



Nationhood as Cultural Repertoire: Collective Identities and Political Attitudes in France and Germany

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For decades, nationalism research had been dominated by historical approaches that viewed the nation state as the product of economic and political forces channelled by elite actors. Once institutionalized, nationalism was seen as a *fait accompli*, except in unstable states, where fringe radicals and separatists occasionally disrupted the national equilibrium. This scholarly consensus was challenged by the publication of Michael Billig's (1995) seminal book on banal nationalism, which persuasively argued that the reproduction of the nation's hegemony is a continuous accomplishment, even in established nation states. Alongside emerging Bourdieusian approaches to nationalism (e.g. Brubaker 1992), Billig's thesis helped shift the focus of research from elite-driven politics to bottom-up identification processes, thereby motivating scholars to ask when and why people think, talk and act with the nation in their everyday lives.

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20 The bottom-up orientation of the new nationalism research has been
21 particularly sensitive to the contextual salience of national identification
22 in everyday situations (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). While sociologists
23 have also been concerned with variations in the meanings commonly
24 attached to the nation, they have been sceptical of reductive gener-
25 alizations that ascribe homogeneous identities to entire national com-
26 munities. The reluctance towards essentialization stems in part from
27 a reaction against the functionalist perspective that had all-too-often
28 mistaken dominant nationalist narratives for lived reality. Rather than
29 assuming that nations possess core values shared by most citizens, con-
30 temporary studies of nationalism have come to see the nation's mean-
31 ing as constructed and fragmented (Bonikowski 2016; Brubaker 2004;
32 Skey 2011).

33 The rejection of reductive understandings of national identity poses
34 particular problems for comparative research. Functionalist models had
35 provided simple comparative rubrics that distinguished between alter-
36 native models of nationalism and unproblematically assigned countries
37 to the resulting categories. The most dominant of such schemes was
38 the ethnic–civic typology popularized by Hans Kohn (1944), which
39 depicted Western nations as political communities based on elective
40 criteria of membership and Eastern nations as cultural communities
41 where ethnicity defined national belonging. This simplistic depiction of
42 national cultures has since been widely discredited as normatively and
43 analytically problematic and empirically inaccurate (Brubaker 2004;
44 Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002). While these critiques have been
45 persuasive, their unintended consequence has been the abandonment of
46 country-level comparisons. This has weakened the analytical power of
47 nationalism research, as most analyses have descended to the individual
48 level, focusing on attitudinal variation without much interest in over-
49 arching macro-level patterns of difference.

50 The ability to carry out systematic comparative research is of cen-
51 tral importance to the study of banal and everyday nationalism. The
52 key thesis of banal nationalism is that the cultural and institutional
53 dominance of the nation is reproduced through the same cognitive
54 and symbolic processes regardless of national context. Research on eve-
55 ryday nationalism accepts that claim, but further suggests that these



56 universal processes result in heterogeneous cognitive representations of
57 the nation across (and possibly within) countries. While the hegemony
58 of nationalism in contemporary society is widely recognized, how peo-
59 ple understand their nations and how they deploy those understandings
60 in practice require careful empirical study. Given the tension between
61 the universality of the national idea and the specificity of its cultural
62 manifestations, such research must attend to both within- and between-
63 country differences, which requires a comparative research design.

64 I suggest a middle ground solution to the problem of comparison
65 in nationalism studies. Consistent with much contemporary research
66 in this field, I reject the notion of coherent national cultures and abso-
67 lute between-country differences, instead viewing national identities
68 as multifaceted, heterogeneous and contested. At the same time, how-
69 ever, I propose a systematic way to study patterns of variation within
70 and across countries by drawing on past research on national cultural
71 repertoires (Lamont and Thévenot 2000) and multiple traditions of
72 nationalism (Smith 1997). Using survey data from two exemplary cases
73 in nationalism research—France and Germany—I demonstrate that
74 aggregate country differences on a range of nationalism variables mask
75 the existence of four distinct dispositions towards the nation within
76 each country, which I call liberal, disengaged, restrictive and ardent (cf.
77 Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). With some notable differences, these
78 repertoires of nationhood share a common cultural logic across the two
79 countries. I further show that the manner in which respondents in both
80 France and Germany understand their nations is associated with their
81 views on immigration, economic protectionism and European integra-
82 tion, as well as their support for radical right parties.

83 While this chapter relies on quantitative methods that have not been
84 widely used in the study of nationalism (but see Bonikowski 2013;
85 Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016), its contribution is not solely meth-
86 odological. The analytical approach taken here has broader theoretical
87 implications for how nationalism scholars should think about cultural
88 similarity and difference. My findings suggest that not only is the idea
89 of the nation state deeply institutionalized across countries, as argued
90 by banal nationalism research, but also that the repertoires of meanings
91 attributed to the nation may themselves be uniform across otherwise



92 distinct political cultures. By mapping these beliefs both within and
93 across countries, the chapter furthers the objective of everyday nation-
94 alism research to attend to micro-level meanings, while taking advan-
95 tage of the ability of survey analysis to make distributional claims about
96 popular attitudes.

97 Varieties of Nationalism in Comparative 98 Research

99 The traditional comparative approach to nationalism research was pri-
100 marily interested in the identification of nations' core values, which
101 were thought to be widely shared within national communities, endow-
102 ing their members with a sense of collective distinctiveness and com-
103 mon solidarity. In this vein, scholars of the US placed at the core of the
104 nation's political culture the key tenets of the American Creed, such as
105 individualism, liberty and scepticism of political authority (Hartz 1955;
106 Lipset 1990; de Tocqueville 1969 [1835]). Sincere belief in these prin-
107 ciples was seen as the main prerequisite for membership in the nation,
108 far outweighing any ascriptive criteria, like native-born status and ances-
109 try. While the specific mix of national values was uniquely American,
110 the idea that the nation is primarily a political community was seen as
111 typical of a civic variety of nationalism, which scholars identified with
112 English-speaking settler societies and the oldest of Europe's modern
113 nation states, where the state came to exist first and the nation followed
114 (Kohn 1944). Among the latter, France was a frequent exemplar: a
115 nation based not on ancestral lineage but on a common belief in repub-
116 lican values, which placed active participation in the political sphere at
117 the core of its members' citizenship duties (Brubaker 1992).

118 Against the example of French republicanism, scholars often placed
119 the German *Kulturnation* (Meinecke 1970 [1907]), where common
120 descent and shared traditions served as the primary bases for national
121 belonging. This ethnocultural form of nationalism was theorized and
122 advocated by von Herder (2002 [1792]) and came to occupy a central
123 role in Kohn's (1944) ethnic-civic binary typology, according to which



124 Germany was an example of a broader, non-Western nationalist tradi-
125 tion. The ethnic–civic dichotomy animated nationalism research for
126 many years, as did the broader scholarly tradition of distilling essential
127 properties of national political cultures (Schulman 2002; Smith 1997).

128 Over time, however, this approach became increasingly unpopular,
129 not least because of the contradictions observable in seemingly exem-
130 plary cases. The US, an ostensible paragon of civic nationalism, had a
131 long history of racial domination from slavery to legally sanctioned seg-
132regation to contemporary discrimination and systemic racism (Smith
133 1997). France was a nation of civic republicanism, but also of Vichy-
134 era persecution of Jews and other ethnic and cultural minorities and
135 of contemporary anti-Muslim sentiments (Korteweg and Yurdakul
136 2014; Marrus and Paxton 1981). Germany had a long and tragic his-
137 tory of ethnoracial violence, and it reckoned with its Nazi past after
138 the Second World War and opened its door to migrants from Eastern
139 Europe and Turkey in more recent decades (Joppke 2007). Such exam-
140 ples led Brubaker (2004) to declare that when taken seriously, the
141 ethnic–civic categories constitute ‘empty sets’ (p. 137). While the dis-
142 tinction between ethnic and civic nationalism may retain some utility
143 for describing individual-level attitudes, its empirical validity for charac-
144 terizing entire nations or geographic regions has been further challenged
145 by survey research (e.g. Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002).

146 The decline of the ethnic–civic typology has been further aided by
147 a general distrust towards essentialist cultural claims. The overarch-
148 ing project of identifying core principles of national political cultures
149 came to be seen as an uncritical perpetuation of myths that were them-
150 selves the product of nationalist ideology (Brubaker 2004). The result
151 has been a movement away from cross-national comparisons and
152 towards individual-level analyses, which privilege lived experience, the
153 situational contextuality of identification processes and unpatterned
154 variation (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). This tendency has been no less
155 pronounced in survey-based research than in qualitative work. While
156 interview-based studies seek to uncover the mechanisms of national-
157 ism-in-practice (e.g. Miller-Idriss 2009), survey analyses tend to focus
158 on specific nationalism variables, which are abstracted from individual



159 respondents and correlated with a range of outcomes of interest (e.g.
160 Schatz et al. 1999).

161 Among the many strengths of these approaches has been their com-
162 mitment to rigorous empirical analysis, their ability to demonstrate
163 nationalism's importance (and lack thereof) in everyday interactions
164 and their attention to the implications of nationalist beliefs for other
165 domains of social life. These advances, however, have come at the cost
166 of a reduced ability to carry out meaningful cross-national research.

167 Cultural Repertoires: An Alternative 168 Comparative Framework

169 If we accept that nationalism in everyday practice is more heterogene-
170 ous and messier than classic accounts of uniform national identities
171 had assumed, how might we conceive of macro-level comparisons in a
172 way that attends to this underlying cultural complexity? Comparisons
173 of average responses to attitudinal surveys are overly reductive, while
174 inferences about popular beliefs from public narratives risk reproduc-
175 ing dominant nationalist ideologies. An alternative solution is suggested
176 by comparative research in cultural sociology. Instead of essentializing
177 cultural differences to the national level, scholars can look for heteroge-
178 neous cultural repertoires within countries and ask whether those rep-
179 ertoires resemble what is observed in other national contexts (Lamont
180 and Thévenot 2000). Researchers have demonstrated, for instance, that
181 in producing moral evaluations of social groups, American and French
182 respondents have access to similar discursive options, relying either on a
183 market-based logic or that of civic solidarity (Lamont 2000). What differs
184 across the countries is the relative prevalence of these evaluative frames.
185 Similarly, Ferree (2003) shows that what distinguishes abortion discourse
186 in the US and Germany is not the content of the arguments but rather
187 the relative prominence of competing narratives in the public sphere:
188 what is mainstream in the US is radical in Germany and vice versa.

189 This suggests an approach to nationalism that identifies multiple
patterns of beliefs within countries and then compares their content



190 and relative prevalence across countries. Indeed, there is precedent for
191 this type of analytical strategy. Though it does not engage in compari-
192 son and emphasizes legal decisions instead of popular attitudes, Rogers
193 Smith's historical research (1997) disaggregates US nationalism into
194 three distinct traditions (liberal, civic republican and ethnocultural)
195 that have competed with one another throughout the country's history.
196 The struggles and occasional compromises between elites espousing
197 these ideologies have produced a complex and contradictory collec-
198 tion of immigration laws that combine elements from each of the three
199 traditions.

200 While revealing different belief structures than those identified
201 by Smith (1997), my past work has shown that the multiple tradi-
202 tions approach can be adapted to the analysis of survey data in order
203 to identify subnational communities of thought that conceptualize the
204 nation in distinct ways (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). Americans
205 combine beliefs about the nation's symbolic boundaries, feelings of
206 pride in the nation and the state and attitudes towards other countries
207 in patterned ways that reveal four underlying cultural schemas (I refer
208 to these as disengaged, creedal or liberal nationalist, restrictive nation-
209 alist and ardent nationalist). In the present chapter, I employ a similar
210 strategy to examine popular nationalism in France and Germany, the
211 two countries long held up as exemplars of civic and ethnic national-
212 ism, respectively. I demonstrate that, much like in the US case, each
213 national sample contains four distinct orientations towards the nation,
214 which are similar in overall structure across the countries. Moreover,
215 espousal of these nationalist beliefs is associated with important political
216 attitudes—in this case, those related to support for radical-right parties.
217 These findings suggest that meaningful, bottom-up and person-centred
218 cross-national comparisons are possible, but they require a shift away
219 from standard variable-based methods of survey analysis. While broadly
220 consistent with the theoretical orientation of qualitative studies on eve-
221 ryday nationalism, the survey-based approach proposed here makes it
222 possible to inductively identify patterns of beliefs based on nationally
223 representative samples, to systematically measure their prevalence across
224 groups and to examine their associations with other social and political
225 attitudes.



226 **Data and Methods**

227

228 To examine the variation in popular understandings of the nation
229 in France and Germany, I rely on data from the National Identity III
230 Supplement to the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The
231 ISSP is a cross-national survey based on representative samples from
232 over 30 countries, which has been administered annually since 1985.
233 The national identity module contains a wide range of questions about
234 the nation, as well as items concerning political preferences, immigra-
235 tion, economic and cultural protectionism and supranational institu-
236 tions. The surveys were administered in France in 2013 and in Germany
237 in 2014, resulting in sample sizes of 2017 and 1717 respondents,
238 respectively. After listwise deletion of missing data on sociodemographic
239 covariates, the sample sizes were reduced to 1049 French respondents
240 and 858 German respondents.

241 The usual strategy in survey-based studies of nationalism is to hone
242 in on a specific variable or item scale and correlate it with other social
243 attitudes and policy preferences. Scholars have typically focused on the
244 intensity of national identification (Li and Brewer 2004), ascriptive
245 and elective criteria of national belonging (Kunovich 2009), domain-
246 specific national pride (Smith and Kim 2006) or hubristic compari-
247 sons of the nation with the rest of the world (Kosterman and Feshbach
248 1989). Indeed, these topics constitute four groups of questions within
249 a 23-item battery that has been featured in multiple waves of the ISSP.
250 My analyses rely on these same items, but in contrast to past research, I
251 simultaneously include all of them in my models, based on the assump-
252 tions that people's cognitive representations of the nation are mul-
253 tifaceted and that the meaning of any given item is a function of its
254 relationship to other items (DiMaggio 1997; Mohr 1998).

255 The method I employ to analyse the distribution of responses within
256 and across countries is latent class analysis (LCA) (Hagenaars 1993).
257 This approach makes it possible to identify clusters of respondents who
258 share similar response profiles across multiple survey questions. The

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Editor Proof



259 analyst selects the appropriate survey items to include in the model
260 and chooses a target number of clusters (referred to as ‘latent classes’);
261 an iterative algorithm then divides the sample into the predetermined
262 number of clusters in a manner that maximizes their internal homoge-
263 neity and mutual differentiation. Multiple models with different num-
264 bers of latent classes can be compared based on fit statistics in order to
265 determine which model most accurately describes the data. Once the
266 optimal model is selected, the LCA procedure generates class member-
267 ship probabilities for every respondent, assigns each respondent to the
268 class with the highest membership probability and produces descriptive
269 statistics for the variables of interest (in this case, nationalist attitudes),
270 which can be used to interpret the content of the classes. The result is a
271 set of discrete groups of respondents, each characterized by a particular
272 distribution of attitudes.

273 If we take survey responses to be indicative of beliefs, then patterns
274 of responses that appear to ‘hang together’ within latent classes can
275 be interpreted as indicative of distinct orientations towards the nation
276 (importantly, this does not imply that respondents belonging to a par-
277 ticular class are part of a self-conscious group or even that they hold
278 shared beliefs for the same reasons). We can then ask whether the simi-
279 larity of nationalist beliefs among these subsets of respondents is system-
280 atically associated with other social and political attitudes, particularly
281 if those attitudes relate closely to the nation. It is also possible to deter-
282 mine what sociodemographic variables predict membership in each
283 latent class.

284 It is worth emphasizing that the latent class approach is fundamen-
285 tally person-centred, even if my supplementary analyses rely on regres-
286 sion analyses: the nationalism profiles are derived entirely from the
287 co-occurrence of attitudinal responses within individuals and each
288 respondent is assigned unambiguously to one of the nationalism pro-
289 files. This makes it quite different from variable-based methods that
290 abstract specific cultural and demographic traits from individuals and
291 look for net associations after controlling for other predictors.

292



293 France and Germany: Aggregate Differences

294 In order to orient the analyses, it is worthwhile to consider what differ-
295 ences we might expect to find between France and Germany at the
296 aggregate level in 2013–2014. The simplest predictions come from
297 Kohn's (1944) ethnic–civic model: on average, Germans should favour
298 more restrictive definitions of the nation's symbolic boundaries, while
299 the French should be more inclined to define the nation in primar-
300 ily civic terms (Brubaker 1992). This distinction is likely to be muted,
301 however, as a result of Germany's gradual shift towards more permis-
302 sive citizenship regulation, which culminated in major reforms in 1999
303 (Joppke 2007). Indeed, past studies have found Germans to be less sup-
304 portive of ethnic definitions of the nation than expected (Jones and
305 Smith 2001; Shulman 2002).

306 On national pride, we would expect Germany to score lower than
307 France due to continued legacies of the Second World War in German
308 collective memory and national identity (Smith and Jarkko 1998;
309 Smith and Kim 2006). These differences should be particularly marked
310 on questions related to the military and history but much less so on
311 items related to the economy and the welfare state (Blank and Schmidt
312 2003; Evans and Kelley 2002). For the same reason, we should expect
313 Germans to be less likely to express chauvinistic attitudes towards the
314 rest of the world.

315 Finally, expectations concerning differences in the overall strength
316 of national identification are less obvious. Neither country has strong
317 regionalist movements that challenge the national project and both are
318 economic and political leaders in the European Union, which should
319 result in relatively similar pressures towards supranational identifica-
320 tion (which is generally quite weak across Western European countries
321 [Fligstein et al. 2012]).

322 To evaluate these predictions, one can simply compare the vari-
323 able distributions across the two countries. The country means, stand-
324 ard deviations and significance tests of between-country differences
325 for the 23 nationalism variables are presented in Table 1. Contrary to
326 expectations, the French sample placed stricter restrictions on national



Table 1 Nationalism variable means by country, 2013 ISSP

	France		Germany		Prob > z
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	
How close do you feel to [France/Germany]	3.44	0.71	3.18	0.68	15.85
Some people say the following things are important for being truly [French/German]. Others say they are not important.					
How important do you think each of the following is?					
To be a Christian	1.60	0.96	1.96	0.98	10.39
To have [French/German] ancestry	2.45	1.12	2.32	0.99	2.81
To have been born in [France/Germany]	2.88	1.10	2.70	0.95	4.46
To have lived in [France/Germany] for most of one's life	3.01	0.94	2.93	0.87	2.74
To be able to speak [French/German]	3.71	0.56	3.64	0.62	4.01
To respect [France's/Germany's] political institutions and laws	3.78	0.49	3.46	0.68	18.81
To have [French/German] citizenship	3.47	0.78	3.17	0.84	12.09
To feel [French/German]	3.55	0.70	3.04	0.86	20.51
How proud are you of [France/Germany] in each of the following?					
The way democracy works	2.51	0.84	2.87	0.72	9.48
[France/Germany]'s economic achievements	1.91	0.73	3.16	0.67	39.08
Its social security system	3.13	0.82	3.00	0.70	8.55
Its political influence in the world	2.46	0.79	2.77	0.74	7.95
Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society	2.36	0.88	2.55	0.77	3.34
[France/Germany]'s armed forces	3.05	0.76	2.18	0.84	27.91
Its history	3.30	0.70	2.19	0.89	33.03
Its scientific and technological achievements	3.09	0.67	3.30	0.64	8.44
Its achievements in the arts and literature	3.11	0.69	3.03	0.69	3.07
Its achievements in sports	2.79	0.73	3.08	0.78	13.25

(continued)




Table 1 (continued)

	France		Germany		z	Prob > z
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?						
I would rather be a citizen of [France/Germany] than of any other country in the world	3.79	1.14	3.71	1.11	4.25	0.00
Generally speaking, [France/Germany] is a better country than most other countries	3.04	1.14	3.42	1.08	8.14	0.00
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like [the French/Germans]	2.55	1.18	2.91	1.11	8.73	0.00
There are some things about [France/Germany] today that make me feel ashamed of [France/Germany]	3.62	1.23	3.11	1.20	9.73	0.00
People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong	2.78	1.28	2.55	1.13	5.49	0.00

Note All variables are ordinal

Means are used for ease of presentation

Z-scores and p-values are from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sample tests





327 membership on all but one indicator: religion. While the contrasts
328 were the most marked for elective criteria of belonging, all differences,
329 including those for ethnocultural criteria, were statistically significant.
330 That is, while both countries favour civic over ethnic bases of national
331 membership, on average, the French appear to be more exclusionary
332 than the Germans. That religion would be an exception to this pattern
333 is understandable, given the dominance of secular republicanism in
334 French political culture (but note that this item has the lowest mean in
335 both countries).

336 On measures of pride in the military and in history, the results are
337 consistent with expectations: on average, Germans are much less likely
338 to express pride in these aspects of their country than the French. The
339 same is true of pride in the social security system, achievements in the
340 arts and literature and three of five chauvinism questions (preference
341 for the country's citizenship, lack of shame in the country and uncondi-
342 tional support for the country). On the remaining pride and chau-
343 vinism questions, however, Germans score higher than the French,
344 contrary to predictions based on past literature. The contrast is the
345 greatest for pride in the country's economic achievements. Finally, on
346 general identification with the nation, the mean for the French sample
347 is higher than that for the German sample.

348 These results challenge arguments that classify these countries as
349 belonging to two distinct types of nationalism. In general, respond-
350 ents in both countries exhibit similar patterns of beliefs: they privilege
351 civic over ethnic criteria of belonging, express moderate pride in their
352 nations (more so in its intellectual achievements than institutions) and
353 moderate levels of chauvinism and feel close to their nations. Because
354 these analyses are carried out at the national level, however, they cannot
355 estimate the heterogeneity of national self-conceptions within the coun-
356 tries. To do so, it is necessary to rely on methods that simultaneously
357 enable within- and between-country comparisons. Latent class analysis
358 is one such approach.



359 **Repertoires of Nationhood in France**
360 **and Germany**

361 To identify clusters of respondents with similar dispositions towards the
362 nation within each country, I performed separate latent class analyses
363 (LCA) on the two samples. In both cases, a cross-model comparison of
364 the approximate weight of evidence (AWE) criterion, which evaluates
365 model fit while taking into account parsimony and classification error,
366 suggested that a four-class solution represented the most reasonable fit
367 to the data.¹ The distributions of the 23 nationalism variables across the
368 four classes in each country are illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2.

369 Despite some cross-national differences in the class-specific response
370 probabilities, the four varieties of nationalism yielded by LCA appear
371 to have a similar logic in both Germany and France (and to also bear
372 resemblance to those found in the US [Bonikowski and DiMaggio
373 2016]). In both countries, two of the classes appear to occupy opposite
374 ends of a continuum between a general rejection and general endorse-
375 ment of most of the nationalism items in the survey. The first of these
376 classes, whose members I call *the disengaged*, is characterized by low
377 levels of national attachment, strong disavowal of ethnic criteria of
378 national membership, relatively low levels of pride in the nation and
379 disagreement with most of the chauvinism items.² It accounts for 19%
380 of the sample in France and 13% in Germany. The second class, which I
381 call *ardent nationalist*, expresses the opposite pattern of attitudes: strong
382 national identification, an embrace of all barriers to national member-
383 ship (of which religion receives the lowest support), a high degree of
384 pride in all aspects of the nation (including the military and history in
385 Germany) and relatively high levels of chauvinism. Ardent nationalists
386 represent 21% of the sample in France and 13% in Germany.

387 The remaining two classes do not fall on the same continuum.
388 Respondents assigned to the first, which I call *liberal nationalist*
389 (cf. Tamir 1993), largely reject ethnocultural criteria of national
390 membership, but exhibit strong national identification and moderate
391 levels of pride and chauvinism. Liberal nationalism is the most prevalent
392 of the four classes, representing 46% of the French sample and 50% of




Fig. 1 Latent class composition in France

393 the German sample. The second class, which I call *restrictive nationalist*,
 394 groups together respondents who embrace ethnocultural criteria of
 395 national membership, but who exhibit only moderate levels of national
 396 identification (especially in France), low levels of pride in political
 397 institutions (again, this is especially true in France) and moderate levels
 398 of chauvinism. It appears then that restrictive nationalists, who account
 399 for 13% of the sample in France and 25% in Germany, draw sharp
 400 symbolic boundaries around the nation, but have relatively less regard
 401 for the state, particularly when compared with ardent nationalists.




Fig. 2 Latent class composition in Germany

402 It is possible that this response pattern is a result of discontent
 403 with the direction in which the country has moved and a desire to
 404 restrict national membership, perhaps in an effort to restore its past
 405 demographic composition. If so, we may expect members of this class to
 406 be particularly supportive of populist radical right parties.

407 These results clearly demonstrate that nationalism is not a uni-
 408 tary phenomenon within these two nations and moreover that beliefs
 409 about the nation cannot be arranged on a continuum from less to more
 410 nationalistic. On the contrary, the four types of nationalism are not



411 only discrete, but also cross-cutting in their attitudinal composition. As
412 we shall see, adherence to these contrasting cultural models has impor-
413 tant implications for people's political attitudes.

414 Despite the overall structural similarity between the four classes in
415 France and Germany, there are some notable differences between them.
416 The French liberal nationalists are much more adamant about the
417 importance of civic criteria of national membership (language ability,
418 respect for institutions, citizenship and subjective feeling) than German
419 liberal nationalists, which is consistent with the dominance of the civic
420 republican model in France. On ethnocultural criteria of belonging,
421 the differences are more complex and reveal underlying differences that
422 were not visible in the aggregate analyses: while the restrictive nation-
423 alists and the disengaged are somewhat less ethnonationalist in France
424 than in Germany, French ardent nationalists (and to some degree liberal
425 nationalists) exceed their German counterparts in favouring ancestry,
426 native birth and lifelong residence as criteria of national membership. It
427 is the higher prevalence in France of this particularly exclusionary type
428 of nationalism that explains why the French sample is more ethnona-
429 tionalist in the aggregate. Consistent with the aggregate analyses, reli-
430 gious definitions of the nation are less common across all four classes
431 in France, though the differences are the smallest among the ardent
432 nationalists.

433 Levels of national pride and hubris evidence some differences among
434 the classes as well. The restrictive and ardent nationalists (but not the
435 liberal nationalists and the disengaged) display higher levels of pride in
436 Germany than they do in France, especially when it comes to the coun-
437 try's economic achievements. As was suggested by the aggregate analy-
438 ses, the two exceptions to this are pride in history and the armed forces,
439 both of which are likely affected by Germany's collective memory of
440 the Second World War. Chauvinism is distributed similarly in both
441 countries, except among the restrictive nationalists in France, who are
442 less likely to view other countries in a disparaging manner than their
443 German counterparts.

444 The above differences point to some country-specific features of
445 nationalism, but these are overshadowed by the overall structural con-
446 sistency in the attitudinal patterns that constitute the four classes.



447 Nationalism in both Germany and France is a heterogeneous phenom-
448 enon, composed of four distinct attitudinal orientations towards the
449 nation that appear to share more in common across national borders
450 than within them. At a minimum, this finding lends credence to the
451 view that 'far from being uniformly distributed in time and space, carry-
452 ing an equal, banal meaning to all the members of the nation, national-
453 ism might be consumed, articulated and mobilized differently by [...]
454 different subjects' (Antonsich 2016: p. 33). The meanings with which
455 people understand and enact their nationhood appear to vary consider-
456 ably within nations, but do so in patterned ways. This opens the possi-
457 bility of seeing everyday nationalism as reflective of underlying cultural
458 cleavages that may shape social interaction and political mobilization.

459 The similarities in nationalism *across* the two countries suggest that
460 there may exist a common repertoire of dispositions towards the nation
461 that transcends national boundaries. If it is the case that a randomly
462 selected French citizen is likely to imagine the nation in a manner more
463 consistent with a similarly disposed German citizen than with another
464 French compatriot, this calls into question the adequacy of analyses that
465 treat culture as nationally bounded (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002).
466 Moreover, this points to a possible extension to Billig's (1995) work: not
467 only is the nation itself pervasive and deeply institutionalized, but the
468 same may be true of the range of options available to everyday people
469 for conceptualizing the nation's meaning.

470 Nationalism and Political Attitudes

471 The identification of multiple varieties of nationalism is relevant only
472 to the degree that these attitudinal clusters affect other politically and
473 socially relevant outcomes. Among the most widely discussed develop-
474 ment in European politics of the past decade has been the rise of
475 radical right parties that combine anti-immigration positions with
476 Euroscepticism (Mudde 2007; Berezin 2009). In France, the National
477 Front has received considerable support in local and regional elections
478 and its leader, Marine Le Pen, has been a contender for the country's
479 presidency. In Germany, the radical right has been more muted in



480 institutional politics, but the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the
481 National Democratic Party (NPD) have been gaining ground in state
482 and European elections; furthermore, radical social movements have
483 long been a prominent feature of German society. Given that national-
484 ist appeals are central to the success of these parties, the four types of
485 nationalism found in both countries should have implications for radi-
486 cal right politics.

487 The ISSP is not ideally suited for predicting support for radical right
488 parties, however, because the survey only asks respondents about their
489 voting preferences in general elections, rather than those held at the
490 municipal or regional level. The German NPD and AfD have received
491 only modest support in elections to the *Bundestag*, so the sample rep-
492 resenting their voters is not large enough to enable meaningful analyses
493 (only 10 German ISSP respondents report voting for the NPD and 54
494 report voting for the AfD). The National Front has been more success-
495 ful in national elections, so the size of relevant French sample is larger,
496 consisting of 179 respondents. The ISSP does not ask about support for
497 radical movements outside of institutional politics. Consequently, I will
498 analyse the association between nationalism and radical right support in
499 France but not Germany.

500 Whereas data on party preferences are limited in the ISSP, the survey
501 does allow for an examination of two sets of political attitudes associ-
502 ated with radical right support: anti-immigrant sentiment and negative
503 perceptions of the EU. Questions measuring the former are available for
504 the French and German samples, while the latter were only asked of the
505 French sample. In addition, I will examine another correlate of nation-
506 alism, which is distinct from anti-immigrant sentiment: economic pro-
507 tectionism. Like anti-immigrant sentiment, economic protectionism is
508 concerned with the penetration of nation state borders, but its focus is
509 on capital and goods rather than people.

510 Immigration attitudes are measured by five items that probe respond-
511 ents' agreement with statements about immigrants increasing crime
512 rates, being good for the economy, taking away jobs from the native-
513 born, bringing in new ideas and cultures and undermining national
514 culture. All the items were recoded so that higher values indicated less
515 favourable opinions of immigration; the variables were then summed



516 into a continuous scale of anti-immigrant belief (Cronbach's alpha:
517 0.80 for France, 0.74 for Germany). In addition, the survey features a
518 number of EU-related questions; the present analyses rely on the most
519 general of these, which asks respondents whether they agree that the
520 country (in this case France) benefits from being a member of the EU.
521 Finally, the economic protectionism item asks whether the country
522 should limit foreign imports.

523 Figure 3 presents the results of models that predict anti-immigrant
524 attitudes and economic protectionism in France and Germany. In
525 addition to cluster membership (corrected for misclassification error
526 [Bakk et al. 2013]), the models control for a range of covariates,
527 including gender, citizenship status, religious denomination, religiosity,
528 ethnicity, age and household income. The immigration attitudes are
529 modelled using ordinary least-squares regression, while economic
530 protectionism is modelled using logistic regression (the point estimates
531 are expressed in terms of odds ratios). In both cases, a clear pattern
532 emerges: the four varieties of nationalism are distinctly and significantly




Fig. 3 Results of regressions predicting anti-immigrant attitudes and economic protectionism in France and Germany

Editor Proof



533 associated with the outcomes of interest. The disengaged express the
 534 lowest levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and economic protectionism,
 535 the ardent nationalists express the highest levels and the liberal and
 536 restrictive nationalists, respectively, occupy the middle ground. The
 537 effect sizes are larger in France than in Germany, but the same overall
 538 pattern holds in both countries.

539 Results from models predicting anti-EU attitudes and support for the
 540 National Front (both in France only) are presented in Fig. 4. Here, the
 541 patterns are somewhat different than in Fig. 3: the disengaged are no
 542 less likely to favour the EU than the liberal nationalists, while restric-
 543 tive nationalists are more likely to express opposition to the EU than
 544 the ardent nationalists. It appears that the low institutional pride of
 545 the restrictive nationalists extends to supranational bodies, which they
 546 view with the greater scepticism than other French respondents. If both
 547 Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant sentiments drive support for radi-
 548 cal right parties (Ivarsflaten 2008; Taggart 1998), then we should expect
 549 restrictive nationalists and ardent nationalists to express similar levels of
 550 support for the far right: the restrictive nationalists due to their strong
 551 anti-EU sentiments and weaker anti-immigrant attitudes and the ardent
 552 nationalists due to their strong anti-immigrant attitudes and weaker
 553 Euroscepticism. Indeed, this is what we observe in the right panel of
 554 Fig. 4: among centre-right and far-right voters, the difference in the
 555 probability of voting for the National Front between restrictive and
 ardent nationalists is not statistically significant (the standard errors are
 large due to the small sample size).




Fig. 4 Results of regressions predicting anti-EU attitudes and vote for the National Front (FN) among center-right and right voters in France

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556 Together, these results suggest that nationalism is a robust predictor
557 of political attitudes, even when controlling for sociodemographic
558 covariates. Ardent nationalists, whose views are characterized by strong
559 national identification, exclusionary definitions of national membership
560 and high levels of pride and hubris, are the most likely to hold anti-
561 immigrant and protectionist attitudes, while restrictive nationalists,
562 whose exclusionary definitions of the nation's boundaries are not
563 accompanied by high levels of national pride and hubris, are particularly
564 critical of the EU (in France). Despite these differences, in the French
565 context, both groups are equally likely to support radical right
566 politics. In contrast, the disengaged are consistently more positively
567 predisposed towards immigration and trade and more strongly opposed
568 to the radical right (in France) than not only the restrictive and ardent
569 nationalists, but also the liberal nationalists. It is only on attitudes
570 towards the EU that the disengaged and liberal nationalists exhibit
571 similar response patterns.

572 In sum, the nation continues to serve as a central point of reference
573 for the French and for Germans, but its meaning varies within each
574 population. Whether considering the role of supranational institutions
575 or policies towards migrants, the policy preferences of citizens in both
576 countries are, at least in part, filtered through their particular under-
577 standing of their nation in terms of its demographic composition, its
578 institutional and human achievements and its place in the world.

579
580

The Path Forward

581 By inductively identifying clusters of survey respondents with shared
582 attitudinal profiles, this paper has demonstrated that conceptions
583 of nationhood are heterogeneous within France and Germany, the
584 two nations often cited as exemplars of distinct nationalist traditions.
585 Some cultural differences between the countries persist, to be sure, but
586 once the within-country variation is accounted for, these differences
587 become a matter of degree rather than of kind. For all their historical
588 and institutional uniqueness, France and Germany are characterized by



589 strikingly similar repertoires of nationhood, which correlate in similar
590 ways with other political preferences, especially attitudes towards immi-
591 gration and economic protectionism.

592 The approach employed here demonstrates that it is possible to
593 engage in cross-national comparison without resorting to country-level
594 cultural reductionism or to its converse, variable-based individualism.
595 Latent class analysis and related sample decomposition methods allow
596 for the detection of patterned variation in nationalist beliefs with-
597 out making strong assumptions about the logical consistency of belief
598 structures or their homogeneity within national populations. It then
599 becomes an empirical question whether the resulting repertoires of
600 nationhood differ more within countries or between them. In the case
601 of France and Germany, within-country differences appear to be para-
602 mount.

603 If political beliefs and behaviours are partly shaped by the mean-
604 ings people attach to the nation, as scholars of everyday nationalism
605 have argued, then systematically mapping those understandings across
606 countries is an essential first step in developing insights about the role of
607 nationalism in modern democracies. To the extent that the lines of cul-
608 tural cleavage related to nationalist beliefs are similar across countries,
609 they may suggest similar explanations for common social and political
610 outcomes, like intolerance towards ethnic minorities and support for
611 radical-right parties. If so, the approach taken here promises to connect
612 the micro-level of everyday nationalism with macro-level outcomes and
613 to do so in a way that transcends the methodological nationalism of
614 much research on this topic.

615 While this study illustrates the potential profitability of a repertoire-
616 based approach to the study of nationalism, its findings raise further
617 questions for future research. If nationalism is indeed characterized by
618 discrete conceptions of the nation that coexist—and potentially compe-
619 pete—within countries, it becomes important to ask how these cultural
620 models change over time. Are the repertoires of nationhood stable in
621 their attitudinal composition or do the constituent attitudes vary with
622 socioeconomic conditions? If the content of the repertoires is stable,
623 what kinds of events might produce shifts in the relative prevalence of
624



625 their component parts? Moreover, how do the tensions between these
626 alternative definitions of the nation affect political change? Is it possi-
627 ble to think of these repertoires as indicative of deeply seated cultural
628 cleavages that can be mobilized by nationalist elite discourse or that can
629 pose challenges to existing political narratives of nationhood? Finally,
630 are there circumstances under which the repertoires themselves undergo
631 major change, possibly calling into question the logic of nationalism
632 itself? To begin answering these questions, what is needed are more sys-
633 tematic longitudinal data on nationalist beliefs and political preferences,
634 and also in-depth qualitative studies of the mechanisms that link con-
635 ceptions of nationhood with politics.

636 This chapter began with a reference to Michael Billig's seminal work
637 on banal nationalism, so it is fitting to conclude by asking how the per-
638 spective adopted here builds on Billig's insights. In the most general
639 sense, this project is motivated by Billig's emphasis on the need to study
640 nationalism in established rather than emergent nation states, in rela-
641 tively settled times rather than moments of institutional upheaval and
642 among everyday people rather than elites. The nation is a fundamental
643 and deeply institutionalized object of political and cultural affiliation,
644 but it is also a cognitive, affective and discursive frame through which
645 people perceive and understand their reality and thus, with which they
646 think, talk and act.³ But institutionalization does not imply cultural
647 homogeneity and consensus. All members of a national population
648 may take for granted the existence of the nation state, but they need
649 not agree about that nation state's meaning. Indeed, such disagreements
650 may fuel ongoing political contestation within countries, which may—
651 under particular circumstances—lead to eruptions of nationalism's more
652 volatile manifestations (what Billig calls 'hot nationalism'). If so, it is
653 imperative that social scientists gain analytical purchase on the varie-
654 ties of popular nationalism prevalent among national populations. This
655 chapter demonstrates that survey research, when carried out in a man-
656 ner that takes seriously the relationality of meaning, offers a useful com-
657 plement to qualitative studies of everyday nationhood by enabling the
658 identification and systematic comparison of cultural repertoires across
659 social groups.



660 **Notes**

- 661 1. Another frequently used model statistic, the Bayesian information cri-
662 terion (BIC), favoured baseline models with greater numbers of classes,
663 but the four-class model provided a superior fit to the data after account-
664 ing for local dependencies among pairs of indicators with large model
665 residuals (Vermunt 1997).
- 666 2. While it may be tempting to interpret this attitudinal profile as indica-
667 tive of respondents' cosmopolitanism, I refrain from doing so, because
668 disengagement from the nation could be a product of other beliefs, such
669 as multiple competing national attachments, strong ties to the local
670 community or a more general reluctance to strongly identify with a col-
671 lective community.
- 672 3. Of course, the analyses in this chapter do not attend to all the dimen-
673 sions of everyday nationalism. How cognitive representations of the
674 nation may be activated by affective states and how they may structure
675 discursive practices are important topics for future research.

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Author Biography

Bart Bonikowski is Associate Professor of Sociology at Harvard University
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784 Relying on surveys, textual data, and experimental methods, his research
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787 research has shown that meanings attached to the nation are fragmented
788 within national populations but consistent across them, that the nation and
789 the state evoke distinct cognitive constructs with differential affective loadings,
790 and that national identification fluctuates in patterned ways within national
791 communities. In studying populism, he has sought to reframe the phenom-
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