors are typically the focus of attention. Yet, according to the sociologists Katherine O'Sullivan See and William Julius Wilson, "It is important to underline that different types of ethnic stratification are not only structured by different arrangements of the economy and the polity, they are also shaped by the participants in the intergroup arena" [1989, 238]. To wit, the perceptions and ideas that guide human behavior and interaction are likely to be core elements in determining who gets a larger or smaller piece of the pie (Reskin 2000). This is perhaps especially so when the issue is how and why privilege or disadvantage is allocated among racial and ethnic groups (Allport 1954, Jackman 1994, Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

In this chapter we are concerned mainly with the perceptions and ideas commonly held about the characteristics of members of different racial and ethnic groups. These beliefs, we submit, are a critical ingredient in the creation and reproduction of patterns of racial and ethnic labor market inequality, segregation of housing, and general intergroup tension and misunderstanding. To be sure, stereotypes have long been taken into account by serious students of racial and ethnic inequality. For example, in his pioneering study *The Philadelphia Negro*, W. E. B. DuBois (1996 [1899], esp. 323–24) wrote of how prevailing prejudices closed the doors of opportunity for African Americans (see Bobo 2000b; O'Connor 2000). Likewise, stereotypes and the rationalizing function they often serve were critical elements in Gunnar Myrdal's (1944) classic assessment of why racial discrimination permeated all aspects of pre-

World War II American social life. And St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton (1945, esp. 266–73) stressed that it was the many convenient "folkbeliefs" about race that sustained and perpetuated the "color line" in "Midwest Metropolis."

This classical foundation notwithstanding, there was a long period of relative disinterest in stereotyping—intergroup attitudes and prejudice—as a factor contributing to social inequality. In part, this reflected how the institutionalization of the social sciences occurred in major universities. Studies of stereotyping and prejudice became the province mainly of psychologists interested principally in cognitive functioning (not social stratification and inequality). In part, this reflected an explicit turn within sociology against microsocial theories of prejudice and toward macrosocial theories of historically emergent and structural forms of racism. In part, this reflected an interest in topical or controversial issues of the day (for example, opinions on school desegregation) among those survey researchers who might have been more expressly concerned with whether and how attitudes connected to social inequality (Kinder and Schuman, forthcoming).

The collective weight of a number of obdurate social facts, major demographic trends, and related intellectual developments served to redirect scholarly attention to questions of the extent, nature, and effects of racial and ethnic stereotypes. First, despite profound changes in the economic and political structure of racial inequality in the United States (Wilson 1978), there remained many forms of black-white inequality. In particular, a complex of social ills such as crime and welfare dependency grew from the intensification of ghetto poverty (Wilson 1987) and persistently high rates of racial residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1993). The black-white divide, in brief, remained an often bitterly divisive social cleavage. Second, steady waves of immigration to the United States from Asian and Latin American countries after 1965 greatly accelerated the extent and pace of racial and ethnic diversification of the urban population (Waldinger 1989; Harrison and Bennett 1995; Bean and Bell-Rose 1999). Nonetheless, many Latinos soon found themselves facing limited chances for upward mobility (Ortiz 1996: Valenzuela and Gonzalez 2000), and even upwardly mobile thirdgeneration Asian-Americans often found that whites continued to assume they were foreigners (Tuan 1998). At the same time, anti-immigrant rhetoric, political movements, and legislation intensified (Chavez 1997; Sears et al. 1999).

Third, a social milieu reflecting the intersection of persistent, severe black disadvantage and rapid population change sometimes erupted into deadly violence, as seen in events like the Los Angeles uprisings of 1992 (Johnson, Farrell, and Oliver 1993; Bobo and Hutchings 1996).

Fourth, and most proximate to our concern, studies of social inequality that allowed for an explicit concern with racial and ethnic stereotypes began to find influences of these beliefs on key labor market outcomes (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991) and residential sorting processes (Farley et al. 1994). The combined result of these developments is that lines of scholarship on critical dimensions of social inequality and on basic stereotyping processes that had become largely uncoupled and separate have increasingly been brought back together (see, for example, Reskin 2000 and the work of Tsui, Xin, and Egan 1995).

As the introduction to this volume explains, we expressly designed the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality to improve our leverage on how stereotypes play into the dynamics of life in contemporary urban centers. Thus, the Household Surveys in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles contained explicit measures of racial stereotypes. Likewise, the Employer Telephone Surveys and the Employer In-depth Interviews sought to gauge the images that those with power in the workplace hold regarding members of different racial and ethnic groups. Each component of the project thus aimed to increase our capacity to assess when, how, and why stereotypes may contribute to residential sorting and segregation processes, unequal employment and earnings outcomes, or broad patterns of intergroup cooperation or conflict.

Using Multi-City Study Household Survey data from Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles on the views of whites, blacks, and Hispanics, this chapter examines stereotyping in the modern urban context. We investigate a range of issues, including how salient and how negative (or positive) racial stereotypes are, how they are organized in individual cognition, whether they exhibit important contextual variation (for example, city-specific), and to the extent possible with cross-sectional survey data, the sources of stereotypes. In order to help clarify the fundamental nature of stereotypes, we organize the analysis that follows around two basic questions about stereotypes that, in some other research contexts, might be assumed to have well-known answers:

- (1) Are racial and ethnic stereotypes reflective of a general, broad ethnocentric bias or are they group-specific? That is, do we find evidence of a general psychological tendency to denigrate any and all out-groups, or are stereotypes closely tailored to particular groups?
- (2) Are racial and ethnic stereotypes highly contextually specific and variable or largely insensitive to context? By context, in this case, we mean metropolitan area (Atlanta versus Boston versus Detroit versus Los Angeles). We wish to know whether there are sharp differences across metropolitan areas in the organization and correlates of racial and ethnic stereotypes.

Clearer answers to these questions will better specify whether we should think of the operation of stereotypes as mainly reflecting powerful human psychological processes of perception or as mainly the product of unique historical and cultural sets of intergroup relationships (question 1), and whether stereotypes derive mainly from a broad common cultural environment and experience or derive mainly from local, directly experienced, and highly contingent social environments (question 2). We thus aim to better elucidate both the nature of racial stereotypes themselves and their role in urban inequality. In so doing, we hope to further the revitalization of a view of social psychological and stereotyping processes as organic and necessary factors in research on inequality.

We offer a few remarks here to presage our theoretical discussion, findings, and major conclusions. After measuring stereotypes aimed at tapping perceptions of both broad competence and sociability, we find that whites receive the most favorable ratings, and African Americans and Latinos the least favorable ratings, with perceptions of Asians falling close to those of whites. Specific group targets are essential to understanding the nature of stereotypes, yet the basic organization of the stereotypes does not differ sharply across respondent racial group, target

group, or social context.

Consistent with prior research, we suggest that racial stereotypes are at once social products and social forces; they spring in part from the fact of social inequality among groups but also form constituent elements in the reproduction of inequality. Stereotypes are social products in the sense that they emerge from the history and context of particular relations among groups. They reflect the positioning of groups in physical space, work or occupational roles, and the overall economic hierarchy. Yet stereotypes are also social forces and highly generalized, durable cognitive constructs. They are bundles of ideas that directly influence individual expectations, perceptions, and social behavior in intergroup contact settings. Social psychological research shows that stereotypes influence what we see, what we believe to be true, what we expect, and therefore how we tend to behave toward members of groups other than our own. Thus, a white employer may expect Latinos to be more cooperative and hard-working employees than otherwise comparable blacks; an Asian American family seeking to buy its first home may search only in overwhelmingly white neighborhoods, even though many integrated communities contain the mix of homes and resources they are looking for, and an African American or perhaps a Latino shopper may anticipate and ultimately receive rude treatment from a Korean American store owner.

We begin with a full theoretical discussion of the concept and origins of stereotypes. We then clarify the role of stereotyping in the reproduction of social inequality. Next we develop the rationale for our core concern with the organization and structure of stereotypes (question 1) and contextual variation in stereotypes (question 2).

### The Nature of Stereotypes

Walter Lippman's early discussion of stereotyping spoke of the "the pictures inside the head" (1922, 18)—an apt intuitive characterization. Subsequent generations of social scientists have attempted more formal statements. A stereotype is a "set of beliefs about the personal attributes of members of a particular social category" or a "set of cognitions that specify the personal qualities, especially personality traits, of members of an ethnic group" (Ashmore and Del Boca 1981, 13). As the social psychologists David Hamilton and Tina Trolier put it, stereotypes are "cognitive structures that contain the perceiver's knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about human groups" (1986, 133). Racial stereotyping thus involves assumptions and expectations about the likely characteristics, capacities, and behaviors of members of a particular racial or ethnic category.

In common sense usage, racial stereotyping is typically assumed to bring with it categorical or extreme judgments, clear negative valence, and resistance to new or contradictory information. It is precisely in response to this conception of stereotypes that "stereotyped" thinking is seen as a bad and usually inaccurate form of "prejudgment" that contributes to bias (Allport 1954). Modern social psychologists, however, tend to limit the meaning of the stereotype concept to the ideas or perceptions about groups, without making strong assumptions that these ideas are necessarily categorical, negative, rigid, or even bad (Ashmore and Del Boca 1981). Social categorization is an inevitable tool that we as perceivers rely on to simplify and impose coherence on the enormous

flood of stimuli bombarding us at any given moment.

Social psychologists commonly distinguish between cultural stereotypes and personal beliefs. Cultural stereotypes refer to widely shared, quite possibly consensually held, ideas about members of a particular racial and ethnic category (Devine 1989; Devine and Elliot 1995). Any particular individual, while almost certainly aware of the broad cultural stereotype about a salient racial or ethnic group, may not personally accept or adhere to that stereotype. Some of the evidence from Patricia Devine and colleagues suggests, for example, that a growing fraction of the white population personally rejects the negative cultural stereotype of African Americans. However, social categories, such as racial distinctions, are often made salient in ways and under conditions that result in the automatic activation of the negative cultural stereotype. Even those

who may personally resist the conventional negative image given a particular outgroup may succumb to negative and discriminatory behavior toward members of that group. Only in circumstances that facilitate inhibiting the otherwise routine activation of the negative cultural stereotype should one expect no biasing effect of the negative stereotype.

The impetus to accept or adhere to prevailing stereotypes has several potential sources or points of origin (Duckitt 1992; Brown 1995). Individuals may come to accept stereotypes through one of three principal avenues. The first mechanism is social learning. Socialization into a particular culture or other direct contact with members of particular racial or ethnic groups, or even vicarious learning experiences such as occurs through the media, may all be sources of stereotypes. These beliefs stem in part from the distribution of groups into particular structural locations. Stereotypes have long been found to respond to the geographic distribution (rural versus urban and large versus small community), work roles, and class standing of social groups (Stephan and Rosenfield 1982]. Stereotypes may also have motivational bases, serving a rationalization function (Lippman 1922; Myrdal 1944; Clark 1965): that is, stereotypes may derive from some externality or instrumental consideration. It is easier to exploit and deny rights to those one perceives as inferior (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999). A less instrumental but no less motivational basis for stereotypes may be found in personality attributes. Strongly ethnocentric (Sumner 1940 [1906]), intolerant and authoritarian (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988), or dominance-oriented individuals (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) may be particularly likely to hold negative views of outgroup members.

Lastly, stereotypes may result from normal cognitive biases. Many social psychologists might see this as the primary source of stereotypes (Stephan 1985). As perceivers, we employ categories to help impose order and meaning on the steady stream of social stimuli impinging upon us at any given moment. It is both necessary and natural for us to do so. However, once social categories exist, and given a principle of efficiency (the assumption that all else equal, we are "cognitive misers"—expending as little energy as possible in processing information), it is likely that we exaggerate the degree of between-group difference and underestimate the degree of within-group variation. This tendency can have pernicious effects in an interracial or interethnic context. Research suggests that rare or infrequently occurring phenomena, especially if linked to negative or unwanted outcomes, can assume exaggerated prominence in memory (such as the perception of minority group members as prone to crime and violence). Thus, there may develop highly salient and easily mobilized views, for instance, of blacks as criminals (Hurwitz and Peffley 1997) or welfare cheats (Gilens 1999), or of Latinos as docile people, well suited to low-skill, low-paying work (Bobo et al. 1995), or of Asians as forever foreign and unassimilable (Tuan 1998).

# Stereotyping in Discrimination and Inequality

There was at one time a debate over whether attitudes influenced behavior or, more precisely, whether measured attitudes bore any relation to observed behavior (see discussions in Schuman et al. 1997; Krysan 2000). This debate has been, we believe, rather decisively resolved in favor of the view that well-measured attitudes and beliefs will, ordinarily, exhibit a clear relation to well-measured patterns of behavior (Schuman 1995). Prior attitudes are one causal input to behavior, along with important situational and normative factors and other individual attributes and experiences. Indeed, our interest in stereotypes rests on the assumption that these are ideas that matter for significant social behavior. In particular, there are good grounds to expect stereotypes to influence the dynamics of group inequality through their impact on perception and understanding in situations of intergroup contact generally, and to do so through a variety of job market—and housing market—specific mechanisms.

## Perception and Understanding

The first and most important effect of a stereotype is that when a social category is made salient, it leads to the activation of an existing bundle of ideas and information, This existing cognitive structure or schema about "blacks," or "Hispanics," or "Asians," or even "whites" then tends to organize and direct the information taken in by the individual during any specific situation. That is, social psychologists have long assumed that the existing stereotype biases what one sees in any situation and the meaning one assigns to objects and events in the immediate situation. Accordingly:

In keeping with this long-standing tradition, we believe that stereotypes affect overt responses producing discriminatory judgments and behaviors, via their impact on the construal of social targets and the immediate social situation. Once activated, stereotypes affect which stimuli people notice and how they interpret them, as well as whether and how they remember the information later. [Bodenhausen, Macrae, and Garst 1998, 318]

The clearest finding of research on stereotyping is that these are ideas that shape what we see and believe (Duckitt 1992; Brown 1995).

Stereotyped expectations influence perception, action, and the

course of interaction (Bodenhausen, Macrae, and Garst 1998, Lieberson 1985). As Galen Bodenhausen and colleagues explained: "stereotypic expectations guide attention to the subset of available stimuli to which they are relevant. In so doing, they can bias the interpretation placed on a target and his or her behavior. It is these biased interpretations that give rise to discriminatory responses" (1998, 319). Critically these stereotypes can influence willingness to enter a situation of between-group contact, how warmly or coldly one engages a member of another group, and whether that interaction is positive or negative in overall quality. The nature of these dynamics is easy to apprehend. In the simplest case, one can envision a white person holding many of the prevalent negative images of African Americans. Any particular African American individual is likely to be aware of these images and monitor for signs of behavior that signal adherence to these beliefs among whites (Lieberson 1985). Bringing two such individuals from different groups together, in the light of these underlying expectations, is fraught with the potential for tension and interactional failure.

More specifically, Lee Sigelman and Steven Tuch (1997) showed that African Americans have clear ideas about how whites view them as a group and that these "meta-stereotypes" are reasonably correspondent to the actual distribution of whites' views. Bringing individuals with these perspectives into face-to-face contact is thus an opportunity for the interplay of stereotyped expectations, just as much of the literature on the often conflictual nature of black-white interaction emphasizes (Feagin and Sikes 1994; Hochschild 1995; Bobo 2000a).

#### The Job Market

There are good reasons to believe that stereotypes matter in one's prospects for employment, benefiting members of those groups held in positive regard and harming members of those groups held in negative regard (Neckerman and Kirschenman 1991; Reskin 2000). In an experimental study that simulated hiring decisions, John McConahay (1983) found that negative attitudes toward blacks reduced evaluations of a potential black job candidate. Carl Word, Mark Zanna, and Joel Cooper (1974) found that those with negative expectations for a black job candidate actually behaved in more negative ways in the course of an interview situation and actually elicited stereotype-confirming behaviors from the candidate. Joleen Kirschenman and Kathryn Neckerman (1991) found widespread negative views of African Americans and more positive views of other groups in their in-depth interviews with Chicagoarea employers. Indeed, William Julius Wilson's general summary of results from the employer interviews done as part of his Urban Poverty and Family Life Study showed that:

Of the 170 employers who provided comments on one or more of these traits, 126 (or 74 percent) expressed views of inner city blacks that were coded as "negative"—that is, they expressed views (whether in terms of environmental or neighborhood influences, family influences, or personal characteristics) asserting that inner-city black workers—especially black males—bring to the workplace traits, including level of training and education, that negatively affect their job performance. [Wilson 1996, 112]

Both studies suggest that these perceptions affect whom employers interview and hire, as well as where they advertise and recruit for workers. These sorts of processes are by no means restricted to in-depth interviews performed in Chicago. Analyses from Atlanta (Browne and Kennelly 1999; Kennelly 1999) and Los Angeles (Waldinger 1996; Moss and Tilly 1995) identify many of the same patterns. Similarly, Harry Holzer's (1996) telephone surveys from four cities with employers pointed to clear preferences for particular groups over others.

#### The Housing Market

Stereotypes also play a part in creating and sustaining patterns of racial residential segregation. Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1993) hypothesized, consistent with a research tradition reaching back to DuBois (1996 [1899]) and Myrdal (1944), that racial prejudice was a key element in relegating blacks to "ghetto" communities. More recent studies of community racial turnover and transition (Cummings 1998) identify a central role for negative racial stereotypes as well.

Reynolds Farley and colleagues (1994) found that, indeed, a direct measure of antiblack stereotypes was a strong predictor of whites' willingness to share residential space with blacks among their sample of Detroit-area residents. This finding was extended by Lawrence Bobo and Camille Zubrinsky (1996), who found that the effect of negative stereotypes held whether one was looking at data on white, black, Latino, or Asian respondents. Their data from Los Angeles County showed negative stereotypes to influence willingness to live in integrated settings among all groups. Camille Zubrinsky Charles (2000a, 2000b, and this volume) has shown that this pattern holds true using far more sensitive measures of openness to residential integration than were available in any of the earlier studies.

# Stereotypes as a Social Force

We tend to acquire stereotypes before we are called upon to act socially. We pick up the ideas about "them," members of other racial or ethnic groups, that our culture, inclinations, and perceptual biases give us, and only then engage the social world in which we live (rather than the other way around). This is why stereotypes are such an important ele-

ment in the structuring and dynamics of urban inequality. This, too, is why the operation of stereotypes is a troubling factor in the social processes that create and maintain social inequality. As the eminent social commentator and analyst Walter Lippman once put it:

A pattern of stereotypes is not neutral. It is not merely a way of substituting order for the great blooming, buzzing confusion of reality, It is not merely a short cut. It is all these things and something more. It is the guarantee of our self-respect, it is the projection upon the world of our own sense of our value, our own position and our own rights. The stereotypes are, therefore, highly charged with the feelings that are attached to them. They are the fortress of our tradition, and behind its defenses we can continue to feel ourselves safe in the positions we occupy. [1922, 63–64]

Stereotypes lead one to assume dissimilarity between the in-group and members of other groups, to overgeneralize and behave toward a social category rather than toward a particular individual, and therefore often to elicit behavior from out-group members that confirms the very biased perceptions with which the interaction began. In a context of historic and enduring inequality in life chances between members of different racial and ethnic groups, stereotypes become key elements in structuring and reconstituting differential chances in life depending upon one's race or ethnicity.

### Possible Structures and Correlates

A handful of recent studies notwithstanding, most of the research on stereotypes derives from experiments conducted on college undergraduates, usually introductory psychology students (Katz and Braly 1933; Devine and Elliot 1995; Fiske 1998). The survey research literature has devoted far less attention to stereotypes until recently (Jackman 1994; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Bobo and Kluegel 1997; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; see Bobo 2000a for a review). As a result, we have a very limited base of knowledge about the basic structure and correlates of stereotypes among respondents to general population surveys. And most of this work focuses exclusively on the black-white divide and usually just the perceptions of white respondents (Bobo and Kluegel 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 1998; Levine, Carmines, and Sniderman 1999; see Sigelman, Shockey, and Sigelman 1993 for one exception). We begin, then, by developing expectations for the basic organization of stereotypes.

Stereotypes may arise, be organized, and function in any of several ways. Our first major empirical question concerns how stereotypes are organized. We wish to know whether out-group stereotypes reflect a sin-

gular us-versus-them dichotomy, wherein members of any outgroup are seen as different and lesser, or whether out-group stereotypes follow a group-specific mapping of the social landscape. The former structure implies a heavily psychologically grounded, perceptual, cognitive, and individual motivational view of stereotyping. The latter structure implies a heavily socially grounded, historical, and cultural view of stereotyping. The two views constitute quite different understandings of the nature of stereotyping and prejudice. If stereotypes do not follow a group-specific pattern, instead reflecting derision of any and all out-groups, then the primary path to improvement is to eliminate the perception of any group boundaries. If, however, stereotypes do follow a more groupspecific pattern, then the primary path to improvement is to address those aspects of culture and social organization that support negative views of particular groups. We do not presume that an either/or choice must be made between these approaches. Rather, for reasons of analytical clarity and because so little work on stereotyping involving large general population samples has been done, it is useful to start from this simplified set of alternatives.

There are ample substantive grounds for posing the question in this manner. Racial attitudes and behavior are often discussed as if, ultimately, they reflect a singular, general tendency to like or dislike members of a particular racial or ethnic group. Classical discussions emphasized a general pattern of in-group preference and general out-group derision. Thus, William Graham Sumner's pioneering discussion of ethnocentrism claimed that:

Ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. Folkways correspond to it to cover both the inner and the outer relation. Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn. (1940 [1906], 13)

Research on the authoritarian personality pointed to a powerful general tendency toward ethnocentrism and hostility to a range of outgroups (Adorno et al. 1950). This view, without the explicit psychoanalytic claims and methodological flaws that weakened the original analysis, has been revived in some important, more recent lines of work as well (Altemeyer 1988; Duckitt 1992). Although contemporary scholars usually adopt a multidimensional conceptualization of racial attitudes (Jackman 1977; Bobo 1983; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), there are still

a number of scholars who make a case for a strong general prejudice-to-tolerance continuum organizing racial attitudes (Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn 1993; Levine, Carmines, and Sniderman 1999).

Our second major empirical question asks whether stereotype structure is similar across different social contexts or whether stereotype structure is highly contingent on the immediate social context. In the extreme case, we would find that a single us-versus-them dichotomy, quite insensitive to specific out-groups, characterizes the stereotype measures in each of the four cities. A less extreme, but still heavily psychological process-oriented pattern would hold if we found the same group-specific (multidimensional) structure in each city. Alternatively, we might find important city differences in the structure of stereotypes. If so, this would begin to suggest that localized patterns of group interaction and experience do much to drive the nature of stereotypes.

Some basis for potentially expecting a highly uniform structure to intergroup attitudes has come from recent cross-national work by the social psychologist Thomas Pettigrew and others. This work has shown that concepts and theories of prejudice derived almost exclusively from studies of black-white relations in the United States translate very well to a wide range of Western European countries now dealing with a variety of different immigrant groups and associated conflicts (Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew et al. 1998). Despite enormous differences in national history, culture, language, institutions, and the specific groups in contention, the same core variables—though often indicating different average levels of hostility—worked effectively across national boundaries.

Alternatively, on at least four grounds, the extant body of research provides warrant to expect local context to matter for stereotypes. First, in general, stereotypes come to reflect the positioning of groups in the social structure and the types of social roles that group members are commonly observed to perform (Stephan and Rosenfield 1982). To the extent that there are important city differences in group size, economic status, and occupational and educational attainments of different groups, we should expect stereotypes to vary. Farley (this volume) has documented a number of across-city differences between groups on these dimensions. To cite just a few examples, at the time of the 1990 census the proportion black varies from a low of about 5 percent in Boston, to 12 percent in Los Angeles, 20 percent in Detroit, and a high of about 25 percent in Atlanta. There was even greater variation across cities in the representation of Latinos, Los Angeles being clearly at the top, with nearly half its population Latino, whereas Atlanta and Boston were each roughly 5 percent Latino and Detroit fell below even that mark. There were also important economic status differences between groups across cities. Los Angeles had the highest fraction of very affluent whites and very affluent blacks. Detroit had the highest black poverty rate, at 33 percent, with the other cities hovering around 20 percent. Latino poverty rates exceeded the black poverty rate in Boston and Los Angeles. Detroit was far more segregated by race than any of the other cities, though all exhibit significant levels of segregation (particularly black-white segregation).

Second, aspects of local demographic composition have been found to influence attitudes and beliefs. A spate of recent studies has shown that the overall negativity of attitudes toward blacks varies directly with the size of the local black population. As the proportion of the population that is black grows, so does the level of expressed racial prejudice by whites (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Glaser 1994; Quillian 1996; Taylor 1998). As Marylee Taylor recently argued: "traditional prejudice rises as the local black population share swells. The magnitude of this effect rivals those of the more powerful individual-level predictors of prejudice" (Taylor 2000, 134).

Third, Mary Jackman (1994) has very persuasively argued that stereotypes are part of ideological belief systems that are exchanged between groups. Under conditions of overt conflict and challenge from a subordinate group, she maintains, the character of group stereotypes is likely to change. In particular, members of a dominant group will find it more effective and appealing to mute and qualify the stereotypes they hold about members of a subordinate group if members of that group are openly resisting their disadvantaged status. The gist of her argument—and the data she presents in the three contexts of race, class, and gender relations—is that specific group contexts and dynamics shape the expression of stereotypes. Her argument helps make sense out of the empirical findings of the often small, qualified nature of whites' negative stereotypes of blacks, but more often categorical nature of class- and gender-based stereotypes expressed in surveys.

Fourth, the growing body of work on the racial beliefs and attitudes of employers often treats employers' expressed views as if they were arrived at through direct, localized workplace experiences and/or contained a substantial element of truth (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; Moss and Tilly 1995; Wilson 1996). For example, Philip Moss and Chris Tilly noted that "employers were acutely aware that black men lag behind their white counterparts in education. When asked to explain why black men have an especially hard time finding and keeping jobs, many cited deficits in education and related basic skills" (1995, 364). In a somewhat similar vein, Kirschenman and Neckerman wrote:

whether or not the urban underclass is an objective social category, its subjective importance in the discourse of Chicago employers cannot be denied. Their characterizations of inner-city workers mirrored many descriptions of the underclass by social scientists. Common among the traits listed were that workers were unskilled, uneducated, illiterate, dishonest, lacking initiative, unmotivated, involved with drugs and gangs, did not understand work, had no personal charm, were unstable, lacked a work ethic, and had no family life or role models. [1991, 208]

In sum, several different research traditions suggest that features of localized context and experience may drive observed stereotypes.

We examine two different types of correlates of stereotypes. First, there is a set of demographic characteristics that may influence the level of stereotyping. In the main (though not entirely), these demographic variables reflect or capture underlying socializing processes. Better-educated individuals usually express more positive intergroup attitudes and beliefs than those who are less well educated (Schuman et al. 1997). Likewise, younger individuals, presumably by virtue of socialization during a more tolerant and liberal time period (rather than aging per se), hold more enlightened views. Women are often found to express more positive intergroup attitudes than are men (Schuman et al. 1997; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Those with higher incomes sometimes are found to express more negative attitudes, presumably out of a vested interest in preserving an advantage over others (Schuman et al. 1997). We also examine the effects of native versus foreign-born status. Prior research does not establish any clear baseline expectations in this case, however.

Second, there may be other social psychological correlates of stereotypes (Peffley and Hurwitz 1998). Two are of special interest to us. We treat the perception of group economic status as a determinant or cause of other, more personality-based trait beliefs. That is, all else equal, the more economically successful the members of a group are perceived to be (rich versus poor), the more favorable the other trait beliefs will be (intelligent, self-sufficient, easy to get along with, and speaking English well). This is consistent with the general finding that racial and ethnic stereotypes routinely correspond to the distribution of groups into particular roles and positions in the social structure (Stephan and Rosenfield 1982; Duckitt 1992; Brown 1995). It is also consistent with the emerging proposition that beliefs about social stratification and inequality powerfully influence more race-specific outlooks (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Bobo and Kluegel 1993). Both Farley et al. (1994) and Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996) found that the more dispositional or personality trait stereotypes were affected by perception of group economic status. In addition, individual susceptibility to stereotyping should vary with political ideology (Sears et al. 2000). More conservative individuals subscribe to more traditional outlooks, including a greater willingness to express negative views about members of out-groups (Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 1998).

#### Measures

Using the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, we are able to compare out-group perceptions of non-Hispanic white and black respondents across the four cities, and of Hispanic respondents in Boston and Los Angeles.1 Out-group perceptions are measured through responses to a series of survey questions asking respondents to characterize racial and ethnic groups as a whole with respect to several characteristics. The survey used a stereotype trait-rating measure to overcome potential limitations of traditional survey questions that only allow respondents stark yes/no or agree/disagree options. The method we employed allowed respondents to rate groups positively as well as negatively, or to opt not to characterize the group as a whole. The survey questions had been tested and evaluated to ensure that respondents were willing to perform the task, respondents did not consistently bias their answers in socially desirable ways, responses about individual traits related to one another in an internally consistent fashion, and the responses were related to variables usually understood to correlate with indicators of prejudice, such as education, age, and political ideology (Smith 1991; Bobo, Johnson, and Oliver 1992).

Respondents were given the following instructions:

Now I have some questions about different groups in our (U.S.) society. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group are "rich." A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group is "poor." A score of 4 means you think that the group is not toward one end or the other, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

In addition to thinking of the groups as rich or poor, respondents were asked to place the groups on scales contrasting the following four additional traits:


unintelligent or intelligent,
prefer to be self-supporting or prefer to live off welfare,
easy to get along with or hard to get along with,
speak English well or speak English poorly.<sup>2</sup>

These traits include matters of competence and ability as well as general sociability. They were selected because collectively they tap attributes long considered important in our achievement-oriented society (intelligence), of relevance to likely successful performance in the work-place (easy to get along with, English-speaking ability), and capturing a core disparaging typification of stigmatized racial groups (prefer welfare dependency to self-reliance). We did not seek to create an exhaustive map or inventory of all widely held stereotypes. Rather, our goal was to develop a set of measures reflecting characteristics that drive judgments in the labor market and residential location choices, and yet of sufficient range to tap potentially important variation in the propensity to negatively characterize out-group members.

The scores for the ends of the scale were alternated to reduce respondent bias toward a particular scale value. For ease of interpretation, all scales were transformed so that positive ratings received positive scores  $\{1, 2, \text{ or } 3\}$ , negative ratings received negative scores  $\{-3, -2, \text{ or } -1\}$ , and neutral ratings were equal to 0. Interviewers also recorded whether respondents said they didn't know how to rate a group on a particular trait, or if they refused to answer. "Don't know" responses

were scored as 0.3

The bipolar trait-rating method is a flexible and comparison-rich way of tapping stereotypes. We find that respondents specify clear and meaningful group differences, use the full range of response options, and are willing to give quite unflattering ratings of some out-groups on specific traits. Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 graphically depict these salient features of respondent behavior in the trait-rating portion of the interview. The first figure, which portrays whites' rich/poor ratings by race of target group, shows that all rating options are used for all groups, whites are most likely to characterize their own group as neither "rich" or "poor"—that is, they are more likely not to stereotype their own group than other groups, and extreme negative perceptions of blacks and Hispanics are relatively common. This approach taps substantial and, in this instance, sociologically sensible perceptions of group differences. Figure 2.2, depicting whites' welfare stereotypes of blacks in each city, shows that while there is remarkable similarity across cities in the distribution of response, the difference in mean rating is primarily a function of using the neutral option and options immediately adjacent—that is, average city differences do not stem from substantially varying tendencies in the use of extremely positive or extremely negative ratings. Yet, negative ratings, even the highest possible negative rating, occur with some frequency in each city. Finally, figure 2.3 shows Boston respondents' stereotypes of the English-speaking ability of out-groups.








FIGURE 2.2 Whites' Welfare Stereotype Rating of Blacks





Source: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality.


FIGURE 2.3 Boston Respondents' Stereotype Rating of English-speaking Ability, by Race



#### Black Respondents








#### FIGURE 2.3 Continued

#### Hispanic Respondents



50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300

Frequency

Source: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality.

TABLE 2.1 Mean Stereotype Trait Ratings by City and Race

		White	White Respondents			Black R	Black Respondents	3	Hispanic Respondents	pondents
	Detroit	Atlanta	Los Angeles	Boston	Detroit	Atlanta	Los Angeles	Boston	Los Angeles	Boston
z	765	662	854	579	969	786	1106	449	992	869
Tend to be rich										
White target	.50	.34	.37	.25	1.02	76.	1.04	.91	1.37	.52
Black target	-1.14	87	-1.15	-1.12	99	75	-1.02	98	96. –	-1.45
Asian target	01	17	.36	49	91.	00	.80	28	96.	83
Hispanic target	-1.09	98	-1.34	-1.31	-1.02	92	-1.18	-1.07	-1.25	-1.14
Intelligent										
White target	.85	1.09	.91	.82	65	.46	09	09	66	93
Black target	01	.28	.16	.14	.56	2.	.64	99.	80:	.27
Asian target	77.	.83	1.08	.61	.56	.39	.71	4.	1.12	.84
Hispanic target	00.	.15	01	.05	.02	.21	.14	.36	.37	.45
Easy to get along							•			
With	ő	1 2 1	70	90	5	6	00	Ü	ç	Ξ
Mine target Black target	26.	42.	0/.	5. 7.	-11.	7.10	o	C4 E	1 9. %	- 22
Asian target	.55	.52	46.	34	13	16	33	1 2	90.	47
Hispanic target	.33	.33	.38	.09	.23	01	.62	.07	1.27	.70
Self-supporting										
White target	1.38	1.76	1.53	1.41	88	1.31	1.04	.73	1.07	.21
Black target	32	03	24	17	.05	89.	00.	01	-1.39	-1.15
Asian target	1.31	1.37	1.67	.87	.83	.94	1.19	4.	1.16	08
Hispanic target	.18	.38	02	21	90:	.36	21	28	34	-1.06
Speak English well										
White target	1.58	1.97	2.03	1.87	1.59	1.56	2.01	1.58	2.44	2.05
Black target	.01	44.	.58	.56	.72	1.21	1.22	99:	1.19	.87
Asian target	.08	14	.14	36	45	72	92'-	62. –	09	52
Hispanic target	16	65	74	86	55	86	77	79	40	56
1-11 j	11) - 1	T	1							

Source: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality.

These data confirm that substantial numbers of each respondent group, even in this ostensibly liberal metropolitan area, view different targets in extreme and categorical terms. The trait-rating method of eliciting stereotypes in a standardized survey interview thus appears to be valid.

# Analysis and Results

We conducted three types of analysis to produce descriptive statistics from the trait-ratings to address our research questions. First, we computed the mean rating and standard deviation of each trait by each group of respondents in each city, and the correlation between ratings, to determine whether out-groups are seen differently. Second, we summarized the structure, or pattern, of correlations among trait ratings of target groups using a confirmatory factor model for each respondent group in each city, suggesting differing degrees among respondent groups of coherence in negative out-group perceptions. Last, using simple linear models, we examined the dependence of out-group perceptions on perceived group economic standing and the relative importance of this determinant compared to individual characteristics reflecting the respondent's background and social standing (such as level of education).

## Basic Stereotype Distributions

Table 2.1 shows the mean rating of each target group by each group of respondents in each city. White respondents gave the most positive ratings to whites as a group on every trait in every city, almost without exception. This is consistent with the behavior of members of more powerful and high-status groups found in the social psychological literature generally (Sachdev and Bourhis 1987, 1991; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). In two instances, however, both observed in Los Angeles, Asians were assigned the highest ratings, on average, for the intelligent/unintelligent and self-supporting/welfare traits. In each city, the economic position of blacks and Hispanics as groups was perceived more negatively than that of Asians. For three of the remaining four traits- "intelligent," "easy to get along with," and "self-supporting"—blacks and Hispanics were always rated in more negative terms than Asians. For the last trait, "speak English well," Asians and Hispanics received more negative ratings than did blacks, except in Detroit, where Asians were rated more positively than blacks.

Among black respondents, ratings vary in interesting ways by trait, but not by city. Blacks rated themselves and Hispanics as a group much more negatively than they rated whites or Asians for the rich/poor and self-supporting welfare traits. On average, they rated themselves sim-

ilarly to whites and Asians on the intelligent/unintelligent trait—all more positively than Hispanics. Blacks rated themselves and Hispanics most positively with respect to "easy to get along with," whites and Asians more negatively, with Asians rated most negatively by blacks in each city. Finally, blacks rated their group's ability to speak English more negatively than whites, but a good deal more positively than the ability of Asians and Hispanics.

Hispanic responses were similar to those of blacks with respect to the traits relating to economic life; they saw themselves and blacks in more negative terms than whites and Asians. Their average ratings of whites and Asians were higher on the intelligent/unintelligent trait, while blacks as a group received a lower average rating than Hispanics. Hispanics rated their own group most positively on "easy to get along with," while rating blacks and Asians most negatively. They rated whites and blacks positively on "speak English well" and rated themselves and Asians negatively.

Overall, in each city we find a pattern of ratings in which whites see themselves most favorably and in terms that might suggest that their achievement as a group (economic standing) is consistent with more frequent possession of characteristics associated with merit (intelligence, speak English well, easy to get along with) and motivation (self-supporting). In contrast, the other three groups, with reference to the same traits, also recognize whites' more favorable economic standing, but do not see the group as so different with respect to the other traits. At the same time, each group would place itself closer to whites than to another out-group.

#### The Underlying Structure of Stereotypes

Viewed trait by trait, there appears to be little systematic difference among the four cities in each group's perceptions of members of other race-ethnic groups. We now turn to consideration of the traits jointly, to determine whether out-group stereotyping occurs in a generalized fashion or is highly nuanced with respect to its consequences and determinants.

Focusing first on white respondents, we wish to know whether the stereotypes reflect general out-group derogation or more group-specific patterns of response. Simple correlations among the out-group trait-rating measures for each respondent group by city are shown in the appendix to this chapter (tables 2A.1, 2A.2, and 2A.3). On average, the correlations among the trait ratings are modest—for example, they average 0.36 for whites in Boston. Upon inspection it is clear that there are

really three levels of correlation: a relatively large correlation among the ratings of a single trait across different groups, a moderate correlation among the ratings of different traits within group, and almost no correlation among the ratings of different traits across different groups. This pattern suggests that the data cannot be accounted for either by a singular propensity to stereotype all out-groups or by independent out-group targeting. Furthermore, it is possible that the interview protocol and cognitive demands of the question-and-answer task may instill consistency of response because the respondent was asked to rate each group on a given trait—white, Asian, black, Hispanic—before being asked about another trait.

To explore the structure of out-group stereotypes across respondent groups, we estimated several (confirmatory factor) measurement models using Karl Jöreskog's general method for the analysis of covariance structures (Sörbom and Jöreskog 1981).5 Table 2.2 displays goodness-offit tests for selected measurement models. The likelihood ratio test statistic (L2) follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom (df) equal to the difference between the number of variances and covariances in the observed data matrix and the number of independent parameters in a model. It contrasts the null hypothesis that the constraints imposed on the variance-covariance matrix by the parameters of the model are satisfied in the population with the alternative that the variance-covariance matrix is unrestricted. The difference in likelihood ratio statistics between two nested models—a general model and a constrained version of that model—provides a likelihood ratio test of the constraints. Because the size of the likelihood ratio is affected by sample size, we also present the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989, 43-45), which compares the minimum of the fit function after the model has been fitted to the minimum of the fit function before any model has been fit, adjusted for the degrees of freedom. The AGFI should range between 0 and 1, although it is technically possible to obtain results outside this range.6

Our model fitting strategy involved fitting alternative models for white respondents, then using those models in confirmatory fashion for blacks and Hispanics. This approach allows us to gauge the consistency of the structure of stereotyping of out-groups. The results we present emphasize relative improvement in fit as the result of introducing broad classes of parameters (for example, correlated measurement errors within traits and between groups, similar in each city) rather than searching for a specification that is highly unique to a respondent group or city. Results for whites, blacks, and Hispanics are presented separately, by city, providing the maximum opportunity to evaluate the consistency of the structure of stereotypes.

Measurement Model Goodness of Fit, by City and Race

ı	ı		<u></u>						_							i	믒	~		m.	m	~	_
	geles	854	AGFI	629	,59.	8.	80.	989.	.94]							106	AGFI	.673	.67(	.71	69.	.82	8.
	Los Angeles	N N	$X^2$	1815.05	1663.65	458.14	1406.76	1455.59	153.10	,	151.40	1205.51	256.89	208.06	1510.55	N = 1106	$X^2$	1963.00	1859.27	1503.31	1663.96	717.90	342.04
	oit	765	AGFI	587	.573	.825	.664	.640	.950							969	AGFI	.705	869.	.761	669.	.829	.900
	Detroit	Z 	$X^2$	2016.24	1917.29	608.11	1401.37	1610.48	118.65	;	98.95	1309.18	515.92	306.81	1798.64	969 = N	$X^2$	1084.17	1054.44	705.10	1000.04	519.30	214.17
ace	n	579	AGFI	.505	.488	.754	.620	.598	.937						٠	149	AGFI	.663	.694	800	.747	.774	.910
City and R	Boston	Z	$X^2$	1991.58	1906.55	689.97	1415.23	1489.92	113.39		85.03	1216.58	491.32	416.63	1793.16	N = 449	$X_2$	774.73	650.91	407.63	536.23	449.23	126.74
Fit, by	ıta	662	AGFI	.524	.521	.731	099.	.590	.911							786	AGFI	829.	.692	.844	.718	.749	.937
odness of	Atlanta	)	$X^2$	2030.71	1929.70	879.22	1218.14	1661.25	183.37		101.01	1050.48	711.56	268.45	1746.44	II Z	$X^2$	1417.35	1303.58	488.13	1183.50	1027.59	150.95
t Model G		1.1	Model df	54	51	47	47	47	39		က	4	4	4	. 12		Model df	54	51	47	47	47	39
TABLE 2.2 Measurement Model Goodness of Fit, by City and Race		White Respondents	Model	1 1 Factor	2 3 Factor, no c.e.	3 2 + B-H, c.e.	4 + 2 + A-H. c.e.	5 2 + A-B c.e.	$62 + B \cdot H, A \cdot H, A \cdot B, c.e.$	Contrasts	2 versus 1	3 versus 2	4 versus 2.	5 versus 2	6 versus 2	Black Respondents	Model	1 1 Factor	2. 3 Factor, no c.e.	3 2 + A-H, c.e.	4 + 2 + W-H c.e.		6 2 + A-H, W-H, A-W, c.e.

Contrasts	c	112 77	123.82	29.73	103./3	
2 versus 1	ω 4	113.77	243.28	349.34	355.96 195.31	
versus 2	4	120.08	114.88	535.14	1141.37	
5 versus 2	12	2/6.99 1152.63	524.17	840.27	1517.23	
			N = 698		N = 992	92
Hispanic Kespondents	Model		$\chi^2$ AGFI		$X^2$	AGFI
Model	ID		ı		1119 96	785
Factor	54		1200.62 .6/1		1094.88	.778
3 Factor, no c.e.	51				958.45	.786
2 + A-B	4/				825.20	818
2 + W-B	, t				4/2./1	, x
2 + A-W 2 + A-B, W-B, A-W	36				152.07	00%
Contrasts			154 00		25.08	
2. versus 1	က		154.89		136.43	
versus 2	4		780.33		269.68	
versus 2	4		178.50		622.17	
versus 2	4 5		600.86		942.81	
versus 2	71					

Source: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality.

Note: A = Asians, B = Blacks, H = Hispanics, W = Whites, and c.e. = correlated error terms. Models 3 through 6 consist of Model 2, plus correlated errors in the trait rating sets specified.

The first model specifies that the correlation among out-group trait ratings of intelligence, welfare use, ease of getting along, and ability to speak English is due to the regression of the observed ratings on a single latent variable (factor): the general tendency to stereotype members of other groups. We reject this model. The likelihood ratio (L²) is large for all groups in all cities and the adjusted goodness of fit index also indicates relatively poor fit. This model also bears little intuitive relation to either the pattern of means in table 2.1, which suggests some tendency to order out-groups consistently across traits, or the simple correlations, which suggest a target group–specific structure. The second model specifies group-specific factors: for whites, we fit Asian, black, and Hispanic factors; for blacks, we fit white, Asian, and Hispanic factors; and for Hispanics, we fit white, Asian, and black factors. Comparison of L² indicates a better fit, but the AGFI is either a bit worse or substantially unchanged in most cases.

The individual group-specific factors are not sufficient to account for the correlation among the trait ratings. The simple correlations suggest that there are other linkages among the group images and between each trait across groups. The next three models show that the fit can be vastly improved by specifying within-trait, between-group correlated errors. These correlations between the specific variance terms in each trait rating for each outgroup could arise either as a consequence of respondents trying to inject consistency into their ratings that they view as consistent with the relative standing of the groups, or simply from the tendency to shift one's favored response category as the interview moved from trait to trait. For each respondent group in each city, some improvement accrues to the addition of a single type of correlated error (for example, between ratings of blacks and Hispanics), but the results for model 6 indicate that the best overall fit is obtained when all forms of within-trait, between-group error are included for all traits (see figure 2.4 for an illustration of the measurement model). Examination of all the estimated correlated errors shows that they are positive, indicating consistent bias between ratings of the different groups on each trait. These results are found for all respondent groups (whites, blacks, and Hispanics) and in all four cities.

It is unclear whether these patterns call for a substantive or a methodological interpretation. Substantively, these results may suggest that group images are not merely correlated, but are thoroughly interdependent in a manner reflective of social comparison processes (that is, all the racial groups exist in a perceptual gestalt, with ideas about one group always tested in relation to ideas about others). Methodologically, these results may suggest that the trait-rating task itself creates interdependence among the measures. (The results reported next incline us to favor the substantive interpretation, though both processes are probably operative.)

(Text continues on p. 122.)




TABLE 2.3 Measurement Model Parameter Estimates and Factor Loadings, by City and Race

		Atla	nta			Bost	on	
	w	Α	В	Н	w	A	В	Н
White respondents Whites intelligent Asians intelligent Blacks intelligent Hispanics intelligent	-	.456	.488	.442		.340	.405	.390
Whites self-supporting Asians self-supporting Blacks self-supporting Hispanics self-supporting		.576	.556	.421		.620	.511	.569
Whites easy to get along with Asians easy to get along with Blacks easy to get along with Hispanics easy to get along with		.200	.649	.457		.515	.619	.659
Whites speak English well Asians speak English well Blacks speak English well Hispanics speak English well		.230	.615	.346		.485	.519	.514
Black respondents Whites intelligent Asians intelligent Blacks intelligent Hispanics intelligent	.317	.233		.294	.121	.030		.099
Whites self-supporting Asians self-supporting Blacks self-supporting Hispanics self-supporting	.530	.285		.500	.622	.331		.513
Whites easy to get along with Asians easy to get along with Blacks easy to get along with	.457	.625			.538	.469	,	
Hispanics easy to get along with				.542				.414

	Detro	ıt ·			Los Ang	eies	
W	Α	В	Н	W	A	В	Н
4	.512	.529	.562		.372	.618	.631
	.644	.527	.498		.336	.657	.557
	.459				.488	476	
		.477	.489			.476	.345
	.362	.422			.557	.440	
.277			.348	.235			.67
.211	.399		250	.200	.110		.24
.507	.594		.350	.062	.048		.24
			.677				.49
047	080		071	.804	.683		.35

(Table continues on p. 120.)

TABLE 2.3 Continued

******		Atla	inta			Bos	ton	
	W	Α	В	Н	w	Α	В	Н
Whites speak English well Asians speak English well Blacks speak English well Hispanics speak English well	.592	.503		.249	.560	.703		.739
Hispanic respondents Whites intelligent Asians intelligent Blacks intelligent Hispanics intelligent					192	.107	.776	
Whites self-supporting Asians self-supporting Blacks self-supporting Hispanics self-supporting	÷				.868	.563	080	
Whites easy to get along with Asians easy to get along with Blacks easy to get					.659	.567		
along with Hispanics easy to get along with							.519	
Whites speak English well Asians speak English well Blacks speak English well Hispanics speak English well					.158	.702	.169	
Measurement model factor correlation White respondents								
Asians Blacks Hispanics		1.00 .179 .213	1.00 .780	1.00		1.00 .519 .586	1.00 .787	1.00
Black respondents Whites Asians Hispanics	1.00 .688 .524	1.00 .717		1.00	1.00 .204 005	1.00 .674		1.00
Hispanic respondents Whites Asians					1.00 052	1.00		
Blacks					664	.218	1.00	

Source: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality.

Note: W = Whites, A = Asians, B = Blacks, H = Hispanics.

	Detro	it			Los Ange	eles ————	
w	A	В	Н	W	A	В	Н
.555				081			
	.195				.607		
	.170		.283				.640
			.200				
				.067	.111		
			,			.395	
				.306	070		
					.072	.417	
				.180			
					.973		
						330	
				.440	.249		
					.249	010	
- "							
						•	
	1.00				1.00		
	.323 .492	1.00 .738	1.00		.289 .260	1.00 .838	1.0
	,+72	.,00	1.00				
1.00 .471	1.00			1.00 .655	1.00		
271	.229		1.00	.255	.473		1.0
				1.00			
			•	.261 513	1.00 103	1.00	

Table 2.3 shows the factor loadings estimated under model 6. These represent the regression of each trait rating on its respective group factor. Both the observed variables and factors are scaled to have their variance equal 1.0, so the factor loadings provide a measure of the relative reliability of each trait rating as an indicator of the propensity to hold stereotypic attitudes of a group. For example, among white respondents in Detroit, the most reliable indicator of their view of Asians is their rating of Asians' preference to be self-supporting (the factor loading is .644, compared with .362 for the rating of Asians' ability to speak English well). The most reliable indicator of Detroit whites' views of Hispanics is their rating of Hispanics' intelligence. White views of Asians in Boston are also most reliably indicated by their rating of Asians' preference to be self-supporting, but their views of Hispanics are most reliably indicated by the rating of how easy Hispanics are to get along with (compare factor loadings of .620 and .659).

Comparison of the factor loadings by target group for whites generally shows the loadings to be more similar when the out-group rated is blacks than when it is Hispanics or Asians—that is, there is greater consistency in whites' use of the trait ratings to characterize blacks, compared to how these traits are used for rating Hispanics or Asians. Further, for white respondents, the overall variation in loadings is less than for black or Hispanic respondents (compare, for example, the factor loadings when Asians are the target of whites, blacks and Hispanics in Boston). This suggests a firmer cognitive grounding to views of blacks among white respondents, compared to their views of other groups.

Another aspect of the measurement model that is more consistent for whites than for blacks and Hispanics is shown in the estimated correlation of the factors. The correlation between the stereotyping of blacks and Hispanics by whites is above 0.7 in each city. The correlation between all the factors is positive for white respondents. But this is not the case for black or Hispanic respondents, and there is not a consistent pattern of positively and negatively signed correlations across cities. Any attempt to explain these results post hoc would be purely speculative. Nonetheless, all the factor loadings, correlations between factors, and correlated errors of measurement are large enough to achieve statistical significance using conventional tests, giving some plausibility to their magnitude and sign.<sup>7</sup>

# Common Determinants of Variation in Stereotyping

We are also concerned with understanding factors that would make stereotypic assessments more positive or negative. The variables consid-

ered in this analysis include perception of the group's economic standing (rich/poor trait rating), the respondent's sex (represented by an indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent was male, 0 if the respondent was female), the respondent's age, the respondent's level of education (represented by years of schooling completed: 0 to 17 or more), whether the respondent was born in the United States (an indicator variable coded 1 if born in the United States, 0 otherwise), the respondent's family income (with levels represented by the midpoint of 20 closed-response options, representing ranges from \$0 to \$5,000 to \$150,000 or more), and self-report of political ideology, ranging from extremely liberal (1) to extremely conservative (7), with those saying "don't know" classified as moderate (4). Means and standard deviations for each of these variables are shown in table 2.4 for each group of respondents in each city. There are few notable differences across city for any given group, with the exception that white respondents in Los Angeles are more likely to be foreign-born than in the other cities, black respondents in Boston are more likely to be foreign-born, and Hispanic respondents in Los Angeles are much more likely to be foreign-born than in

Table 2.5 shows the results obtained by regressing the group-specific stereotype factors on the independent variables. Three regression models were estimated for each group. The first model specifies that the stereotype factor for each group depends only on the respondent's perception of the economic standing of the group. The second model builds on the first by allowing the other person's characteristics also to affect the stereotyping factors. The third and final model builds on the first and second by allowing the stereotyping factors to be influenced by perceptions of the economic standing of other out-groups. For example, perceptions of the economic standing of blacks are allowed to affect the Hispanic stereotyping factor. (Figure 2.5 provides a graphic illustration of the first-stage structural model.) Overall, while comparison of L<sup>2</sup> suggests that allowing personal characteristics and cross-group effects of perceptions of economic standing improves the model fit, the AGFI is virtually unchanged. This occurs for every group of respondents in each city.

Parameter estimates from model 3 for each group of respondents in each city are shown in table 2.6. The main conclusion to be drawn from examination of the parameter estimates is that more positive stereo types are usually associated with positive perceptions of the targe group's economic standing, net of personal characteristics usually associated with positive attitudes toward out-groups (education, liberal ide ology, being female). This pattern is consistent with James Kluegel' argument about the centrality of stratification beliefs to intergroup

(Text continues on p. 127

TABLE 2.4 Descriptive Statistics, by City and Race


ליייטטע דיי יותערו	Continue orangement	(20) (2)						
	Atlanta	nta	Boston	uo:	Detroit	oit	Los Angeles	geles
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
White respondents	[ ]	03	47	05	.48	.50	.50	.50
Sex Age	.51	15.79	45.89	17.14	45.74	17.19	44.98	15.28
Age Education	13.99	2.49	13.83	2.40	13.30	2.40	14.21	2.11
Native-born	.94	.23	.96	.21	.90	.30 \$33.673	.85	\$42,505
Family income Liberal-conservative	\$30,024 4.47	1.47	4.07	1.42	4.15	1.31	4,00	1.41
Black respondents	43	Ċ.	47	.50	.43	.49	.49	.50
Sex Age	41.67	14.16	40.42	15.45	44.12	16.45	41.12	15.41
Education	13.41	2.55	12.45	2.72	12.60	2.49	13.08	2.71
Native-born	76.	.17	99.	.47	96.	.10	. 71	27.
Family income	\$33,791	\$23,028	\$29,991	\$24,626	\$33,616	\$31,948	\$38,843 2.57	453,134 1 53
Liberal-conservative	3.59	1.38	3.90	1.56	3./6	1.40	9.3/	00.1
Hispanic respondents			47	. 50			.50	.50
Age			37.02	13.31			37.10	12.83
Education			10.60	3.51			10.13	4.03 44
Native-born			55. 504 708	000.			\$2.7.604	\$22.543
Family income			427,423	1.48			4.05	1,30
Liberal-conservative			17:1	)				

Source: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality.

Structural Equation Model Goodness of Fit Results, by City and Race TABLE 2.5

TABLE 2.5 Structu	Structural Equation Model Goodness of Fit Results, by Oily and Nace	Model G	ooaness of	ril resuit	s, by Oit,	י מוזמ עמכ	Ď		
The state of the s		Atlanta	nta	Boston	ц	Detroit	oit	Los Angeles	cles
White Respondents	;	Z	662	N = 579	62	N = 765	765	∞   Z	854
Model	Model df	$X^2$	AGFI	$X^2$	AGFI	$X^2$	AGFI	$X^2$	AGFI
1 Rich-poor 2 1 + all exs. 3 2 + cross R-P	144 126 120	615.42 486.70 476.04	.874 .884 .881	603.99 457.90 395.89	.858 .874 .886	498.87 391.67 347.07	.911 .917 .923	645.27 483.56 452.95	.995 .907 .909
Contrasts 2 versus 1 3 versus 2	18 6	128.72 10.66		146.09 62.01		107.20 44.60		161.71 30.61	
Black Respondents		98Z = N	786	N = 449	149	II Z	969 =	N = 1106	106
Model	Model df	$X^2$	AGFI	$X^2$	AGFI	$X^2$	AGFI	$X^2$	AGFI
1 Rich-poor 2 1 + all exs. 3 2 + cross R-P	144 126 120	682.84 576.40 541.93	.880 .883 .884	491.16 425.75 404.25	.852 .851 .851	552.70 451.13 426.33	.888 .894 .893	1276.39 1079.43 1035.26	.842 .847 .845
Contrasts 2 versus 1 3 versus 2	18 6	106.44 34.47		65.41 21.50		101.57 24.80		196.96 44.17	
Hispanic Respondents	-			) = Z	869			Z	992
Model	Model			$X^2$	AGFI			X <sup>2</sup>	AGFI
1 Rich-poor 2 1 + all exs. 3 2 + cross R-P	144 126 120			1677.75 1384.69 1275.02	.720 .729 .737			884.03 739.83 691.59	.882 .882 .881
Contrasts 2 versus 1 3 versus 2	18			293.06 109.67				144.20	

Source: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality. Note: All exs. = all explanatory variables, cross R-P = both nontarget group rich-poor trait ratings allowed to influence.



Source: Authors' compilation.

attitudes (Kluegel and Smith 1986). There are a few interesting exceptions. Among whites in Boston, those who have more positive views of blacks' economic position are likely to express more negative stereotypes (the regression estimate is – 191). Among black respondents in Los Angeles and Hispanic respondents in Boston, those with more positive views of the economic position of whites and Asians are more likely to express more negative stereotypes of those groups.

The model allowing only the rating of group economic position to affect the out-group stereotype usually accounted for less than 10 per cent of the estimated variation in the stereotype factor. Exceptions in cluded whites' ratings of Hispanics in Los Angeles (11 percent), blacks ratings of whites in Boston (15 percent) and Detroit (21 percent), blacks ratings of Asians in Detroit (18 percent), Hispanics' ratings of blacks in Boston (34 percent), and Hispanics' ratings of whites (14 percent) and Asians (36 percent) in Los Angeles. The amount of variation explained increases two- to fourfold when the model includes effects of sex, age education, native-born, family income, and political ideology, but the effects of these variables are not always consistent and are usually no as large as the effect of the perception of group economic position. The most consistent effect is due to education, which is nearly always positive, so that those with more education are more likely to express more positive stereotypes. The relative strength of the education effect often equals or exceeds the effect of the perception of group economic stand ing. The effect of sex tends to be negative, meaning that male respon dents held more negative views than women did. The effect of age, in come, and political ideology was inconsistent, both in sign and strength varying by group and city. Native-born respondents in all groups usuall held more positive views than did foreign-born respondents.

Adding cross-group effects of perception of economic position of the other stereotypes usually did little to improve the overall fit of th model, and in a few cases the estimate of variation explained was actually worse than when these effects were not included at all. Exceptional improvement by inclusion of these effects did occur in the models for Hispanic respondents. Statistically significant effects do emerge in number of instances.

Some of the patterns are suggestive of potentially important metro politan-area differences in effects. For example, among Los Angeles—are whites, the more economically successful that Asians are perceived to be, the less favorable are the images of blacks and Hispanics. This implies that in Los Angeles, the area with the largest and most affluent Asian population among our sites, a sort of "model minority" mythes fect may be at work. Few of the differences, however, lend themselves to straightforward interpretation.

		Atl	anta			Во	ston	
	White	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White	Asian	Black	Hispanio
White respondents Sex		135*	067	019		006	109*	.097*
Age		.035	.018	.140*		.109*	160*	084
Education		.310*	.278*	.312*		.140*	.315*	.325*
Native		147*	.131*	.068		.030	.016	.000
Income		.138*	125*	094		.029	.028	.005
Liberal-conservative		045	157*	160*		.054	050	050
Rich-poor Asians		.298*	.009	030*		.394*	015	426*
Rich-poor blacks		.039	.183*	030		.055	191*	100
Rich-poor Hispanics		182	.007	.207*		.050	<b>040</b>	.166*
Variance explained								
Model 1		.09	.05	.05		.03	.05	.08
Model 2		.25	.16	.16		.12	.21	.23
Model 3		.26	.15	.15		.25	.19	.18
Black respondents								
Sex	302*	064		098	016	069		.161
Age	.128*	.135*		.168*	.067	.111		.118
Education	.059	.109		.256*	002	.060		.157
Native	096*	.017		.132*	.139	.207		.300
Income	061	086		083	064	.120		.056
Liberal-conservative	.069	.098*		034	037	062		.054
Rich-poor whites	.281*	.030		.031	.331	195		072
Rich-poor Asians	174 <sup>*</sup>	.090		.086	053	.350		.188
Rich-poor Hispanics	096*	063		.213*	120	078		.107
Variance explained								
Model 1	.07	.01		.08	.15	.05		.03
Model 2	.19	.04		.16	.17	.17		.19
Model 3	.24	.04		.14	.16	.21		.21
Hispanic respondents								
Sex					330*	048	230*	
Age					058	.040	099*	
Education					071	187	054	
Native					.185*	.250	.222*	
Income					.084	.154	.053	
Liberal-conservative					.112*	.072	.302*	
Rich-poor whites					236*	.304	.071	
Rich-poor Asians					292*	479	158*	
Rich-poor blacks					.055	103	.110*	
Variance explained						÷.	-00	
Model 1					.05	.34	.00	
Model 2					.21	.56	.27	
Model 3					.24	.65	.29	

Source: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality. \*t > 1.96.

STEREOTYPING AND URBAN INEQUAL

	De	troit			Los A	ngeles	
White	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White	Asian	Black	Hispanio
	.045 192* .137* .032 .009 .065 .292* 269* 005	099*258* .225* .109*024039080 .164*	033 269* .163* .038 054 .017 .004 055 .293*		112* .014 .123* .057 .142* .011 .056019 .053*	.072 128* .046 .080* .032 298* 149* .288* .127	.194*046 .060 .069 .095*199*148* .073*
	.06 .17 .23	.05 .20 .19	.09 .19 .17		.01 .06 .05	.09 .20 .27	.11 .20 .28
136* 107 .126 .097 .016 162* .455* .031 201*	.076 .044 .206* .009 .075 089 .036 .555*	•	050 003 .096 .039 .190* 101 059 .034 .250*	048 .230* .227* 239* .110 014 383* .006 .206*	.025 .069 .208 013 .021 143 .097 297		.105*105* .160* .094* .078*112*117*002
.21 .36 .41	.18 .26 .49		.08 .15 .12	.09 .51 .52	.09 .19 .18		.08 .15 .17
	<i>:</i>			090 146* 077 016 002 024 .209* .154* 153*	138* .014 .308* .147* .019247*152* .716*194*	123 .357* .264* .448* .116 .084 296* 153	
			,	.14 .14 .17	.36 .61 .73	.07 .34 .89	

At least, the following caveats apply: (1) in most instances, a large amount of variation in the use of the trait ratings cannot be explained by the factors we included in the models, and (2) the relationship between perceived group economic standing and out-group ratings might well differ with a different underlying set of traits. Yet, given the scope of traits included here, we would expect, in any case, the impact of perception of group economic position to be a persistent driver of the group stereotype, independent of the impact of measures of the respondent's experience and social position usually associated with variation in racial attitudes, such as education and ideology.

#### Conclusion

Scholars such as DuBois (1996 [1899]), Myrdal (1944), and Drake and Cayton (1945) treated stereotypes as fundamental and organic factors in the dynamics of group inequality. No doubt this legacy contributed to the conclusion by See and Wilson that "persistent ethnic stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes are one of the major factors in limiting intergroup contact and preserving ethnic boundaries" (1989, 226). Our own analyses of the contemporary urban landscape renew and reinforce this view of the importance of stereotyping. Respondents rarely gave "don't know" or "refused" responses to the effort to measure stereotypes. Target-group differences emerge on specific traits and in terms of overall evaluative judgments, with African Americans and Latinos given the least favorable ratings and whites generally given the most favorable ratings (with Asians close behind). On the whole, we have found a sensible organization and pattern of correlates for the measured stereotypes. All these patterns point toward a view of stereotypes as socially consequential ideas.

First, in response to our opening core concern with the structure of stereotypes, we find for the Multi-City Study data that we can reject a view of stereotypes as organized around a simple, singular us-versus-them dichotomy. Specific racial-ethnic group targets matter. This is true in all four cities and for our white, black, and Latino respondents. But before we rush to reject a centrally psychological view of stereotypes, we find, second, in response to our other core concern with contextual variation in stereotypes, that a largely similar structure or organization to stereotypes exists in each city and, with the exception of Hispanics in Boston, for respondents from each racial group. Third, the social psychological variable of perceived group economic success is always an important influence on the other dispositional or personality stereotype trait ratings. Fourth, the social learning variable of level of education usually influences the degree of negative stereotyping, with the better educated

expressing less negative views. There was less consistent evidence that an individual's age, gender, native versus foreign-born status, and political ideology shaped the degree of negative stereotyping

By implication, then, and following a broad legacy of previous stereotyping research, we conclude that stereotypes are grounded in social structure and shaped by direct social learning and the acquisition of group culture. They vary across individuals in acceptance and likely responsiveness to new information and experience. Racial stereotypes are multiply determined but also highly generalized ideational constructs. In all likelihood, they influence perception and understanding, individual action, and interpersonal interaction. They facilitate bias and discrimination in face-to-face encounters, in important workplace dynamics, and in the operation of housing market and neighborhood sorting processes.

Some of the basic descriptive patterns for our results confirm expectations of general theories of stereotypes (Jost and Banaji 1994). Whites, the dominant social group, are the most likely to rate themselves positively. Whites are also the group most likely to be seen in positive terms by members of other groups. The subordinate groups, particularly Hispanics but also African Americans to a degree, are the least likely to see members of their own groups in favorable terms. And these groups are least likely to be seen in a favorable light by members of other groups.

Since stereotypes flow from the structural placement of groups in society and the evolving group cultures and patterns of relationship, these beliefs contain a kernel of truth. Thus, social reality and the perceptions we measured point to the fact that blacks and Hispanics tend to be less affluent than Asians, who, in turn, are much closer in economic status to whites. Similarly, consistent with the stereotype perceptions, African Americans and Hispanics are disproportionately dependent on welfare. In addition, to the extent that group differences are perceived, our data suggest that for most people these differences are seen in muted terms (consistent with Jackman's argument [1994]). Despite a kernel of truth and qualified expression, there should be no doubt that we regard these stereotypes as highly problematic, as they tend to be applied categorically and to have self-reinforcing properties in the face of contradictory information (Bodenhausen, Macrae, and Garst 1998; Fiske 1998). Moreover, when made salient by the presence of members of an out-group, it is the broad cultural stereotype that is most readily—indeed, often automatically—activated (Devine 1989).

Consider for a moment the potential workplace influence of these stereotypes. We know that employers frequently must make decisions on the basis of partial information about potential employees and often are not good judges of future performance (Holzer 1996). Indeed, employers frequently ignore readily obtainable information on formal credentials in favor of their own "gut instincts" and input from what they regard as "trustworthy" ties (Miller and Rosenbaum 1997). These circumstances open the door for the biasing and discriminatory effects of stereotypes to operate (Reskin 2000 and forthcoming). A similar dynamic almost certainly enters into the difficult terrain that members of stigmatized racial groups must negotiate in order to rise to positions of power in workplace settings as well (Smith 1997, 1999).

In this regard, we would stress that the lack of sharp city-specific variation in the basic structure of stereotypes, and the lack of theoretically consistent differences across cities in the correlates of racial stereotypes, is telling. This pattern cautions against a view of stereotypes as highly localized and context-specific. Still, it would be inappropriate on the basis of these data to reject any role for local context. We know that under the right conditions (equal status, common goals, positive institutional support), close intergroup contact can improve some aspects of intergroup attitudes (Jackman 1994; Ellison and Powers 1994; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995), and that local normative conditions may exert effects as well (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). But we speculate that much of the content and functioning of racial stereotypes derive from the joint effects of mutual embeddedness in both a larger national historical or cultural context and the contemporary social organization of race, and the general social psychological processes of stereotype formation. Thus, we find that whites' views of blacks are probably the most firmly rooted of the group stereotypes, that whites' views of blacks and of Hispanics are often closely correlated but still involve some target group-specific features (for example, extent of English language mastery), and that generally the group images exhibit a substantial element of interdependence or mutual relevance (that is, the factor correlations, correlated error structures, and across-target group effects of perceived economic status).

We think this multiply determined but highly generalized nature of stereotypes is also why in-depth employer interviews reveal employers making patently contradictory claims. For example, black women can be typified as "single mothers" in ways that make them either especially good or especially bad employees (Browne and Kennelly 1999; Kennelly 1999). There is clearly a general stereotype perception out there that employers appear to share with the mass of individuals not holding such workplace power (compare Bobo, Johnson, and Suh 2000). A general cultural stereotype does exist and is brought by individuals into a variety of social settings and encounters. As an aspect of learned group culture and experience, the cultural stereotype is a bundle of ideas

that can be drawn upon to provide an account for one's actions, including those of an employer seeking to explain his or her actions. Walter Lippman perhaps said it best: "For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture" (1922, 54–55).

From our vantage point, what is important about the stereotype is not derived from the workplace setting or neighborhood context itself, but rather from the acquisition and functioning of the larger cultural belief. For example, it is clear that negative stereotypes of African Americans or Latinos as potential neighbors do not derive from direct personal experience in neighborhood settings; the extant patterns of residential segregation by race make this unlikely. The negative stereotypes matter, sadly, because larger patterns of social organization (overt historical racism, vast and durable inequalities in wealth, contemporary segregated communities, friendship and family networks) and the ideas conveyed by numerous cultural artifacts (such as Aunt Jemima, Uncle Ben, Willie Horton, Charlie Chan, Hop Sing, Speedy Gonzalez), institutions (the media, realtors), and leaders (that is, elite social discourse) reinforce these stereotypes (Entman and Rojecki 2000; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000).

The prevalence and effects of racial stereotypes carry a deeper implication for our thinking about studies of social inequality. If our own work and the enormous body of historical and social psychological research on stereotyping and prejudice are accurate, then we suspect that mainstream approaches to inequality are flawed. More precisely, there is something both ahistorical and asociological, we think, about recent research that proceeds on the basis of an under-racialized view of social dynamics. For example, we are doubtful of interpretations of labor and housing market dynamics that seek to explain away racial group inequality in terms, respectively, of the "skills variable" (for example, Farkas and Vicknair 1996) or of the "fear of crime variable" (for example, Harris 1999).8 From our vantage point, such arguments substitute arid "variable analysis" for nuanced social analysis. To be sure, we too measure variables in order to test our ideas about processes operative in the social world. But the effects of significant variables in regression or other types of statistical models do not in and of themselves constitute social explanations or theories. Variables are lent meaning, and theories hold explanatory, predictive, and policy-relevant power, only when securely anchored in an appreciation of the full historical, cultural, social psychological, and individual processes that produce observed patterns of relationship. With the noteworthy exceptions of William Iulius Wilson (1987, 1996), Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1993), and Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro (1995), too much of our research and knowledge about urban inequality proceed on the basis of an atomizing, socially uprooted analytical framework that seems to have forgotten this important lesson—a lesson we credit to the exemplary work of Du Bois, Myrdal, and Drake and Cayton (O'Connor 2000).

Given our data on stereotypes and a U.S. history and culture that the eminent historian George M. Fredrickson (1999) described as involving an unambiguous "ethnic hierarchy," it is fair to say that the disadvantages faced by African Americans, Latinos, and, to a lesser degree, Asian Americans continue to be linked to deeply racialized contemporary social conditions and processes (Sanjek 1994; Jankowski 1995; Zubrinsky and Bobo 1996; Bonilla-Silva 1997; Gans 1999; Dawson 2000). That is what the tilt of our analysis of racial stereotypes tells us. Again, we think Walter Lippman put it well when he observed nearly a century ago that:

The subtlest and most pervasive of all influences are those which create and maintain the repertory of stereotypes. We are told about the world before we see it. We imagine most things before we experience them. And those preconceptions, unless education has made us acutely aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception. They mark out certain objects, as familiar or strange, emphasizing the difference, so that the slightly familiar is seen as very familiar, and the somewhat strange as sharply alien. [1922, 59]

Although not as extreme or potent as they once might have been, stereotypes of historically stigmatized and disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups remain alive today. Though almost never the only or the overdetermining input to behavior and social interaction, racial stereotypes are ideas that matter. Whether as omnipresent cultural backdrop or as the individual's tool kit of ideas for engaging a variety of social interactions, racial stereotypes envelop the relations and dynamics that bring about social inequality. Researchers and policymakers concerned with ameliorating urban inequality must attend to these facts as well.

We wish to thank several colleagues for helping us complete this paper. Reynolds Farley, Robinson Hollister, Harry Holzer, and Irene Browne gave us good advice in reaction to a preliminary draft of this paper presented during a Multi-City Study project conference held at the Russell Sage Foundation in October 1997. Alice O'Connor, Howard Schuman, Jim Sidanius, Abel Valenzuela, Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Devon Johnson, and Monica McDermott read and critiqued the substantially completed manuscript. We, of course, are responsible for any remaining shortcomings and errors. This research was partly supported by a National Science Foundation grant.

Appendix

(follows next page)

TABLE 2A.1 Means, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrices for White Respondents by City

White Respondents
Atlanta (N = 662)

Atlanta ( $N = 662$ )									
	Mean	S.D.		Corre	lation Ma	ıtrix (Des	ign Weig	hted)	
Sex	0.506	0.500	1.000						
Age	44.718	15.795	0.023	1.000					
Education	13.985	2.490	0.079	-0.264	1.000				
Native-born	0.942	0.233	0.031	0.077	0.039	1.000			
Family income	56024	38360	0.142	-0.114	0.335	0.110	1.000		
Liberal-conservative	4.467	1.475	0.059	0.141		-0.095	0.149	1.000	
Asian rich-poor	-0.184	1.251	-0.018	-0.104	0.079	-0.056	-0.024	-0.061	1.000
Black rich-poor	-0.854	1.041	-0.024	-0.060	-0.102	-0.064	-0.090	-0.099	0.162
Hispanic rich-poor	-0.962	1.173	-0.061	0.093	-0.068	-0.094	-0.099	-0.003	0.367
Asian intelligent	0.812	1.242	-0.062	-0.025	0.062	-0.129	-0.022	-0.011	0.108
Black intelligent	0.268	1.235	-0.114	0.043	0.020	-0.023	-0.113	-0.102	-0.072
Hispanic intelligent	0.142	1.131	-0.094	0.129	-0.005	-0.038	-0.090	-0.050	-0.072
Asian self-supporting	1.346	1.462	-0.072	-0.060	0.274	-0.065	0.184	-0.031	0.159
Black self-supporting	-0.041	1.716	-0.054	0.033	0.208	0.066	0.006	-0.167	0.061
Hispanic self- supporting	0.348	1.514	0.000	0.076	0.197	0.019	0.057	-0.085	0.022
Asian easy to get along with	0.527	1.408	0.129	-0.026	0.082	-0.077	0.092	0.059	-0.106
Black easy to get along with	0.423	1.460	0.002	-0.035	0.162	0.114	0.033	-0.049	0.011
Hispanic easy to get along with	0.327	1.344	0.061	0.005	0.157	0.046	0.009	-0.043	-0.016
Asian speak English well	-0.147	1.328	-0.013	-0.040	0.169	0.008	0.048	-0.040	0.161
Black speak English well	0.445	1.601	0.037	-0.164	0.097	0.061	- -0.093	-0.141	0.047
Hispanic speak English well	-0.661	1.284	0.015	0.018	0.078	0.030	-0.028	-0.088	0.094
Boston (N = $579$ )									
	Mean	S.D.		Corre	lation M	atrix (De	sign Weig	ghted)	
Sex	0.466	0.499	1.000						
Age	45.888	17.139	-0.105	1.000					
Education	13.832	2.396	0.180	-0.174	1.000				
Native-born	0.956	0.206	0.054	-0.082	0.081	1.000			
Family income	53639	38797	0.043	-0.068	0.364	0.054	1.000		
Liberal-conservative	4.068		0.063	0.143	-0.176	-0.037	-0.038	1.000	
Asian rich-poor	-0.501	1.057	-0.040		0.141	0.010	-0.072	-0.098	1.000
Black rich-poor	-1.131	1.051	0.013	-0.068	-0.117	0.064	-0.204	0.026	0.350
Hispanic rich-poor	-1.318			-0.021	-0.130	0.092	-0.250	-0.019	0.42
Asian intelligent	0.608			-0.076	-0.055	0.029	0.040	0.151	-0.039
Asian intelligent	0.000	1.270		_0.076		0.045	0.021	0.050	-0.05

 $0.142 \quad 1.177 \quad -0.032 \quad -0.135$ 

0.051 1.151

0.051 - 0.146

	1.000												
	0.584	1.000											
-	-0.045	-0.040	1.000										
	0.120	0.032	0.341	1.000									
	0.025	0.052	0.405	0.763	1.000								
-	-0.036	-0.079	0.254	0.016	0.023	1.000							1
	0.109	0.066	0.036	0.292	0.216	0.343	1.000						
						0.405	2.720	1 000					
	0.038	0.023	0.002	0.130	0.137	0.495	0.738	1.000					
				0.045	0.060	0.021	0.110	0.100	1 000				
	0.120	-0.003	-0.003	-0.065	- 0.060	0.231	0.110	0.199	1.000				
	0.104	0.000	0.110	0.224	0.270	0.105	0.386	0.303	0.416	1 000			
	0.134	0.038	0.112	0.324	0.270	0.105	0.360	0.000	0.410	1.000			
	0.110	0.000	0.022	0.098	0.132	0 181	0 289	0.363	0.589	0.650	1.000		
	0.119	บ.บชบ	-0.033	0.070	0.102	0.101	0.207		0.002	0.000	1.550		
	0.027	0.168	-0.001	-0.062	-0.044	0.098	0.117	0.083	0.271	0.148	0.277	1.000	
	0.027	0.100	-0.001	- 0.002	- 0.011	0.07.0	0.11,	0.011	C		•		
	0.116	0.076	0.121	0.341	0.234	-0.034	0.291	0.105	0.060	0.422	0.217	0.184	1.00
	0.110	0.070	V.12.	0.0			-	-					
	0.025	0.244	-0.054	0.033	0.105	-0.011	0.236	0.203	0.117	0.199	0.266	0.577	0.29
	0.020									<del></del>			

 $\begin{array}{ccccc} 1.000 & & & & & \\ 0.661 & 1.000 & & & & \\ -0.131 & -0.084 & 1.000 & & & \\ 0.014 & 0.056 & 0.513 & 1.000 & & \\ 0.054 & 0.101 & 0.486 & 0.818 & 1.000 & & \\ \end{array}$ 

0.050 - 0.051

0.040 - 0.051

0.045

0.061

0.060

0.045

0.021

0.032

(Table continues on p. 1

Black intelligent

Hispanic intelligent

TABLE 2A.1 Continued

White F	Respondents	
	(N = 579)	

	Mean	S.D.		Corre	lation M	atrix (De	sign Weig	ghted)	·`
Asian self-supporting	0.872	1.490	0.055	0.055	0.227	-0.030	0.135	-0.015	0.112
Black self-supporting	-0.168	1.677	0.031	-0.053	0.289	~0.019	0.099	-0.145	0.037
Hispanic self-									
supporting	-0.210	1.639	0.139	-0.052	0.277	-0.025	0.059	-0.138	0.054
Asian easy to get									
along with	0.340	1.172	0.063	0.091	0.077	0.019	0.023	-0.020	0.151
Black easy to get							à .a.	0.070	0.47
along with	0.233	1.254	0.026	-0.167	0.128	0.058	0.101	-0.073	0.167
Hispanic easy to get along with Asian speak English	0.087	1.270	0.126	-0.090	0.217	0.073	0.104	-0.046	0.146
well	-0.367	1.412	-0.086	0.021	0.128	0.005	0.086	-0.048	0.183
Black speak English well	0.555	1.594	-0.003	-0.215	0.075	0.042	-0.013	-0.018	0.030
Hispanic speak English well	-0.871	1.344	-0.054	-0.002	0.247	0.026	0.034	-0.133	0.204

#### Detroit (N = 765)

	Mean	S.D.		Corre	lation M	atrix (De:	sign Weig	(hted)	
Sex	0.481	0.500	1.000						
Age	45.739	17.190	-0.082	1.000					
Education	13.301	2.402	0.109	-0.302	1.000			*	
Native-born	0.899	0.302	0.061	-0.133	0.086	1.000			
Family income	49693	33673	0.036	-0.179	0.361	0.097	1.000		
Liberal-conservative	4.149	1.305	0.073	0.062	0.047	0.035	0.018	1.000	
Asian rich-poor	-0.009	1.111	0.034	-0.148	0.071	-0.021	0.016	-0.046	1.000
Black rich-poor	-1.152	1.074	-0.056	-0.003	-0.119	-0.002	-0.106	0.031	0.274
Hispanic rich-poor	-1.096	1.062	0.013	0.065	-0.169	-0.011	-0.141	0.046	0.276
Asian intelligent	0.786	1.102	0.043	-0.183	0.096	0.098	0.029	0.018	0.196
Black intelligent	-0.008	1.031	-0.106	-0.159	0.056	0.009	0.019	0.041	-0.036
Hispanic intelligent	-0.011	0.973	-0.032	-0.132	0.070	-0.026	0.005	.0.024	0.043
Asian self-supporting	1.334	1.294	0.089	-0.139	0.243	0.024	0.143	0.017	0.126
Black self-supporting	-0.325	1.563	-0.007	-0.116	0.263	0.150	0.135	-0.061	0.007
Hispanic self-			*						
supporting	0.173	1.367	0.030	-0.121	0.187	0.089	0.074	0.001	0.043
Asian easy to get									
along with	0.557	1.186	0.085	-0.140	0.073	0.040	0.061	0.049	0.073
Black easy to get		•							
along with	0.287	1.296	0.048	-0.108	0.089	0.096	0.010	-0.019	0.029
Hispanic easy to get					*				
along with	0.339	1.160	0.061	-0.112	0.043	0:030	0.013	0.044	0.020
Asian speak English	0.007								
well	0.090	1.201	-0.009	-0.113	0.073	0.071	-0.005	0.011	0.144

							•					
-0.159	-0.271 -0.065	0.191	0.067	0.104 0.161	1.000 0.518	1.000				•		
	-0.015			0.220	0.531		1.000					
		0.139	0.019	-0.006	0.331	0.163	0.207	1.000				
0.034	-0.003	0.088	0.272	0.190	0.192	0.313	0.279	0.542	1.000			
0.002	0.041	0.072	0.179	0.210	0.281	0.297	0.406	0.569	0.715	1.000		
0.011	-0.023	0.024	-0.012	-0.058	0.324	0.199	0.188	0.295	0.248	0.257	1.000	
0.098	-0.005	0.108	0.208	0.153	0.161	0.331	0.300	0.124	0.315	0.197	0.267	1.0
0.005	0.022	0.027	0 133	Λ 191	0.216	0.283	0.336	0.148	0.183	0.343	0.473	0.2

									(00.1.1			_
0.079	0.078	0.142	0.137	0.129	0.228	0.132	0.120	0.211	0.153	0.174	1.000	
0.037	0.066	0.118	0.216	0.337	0.134	0.214	0.287	0.608	0.660	1.000		
0.074	0.052	0.101	0.288	0.215	0.054	0.225	0.161	0.480	1.000			
-0.077	-0.033	0.227	0.184	0.279	0.280	0.134	0.178	1.000				
0.054	0.096	0.021	0.151	0.255	0.468	0.778	1.000					
0.044	0.017	0.035	0.261	0.236	0.379	1.000						
-0.199	-0.161	0.329	0.018	0.142	1.000							
0.025	0.079	0.196	0.686	1.000								
0.054	0.020	0.225	1.000									
-0.099	-0.070	1.000										
0.716	1.000											
1.000												

(Table continues on p.

TABLE 2A.1 C	Continue	d							
White Respondents Detroit (N = 765)									`
	Mean	S.D.		Correl	ation Ma	trix (Des	ign Weigł	nted)	
Black speak English well	0.017	1.491	-0.048	-0.269	0.055	0.021	-0.026	0.007	0.045
Hispanic speak English well	-0.168	1.183	-0.048	-0.161	0.056	0.075	-0.035	-0.060	0.095
Los Angeles (N = 854)									
	Mean	S.D.		Corre	ation Ma	trix (Des	ign Weigl	hted)	<del></del>
Sex Age	0.496 44.978	0.500 15.283	1.000 -0.040	1.000					
Education	14.212 0.846	2.109 0.361	0.173 0.055	-0.103 0.017	1.000 0.001	1.000			
Native-born	56754	42505	0.062	-0.049	0.263	-0.057	1.000		
Family income Liberal-conservative	4.002	1.411	0.027	0.081	-0.065	0.024	-0.042	1.000	
Asian rich-poor	0.370	1.064	0.017	-0.081	-0.048	-0.001	-0.049	0.044	1.000
Black rich-poor	-1.147	1.004	-0.065	-0.074	-0.104	-0.074	-0.154	0.060	0.128
Hispanic rich-poor	-1.335	1.037	0.021	0.033	-0.007	0.003	-0.157	0.030	0.094
Asian intelligent	1.075	1.224	-0.112	-0.043	0.041	-0.013	-0.024	-0.044	0.089
Black intelligent	0.161	1.169	0.012	-0.107	0.029	0.006	-0.058	-0.166	-0.061
	-0.016	1.262	0.098	-0.040	0.069	0.037	-0.029	-0.111	-0.022
Hispanic intelligent		1.245	0.018	-0.061	0.181	-0.015	0.088	-0.018	0.079
Asian self-supporting	-0.226	1.639	0.069	-0.088	0.151	0.098	0.058	-0.241	-0.056
Black self-supporting Hispanic self- supporting	-0.005	1.632	0.179	-0.028	0.207	0.063	0.118	-0.178	-0.104
Asian easy to get along with	0.343	1.505	0.039	-0.007	0.034	-0.006	0.076	-0.014	-0.044
Black easy to get along with	0.190	1.329	0.059	-0.034	0.058	-0.056	0.062	-0.163	-0.048
Hispanic easy to get along with	0.373	1.325	0.106	-0.039	0.001	-0.145	0.076	-0.078	0.012
Asian speak English well	0.145	1.373	-0.067	0.040	0.042	0.040	0.120	0.034	-0.003
Black speak English well	0.586	1.520	0.027	-0.210	-0.073	-0.044	-0.073	-0.123	-0.002
Hispanic speak English well	-0.729	1.388	0.119	-0.056	0.024	0.054	0.024	-0.081	-0.106

Source: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality.

		_										
0.175	0.126	0.054	0.231	0.174	0.018	0.227	0.163	0.119	0.282	0.178	0.270	1.000
0.189	0.205	0.029	0.156	0.180	0.097	0.205	0.252	0.112	0.215	0.186	0.433	0.517

1.000												ļ
0.661	1.000											
-0.027	-0.073	1.000										l
0.167	0.116	0.235	1.000									
0.128	0.196	0.141	0.824	1.000								
-0.087	-0.099	0.231	0.075	0.036	1.000							ļ
0.190	0.173	-0.046	0.396	0.365	0.245	1.000						ļ
			1									l
0.108	0.190	-0.030	0.278	0.347	0.300	0.758	1.000					
										,		
0.023	0.102	0.219	0.137	0.159	0.103	0.101	0.118	1.000	•			
0												
0.116	0.121	0.042	0.296	0.224	0.019	0.312	0.234	0.319	1.000			
0	•											
0.111	0.073	0.002	0.247	0.239	0.035	0.186	0.233	0.331	0.519	1.000		
0,111	0,1											ļ
0.027	0.030	0.167	0.141	0.115	0.192	0.163	0.112	0.292	0.098	0.055	1.000	
0,027	0,000											
0.233	0.194	0.000	0.232	0.176	0.016	0.262	0.142	0.054	0.314	0.132	0.169	1.000
0.200	0.27 .	0.000										
0.209	0.308	-0.060	0.329	0.422	-0.057	0.355	0.346	0.174	0:272	0.247	0.287	0.447
0,207	0.000	0.00-										

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrices for Black TABLE 2A.2 Respondents, by City

	Kespona	ieiiis, t	ly City						
Black Respondents Atlanta (N = 786)						•			
	Mean	S.D.		Cor	relation M	atrix (Desig	n Weighte	d) 	
Sex	0.433	0.496	1.000						
Age	41.689	14.158	-0.033	1.000					
Education	13.408	2.553	-0.003	-0.369	1.000	1 000			
Native-born	0.969	0.174	-0.138	0.101	-0.192	1.000	1.000		
Family income	33791	23028	0.136	-0.076	0.380	-0.149	1.000	1.000	
Liberal-conservative	3.589	1.376	0.090	-0.119	-0.058	-0.059	-0.014	-0.037	1.000
White rich-poor	0.960	1.274	-0.070	0.019	-0.044	-0.018	-0.047 0.087	-0.037	0.239
Asian rich-poor	-0.009	1.430	-0.021	-0.093	0.012	-0.025		-0.023	-0.083
Hispanic rich-poor	-0.930	1.287	-0.014	0.025	-0.174	0.040	-0.138	0.029	0.036
White intelligent	0.467	1.640	-0.119	0.046	-0.044	0.052	-0.096	0.029	-0.081
Asian intelligent	0.389	1.397	-0.026	-0.047	0.092	-0.055	-0.059 -0.072	-0.011	0.059
Hispanic intelligent	0.210	1.302	-0.089	0.008	0.088	0.053		0.017	0.202
White self-supporting	, 1.300	1.552	-0.183	0.135	-0.011	0.021	-0.055 0.069	-0.005	0.123
Asian self-supporting	0.949	1.487	-0.146	0.011	0.105	0.064	0.069	-0.003	0.120
Hispanic self-							0.000	0.054	0.025
supporting	0.359	1.533	-0.101	0.113	0.047	0.074	-0.030	-0.054	0.023
White easy to get							0.000	0.030	-0.042
along with	-0.095	1.857	-0.148	0.009	0.086	-0.094	0.009	0.050	-0.042
Asian easy to get							0.007	0.049	-0.042
along with	-0.169	1.608	-0.019	0.071	-0.025	-0.016	0.006	0.049	-0.042
Hispanic easy to get								0.07/	0.006
along with	-0.011	1.477	-0.065	-0.018	0.059	0.059	0.010	-0.076	0.000
White speak English								0.005	0.217
well	1.586	1.522	-0.187	0.034	0.011	- 0.078	-0.025	0.005	0.217
Asian speak English							0.014	0.041	0.014
well	-0.720	1.597	-0.029	0.025	0.032	0.065	-0.044	0.041	0.014
Hispanic speak							0.040	-0.004	-0.041
English well	-0.863	1.551	-0.048	0.000	0.070	0.092	0.062	-0.004	- 0.041
$\frac{1}{\text{Boston}(N = 449)}$	<del></del>								
Doctor (	Mean	S.D.	·	Co	orrelation I	Matrix (Des	ign Weight	ed)	
		0.499	1.000						
Sex	0.469	15.451	-0.060	1.000					
Age	40.424	2.720	0.111	-0.361	1.000				
Education	12.448	0.475	-0.135	0.202	0.003	1.000			
Native-born	0.657	24627	0.121	-0.022	0.356	0.024	1.000		
Family income	29992	1.560	-0.032	-0.138	0.035	-0.157	0.076	1.000	
Liberal-conservative	3.900		0.043	-0.217	0.063	-0.055	-0.101	-0.185	1.000
White rich-poor	0.899	1.385	-0.017	-0.110	0.061	-0.017	-0.073	-0.279	0.257
Asian rich-poor	-0.280	1.222	-0.017 -0.122	0.164	-0.137	0.149	-0.028	0.058	-0.263
Hispanic rich-poor	-1.080	1.359		0.104	-0.033	-0.120	0.007	0.089	-0.061
White intelligent	0.586	1.464	-0.008	-0.104	0.053	-0.032	-0.018	-0.070	0.010
Asian intelligent	0.483	1.446	-0.006		-0.053	-0.002	-0.062	0.028	0.028
Hispanic intelligent	0.352	1.305	-0.021	-0.035	0.160	0.003	-0.005	-0.049	0.333
White self-supporting	g 0.742	1.730	-0.006	-0.032	-	0.057	0.082	-0.043	0.056
Asian self-supporting	0.429	1.709	-0.048	-0.056	0.288	. 0.133	0.002	5.5.0	
Hispanic self-			0.070	0.033	0.210	0.167	0.123	-0.022	0.081
supporting	-0.276	1.883	0.079	0.033	0,210	0.107			

												,
0.0=-	1.000 - 0.013 - 0.048 0.057 - 0.168 - 0.091	1.000 0.449 0.357 0.211 0.062	1.000 0.543 0.148 0.159	1.000 0.096 0.098	1.000 0.380	. 1.000						
0.092	0.110	0.112	0.049	0.147	0.310	0.582	1.000				•	
-0.142	-0.039	0.132	0.007	-0.016	0.233	0.154	0.195	1.000				
-0.146	-0.056	0.062	0.089	0.068	0.261	0.178	0.269	0.483	1.000			
0.064	0.045	0.076	0.115	0.161	0.189	0.200	0.297	0.234	0.545	1.000		
-0.071		0.165	0.138	0.074	0.381	0.214	0.160	0.258	0.244	0.196	1.000	
0.123	0.100	0.085	0.058	0.100	0.064	0.078	0.204	0.190		0.163		
0.123	0.151	-0.034	-0.019	0.080	-0.011	-0.012	0.109	0.082	0.049	0.161	-0.054	0.60

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(Table continues on p. 14

TABLE 2A.2 Continued

Black Respondents Boston (N = 449)									
	Mean	S.D.		Co	orrelation N	Matrix (Des	ign Weight	ed)	
White easy to get along with	0.255	1.755	-0.013	0.096	-0.009	0.110	-0.033	-0.041	0.025
Asian easy to get along with	-0.103	1.609	-0.014	0.167	0.018	0.166	0.118	-0.096	-0.092
Hispanic easy to get along with White speak English	0.084	1.540	0.023	0.075	0.084	0.336	0.079	-0.124	-0.061
well Asian speak English	1.580	1.573	-0.008	-0.035	-0.127	0.084	-0.115	-0.184	0.247
well Hispanic speak	-0.808	1.513	-0.068	0.080	-0.029	0.079	0.037	-0.043	-0.135
English well	-0.795	1.542	0.075	0.069	0.091	0.109	0.059	0.082	-0.162
Detroit $(N = 696)$		•				•			
	Mean	S.D.		Co	rrelation N	Aatrix (Des	ign Weight	ed)	
Sex	0.426	0.494	1.000						
Age	44.122	16.453	0.004	1.000					
Education	12.603	2.493	-0.020	-0.421	1.000				
Native-born	0.990	0.098	-0.056	0.019	-0.044	1.000			
Family income	33617	31949	0.021	-0.178	0.504	-0.009	1.000		
Liberal-conservative	3.760	1.460	0.013	0.054	-0.040	0.009	0.084	1.000	
White rich-poor	1.011	1.240	0.030	-0.109	-0.019	-0.013	-0.039	-0.080	1.000
Asian rich-poor	0.201	1.174	-0.013	-0.009	-0.015	-0.056	-0.077	-0.185	0.331
Hispanic rich-poor	-1.053	1.244	0.010	. 0.102	-0.208	0.044	-0.147	0.087	-0.085
White intelligent	0.653	1.412	-0.036	0.000	0.040	0.007	0.026	-0.010	0.090
Asian intelligent	0.547	1.329	0.008	0.013	0.112	0.000	0.040	-0.065	0.103
Hispanic intelligent	0.011	1.168	-0.107	0.009	0.071	0.026	-0.003	-0.100	0.025
White self-supporting	0.901	1.537	-0.063	-0.132	0.245	0.017	0.127	-0.143	0.208
Asian self-supporting Hispanic self-	0.846	1.440		-0.109	0.236	-0.060	0.165	-0.138	0.051
supporting White easy to get	0.039	1.395	-0.030	-0.056	0.164	0.005	0.173	-0.040	-0.099
along with Asian easy to get	-0.147	1.531	-0.042	0.086	-0.029	-0.019	0.073	0.014	-0.155
along with Hispanic easy to get	-0.145	1.314	-0.001	-0.048	0.007	0.001	0.079	-0.020	-0.133
along with White speak English	0.221	1.202	-0.058	-0.044	0.043	0.029	0.022	-0.128	0.052
well Asian speak English	1.598	1.518	~0.086	-0.136	0.004	0.056	0.004	-0.116	0.276
well	-0.455	1.290	-0.039	0.009	0.030	0.019	0.067	-0.022	-0.022
Hispanic speak English well	-0.567	1.271	0.032	-0.011	-0.010	0.038	0.104	-0.023	-0.003
Los Angeles (N = 1,106)									
	Mean	S.D.		Co	rrelation N	latrix (Des	ign Weight	ed)	
Sex Age	0.492 41.119	0.500 15.408	1,000 -0.015	1.000					

8 0.146	0.073	0.149	0.404	0.147	0.168	1.000				
					0.100	1.000				
9 -0.016	-0.031	0.111	0.071	0.141	0.181	0.414	1.000			
2 0.007	0.124	0.058	0.117	0.233	0.322	0.217	0.433	1.000		•
5 0.050	0.060	0.050	0.318	-0.056	-0.086	0.336	0.104	0.099	1.000	
0.059	0.019	0.141	0.028	0.182	0.183	0.119	0.376	0.197	0.022	1.000
6 0.024	0.084	0.076	-0.042	0.229	0.408	0.008	0.225	0.279	-0.140	0.503
3	0.007 0.050 0.050 0.059	22 0.007 0.124 05 0.050 0.060 31 0.059 0.019	0.007 0.124 0.058 0.050 0.060 0.050 0.059 0.019 0.141	0.007 0.124 0.058 0.117 0.050 0.050 0.060 0.050 0.318 0.059 0.019 0.141 0.028	0.050 0.050 0.050 0.117 0.233 0.050 0.050 0.060 0.050 0.318 -0.056 0.059 0.019 0.141 0.028 0.182	0.050 0.050 0.058 0.117 0.233 0.322 05 0.050 0.060 0.050 0.318 -0.056 -0.086 031 0.059 0.019 0.141 0.028 0.182 0.183	12 0.007 0.124 0.058 0.117 0.233 0.322 0.217 15 0.050 0.060 0.050 0.318 -0.056 -0.086 0.336 16 0.059 0.019 0.141 0.028 0.182 0.183 0.119	12 0.007 0.124 0.058 0.117 0.233 0.322 0.217 0.433 15 0.050 0.060 0.050 0.318 -0.056 -0.086 0.336 0.104 16 0.059 0.019 0.141 0.028 0.182 0.183 0.119 0.376	12 0.007 0.124 0.058 0.117 0.233 0.322 0.217 0.433 1.000 15 0.050 0.060 0.050 0.318 -0.056 -0.086 0.336 0.104 0.099 16 0.059 0.019 0.141 0.028 0.182 0.183 0.119 0.376 0.197	12 0.007 0.124 0.058 0.117 0.233 0.322 0.217 0.433 1.000 15 0.050 0.060 0.050 0.318 -0.056 -0.086 0.336 0.104 0.099 1.000 16 0.059 0.019 0.141 0.028 0.182 0.183 0.119 0.376 0.197 0.022

1.000											
										•	
0.035				1 000							
-0.121			-		1 000						
~0.087	0.073	0.232	0.110	0.515	1.000			•			
0.126	0 031	0.011	0.234	0.143	0.366	1.000					
0.130	-0.001	0.011	0.20								
0.049	0.142	0.133	0.063	-0.043	0.000	0.078	1.000				
0.085	-0.054	-0.014	0.073	-0.074	-0.017	0.162	0.491	1.000			
								0.070	1 000		
-0.049	0.141	0.121	0.063	0.086	0.014	-0.003	0.242	0.272	1.000		
0 137	0.131	0.098	0.015	0.271	0.166	-0.115	0.145	-0.150	0.037	1.000	
0.107	0.101										
0.042	0.154	0.253	0.177	0.031	0.079	0.106	0.183	0.195	0.228	0.056	1.00
0.119	0.136	0.161	0.204	-0.055	0.024	0.238	0.180	0.169	0.187	-0.030	0.59
	0.135 -0.210 0.035 -0.121 -0.087 0.136 0.049 0.085 -0.049 -0.137 0.042	0.135         1.000           0.210         0.517           0.035         0.229           0.121         0.124           0.087         0.073           0.136         -0.031           0.049         0.142           0.085         -0.054           -0.049         0.141           -0.137         0.131           0.042         0.154	0.135     1.000       0.210     0.517     1.000       0.035     0.229     0.369       0.121     0.124     0.063       0.087     0.073     0.232       0.136     -0.031     0.011       0.049     0.142     0.133       0.085     -0.054     -0.014       -0.049     0.141     0.121       -0.137     0.131     0.098       0.042     0.154     0.253	0.135         1.000           0.210         0.517         1.000           0.035         0.229         0.369         1.000           0.121         0.124         0.063         -0.029           0.087         0.073         0.232         0.110           0.136         -0.031         0.011         0.234           0.049         0.142         0.133         0.063           0.085         -0.054         -0.014         0.073           -0.049         0.141         0.121         0.063           -0.137         0.131         0.098         0.015           0.042         0.154         0.253         0.177	0.135     1.000       0.210     0.517     1.000       0.035     0.229     0.369     1.000       0.121     0.124     0.063     -0.029     1.000       0.087     0.073     0.232     0.110     0.515       0.136     -0.031     0.011     0.234     0.143       0.049     0.142     0.133     0.063     -0.043       0.085     -0.054     -0.014     0.073     -0.074       -0.049     0.141     0.121     0.063     0.086       -0.137     0.131     0.098     0.015     0.271       0.042     0.154     0.253     0.177     0.031	0.135       1.000         0.210       0.517       1.000         0.035       0.229       0.369       1.000         0.121       0.124       0.063       -0.029       1.000         0.087       0.073       0.232       0.110       0.515       1.000         0.136       -0.031       0.011       0.234       0.143       0.366         0.049       0.142       0.133       0.063       -0.043       0.000         0.085       -0.054       -0.014       0.073       -0.074       -0.017         -0.049       0.141       0.121       0.063       0.086       0.014         -0.137       0.131       0.098       0.015       0.271       0.166         0.042       0.154       0.253       0.177       0.031       0.079	0.135       1.000         0.210       0.517       1.000         0.035       0.229       0.369       1.000         0.121       0.124       0.063       -0.029       1.000         0.087       0.073       0.232       0.110       0.515       1.000         0.136       -0.031       0.011       0.234       0.143       0.366       1.000         0.049       0.142       0.133       0.063       -0.043       0.000       0.078         0.085       -0.054       -0.014       0.073       -0.074       -0.017       0.162         -0.049       0.141       0.121       0.063       0.086       0.014       -0.003         -0.137       0.131       0.098       0.015       0.271       0.166       -0.115         0.042       0.154       0.253       0.177       0.031       0.079       0.106	0.135       1.000         0.210       0.517       1.000         0.035       0.229       0.369       1.000         0.121       0.124       0.063       -0.029       1.000         0.087       0.073       0.232       0.110       0.515       1.000         0.136       -0.031       0.011       0.234       0.143       0.366       1.000         0.049       0.142       0.133       0.063       -0.043       0.000       0.078       1.000         0.085       -0.054       -0.014       0.073       -0.074       -0.017       0.162       0.491         -0.049       0.141       0.121       0.063       0.086       0.014       -0.003       0.242         -0.137       0.131       0.098       0.015       0.271       0.166       -0.115       -0.145         0.042       0.154       0.253       0.177       0.031       0.079       0.106       0.180	0.135       1.000         0.210       0.517       1.000         0.035       0.229       0.369       1.000         0.121       0.124       0.063       -0.029       1.000         0.087       0.073       0.232       0.110       0.515       1.000         0.136       -0.031       0.011       0.234       0.143       0.366       1.000         0.049       0.142       0.133       0.063       -0.043       0.000       0.078       1.000         0.085       -0.054       -0.014       0.073       -0.074       -0.017       0.162       0.491       1.000         -0.049       0.141       0.121       0.063       0.086       0.014       -0.003       0.242       0.272         -0.137       0.131       0.098       0.015       0.271       0.166       -0.115       -0.145       -0.150         0.042       0.154       0.253       0.177       0.031       0.079       0.106       0.183       0.195	0.135       1.000         0.210       0.517       1.000         0.035       0.229       0.369       1.000         0.121       0.124       0.063       -0.029       1.000         0.087       0.073       0.232       0.110       0.515       1.000         0.136       -0.031       0.011       0.234       0.143       0.366       1.000         0.049       0.142       0.133       0.063       -0.043       0.000       0.078       1.000         0.085       -0.054       -0.014       0.073       -0.074       -0.017       0.162       0.491       1.000         -0.049       0.141       0.121       0.063       0.086       0.014       -0.003       0.242       0.272       1.000         -0.137       0.131       0.098       0.015       0.271       0.166       -0.115       -0.145       -0.150       0.037         0.042       0.154       0.253       0.177       0.031       0.079       0.106       0.183       0.195       0.228	0.135       1.000         0.210       0.517       1.000         0.035       0.229       0.369       1.000         0.121       0.124       0.063       -0.029       1.000         0.087       0.073       0.232       0.110       0.515       1.000         0.136       -0.031       0.011       0.234       0.143       0.366       1.000         0.049       0.142       0.133       0.063       -0.043       0.000       0.078       1.000         0.085       -0.054       -0.014       0.073       -0.074       -0.017       0.162       0.491       1.000         -0.049       0.141       0.121       0.063       0.086       0.014       -0.003       0.242       0.272       1.000         -0.137       0.131       0.098       0.015       0.271       0.166       -0.115       -0.145       -0.150       0.037       1.000         0.042       0.154       0.253       0.177       0.031       0.079       0.106       0.183       0.195       0.228       0.056

(Table continues on p. 146

TABLE 2A.2 Continued

Black Respondents
Los Angeles (N = 1,106)

Los Migeres (14 - 1,10									
	Mean	S.D.	_	Co	rrelation N	Aatrix (Des	ign Weight	ed)	
Education	13.080	2.712	0.104	-0.132	1.000				
Native-born	0.911	0.284	-0.231	0.181	-0.175	1.000			
Family income	38843	35134	0.227	-0.071	0.438	-0.367	1.000		
Liberal-conservative	3.567	1.533	-0.012	0.069	-0.091	0.265	-0.106	1.000	
White rich-poor	1.029	1.319	-0.143	-0.092	-0.056	0.210	-0.178	0.008	1.000
Asian rich-poor	0.801	1.367	-0.105	-0.127	-0.102	0.161	-0.179	-0.001	0.595
Hispanic rich-poor	-1.180	1.387	0.119	-0.052	0.054	-0.262	0.238	-0.059	-0.259
White intelligent	0.608	1.363	-0.036	0.036	0.042	-0.190	0.053	-0.053	-0.077
Asian intelligent	0.719	1.386	-0.011	-0.020	0.122	-0.111	0.116	-0.079	-0.061
Hispanic intelligent	0.143	1.249	0.027	-0.031	0.052	-0.234	0.155	-0.082	-0.118
White self-supporting	1.046	1.463	-0.075	0.032	0.028	0.084	-0.117	0.047	0.221
Asian self-supporting	1.192	1.453	0.049	0.063	0.169	0.087	-0.036	-0.034	0.238
Hispanic self-									
supporting	-0.209	1.600	-0.030	0.106	0.054	0.066	0.006	-0.077	0.024
White easy to get									
along with	0.082	1.770	0.070	0.060	0.129	-0.113	0.140	-0.025	-0.239
Asian easy to get									
along with	-0.320	1.762	0.019	0.083	0.122	0.089	0.012	-0.036	-0.111
Hispanic easy to get									
along with	0.620	1.573	0.023	-0.087	0.013	-0.056	0.006	-0.073	0.000
White speak English									
well	2.016	1.254	0.014	-0.188	-0.130	0.056	-0.082	0.023	0.226
Asian speak English									
well	-0.750	1.448	0.090	-0.007	0.206	-0.169	0.185	-0.153	-0.086
Hispanic speak									
English well	-0.764	1.601	0.165	-0.134	0.225	-0.120	0.228	-0.130	-0.173

Source: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality.

1.000												
-0.199	1.000											
-0.090	0.109	1.000										
~0.015	0.075	0.635	1.000									
-0.131	0.201	0.305	0.383	1.000								
0.080	-0.123	0.152	0.089	-0.071	1.000							
0.260	-0.110	0.060	0.108	-0.054	0.600	1.000						
0.022	-0.007	-0.034	-0.001	0.070	0.230	0.300	1.000					
-0.149	0.101	0.220	0.095	0.036	0.038	-0.016	0.137	1.000				
-0.184	-0.059	0.104	0.070	0.053	0.117	0.079	0.229	0.617	1.000			
0.085	-0.047	0.151	0.172	0.149	0.077	0.112	0.179	0.304	0.287	1.000		
0.216	-0.051	0.111	0.095	0.004	0.245	0.233	-0.033	-0.034	-0.007	0.180	1.000	
-0.210	0.174	0.122	0.102	0.161	0.019	0.063	0.148	0.300	0.399	0.060	-0.028	1.000
-0.115	0.268	0.033	0.032	0.165	0.041	0.131	0.334	0.116	0.183	0.245	0.028	0.375

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrices for Hispanic Respondents, by City

Hispanic Respondents	
Boston $(N = 678)$	

	Mean	S.D.		C	orrelation I	Matrix (Des	ign Weigh	ted)	
Sex	0.472	0.499	1.000						
Age	37.02	13.31	-0.009	1.000					
Education	10.60	3.51	-0.221	-0.257	1.000				
Native-born	0.539	0.498	-0.022	-0.064	-0.056	1.000			
Family income	27423	17730	0.065	-0.129	0.161	-0.029	1.000		
Liberal-conservative	4.185	1.481	-0.144	-0.047	0.011	0.011	-0.017	1.000	
White rich-poor	0.551	1.389	-0.220	-0.085	-0.118	0.109	0.053	0.292	1.00
Asian rich-poor	-0.868	1.413	-0.066	0.041	-0.011	-0.178	-0.215	-0.084	-0.03
Black rich-poor	-1.477	1.300	0.046	0.094	-0.204	-0.045	-0.241	-0.067	-0.03
White intelligent	0.830	1.666	-0.109	-0.184	0.065	0.179	0.097	0.172	0.08
Asian intelligent	0.795	1.575	~0.179	0.030	0.143	-0.019	0.026	0.212	-0.05
Black intelligent	0.236	1.466	-0.177	-0.049	-0.003	0.111	0.053	0.245	0.06
White self-supporting	0.370	1.952	0.185	0.041	-0.048	-0.153	-0.093	-0.083	0.05
Asian self-supporting	-0.040	1.813	0.010	0.114	0.144	-0.251	-0.268	-0.247	-0.31
Black self-								*	
supporting	-1.216	1.599	0.024	0.226	0.000	0.033	-0.218	-0.085	-0.076
White easy to get									
along with	-0.042	2.027	0.159	0.058	0.049	-0.153	-0.040	~0.069	0.098
Asian easy to get									
along with	-0.357	1.478	0.064	-0.027	0.221	-0.141	-0.022	-0.069	-0.148
Black easy to get									
along with	-0.195	1.890	-0.212	-0.056	0.087	0.229	0.014	0.331	0.229
White speak English									
well	2.019	1.538	0.109	-0.240	-0.015	0.277	-0.028	0.085	0.195
Asian speak English									
well	-0.395	1.588	0.138	-0.184	0.034	-0.257	-0.118	0.037	-0.225
Black speak									
English well	1.020	1.973	-0.070	-0.227	-0.039	0.195	-0.075	0.048	0.202

	Mean	S.D.		Co	orrelation N	Matrix (Des	ign Weigh	ed)	
Sex	0.503	0.500	1.000			·			
Age	37.10	12.83	-0.082	1.000					
Education	10.13	4.05	0.067	-0.189	1.000				
Native-born	0.269	0.444	0.042	0.064	0.355	1.000			
Family income	27604	22543	0.065	-0.051	0.396	0.368	1.000		
Liberal-conservative	4.055	1.300	-0.037	0.093	-0.020	-0.043	0.042	1.000	
White rich-poor	1.368	1.325	0.007	-0.146	-0.179	-0.204	-0.175	-0.104	1.000
Asian rich-poor	0.964	1.349	-0.033	-0.174	-0.013	-0.052	-0.032	-0.023	0.456
Black rich-poor	-0.956	1.257	-0.085	-0.054	-0.144	-0.035	-0.047	-0.044	-0.025
White intelligent	0.925	1.534	-0.079	0.049	-0.125	0.168	-0.092	0.011	0.114
Asian intelligent	1.114	1.553	-0.070	-0.023	0.072	-0.072	0.022	-0.068	0.018
Black intelligent	0.074	1.325	-0.061	0.036	0.033	-0.024	-0.036	-0.006	-0.062
White self-supporting	1.068	1.678	-0.024	0.018	0.008	0.061	0.060	0.085	0.169
Asian self-supporting	1.155	1.578	0.005	-0.018	0.083	0.076	0.057	0.045	0.126
Black self-									
supporting	-1.393	1.490	-0.041	0.111	0.050	0.201	0.093	0.027	-0.118

1.000												
0.525	1.000											
-0.144	-0.035	1.000										
-0.109	-0.181	0.397	1.000									
-0.175	-0.126	0.348	0.530	1.000								
0.332	0.202	-0.260	-0.247	-0.424	1.000							
0.513	0.352	-0.084	-0.090	-0.059	0.193	1.000						
0.319	0.421	-0.215	-0.120	-0.096	0.274	0.303	1.000					
0.117	0.053	-0.250	-0.237	-0.394	0.586	0.035	0.221	1.000				
0.208	0.145	-0.089	-0.133	-0.159	0.132	0.341	0.158	0.252	1.000			
-0.075	0.048	0.211	0.263	0.486	-0.179	-0.056	-0.019	-0.079	0.033	1.000		
-0.181	-0.068	0.139	-0.053	0.045	0.125	-0.194	-0.129	0.162	-0.205	0.195	1.000	
01202	*****											
0.362	0.206	-0.089	-0.002	0.046	0.234	0.398	0.108	0.073	0.350	0.012	0.016	1
-0.101	0.001	-0.017	0.109	0.228	-0.103	-0.147	0.080	-0.027	-0.076	0.293	0.533	n
-0.101	0.001	-0.017	0.109	0.226	0.103	0.147	0.000	0.027	0.070	0.270	0.000	

1.000							
-0.029	1.000						
-0.086	0.016	1.000					
0.132	-0.054	0.497	1.000				
-0.037	0.101	0.281	0.231	1.000			
0.119	-0.091	0.067	0.076	-0.101	1.000		
0.244	0.017	-0.002	0.118	0.028	0.463	1.000	
-0.146	0.137	0.066	-0.043	0.147	0.071	0.072	1.00

(Table continues on p. 1

TABLE 2A.3 Continued

Hispanic Respondents Los Angeles (N = 992)

	Mean	S.D. Correlation Matrix (Design Weighted)											
White easy to get													
along with	0.393	1.950	0.020	0.019	0.071	0.026	0.065	0.120	-0.099				
Asian easy to get													
along with	-0.097	1.660	0.069	-0.022	0.108	0.026	0.113	0.108	-0.178				
Black easy to get													
along with	-0.284	1.711	0.086	0.059	0.152	0.216	0.152	0.030	-0.122				
White speak English													
well	2.441	1.209	-0.031	-0.170	-0.072	-0.085	-0.074	-0.073	0.235				
Asian speak English													
well	-0.090	1.555	0.054	-0.020	-0.139	-0.212	-0.070	0.104	0.006				
Black speak													
English well	1.195	1.700	0.076	-0.157	-0.161	-0.160	-0.146	-0.091	0.201				

Source: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality.

-0.077	0.072	0.066	0.049	0.012	0.060	0.021	-0.077	1.000				
-0.076	0.030	0.059	0.161	0.173	0.020	0.093	0.038	0.416	1.000		:	
-0.002	0.032	0.019	0.074	0.165	-0.032	0.022	0.156	0.133	0.323	1.000		
0.242	-0.039	0.134	0.137	-0.023	0.168	0.108	-0.192	0.096	-0.038	-0.048	1.000	
-0.031	0.146	0.083	0.046	0.105	0.015	-0.035	0.113	-0.020	0.226	0.019	0.011	1.0
0.139	0.124	0.074	0.094	0.090	0.047	0.074	-0.026	0.020	-0.028	0.027	0.427	0.2

#### Notes

- 1. Since our interest is to compare stereotypes across cities, we do not examine the data for the Multi-City Study Asian respondents. Only one city, Los Angeles, had enough Asian respondents to perform meaningful multivariate analyses. Lawrence Bobo and Devon Johnson (2000) provide a comprehensive analysis of these data.
- 2. The additional traits of "involved in drugs and gangs/not involved in drugs and gangs" and "treat members of other groups equally/discriminate against members of other groups" were also asked in three of the cities (Atlanta, Boston, and Los Angeles). Since we are interested in maximizing across city comparisons, we restrict attention to those trait-rating items available in all four cities.
- 3. Very few respondents refused to perform the rating task and offered judgments quite readily. We examined the relative frequency of "don't know" responses for each trait by each target group in each city (eighty trials each for the black and white respondent groups). Among blacks and whites we found the relative frequency of "don't know" response was 5 percent or lower in sixty trials. "Don'tknow" responses occurred at a rate of 10 percent or higher in only five trials among whites, never exceeding 11 percent, and at a rate of 10 percent or higher in nine trials among blacks, never exceeding 15 percent. Hispanic respondents in Boston and Los Angeles also rarely used the "don't know" option. The relative frequency of this response was 5 percent or less in thirty-six out of forty trials and never exceeded 11 percent. Whites, blacks, and Hispanics alike most readily rated their own group; the rates of "don't know" responses were slightly higher when these groups were asked to rate other groups. Whites, blacks, and Hispanics all were most reluctant to judge Asians. Based on these results, we assigned "don't know" responses the same score (0) as a neutral rating. We also sought to determine whether images of the groups were associated with gender. Images common in today's media and mass culture frequently portray gang members as young black males and welfare recipients as black females (Entman and Rojecki 2000; Gilens 1999). To do this, we randomly assigned respondents, via a survey-based experimental manipulation (Schuman and Bobo 1988), the task of rating the group as a whole (whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians), rating males in each group, or rating females in each group. Analysis of variance in the experimental groups showed no strong or consistent differences in ratings due to gender of the target group, so we combined responses from the experimental forms for the analysis that follows.
- 4. Other analyses of these data (for example, Bobo and Johnson 2000; Charles 2000a, 2000b; Massagli 2000) rely on computing differences

- between respondent's rating of own group and each outgroup. These measures of relative differences do not yield substantially different conclusions regarding the relative ranking of out-groups or the relationship among out-group ratings within a city, but lend themselves less well to a straightforward description of group and city differences in respondents' use of stereotypes.
- 5. This analysis method yields maximum likelihood estimates when the data are multivariate normal, an assumption that is most unlikely to hold given the complex sample design used in the Multi-City Study surveys. However, we use design-wrighted correlations which yield unbiased estimates of the covariation among trait ratings.
- 6. The L<sup>2</sup> statistic is affected by the sample size, which is somewhat problematic in the analysis of data obtained under complex sample designs. The correlations have been estimated using design-based weights, which take account of differential probabilities of selection and reproduce the estimated population size. For the production of likelihood ratio statistics we assume the observed sample size, or else we would seriously overestimate the importance of deviations between the fitted and observed correlations which could be reduced only by fitting relatively complex models. However, because the sampling scheme involved clustering of interviews by residential area, the observed sample is likely to be somewhat less efficient than a random sample of the same size. Effectively, standard errors of estimates that assume the observed sample size are likely too small (and t-tests are too large). Estimates of standard errors may effectively be inflated (t-tests deflated) by decreasing the effective sample size consistent with the assumed design effect. However, there is no simple correction that can be applied to the test statistics, as the design effect will vary by variable and by sampled stratum (Kish 1987). But the same action (decreasing the sample size) that reduces the potential bias in standard errors also increases the likelihood of acceptable goodness of fit with more degrees of freedom. Under the circumstances, we thought it best to assume the observed sample size in the calculation of goodness of fit and other test statistics, and to emphasize relative improvement in fit through the introduction of classes of parameters rather than specific parameters.
- 7. It is possible with structural equation models to perform a formal statistical test, using multiple group comparisons, for the equivalence of factor structures As a result of the very large sample sizes we are working with here, we decided to rely on more substantive assessment of the patterns (rather than purely statistical grounds) for judging similarity of the underlying factor structures.

8. In terms of the labor market, A. Silvia Cancio, T. David Evans, and David Maume (1996), Maume, Cancio, and Evans (1996), and perhaps especially Kenneth Arrow (1998) and William Darity and Patrick Mason (1998) make clear the empirical and conceptual weaknesses of a socially uprooted, "variable analysis" version of the "skills" argument. In terms of the housing market and fear of crime hypothesis, Camille Zubrinsky Charles (2000a and this volume) provides an equally trenchant rejoinder.

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