Schemas of the Nation in Modern Democracies

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Abstract
This study develops a novel analytical approach for studying popular conceptions of the nation-state that accounts for both within- and between-country heterogeneity and avoids a priori assumptions about the national boundedness of culture. I identify widely shared attitudinal patterns among a pooled sample of over 27,000 respondents from thirty countries and only subsequently examine those respondents’ national affiliations. Having established the robustness of the resulting four-fold typology of nationalist beliefs using multiple strategies, including out-of-sample replication, I relate these cultural schemas to the respondents’ political beliefs. The results reveal four characteristics of nationalism in settled times: 1) meanings attributed to the nation are far more heterogeneous than is suggested by existing theories; 2) the same four cultural schemas of the nation are found in all countries, though their relative prevalence varies; 3) the content—but not the distribution—of the schemas is stable over time; and 4) schemas of the nation are highly predictive of other political attitudes. The paper makes a substantive contribution to research on political culture and offers a general analytical approach for the comparative study of collective identification.

The symbolic meanings attributed by individuals to their nations are associated with a variety of outcomes of interest to sociologists and political scientists. Restrictive conceptions of a nation’s social boundaries, strong collective identification with the nation, high levels of national pride, and feelings of national superiority, for instance, have been linked to heightened levels of in-group favoritism, out-group prejudice, and support for authoritarian politics (Blank, Schmidt, and Westle 2001; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Kunovich 2009; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). These attitudinal associations have been shown to influence voting and support for public policies, particularly when the nation is made salient in political discourse (Sears 1993; Citrin et al. 1990). Historical studies have also demonstrated that political elites’ favorability toward
exclusionary public policies has been historically shaped by idealized conceptions of the nation’s character (Smith 1997).

Despite the proliferation of research on contemporary nationalism in settled times—with nationalism understood broadly and inclusively, as the heterogeneous domain of dispositions and practices that reflect and reproduce the primacy of the nation-state as a fundamental unit of identification and governance (Brubaker 1996, 2004)—the theoretical contributions of this field remain fragmented.² This research tends to either privilege practice-based approaches, which emphasize the richness and contextuality of multilayered ethnic and national identities at the cost of empirical generalizability (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008), or variable-based survey research, which focuses on individual attitudes without considering how such attitudes may aggregate into overarching cultural worldviews (e.g., Kunovich 2009; Hjerm and Schnabel 2010). Neither approach has generated a systematic typology of popular conceptions of the nation-state that can enable comparative research on the causes, consequences, and changing form of contemporary nationalism (Dekker, Malová, and Hoogendoorn 2003).³ In contrast, an older research tradition on the essential content of national identities did catalogue distinct varieties of nationalism (Kohn 1944), but its impact was limited by a reductive understanding of culture that ignored the multivocality of the nation’s meanings within each national community (Smith 1997).

In this paper, I seek to build on these three approaches by developing a systematic typology of cultural schemas of the nation-state among 27,790 respondents from thirty countries. In particular, I draw inspiration from practice-based nationalism research (Fox and Miller-Idriss

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² It is important to note that I do not define nationalism here as a coherent elite ideology (as does Gellner [1983], for instance) or as a specific set of normative attitudes toward the nation (as do scholars of chauvinism [e.g., Kosterman and Feschbach 1989]). Instead, I favor Brubaker’s (1996:10) view of nationalism as a “set of ‘nation’-oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are continuously available or ‘endemic’ in modern cultural and political life,” the normative content of which can vary widely.

³ My use of the term “nation-state” does not imply a political territory that is ethnically homogeneous (i.e., a national state). Instead, it highlights two related objects of collective identification: the sociocultural community
2008), which views the meaning of collective identities as variable within national communities, and from survey-based research (Kunovic 2009), which makes distributional claims about such attitudinal variation. While my analytical strategy also makes use of distinctions made in classic research on national character, I steer clear of some of the limitations of this tradition by avoiding *a priori* judgments about the national boundedness of culture. Finally, in contrast to both survey-based and national character research, I treat cultural schemas of the nation as primary units of analysis. This distinction is a subtle but important one: the objective is not to correlate disembodied attitudes or to argue for fundamental cultural differences between countries, but to map communities of shared meaning, whose members view their nation-states through similar interpretive lenses and whose boundaries may not be congruent with national borders (Fine 1979; Zerubavel 1999; Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Goldberg 2011). In so doing, the approach offered here privileges persons over variables, polysemy over singularity of meaning, and relational configurations of beliefs over individual attitudes (Abbott 1988, 1992). The results demonstrate that cross-national differences in popular conceptions of the nation-state are best understood in terms of the relative salience of multiple cultural models within countries rather than in terms of essential country characteristics (cf. Lamont and Thévenot 2000). Respondents who subscribe to these distinct cultural models have contrasting attitudes on social and political issues, a finding that attests to these models’ substantive importance for politics. Furthermore, the content of the cultural schemas that define these groups is remarkably stable, as evidenced by an out-of-sample replication performed with comparable data collected eight years earlier.

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4 This is not to say that a variable-based approach is not useful for demonstrating the robustness of the cultural schemas that define such communities of shared meaning. Indeed, in this paper, I use regression analyses to demonstrate that other politically relevant beliefs are systematically distributed across the observed cultural communities.
RESEARCH ON NATIONALISM IN SETTLED TIMES

Much nationalism research has focused on those aspects of the phenomenon that have been the most destabilizing for existing social and political institutions: the emergence of collective identification in newly forming nation-states, the struggle for statehood by separatist, irredentist, and post-colonial nationalist movements, and the periodic eruptions of nativism and xenophobia in otherwise stable societies. There is no doubt that such work has made essential contributions to the scholarly and popular understanding of the contemporary social and political order. Yet, for all its rich insights, the nationalism literature has suffered from an analytical blind spot, stemming from the implicit assumption that in the absence of explicit conflict, nationalism in established democracies is simply a fait accompli, rather than a constitutive frame of reference that continually shapes the course of social and political change.

Over the past twenty years, however, an emerging scholarly tradition has challenged this position. Focusing on nationalism in settled times, this research has asked two sets of questions: (1) how do people use the nation in everyday practice to make sense of the world, maintain a collective identity, and facilitate social interaction? and (2) how do attitudes toward the nation vary within national communities and how are they associated with other beliefs? Both approaches are predicated on the pervasiveness of a taken-for-granted cognitive and affective orientation that reproduces the primacy of the nation-state in everyday life (Billig 1995; Brubaker 2004; Collins 2012), but the former privileges the contingency of micro-level processes embedded in rich social contexts, while the latter abstracts from such contexts in an effort to map attitudinal variation in nationally representative samples. In advancing a constructivist understanding of culture, these two modes of research differ sharply from
antecedent research on nationalism in settled times, which sought to specify the core values that ostensibly define each country’s fundamental political identity.

Methodological Nationalism and Reductive Individualism in Nationalism Research

Influenced by a functionalist understanding of culture as a coherent system of consensus values, traditional research on nationalism in settled times assumed that each nation has an essential character—a set of principles that defines the collective identity of its people and the logic of its institutions. The task of the analyst was then to uncover these principles and, often, to compare them to the identities of other nations. Thus, for instance, Lipset (1990) argued in Continental Divide that national identity in the U.S. embodies the core features of the American Creed: anti-statism, individualism, populism, and egalitarianism. In contrast, national self-understanding in Canada, he argued, is based on deference to authority, collectivism, elitism, and particularism (also see Huntington 2004).

The primary legacy of the macro-level approach to nationalism research came in the form of a distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism that originated in the writing of Meinecke ([1907] 1970) and became popularized by Kohn (1944). This binary typology, which continues to be salient in a variety of forms, focuses on one of the most salient features of national identity, namely the principles that determine legitimate national membership. Ethnic nationalism is based on ascriptive criteria, such as race, ethnicity, ancestry, language, and in some cases religion, while civic nationalism is based on elective criteria, such as commitment to the country’s values, subjective identification with the national community, and respect for the nation’s laws and institutions. In keeping with the view of culture as a collective attribute of social groups, this dichotomy has been used to classify countries and world regions into two distinct ideological
camps, with Germany epitomizing ethnic nationalism and France and the United States exemplifying civic nationalism (Kohn 1944).

Despite its merits, the problem with the classic research on political culture was its tendency toward “methodological nationalism”, that is, a taken-for-granted view of the nation-state as a naturally bounded cultural unit of analysis (Calhoun 1999; Wimmer and Schiller 2002). Even though the ethnic-civic typology has become less rigid in its more recent applications, the assumption that nation-state borders provide natural bounds for homogenous nationalist ideologies persists in contemporary comparative research (e.g., Smith 1991; Ignatieff 1993; Schopflin 1995). As Brubaker (2004) has persuasively argued, such “groupism”—the conflation of analytical categories (e.g., the nation-state) with empirical groups (e.g., a community with shared beliefs)—leads to theoretically problematic and empirically inaccurate conclusions. In reality, national populations comprise multiple competing belief systems and the tension between them is an important driver of political change (Smith 1997). Whether those cultural repertoires are similar or distinct across nations should be a matter for empirical investigation, not an untested assumption. Furthermore, such beliefs systems can vary over time, both in their content and in their relative dominance in any given country, a fact that is largely ignored by traditional nationalism research. Nonetheless, when stripped of its essentialist trappings, the ethnic-civic distinction produced by this literature may be useful for classifying subsets—though not the full range—of attitudes that constitute popular understandings of the nation-state.

In contrast to traditional scholarship on national character, more recent research has sought to challenge the notion that the meaning of the nation is consistent in content and stable in salience across the national community. Rather than treating national political culture as a set of widely shared values, sociologists have stressed the continent nature of cognitive and affective
dispositions toward the nation, as they are put into practice in everyday life (Brubaker 2004; Brubaker et al. 2007). The question for these scholars is not what constitutes a particular country’s essential national identity but what use do people make of the national frames of reference as they navigate their social world—that is, under what circumstances and to what ends does thinking, talking, and acting with the nation become relevant in specific social contexts (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). In so doing, this work has shown that the meaning of the nation is itself highly variable, not just across situations but also across individuals. The microinteractional orientation of this tradition, however, along with its tendency to rely on ethnographic and interview-based methods, has precluded it from systematically mapping and classifying the variation in popular understandings of the nation.

If classic studies of national political culture have tended toward methodological nationalism and practiced-based approaches have privileged situational particularity, quantitative analyses of survey data in sociology and political psychology—though attentive to within-country heterogeneity—have been prone to reductive individualism. The units of observation in such research are individuals, but the mode of analysis is variable-based: the regression models used in this work abstract specific attitudes from concrete persons and correlate those attitudes with other variables of interest, including anti-immigrant sentiments (Citrin et al. 1990), authoritarianism (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999), support for aggressive foreign policy (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989), and skepticism toward supranational institutions (Lubbers and Scheepers 2007). This analytical approach does not consider the intersubjective dimensions of culture that produce patterns of shared meaning within groups of likeminded individuals belonging to distinct thought communities (Zerubavel 1999).^5_

^5 To be clear, Zerubavel’s (1999) concept of “thought communities” does not imply that people with shared cultural understandings constitute “classes-for-themselves.” Likewise, despite my objective of identifying common patterns
Thus, while survey-based research has generated a rich set of results that demonstrate the political relevance of and within-country variation in attitudes toward the nation, it has not been able to produce a set of conceptual tools that lend themselves to meaningful aggregation beyond the individual level and—if we are to understand common conceptions of the nation in more general terms—that enable systematic cross-national comparison. Developing such tools is one of the central objectives of the present paper. A systematic typology of the varieties of cultural frameworks through which individuals understand their nation-states can serve as a foundation for a more complete understanding of the relationship between nationalism and political change, from electoral outcomes and policy reforms to social movement mobilization.

**Attitudes, Cognitive Schemas, and Shared Representations**

A core assumption of the present study is that a typology of nationalist beliefs should rest on realistic assumptions about the cognitive foundations of meaning structures (DiMaggio 1997). Survey studies in this field have tended to emphasize specific attitudes (typically measured by specific variables), such as identification with the nation or pride in the nation’s heritage, to the exclusion of others, thereby assuming that the meaning of such attitudes is self-evident. Yet, a long tradition in cultural sociology, influenced by structural linguistics (Saussure 1916 [1960]), has demonstrated that symbols (and other cultural objects) derive their meaning from their relationship to other symbols (and objects) and not from their own inherent properties (Emirbayer 1997; Mohr 1998). Consequently, to understand symbolic structures—that is, of dispositions toward the nation, I do not assume that such patterns characterize groups of individuals with shared experiences, common political goals, or even conscious awareness of cultural commonality.

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7 In keeping with a domain-based definition of nationalism (Brubaker 1996), I use “nationalism” and “nationalist beliefs” as shorthand for the wide range of popular dispositions toward the nation without implying any particular normative content of those dispositions. This assumes that most people employ the nation as a frame of reference in their everyday lives at least some of the time, even if the meanings they attribute to it differ markedly. This is consistent with Billig’s (1995:6) argument that “nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition.”
culture—we must take into account their constituent parts, as well as the relations of similarity and opposition among those parts.

A particularly useful analytical tool for thinking relationally about meaning making in specific cultural domains is the concept of a cognitive schema, which originates in cognitive psychology (Fiske and Linville 1980) and has made its way into cultural sociology (DiMaggio 1997). Cognitive schemas (or schemata) are networks of association that impart coherence and order onto the messy and rapid flow of sensory information to which individuals are exposed in their daily lives. In addition to organizing and interpreting lived experience, schemas feature affective and evaluative components that enable individuals to respond to stimuli in a manner consistent with their past experience and future aspirations. The schematic processing of information occurs rapidly and without much deliberation (Lieberman et al. 2002).

As it is typically used in cognitive psychology, however, the cognitive schema concept underemphasizes the fact that meaning structures are produced in social interaction and institutionalized through collective narratives, rituals, and symbolic practices (Collins 2004). Indeed cognitive schemas are most appropriately thought of as individualized instances of overarching shared representations of particular domains of social life (Durkheim [1895] 1982; Moscovici 1984; Thompson and Fine 1999). Such representations are shared because they reflect collective belief patterns found within thought communities and they are representations because they consist of relational systems of symbolic elements that give meaning to social experience. To emphasize these intersubjective and relational features of belief systems, I refer to the observed patterns of meaning as cultural schemas.

This paper is concerned with a specific type of cultural schema, namely that through which people give meaning to their membership in imagined communities defined and governed

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8 For stylistic reasons, I use the terms “cultural schema” and “cultural model” interchangeably.
by formal institutions. Whether such groups are nation-states, religions, professions, or federated social movements, they share a core set of features that can be systematically studied using the approach suggested here: they serve as objects of collective identification (Tajfel and Turner 1979), they are delineated by social and symbolic boundaries that determine group membership (Lamont and Molnár 2002), they are dually constituted by both their membership and their institutional governance structure (Gellner 1983), their members feel a sense of mutual belonging, despite the lack of face-to-face contact (Calhoun 1997), and they function within a broader social field populated by other groups against which they vie for resources (Fligstein and McAdam 2011).

Crucially, group members often disagree, whether actively or not, about the meaning of the group, with important implications for the group’s internal dynamics and relations with external actors. What this paper seeks to demonstrate is that the underlying heterogeneity in meaning can be systematically studied by identifying competing cultural schemas using inductive survey analysis methods.9

Which Attitudes Are Relevant for Measuring Cultural Schemas of the Nation-State?

Scholars of nationalism in political psychology, where survey-based research on the topic is most prevalent, study a wide variety of attitudes, often treating subsets of them as constitutive of nationalism as a whole (as opposed to patriotism, for instance). Setting aside the resulting definitional disagreements, it is possible to identify four broad attitudinal groupings that have received the most scholarly attention in this work—and that feature in widely available cross-

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9 Given that the cultural schemas of interest in this paper concern the meanings attached to the collective community by its members, they are a variant of what can be termed “collective identification schemas.” Because “collective identification schemas of the nation-state” is a rather awkward formulation, however, I refer to these meaning structures as, interchangeably: cultural schemas of the nation(-state), cultural models of the nation(-state), shared representations of the nation(-state), or more generically, popular conceptions or popular understandings of the nation(-state).
national survey data. In this paper, I will jointly consider all of these attitudes and examine how they systematically co-vary within subsets of respondents with shared attitudinal profiles.

For some political psychologists, nationalism corresponds to the identification with the nation over and above other collective entities (Sidanius et al. 1997; Li and Brewer 2004; Huddy and Khatib 2007). A standard (if imperfect) survey item used to capture this sentiment asks respondents to rate how close they feel to the nation. These responses are then typically compared with degree of identification with sub- and supra-national communities.

For others, the most important feature of nationalism consists of the membership criteria that define the nation’s symbolic boundaries, with a particular focus on elective (or civic) and ascriptive (or ethnic) characteristics (Jones and Smith 2001; Hjerm 2003; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008)—an approach that adapts the binary typology from macro-level research on national character to individual-level attitudes. Survey items typically ask respondents to rate the importance of ancestry, birth in the country, language, religion, subjective identification, and other criteria for being a “true” member of the nation (e.g., a true American).

The third approach focuses on the specific aspects of the nation-state that are positively evaluated by respondents (De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Parker 2010; Green et al. 2011); some label this patriotism, but I will refer to it as national pride in order to avoid unnecessary normative connotations. Survey measures of this dimension of nationalism typically ask respondents how proud they are of the nation’s achievements in domains like sports, science, democratic rule, or the egalitarian treatment of groups.

Finally, the fourth dimension of nationalism consists of comparisons of the nation and its people with the rest of the world (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Blank and Schmidt 2003; Huddy and Khatib 2007). Scholars often interpret excessively boastful comparisons of this sort
as constitutive of nationalism in general, but I prefer the more precise labels of chauvinism or *national hubris*. Standard measures ask respondents about their preference for their country over others, whether the world would be better if everyone was more like the country’s residents (e.g., more like Americans), along with a variety of other evaluative statements.

It is worth emphasizing that these four areas of research capture different dimensions of a single overarching phenomenon: the repertoire of intersubjective meanings through which contemporary nation-states are understood and reproduced. My analysis incorporates indicators of all four dimensions of nationalism, because the meaning attributed by respondents to each indicator is likely to depend on their overall relational configuration.

**DATA**

Given that cultural schemas are held at the individual level but shared across subsets of a given group’s members, it is possible to study them using survey data. Survey data have the dual advantage of facilitating systematic comparisons across respondents that can yield patterns of broadly shared beliefs and enabling inferences about the distribution of the resulting cultural models in the population of interest. Because the objective of this paper is to measure the heterogeneity of nation-state schemas within national populations and compare the resulting patterns across countries, survey data are the most appropriate choice for the task.

In particular, the analyses in this paper rely on data from the 1995 and 2003 National Identity Supplements to the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), a representative multinational survey administered independently in each participating country (in the U.S., it is

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10 Although hubris is often defined as excessive pride, there is an important distinction between the two concepts, in that pride can be self-oriented while hubris necessarily involves a comparison of one’s attributes to those of others. In fact, in the original Greek, hubris was a legal term referring to the act of exercising power through the shaming of a victim, often by way of sexual violence (Cohen 1991).

11 The limitations of survey data for studying meaning are of course well known and should be kept in mind when interpreting the results of this paper. For a recent critique of interview-based methods, including surveys, see Jerolmack and Khan (2014).
incorporated into the General Social Survey). The survey probes respondents’ attitudes on a variety of topics and features a wide selection of sociodemographic covariates.

The Aspects of National Identity II supplement was administered in 34 countries between 2003 and 2005. Residents of former East and West Germany were sampled separately, as were Israeli Jews and Arabs, bringing the number of separate samples to 36. For the purposes of the analysis, the East and West German samples were combined using the appropriate sample weights and four countries were excluded: Bulgaria, Latvia, and Israel were dropped because their questionnaires omitted a number of nationalism items and Taiwan was excluded because of insufficiently complete covariate data. In the interest of comparability, respondents under 18 and over 65 years of age were omitted from the analyses, as were non-citizens and respondents with missing values on more than two nationalism items. The final sample size consisted of 27,790 observations from 30 countries, with an average of 926 respondents per country.

In addition to analyzing the 2003 sample, the paper features an out-of-sample replication that makes it possible to examine change over time in the content and distribution of nationalist cultural schemas. To do so, I take advantage of a previous wave of ISSP data collected in 1995 as part of the ISSP National Identity I supplement. The 1995 data feature 20 countries, with a total sample size of 18,613 and country samples ranging from 608 to 1,767 respondents. The replication analysis relies on the 1995 data along with a subset of the 2003 sample restricted to the 20 countries that were polled in both years. The reduced 2003 sample consists of 17,574 respondents.

The two national identity supplements include twenty-six indicators of national identification, membership criteria, national pride, and national hubris, which are listed in detail in Appendix A, and all of which will be used to identify the cultural schemas of the nation. The
variables were recoded so that higher scores correspond to stronger national identification, greater importance attributed to each criterion of national membership, greater degrees of pride, and greater levels of hubris. The observations were weighted using individual-level sampling weights provided by the ISSP, as well as population weights to ensure that all countries contributed equally to the model estimation.

The data also include a variety of sociodemographic covariates and indicators of other social and political attitudes. The former will serve as controls, while the latter will be used to examine the association between the cultural schemas of the nation and other sets of beliefs.

**MEASURING CULTURAL SCHEMAS**

The primary challenge in identifying cultural schemas using survey data lies in the selection of appropriate analytical methods. Given the theoretical approach to culture employed in this paper, the method of choice must meet the following requirements: it must be relational because the meanings it is intended to capture are themselves inherently relational (Mohr 1998); it must be person-centered rather than variable-centered, so that the respondent-level dependencies between attitudes are preserved (Muthén and Muthén 2000); it must allow for the aggregation of individual-level data into discrete clusters defined by shared patterns of survey responses, so that distinct thought communities can be identified; and it must enable the classification of respondents into those clusters so that the distribution of the resulting cultural models can be examined within and across groups (in this case, within and across countries).12

Those requirements are partially met by a variety of relational and combinatorial methods, ranging from semantic network analysis (Carley and Palmquist 1992) and qualitative

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12 The logic of the last two objectives is similar to that employed in optimal matching (Abbott and Hrycak 1990) and other clustering techniques: first identify overarching patterns in complex data and then match observations to those patterns to obtain a pattern-by-observation classification.
comparative analysis (Ragin 1987) to hierarchical clustering and multidimensional scaling (Breiger, Boorman, and Arabie 1975). One approach in particular, however, satisfies all four criteria: latent class analysis (LCA), a well-documented survey analysis method that groups respondents based on the similarity in the pattern of responses to multiple survey items (Lazarsfeld and Henry 1968; Goodman 1978). LCA has been used in a variety of fields, from medicine and marketing to the sociological study of cultural consumption (Van Rees, Vermunt, and Verbrood 1999). Cultural sociologists, however, are only beginning to realize its utility for mapping cultural schemas (DiMaggio and Bonikowski 2008; Gross 2013; cf. Goldberg 2011).

Latent class analysis, a variant of structural equation modeling, estimates one or more unobserved categorical (latent) variables by modeling the associations between a set of observed indicators. Like factor analysis, it is often used as a data reduction technique, but factor analysis produces continuous latent variables, while LCA generates categorical classes that capture distinct patterns of survey responses. This unique feature allows LCA to classify observations into distinct response sets, which—in the context of attitudinal surveys—can be interpreted as clusters of respondents with similar cultural understandings of a particular social domain. As such, LCA is an ideal method for developing empirically grounded conceptual typologies (McCutcheon 1987).

Formally, a latent class model with four indicators can be represented as follows (Magidson and Vermunt 2004):

\[
\pi_{i|jklt} = \pi_t^X \pi_{it}^A X \pi_{jt}^B |X \pi_{kt}^C X \pi_{lt}^D |X \]

(1)

In this notation, \( X \) is the latent categorical variable with \( t \) classes and \( A \) through \( D \) are the observed indicators with \( i \) through \( l \) response categories. Consequently, \( \pi_t^X \) is the probability of
an observation belonging to each latent class, while $\pi_{it}^{A|X}$ is the probability of a response $i$ to variable A conditional on membership in latent class $t$. In estimating the model parameters, LCA uses iterative maximum likelihood estimation to best approximate a solution where the indicators become conditionally independent of one another—that is, any residual associations between them can be attributed to chance alone—within each level of the latent variable. The algorithm then calculates a posterior probability of class assignment for each observation in the data set and classifies the observations as belonging to the class with the modal posterior probability.

If we analyze pooled data from multiple countries, we can use LCA to inductively generate groups (i.e., classes) of respondents who share similar response patterns—that is, similar ways of understanding the nation-state—regardless of their national affiliations. Having generated the latent class structure, we can then ask subsequent questions, such as what predicts class membership, how is class membership related to other political attitudes, how are the classes distributed across and within countries, and how does the content and distribution of the classes change over time.

The nestedness of the individual observations within countries, however, violates the assumption of independent errors in the regression models used to estimate the latent classes. To account for this, a country-level variable is added as a covariate to the original LCA model. The probability structure of the extended model is restricted so that the country clustering of individual observations affects the distribution of classes within each country, but it does not affect the response probabilities of particular indicators within each latent class. This model, known as the partial homogeneity model, is formally expressed as follows (with $G$ indicating the country grouping variable):

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\pi_{ijkl|g}^{ABC|X|G} = \pi_{tl|g}^{X|G} \pi_{it}^{A|X} \pi_{jt}^{B|X} \pi_{kt}^{C|X} \pi_{lt}^{D|X} \pi_{gt}
$$

(2)
The same model can be further extended by including individual-level sociodemographic variables as additional covariates. These covariates improve the ability of the model to assign observations to classes, but they do not affect the class content. In the present analysis, I include age, education, partisan ideology, gender, marital status, religiosity, urban residence, and parental immigration status as covariates. All of the variables have significant effects on the classification of observations into latent classes.

**THE FOUR CULTURAL SCHEMAS OF THE NATION**

When estimating latent class analysis models, it is up to the analyst to decide how many classes should be identified. This decision is typically based on theoretical grounds, as well as on measures of goodness of fit, such as the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). My analyses of the ISSP data consistently demonstrated that a four-class solution appropriately captures the cross-national variation in nationalist attitudes. This conclusion is based on a wide range of detailed robustness checks, including comparisons of BIC scores and classification errors across models, comparisons of results across models with a variety of classes, and a replication of the analysis with both a subset of the 2003 data and a completely independent survey sample collected in 1995. For more details on model fit, see Appendix B. The replication analysis will be presented in the final section of the paper, because its implications are both methodological and substantive.

To interpret the four types of nationalism, it is possible to examine how respondents in each class structure their understandings of the nation-state. LCA calculates the probabilities of specific survey responses conditional on class assignment; based on those probabilities, it then predicts the distribution of responses to each nationalism measure in every class. By examining these predicted responses, we can get a sense of the attitudinal profile of each class (or what I
refer to as class content). Given that there are twenty-six variables, each of which has between four and five response categories, the easiest way to compare the classes is to use variable means. The class means for the twenty-six nationalism measures are presented in Figure 1. To aid in the interpretation of the results, I have labeled the four classes as liberal, disengaged, restrictive, and ardent.

*Class 1: Liberal nationalism.* The defining characteristics of the first class, which comprises 36 percent of the sample, are its moderate scores on the identification, membership, and hubris variables, combined with a high degree of pride in all domains of the nation-state. Respondents in this class feel close to their region and country and are ambivalent about their identification with their continent. Their notion of who is a legitimate member of the nation tends toward civic nationalism, with more emphasis placed on elective criteria, like respect for institutions and laws, language ability, and subjective feeling than on ascriptive criteria, like religion, ancestry, and birth. The pattern of responses to the pride items stands in contrast to the moderate values on the identification and membership criteria variables: members of Class 1 exhibit a high degree of pride in all aspects of the nation-state, which is only surpassed by Class 4. Finally, members of Class 1 exhibit moderate attitudes on measures of chauvinism, shame, and unconditional support for their countries.

Because the model of the nation-state espoused by members of this class consists of moderate identification with the nation, relative open-mindedness about the nation’s social boundaries, and a fairly strong sense of pride in the nation-state’s accomplishments without

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13 The appropriateness of reporting mean values for ordinal data has been debated because the distances between the individual categories may not be equal. I use means here in the interest of parsimony. Having compared each mean value with the underlying variable distribution, I am confident that the means satisfactorily capture the response patterns found in each of the four LCA classes.

14 It is important to remember that the values shown on the graphs represent central tendencies. Consequently, given that most of variables were measured using a forced-choice four-point scale, the 2.5 mark on the graph represents not an individual’s lack of agreement or disagreement with a particular survey question, but an underlying distribution of positive and negative responses among all the respondents assigned to that class.
Figure 1. Variable means by latent class, ISSP 2003.a

Id = Identification; Mem = Membership Criteria, Prd = Pride, Hub = Hubris
strong feelings of hubris, I refer to it as *liberal nationalist*. Its characteristics are reminiscent of the restrained and inclusive disposition toward the nation advocated by political theorists like Kymlicka (1995) and Tamir (1993). This label, however, should not be confused with political liberalism; whether or not liberal nationalism and liberal political ideology are correlated is an empirical question that will be explored later in the paper.

Class 2: *The disengaged.* The second class, which comprises 24 percent of the sample, consistently scores lowest on all the nationalism variables. Members of this class have moderate levels of national identification and their conception of the nation’s social boundaries leans strongly toward civic nationalism. In that respect, they are quite similar to members of the liberal nationalist class. The two classes diverge sharply, however, on measures of national pride. Liberal nationalists are unambiguously proud of all aspects of their countries, while members of Class 2 consistently exhibit a lack of pride in or ambivalence about their countries’ achievements. The pride variables with the lowest means are those related to the domain of state and economic institutions, while those associated with the cultural heritage of the nation tend to be evaluated more favorably. This response pattern suggests that members of Class 2 make a clear distinction between the state and the nation, and hold the former in lower regard. Finally, members of Class 2 also score lower on the hubris, shame, and unconditional support variables than any other respondents.

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15 Again, “nationalism” here serves as shorthand for a particular understanding of the nation and does not imply normative judgment about the content of the constitutive attitudes. Because the cultural and political primacy of the nation is widely taken for granted in contemporary societies (Billig 1995), most people espouse some form of nationalist beliefs. This theoretical position is consistent with other dominant typological approaches to the topic, which treat multiple varieties of nationalism as mutually exclusive and exhaustive, so that each respondent belongs to one nationalist category or another (e.g., Snyder 1993; Kunovich 2009). Nonetheless, it is conceivable that for a small subset of respondents in any nationally representative sample, the cultural importance of the nation may not be particularly salient. Indeed, this appears to be the case in the second class identified in my analysis. To avoid confusion, I refrain from labeling that class as “nationalist.”
Because of the low levels of identification, pride, and hubris, as well as the inclusive definition of national membership among members of Class 2, I refer to the class as *disengaged*. In all likelihood, people who exhibit this pattern of responses are either negatively disposed toward their particular country of residence or are generally skeptical of the nation-state as an institution. Though it may be tempting to label members of this class as non-nationalist, post-nationalist, or even anti-nationalist, I stop short of doing so; we cannot rule out the possibility that some respondents in this class have positive feelings toward another country, perhaps because they hold multiple citizenships or aspire to reside elsewhere at some point in their lives.

**Class 3: Restrictive nationalism.** The pattern of responses in Class 3, which represents 21 percent of the sample, resembles the disengaged class in its markedly low scores on measures of national pride. Members of Class 3, however, feel stronger identification with their region and country than the disengaged or liberal nationalists and, in sharp contrast to both the disengaged and liberal nationalists, their definition of the nation’s social boundaries is decidedly ethnic.\(^{16}\) As a result, I refer to this class as *restrictive nationalist*. Religion is the only membership criterion to receive a weaker positive response, which suggests that members of this class differentiate between ethnic and religious criteria of national membership. Finally, the responses to the hubris, shame, and unconditional loyalty variables among members of Class 3 are moderate, much like those of liberal nationalists.

**Class 4: Ardent nationalism.** Members of Class 4, which comprises 18 percent of the sample, score higher than those in any other class on all but one of the nationalism items. Their response pattern is nearly a mirror opposite of liberal nationalists: they feel intense identification with their region, country, and continent; they place great importance on all criteria of national

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\(^{16}\) Prior research demonstrates that ethnic nationalists typically also place a high priority on elective aspects of national identity (Kunovich 2009). However, the opposite does not hold true: civic nationalists favor elective criteria of national belonging while rejecting ascriptive criteria.
membership including religion; they feel extremely proud of the nation-state’s achievements in all domains; and exhibit high levels of chauvinism and unconditional support for their country, as well as low levels of shame. Because of the overall intensity of its members’ attitudes, I refer to this class as *ardent nationalist*.

Interestingly, the four cultural schemas cannot be easily arranged along a single continuum. On the membership criteria, for instance, liberal nationalists are similar to disengaged respondents, while ardent nationalists are similar (in terms of the relative pattern of means, not necessarily their magnitude) to restrictive nationalists. On the identification variables, all four classes follow a similar pattern, with attachment to the state scoring lower than attachment to the country, and attachment to the continent scoring lower than attachment to the state or the country. In contrast, on measures of pride, the disengaged class shares a similar pattern of responses with restrictive nationalism, while liberal nationalism resembles ardent nationalism. Finally, on the hubris measures, the pattern of means is similar in all four classes, as was the case for the identification measures.

These response patterns demonstrate is that in terms of meaning, the four cultural schemas are in fact crosscutting. Consequently, it is not sufficient to differentiate between ethnic and civic nationalism or between patriotism and chauvinism as has been done in past survey-based studies. National identification, membership criteria, pride, and hubris form webs of meaning that are not reducible to their individual parts. The current approach makes it possible to identify these meaning structures and map their distribution within and across countries.

**REPLICATION WITH 1995 DATA**

To further ensure that the cultural schemas identified by LCA are not mere artifacts of the method, it is possible to test their robustness by comparing the distribution of the constitutive
variables within each latent class across multiple independent survey samples. If separate analyses of the independent samples produce similar results, this provides strong additional evidence for the validity of the latent classes identified by the original model.17

To that end, I repeat the earlier analyses using the 1995 wave of the ISSP, as well as a subsample of the 2003 data restricted to the twenty countries included in the 1995 wave. I apply the LCA algorithm independently to the two twenty-country samples, imposing no constraints on the results. One of the nationalism questions—the importance of ancestry for national membership—was not asked in 1995, so I omit it from the 2003 comparative sample.

Figure 2 presents the means for the nationalism variables by class, with each of the four classes plotted separately. The bars in the graphs correspond to the two comparison samples and the full 2003 sample. As the figure demonstrates, the content of the four types of nationalism is strikingly similar in the 1995 and 2003 comparison samples, which suggests that people drew on the same repertoire of cultural schemas at the two time points, despite the various economic, political, and cultural transformations that took place in the ensuing eight years.

Beyond this substantive point, the similarity of the nationalism variable means in the 1995 and 2003 comparison samples provides evidence for the robustness of the LCA estimation. Had the LCA models produced invalid and unreliable measurements of attitudinal clustering, it would not have been possible to generate nearly identical sets of classes from two completely independent samples, regardless if the true cultural schemas were themselves stable. The reliability of the method and the stability of the generated classes are further reinforced by the

17 If, however, independent samples collected at different time points generate divergent results, it is conceivable that the content of the cultural schemas measured by the classes could have in fact changed over time. In such circumstances, one would have to rely solely on the measures of model fit reported in Appendix B to establish the robustness of the classes.
Figure 2. Means of nationalism variables by latent class, 1995-2003.

Note: **Identification**: cont = continent, ctry = country, prov = province; **Membership Criteria**: relig = religion, live = life-long residence, resp = respect for laws/institutions, lang = language, feel = subjective feeling, citiz = citizenship, brth = birth, ance = ancestry; **Pride**: art = art/literature, demo = democracy, econ = economy, grps = treatment of groups, hist = history, armf = armed forces, poli = political status, scit = science/technology, sprt = sports, socs = social security; **Hubris**: peop = better people, ctry = better country, citiz = preference for own citizenship, ifwr = support country even if wrong, sham = shame in country.

Results are from base models without covariates or direct effects.
fact that the deletion of ten countries from the full 2003 sample did not have a major impact on
the content of the classes in the reduced 2003 sample. Furthermore, the robustness of the results
to changes in the selection of countries suggests that most of the variation in nationalist attitudes
is in fact found within countries not between them.

COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF CULTURAL SCHEMAS OF
THE NATION-STATE

Equipped with a robust inductive typology of nationalist beliefs, we can now ask how the four
varieties of the phenomenon are distributed within and across countries. It may be the case that
some of the classes are present only in some countries, as we would expect from theories that
unambiguously classify countries into distinct types of nationalism. A more uniform cross-
national distribution of the classes would challenge such theories. It is also possible that some of
the classes are specific to particular countries while others are universal.

To compare the distribution of classes across countries, I analyze the posterior
probabilities of class membership produced by the multigroup LCA model specified in Equation
2. The results are shown in Table 1. In addition to the country-specific class proportions, the
table lists each country’s index of qualitative variation (IQV), which measures the concentration
of the class distribution on a scale from 0 (all observations fall into one class) to 1 (observations
are equally distributed across the four classes).

The most important finding illustrated in Table 1 is that all four cultural models are
represented in every country in the sample, contrary to the prevalent view in the literature. The
IQV falls below 0.8, indicating moderate concentration, only in four countries: Australia,
Canada, Slovakia, and the United States. Even in these cases, however, the most prevalent class
comprises less than 60 percent of the population and the second-most prevalent class comprises
no more than 35 percent of the population. The probability that any two randomly selected
Table 1. Distribution of latent classes by country, ISSP 2003 full data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal (%)</th>
<th>Disengaged (%)</th>
<th>Restrictive (%)</th>
<th>Ardent (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>IQV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35.75</td>
<td>22.17</td>
<td>22.71</td>
<td>19.37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>55.44</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>34.86</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>40.30</td>
<td>8.43</td>
<td>9.11</td>
<td>42.16</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>0.86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>55.88</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>36.40</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>21.27</td>
<td>10.56</td>
<td>36.69</td>
<td>31.49</td>
<td>1,167</td>
<td>0.95</td>
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<td>Czech Rep.</td>
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<td>49.41</td>
<td>40.36</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>59.42</td>
<td>8.07</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>15.31</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>65.98</td>
<td>11.97</td>
<td>16.63</td>
<td>8.62</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>58.19</td>
<td>16.63</td>
<td>16.56</td>
<td>8.62</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>48.29</td>
<td>38.90</td>
<td>9.16</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>56.69</td>
<td>18.12</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>17.30</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>11.79</td>
<td>22.04</td>
<td>60.25</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>0.76</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>50.60</td>
<td>14.67</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>28.75</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>40.80</td>
<td>29.45</td>
<td>12.15</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>0.93</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>73.20</td>
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<td>4.08</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>0.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>49.86</td>
<td>8.36</td>
<td>14.03</td>
<td>27.75</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>0.86</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>10.62</td>
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<td>30.04</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>57.24</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11.28</td>
<td>31.37</td>
<td>48.73</td>
<td>8.61</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>40.90</td>
<td>53.81</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>51.83</td>
<td>36.52</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>63.64</td>
<td>32.98</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>28.09</td>
<td>35.05</td>
<td>32.16</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>28.26</td>
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<td>14.86</td>
<td>37.83</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>50.90</td>
<td>22.03</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>21.49</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>63.58</td>
<td>22.69</td>
<td>9.95</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>64.26</td>
<td>20.92</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>13.42</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>17.16</td>
<td>23.52</td>
<td>41.41</td>
<td>17.91</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>24.25</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>69.53</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>39.40</td>
<td>47.48</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values for each country are shaded in descending order, with darkest cells representing higher values and lighter cells representing lower values. Ns are weighted with sample weights but not population weights.

respondents from one of these four countries will espouse different models of the nation-state is quite high, ranging from 0.591 in Australia and Slovakia to 0.599 in the U.S.\(^\text{18}\)

The second striking feature of the results is the pattern formed by the most prevalent classes, represented by cells with the darkest shading in the table. Wealthy, established democracies have the highest concentration of liberal nationalism, most Eastern European

\(^{18}\) These figures are based on an unstandardized IQV, which was omitted from the table.

26
countries are characterized by a high prevalence of disengaged respondents and restrictive nationalists, and former Spanish colonies share a high concentration of restrictive nationalism. This provides some evidence for the persistence of regional particularities rooted in common historical trajectories and shared institutional regimes.

Despite these patterns, however, it would be a mistake to categorize countries based solely on their most prevalent classes. Table 1 reveals multiple exceptions to the regional distributions described above. For instance, although the wealthiest of the established democracies, the United States, has a large proportion of liberal nationalists, its most prevalent class is ardent nationalism. Also, a number of newer and less wealthy democracies are found among countries with a high prevalence of liberal nationalism (e.g., Hungary, Slovenia, and South Africa), while non-Eastern-European countries feature among those with the highest prevalence of the disengaged (e.g., Germany and South Korea).

Furthermore, classifying countries based on the most prevalent class would ignore the within-country variation captured by the LCA. For instance, although liberal nationalism is most common in both Ireland and the Netherlands, the second most prevalent class in Ireland is ardent nationalism, while in the Netherlands it is the disengaged class. Similarly, restrictive nationalism is the most prevalent class in both Uruguay and the Philippines, but the second most prevalent class in Uruguay is the disengaged, while in the Philippines it is ardent nationalism. These differences are likely to produce varied lines of cleavage in the countries’ political cultures, so it is important that the complete distribution of classes within each country is taken into account in cross-national comparison.
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONALIST BELIEFS

By striking a balance between precision and parsimony, the comparative typology of popular understandings of the nation-state developed here combines the classificatory orientation of research on national character with the emphasis on within-country variation in political psychology. The practical utility of the conceptual model, however, ultimately depends on its explanatory power.

There are at least two paths of influence through which the four types of nationalism may affect political change. First, adherence to particular schemas of the nation-state may be associated with other political beliefs, from social attitudes to views of specific state policies. When national identification becomes salient—for instance, during national elections and national crises—the associations between nationalism and political beliefs are likely to be activated, influencing people’s political decisions about whom to vote for, whether to get involved in a political movement, or whether to voice opposition to a proposed policy initiative. This micro-level path from nationalist beliefs to political behavior is consistent with a long tradition of research on symbolic politics in political science (Sears 1993).

The second path through which nationalist beliefs may impact politics operates at the aggregate level of the political community. The overall distribution of cultural schemas in the population is likely to serve as a structure of opportunities and constraints within which politicians pursue particular policy projects. Given that policymakers regularly monitor public opinion polls and media accounts in order to evaluate the chances of success for particular policy initiatives, their strategic decisions should be shaped in important ways by the degree to which
the public is united in its identification with the nation, its unquestioning support of state institutions, and its opposition to perceived outgroups.\(^{19}\)

In what follows I demonstrate that the four types of nationalism are in fact associated with particular political attitudes over and above other sociopolitical measures routinely used in political sociology and political science. The second pathway through which beliefs about the nation may impact political outcomes—that of cultural schemas as constitutive of a political opportunity structure that enables and constrains elite political behavior—cannot be evaluated without more fine-grained longitudinal data on popular attitudes and thus remains a matter for future research.

**Schemas of the Nation and Political Attitudes**

To determine whether adherence to the four cultural models of the nation affects other politically salient attitudes, I included dichotomous measures of the latter in a series of LCA models with distal outcomes. Making use of recent innovations in LCA methodology (Asparouhov and Muthén 2012; Bakk, Tekle, and Vermunt 2013), the analysis relies on a bias-adjusted three-step procedure: first, the optimal latent class model is selected; second, the individual-level probabilities of class membership are estimated by the model; and third, the class membership are used to predict other dependent variables. This strategy was long viewed as inappropriate, because the absence of information about classification uncertainty in the third step resulted in severely biased estimates. This problem was addressed, however, in a recent paper by Vermunt

\(^{19}\) Of course, even though this mechanism functions primarily at the collective level, it is also linked with individual-level political behavior, since a political leader’s decision to pursue an initiative that is starkly at odds with public opinion is likely to be actively resisted by politically mobilized individuals who are opposed to that initiative on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the meanings they attach to the nation. Additionally, a third path through which competing cultural models of the nation may affect political change are the beliefs of political elites themselves, which may reflect the broader zeitgeist of a given historical era. This is the argument made by Rogers Smith (1997), who traced the influence of competing traditions of American national identity on political and legal decision-making in the domain of citizenship law.
Bonikowski (2010), which suggested a corrective procedure that introduces information about known error probabilities into the third step of the analysis. This revised three-step procedure is preferable to the alternative approach of including outcome variables in a one-step LCA model, because it ensures that those variables do not affect the original LCA results, that the model is parsimonious, and that the potential for additional violations of model assumptions is minimized.

The ISSP features a number of items concerning respondents’ political views. These can be broadly grouped into three domains: perceived dangers of foreign culture and economic trade, the importance of state sovereignty, and the value of immigration. Extreme views on each of these issues can be characterized as, respectively, protectionism (both cultural and economic), isolationism, and nativism. Because all three of these ideologies have received widespread attention in the literature on ethnicity and nationalism, they are particularly well suited for testing the political consequences of the four cultural schemas of the nation-state. The dependent variables included in the analysis measure both general attitudes on these topics and beliefs about the extent to which the state should be involved in addressing them.

All the variables were originally measured on a five-point scale, but for ease of estimation were subsequently dichotomized, with “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” and “neither agree or disagree” coded as 0. Where indicated, a few of the variables are reverse coded, so that the responses follow the order from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”; one variable—the perceived benefits of EU membership—is measured on a five-point scale that corresponds to a different set of categories (“greatly benefits,” “largely benefits,” “somewhat benefits,” etc.).

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20 Logistic regression was used in the interest of parsimony. Ordinal regression was not a viable alternative because the data did not meet the criterion of proportional odds that makes it possible to estimate a single set of coefficients for all the categories (Long and Freese 2006). All the analyses were reproduced using multinomial models, which did not produce substantively different results. The results of the multinomial models provided additional support for my decision to group the ambivalent response with the two categories of agreement, because the independent variables of interests did not produce statistically distinct results for these three response categories.
Given that the four classes are new constructs, it is difficult to make extensive predictions about their impact on other attitudes. Nonetheless, a few preliminary hypotheses can be formulated based on the content of the four types of nationalism. First, we should expect those who subscribe to exclusionary definitions of national membership—that is restrictive and ardent nationalists—to be particularly critical of cultural trade and immigration. Second, given their high level of pride in the state, ardent nationalists (and possibly liberal nationalists) may be especially favorable toward state regulation of the issues about which they have the strongest views. Finally, the disengaged and restrictive nationalists, who are the most skeptical of state and economic institutions, are also likely to be the least supportive of regional integration through supranational organizations, such as the European Union.

The interpretation of the bias-adjusted three-step analysis follows the same logic as a standard regression model. Because, all the outcome variables in the present analysis are dichotomous, the models use logistic regression. Figure 3 presents the class-specific odds ratios of agreement or strong agreement with the item prompts, with the liberal nationalist class as the base category. All models include controls for age, sex, marital status, education, religiosity, urban residence, second-generation immigrant status, and political party affiliation, as well as country fixed effects.21

The first important feature of the results is the statistical significance of latent class membership in all the models. As the results demonstrate, adherence to a particular cultural schema is a strong predictor of respondents’ political attitudes. Moreover, these effects persist despite the inclusion of a full set of controls in the models, including party affiliation. This

21 I retain party identification in the models despite the resulting reduction in the sample size, because my interest is in the net effect of class adherence on other attitudes. Given that those attitudes are known to be correlated with political ideology, omitting party affiliation would lead to biased results. Supplementary analyses without party affiliation produced larger and more significant effects of latent class membership (results available upon request).
Figure 3. Three-Step LCA logistic regression of social and political attitudes on class assignment and controls, ISSP 2003 full sample.

Note: Reverse-coded variables have opposite order of response categories (e.g., “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”). EU-related items are restricted to subsample of EU member states (Czech Rep., Finland, France, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden). All models include controls for age, sex, marital status, education, religiosity, urban residence, 2nd generation immigrant status, political affiliation, and country. Liberal nationalism is the omitted category.
provides strong evidence that the four cultural schemas of the nation-state constitute distinct cultural and political phenomena that are irreducible to other sociodemographic and political covariates typically used to explain political behavior.

The results of the first model in Figure 3, which predict support for the idea that the country should always follow its own interests, are indicative of a linear ordering among the four cultural schemas of the nation. Ardent nationalists are the most likely to strongly agree with this item, followed by restrictive nationalists, liberal nationalists, and finally the disengaged. This hierarchy of effects is consistent with the ordering of the four classes on the identification and hubris variables and the measure of unconditional support for the country, which suggests that those elements of the four cultural schemas may partly drive the relationship between latent class membership and the dependent variable.

The other models that predict attitudes concerning economic and cultural protectionism (i.e., Models 2-4) have generally similar patterns of results, with some minor differences. The ordering of classes is identical in the model predicting support for the prioritization of domestic television programming (Model 3), but it shifts somewhat for the other two questions, both of which prime the respondents with the word “foreign.” Though the disengaged are the least likely to fear foreign cultural influences (Model 4) and liberal nationalists are the second least likely to do so, the differences between restrictive and ardent nationalists are not statistically significant in those models—that is, members of the latter two classes are equally likely (i.e., more so than liberal nationalists and the disengaged) to support cultural protectionism. In Model 2, concerning foreign imports, the differences between liberal nationalists and the disengaged also cease to be significant, with the four classes splitting into two distinct camps: the anti-protectionist liberal nationalists and disengaged respondents and the protectionist restrictive and ardent nationalists.
Models 6 and 7 measure support for European Union membership among citizens of eight EU member states that participated in the ISSP: the Czech Republic, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden. The results are interesting in two respects. First, the ordering of the disengaged and liberal classes is reversed, with the disengaged being significantly more skeptical than liberal nationalists of European integration. Indeed, in both models, the disengaged are as likely to be skeptical of the EU as restrictive nationalists and in Model 7 they lean more heavily toward Euroskepticism than ardent nationalists, whose views do not differ significantly from the liberal nationalists.

These findings are brought into further relief when compared to Model 5, which elicits general opinions about international organizations to the full sample from 30 countries. The ordering of the classes in Model 5 is consistent with the imports question, as the classes group into two distinct, internally homogeneous camps. These distinctions suggest that disengaged respondents are likely to view European institutions with the same level of suspicion they direct toward their national institutions (the latter is evidenced by these respondents’ bifurcated and low pride item responses). Interestingly, restrictive nationalists share a similar sense of detachment from national institutions and appear to be equally (or somewhat more) unfavorably disposed toward the EU.

The second interesting result in the EU attitude analysis compared to the previous models is the reversed pattern of effects among restrictive and ardent nationalists, particularly in Model 7, concerning the benefits of EU membership. Restrictive nationalists are far more likely than ardent nationalists to be skeptical of the EU. Indeed, they are the least likely of all the groups to think that the EU greatly benefits its member states. This finding is consistent with the prevalence of radical nationalist politics in European countries in the late 1990s and early

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22 The question was not asked in other E.U. member states.
2000s—an ideology that often combined anti-European attitudes with anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric and a general distrust of political elites (Mudde 2007; Berezin 2009).23

While restrictive nationalists appear to be the strongest Euroskeptics in the sample, ardent nationalists are only marginally less likely than liberal nationalists to state that the EU greatly or largely benefits the member state. Their positive assessment of the EU may be driven by a cost-benefit calculation of the perceived economic benefits to their nation-state or by an affective alignment of their national identification with Europe as a whole, but when national interest conflict with European interests, they become strong defenders of their country’s sovereignty (as illustrated in Model 6) (cf. Lubbers and Scheepers 2005). The fact that the two classes with the highest levels of national pride and high levels of national identification are also those that view the EU in the most positive light is consistent with past research that finds a non-zero-sum relationship between national and supranational identities (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Fligstein et al. 2012).

The ordering of categories on the immigration items (Models 8-14) differs from that observed in the protectionism and supranationalism items. Although liberal nationalists and the disengaged express more pro-immigrant attitudes than restrictive and ardent nationalists in five of the models (i.e., Models 8, 9, and 11-13), the disengaged appear to be less sanguine than liberal nationalists about the consequences of immigration (Models 8-10) and less supportive of full legal incorporation of immigrants (Models 11 and 14). Yet, at the same time, the disengaged do not favor more stringent control of illegal immigration (Model 12) nor do they view immigrant incorporation in primarily cultural terms (Model 13). This suggests an ambivalence about immigration among members of this category: they appear to tacitly accept immigration

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23 The finding is not limited to Eastern European countries, however. A model restricted to the non-Eastern-European EU members produces the same significant effects of latent class membership on Euroskepticism.
and reject greater border control, while at the same time viewing immigration as having some negative consequences and placing immigrants in a separate (and legally inferior) category to native-born citizens.

Restrictive nationalists, on the other hand, emerge in these models as the most anti-immigrant class, even more so than ardent nationalists. The only item where ardent nationalists exhibit more extreme attitudes concerns the exclusion of illegal immigrants (a question that primes concern with border security and national sovereignty), but the difference between the two classes is not statistically significant.

The results for the immigration items are broadly consistent with the preferred criteria of national membership among the four classes, with the disengaged and liberal nationalists being the most ethnically inclusive (and the least anti-immigrant) and restrictive and ardent nationalists being the least ethnically inclusive (and the most anti-immigrant). At the same time, the ordering of the classes adds nuance to our understanding of the differences between liberal nationalists and the disengaged on one hand and restrictive and ardent nationalists on the other.

In general, the models reported in Figure 3 demonstrate that the four classes correspond to meaningful cultural and political phenomena that are themselves strong predictors of other political attitudes. Had the LCA algorithm identified response patterns that were mere statistical artifacts, the resulting classes would not have yielded the systematic effects observed here. The models also reveal substantively interesting features of the four classes, such as the Euroskepticism of the disengaged, the tentative pro-Europeanism of ardent nationalists, the enthusiastic support for immigration among liberal nationalists, and the strong anti-immigrant sentiments of the restrictive nationalists.
It should be emphasized that the associations between the latent classes and social and political attitudes persist after controlling for partisan ideology—that is, these effects exist within politically like-minded groups and not just between them. Theoretically, these results point to an important conclusion: if we are to understand how people formulate their political views, we need to take into account not only their political party affiliation and their overall ideological orientation, but also the specific cultural schemas through which they perceive their nation-states. These beliefs are likely to shape how people interpret political messages, what policies they favor, and which political parties and leaders they trust. Far from being a marginal phenomenon, therefore, nationalism should be considered essential to routine political decision-making in settled times, particularly when the nation is evoked in political discourse (Sears 1993).

DISCUSSION

The empirical investigation undertaken in this paper has revealed four important characteristics of cultural schemas of the nation in modern democracies:

*Meanings attributed to the nation are more heterogeneous than is suggested by existing theories.* Comparative theories that posit the existence of two varieties of nationalism—civic and ethnic—and map them onto specific countries gloss over the complexity that characterizes popular understandings of the nation-state. The analyses in this paper demonstrate that nationalist attitudes are better represented by a more extensive typology. These contrasting results are understandable given that the ethnic-civic dichotomy focuses almost exclusively on the nation’s symbolic boundaries, while I define nationalism more broadly, as a combination of identification, membership criteria, pride, and hubris. In practice, however, when people speak about ethnic or civic *nationalism* they often equate criteria of national belonging with the overall...
ideology that defines the fundamental characteristics of a nation. In so doing, they ignore other, equally important dimensions of the phenomenon.

Furthermore, despite occasional slippages in its use, the ethnic-civic distinction was originally intended to describe the logic that governs a country’s institutions, such as immigration and citizenship law, and not to serve as a theory of everyday nationalism. Because it is reductive and static, this binary typology cannot account for the full variation in the cultural schemas of the nation-state across countries and over time. In fact, however, these same qualities limit its utility for understanding national institutions. As Rogers Smith’s (1997) study of American citizenship law demonstrates, institutional arrangements can oscillate over time between more and less inclusive policies, which reflect the ongoing conflict between divergent understandings of what constitutes the country’s rightful social boundaries. Smith’s findings point to the fact that legal arrangements cannot be divorced from the policy environments in which they are created, which in turn are shaped by shared (and competing) cultural understandings. If we want to understand the conflicts surrounding a particular policy domain in a given country, we must attend to the heterogeneous conceptions of the nation that inform them.

*All cultural schemas of the nation are present in all countries, though their relative prevalence varies.* Nothing in the logic of the LCA models presupposed a particular distribution of classes across countries. Though it was entirely possible that some classes would only be found in some countries, the actual results did not follow this pattern: The four classes were found throughout the sample. These findings clearly show that multiple understandings of the nation coexist in each country and are likely to compete with one another in defining public discourse and shaping policy outcomes. This heterogeneity complicates attempts to group
countries into distinct nationalist camps. As the results suggest, on average, people are more similar to their counterparts in other countries than to their own compatriots.

*The content of the cultural schemas is remarkably stable over time.* Again, nothing in the model presupposed this finding. In principle, both the content and the distribution of attitudes can be stable or variable. Yet, the results were unambiguous: The means of the nationalism variables were strikingly similar across the two waves of data. This suggests that the set of available tools on which people draw to understand their nation-states does not fluctuate with economic, political, or cultural conditions, at least not in the short-term. Perhaps if we looked at a longer timeframe that included periods of significant turmoil, the results would be different. As Swidler’s (1986) cultural toolkit theory suggests, people rarely revise accepted understandings of the world during settled times, but they do so readily in periods of widespread uncertainty.26

*Variation in schemas of the nation is associated with other political attitudes.* The pooled cross-national regressions demonstrated that schemas of the nation are associated with a variety of politically relevant attitudes, even after extensive controls were included in the models. How respondents understood their nation had implications for their beliefs about the country’s appropriate role in the world, the need to protect the country’s culture against foreign influences, the desirability of supranational integration, and the appropriate handling of immigration issues. It is likely that when the nation’s collective salience becomes heightened, different understandings of the nation may have important consequences for people’s evaluation of state policies and political candidates (Sears 1993).

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26 Arguably, the period between 1995 and 2003 could be viewed as “unsettled” in many countries. However, the events that transpired did not seem to fundamentally alter the repertoire of cultural schemas in the twenty countries included in the sample. “Unsettlement,” as used by Swidler, is a somewhat vague concept, so it is difficult to generate specific hypothesis about sources of major structural changes in available cultural repertoires. Perhaps more severe shocks, such as major armed conflicts that threaten the lives of large portions of a national population, would lead to drastically redefined understandings of the nation.
By offering a systematic alternative to the methodologically nationalist and variable-based approaches to nationalism research, the analytical model proposed here is intended to stimulate research on within-country variation in cultural schemas of the nation-state. A number of substantive questions remain, which can be addressed by future studies: How do cultural models vary across subnational regions? What is the relationship between nationalist beliefs and other political ideologies, such as populism, separatism, or cosmopolitanism? What social, economic, and political events drive changes in the relative salience of cultural schemas within countries? How do these cultural models reflect and shape narratives commonly found in popular discourse? To what extent do these cultural schemas define publics that can be collectively mobilized by social movements and other political actors? Under what circumstances do competing definitions of the nation-state serve as the basis for political cleavages that can generate social conflict and social change? And finally, what does the universality of these cultural repertoires along with their internal variation tell us about cultural convergence and conflict in the world polity (Koenig and Dierkes 2011)? These are some of the many possible starting points for future inquiry into the cultural and political dimensions of the heterogeneous popular understandings of the nation-state.

In addition to its substantive contributions to nationalism studies and political sociology, this paper has general implications for the sociology of culture. First, the cross-national consistency of nationalist attitudes may be generalized to other highly institutionalized domains, such as the economy, education, or family. To the extent that these domains are subject to international institutional pressures, we may expect to find cross-national similarities in the content of attitudes along with variation in their distribution across countries. Barring major
shocks to the institutional order, those attitudes should be stable over time, but their prevalence should fluctuate in response to domain-relevant events.

Second, the data-driven clustering employed here could be applied to other types of groups that function as objects of collective identification and are governed by formal institutions. Despite the tendency to view the culture of individual religions, professions, or organizations as internally homogeneous and externally differentiated, it is quite possible that group members actually hold multiple collective identification schemas that imbue the group with distinct—and possibly conflicting—meanings. The degree of this internal variation can be measured, compared across groups or group types, and explained. Moreover, scholars can examine the consequences of within-group variation in collective identification schemas. Such differences may translate into social and political cleavages that can have implications for conflict and cooperation within and across groups, thereby contributing to social change.

Third, this study demonstrates the possibility of conducting large-sample comparative cultural research without resorting to methodological nationalism or other forms of groupism (Brubaker 2004). Simply because the nation-state is used as a sampling frame does not imply that it is always the most appropriate unit of cultural analysis. An inductive approach that identifies patterns among all the cases avoids the problems of cross-case incommensurability and arbitrary reduction of variation to the case level. The result is a set of cultural categories that may or may not map onto the cases in the sample. If the categories and the cases are congruent, we can conclude that the cases are culturally distinct; if not, we can view this as evidence for at least partial overlap in cultural repertoires between the cases.

For instance, it is possible that members of groups with stronger central authority will exhibit less internal differentiation—or at least greater belief constraint—than members of less authoritative groups (Martin 2002).
While this method was developed specifically for survey data, its principles could be incorporated quite easily into qualitative research designs. For instance, in an interview-based study of multiple settings, the researcher could code responses based on their overall similarity regardless of where they were observed and then, in a second step, identify their prevalence in each setting. This strategy would minimize the risk of artificially imposing the boundaries of the settings on the cultural processes observed, thereby maximizing the researcher’s ability to observe and explain variation found both within and across settings. A similar process could be used to interpret data collected through ethnographic fieldwork or archival research.

Finally, the results suggest that cultural comparisons between collectivities should not be thought of in terms of the essential group attributes, but rather in terms of distributional differences in widely diffused cultural repertoires (Swidler 1986; Lamont and Thévenot 2010). Given that in the era of intensified global cultural diffusion (Meyer et al. 1997; Bonikowski 2010), ideas, beliefs, and cultural scripts are being rapidly and widely circulated between groups, strong assumptions about categorical cultural differences are becoming increasingly untenable. At the same time, of course, certain ways of thinking are likely to resonate more than others in particular collective settings. Just how dramatic are such within- and between-group differences in the relative salience of cultural repertoires is an empirical question.

CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to advance research on nationalism and culture by demonstrating that it is possible to avoid the pitfalls of reductive cross-national comparisons that do not take into consideration both within- and between-country variation in attitudes. The approach presented here explicitly treats the appropriateness of studying nationalism at the country level as an empirical question rather than a foregone conclusion. The results challenge existing models of
nationalism that reduce the phenomenon to a binary distinction mapped onto individual countries. Instead, the study demonstrates that multiple varieties of everyday nationalism can be found across a variety of national contexts and that the content of everyday nationalism is remarkably stable over time, while its distribution within and across countries varies.
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I. National Identification (4-point scale: Not close at all, Not very close, Close, Very Close)

1. CLSSTAT: “How close do you feel to [county/province/state]?”
2. CLSCTRY: “How close do you feel to [country]?”
3. CLSCONT: “How close do you feel to [continent]?”

II. National Membership Criteria (4-point scale: Not important at all, Not very important, Fairly important, Very important)

“Some people say the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?”

1. IMPANC: “To have [nationality] ancestry.” *(ASKED ONLY IN 2003)*
2. IMPBORN: “To have been born in [country].”
3. IMPCIT: “To have [nationality] citizenship.”
4. IMPFEEL: “To feel [nationality].”
5. IMPLANG: “To be able to speak [language].”
6. IMPLAW: “To respect [nationality] political institutions and laws.”
7. IMPLIV: “To have lived in [country] for most of one’s life.”
8. IMPREL: “To be a [religion].”

III. National Pride (4-point scale: Not proud at all, Not very proud, Somewhat proud, Very proud)

“How proud are you of [country] in each of the following?”

1. PRDART: “Its achievements in the arts and literature.”
2. PRDDEM: “The way democracy works.”
3. PRDECO: “[Country’s] economic achievements.”
4. PRDGRP: “Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society.”
5. PRDHIS: “Its history.”
6. PRDMIL: “[Country’s] armed forces.”
7. PRDPOL: “Its political influence in the world.”
8. PRDSCI: “Its scientific and technological achievements.”
10. PRDSS: “Its social security system.”

IV. Hubris (5-point scale: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither agree or disagree, Agree, Strongly agree)

“How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?”

1. HUBCIT: “I would rather be a citizen of [country] than of any other country in the world.”
2. HUBCTRY: “Generally speaking, [country] is a better country than most other countries.”
3. HUBPEOP: “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [nationality].”
4. HUBIFWR: “People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.”
5. HUBSHAM: “There are some things about [country] today that make me feel ashamed of [country].” *(This item is reverse-coded in the analysis.)*
Appendix B. How Many Cultural Schemas of the Natio-State Are There?

Not surprisingly, with over 27,000 sets of responses to twenty-six survey questions, standard goodness of fit measures are likely to favor solutions with a large number of classes. However, the number of classes has an inverse relationship with interpretability. The more classes there are, the smaller are the differences between them and the lower is the analytical utility of the overall classification system (indeed, this is true of all typologies). Also, more classes result in fewer observations per class, which makes it difficult to analyze the correlates of class assignment.

It is possible to think of the choice of classes in an LCA model as the resolution with which one wants to view cultural variation. At maximum resolution, 27,790 observations will yield up to 27,790 cultural profiles; at minimum resolution, they will yield one cultural profile. The statistically preferable solution, one that yields the lowest Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), is found somewhere in between these two extremes. Pragmatically, however, a solution with only a few classes is preferable for the purposes of interpretability. To identify this optimal tradeoff point, it is possible to rely on a similar method to that routinely used in principal component and factor analysis for selecting the most appropriate number of factors. The method relies on a scree plot, which maps the number of factors against the additional information provided by the inclusion of each additional factor. The optimal stopping point is represented by an “elbow” in the plot, at which the amount of additional information generated by each new factor begins to level off. Analogously, when evaluating a series of LCA models, it is possible to identify an elbow in a two-way graph of BIC by the number of classes included in each model.

Figure B1 illustrates the relationship between BIC and number of classes in the ISSP nationalism data. The first graph reflects the full data for the 2003 sample of thirty countries and
the second graph reflects the data for the 1995 and 2003 comparison samples of twenty countries. The graphs show BICs for solutions ranging from one to ten classes. For all three samples, the optimal tradeoff point is produced by the four-class solution: at first, the inclusion of additional classes produces large payoffs in BIC improvement, but beyond four classes the payoff declines considerably.

This decision is further justified by the fact that additional classes merely add further nuance to the four-class solution. While each of the four classes represents a completely unique pattern of responses, this is not the case with the fifth class. Its addition simply splits the liberal class into two further response patterns, which differ in only minor ways (the primary distinction is in the level of importance attached to religion as basis for national belonging—one class disagrees that religion is important, while the other strongly disagrees with the same statement). The same is true of each additional class. Indeed, the content of a ten-class solution for the full 2003 sample, illustrated in Figure B2, demonstrates that the ten classes are variations on the four fundamental response patterns identified in the original four-class solution. Some of these variations may be substantively interesting (for instance, the form of restrictive nationalism that
Is widespread in Hungary is characterized by especially high levels of pride in sports, art, and science), but their inclusion would unnecessarily complicate the present analysis and would not significantly alter the paper’s main contribution.

A supplementary method for evaluating model fit is to examine how well the model is able to assign individual cases to the latent classes. The assignment process consists of two steps. First, the algorithm calculates a posterior probability of every respondent’s assignment to each latent class. Second, every respondent is assigned to the class for which he or she has the highest posterior probability of membership. In the four-class solution, for instance, an individual respondent with hypothetical probabilities of 0.5, 0.2, 0.1, and 0.2 for classes one through four, respectively, would be assigned to the first class, for which the probability of membership is 0.5.
Table B1. Posterior probabilities of class assignment, ISSP 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threshold</th>
<th>Class 1</th>
<th>Class 2</th>
<th>Class 3</th>
<th>Class 4</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 0.9</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td>0.673</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 0.75</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>0.844</td>
<td>0.823</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>0.846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 0.5</td>
<td>0.987</td>
<td>0.990</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ability of the modal assignment process to produce unambiguous results can itself be used as a measure of model fit. If the majority of respondents have high modal posterior probabilities then we can be confident that the classes provide a reasonable fit to the data.

The proportion of cases in the full 2003 sample that exceed 0.5, 0.75, and 0.9 probability thresholds for class assignment are presented in Table B1. The denominators for each of the proportions are the counts of all the cases assigned by the algorithm to the corresponding class using the modal probability method. The results demonstrate that the assignment process in the four-class solution is quite accurate, with 71.1 percent of cases having a posterior probability greater than 0.9 and 84.6 percent of cases having a probability greater than 0.75 (a lower but still highly discriminating probability threshold). A probability greater than 0.5 is the minimum threshold for unambiguous class assignment and, as the table illustrates, this threshold is exceeded by over 98 percent of cases.

One way to test the impact of low-probability class assignment on model fit is to perform post-estimation analyses with a sample restricted to high-probability cases and compare the results with those generated from a full sample. This strategy was employed for all of the analysis in this paper and no meaningful differences were found between the full sample and the restricted sample, further demonstrating the robustness of the four-class solution.

Finally, model fit can be further improved through the inclusion of covariates and local dependencies. The former strategy improves the ability of the model to assign observations to classes, while the latter strategy makes it possible to relax the assumption of local independence.
for particular pairs of indicators that generate large model residuals (Hagenaars 1988; Vermunt and Magidson 2002). In the present case, the inclusion of sociodemographic covariates reduced the model BIC from 1,627,423 to 1,615,156, a 0.6 percent improvement. The residuals from the model with covariates were then reviewed and direct effects for the eleven pairs of indicators with the highest residuals were included in a final model. This resulted in an additional 2.1 percent improvement in BIC. The final BIC statistic of 1,581,141 was considerably lower than that generated by any of the models with more than four classes (by comparison, the 10-class model generated a BIC of 1,593,743). The overall improvement in BIC between the base model and the final model with both covariates and local dependencies was 2.8 percent.

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28 Including more than eleven conditional dependencies was computationally prohibitive and the incremental improvement in model fit generated by each conditional dependency became increasingly negligible.