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1 Introduction

2 Sociologists ordinarily assume that social structure drives the content of individual level values, attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately, behavior. In some classic models this posture reaches a point of essentially denying the sociological relevance of any micro-level processes. In contrast, psychologists (and to a degree, economists) operate with theoretical models that give primacy to individual level perception, cognition, motivation, and choice. Within the domain of studies of ethno-racial relations, each of these positions has modern advocates. From the sociologically deterministic vantage point Edna Bonacich trumpets the “deeper’ level of reality” exposed by class analytics (1980, p. 9), while Omi and Winant (1994, p. 59) focus on “racialized social structure.” Others, while not so completely rejecting micro-level analyses, nonetheless call for primary attention to so-called “structural racism” (e.g., Bonilla-Silva

(1997)). Within psychology we have seen an explosion of work on implicit attitudes or unconscious racism that more than ever centers attention on the internal psychological functioning of the individual. We argue here that, in general, a committed social psychological posture that examines both how societal level factors and processes shape individual experiences and outlooks and how the distribution of individual attitudes, beliefs, and values, in turn, influence others and the larger social environment provides the fullest leverage on understanding the dynamics of race. Specifically we argue in this chapter that ethno-racial attitudes, beliefs, and identities play a fundamental constitutive role in the experience, re-production, and process of change in larger societal patterns of ethno-racial inequality and relations.

Some basic conceptual anchoring of *attitude*, *race*, and *ethnicity* is necessary. By *attitude*, we refer to “a favorable or unfavorable evaluation of an object” (Schuman et al. 1997, p. 1). *Race* typically involves socially constructed perceptions of phenotypic differences, variation in skin color and tone, hair texture, eye shape and other facial features while *ethnicity* refers to variations in language, attire, aspects of self-presentation, and other cultural behaviors. Ethno-racial attitudes thus reflect a variety of race and ethnicity associated objects: racial and ethnic groups and their attributes, features and assessments of relations between such groups, intergroup contact, and public policies pertinent to either race or ethnicity. Ethno-racial attitudes are built up and constituted in environments structured to correspond to

Frank L. Samson was supported in part by funding from the National Science Foundation awarded to the University of Miami (Award No.: 0820128) during the writing of this chapter.

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56 socially constructed and recognized ethno-racial
57 markers or designations (Omi and Winant 1994;
58 See and Wilson 1988).

59 With only a limited amount of space to review
60 a wide range of scholarship on the social psychol-
61 ogy of racial inequality, this chapter focuses on
62 just three key areas. First, we summarize trends
63 reflecting important changes in ethno-racial atti-
64 tudes. Next, we briefly review major contempo-
65 rary theoretical approaches in the social psychol-
66 ogy of racial prejudice, including a theory captur-
67 ing the current tenor and behavioral implications
68 of modern ethno-racial attitudes, labeled aversive
69 racism. Lastly, we address how ethno-racial atti-
70 tudes affect processes of labor market inequality,
71 residential segregation, and politics and public
72 policy.

73 **Changing Ethno-Racial Attitudes**

74 Sociologists have systematically studied change
75 in ethno-racial attitudes since at least the 1950s
76 (Hyman and Sheatsley 1956). Critical baseline
77 surveys were conducted in the early 1940s and
78 then replicated in subsequent national surveys.
79 University of Chicago scholars famously report-
80 ed these studies in a series of *Scientific American*
81 articles (Garth et al. 1978; Greeley and Sheatsley
82 1971; Hyman and Sheatsley 1964, 1956). A more
83 expansive review and integration of available
84 sources was undertaken by Howard Schuman
85 and colleagues in the book, *Racial Attitudes in*
86 *America: Trends and Interpretations* (Schuman
87 et al. 1985) and later broadened conceptually and
88 extensively updated (Schuman et al. 1997).

89 Most of this work has focused on the attitudes
90 of white Americans towards blacks. One recent
91 extensive summary of the General Social Survey
92 stressed the following key patterns (Bobo et al.
93 2012). First, surveys point to a large positive nor-
94 mative transformation in ethno-racial attitudes.
95 Since the 1970s, white attitudes have shown a
96 clear and steady decline in support for school
97 segregation, the right to segregate neighbor-
98 hoods, laws allowing homeowner discrimination
99 in selling a house, and laws banning interracial
100 marriage.

101 Second, whites prefer to maintain their social
102 distance from non-white minorities. While white
103 support for school segregation has assuredly decl-
104 ined, white respondents' objection to sending
105 their children to a school with black children
106 increases as the proportion of blacks increases.
107 As will be discussed in greater depth later, white
108 attitude towards residential segregation parallels
109 these school segregation findings. As a third mea-
110 sure of social distance, while white opposition to
111 interracial marriage has declined overall, whites
112 still prefer Hispanic/Asian marriage partners for
113 one of their family members and in 2008, about
114 one-fourth of whites surveyed were still opposed
115 or strongly opposed to a family member marry-
116 ing a black person.

117 Third, white support for inequality amelior-
118 ating policies and government intervention is
119 limited and has remained so for decades. White
120 attitude regarding the denial of government's
121 special obligation to improve blacks' living stan-
122 dard after such lengthy discrimination has hov-
123 ered between 50 and 60% from the mid-1970s
124 through 2008. Forty percent of whites in 1990
125 felt it was somewhat likely that affirmative ac-
126 tion would hurt whites' job or promotion pros-
127 pects, a perspective that half of whites expressed
128 in 2008. However, while income-targeted policy
129 interventions are more popular than race-targeted
130 ones, substantial percentages of whites still sup-
131 ported black-targeted programs such as early
132 childhood education and college scholarships.
133 Approximately 90% of whites opposed preferen-
134 tial hiring or promotion for blacks, a percentage
135 that has not budged since 1994 when the question
136 was first asked.

137 Fourth, racial stereotypes have become less
138 categorical and more gradational, departing from
139 earlier assumptions of absolute biological differ-
140 ences towards more qualified, group-based com-
141 parisons on stereotypical traits. The belief that
142 blacks are inherently less intelligent than whites
143 has declined. While 40% of whites in 2008 be-
144 lieved that blacks tend to be lazier than whites,
145 this percentage has dropped from over 60% in
146 1990. More whites express belief in blacks' re-
147 lative lack of industriousness than the belief that
148 blacks tend to be less intelligent. Relatedly, ex-

149 planations for black-white socioeconomic in- 196
 150 equality have also shifted towards more cultural- 197
 151 ly rooted attributions (i.e., need to work harder), 198
 152 rather than the belief that blacks have less inborn 199
 153 ability. Lack of motivation or willpower has been 200
 154 either the first or second preferred rationale for 201
 155 black-white socioeconomic inequality since 202
 156 1977, compared to lack of education (which sur- 203
 157 passed motivation in the early 1990s), inborn 204
 158 ability or discrimination. 205

159 We should note it is important not to infer 206
 160 from these results that biological thinking has 207
 161 disappeared from how white Americans think 208
 162 about race more broadly. Sociologist Ann Morn- 209
 163 ing has rightly cautioned that processes of “racial 210
 164 conceptualization”—how people frame the very 211
 165 notion of race itself—continues to exhibit strong 212
 166 biological overtones. These overtones are rein- 213
 167 forced by some trends in science, particularly the 214
 168 limited spread of the constructivist view of race 215
 169 endorsed in the social sciences and perhaps more 216
 170 importantly the growth of genomic science in bi- 217
 171 ology and related fields (Morning 2011; Phelan 218
 172 et al. 2013). 219

173 Finally, the emotional aspects of whites’ in- 220
 174 terracial attitudes are important to recognize. 221
 175 Whites continue to hold African Americans at an 222
 176 emotional distance. Less than 10% of whites felt 223
 177 both admiration and sympathy for blacks in 1994, 224
 178 while over 70% of whites felt closer to whites 225
 179 than blacks in 2008, up from just under 60% in 226
 180 1996. Moreover, whites view blacks as undeserv- 227
 181 ing of “special treatment,” reflecting a collective 228
 182 racial resentment towards African Americans 229
 183 (see section on Racial Resentment). Over 75% of 230
 184 white Americans since 1994 through 2008 agree 231
 185 that blacks should work their way up without 232
 186 special favors. 233

187 African American attitudes have changed as 234
 188 well, as three patterns have emerged. First, black 235
 189 explanations for racial inequality are less likely 236
 190 to refer to structural or discrimination-based fac- 237
 191 tors, declining from over three-quarters of blacks 238
 192 in the late 1980s to about 60% by 2008. Second, 239
 193 such explanations increasingly reflect motiva- 240
 194 tional and cultural justifications with 44% of 241
 195 blacks offering lack of motivation as the reason

196 for black-white socioeconomic inequality. Final- 197
 198 ly, black support for some types of government 199
 200 intervention has declined. Since 1994 when less 201
 202 than 40% of blacks opposed preferential hiring 203
 204 and promotion for blacks, recent survey data 205
 206 indicates that a majority of blacks (~55%) oppose 207
 208 such preferences. 209

210 Finally, racial apathy appears to be on the rise 211
 212 (Forman 2004). In 1976, one out of ten young 213
 214 whites expressed no concern that minorities may 215
 216 get unfair treatment, which almost doubles to 217
 218 18% by 2000. Surveys of white adults also ap- 219
 220 pear to express racial apathy. Compared to either 221
 222 support or opposition, national survey data 223
 224 indicates an increase in the percentage of white 225
 226 respondents from 1964 to the mid-1990s and 227
 228 2000 who expressed “no interest” in federal in- 229
 230 tervention for fair treatment in jobs, federal in- 231
 232 tervention for school desegregation, and govern- 233
 234 ment support for the right of black people to go 234
 235 to any restaurant or hotel they can afford. These 235
 236 changing attitudes, along with the tripling in per- 237
 238 centage of respondents, from 5% (1977) to 15% 238
 239 (2004), who reject all four justifications (moti- 239
 240 vational, educational, in-born ability, discrimina- 240
 241 tion) for black-white socioeconomic inequality 241
 242 (Hunt 2007), seem to suggest that a substantial 242
 243 proportion of the white population is indifferent 243
 244 to the challenges facing African Americans (see 244
 245 also Forman and Lewis (2006)). 245

246 A full accounting of ethno-racial attitudes 246
 247 across a range of topics, from general racial prin- 247
 248 ciples, feelings of social distance, perceptions 248
 249 about government, policy, and racial inequality, 249
 250 to perceived group traits and the emotions that 250
 251 groups trigger, gives sociologists traction for 251
 252 interpreting and predicting behaviors and social 252
 253 interactions. As social psychologists studying so- 253
 254 cial inequality, these attitudes are of paramount 254
 255 importance, as they represent effects, indicators, 255
 256 and crucial components of a long-standing object 256
 257 of social psychological inquiry: racial prejudice. 257
 258 We describe some of the leading contemporary 258
 259 approaches to prejudice in the next section after 259
 260 first detailing conceptual foundations for *preju-* 260
 261 *dice*, *stereotypes*, and *racism*. 261

242 Theories of Prejudice

243 Among social psychologists and other social sci- 289
 244 entists, Gordon Allport's definition of *prejudice* 290
 245 is perhaps best known: "Ethnic prejudice is an 291
 246 antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible gen- 292
 247 eralization" (Allport 1954[1979], p. 9). There are 293
 248 two important components of this definition: an 294
 249 affective or feeling component and a cognitive 295
 250 component (Pettigrew 1980). 296

251 Emotional hostility is a central element of 297
 252 classical notions of prejudice. The negative affect 298
 253 can include aggression, disdain, fear, resentment, 299
 254 distrust, a lack of sympathy, and anger, as well 300
 255 as coldness typically measured by feeling ther- 301
 256 mometers in psychological studies. Historians of 302
 257 racial discrimination have noted the importance 303
 258 of this racial animus: "Prejudice can be defined 304
 259 as an attitude of generalized hostility or aggres- 305
 260 sion against a group of human beings who are 306
 261 thought to have some undesirable characteristics 307
 262 in common. It manifests itself in such ethnic ste- 308
 263 reotypes as the lazy Negro, the drunken Indian, 309
 264 the unscrupulous Jew, or the unruly Irishman" 310
 265 (Fredrickson and Knobel 1980, pp. 30–31). 311

266 The cognitive component can involve stereo- 312
 267 types, or "cognitive structures that contain the 313
 268 perceiver's knowledge, beliefs, and expectations 314
 269 about a human group" (Hamilton and Troler 315
 270 1986, p. 133). Persons acquire, process, and se- 316
 271 lectively organize information into larger cate- 317
 272 gories to help them anticipate, make sense of, and 318
 273 react to a world full of stimuli. This process often 319
 274 involves oversimplifications in light of limited 320
 275 cognitive resources. Stereotypes thus act as cog- 321
 276 nitive shortcuts, allowing individuals to expect 322
 277 likely characteristics or behaviors of a person cat- 323
 278 egorized as a member of a larger group, based on 324
 279 average information associated with that group. 325
 280 Social scientists today consider stereotypes as 326
 281 basic features of human cognition, without nec- 327
 282 essarily carrying any negative connotations. 328

283 Prejudice scholars argue that stereotypes be- 329
 284 come problematic when such perceptions, par- 330
 285 ticularly negative ones, are inaccurate due in part 331
 286 to overgeneralizations; if they become resistant 332
 287 to new information; or are applied in a categori- 333
 288 cal manner (Katz 1991). Thus, sociologists have

stated: "Prejudice refers to the attitudinal dimen- 289
 sion of intergroup relations, to the process of 290
 stereotyping and aversion that may persist even 291
 in the face of countervailing evidence" (See and 292
 Wilson 1988, p. 227). 293

Specifying the individual-level operations of 294
 prejudice allows us to arrive at a conceptual de- 295
 lineation between *prejudice* and *racism*. *Racism* 296
 involves supra-individual cultural and societal 297
 factors, as the following sociological view on 298
 racism stresses: "Racism is a more complex be- 299
 lief system [than prejudice] that prescribes and 300
 legitimates a minority group's or an out-groups 301
 subordination by claiming that the group is either 302
 biogenetically or culturally inferior... there are 303
 two components to racism that are not present in 304
 prejudice: an ideology that justifies social avoid- 305
 ance and domination by reference to the 'unal- 306
 terable' characteristics of particular groups and a 307
 set of norms that prescribes differential treatment 308
 for these groups. Whereas prejudice is an attitude 309
 held by an individual, racism is an ideology of 310
 exploitation and is therefore equated with a so- 311
 ciety's culture" (See and Wilson 1988, p. 227). 312
 Such a definition allows sociologists to avoid 313
 hazardous, casual and stigmatizing applications 314
 of the term, as well as avoid using the term *rac-* 315
ism or *racist* solely to describe individual-level 316
 antipathies. This definition affords scholars 317
 greater conceptual clarity as it pertains to distinct 318
 levels of analysis. (See also Hunt, this volume.) 319

Having already catalogued changes in racial 320
 attitudes leading up to more recent times, includ- 321
 ing stereotypes and affect as key components of 322
 prejudice, we now turn to contemporary formu- 323
 lations of racial prejudice, beginning with socio- 324
 cultural models. 325

Sociocultural Models 326

In many respects the core way of thinking about 327
 ethno-racial attitudes, the sociocultural approach 328
 to prejudice acquisition emphasizes social learn- 329
 ing. It achieved its most influential elaboration 330
 in the work of Allport (Allport 1954[1979]) and 331
 later interpreters (Katz 1991; Pettigrew 1980). 332
 Individuals develop attitudes towards ethno-ra- 333

334 cial groups as they are socialized to adopt or con- 374
 335 form to the values of a particular cultural context 375
 336 through family, peers, schools, religion, media, 376
 337 etc. They may also have direct contact with 377
 338 members of particular racial or ethnic groups, 378
 339 who then serve as an initial source of informa- 379
 340 tion. From the sociocultural perspective, if age 380
 341 (cohort), education, and region of origin affect 381
 342 prejudice it is because they indicate the particu- 382
 343 lar historical (e.g., pre-Civil Rights) and cultur- 383
 344 al context within which an individual has been 384
 345 socialized. This sociocultural mechanism is an 385
 346 important distinction from, for instance, a social 386
 347 structural approach that might situate prejudice 387
 348 development in the arrangement of group status- 388
 349 es and perceived competition for resources (see 389
 350 section on Group Position Theory), or a person- 390
 351 ality model that focuses on either authoritarian 391
 352 proclivities, of either the earlier Freudian variety 392
 353 (Adorno et al. 1950) or more recent non-Freudian 393
 354 sort (Altemeyer 1998), or an individual orienta- 394
 355 tion to group dominance (Sidanius and Pratto 395
 356 1999). We review two sociocultural models here: 396
 357 racial resentment and aversive racism. 397

358 **Racial Resentment**

359 The sociocultural model most familiar to soci- 398
 360 ologists is the theory of symbolic racism (Sears 399
 361 1988), also referred to in the ethno-racial atti- 400
 362 tudes literature as modern racism (McConahay 401
 363 1982) and racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 402
 364 1996), the last stated less provocatively and with 403
 365 greater theoretical and conceptual precision.¹ Racial 404
 366 resentment theory first arose as an attempt 405
 367 to understand seemingly paradoxical trends in 406
 368 white public opinion in the United States. White 407
 369 ethno-racial attitudes since the early 1960s had 408
 370 notably and extensively improved, indicat- 409
 371 ing that whites were progressively embracing 410
 372 the principles of racial equality and integration 411
 373 across a variety of domains: education, neigh-

borhoods, employment, and interracial marriage. 374
 Old-fashioned or Jim Crow racism, characterized 375
 by beliefs in blacks' biological inferiority, inter- 376
 racial social distance, and support for legal dis- 377
 crimination and segregation, was on the decline. 378
 Contemporaneously, white support for many 379
 programs and policies to address extant racial in- 380
 equalities (e.g., affirmative action, school busing, 381
 etc.) stagnated or declined, indicating a gap be- 382
 tween what whites supported in principle and the 383
 policies they endorsed to realize such egalitarian 384
 value commitments. Though some pockets of 385
 white America still espoused old-fashioned racist 386
 attitudes, scholars argued that a new, "symbolic" 387
 racism had arisen and become more politically 388
 influential than the older Jim Crow variety. 389

Racial resentment scholars argued that this 390
 new racism involved a blend of anti-black affect 391
 and the belief that blacks violate traditional 392
 American values such as hard work, individual- 393
 ism, self-reliance, obedience, discipline, punctu- 394
 ality, and delayed gratification (Kinder and Sears 395
 1981; Sears 1988; Sears et al. 1979). Racial re- 396
 sentment was seen as independent of realistic 397
 threat or self-interest; one might be opposed to 398
 particular attitudinal objects (e.g., affirmative 399
 action, Harlem, a black political candidate, etc.) 400
 that symbolized the groups (e.g., blacks) who in- 401
 voked negative emotions developed through pre- 402
 adult socialization, even if one was not in a situ- 403
 ation where such attitudinal objects posed a risk. 404
 The "symbol" in symbolic racism also denoted 405
 its antagonistic basis in perceived violations of 406
 abstract moral values. In sum, individually lo- 407
 cated, socialized prejudice could intrude into po- 408
 litical contests and contestations and produce real 409
 political outcomes. 410

Racial resentment scholars reinvigorated 411
 research on new forms of negative ethno-racial 412
 attitudes. Their work was critical in identifying key 413
 elements of contemporary discourse on race and 414
 politics: resentment to perceived special favors 415
 to minorities, resentment to demands being made 416
 by minorities, and the denial that racial discrimi- 417
 nation remained influential well into the post- 418
 Civil Rights era. Recent studies have expanded 419
 the application of racial resentment theory to 420
 understand presidential candidate choice, voter 421

¹ "Racial resentment" as a concept/theory label is more concrete, closer to the face validity content of what the measures tap, and lack the intrinsic vagueness and controversy aroused by the "symbolic racism" label; see also discussion of collective racial resentments (Bobo et al. 2012, pp. 65–70).

422 turnout, health care policy, and crime-related attitudes (see review in Racialized Politics section
423 below). Given the range of outcomes to which it
424 is related, scholars expect it will likely continue
425 to shed light on the social psychology of racial
426 inequality for years to come (Tuch and Hughes
427 2011).
428

429 **Aversive Racism**

430 Aversive racism theory represents another so-
431 ciocultural approach to the principle-implemen-
432 tation gap that situates whites within a conflict
433 between open endorsements of racial egalitarian-
434 ism on the one hand and black antipathy on the
435 other, the latter existing often implicitly or at an
436 unconscious level (see section on Implicit Atti-
437 tudes and Bias below). Theorists of aversive rac-
438 ism argue that the affective component of these
439 negative attitudes can be characterized as avoid-
440 ance rather than open hostility, centered around
441 “discomfort, anxiety, or fear” rather than “hotter”
442 reactions (Pearson et al. 2009, p. 317). As with
443 other sociocultural approaches, negative atti-
444 tudes towards blacks are thought to be a product
445 of socialization. According to the theory, despite
446 antipathy toward blacks, aversive racists desire
447 to uphold their non-prejudiced self-conception.
448 Thus, in contrast to other racists, aversive rac-
449 ists may discriminate in some instances and may
450 not do so in others because of their conflicting
451 impulses. Specifically, they are more likely to
452 engage in discriminatory behavior when racially
453 egalitarian normative expectations are ambigu-
454 ous or plausible non-racial justifications for be-
455 havior are readily available.

456 Researchers primarily employ experimental
457 methods to more precisely specify and test the
458 theoretical conditions necessary for discrimina-
459 tion to occur. Using samples of white college
460 students, experimenters documented the influ-
461 ence of aversive racism on hypothetical selection
462 decisions involving employment (Dovidio and
463 Gaertner 2000) and college admissions (Hodson
464 et al. 2002). In each scenario, participants did
465 not discriminate against the black applicant with
466 strong qualifications. However, when candidates
467 possessed ambiguous qualifications, the white
468 participants recommended the white candidate

469 for employment significantly more often than
470 the black candidate. Similarly, highly prejudiced
471 white participants, as measured by Brigham’s At-
472 titudes Towards Blacks scale (Brigham 1993),
473 recommended the white candidate for college
474 admission more often than the black candidate.
475 Moving beyond the black-white binary, aversive
476 racists in Canada similarly discriminated against
477 Asian candidates for employment compared to a
478 white applicant, pointing to the generalizability
479 of aversive racism beyond the U.S. national con-
480 text (Son Hing et al. 2008).

481 Subsequent studies have also documented
482 aversive racism’s impact on jury decision-mak-
483 ing in a legal context (Pearson et al. 2007). Aversive
484 racism researchers in a laboratory setting
485 found that explicit prejudice was linked to white
486 participants’ assessment of a black defendant’s
487 guilt in hypothetical robbery, assault, and murder
488 cases (Dovidio et al. 1997). In a later study, Pear-
489 son et al. (2007) not only confirmed the influen-
490 tial role played by prejudice in white attitudes
491 towards crime punishment, they also uncovered
492 the subtle ways in which prejudice affected puni-
493 tive attitudes under one context but not another.
494 White endorsement for a more severe penalty
495 was related to their levels of explicit prejudice
496 towards blacks when given a non-racial justifi-
497 cation for harsher punishment, consistent with
498 aversive racism’s predictions. Yet in the absence
499 of a non-racial justification to draw upon, white
500 participants’ prescribed length of prison sentence
501 was not directly related to anti-black prejudice.
502 Racial prejudice did indeed matter for whites’
503 support for punitive responses to crime, but some
504 whites required recourse to a non-racial rationale
505 for such attitudes to prove consequential. These
506 findings may help us understand the high rates of
507 black male incarceration in the United States—
508 so high that some now argue that imprisonment
509 represents a new stage in the life course of young
510 low-skilled black males (Pettit and Western 2004;
511 Western 2007). The punitive tenor of criminal
512 justice policies, linked explicitly to racial preju-
513 dice (Bobo and Johnson 2004), has contributed to
514 the black male prison boom.

515 One clear advantage of the aversive racism
516 framework lies in its ability to propose interven-

tions. The largely experimental approach to specifying the psychological (cognitive and affective) and social (contextual) mechanisms through which aversive racism operates provides clues about how one might disrupt the attitude to behavior pathway. One proposed intervention lies in drawing upon the cognitive implications of in-group/out-group identification to propose a common, superordinate in-group identity that reduces bias between groups (Dovidio et al. 2004; Gaertner et al. 1993, 1996; West et al. 2009a). Activating a common in-group identity that linked white participants to “all citizens of the United States, regardless of race, religion or status” led to an increase in feelings of injustice after watching a video clip about anti-black racial bias (Dovidio et al. 2004). These feelings in turn mediated a decrease in prejudice towards blacks and other ethno-racial minorities (Latin Americans and Asian Americans). In a study conducted among college roommates, students who perceived a high level of commonality with their cross-race roommate experienced no significant decline in their friendship over time, compared to the significant declines in friendship expressed by cross-race roommates who perceived a low level of commonality between them (West et al. 2009a).

While the identification of possible interventions is a welcome development, are such interventions likely to have a strong and lasting impact on larger patterns of social inequality? From a sociological standpoint, the prospects look mixed. The lessons from aversive racism point to the possibility of positive change at the level of micro, social interactions. A decrease in racial bias in selection and other decision-making processes by egalitarian-minded individuals would no doubt represent some narrowing of the racial gap in the domains of employment, education, and criminal justice. They might also reduce biases in access to housing, credit, and some consumer goods.

Challenging social inequality in various institutional domains will also require significant macro-level responses, the likelihood of which still remains tied to the social psychological dynamics of ethno-racial attitudes and racialized politics (Sears et al. 2000). A crucial consider-

ation in these dynamics is that prejudice is entrenched and developed *within* the competitive structure of U.S. politics itself, rooted in part in ethno-racial group competition and a sense of group position (Bobo and Tuan 2006). This theoretical distinction is an important one, as it departs from sociocultural perspectives that view prejudice as *exogenous* to politics and the social organization of group statuses, power, and interests. A clearer understanding of the operations of ethno-racial group threat is the topic to which we now turn.

Social Structure Model: Group Position Theory

In general, sociologists have favored accounts of group relations and ethno-racial attitudes that recognize how durable group inequalities also create group interests that then align with socially constructed groups and identities. This tradition received very influential articulation in the work of Herbert Blumer and subsequent interpreters (Wellman 1977; Bobo 1999; Bobo and Tuan 2006)

Taking direct aim at theories that located racial prejudice inside individuals by focusing on individuals’ feelings, Blumer proposed an alternative, sociologically-centered theory of racial prejudice in his now classic essay on “race prejudice as a sense of group position” (Blumer 1958). Blumer argued that racial prejudice was fundamentally about racial group relations, and must be understood in the collective process through which racial groups define themselves and other racial groups in relation to each other. The sense of group position involves an idea about the appropriate relative status between groups, but is not limited solely to such a vertical positioning, as it can entail boundaries of inclusion/exclusion.

Among members of the dominant group, race prejudice can be characterized by four feelings. First, there is a feeling of group superiority. Second, there is a feeling that a subordinate group is inherently different, which serves as the basis for attempts to exclude the subordinate other. Third, racial prejudice involves a feeling of entitlement,

610 or proprietary claim to resources, opportunities,
611 authority, and prestige. Fourth, members of the
612 dominant group feel threatened by the belief that
613 a subordinate group wishes to encroach on those
614 entitlements. This last makes group position
615 theory, in part, a theory about perceived group
616 interests and threat.

617 Crucially, against sociologists and others who
618 might reduce the sense of group position to ob-
619 jective relations or positions between groups,
620 Blumer highlights both the subjective and nor-
621 mative dimensions of the sense of group posi-
622 tion: “it stands for “what ought to be” rather than
623 for “what is.” It is a sense of where the two ra-
624 cial groups *belong*” (1958, p. 5, emphasis origi-
625 nal). As a collective sense, individual members
626 of the dominant group will have to wrestle with
627 the group’s sense of dominant position if the in-
628 dividual wishes to behave contrary to that sense,
629 facing possible sanction in the exercise of indi-
630 vidual agency. That is because the sense of group
631 position originates not within individuals but is
632 collectively held.

633 Lastly, Blumer emphasizes that the sense of
634 group position is a historical product. It is shaped
635 by the structure of opportunities, the size of pop-
636 ulations, the distribution of knowledge and skills,
637 and the behaviors and communications between
638 key figures and group leaders. As these and other
639 social factors shift, so too does the sense of group
640 position, again marking this sociological theory’s
641 distinctiveness from theoretical approaches that
642 depict racial prejudice as an individual-level
643 factor.

644 Blumer’s sociological social psychological ap-
645 proach to racial prejudice provided a new lens to
646 view questions about the paradox in white public
647 opinion: rising commitment to racial equality and
648 integration, stagnant or declining support for so-
649 cial programs and policies to redress inequality.
650 Drawing on Blumer’s insights, Bobo analyzed at-
651 titudes towards school busing and employed the
652 same measures previously used by racial resent-
653 ment researchers (Bobo 1983). However, Bobo
654 recognized that the racial resentment measures
655 involved collective dimensions of group conflict,
656 which problematized racial resentment theory’s
657 assertion that such attitudes reflected simply in-

658 dividuals’ socialized negative affect devoid of
659 group interest-based concerns. Bobo discovered
660 that the racial resentment measures loaded on
661 multiple latent factors, one of which could eas-
662 ily be discerned as reflecting a “civil rights push”
663 or “black political push,” dimensions that evoked
664 Blumer’s perceived group interests and conflict.
665 These perceived group conflict factors, previous-
666 ly aggregated along with other factors in a “racial
667 intolerance” scale representing symbolic politics
668 in earlier research (Sears et al. 1979), predicted
669 white opposition to school busing. Resentments
670 expressed and captured by racial resentment and
671 symbolic politics researchers were not simply at-
672 omistic feelings of animosity; they were also po-
673 litical appraisals about which groups should have
674 entitled claim and access to scarce and desired
675 status, rewards, and opportunities as Blumer had
676 claimed.

677 Bobo argued that Blumer’s group position
678 theory provided a more powerful and compre-
679 hensive framework for the study of racial preju-
680 dice (Bobo 1999). Blumer had articulated an ex-
681 pansive theory, one capable of explaining affect/
682 emotions previously the province of individual-
683 oriented prejudice approaches, while simultane-
684 ously remaining attuned to both social structure
685 and identity-based processes. Furthermore, soci-
686 ologists could now also draw on the importance
687 of history to articulate a sense of group posi-
688 tion that could account for not only the sense of
689 group position among dominant group members
690 but also a sense of racial alienation among sub-
691 ordinate group members (Bobo 1999; Bobo and
692 Hutchings 1996). This attention to the historical-
693 ly variant experiences across dominant group and
694 subordinate group members also allows space for
695 the recognition that ethno-racial groups might
696 explain racial inequality using different attribu-
697 tions (Hunt 2007), differences based on group-
698 specific historical experiences with societal dis-
699 crimination and institutional discrimination (Fox
700 2012; Fox and Guglielmo 2012).

701 Group position theory’s emphasis on per-
702 ceived group threat also helped identify impor-
703 tant variations in both support for principles of
704 racial equality/integration and opposition to so-
705 cial programs and policies. If perceived group

706 threats were important, one would expect greater
 707 support for compensatory programs/policies that
 708 promote opportunity over preferential policies
 709 perceived to impinge upon group interests, a hy-
 710 pothesis confirmed by public opinion data (Bobo
 711 2001; Bobo and Kluegel 1993). Thus, the lack-
 712 daisical support previously found on the imple-
 713 mentation side of white ethno-racial attitudes
 714 may actually hide greater openness to particular
 715 opportunity-enhancing policies and programs:
 716 both a more hopeful and empirically-verifiable
 717 conclusion.

718 With Blumer's group position theory, the so-
 719 cial scientific attention to realistic group conflict,
 720 group numbers, and group threat also took on
 721 greater complexity (Bobo 1999). First, a fully
 722 elaborated group position theory recognized that
 723 not only did objective factors, such as the mea-
 724 sured size of an out-group population, matter but
 725 subjective or perceived size and threat mattered
 726 as well. Second, the economic resources of a
 727 group mattered; subordinate groups with greater
 728 resources but lower numbers such as Asians may
 729 be perceived as more threatening. Third, social
 730 domain mattered; whites perceived lower levels
 731 of threat from blacks over housing. Finally, his-
 732 tory and intensity of conflict mattered; blacks
 733 perceived Asians as greater threats than Latinos,
 734 despite larger numbers of Latinos in the popula-
 735 tion. More recent studies on group size and group
 736 threat incorporated insights about subjective per-
 737 ceptions of group size and ethno-racial group dif-
 738 ferences in a multiethnic social context, a litera-
 739 ture we review next.

740 **Group Size and Group Threat**

741 While the last decade of the twentieth century
 742 produced important studies capturing the impact
 743 of group size and group threat on ethno-racial at-
 744 titudes and inequality (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989;
 745 Quillian 1995, 1996; Taylor 1998), the first de-
 746 cade of the twenty first century generated addi-
 747 tional studies that are critical for a number of rea-
 748 sons. First, we believe that despite signs of rela-
 749 tively slow black population growth in the years
 750 ahead, the "black image in the white mind," bor-
 751 rowing from the late historian George Fredrick-
 752 son, still holds a special place in the social psy-

753 chology of social inequality (Fredrickson 1971).
 754 US Census projections predict that the black
 755 population nationwide is unlikely to exceed 13 %
 756 by 2050, making earlier studies on group size
 757 focused almost exclusively on the black-white
 758 divide seem less relevant (Ortman and Guarneri
 759 2009). However, while black population shares
 760 may remain stable at the national level, local
 761 black population shares are expected to fluctu-
 762 ate greatly. Demographers have identified sub-
 763 stantial migration within the United States that
 764 is significantly altering black population per-
 765 centages at the metropolitan level, with Atlanta,
 766 Dallas, and Houston undergoing the largest gains
 767 between 2000 and 2010 (Frey 2011). Second, the
 768 projected share of non-white groups is growing
 769 and will continue to grow considerably, serving
 770 as a new source of perceived and realistic group
 771 threat. By 2050, Hispanics are projected to com-
 772 prise 30 % of the U.S. population, up from 16 %
 773 in 2010. The Asian population will approach
 774 8 % in 2050 from less than 5 % in 2010. The in-
 775 fant population in the United States has already
 776 passed a demographic tipping point, with the ma-
 777 jority of the U.S. population aged 1 or younger
 778 now hailing from non-white ethno-racial groups
 779 (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). In light of these sig-
 780 nificant demographic changes that will one day
 781 supplant the non-Hispanic white population as
 782 the numerical majority in the United States, it is
 783 worthwhile to reflect upon advances in the study
 784 of group size and threat produced over the last
 785 decade to anticipate how some might react to
 786 these demographic changes.

787 Over the last decade, research on group size
 788 and group threat have largely focused on two
 789 general themes. First, scholars have tried to tease
 790 out the relationship between perceptions of group
 791 size and objective group size. Various individual
 792 and structural factors were taken into account to
 793 explain discrepancies between the actual size of
 794 ethno-racial groups compared to their perceived
 795 size, with white population numbers typically
 796 under-estimated and non-white populations over-
 797 estimated. Relatedly, social scientists also sought
 798 to identify the reference points or boundaries
 799 (e.g., neighborhood, metropolitan area, county,
 800 nation, etc.) that informed perceptions about

801 group size. Second, investigators proposed and
802 assessed alternative explanations for racialized
803 group and policy attitudes that had previously
804 been accounted for by a group threat framework.
805 Among the approaches considered were addi-
806 tional contextual features besides group size, and
807 contact theory.

808 A first thematic set of studies sought to clarify
809 ambiguity in, and explain the disjuncture between,
810 people's perceptions of the size of particular eth-
811 no-racial groups and the actual size of these pop-
812 ulations. Glaser (2003) argued that prior studies
813 on group threat did not clearly set the boundaries
814 within which people were expected to consider:
815 first, the size of group populations, and second,
816 the rewards or opportunities affected by group
817 size. To more clearly delineate these boundar-
818 ies, Glaser employed survey-based experiments
819 that measured white opposition to proportional
820 apportionment of congressional representatives
821 based on indicated state proportions of blacks,
822 and proportional allotment of city government
823 jobs and city minority set-aside contracts based
824 on indicated black proportions at the city level.
825 Gallagher (2003) used qualitative methods (focus
826 groups, interviews, and open-ended surveys) to
827 identify whites' explanations for their racial in-
828 numeracy, or the numerical misperception of eth-
829 no-racial group size relative to actual group size.
830 Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz (2005) argued for
831 an analytical distinction between what they de-
832 fine as "innumeracy" (limitation in the ability to
833 translate a perception into numerical terms) and
834 the perception of group size itself. They circum-
835 vented challenges related to innumeracy by using
836 a ratio of estimated black and Hispanic popula-
837 tions to the estimated white population as a better
838 indicator of perceived ethno-racial group sizes
839 and perceived threat, rather than estimations of
840 absolute numerical group sizes alone. Finally,
841 Wong (2007) explored the linkages between per-
842 ceived and actual local ethno-racial group sizes
843 on the one hand and perceived national group
844 sizes on the other. Wong found that perceptions
845 of local group size are better predictors of indi-
846 viduals' estimations of national group sizes than
847 actual local group sizes.

848 Results from this first thematic set of studies
849 have implications for the social psychology of
850 group threat and its relationship to social inequal-
851 ity. Glaser (2003) found that setting boundaries
852 and specifying group sizes confirm earlier re-
853 search on the effects of group threat. Increases in
854 the black share of a state's population decreased
855 the percentage of non-black respondents support-
856 ing the redrawing of district lines to guarantee
857 racially proportional apportionment of congress-
858 sional seats. Similarly, experimentally increasing
859 the black share of a city's population decreased
860 the percentage of non-blacks supporting racially
861 proportional apportionment of city government
862 jobs. Glaser also found that white opposition
863 is not entrenched solely in in-group/out-group
864 distinctions, as the percentage of respondents
865 supportive of proportional allotments in con-
866 gressional seats was substantially smaller when
867 proportions are based upon racial distinctions
868 (i.e., black population) rather than geographic
869 ones (i.e., rural population). Moreover, percent-
870 age of support did not vary significantly as a
871 function of the percentage of the rural population
872 specified on the survey ballots. Gallagher (2003)
873 found that whites over-estimate the number of
874 blacks because of perceived over-representation
875 of blacks in the media (e.g., news coverage of
876 crime, and sports broadcasts), perceived exces-
877 sive black political demands, and Census reports
878 about the decreasing proportion of whites in the
879 U.S. population. Gallagher proposed that whites
880 might equate larger nonwhite population sizes
881 with unobstructed access to resources, obviat-
882 ing calls for the amelioration of racial inequality.
883 Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz (2005) found that
884 their ratio-based measure of perceived threat was
885 positively related to whites' restrictive positions
886 on immigration, stereotypical views of blacks
887 and Hispanics as violent, and beliefs that blacks
888 shouldn't push too hard and that whites are hurt
889 by affirmative action. Lastly, Wong (2007) sug-
890 gested that because perceptions of local ethno-
891 racial group sizes predict estimations of national
892 ethno-racial group sizes more than actual local
893 group sizes themselves, thereby foregrounding
894 social psychological processes, the influence of
895 perceptions of local group size may trump the in-

896 fluence of actual group size on outcomes such as
897 racial or political attitudes as well.

898 A second set of studies sought to propose and
899 test alternative explanations for ethno-racial at-
900 titudes that had previously been tied to group
901 threat. Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) tested the
902 group threat hypothesis using contextual mea-
903 sures such as objective group threat (measured
904 as % black at zip code and metropolitan levels)
905 against neighborhood socioeconomic status
906 (measured as % college educated at the zip code
907 level). They found support for the effect of ob-
908 jective contextual racial threat on white attitudes
909 toward neighborhood integration and federal
910 government intervention on behalf of black em-
911 ployment, but not university affirmative action.
912 However, they found no support for the effect of
913 objective contextual threat on white racial dispo-
914 sitions (racial resentment, negative stereotypes,
915 anti-Semitism, and authoritarianism), while
916 finding consistent effects of neighborhood edu-
917 cational status on these dispositions, qualifying
918 the explanatory reach of objective threat. Dixon
919 and Rosenbaum (2004) and Dixon (2006) tack-
920 led the problem of resolving the ambiguous ef-
921 fect of proximity to ethno-racial out-groups on
922 negative group stereotypes, i.e., did proximity
923 facilitate the positive influence of contact or the
924 negative influence of group threat? Using mul-
925 tilevel models, they found that objective group
926 threat (% black) was positively related to whites'
927 anti-black stereotypes but % Hispanic had no
928 relationship to anti-Hispanic stereotypes (Dixon
929 and Rosenbaum 2004). They also found that con-
930 tacts with blacks in schools and workplaces were
931 related to decreases in whites' anti-black stereo-
932 types, while similar decreases in anti-Hispanic
933 stereotypes were associated with Hispanic con-
934 tact in communities, and to a lesser extent, also
935 in schools. In a similar study, Dixon (2006) con-
936 firmed the effects of % black on anti-black ste-
937 reotypes, but found an opposite effect of % Asian
938 on anti-Asian stereotypes. Dixon also discovered
939 that knowing and feeling close to a black, His-
940 panic, or Asian was associated with decreases in
941 negative stereotypes for each group respectively.
942 Contrary to suggestions by Wong (2007), whites'
943 estimations of black, Hispanic, or Asian group

944 size at the local level were unrelated to their at-
945 tendant group's stereotypes.

946 The social psychological implications of this
947 second set of studies on group threat, ethno-racial
948 attitudes and social inequality are mixed. While
949 Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) reported that
950 some of their findings contradict the "material"
951 (or objective) threat hypothesis, their analysis did
952 not evaluate perceived group threat. Their mea-
953 sure of "symbolic racism" contained items that
954 could tap into a dimension of perceived group
955 threat, including an item about attitudes towards
956 "spokesmen for minorities who are complaining
957 that blacks are being discriminated against." This
958 item resembled an item used to operationalize
959 perceived group threat in an earlier study assess-
960 ing the relationship between racial resentment
961 and white opposition to busing (Bobo 1983).
962 Since their racism scale was consistently sig-
963 nificant across models predicting white support
964 for neighborhood integration and affirmative ac-
965 tion, the threat hypothesis in one form, perceived
966 group threat, might still retain some utility when
967 measures other than objective group size are em-
968 ployed. Moreover, their use of OLS regression
969 without apparent adjustments for clustering raises
970 some concern about the non-independence of
971 the error terms; a more recent study using hierar-
972 chical models did not confirm some of their key
973 findings on neighborhood socioeconomic status
974 (McDermott 2011).

975 The appraisals of contact theory versus group
976 threat (actual group size) likely contributed the
977 most among these studies to our understanding
978 of the social contexts of inequality. Dixon and
979 Rosenbaum (2004) proposed that desegregation
980 and affirmative action policies at schools and the
981 workplace could make meaningful inroads on
982 decreasing whites' anti-black stereotypes. Like-
983 wise, similar policies targeted at neighborhoods
984 and schools might attenuate whites' anti-Hispanic
985 stereotypes. Beyond identifying the interactive
986 settings in which beneficial interracial contact
987 takes place, Dixon (2006) pointed to the pos-
988 sible upsides of interracial contact that promotes
989 whites' feelings of closeness with non-whites,
990 which can also temper whites' negative stereo-
991 types about non-white groups.

Two studies involving ethno-racial group size within the last decade did not necessarily utilize group size to operationalize group threat. Fox (2004) took percent black and percent Hispanic at the state and county levels as indicators of diverse ethno-racial contexts, adopting OLS regression with robust standard errors to evaluate their effects on white support for welfare. Her results indicated that white support for welfare took into account not only whites' stereotypes about black work ethic, but also whites' stereotypes about Hispanics' work ethic. Surprisingly, the effect of beliefs about Hispanics' work ethic on white support for welfare differed immensely based upon the contextual effects of black group size and Hispanic group size. McDermott (2011) deployed multilevel modeling to examine the direct and indirect effects of race and socioeconomic status, measured at different levels, on a variety of ethno-racial attitudes expressed by whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. McDermott found that the anti-black stereotypes of black respondents increased in conjunction with increases in the black percentage in a neighborhood, a finding McDermott also finds operating for the percentage of Asians living in a neighborhood and its effects on Asian respondents' anti-Asian stereotypes. In regards to attitudes about training programs for blacks, support across all respondents increased as the percentage of blacks at the neighborhood level increased. However, black support for affirmative action programs, which was already higher than white support for such programs, diminished as the share of blacks at the neighborhood level rose, a result Glaser (2003) also found when using experimentally varied survey ballots on black respondents. These results all point to the need for additional social psychological research on racial and policy attitudes in a multiracial social context to further clarify the precise mechanisms.

Several studies published over the first decade of the twenty first century improved our understanding of ethno-racial group size and group threat, and ultimately their effects on ethno-racial relations, attitudes, and social inequality. Measures involving the local black population size, be they objective or perceived, continue to large-

ly uphold the theory that more blacks represents more threat and less egalitarian outlooks and politics. The black image still haunts the white mind of the twenty first century. Some research has also drawn our attention to the meaning of group size in a multiracial social context, where white attitudes may be influenced by the complex interaction between the population sizes of multiple groups. Other research has shown that respondents of different ethno-racial backgrounds react to variations in ethno-racial group contexts in different ways. This points to the importance of understanding a particular group's subjective sense of its own status, power, and resources and its relationship to other groups: all of which can vary in complex ways not easily captured by classifying such groups as dominant or subordinate. Recent studies on the lived experience of whiteness among working class whites (McDermott 2006), factors related to the strength of white identity (Croll 2007), on how high-achieving Asians can recast whiteness as lower status (Jiménez and Horowitz 2013), emphasize this complexity. In sum, sociological social psychological research indicates that the sweeping demographic changes currently occurring in the United States will continue to influence social inequality, despite projections that the share of the black population will remain stable for years to come.

Having outlined sociocultural and social structural models for the study of racial prejudice, we now turn our attention to another relatively recent entry. This account draws largely upon methodological innovations in cognitive psychology, creatively adapted to the study of implicit racial bias.

The Cognitive Turn: Implicit Attitudes and Bias

Developments in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience point to significant ways in which attitudes influence perception below the level of conscious awareness, embedding patterns of association and bias that affect what we see and how we are likely to behave, but not without some real measure of controversy over

1085 the meaning of and appropriate generalizations
1086 from these findings. Psychologists have pro-
1087 posed that implicit cognition, which involves
1088 an introspectively unidentified or inaccurately
1089 identified construct that nevertheless influences
1090 a range of individual responses, can illuminate
1091 research on ethno-racial attitudes and stereotypes
1092 (Greenwald and Banaji 1995). Unlike an explicit
1093 attitude or stereotype, which can be measured
1094 through introspective self-report, an implicit or
1095 unconscious attitude or stereotype requires in-
1096 direct measures, often involving tasks that im-
1097 plicate categorization processes. While a wide
1098 variety of implicit measures and ways of mea-
1099 suring them exist (Fazio and Olson 2003), some
1100 complexities in the meaning and interpretation
1101 of many of the measures and results need to be
1102 borne in mind. We address these complexities by
1103 first describing one method of measuring implicit
1104 attitudes, the Implicit Association Test.

1105 The Implicit Association Test (IAT), a popular
1106 method of measuring implicit attitudes often used
1107 in studies of aversive racism, represents a prom-
1108 ising methodological innovation for researching
1109 the social psychology of racial inequality. The
1110 IAT captures response latencies (or time differ-
1111 entials in a timed task) reflecting the ease or dif-
1112 ficulty of classifying items into category/attribute
1113 pairs, pairs hypothesized to converge or diverge
1114 in the minds of individuals. Individuals should
1115 find it easier to classify an item (e.g., rose, roach)
1116 under a category/attribute pairing that resonates
1117 with an individual's cultural perspective (e.g.,
1118 flower/good or insect/bad) than one that does not
1119 (e.g., flower/bad or insect/good). Applied to the
1120 study of racial bias, the IAT measures the diffi-
1121 culty of classifying items when black/good and
1122 white/bad are paired, compared to when white/
1123 good and black/bad are paired. The absence of a
1124 time lag between category pairs that are theoret-
1125 ical matches versus theoretical mismatches would
1126 indicate the absence of cognitive bias. Since the
1127 response latency score only partially correlates
1128 with a handful of explicit racial attitude indica-
1129 tors and loads on separate constructs when fac-
1130 tor analyzed (Lane et al. 2007), IAT proponents
1131 argue that the method captures an underlying
1132 construct unmeasured by explicit ethno-racial

1133 attitudes. However, along with the leading pro-
1134 ponents of the IAT, we emphasize that the IAT
1135 and its measurement of an, as yet, un-described
1136 underlying racial construct do not signify a theo-
1137 retical departure from the longstanding study of
1138 racial bias. Rather, the IAT may help us more
1139 precisely discern and better specify the nature of
1140 racial group stereotypes and attitudes.

1141 While an important and innovative approach,
1142 we argue as sociologists that such measures can-
1143 not replace careful study of the terms of explicit
1144 social discourse and interaction, nor fully answer
1145 more basic questions about how attitudes and be-
1146 liefs interact with larger socio-political processes
1147 and institutions to shape the broader social pat-
1148 terning of group inequality. Ambiguity surround-
1149 ing the explicit-implicit divide has drawn ques-
1150 tions from a number of quarters. Arkes and Tet-
1151 lock (2004) proposed alternative interpretations
1152 of reaction time scores as either reflections of cul-
1153 tural rather than personal bias, indicative of dif-
1154 ferent types of negative affect besides antipathy
1155 (guilt, shame, embarrassment, etc. as opposed to
1156 bigotry or hostility), or simply outcomes predict-
1157 ed by the probabilistic cognitive exercise of ratio-
1158 nality. The higher predictive validity observed for
1159 the IAT relative to explicit attitudinal measures,
1160 and for that matter, the occasionally low levels
1161 of correlation between IAT scores and explicit at-
1162 titudinal scores, may reflect the use of a truncated
1163 set of explicit ethno-racial attitudes rather than
1164 an absolute distinction between observable and
1165 unobservable constructs (see also Blanton and
1166 Jaccard (2008)). To be sure, we do not argue that
1167 there cannot be some measure of an underlying,
1168 unidentified construct or constructs that relates to
1169 a variety of racial inequality outcomes.

1170 While IAT proponents do not recommend pri-
1171 oritizing implicit measures or replacing explicit
1172 measures with implicit ones, it is important to
1173 warn against critics of explicit measures who
1174 might go too far in overemphasizing a core argu-
1175 ment marshaled on behalf of implicit attitudes:
1176 concerns about self presentation (Nosek 2005).
1177 This line of reasoning concerns us for two rea-
1178 sons. First, survey respondents continue to give
1179 what many people believe to be socially unde-
1180 sirable responses including manifestly racially

1181 prejudiced opinions (Bobo and Tuan 2006; Wil- 1229
 1182 son 1997). These responses in turn continue to 1230
 1183 co-vary with a range of race-related outcomes 1231
 1184 such as policy attitudes, ethno-racial neighbor- 1232
 1185 hood composition preferences, hiring prefer- 1233
 1186 ences, etc. Second, concern about social desir- 1234
 1187 ability casts a pall over the authenticity of indi- 1235
 1188 viduals' responses, which, taken to an extreme, 1236
 1189 may cause some researchers to disregard whether 1237
 1190 individuals may actually want to be less racially 1238
 1191 biased. As IAT proponent Nosek (2005, p. 566) 1239
 1192 noted, self-presentation "can be genuine" and can 1240
 1193 emerge in other socially consequential behaviors 1241
 1194 and outcomes. 1242

1195 The authenticity of unbiased self-presentation 1243
 1196 is critical for social interaction, particularly be- 1244
 1197 cause unconscious expressions of negative atti- 1245
 1198 tudes can hinder congenial interracial relations. 1246
 1199 Researchers hypothesized and confirmed a link 1247
 1200 between white participants' implicit attitudes and 1248
 1201 their nonverbal behaviors signifying distance, 1249
 1202 disrespect, and tension (less visual contact and 1250
 1203 increased rates of blinking) towards a black in- 1251
 1204 terviewer (Dovidio et al. 1997). A subsequent 1252
 1205 study confirmed the relationship between white 1253
 1206 participants' implicit attitudes and white observ- 1254
 1207 ers' ratings of the participants' nonverbal friend- 1255
 1208 liness; moreover, the same study revealed that 1256
 1209 black confederate evaluation of the friendliness 1257
 1210 of the white participant was associated with these 1258
 1211 nonverbal cues rather than verbal behavior (Dovi- 1259
 1212 dio et al. 2002). Goff, Steele and Davies (2008) 1260
 1213 warned that racial distancing need not derive 1261
 1214 from racial prejudice, but might reflect white par- 1262
 1215 ticipant anxiety about appearing racist, thereby 1263
 1216 confirming an undesirable white group stereotype 1264
 1217 as stereotype threat can affect IAT scores as well 1265
 1218 (Frantz et al. 2004). Assessments of the friendli- 1266
 1219 ness of interracial others is important given dif- 1267
 1220 ferent attributions, expectations, and goals that 1268
 1221 individuals bring to explain inaction and anxiety 1269
 1222 pertaining to interracial interactions (Bergsieker 1270
 1223 et al. 2010; Richeson and Shelton 2007; Shelton 1271
 1224 and Richeson 2005, 2006; Shelton et al. 2005a; 1272
 1225 Trawalter et al. 2009; West et al. 2009b). 1273

1226 While individuals may be initially unaware of 1274
 1227 their biases, overt acknowledgment that uncon- 1275
 1228 scious bias may lead to discriminatory behavior 1276

1229 can serve as an intervention against such biases. 1230
 1231 A study testing the link between physicians' im- 1232
 1233 plicit attitudes and their recommendations for 1233
 1234 blood clot treatment to a black or white patient 1234
 1235 presenting heart attack symptoms found that phy- 1235
 1236 sicians aware of the study's purpose were more 1236
 1237 likely to recommend the treatment for black pa- 1237
 1238 tients as their implicit bias increased (Green et al. 1238
 1239 2007). This unanticipated finding reversed the 1239
 1240 black disadvantage in treatment found among 1240
 1241 physicians scoring high on implicit bias that were 1241
 1242 unaware of the study's purpose. This finding that 1242
 1243 a beneficial outcome positively correlates with 1243
 1244 implicit bias also corresponds with research on 1244
 1245 the irony of more engaged interracial interaction 1245
 1246 among high IAT scoring whites (Shelton et al. 1246
 1247 2005b), and high IAT scoring whites' behavioral 1247
 1248 overcorrection towards stigmatized outgroups 1248
 1249 under challenging conditions (Mendes and Ko- 1249
 1250 slov 2013). 1250

1249 To this point, we have charted changes in ra- 1249
 1250 cial attitudes, mapped out four of the most promi- 1250
 1251 nent contemporary approaches to understanding 1251
 1252 contemporary racial prejudice and bias, and re- 1252
 1253 viewed recent studies related to these various 1253
 1254 research agendas. We now turn our attention to 1254
 1255 specific domains of ethno-racial inequality that 1255
 1256 are in part produced or constrained by the social 1256
 1257 psychology of racial prejudice. We do not at- 1257
 1258 tempt a comprehensive summary of all relevant 1258
 1259 social domains or studies, but instead focus on a 1259
 1260 few key research questions, topics, and method- 1260
 1261 ologies, including recent innovations. 1261

1262 Domains of Ethno-Racial Inequality 1262

1263 While larger patterns of ethno-racial inequality, 1263
 1264 particularly those embedded in institutions, will 1264
 1265 likely require a forceful political and policy- 1265
 1266 based approach to significantly alter ethno-racial 1266
 1267 inequalities in labor markets (Wilson 1997), 1267
 1268 housing markets (Massey and Denton 1993), 1268
 1269 wealth distribution (Oliver and Shapiro 1997), 1269
 1270 educational settings (Darling-Hammond 2004), 1270
 1271 mass incarceration (Western 2007), and health 1271
 1272 care (Williams and Rucker 2000), social sci- 1272
 1273 entists must nevertheless continue to track the 1273

1274 micro-level dynamics that produce these macro
 1275 configurations of inequality. These inequalities
 1276 have been exacerbated even further by monu-
 1277 mental debt, job loss, and home foreclosures
 1278 from the “Great Recession” (Grusky et al. 2011),
 1279 possibly requiring comprehensive anti-poverty
 1280 policy and serious re-investments in education,
 1281 health care, and factors impacting neighborhood
 1282 cohesion (Sampson 2012; Wilson 2010). We
 1283 focus our attention now on the labor market and
 1284 the housing market, two major domains of social
 1285 life where evidence of substantial structural racial
 1286 inequality remains, and end with a brief look
 1287 at possible social psychological factors impact-
 1288 ing the domain from which the most effective
 1289 macro-level interventions are likely to arise, that
 1290 is, the political arena.

1291 **Labor Market Inequality**

1292 Consider first the labor market. We know that Af-
 1293 rican Americans in particular face significantly
 1294 higher rates of unemployment, longer spells of
 1295 unemployment and job search, as well as a great-
 1296 er likelihood of falling into persistent joblessness
 1297 than their white counterparts (Bobo 2011; Harris
 1298 2010; Katz et al. 2005).

1299 There is also growing evidence that negative
 1300 racial stereotypes still play a powerful role in
 1301 shaping labor market experiences and outcomes.
 1302 Evidence for this claim takes several forms. For
 1303 example, Kirschenman and Neckerman (1991)
 1304 in their now classic qualitative interview study
 1305 of Chicago employers found that employers
 1306 described their black and Hispanic employees
 1307 using negative stereotypes, despite what would
 1308 seem to be social desirability pressures to ap-
 1309 pear race neutral. Employers questioned their
 1310 black workers’ work ethic, education level, and
 1311 leadership skills. Some employers in sales and
 1312 customer service mentioned their customers’ racial
 1313 prejudices as justification for bias in hiring
 1314 that favored white employees. Other employers
 1315 for clerical jobs referenced blacks’ appearance
 1316 (e.g., hairstyle) and speech patterns (“street talk”)
 1317 as detracting from a professional image. A few
 1318 employers for low-skilled blue collar or service

1319 jobs recited stereotypes of blacks as unreliable
 1320 and lazy, and therefore ill suited for a job sector
 1321 where dependability and work ethic were seen as
 1322 paramount. Employers did appreciate heteroge-
 1323 neity within the black community and recognized
 1324 “good” black employees who did not conform to
 1325 negative stereotypes. In such situations, however,
 1326 employers screened for markers they attributed
 1327 to inner-city culture.

1328 While still retaining analytical focus on struc-
 1329 tural changes in the U.S. urban economy and
 1330 many poor blacks’ rootedness in social networks,
 1331 households, and neighborhood contexts that are
 1332 not conducive to employability, William Julius
 1333 Wilson recognized that employers nevertheless
 1334 took into account racial considerations in their
 1335 hiring practices (Wilson 1997). Drawing on
 1336 the same employer survey as Kirschenman and
 1337 Neckerman, Wilson found that 74% of surveyed
 1338 employers related negative views of blacks, in-
 1339 cluding assumptions about their dishonesty, wel-
 1340 fare dependency, poor family values, tardiness,
 1341 etc. Such views cut across racial lines as both
 1342 black and white employers expressed these nega-
 1343 tive evaluations of inner-city blacks. Wilson also
 1344 found a gendered component, with black males
 1345 more than females bearing the brunt of the nega-
 1346 tive attitudes. However, black women did not
 1347 escape questions about their childcare and fam-
 1348 ily responsibilities, including the assumption that
 1349 black women desired too many children to sustain
 1350 employment. A few employers openly disclosed
 1351 that racial prejudice affected the hiring process,
 1352 while most engaged in selective recruitment. The
 1353 latter chose to search for their ideal high quality
 1354 candidates by avoiding placing job ads in met-
 1355 ropolitan or particular ethnic and urban neigh-
 1356 borhood newspapers and purposefully shunning
 1357 recruitment at inner-city schools or government-
 1358 run programs. In the ethnographic portion of
 1359 the study, Wilson summarized findings among
 1360 a smaller sample of inner-city residents, docu-
 1361 menting blacks’ feelings of having experienced
 1362 discrimination and exploitation. Such feelings
 1363 underlie some inner-city black men’s hostility to
 1364 jobs they characterized as being less remunera-
 1365 tive relative to the wages earned by non-blacks,
 1366 and entailing the most arduous tasks, a finding

1367 confirmed in more recent research on job chan- 1415
 1368 neling (see Pager et al. (2009) below). 1416

1369 In addition to in-depth interviews, multivari- 1417
 1370 ate analyses of large sample surveys indicate 1418
 1371 that employers' perceptions of the ethno-racial 1419
 1372 makeup of their customers relate to the likeli- 1420
 1373 hood of hiring blacks (Holzer and Ihlanfeldt 1421
 1374 1998). Utilizing employer surveys from Atlanta, 1422
 1375 Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles, the researchers 1423
 1376 found that employers' perceptions of the propor- 1424
 1377 tion of their customers of a particular ethno-racial 1425
 1378 background (and by implication those customers' 1426
 1379 preferences for employees of a particular ethno- 1427
 1380 racial background) was linked to the hiring of a 1428
 1381 black worker as the most recently hired worker. 1429
 1382 The perceived ethno-racial proportion of their 1430
 1383 customers had the strongest negative effect on 1431
 1384 the hiring of blacks into jobs with direct custom- 1432
 1385 er contact versus jobs without customer contact, 1433
 1386 and hiring blacks into sales jobs compared to 1434
 1387 blue collar jobs and other white-collar and ser- 1435
 1388 vice jobs, even though skill requirements may 1436
 1389 have been higher for the latter. As the research- 1437
 1390 ers note, these effects are linked not to the actual 1438
 1391 ethno-racial makeup of a firm's clientele, but 1439
 1392 rather employers' *perceived* ethno-racial makeup 1440
 1393 of their customer base. 1441

1394 Employer surveys are important not only 1442
 1395 because of the critical role that hiring authority 1443
 1396 confers to employers in regards to nonwhites' job 1444
 1397 prospects, but also because of survey data's abil- 1445
 1398 ity to address social scientific predictions about 1446
 1399 labor market and workplace competition as the 1447
 1400 fundamental cause of ethno-racial antagonism. A 1448
 1401 structural, sociological perspective on racial and 1449
 1402 ethnic conflict that privileges class location (Bo- 1450
 1403 nacich 1972, 1980) might predict that business 1451
 1404 owners and supervisors would be less likely to 1452
 1405 report negative stereotypes than non-managerial 1453
 1406 workers, given the relative lack of workplace 1454
 1407 power that places the latter in economic competi- 1455
 1408 tion with job-seeking blacks. Bobo, Johnson, and 1456
 1409 Suh (2000) found that negative stereotyping of 1457
 1410 blacks did not differ significantly by workplace 1458
 1411 power; business owners, supervisors, and non- 1459
 1412 managerial workers alike tended to rate blacks 1460
 1413 more negatively than whites on stereotype mea- 1461
 1414 sures. Bipolar trait rating items for intelligence, 1462

1415 and English speaking proficiency were used to 1416
 1417 measure stereotypes, including a scale averaging 1418
 1419 all four items. Like the stereotypes held by work- 1419
 1420 ers without workplace power, owners and super- 1420
 1421 visors' black stereotypes were related to political 1421
 1422 ideology, after controlling for socio-demographic 1422
 1423 factors, region, and religious factors. That a po- 1423
 1424 litical orientation which cuts across differences 1424
 1425 in workplace authority significantly relates to 1425
 1426 stereotyping further supports the idea that racial 1426
 1427 stereotypes are not reducible solely to class loca- 1427

1428 More recent studies have drawn upon experi- 1428
 1429 mental methods to identify racial bias in employ- 1429
 1430 ers' actual hiring decision-making, corroborating 1430
 1431 the negative stereotypes that employers self re- 1431
 1432 ported during in-depth interviews and large sam- 1432
 1433 ple surveys. A study of the low wage labor mar- 1433
 1434 ket in New York City utilized a field experiment, 1434
 1435 or audit study, to document employer bias in the 1435
 1436 hiring process (Pager et al. 2009). Research- 1436
 1437 ers sent trained white, black and Latino testers 1437
 1438 matched on a range of characteristics (e.g., ver- 1438
 1439 bal ability, eye contact, talkativeness, physical 1439
 1440 attractiveness) to apply for 340 entry-level jobs. 1440
 1441 White and Latino applicants received more sec- 1441
 1442 ond interview call-backs or job offers than black 1442
 1443 applicants, despite possessing equivalent qualifi- 1443
 1444 cations (education, job experience, and neighbor- 1444
 1445 hood residence) and applying for the exact same 1445
 1446 job opening. A second team of testers revealed 1446
 1447 that black and Latino applicants without a crimi- 1447
 1448 nal record fared about as well as a white applicant 1448
 1449 recently released from prison after a drug felony 1449
 1450 conviction, confirming findings from an earlier 1450
 1451 audit study in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on race and 1451
 1452 criminal stigma (Pager 2003). Being black or 1452
 1453 Latino (with a clean record) held the same level 1453
 1454 of social psychological stigma to employers as a 1454
 1455 white felon's criminal record. 1455

1456 Qualitative analysis of testers' field notes also 1456
 1457 revealed that minority applicants were more like- 1457
 1458 ly to be excluded from the applicant pool outright, 1458
 1459 with very little, if any, chance to communicate 1459
 1460 their job suitability. When given a chance to con- 1460
 1461 vey their qualifications, the minority testers— 1461
 1462 sometimes only the black tester, sometimes both 1462

1463 black and Latino testers—faced higher standards
 1464 of resume evaluation than the white tester despite
 1465 equivalent experience and credentials (see also
 1466 Biernat and Kobrynowicz (1997)). What proved
 1467 to be job-denying resume deficiencies for the
 1468 black and/or Latino applicant did not hinder their
 1469 white confederate. Lastly, the study revealed that
 1470 black and Latino applicants were more likely to
 1471 be “channeled” or steered toward jobs that em-
 1472 ployed greater manual labor, less customer con-
 1473 tact, or less authority than the job initially sought
 1474 by the applicant. A few white testers experienced
 1475 channeling in the opposite or “upward” direction:
 1476 greater customer contact, less manual labor, or
 1477 entailing supervisory or managerial skills. Social
 1478 psychology underlies multiple factors that influ-
 1479 ence labor market prospects: from employers’
 1480 beliefs about applicants identified with particular
 1481 racial groups, the types of jobs into which ap-
 1482 plicants were channeled, the shifting standard of
 1483 evaluation faced by differently racialized testers,
 1484 to the stigma equivalence between being a minor-
 1485 ity on the one hand and being a convicted and
 1486 recently imprisoned felon on the other.

1487 The race associated with an applicant’s name
 1488 on a resume can influence the applicant’s job
 1489 prospects (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004).
 1490 Again utilizing a field experiment, researchers
 1491 sent almost 5000 resumes responding to over
 1492 1300 job postings in the Chicago and Boston
 1493 region, primarily changing the name on the re-
 1494 sume from a typically white-sounding name,
 1495 e.g., “Emily Walsh or Greg Baker,” to a typically
 1496 black-sounding name, e.g., “Lakisha Washington
 1497 or Jamal Jones.” Resumes with white-sounding
 1498 names were 50% more likely to receive a call-
 1499 back response than resumes bearing black-sound-
 1500 ing names. The researchers also looked at the ef-
 1501 fects of resume quality, subjectively classifying
 1502 resumes into low and high quality resumes based
 1503 on features such as skills, gaps in employment,
 1504 job experience, etc. To ensure that high-quality
 1505 resumes could be differentiated from low-qual-
 1506 ity ones, researchers also added some subset of
 1507 a number of additional characteristics: summer
 1508 or in-school employment, additional computer
 1509 skills, volunteer experience, certifications, for-
 1510 eign languages, honors, and military experience.

1511 Resumes with white-sounding names received
 1512 a higher call back percentage in response to
 1513 high-quality resumes (10.79%) than low-quality
 1514 resumes (8.5%), a statistically significant dif-
 1515 ference. On the other hand, resumes with black-
 1516 sounding names received statistically equivalent
 1517 percentages of callbacks: 6.7% for high-quality
 1518 resumes and 6.2% for low-quality resumes. In-
 1519 creasing the subjective quality of one’s resume
 1520 did not produce the same reward across racial
 1521 categories.

1522 King et al. (2006) replicated and extended
 1523 Bertrand and Mullainathan’s results for white
 1524 and black associated resumes by using a multi-
 1525 ethnic collection of resumes, adding resumes
 1526 with Asian and Hispanic sounding names. They
 1527 recruited 160 participants at a downtown metro-
 1528 politan pedestrian area and an airport to evalu-
 1529 ate the resumes. Results indicated that Asian
 1530 Americans’ resumes were more highly rated than
 1531 resumes with either black or Hispanic-sounding
 1532 names. The data also revealed that occupational
 1533 stereotypes, or the perceived suitability of ap-
 1534 plicants for either high status (e.g., physician,
 1535 chemist, engineer, judge) or low status jobs (cus-
 1536 todian, construction worker, repairman, etc.) me-
 1537 diated the relationship between race and resume
 1538 evaluations.

1539 This brief review of the literature pertaining
 1540 to the social psychology of labor market racial
 1541 inequality make clear three key points. First,
 1542 employers express awareness of a variety of racial
 1543 considerations that impact employee search,
 1544 screening, and suitability for specific jobs. Sec-
 1545 ond, contrary to social desirability expectations,
 1546 employers willingly and openly express nega-
 1547 tive racial stereotypes about both workers and
 1548 prospective applicants during face-to-face inter-
 1549 views. Such negative attitudes spanned multiple
 1550 locations across the United States. Third, meth-
 1551 odological innovations in the study of race-based
 1552 labor market inequality, in particular the use of
 1553 experimental manipulations, reveal exact points
 1554 in the hiring process at which employers or hiring
 1555 managers’ beliefs about racial groups can lead
 1556 to racial inequality in labor market outcomes.
 1557 Race affected initial acknowledgement about job
 1558 availability, actual hiring decisions, and subse-

1559 quent job placement. Even fielding a better re-
 1560 sume yielded racially differentiated returns. As
 1561 our main argument asserts, the social psychology
 1562 of ethno-racial attitudes and identities is a funda-
 1563 mental component of larger structural patterns of
 1564 race-based inequalities in the labor market.

1565 **Racial Residential Segregation**

1566 Racial residential segregation has been referred
 1567 to as the “linchpin” of modern racial inequality
 1568 (Pettigrew 1979). Where individuals and groups
 1569 reside has consequences for broad neighborhood
 1570 quality. This includes such considerations as the
 1571 quality of schools, safety and likelihood of expo-
 1572 sure to violence and criminal victimization, level
 1573 and quality of public services, and even proxim-
 1574 ity to serious environmental risks and hazardous
 1575 conditions. Patterns of racial residential segrega-
 1576 tion intensified over much of the early part of the
 1577 twentieth century (Massey and Denton 1993).
 1578 Most major metropolitan areas and a very large
 1579 fraction of the black population could be classi-
 1580 fied as living in “hypersegregated” circumstanc-
 1581 es where black and white places of residence
 1582 were highly separated along at least four of five
 1583 major indicators of residential dispersal. Despite
 1584 some modest decline in recent decades, especial-
 1585 ly in smaller and newer metropolitan areas of the
 1586 southwest and west, the black-white dissimilar-
 1587 ity index remains high and has yet to approach
 1588 the lower but still sizable dissimilarity index for
 1589 whites-Hispanics. Black isolation has substantial-
 1590 ly decreased, though largely due to the influx of
 1591 Hispanics and Asians into black neighborhoods,
 1592 and black exposure to whites has remained fairly
 1593 static over the last three decades (Logan 2013;
 1594 Rugh and Massey 2013). Declarations of “the
 1595 end of the segregated century” (Glaeser and
 1596 Vigdor 2012) may be premature.

1597 An extensive body of research has tried to as-
 1598 sess the degree to which ethno-racial attitudes
 1599 play a part in the maintenance (or break-down)
 1600 of racial residential segregation. Four general
 1601 themes of inquiry have primarily occupied this
 1602 line of social psychological research. First, do
 1603 neighborhood racial composition preferences

1604 vary by race and how are these compositional
 1605 preferences related to attitudes about willingness
 1606 to join or exit a particular neighborhood? Sec-
 1607 ond, what is the association between neighbor-
 1608 hood racial preferences and indicators of racial
 1609 prejudice (e.g., negative stereotypes, out-group
 1610 aversion and social distance, perceived group
 1611 competition, etc.), particularly in a multiethnic
 1612 society? Third, how heavily do other race-related
 1613 social psychological factors (e.g., ethnocentrism)
 1614 weigh vis-à-vis racial prejudice? Finally, is race
 1615 primarily a proxy for a variety of socioeconomic
 1616 or neighborhood considerations (e.g., percep-
 1617 tions of property value changes, neighborhood
 1618 disorder) or are there important social psycho-
 1619 logical dimensions of race-based evaluation that
 1620 also pertain? Work in this domain has also grown
 1621 in complexity and methodological sophistication.

1622 With data from the 1976 Detroit Area Study,
 1623 Farley and Schuman introduced a major innova-
 1624 tive showcard methodology for assessing neigh-
 1625 borhood racial composition preferences (Farley
 1626 et al. 1978). Prior studies often used general or
 1627 imprecise survey items querying, for instance,
 1628 whether it would make a difference for whites if
 1629 a Negro moved into your block, or if blacks pre-
 1630 ferred segregated or mixed neighborhoods (Petti-
 1631 grew 1973). The researchers used five showcards
 1632 depicting the neighborhood composition based
 1633 on three rows of five houses, with the respon-
 1634 dent’s house situated in the middle. For black
 1635 respondents, the five showcards ranged across
 1636 the following compositions: an all black neigh-
 1637 borhood, four houses occupied by whites, seven
 1638 white houses (or just under half white), twelve
 1639 houses, and an all white neighborhood. For white
 1640 respondents, the five showcards depicted: an all
 1641 white neighborhood, one black family moving
 1642 into the neighborhood, three black families in
 1643 the neighborhood, five black houses (one-third),
 1644 and eight black houses (just over half the houses
 1645 occupied by blacks). Showcard pre-tests indi-
 1646 cated almost no whites preferred neighborhoods
 1647 with higher black concentrations. The Detroit
 1648 Area Study data revealed that as the number of
 1649 black homes depicted in a hypothetical neighbor-
 1650 hood rose white respondents expressed growing
 1651 discomfort, rated the neighborhood as one they

would not move into, and if already there, would consider moving out. On the other hand, 82% of blacks preferred mixed (~50% white) neighborhoods as their first or second choices, contradicting the hypothesis that blacks preferred to live amongst themselves and not with whites. The least desirable neighborhood among whites approximated the racial composition of the most desirable neighborhood among blacks.

That neighborhood racial composition affected neighborhood discomfort and willingness to enter and exit a neighborhood does not mean such attitudes are static. Farley et al. (1994) revisited the 1976 Detroit study using data collected in 1992, which showed that whites' neighborhood racial composition preferences reflected an increased tolerance for integration. Among blacks, neighborhood attractiveness varied little over the corresponding time period, with the most notable changes reflecting a declining desire among blacks to live in neighborhoods where almost all or all the neighbors were white. Black respondents still held racially mixed neighborhoods in the highest regard, with levels of racial integration that white respondents in 1976 and 1992 found to be the least attractive. Open-ended follow up questions, in particular regarding blacks' desire to live in an all-black neighborhood, divulged a possible explanation for blacks' reluctance to live in mostly white or all white neighborhoods: fear of white prejudice.

Farley et al. (1994) also tested two other possible factors linked to neighborhood attractiveness among whites: a perceived gap in socioeconomic status (difference scores between whites and blacks on perceptions as rich or poor) and group stereotypes (black/white difference scores on bipolar trait measures tapping perceived intelligence, preference for welfare dependency, difficulty of getting along with a particular group, and English speaking proficiency). The perceived gap in socioeconomic status between groups is another frequently cited source of opposition to residential segregation, with decline in property maintenance, unstable employment, and crime attributed to relatively poorer status. They found no effect of perceived socioeconomic gap on the three dependent outcomes: whites' discomfort

with black neighbors, an index of willingness to exit a neighborhood based on the neighborhood's black composition, and reluctance to move into a mixed neighborhood. The data did reveal that negative black stereotypes were related to these three residential attitudes, with white discomfort, inclination towards white flight, and white reluctance to enter integrated neighborhoods all increasing as the black-white difference score indicated greater endorsement of negative black stereotypes.

Some research suggests that own-race preferences are an important factor producing racially segregated neighborhoods (Clark 1992). According to this perspective, multiple groups' preference for living among members of their same race can jointly determine observed patterns of residential segregation. Some claim that blacks' desire to self-segregate is a main factor in contemporary racial residential segregation (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997). Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996) directly test the in-group preference hypothesis by using feeling thermometer scores to operationalize ethnocentrism or positive in-group affect. For the most part, in-group affect was linked to residential integration attitudes primarily for white respondents, and only in reference to black and Asian neighbors; higher levels of white in-group affect related to lower support for living in neighborhoods where half the residents were black or Asian. In-group affect related to integration attitudes for only one other group: black respondents in relation to half Hispanic neighborhoods. However in that case, the relationship contradicted the in-group preference hypothesis; higher in-group affect among blacks decreased opposition to residential integration with Hispanics. Additional studies employing quantitative analysis of open-ended survey responses did not provide strong, if any, support for a relationship between ethnocentrism and neighborhood racial composition, in part because of the relative absence of ethnocentric justifications relative to other concerns (Krysan 2002; Krysan and Farley 2002).

Out-group affect predicted residential integration attitudes more consistently than in-group affect. Bobo and Zubrinsky's multiethnic data

revealed that two indicators of racial prejudice (out-group affective hostility and the in-group/out-group affective difference scores) explained more variation in the willingness to live in a neighborhood composed of 50% of an ethno-racial out-group (whites, blacks, Latinos or Asians) than in-group affect. Models containing out-group affect generally explained as much or more of the variation in blacks, Hispanics, and Asians' attitudes than the affective difference score. However, the difference score models explained the most variation for whites, leading Bobo and Zubrinsky to surmise that the maintenance of social status difference for whites is a more powerful predictor of residential integration attitudes than either ethnocentrism or out-group animus alone. The multiethnic data also confirmed earlier findings on the almost statistical irrelevance of perceived group differences in socioeconomic status across all groups, as well as the robust relevance of negative group stereotypes, particularly for white respondents (Farley et al. 1994). In sum, racial prejudice was more often directly linked to residential racial integration attitudes than in-group affective preference, and only among whites was both out-group animus and in-group preference broadly related to opposition to living in substantially integrated neighborhoods.

Prior investigations provided limited footing on preferences for living among multiple out-groups simultaneously, typically due to the use of forced-choice measures. To provide additional information and decrease pressure for respondents reacting to pre-specified questions, the show card methodology underwent two important modifications with the Los Angeles subsample of the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality project (Charles 2000). First, respondents were presented with blank showcards and were asked to construct their own "ideal" neighborhoods by filling in their own ethno-racial neighbor preferences. Second, respondents were allowed to also indicate Latino and Asian neighbors, in addition to white and black neighbors. This moved the showcard methodology beyond both two-group comparisons and research focused on the black-white dichotomy, as a multiethnic society

increasingly characterizes many major metropolitan areas.

Results from the multiethnic neighborhood showcards yielded news both sanguine and somber. Optimistically, most people created integrated neighborhoods, indicating extensive openness to residential integration. However, blacks were universally the most stigmatized out-group. Almost one in five white respondents constructed ideal neighborhoods with no black neighbors. Almost one-third of Latinos respondents and two out of five Asian respondents constructed ideal neighborhoods that excluded black neighbors, with important variations by nativity; foreign-born Latinos and Asians expressed greater distaste for living among blacks. Whites also expressed the greatest preference for exclusively same-race neighbors. Eleven percent of whites constructed ideal neighborhoods that contained only same-race neighbors, compared to 2.8% of blacks, 6.6% of Latinos, and 7% of Asians. Ideal neighborhoods also indicated that all groups preferred substantial in-group representation, with whites as the most desirable out-group neighbor among minority respondents.

Multiethnic neighborhood showcards also allowed explorations of factors influencing the extent of same-race preferences as well as the influence on neighbor preferences of an additional racial prejudice factor: perceived racial group competition. The data revealed that a composite scale of perceived out-group job and political competition inversely predicted white preference for out-group neighbors and positively predicted same-race neighbor preferences. These results were net of racial stereotypes (intelligence, welfare dependency, English proficiency, drug and gang involvement) and social distance (assessments of difficulty of groups to get along with) that were again found to be significant for whites' neighborhood attitudes (Charles 2006). The data thus revealed that a third psychological indicator of racial prejudice (perceived group threat) independently predicted whites' neighbor preferences (see also Timberlake (2000)).

Furthermore, the multiethnic neighborhood showcards expanded our understanding of non-whites' neighborhood preferences. Racial stereo-

1844 types and social distancing, and group threat to a
 1845 lesser extent, proved significant for blacks' out-
 1846 group and same-race neighbor preferences. Also,
 1847 in-group attachment (a sense of common fate with
 1848 same-race others) did have a moderate influence
 1849 on blacks' same-race preferences (Thernstrom
 1850 and Thernstrom 1997). Latinos' negative stereo-
 1851 types of Whites and Asians decreased their pref-
 1852 erence for either group as neighbors, while black
 1853 stereotypes had no relationship to black neighbor
 1854 preference. Social distance was an important fac-
 1855 tor across all out-group and same-group neighbor
 1856 preferences for Latinos. The various out-group at-
 1857 titudes did not affect Asians' same-race neighbor
 1858 preferences. On the other hand, social distancing
 1859 predicted Asians' out-group neighbor preferences,
 1860 and stereotyping was associated with only black
 1861 and Latino neighbor preferences. Racial group
 1862 threat had no effect on either Latino or Asians'
 1863 neighbor preferences. All minority groups were
 1864 less likely to prefer white neighbors if they be-
 1865 lieved whites tended to discriminate against other
 1866 racial-ethnic groups. In sum, across all groups,
 1867 whites and non-white minorities, racial prejudice
 1868 factors were linked to neighbor preferences.

1869 There are those who argue, however, that racial
 1870 prejudice is not as prominent a factor in the
 1871 maintenance of racial residential segregation as
 1872 earlier studies might suggest. Harris (1999, 2001)
 1873 proposed that race acts as a proxy for non-race-
 1874 related factors: property values, poverty, crime,
 1875 etc. Certainly, open-ended responses indicate
 1876 that perceptions of declining property values and
 1877 crime are among the most cited reasons whites
 1878 give for their willingness to move from a neigh-
 1879 borhood as the number of black neighbors in-
 1880 creases (Farley et al. 1994). However, critics of
 1881 the showcard methodology maintained that when
 1882 respondents reacted to showcards indicating a
 1883 neighborhood's racial composition, race served
 1884 as a proxy for these other race-neutral apprehen-
 1885 sions. Using data from the 1990–1993 Chicago
 1886 Area Study, Harris (2001) found that percep-
 1887 tions about three neighborhood characteristics—
 1888 crime, deterioration, and quality of public school
 1889 education—predict white and black respondents'
 1890 neighborhood satisfaction, reducing the initial
 1891 significant effect of percent black in the respon-

1892 dents' zip code to statistical non-significance. 1892
 1893 Because controlling for these non-racial neigh- 1893
 1894 borhood evaluations wiped out the negative rela- 1894
 1895 tionship between neighborhood satisfaction and 1895
 1896 objective indicators of percent black in the larger 1896
 1897 zip code area, Harris argued that respondents' 1897
 1898 negative reaction to racial composition at the 1898
 1899 zip code level is primarily a negative reaction to 1899
 1900 underlying non-racial considerations manifested 1900
 1901 through the proxy of race. However, Harris did 1901
 1902 not control for either ethno-racial group stereo- 1902
 1903 types or affective ratings to assess whether these 1903
 1904 social psychological factors played a role as 1904
 1905 well, nor was there discussion about the extent to 1905
 1906 which the relevant neighborhood characteristics 1906
 1907 themselves were related to racial factors. 1907

1908 For instance, we know that perceptions of 1908
 1909 neighborhood crime and disorder are in fact 1909
 1910 linked to racial factors, net of the actual, objec- 1910
 1911 tively measured crime, disorder, and social class 1911
 1912 of a neighborhood. Quillian and Pager (2001) 1912
 1913 found that a census tract's percentage of young, 1913
 1914 black men (age 12–29) in Chicago and Seattle 1914
 1915 and percent black in Baltimore predicted per- 1915
 1916 ceptions of neighborhood crime, controlling for 1916
 1917 official reported crime rates, victimization rates, 1917
 1918 and percent poor at the neighborhood level. Like- 1918
 1919 wise, Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) utilized 1919
 1920 systematic social observation to collect data on 1920
 1921 objective neighborhood disorder. Researchers 1921
 1922 sent a sports utility vehicle moving three to five 1922
 1923 miles an hour into almost 500 block groups, from 1923
 1924 which both trained observers and video cam- 1924
 1925 eras recorded physical disorder (e.g., cigarettes, 1925
 1926 garbage, empty beer bottles, graffiti, condoms, 1926
 1927 abandoned cars, etc.), social disorder (i.e., loi- 1927
 1928 tering, alcohol consumption, intoxication, fight- 1928
 1929 ing, prostitution, drug sales), and physical decay 1929
 1930 (e.g., boarded up houses, abandoned commercial 1930
 1931 buildings, etc.). They found that not only did 1931
 1932 objective indicators of physical disorder, social 1932
 1933 disorder, and physical decay predict perceptions 1933
 1934 of neighborhood disorder, but controlling for per- 1934
 1935 cent of families living in poverty, percent black, 1935
 1936 and percent Latino eliminated the association 1936
 1937 between perceived disorder and observed phys- 1937
 1938 ical disorder, and substantially reduced perceived 1938
 1939 disorder's association with objective social disor- 1939

1940 der and physical decay, the former by a half. As
 1941 with perceptions of neighborhood crime, percep-
 1942 tions of neighborhood disorder involve crucial
 1943 race-related dimensions. Though perceptions of
 1944 neighborhood crime and deterioration matter for
 1945 whites' evaluations of neighborhood desirability
 1946 (Harris 2001), both Quillian and Pager (2001)
 1947 and Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) concluded
 1948 that racial stereotypes are central to understand-
 1949 ing both of these *prima facie* race-neutral atti-
 1950 tudes. Racial stereotypes therefore cannot be
 1951 summarily ruled out.

1952 Another methodological innovation embed-
 1953 ded videos in a self-administered computer-
 1954 assisted survey, allowing researchers to revisit
 1955 the race vs. class debate while controlling for
 1956 class-related neighborhood characteristics (Kry-
 1957 san et al. 2009). Respondents viewed four to five
 1958 short videos of neighborhoods, 27–44 seconds in
 1959 length, which depicted one of five social class
 1960 levels (lower working class, upper working class,
 1961 unblemished middle class, blemished middle
 1962 class, and upper middle class), based on factors
 1963 such as property size, house maintenance, and
 1964 neighborhood upkeep. Furthermore three of the
 1965 five videos depicted different racial compositions
 1966 (all white, all black, mixed white/black) based on
 1967 the race of actors hired to engage in the same,
 1968 routine activities for a given neighborhood so-
 1969 cial class level. Researchers randomly assigned
 1970 respondents to view different neighborhood ra-
 1971 cial compositions, and utilized a within-subjects
 1972 hierarchical linear model to estimate the effects
 1973 on neighborhood desirability of a neighborhood's
 1974 racial composition net of neighborhood social
 1975 class, with both entered as level one predictors.
 1976 Results revealed that whites rated the all white
 1977 neighborhood as more desirable than the mixed
 1978 neighborhood and the all black neighborhood as
 1979 least desirable, effects independent of the influ-
 1980 ence of perceived neighborhood social class on
 1981 neighborhood desirability.

1982 Also, Krysan et al. (2009) found that the effect
 1983 of racial composition on whites' assessments of
 1984 neighborhood desirability varied based on a range
 1985 of social psychological indicators. Both negative
 1986 stereotypes about blacks (black/white difference
 1987 scores on intelligence, welfare preference, crime/

1988 gang involvement, and quality of children super-
 1989 vision) and stereotypes about blacks' negative
 1990 impact on property values further reduced whites'
 1991 desire for living in a black neighborhood. Posi-
 1992 tive in-group affect increased whites' desirability
 1993 for the all-white neighborhood, as earlier studies
 1994 found, but also exacerbated aversion to black and
 1995 racially mixed neighborhoods. Neighborhood
 1996 racial composition also affected black respon-
 1997 dents' neighborhood assessments, with mixed
 1998 race neighborhoods perceived as most desirable
 1999 and all white neighborhoods as least desirable.
 2000 However, none of the social psychological factors—
 2001 perceptions of racial discrimination (job, police,
 2002 neighborhood, and housing market), in-
 2003 group identity (sense of linked fate and closeness
 2004 in feelings and thoughts to other in-group mem-
 2005 bers), and in-group affect (black/white difference
 2006 score on warmth towards group)—interacted
 2007 with the effect that racial composition had on
 2008 blacks' assessments of neighborhood desirabil-
 2009 ity. In short, social psychological factors relate to
 2010 how the racial composition of a neighborhood af-
 2011 fects a neighborhood's desirability for whites, net
 2012 of the perceived social class of the neighborhood,
 2013 while the same cannot be said for blacks.

2014 While most of the foregoing research ad-
 2015 dressed the connection between group attitudes
 2016 and neighborhood preferences, social psycholo-
 2017 gy has been implicated in housing discrimination
 2018 via the sound of a voice. One study on language
 2019 and social psychology indicated that among 421
 2020 listeners to speakers of Standard American Eng-
 2021 lish, African American Vernacular English, and
 2022 Chicano English, listeners correctly associated
 2023 multiple speakers of Standard American English
 2024 with European American identity between 81
 2025 and 92% of the time, different speakers of Af-
 2026 rican American Vernacular English with African
 2027 American identity between 77 and 97% of the
 2028 time, and different speakers of Chicano English
 2029 with Hispanic American identity between 79 and
 2030 91% of the time (Purnell et al. 1999). On the
 2031 basis of such high accuracy in associating dia-
 2032 lect to ethnic identity, sociologists conducted a
 2033 phone audit study of Philadelphia's rental hous-
 2034 ing market exploring whether variations in black-
 2035 sounding versus white-sounding phone inquiries

would relate to various housing access outcomes (Fischer and Massey 2004; Massey and Lundy 2001). The data revealed that speakers of a black-associated linguistic style were less likely than speakers of a white-associated linguistic style to speak to a rental agent (as opposed to leaving a voice mail), less likely to be informed that a unit was available, less likely to be given access to a unit, more likely to have fees requested, and more likely to receive a credit record inquiry. Another study found that racially identifiable voices also led to differential treatment during home insurance policy inquiries (Squires and Chadwick 2006). Just as the name on a resume triggered perceptions of the racial identity of a job applicant and led to discriminatory labor market outcomes, so too did the voice heard on a telephone suggest the perceived ethnic identity of a rental housing seeker that led to housing discrimination.

Rigorous, complex, and innovative studies on social psychology and neighborhood-related attitudes very clearly confirm that ethno-racial attitudes are implicated in the dynamics of racial residential segregation. While concerns about social class level of a neighborhood and declining property value are indeed important factors in evaluations of neighborhood desirability, race operates as more than a proxy for such considerations. Study after study reveals the independent effects that negative racial stereotypes and indicators of racial animus have on whites' neighborhood preferences, net of social class factors, while the effect of same-group preference on neighborhood attitudes, across all racial groups, is modest at best. Multiple studies attuned to the multiethnic landscape also point to a clear racial hierarchy in race-of-neighbor preferences, with blacks universally viewed as the least desirable neighbor and whites the most desirable. Finally, research exploring how social psychological mechanisms affect neighborhood attitudes across ethno-racial groups indicates that such processes differ between groups; social psychological processes that explain residential attitudes for one group may not apply to other groups (Hunt et al. 2000)

Racialized Politics

2083

To round out our brief survey of the social psychology of ethno-racial attitudes and social inequality, we now turn to a critical domain of social life that weighs directly and quite heavily on many of the issues we've discussed so far: the domain of politics. A sizeable inter-disciplinary literature now exists on the debate about whether racial prejudice, in some form, influences U.S. politics (Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Krysan 2000). This review will assess what we know about the influence of ethno-racial identities and attitudes on partisanship, voting, explicitly ethno-racial policy issues (i.e., school busing, affirmative action, immigration, bilingualism), and implicitly racial policy issues (e.g., welfare, crime and criminal justice).

In this section, we will attempt to address three questions. Do negative ethno-racial attitudes and outlooks heavily influence politics? If so, what is the nature of such negative outlooks, how should we measure them, and what sorts of outcomes do they affect? If not, how should we understand what appears and is often interpreted as racialized political controversy? Given the vast amount of literature that can be classified under the general heading "ethno-racial attitudes and politics," and the extensive treatment already done in the book, *Racialized Politics: The Debate about Racism in America* (Sears et al. 2000), we focus our attention on one of the theoretical frameworks introduced earlier: racial resentment.

Racial resentment has successfully predicted a number of electoral and other political outcomes over the course of over three decades of research. In one of the earliest tests of racial resentment, researchers asked if direct personal racial threat or racial resentment would better predict preference for a white mayoral candidate over a black mayoral candidate. Researchers found that racial resentment was a better predictor of white preference for voting against the black candidate than direct racial threat. The influence of racial resentment on voter preference did not wane even for those less vulnerable to direct racial threat (Kinder and Sears 1981). Racial resentment was also a better predictor than self-interest for whites'

2130 opposition to busing for school desegregation
 2131 (Sears and Allen 1984), and opposition to affir-
 2132 mative action (Jacobson 1985). In a more recent
 2133 test, Matsueda and Drakulich (2009) found that
 2134 controlling for both racial resentment and nega-
 2135 tive black stereotypes accounted for the nega-
 2136 tive influence of both Republican identification
 2137 and conservative ideology on support for affir-
 2138 mative action, though the relationship between
 2139 conservative ideology and racial resentment has
 2140 long been a point of contention (Sniderman and
 2141 Tetlock 1986; Tarman and Sears 2005). Racial
 2142 resentment also predicted 2008 presidential sup-
 2143 port for McCain over Obama (Ford et al. 2010;
 2144 Pasek et al. 2009), and either choosing not to vote
 2145 or voting for a nonmajor party candidate in 2008
 2146 versus voting for Obama (Pasek et al. 2009).

2147 Racial resentment has also been tested on po-
 2148 litical attitudes beyond the black/white divide.
 2149 Huddy and Sears (1995) found that an indicator
 2150 of new prejudice against Hispanics (disagreeing
 2151 that Hispanics' financial situation would improve
 2152 with a chance at a good education) predicted op-
 2153 position to bilingual education. They found that
 2154 negative averaged ratings towards Mexican-
 2155 Americans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans on an af-
 2156 fect thermometer scale also predicted opposition
 2157 to bilingual education. Finally, endorsement of
 2158 racial resentment targeted towards immigrants
 2159 (e.g. immigrants are too demanding in push for
 2160 equal rights, immigrants should work their way
 2161 up without special favors) predicted opposition
 2162 to a number of pro-immigration policies: allow-
 2163 ing increased legal immigration, granting immi-
 2164 grants eligibility for government assistance as
 2165 soon as they arrive, and illegal immigrant entitle-
 2166 ment to work permits, citizenship for their Amer-
 2167 ican-born children, and same costs for public uni-
 2168 versity attendance as other students (Berg 2013).

2169 Finally, racial resentment is also related to a
 2170 number of attitudes that are not explicitly race-
 2171 related. Individualism, economic self-interest,
 2172 and three racial resentment items predicted sup-
 2173 port for food stamps spending, an attitude to-
 2174 wards welfare (Gilens 1995). Racial resentment
 2175 also predicted opposition to health care policy
 2176 (Henderson and Hillygus 2011; Tesler 2012), and
 2177 crime-related concepts such as support for the

2178 death penalty and other punitive sanctions (Bobo
 2179 and Johnson 2004; Buckler et al. 2009; Matsueda
 2180 and Drakulich 2009), crime spending (Matsueda
 2181 and Drakulich 2009) and progressive punishment
 2182 policies (Buckler et al. 2009). Racial resentment
 2183 also predicted a racially-tinged, criminal justice-
 2184 associated behavior, the likelihood that Louisiana
 2185 registered voters closely followed news about
 2186 protests regarding a racially-charged court case
 2187 (Goidel et al. 2011).

2188 Racial resentment has undergone a number
 2189 of operationalized incarnations over the years.
 2190 While Henry and Sears (2002) endorse the eight
 2191 item Symbolic Racism 2000 (SR2K) scale, we
 2192 list instead the six item set Kinder and Sanders
 2193 (1996) offered to measure racial resentment,
 2194 some of which are identical to SR2K items.

- 2195 • Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minori-
 2196 ties overcame prejudice and worked their way
 2197 up. Blacks should do the same without any
 2198 special favors. 2198
- 2199 • Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten
 2200 less than they deserve. 2200
- 2201 • Government officials usually pay less atten-
 2202 tion to a request or complaint from a Black
 2203 person than from a white person. 2203
- 2204 • Most Blacks who receive money from welfare
 2205 programs could get along without it if they
 2206 tried. 2206
- 2207 • It's really a matter of some people not trying
 2208 hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder,
 2209 they could be just as well off as Whites. 2209
- 2210 • Generations of slavery and discrimination
 2211 have created conditions that make it difficult
 2212 for Blacks to work their way out of the lower
 2213 class. 2213

2214 These items taken together reflect the two core
 2215 dimensions of racial resentment: anti-black animus
 2216 and blacks' perceived violations of tradition-
 2217 al American values. Scholars have also argued
 2218 for updated items that more explicitly measure
 2219 racial resentment (Wilson and Davis 2011).

2220 One of the biggest challenges to racial resent-
 2221 ment theory has come from those who argue that
 2222 commitment to race-neutral values and principles
 2223 provides an alternative interpretational lens for
 2224 understanding what would appear to be racially
 2225 prejudiced political attitudes (Sniderman and

2226 Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993).
 2227 Such values include political conservatism (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Sniderman and Tetlock
 2228 1986), individualism (Feldman 1988; Sniderman
 2229 and Hagen 1985), and fairness and egalitarianism
 2230 (Peterson 1994; Sniderman and Carmines 1997).
 2231 Some have found that principled objections not
 2232 only reflect race-neutral values but are also man-
 2233 ifestations of group dominance (Federico and
 2234 Sidanius 2002). While some analysts engage in
 2235 contentious arguments about theoretical primacy,
 2236 a multi-causal framework that acknowledges the
 2237 important role played by both race-neutral values
 2238 and group-related factors is warranted (Bobo and
 2239 Tuan 2006).

2241 Space limitations do not permit us to review
 2242 other social psychological frameworks relevant
 2243 to the domain of race and politics. These in-
 2244 clude the aforementioned model of group posi-
 2245 tion theory, and other theoretical approaches
 2246 such as social dominance (Pratto et al. 1994;
 2247 Sidanius 1993; Sidanius and Pratto 1999), pa-
 2248 ternalism theory (Jackman 1994), stratification
 2249 beliefs (Kluegel and Smith 1983,1986; Tuch and
 2250 Hughes 1996), linked fate (Dawson 1994) and ra-
 2251 cialization (Gilens 1999; Tesler 2012; see Hunt,
 2252 this volume). Ethno-racial attitudes and identities
 2253 also play a major role in the political sociology of
 2254 collective action, from the “cognitive liberation”
 2255 of ethno-racial identities (McAdam 1982) to the
 2256 emotional pull and “frame lifting” exhortations
 2257 of African American church leaders involved in
 2258 civil rights struggle (Morris 2000; see Snow and
 2259 Owens, this volume). All these approaches testify
 2260 to the enduring connection between ethno-racial
 2261 attitudes, politics, and social inequality.

2262 Conclusion

2263 The social psychological study of ethno-racial
 2264 attitudes constitutes one of *the* quintessential il-
 2265 lustrations of sociological processes, insofar as
 2266 ethno-racial attitudes are deeply implicated in the
 2267 operation, reproduction, and transformation of
 2268 society at every level of analysis. From the micro-
 2269 level processes of cognitive categorization and
 2270 affective and behavioral aversion, to macro-level

2271 patterns of labor market sorting and residential
 2272 segregation, to either the unfettering or shackling
 2273 of possibilities via the election of political lead-
 2274 ers and the policy constraints and opportunities
 2275 placed upon them, ethno-racial attitudes structure
 2276 and are in turn structured by the complex and oft-
 2277 times contradictory impulses expressed through
 2278 historical and contemporary forces and the prac-
 2279 tice of individual and collective agency. Despite
 2280 our predilection for sociological analyses, we
 2281 believe most of the studies we reviewed indicate
 2282 that the social psychological investigation of eth-
 2283 no-racial attitudes and social inequality is a truly
 2284 interdisciplinary affair, spanning sociology, psy-
 2285 chology, political science, economics, anthropol-
 2286 ogy, linguistics, and health-related disciplines as
 2287 well (Krieger 1999; Major et al. 2013; Schnittker
 2288 and McLeod 2005; Williams et al. 2003). These
 2289 social psychological processes are too complex,
 2290 too variegated, too profoundly entwined in the
 2291 fabric of social life to be the province of any dis-
 2292 ciplinary silo. The goal of a United States where
 2293 ethno-racial factors no longer limit any individu-
 2294 als’ life chances is indeed a distant one, but the
 2295 malleability and change observed in ethno-racial
 2296 attitudes over the last half-century suggest that at
 2297 the very least, it is not an impossible one.
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