Is Civic Nationalism Necessarily Inclusive? Conceptions of Nationhood and Anti-Muslim Attitudes in Europe

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ABSTRACT

Despite the centrality of national identity in the exclusionary discourse of the European radical right, scholars have not investigated how popular definitions of nationhood are connected to dispositions toward Muslims. Moreover, survey-based studies tend to conflate anti-Muslim attitudes with general anti-immigrant sentiments. This article contributes to research on nationalism and out-group attitudes by demonstrating that varieties of national self-understanding are predictive of anti-Muslim attitudes, above and beyond dispositions toward immigrants. Using latent class analysis and regression models of survey data from 41 European countries, we demonstrate that conceptions of nationhood are heterogeneous within countries and that their relationship with anti-Muslim attitudes is contextually variable. Consistent with expectations, in most countries, anti-Muslim attitudes are positively associated with ascriptive— and negatively associated with elective (including civic)—conceptions of nationhood. Northwestern Europe, however, is an exception to this pattern: in this region, civic nationalism is linked to greater antipathy toward Muslims. We suggest that in this region, elective criteria of belonging have become fused with exclusionary notions of national culture that portray Muslims as incompatible with European liberal values, effectively legitimating anti-Muslim sentiments in mainstream political culture. This may heighten the appeal of anti-Muslim sentiments not only on the radical right, but also among mainstream segments of the Northwestern European public, with important implications for social exclusion and political behavior.
Take a walk down the street and see where this is going. You no longer feel like you are living in your own country. There is a battle going on and we have to defend ourselves. Before you know it there will be more mosques than churches (Geert Wilders, Leader of the Party for Freedom, Netherlands, in interview with the Dutch daily newspaper *De Pers*, 2007).

Islam was never part of Europe. It’s the rulebook of another world (Viktor Orban, Prime Minister, Hungary, in interview with German weekly newspaper *Focus*, 2015).

I believe that almost all values of Islam are incompatible with the values of Danish society (Martin Henriksen, Spokesman on Foreigners and Integration, Danish People’s Party, Denmark, in live debate program *Debatten* on Danish national television, 2016).

Islam has no place in Slovakia (Robert Fico, Prime Minister, Slovakia, in interview with Slovakian news agency *TASR*, 2016).

INTRODUCTION

Across Europe, Islam has become central to debates about collective identity. As illustrated by the quotes above, prominent politicians frequently depict Muslims’ beliefs and practices as incompatible with their nations’ core values, and these viewpoints appear to resonate with segments of the European population (Foner and Simon 2015). Yet, despite the existence of research on individual-level predictors of anti-Muslim attitudes (e.g. Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Helbling 2014; Spruyt and Elchardus 2012) and on the relationship between nationalism
and anti-immigrant attitudes (Kunovich 2009), scholars have not considered whether popular conceptions of nationhood affect attitudes toward Muslims.

To address this gap in scholarship, our study asks whether definitions of national symbolic boundaries (i.e., the criteria perceived as necessary for legitimate national membership) are associated with preferences regarding interactions with Muslims. We examine this question using survey data from 41 European countries. Given that most studies of anti-Muslim attitudes are limited to one or a few—typically Western European—countries, the broader analytical scope of our project allows us to make more general claims, while attending to previously unexamined cross-national variation. In particular, we use inductive methods to show that the relationship between specific conceptions of nationhood and anti-Muslim attitudes is context-dependent: civic nationalism, seen in the literature as broadly inclusive, is associated with particularly strong anti-Muslim sentiments in Northwestern Europe but not in other countries in the sample.

These results resonate with recent arguments that a secular variety of anti-Muslim political rhetoric is gaining ground in Western Europe, both on the radical right and in mainstream public discourse (Brubaker 2017; Mouritsen and Olsen 2013; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). This rhetoric presents Islam as a threat to fundamental “European values,” such as civic republicanism, cultural progressivism, secularized Christian collective identity, and the belief that overt religious practices have no place in public life.
ANTI-MUSLIM ATTITUDES

The question that has received the most attention in existing scholarship is whether anti-Muslim attitudes are distinct from attitudes toward other out-groups, in particular immigrants. To answer this question, some studies compare the levels of antipathy directed toward multiple groups. Others examine whether anti-Muslim attitudes are associated with the same explanatory factors as anti-immigrant attitudes. A handful of studies do both.

Research comparing the relative levels of prejudice toward Muslims and other groups has generated mixed findings. For instance, while Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) argue that “the points of difference [between Muslims and non-Muslims] are so visible and go so deep” (p. 5), they find that the Dutch have similar dispositions toward immigrant groups from Muslim-majority and non-Muslim countries. This finding is echoed by Strabac, Aalberg and Valenta (2014), who use data from a survey experiment conducted in Norway, Sweden, the United States, and the United Kingdom to show that Muslim immigrants are viewed no more negatively than immigrants in general.

Other studies, however, come to the opposite conclusion. Using data from a survey experiment among Belgian university students, Spruyt and Elchardys (2012) find that anti-Muslim sentiments are more intense than anti-foreigner feelings, on a host of criteria (see also Spruyt, van der Noll, and Vandenbossche 2016; Spruyt and van der Noll 2017). While the authors do not test their proposed explanation, they suggest that hostility toward Muslims is more “accessible” than hostility toward immigrants in general, and that this is so for three reasons. First, a liberal
critique of Muslims focusing on equality, democracy, individual rights, and tolerance has become widespread in public discourse. This may induce negative feelings about Muslims in liberally minded people, even if they may be otherwise less prone to prejudice. Second, Muslims are potential victims of prejudice along multiple axes of differentiation (i.e., religious, cultural, and ethnic), which may cumulatively heighten negative sentiments toward them (see also Helbling and Traunmüller forthcoming). Finally, the authors claim that the practices of Muslim groups may themselves contribute to an identity-based backlash, because they display “differences in norms, attitudes and ways of life” (p. 802). While none of the studies in this tradition test the notion that the opposition to Muslims is driven by a sense of identity incompatibility, several of them formulate hypotheses about the ways in which the social construction of the Muslim Other challenges national values and ideals.

The only comparative study we know that includes more than a few countries also finds a higher level of anti-Muslim sentiment in comparison with anti-immigrant attitudes (Strabac and Listhaug 2008). However, the authors find that both outcomes are predicted by the same sociodemographic variables (in particular, age, education, and occupation, but not religious variables), leading to the conclusion that “we are not dealing with a novel or exceptional phenomenon. A particular minority group has become especially exposed to prejudice, but we find little evidence that religious or cultural elements play a prominent role” (p. 282). As an extension of this argument, the study identifies the same empirical associations in both Eastern and Western European countries, which the authors interpret as evidence for the “increasingly global nature of dissemination of information about Islam and Muslims” (p. 283). This research echoes the broader finding that xenophobia, understood as hostility toward foreigners in general,
is a strong predictor of attitudes toward Muslims and Islam (van der Noll and Saroglou 2015; Helbling 2014; Wike and Grim 2010; Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner 2009).

In sum, while there is mixed evidence for whether the level of opposition to Muslims is higher than toward immigrants, there is more agreement across studies that similar factors explain attitudes toward both groups, and that xenophobia is an important driver of hostility toward Muslims. We incorporate these insights in our analysis by controlling for anti-immigrant sentiment. Our study stands apart, however, by explicitly theorizing and testing the notion that anti-Muslim attitudes are shaped—at least in part—by shared understandings of legitimate criteria of national belonging. To do so, we engage with the literature on national symbolic boundaries.

NATIONAL SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES AND EXCLUSIONARY ATTITUDES

Exclusionary attitudes toward religious, ethnic, and racial out-groups are predicated on particular understandings of the in-group’s collective identity. This insight has been at the core of a voluminous literature on nationalism, which has traced how divergent national self-conceptions have historically shaped national political cultures and continue to inform contemporary social attitudes and political preferences. This work has frequently employed a binary distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism to describe definitions of national belonging based on ascriptive and elective criteria, respectively. The former include relatively fixed attributes, such as race, ethnicity, native-born status, and national ancestry, as well as deeply socialized cultural
traits, like religious beliefs. The latter consist of more voluntary dispositions, such as subjective identification with a given nation, commitment to its political values, and formal citizenship.²

These two configurations of national membership criteria—or of symbolic boundaries drawn around the nation (Bail 2008; Lamont and Molnar 2002)—were initially conceptualized as expressions of distinct forms of national character (Kohn 1944; Lipset 1990), but over time, scholars came to acknowledge their co-existence and competition within countries. Operationalized at the individual rather than country level, these dispositions have been shown to predict racial resentment, anti-immigrant attitudes, and a variety of social policy preferences (Citrin et al. 1990; Schildkraut 2011; Wright 2011; Wright and Reeskens 2013). It is likely, therefore, that how people understand the boundaries of their nation is also an important factor shaping anti-Muslim attitudes.

Much of the empirical research on national symbolic boundaries is based on two assumptions that deserve further scrutiny: (1) that the binary civic/ethnic typology is sufficiently exhaustive to capture the variation in national identity across contemporary democracies and (2) that civic nationalism is unambiguously inclusive. The first assumption has been challenged by recent research, which has shown contemporary nationalism to be multidimensional, varying in its content both across countries (Bail 2008; Bonikowski 2017) and within them (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). This research suggests that nationalist beliefs cannot be reduced to two competing perspectives and that inductive approaches hold considerable promise in mapping symbolic boundaries using attitudinal data.
The second assumption rests on the view that political principles are voluntary rather than ascribed. The nation is portrayed as a community of choice—“a daily plebiscite” (Renan [1882] 1996:42)—in which membership depends primarily on one’s commitment to the nation’s political values. Because civic nationalism rejects barriers to national belonging rooted in immutable individual characteristics like ancestry and place of birth, it has been shown to correlate with more positive attitudes toward minorities and immigrants (Kunovich 2009; Pehrson et al. 2009), and as a result, has been equated with social inclusion in general (Simonsen 2016).

It is not self-evident, however, that placing a premium on voluntary criteria of belonging makes civic nationalism immune from the vilification of out-groups. Commitment to a nation’s political principles—the mainstay of civic nationalism—may be seen by some as a deeply rooted cultural disposition that is inherently lacking among immigrants and ethno-religious minority groups (Mouritsen and Olsen 2013; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). Indeed, as Brown (1999:290) argues, “the civic nation similarly [to the ethnocultural nation] clothes itself in the myths and symbols of family” in order to offer its members a coherent sense of temporally durable community.

The idea that essentialist narratives concerning national political culture can serve as bases of social exclusion is borne out in recent European history, with anti-immigrant movements and parties—most notably, the Dutch Party for Freedom, and the Pim Fortuyn List before it—supporting liberal principles (e.g., gender equality and protection of sexual minorities) while at the same time rejecting Muslim immigrants on the basis of their ostensibly illiberal values.
(Akkerman 2005; Halikiopoulou, Mock, and Vasilopoulou 2013; Brubaker 2017; Mudde 2007; Minkenberg 2000; Rydgren 2004; Wren 2001). This suggests that, contrary to dominant arguments in the nationalism literature, some varieties of civic nationalism may be associated at the individual level with out-group antipathy, and anti-Muslim attitudes in particular (Spruyt and Elchardys 2012). The inductive methods employed by configurational studies of nationalism (Bail 2008; Kunovich 2009; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016) could in principle be used to explore this possibility, but thus far, that research tradition has shown civic nationalism to be exclusionary only when combined with ethnic nationalism (i.e., when respondents simultaneously endorse the importance of all criteria of national membership).

Despite the established link between national self-understanding and out-group attitudes in general, research in this tradition has rarely focused specifically on anti-Muslim attitudes. The few studies that do exist touch on nationalism tangentially and operationalize it narrowly. Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner (2009), for instance, demonstrate that patriotism, defined as positive affect toward the nation combined with strong national identification, has a negative relationship with attitudes toward out-groups, which indirectly affects perceptions of Muslims. Dekker and van der Noll (2012) rely on a similar patriotism scale, but compare it with a measure of nationalism, understood as perceptions of national superiority; only the latter is a statistically significant predictor of antipathy toward Muslims. Ernst and Bornstein (2012) conceptualize nationalism in terms of “whether or not it is to the benefit of other countries to be influenced by the United States and for the United States to gain more power;” this measure is correlated with anti-Muslim attitudes. None of these studies consider respondents’ perceptions of the legitimate criteria of national belonging.
We address this gap in research by examining how within-country variation in the configuration of symbolic boundaries of the nation affects attitudes toward Muslims. We expect individuals who subscribe to elective conceptions of the national community to be less likely to view Muslims as outsiders. However, following the above discussion, we also investigate whether this relationship may be reversed in some European countries, in particular those where liberal values are framed by politicians in culturally essentialist terms. If so, this would challenge accepted understandings of civic nationalism and suggest that anti-Muslim attitudes in Europe may be more pervasive and durable than typically assumed.

DATA

We use data from the 2008 European Values Study (EVS). Fielded in 47 countries and subnational regions, this survey includes measures of attitudes toward Muslims, as well as a battery of questions concerning national symbolic boundaries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only dataset to feature this unique combination of items; yet, thus far, the relationship between these items has not been empirically studied.3

Given our focus on beliefs about Muslims held by non-Muslim majority populations, we eliminate from the analysis six samples collected in Muslim-majority countries. These include Albania, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Northern Cyprus, and Bosnia Herzegovina. We also exclude first- and second-generation immigrants, whose understanding of the nation and attitudes toward minorities are likely to differ considerably from those of respondents with native-born
parents. After listwise deletion of 4,230 cases with missing values on the five symbolic boundary variables, the sample for the initial latent class analysis consists of 51,829 respondents from 41 countries or subnational regions; that number further decreases to 47,986 in the final regression models because of missing values on the dependent variable and control variables.

Our dependent variable captures respondents’ preference against having Muslims as neighbors. The measure is dichotomous, coded "1" if Muslims are among the groups the respondent does not want as neighbors, and "0" otherwise. By focusing on residential proximity, the item confronts respondents with a personal choice that has relevance (at least hypothetically) for their everyday lives. This is likely to make salient their anti-Muslim sentiments in ways that more abstract questions about the accommodation of Muslim practices in public life would not. Given the widespread availability of cultural scripts about religious and ethnic inclusion, responses to this item may underestimate anti-Muslim sentiments due to social desirability bias. If so, the estimates generated by our analyses are likely to be conservative.

METHODS

Latent class analysis: an inductive approach to identifying symbolic boundaries within country groups

To examine how anti-Muslim attitudes are related to respondents’ beliefs about the nation’s symbolic boundaries, we rely on a battery of questions about the relative importance of multiple criteria of national belonging, including ancestry, birth in the country, respect for the country’s
laws and institutions, ability to speak the country’s official language, and long-term residence in the country—measures that have been routinely used in other national identity surveys. Unlike studies that use these items selectively or aggregate them into factor or additive scales, however, we use latent class analysis (LCA) to inductively group respondents based on their patterns of responses to all five items. Based on the common insight from cultural sociology that meaning is relational—that is, that it is derived from the set of similarities and oppositions between multiple entities, not from the entities themselves (Mohr 1998)—this allows us to measure unique configurations of boundary-related beliefs. These configurations can be thought of as elements in overarching schemas through which subsets of respondents understand the domain of nationhood (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016).

LCA estimates a latent categorical variable based on observed responses to a set of indicators. Every respondent in the sample is assigned a probability of obtaining a particular value on the latent categorical variable (i.e. of being assigned to a particular latent class), conditional on his or her responses to the indicators of interest. The model is estimated based on the assumption that the indicators are independent of one another, conditional on the latent variable (Hagenaars 1993). This assumption can be relaxed for certain pairs of indicators to improve model fit (Vermunt 1997), a strategy that we employ in our analysis.

One way to conduct comparisons across countries within an LCA framework is to include country fixed effects in a pooled model. This multiple-group design, however, raises the question of between-country comparability in the composition of the latent classes, because it imposes the same latent class structure on the samples from all the countries (Kankaraš, Moors, and Vermunt
This glosses over country-level heterogeneity, which is likely to be considerable in our data, given the highly varied cases included in the sample. On the other hand, allowing a unique class structure for every country would make between-country comparison impossible.

To overcome this problem, we employ an innovative two-stage approach. First, we generate a multilevel LCA model that groups respondents into latent classes and simultaneously assigns the 41 countries into discrete groups, based on the distribution of the classes within countries. This allows us to identify countries that share similar profiles of nationalism variables (in particular, our analysis generates four distinct country groups). We do so in keeping with the configurational logic discussed above, which suggests that not only is the meaning of nationhood likely to depend on how individuals combine multiple boundary-related beliefs into overarching schemas, but the meaning of these schemas is also likely to be context-dependent because those who subscribe to a given nationalist schema may do so partly in reaction to competing schemas in the population. Second, we run a new LCA model with country fixed effects using a pooled sample within each country group (in most cases a four-class model was optimal, but in one country group, a three-class model provided a better fit to the data). Finally, having optimized the models, we examine the content of the latent classes (i.e., the posterior distribution of the nationalism indicators in each class) and assign each of them a label that best reflects their most distinctive characteristics. The result is a set of symbolic boundary configurations specific to four groups of countries. These configurations are invariant within each country group and heterogeneous between them, thus representing an empirically grounded compromise between a fully uniform pooled model and a series of 41 unique country-level LCA models. We return to a discussion of the observed boundary configurations in the results section.
Examining associations between symbolic boundaries and anti-Muslim attitudes within country groups

Having obtained the latent class estimates for each of the four groups of countries, we assign each respondent to a specific class using the modal probability of class membership. We then use conditional logistic regression with country fixed effects to regress the dependent variable—preference against living near Muslims—on respondents’ class membership. We run these models separately for each country group to ensure that our results are comparable across respondents. We apply country fixed effects to focus the analysis on individual-level differences within each country group. This modeling strategy eliminates concerns about omitted variables at the country level, as all variation in the dependent variable that can be attributed to the country level is included in the country-specific error term. Since we are not estimating parameters for country-level covariates or analyzing cross-level interactions in a multilevel framework, the small number of country cases in each country group is not a concern for our models.

All models include a range of individual-level control variables found to correlate with anti-Muslim attitudes in previous research. These include gender (male), age, education (less than high school, high school or vocational education, and university or higher), employment status (in job or not), and religious denomination (Catholic, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, Muslim, Orthodox, and none/atheist; denominations represented by fewer than 50 respondents in a given country group are coded as “other”). The models also include a measure of attachment to the nation, coded “1” if the respondent mentions the nation as the geographical group (s)he belongs
to “first of all” among five geographical groups, and “0” otherwise. Including this variable allows us to investigate whether strong attachment to the nation drives anti-Muslim attitudes in and of itself, or whether what matters is the respondent's conception of the boundaries of the national community. As we have argued, the latter is likely to be most important for anti-Muslim attitudes, but previous studies have only examined the effects of the former.

Finally, all models also include a control for anti-immigrant sentiment. Given the links demonstrated in previous studies between conceptions of nationhood and out-group attitudes (especially anti-immigrant attitudes), this will enable us to examine whether symbolic boundary configurations independently affect attitudes toward Muslims or whether this potential effect is fully mediated by anti-immigrant attitudes. The fact that in some counties there is considerable overlap between the categories “immigrant” and “Muslim” may raise concerns about the inclusion of anti-immigrant attitudes in our models. Empirically, however, the correlation between the two variables is only moderate in our sample ($r = 0.46$). Note too that removing this control variable does not substantially alter the findings, a robustness check that further strengthens our confidence in this model specification (see also endnote 14). The variable is coded as “1” when immigrants are mentioned among the groups of people whom the respondent would not like as neighbors, and “0” otherwise. All data and code used in our analyses are available in the online replication package.

After having run conditional logistic regressions for each country group, we compare the results across country groups to determine whether certain configurations of symbolic boundaries are more likely to be associated with anti-Muslim attitudes in particular sets of countries. While we
can reasonably make the theoretical claim that abstract symbolic boundaries affect preferences for socially exclusionary behavior, we are not able to empirically ascertain the direction of causality on the basis of our data. Indeed, it is possible that individuals use certain understandings of national membership as justification for their antipathy toward Muslims. We return to this point in the discussion section. Given this possibility, we interpret our results in terms of associations between boundary configurations and anti-Muslim attitudes, rather than the causal effects of the former on the latter.

RESULTS: LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS

We first carry out a multilevel latent class analysis model in order to inductively generate groups of countries with similar profiles of nationalism variables. We chose a six-class specification because it generated between three and four meaningful classes within each country; adding more classes to the model increased the complexity of the solution without yielding substantively distinct results. The country distribution of classes is presented in Table 1. As the table demonstrates, there is considerable variation in the size of the classes across countries—and therefore in the distribution of the symbolic boundary indicators themselves—which would make the use of a single aggregate LCA model problematic. This variation, however, is patterned, with some countries exhibiting relatively similar configurations of symbolic boundaries. These similarities allowed the multilevel LCA model to combine the countries into four groups, as shown in Table 1.10
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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Class 2</th>
<th>Class 3</th>
<th>Class 4</th>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>0.12</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: All posterior probabilities were generated by the Latent GOLD software package. The proportions in bold correspond to latent classes that have a prevalence greater than 0.1 within each country. Taken together, these results suggest that each country group consists of a unique combination of three or four classes, out of the six classes estimated from the aggregate data.

As a second step, we run a separate LCA model within each country group—that is, we discard the classes produced by the multilevel model but retain the country groupings (for a detailed discussion of our modeling strategy, see Appendix A). We then examine the posterior distribution of the nationalism indicators by class within each country group in order to interpret the content of the classes. The results are shown in Figure 1. The x-axis in each graph in Figure 1 lists the five boundary criteria and the y-axis displays their normalized means within each class. The classes are labeled based on their most distinctive features, which we discuss below.

Group 1: Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ireland, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Northern Ireland, Serbia, Ukraine

The first group is primarily composed of countries from Central and Eastern Europe, with two exceptions: Ireland and Northern Ireland. While Ireland and Northern Ireland have a distinct history and geographic location they share a similar set of symbolic boundary configurations with the remaining countries in this group, and these configurations differ from those observed in other Western European countries (notably, Ireland was also grouped with Eastern European countries in Kohn’s [1944] classic work on ethnic nationalism). Group 1 is characterized by four distinct conceptions of nationhood. The first, which we call thin, does not place any strong restrictions on national belonging. The second, constitutional, views respect for the laws and
**Figure 1.** LCA results: Configurations of symbolic boundaries by country group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Thin (0.28)</th>
<th>Constitutional (0.27)</th>
<th>Undifferentiated (0.26)</th>
<th>Thick (0.19)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ancestry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* For each country group, the figure presents class-specific partial probabilities of nationalist variable responses, as well as latent class sizes in parentheses.
institutions of the country as the primary basis of national membership. This country group also features an undifferentiated boundary configuration that equally prioritizes all criteria of national belonging at a level roughly equal to the national mean and a thick boundary that treats all criteria of membership as very important.

Group 2: Armenia, Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain

The second country group is composed of a wide range of countries from multiple regions: Central and Eastern Europe, but also Southern and Northern Europe. Across all these cases, we observe four classes, of which two resemble those found in Group 1. In addition to a thin and thick understanding of the nation’s symbolic boundaries, this group includes one boundary configuration that places a high priority on language (we refer to it as the linguistic class) and one that views both language and respect for the country’s laws and institutions as prerequisites for national membership. We label the latter boundary configuration civic, because of its consistency with standard accounts of inclusive forms of nationalism predicated on criteria of belonging that enable full political and economic participation in society (Kohn 1944; Brubaker 1992).
Group 3: Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland

The third group consists entirely of Western and Northern European countries. In this group, we find variants of the constitutional, thin, linguistic, and civic configurations observed elsewhere, but, interestingly, no thick definition of the nation’s symbolic boundaries. Even the class with the highest mean values on all the indictors (i.e., the civic class) is primarily composed of respondents who do not believe that ancestry is important for national membership and who exhibit only modest agreement with the importance of native birth and lifelong residence as sources of national belonging. This fits with standard depictions of Northwestern Europe as more progressive and inclusive toward minorities and immigrants than the rest of the continent (e.g. Kohn 1944).

Group 4: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia

The fourth group is composed of countries from Eastern and Southern Europe. We chose a three-class model for this group, because a four-class model produces two redundant classes with similar composition. The resulting symbolic boundary configurations in this group include thick, thin, and linguistic definitions of the nation.

As many of the classes (i.e. those with the same labels) are analogous across country groups, we can compare regression results across groups to assess the degree to which the same nationalist
beliefs are similarly or differently associated with anti-Muslim attitudes in different countries. Existing theories would lead us to expect consistent effects regardless of geographic and institutional context, while our intuitions about the specific meaning of cultural identity in Northwestern Europe suggest the possibility of heterogeneous effects across place.

RESULTS: ANTI-MUSLIM ATTITUDES

The classes generated by LCA can be used to formulate expectations for the subsequent regression analyses, based on our theorization of the potential connections between national symbolic boundaries and anti-Muslim attitudes. In all country groups but Group 3 there is a thick versus thin divide, which does not squarely fit into the traditional civic-ethnic distinction, because the thick boundary configuration combines civic/elective and ethnic/ascriptive elements. This finding is in line with previous configurational studies (e.g. Kunovich 2009), and it demonstrates the value of an inductive approach to the measurement of nationalist beliefs. As the difference between the two classes is that either all or no criteria of national belonging are highly prioritized, those who ascribe to the thick boundary configuration should display greater opposition to any out-group that does not satisfy all of the membership criteria, compared to individuals who subscribe to the thin boundary configuration.

In addition, we expect boundary configurations of a more elective form to be associated with less opposition to Muslims, compared to configurations of a more ascriptive variety. We understand elective boundary configurations to include those termed constitutional, civic, and linguistic, because the criteria that stand out in each are not inherently exclusionary. However, our earlier
discussion of “civilizational” nationalism in Western Europe suggests a possible alternative hypothesis: that civic conceptions of nationhood may also be associated with anti-Muslim attitudes in countries where Muslims have been framed in culturally exclusionary terms, as a group whose values are incompatible with Western secularism and progressive ideals (Brubaker 2017; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). Finally, we expect the undifferentiated boundary configuration to resemble the thin configuration, but possibly with greater opposition to Muslims due to the somewhat higher priority placed on all boundary criteria.

In what follows, we present results from conditional logistic regressions with country fixed effects for each country group in turn. We illustrate these in Figure 2 with pairwise comparison plots of association of class membership and anti-Muslim sentiment. Full regression tables displaying coefficient estimates for all variables can be found in Appendix B.

In Group 1, which is composed of Eastern European countries, Ireland, and Northern-Ireland, we find that the thick boundary configuration stands out in its association with higher levels of opposition to having a Muslim neighbor, in comparison with the other three classes. This is consistent with our expectation that individuals who subscribe to thinner or more elective boundary configurations should be less prone to anti-Muslim sentiments than individuals who endorse all criteria of belonging, including both ascriptive and elective ones. In addition, it appears that thin and elective conceptions of nationhood are equally inclusive of Muslims in this country group, as there is no statistically significant difference between the constitutional and thin classes or between the undifferentiated and thin classes. This suggests that a low bar for national membership is not the only path toward more inclusive attitudes toward Muslims in
these countries. Indeed, individuals who place emphasis on respecting the country’s laws and institutions as a basis for national membership are equally inclusive of Muslims as individuals who place relatively little emphasis on any criterion of national membership.

Next, we turn to Group 2, comprising Armenia, Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Here too, we find the thick class to be associated with greater opposition to Muslims than the other three classes. In a further parallel to Group 1, an elective conception of nationhood is equally inclusive of Muslims as a thin conception, as there is no statistically significant difference in the associations with anti-Muslim attitudes between the civic and thin classes. Viewing civic duties—respect for the country’s laws and knowing the language—as important criteria of national membership thus seems to foster an open attitude toward Muslims in one’s private social space. The Group 2 results, however, differ from those for Group 1 in one respect: the linguistic class is associated with greater dislike of Muslim neighbors than the thin class but not the civic class. As discussed above, it is reasonable that placing relatively little weight on any criteria of national membership should result in less opposition to out-group members in comparison with valuing any one criterion. What is interesting, however, is that this logic does not apply to the constitutional and civic classes in Groups 1 and 2, respectively. Neither of these classes is significantly different from the thin class in its association with anti-Muslim attitudes, which suggests that the prioritization of the country’s basic political norms fosters inclusive attitudes toward outsiders.

The results for Group 3, comprising Northwestern European countries, are strikingly different. In this group, there is a pairwise hierarchy of classes; the civic and linguistic classes are associated
Figure 2. Regression results predicting anti-Muslim attitudes by country group.

Note: Pairwise comparison plots of unexponentiated coefficients with 95% confidence intervals generated by group-specific conditional logistic regressions with country fixed effects. Group 1: n/respondents) = 11,014, N(countries) = 10; Group 2: n/respondents) = 13,627, N(countries) = 11; Group 3: n/respondents) = 9,239, N(countries) = 9; Group 4: n/respondents) = 14,106, N(countries) = 11.
with more opposition to living near a Muslim than both the constitutional and thin classes, with no statistically significant differences between the classes on either side of this divide. This contradicts common assumptions in the nationalism literature, which led us to predict no difference between classes focused on elective criteria of national membership (i.e. the civic and constitutional classes and, somewhat more ambiguously, the linguistic class). The fact that the key distinction is between the constitutional and thin boundary configurations on one hand and the civic and linguistic boundary configurations on the other, is consistent with the notion that civic principles and language have taken on a culturally exclusionary character in Northwestern Europe—at least when it comes to Muslims.\(^\text{12}\)

To ensure that our group-level findings are not mere artifacts of the models but instead reflect actual empirical patterns observed within the countries in question, we run additional analyses on two particularly relevant cases from Group 3: the Netherlands and Sweden. The results, reported in Appendix C, are consistent with those obtained at the group level.

These results indicate that in Northwestern Europe it is not necessary for civic nationalism to be coupled with ascriptive criteria of membership (as in the thick boundary configuration) for the former to foster exclusionary attitudes. That being said, it does appear that the crucial distinction is between a cultural and a purely elective understanding of what it means to respect the political institutions and laws of the country, since the main difference in the composition of the constitutional and civic classes is whether language skills are also seen as an important criterion of national membership. We will expand on this interpretation in the discussion section.
Finally, we turn to Group 4, which comprises Southern and Eastern European countries. Here, the thin class stands out as less anti-Muslim than the linguistic and thick classes, with no difference between the latter two. The fact that the linguistic boundary configuration is associated with equal antipathy toward Muslims as the thick conception stands in contrast to the findings from Group 2 and further underscores the results from Group 3. As was the case with the civic boundary configuration, it suggests that the implications of a linguistic definition of national membership are context-dependent: while the value placed on language may signal a culturally exclusionary understanding of national membership in some parts of Europe (Groups 3 and 4), it appears not to do so in other parts of the continent (Group 2).

One possible reason for the differential associations of the linguistic class with anti-Muslim attitudes is the relative size and composition of the Muslim population in the different country groups. In Group 2, the Muslim share of the population is either very small (in Armenia, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Slovakia it is below 1 percent [Pew Research Center 2010]) or consists primarily of labor migrants from the 1960s and 1970s (and their children and grandchildren born in the country) who are largely proficient in the countries’ dominant languages. Thus, language may not be an effective criterion of differentiation in these countries. In contrast, several of the countries in Group 4 are home to large Muslim populations consisting of national minorities (e.g. Caucasian and Turkic ethnicities in Russia or Turks in Bulgaria), while in countries belonging to Group 3, the Muslim population includes not only labor migrants but also more recent refugees. Thus, in both cases, language may be a central component of the “otherness” of Muslims. This interpretation suggests that the differences in results across countries may stem in part from the
relative resonance of a particular criterion of national belonging as a basis for marking social boundaries.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Addressing a significant gap in the literature on anti-Muslim attitudes, this study has proposed a theoretical argument for why conceptions of nationhood should be related to the drawing of social boundaries against Muslims and tested it on a unique dataset consisting of respondents from 41 European countries. In what follows, we highlight three distinct contributions of our research.

First, we have demonstrated that conceptions of nationhood are strongly associated with anti-Muslim attitudes, even when controlling for a number of correlates emphasized by other studies. In particular, as our models control for anti-immigrant attitudes, the associations between boundary configurations and opposition to having a Muslim neighbor function above and beyond any hostility toward Muslims qua foreigners. Although anti-immigrant attitudes are a strong predictor of anti-Muslim attitudes in all four country groups (in line with findings from past studies), introducing boundary configurations into the explanatory framework provides an independent contribution to understanding individual differences in exclusionary attitudes.14

Also, in contrast to other studies (Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner 2009; Dekker and van der Noll 2012; Ernst and Bornstein 2012), we find that anti-Muslim sentiments are not driven by national attachment in any of the country groups. Rather than the strength of national identity, what
drives anti-Muslim attitudes is the content of beliefs about criteria of national belonging, which underscores the importance of taking meaning seriously when examining nationalist exclusion. Finally, concerning the notion that anti-Muslim attitudes should be more “accessible” than negative sentiments toward other minority groups, as suggested by Spruyt and Elchardys (2012), our results offer qualified support. Namely, in Northwestern Europe, we find that respondents who subscribe to a civic conception of nationhood are not immune from exclusionary beliefs. This only holds, however, when liberal principles are interpreted in cultural terms, as those who subscribe to a purely constitutionalist boundary configuration are less likely to hold anti-Muslim attitudes. In addition, the greater propensity of civic nationalists to be anti-Muslim is specific to the Northwestern group, suggesting that anti-Muslim attitudes are not equally “accessible” to liberally minded people in other countries.

This leads us to the second contribution of the study. Utilizing a large cross-national sample and an inductive analytical approach, we have shown that the ideological climate in a given national context conditions individual-level effects of national symbolic boundaries. This contradicts the conclusions made in the only other study we know of that has also examined anti-Muslim attitudes across Eastern and Western European countries: Strabac and Listhaug (2008) argue that the drivers of anti-Muslim sentiments are of a “global nature,” because the same individual-level predictors are significant in both contexts. In contrast, we show that there are important differences in anti-Muslim attitudes across European regions, which likely stem from the distinct ways in which Muslims are framed in political discourse on national—and European—identity. Only by connecting the literature on anti-Muslim attitudes with the literature on national
boundary drawing—and by inductively separating countries into groups sharing similar nationalism profiles in our analysis—were we able to arrive at these insights.

To be sure, it is possible that the results may also be driven in part by social desirability. This alternative interpretation is context dependent in another way: because ethnonationalism is deemed politically incorrect in Western Europe, it may be “covered up” by a civic vocabulary (Fozdar and Low 2015; Halikiopoulou, Mock, and Vasilopoulou 2013). If this is the case, respondents subscribing to the civic boundary configuration are not “truly” civic but rather express their ethnonationalism in civic terms. While we are not able to determine which of these interpretations is correct, the fact that ostensibly civic notions of nationhood can lead to exclusionary attitudes in some contexts but not others is a significant finding, which we hope will inspire further research.

Finally, we wish to highlight the empirical contribution of our study, as we believe the results help us understand the particular make-up of anti-Muslim attitudes among (some) liberals in Northwestern Europe. Our results suggest that in this region, distancing oneself from Muslims is premised on a cultural understanding of liberal-democratic values, whereas in other parts of Europe, exclusionary attitudes toward Muslims have their basis in a more traditional ethnonationalist understanding of national membership (cf. Turgeon et al., forthcoming). Given that the results point to the different bases of anti-Muslim sentiment across European countries, scholars should exercise caution when making general claims about this phenomenon without taking into account country-level heterogeneity.
While space limitations prevent us from offering a full analysis of the potential causes of the observed cross-national variation, the contemporary resonance of exclusionary civic arguments in Northwestern Europe is likely to have deeper historical roots. In particular, what appears to distinguish Western European countries in Groups 2 and 3 (the two country groups with a civic class) is the degree to which religion has historically been relegated to the private sphere. This is the case in all Group 3 countries, either through church-state separation (France, Luxembourg and parts of Switzerland), pillarization (the Netherlands, Belgium, and parts of Switzerland), or adherence to Lutheranism (Scandinavian countries). In contrast, the church has historically enjoyed a more privileged position in relation to the state in Group 2 countries. We hypothesize that civic nationalists in Northwestern European countries have come to see the exclusion of religion from the public sphere not only as an important political principle but also a cultural value constitutive of the nation itself—and of European “civilization” more broadly (Mouritsen 2006; Brubaker 2017). In this light, the contemporary presence of religious “others” (i.e., Muslims) who (are perceived to) openly signal their faith in public settings and make claims for religious accommodation is interpreted by civic nationalists as a threat to the nation’s secular ideals and progressive political principles (see also Fetzer and Soper 2003; Soper and Fetzer 2003; Carol and Koopmans 2013; Statham 2016; Helbling and Traunmüller 2016). We offer a more systematic discussion of these mechanisms and an analysis of the underlying cross-national variation in Appendix D.

This historical-institutional account helps explain the resonance of the civilizational-nationalist discourse of radical-right—and increasingly liberal—parties in Group 3 countries. Such discourse depicts Muslims as backward and fundamentally unassimilable due to their lack of
cultural rootedness in the secular liberal-democratic tradition (Mouritsen 2006:83). In contrast, among Group 2 countries, where a civic conception of nationhood is not at odds with the presence of religion in the public sphere, the stigmatization of Muslims as essentially un-civic is less common and has less resonance (note that this interpretation bolsters Brubaker’s [2017] argument regarding the absence of civilizational discourse in Great Britain and Germany). This, of course, does not preclude the presence of anti-Muslim attitudes in Group 2, but it suggests that they are likely to be associated with “thick” rather than civic-nationalist beliefs. We consider this a promising hypothesis that should prompt further research.

Even though we believe that our study offers important empirical and theoretical insights, it also has some limitations. In particular, the cross-sectional character of our data prohibits causal claims. While theory leads us to anticipate that symbolic boundary configurations shape social behavior, reluctance to interact with specific out-groups could also lead people to form more abstract ideas of who is part of their imagined community. In addition, particular understandings of nationhood can be used as justifications for disliking particular out-groups. If so, our results suggest that different conceptions of national membership have different justificatory power or resonance in different contexts. Given the possibility that the direction of causality runs in the opposite direction than what the literature suggests, all we can conclude is that boundary configurations are associated with anti-Muslim attitudes. We hope that our study can serve as a foundation for future research seeking to test this relationship in causal terms.

A second limitation is temporal, as our survey data are from 2008. This means that we cannot attend to time-varying effects, another form of context that may influence the individual-level
consequences of boundary configurations. That our data were collected before the intense politicization of Islam in Europe has one advantage, however, as the patterns we identify can serve as a reference point for future studies based on more current data. We speculate that the link between civic definitions of nationhood and anti-Muslim attitudes is even stronger today in Northwestern Europe, because views linking Islam with anti-democratic and anti-liberal values have been increasingly espoused not only by radical-right but also center-right politicians. An interesting question for future research is whether this understanding of national culture has diffused to countries in Southern and Eastern Europe or whether its resonance in these regions continues to be limited, as our historical hypothesis suggests.

Despite these limitations, our article demonstrates the value of an inductive approach to comparative research on nationalist beliefs. Rather than assuming that symbolic boundaries based on ostensibly elective criteria effectively inoculate respondents from anti-Muslim sentiments, our country-group analysis of attitudinal patterns reveals striking regional differences in the political correlates of civic nationalism. In countries where political culture has taken on the character of civil religion (Bellah 1992), out-groups are more likely to be stigmatized for being culturally distinct than for their ethno-racial characteristics. This reveals the dark side of Western European cultural progressivism: the acceptance of diversity in particular domains of social life, like gender or sexuality, can be used as a powerful ideological weapon against perceived out-groups. Such exclusionary practices are easily masked by a veneer of open-mindedness that purports to defend Western European secular beliefs from dangerous outsiders.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A. LCA MODEL FIT STATISTICS

The group-specific LCA models differ from the multilevel LCA models in three ways. First, instead of the original ordinal nationalism items, we use standardized z-scores, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This allows for direct comparisons between countries, unaffected by different mean levels of the indicators within each country. Some countries are likely to be more or less nationalistic on average, but what matters for our purposes is the within-country variation in nationalism variables. Second, because we are not interested in producing further country-level groupings, we rely on LCA with country fixed effects (i.e., a nominal country variable as a covariate) instead of multilevel LCA models. Third, we optimize each model by including direct effects between indicators, as well as between indicators and country dummy variables, in order to relax LCA’s local independence assumption for pairs of variables with particularly large model residuals (Vermunt 1997). This results in models with considerably improved fit (as measured by BIC statistics) without increasing the number of classes.

For each group, additional direct effects were added until further additions no longer generated decreases in the BIC. If the model produced through this process yielded a lower BIC than a model with a greater number of classes, the more parsimonious model was retained. To ensure that the selected models did not represent local maxima in the maximum likelihood estimation process, we re-ran each model ten times and selected the variant with the lowest BIC score, as suggested by Uebersax (2010). All LCA models were generated using the Latent GOLD 5.1 software package. The results are presented below in Tables A1 through A4.
Table A1. Group 1: Eastern Europe, Ireland, and Northern Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Number of classes</th>
<th>Log-likelihood</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Classification error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-class model</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-35,060.66</td>
<td>70,636.00</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
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<td>1 direct effect</td>
<td>4-class</td>
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<td>57,545.32</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td>2 direct effects</td>
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<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4-class</td>
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</tr>
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<td>47,257.87</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>74</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A2. Group 2: Armenia, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Number of classes</th>
<th>Log-likelihood</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Classification error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-class model</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-59,189.12</td>
<td>119,013.68</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 direct effect</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-32,038.32</td>
<td>64,787.94</td>
<td>75</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 direct effects</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-8,763.07</td>
<td>18,313.33</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 direct effects</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-6,374.53</td>
<td>13,574.19</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 direct effects</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-6,216.20</td>
<td>13,295.45</td>
<td>91</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 direct effects</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-6,112.09</td>
<td>13,125.17</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 direct effect</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-6,079.55</td>
<td>13,098.03</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 direct effects</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-5,670.56</td>
<td>12,318.00</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 direct effects</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-4,519.14</td>
<td>10,053.09</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 direct effects</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-4,485.79</td>
<td>10,024.33</td>
<td>111</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 direct effects</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-4,460.77</td>
<td>10,012.22</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 direct effects</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-4,417.18</td>
<td>10,000.91</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 direct effects</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-4,220.12</td>
<td>9,644.73</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-class model</td>
<td>5-class</td>
<td>-62,583.45</td>
<td>125,982.53</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A3. Group 3: Northwestern Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Number of classes</th>
<th>Log-likelihood</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Classification error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-class model</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-55,971.62</td>
<td>112,570.79</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 direct effect</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-53,782.36</td>
<td>108,229.74</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2 direct effects</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-32,286.95</td>
<td>65,313.85</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
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<td>3 direct effects</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-4,755.32</td>
<td>10,325.52</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Number of classes</td>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>Parameters</td>
<td>Classification error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-class model</td>
<td>3-class</td>
<td>-22,145.48</td>
<td>44,669.48</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 direct effect</td>
<td>3-class</td>
<td>-12,093.28</td>
<td>24,610.15</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 direct effects</td>
<td>3-class</td>
<td>-10,002.84</td>
<td>20,456.31</td>
<td>50</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 direct effects</td>
<td>3-class</td>
<td>-3,809.25</td>
<td>8,114.19</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 direct effects</td>
<td>3-class</td>
<td>-3,597.46</td>
<td>7,717.65</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 direct effects</td>
<td>3-class</td>
<td>-3,428.44</td>
<td>7,406.63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-class model</td>
<td>4-class</td>
<td>-16,845.68</td>
<td>34,214.09</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A4. Group 4: Eastern and Southern Europe
APPENDIX B. REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EACH COUNTRY GROUP

Table B1 presents results from conditional logistic regressions with country fixed effects for each country group. These models were generated using the xtlogit command in StataMP 15 and checked for robustness using the Step3 process in Latent GOLD 5.1; the two software packages produced nearly identical results (for most coefficients, differences were limited to the third place after the decimal point). The results in Table B1 inform Figure 2 in the article.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group 1</th>
<th>Group 2</th>
<th>Group 3</th>
<th>Group 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school/vocational</td>
<td>-0.23**</td>
<td>-0.15*</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University or higher</td>
<td>-0.35***</td>
<td>-0.24***</td>
<td>-0.70***</td>
<td>-0.51***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>-0.15*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>-1.21**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.54**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.43**</td>
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<td>-0.10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.45**</td>
<td>-0.73*</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National attachment</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant sentiment</td>
<td>2.54***</td>
<td>2.41***</td>
<td>3.01***</td>
<td>2.71***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1a</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.71***</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Value 1</td>
<td>Value 2</td>
<td>Value 3</td>
<td>Value 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>11,014</td>
<td>13,627</td>
<td>9,239</td>
<td>14,106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Conditional logistic regressions, country fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
* $p < 0.05$,  ** $p < 0.01$,  *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed test).

a Group 1: Class 1 = thin, class 2 = constitutional, class 3 = undifferentiated, class 4 = thick  
Group 2: Class 1 = thin, class 2 = civic, class 3 = linguistic, class 4 = thick  
Group 3: Class 1 = thin, class 2 = civic, class 3 = constitutional, class 4 = linguistic  
Group 4: Class 1 = thin, class 2 = linguistic, class 3 = thick
APPENDIX C. CASE-SPECIFIC ANALYSES OF SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES AND ANTI-MUSLIM ATTITUDES

To determine whether our aggregate results at the level of country groups correspond to similar latent classes at the level of individual countries, we consider two cases from within the Northwestern European group. We focus on this group, because it yielded the central, and most counter-intuitive, finding in our article: that civic nationalism is associated with exclusionary attitudes toward Muslims. The first country we consider, the Netherlands, represents a most-likely case within this group to mirror the aggregate results, because this is where political discourse has explicitly focused on the ostensible incompatibility of Muslims with progressive liberal values, initially gaining traction with Pim Fortuyn’s populist campaign of 2002 (Brubaker 2017; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Consequently, this case is crucial for substantiating our group-level analysis. The second case we consider, that of Sweden, is a conservative one. Nationalist populism is relatively new to Sweden, and the country is generally considered to have shown strong commitment to openness and inclusiveness at the level of state policy, even during the recent refugee crisis of 2015 and 2016. While a culturally exclusionary civic nationalism may well operate in the Swedish population, it is not self-evident that it necessarily does. Therefore, if there were a country in the Northwestern European group that deviated from the aggregate results, Sweden is likely to be it. These substantive considerations aside, if the results for both the Dutch and Swedish cases are consistent with the aggregate group-level results, this will further reassure us about the robustness of the multilevel LCA models.
Figure C1. LCA Results for the Netherlands and Sweden

Note: The figure presents class-specific partial probabilities of nationalist variable responses, as well as latent class sizes in parentheses.

Netherlands

The LCA results are presented in Figure C1. In the Netherlands, the civic and linguistic classes correspond directly to those found in the aggregate data for the Northwestern European country group. One of the two thin classes, in which language ability stands out as the only criterion of national membership rated well below the sample mean, does not appear in the aggregate results,
presumably because it is subsumed by the single overarching thin class. We would therefore expect both thin classes in the Dutch sample to be similarly associated with anti-Muslim attitudes. Note, however, that only a small proportion (1.5 percent) of the Dutch sample fall into the second thin class which means that we have limited statistical power to detect significant differences between this and the other classes. The one class present in the aggregate results but absent from the case-specific results is a constitutional class that values respect for the law more highly than language skill. Given that the aggregate model averages over samples drawn from nine countries, it is not unreasonable to see some variation at the individual country level. That this variation involves the constitutional class rather than the civic class, which is central to our main results, is reassuring.

In addition to examining the content of the classes observed in the Dutch sample, we use class membership to predict anti-Muslim attitudes. Given that our sample is limited to a single country, we rely on a simple logistic model instead of a conditional logit with fixed effects. This model contains the same control variables as those used in the main analyses. The results are shown in Figure C2. Consistently with the group-level findings, civic nationalism in the Dutch case is as likely to be associated with anti-Muslim attitudes as linguistic nationalism, and both are associated with stronger anti-Muslim attitudes than the main thin class. The second thin class does not yield any significant results, presumably because of its small sample size. Note, however, that the direction of differences follows the pattern of the aggregate group-level findings. In general, the regression results for the Netherlands are consistent with the aggregate findings for the Northwestern country group.
Sweden

We perform the same case-specific analyses for Sweden, as illustrated in figures C1 and C2. The first thing to note is that like in the Netherlands, the classes are generally consistent with the group-level findings. The thin and civic classes are directly comparable to those in the aggregate analysis, as is the constitutional class, which is present in the Sweden results but not those for the Netherlands (in contrast, there does not appear to be a linguistic class in Sweden). Finally, like in the Netherlands, there are two thin classes in the Swedish sample, one of which features strongly negative responses concerning the importance of respect for the law for being a true Swede, and the other combines this with negative responses for the importance of language.
The regression results mirror those found in the group-level analyses. The civic class is the most strongly associated with anti-Muslim attitudes, followed by the constitutional and thin classes. The second thin class does not generate any significant results, once again most likely because of its small sample size (it accounts for 5.4 percent of the sample). The fact that the linguistic class in the Dutch case is associated with stronger anti-Muslim attitudes than the thin class, but the pattern is reversed for the constitutional class in Sweden is consistent with the relative ordering of the four classes in the group-level data, where the thin and constitutional classes stand in contrast to the linguistic and civic classes.

In general, then, the case-specific analyses for the Netherlands, our crucial case, and Sweden, a more likely outlier, suggest that the multilevel models perform well at capturing empirical patterns present in individual countries. Our central finding of a culturally exclusionary civic nationalism holds in both countries, which provides further evidence for our argument about the contextual dependence of symbolic boundary effects.
APPENDIX D. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF EXCLUSIONARY CIVIC NATIONALISM

While our country groupings were generated inductively based on the intuition that meaning-making is relational and thus contextual, the theoretically innovative result concerning civic nationalism’s association with anti-Muslim attitudes in Northwestern Europe (Group 3) prompts us to look more closely at factors specific to these countries that may help explain our findings. The question to be addressed is why a civic conception of nationhood is associated with higher levels of anti-Muslim attitudes in one context (Group 3) and not in another (Group 2). Our suggested explanation simultaneously substantiates the inductive grouping of the countries in Groups 2 and 3 and provides historical context for our claims about the resonance of exclusionary appeals to civic nationalism in this group. As we do not formally test the following argument, it should be considered a potential (in our opinion, promising) hypothesis that should prompt further study.

We are inspired by research that considers the historical place of religion in public life as a central feature of political culture that structures contemporary public beliefs and narratives about religious diversity and integration (Halman and Draulans 2006; Fetzer and Soper 2003; Soper and Fetzer 2003; Carol and Koopmans 2013; Statham 2016; Helbling and Traunmüller 2016). However, it should be noted that while this work tends to portray historical state-church relations as uniformly shaping entire national cultures, our argument is specific to civic nationalists, as it is this subset of the population that should be particularly susceptible to ideas concerning public institutions and political principles. Thus, we argue that in countries where religion has historically been kept out of politics, civic nationalists conceive of the principle of
private religion as a cultural value that is essential for national cohesion. In contrast, in countries with a historically strong connection between church and state, where religious identity and religious claims have been legitimate features of public and political life, civic nationalists do not view Muslims’ overt religious commitments as threatening to the nation’s core political principles. This, of course, does not preclude their compatriots (particularly those who subscribe to “thick” definitions of national boundaries) from expressing anti-Muslim attitudes, but we would expect such attitudes to be rooted primarily in ethnonationalist rather than civic-nationalist beliefs.16

To substantiate our argument, we draw on existing literature to categorize the Western European countries17 in Groups 2 and 3 according to their distinct historical trajectories of formal state-church relations (see Table 2). This places Great Britain and Germany (both in Group 2) at one end of the continuum, where the state privileges Christian religions over others, and France (Group 3) at the other end, where state and church are strictly separated (Fetzer and Soper 2003; Soper and Fetzer 2003; Carol and Koopmans 2013; Statham 2016). Historically, Luxembourg and some Swiss cantons have also observed the principle of laïcité, in close resemblance to the French tradition. In the Netherlands, religious divisions in society were historically handled through a “pillarization system,” in which the state recognizes and supports different religious and ideological groups, but does not interfere in these groups’ (or “pillars”) self-governance practices. Belgium has a similar system of pillarization, as do some cantons in Switzerland. Following Statham (2016), we conceive of pillarization as another way in which the state “privatizes” religion in the sense that no religion is privileged over others and the state cannot be associated with any one religion.
Table D1. Historical church-society relations affecting contemporary dispositions toward Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Separation</th>
<th>Pillarization</th>
<th>State church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(laïcité)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(privileged)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiously divided</td>
<td></td>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(multiple Christian</td>
<td></td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religions)</td>
<td></td>
<td>SWITZERLAND*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominantly Catholic</td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWITZERLAND*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominantly Lutheran</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DENMARK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NORWAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ICELAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Church-state relations in Switzerland are regulated at the cantonal level, with variations between French laïcité and some state-recognition and state-sponsorship of religious communities (pillarization).

Because the Scandinavian countries are not included in the literature on church-state relations and anti-Muslim attitudes, we draw on other secondary sources to categorize them according to the rubric in Table D1. Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Iceland share a history of state sponsorship of church institutions, much as is the case in the United Kingdom and Germany. We
argue, however, that the specific religious tradition institutionalized in the Scandinavian countries—Lutheranism—has served to privatize religion rather than incorporate it into public and political life. In particular, the Lutheran principle of division between “the personal realm of (free) faith, organized inside the Church, and the realm of external conduct, regulated by state authority” has ensured a pragmatic politics “unburdened by contentious issues of faith” (Mouritsen 2006: 79). As such, the Church has been seen as apolitical in these countries (Riis 1994: 100) (in contrast to the UK, for instance, where some bishops are entitled to sit in the House of Lords). This is also reflected in the fact that strong Christian Democratic parties have never developed in Scandinavian countries, while they have been influential in Germany and Austria: in Sweden and Denmark, the Christian Democrats have received minimal electoral support (in Norway their support has been somewhat higher, but never above 13 percent of the vote, and usually only around 5-6 percent) and, moreover, their politics are tied to minority religious groups and free churches rather than to majority religious practices. In Iceland, a Christian Democratic party has never emerged.

There are two cases that appear not to fit well with our classification scheme: Finland and Austria. Both of these countries, however, possess unique historical features that account for their outlier status. Finland, a Lutheran country, was assigned by our LCA procedure into Group 2, rather than Group 3 with the other Scandinavian countries. This is less surprising when one considers the fact Finland is generally seen as an exceptional case in Nordic Lutheran Europe (Halman and Draulans 2006: 266). Finns are more religious than Swedes and Norwegians and have stronger orthodox tendencies resulting from Russian occupation (Finland only gained its freedom in 1917). As a result, religion in Finland has become closely tied to national identity and
state institutions because “Lutheranism is what distinguishes [Finns] from the Slavs next door” (Bruce 1992: 99). Austria is also assigned to Group 2 despite the fact that it adheres to a system of pillarization, much like the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland. This system, however, was only introduced in Austria after World War II in an effort to politically reunite the country. Before then, Catholicism was treated much like a state religion. It appears that Austrian political culture continues to exhibit tendencies shaped by its pre-War institutions, and lacks the presence of a civilizational civic nationalism.

While our explanation is intended to be suggestive rather than conclusive, it is important to note that other country-level features—such as citizenship regimes or the size or relative growth of the Muslim population—often used to explain differences in attitudes toward Muslims or immigrants, do not fit the distribution of countries observed in our data. To take one example, countries with the largest population shares of Muslims—between 6 and 8 percent—are France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden (Pew Research 2016). These countries are not clustered into a single group in our data, and only some of them exhibit a tendency toward exclusionary forms of civic nationalism. The lack of fit between our data and common alternative explanations for anti-Muslim attitudes strengthens our confidence in our historical account.

The historical trajectories of the countries in Group 3 provide context for the fusion of liberal-democratic principles and cultural essentialism that, as we suggest, may account for the association between civic nationalism and anti-Muslim attitudes. In sum, our argument posits a cross-level interaction in which the historical place of religion in society shapes whether a civic conception of nationhood is linked to anti-Muslim attitudes today. Importantly, this argument is
specific to the civic boundary configuration; even though the constitutional conception of nationhood values political criteria of national membership, it does not perceive them in culturally essentialist terms and oppose them to the belief systems of religious minority groups. Finally, we do not claim that anti-Muslim attitudes are absent from Group 2 (they certainly are not), but in those countries, exclusionary beliefs are a feature of ethnic or thick, rather than civic, conceptions of nationhood.

REFERENCES

ENDNOTES

1 To be clear, other scholars show that differences in values between Western majority populations and Muslim/non-Western immigrant minorities are small or negligible (e.g. Breidahl and Larsen 2016, Gundelach 2010).

2 Ability to speak the country’s dominant language is also a common criterion of national belonging, but its status as an attribute of civic or ethnic nationalism has been contested. On one hand, language can be acquired, like other elective traits. On the other hand, language can serve as a proxy for cultural belonging, so that imperfect fluency or the presence of an accent, both of which are common in adult language acquisition, can become markers of otherness. This ambiguity is reflected in our results: the expectation that “true” nationals should speak the country’s dominant language takes on either an inclusive or exclusive meaning depending on national context.

3 The downside of the EVS’s unique combination of variables is that our results cannot at this time be replicated using other data. While we are confident in our chosen dependent variable, we hope that in the future, scholars will collect more systematic data on the relationship between nationalism and anti-Muslim sentiments.
Because of its cultural distinctness, we treat Northern Ireland as a national case comparable to the other countries in the sample. This is facilitated by the EVS’s collection of a separate sample for Northern Ireland.

The variables that contribute most toward the decrease in the final sample size are the dependent variable and the control for anti-immigrant attitudes. This may suggest that these questions are sensitive to some people, a concern which we discuss throughout the article. Other questions in the same battery as our dependent variable (e.g., attitudes toward right-wing extremists) generate a similar proportion of missing responses, which reassures us that the sensitivity concern is not specific to issues concerning Muslims or immigrants.

While some may question the grounds for positing a relationship between local-level preferences and conceptions of national symbolic boundaries, our results clearly demonstrate that these two sets of beliefs are closely associated. Theoretically, beliefs about national symbolic boundaries determine whom respondents perceive to be legitimate co-nationals and it is intuitive that some respondents will prefer not to live near people they perceive as outsiders to the nation. Such residential preferences are a frequent manifestation of xenophobia (i.e., fear of foreigners/strangers).

Social desirability is likely to be of particular concern in more liberal countries, such as those in Northwestern Europe. Yet, it is in those countries that we find a strong relationship between
civic nationalism and reluctance to live near Muslims. Given that the civic nationalist respondents in this region should be particularly prone toward socially desirable responses, we interpret this finding as conservative. Were we able to eliminate any possible social desirability effect, the association between civic nationalism and anti-Muslim attitudes would likely be even stronger. In less liberal countries outside of this region, social desirability should be a less relevant concern.

8 The EVS does not ask about three criteria of membership typically found in other surveys: subjective identification, religion, and citizenship. Identification and citizenship are commonly interpreted as measures of civic nationalism and religion as a measure of ethnocultural nationalism. While our analyses of symbolic boundaries may be less nuanced than those based on more extensive survey items, we are able to identify ascriptive and elective forms of nationalism in the data and we observe considerable variation in these beliefs within countries. Moreover, while the omission of religious membership criteria may appear to be a problem for a study of anti-Muslim attitudes, in practice, it is unlikely that its inclusion would alter our results, because past inductive studies (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Bonikowski 2017) have consistently found religion to cluster together with, and only with, symbolic boundaries based on ancestry, lifelong residence, and birth in the country—attitudes that do not figure prominently in the primary contribution of our article.

9 This discards information about non-zero probabilities of assignment to the remaining classes, but makes the models easier to implement and interpret.
We do not provide a substantive interpretation of the classes in Table 1, because we use them solely for deriving the country groupings used in the next step of the LCA analysis.

Note, however, that the linguistic vs. civic comparison is on the boundary of statistical significance, suggesting a possible hierarchy of boundary conceptions in which civic and thin classes are the least anti-Muslim, the thick class most anti-Muslim, and the linguistic class is in-between.

One possible objection to our results is that the latent class analysis did not identify any thick nationalists in Group 3, even though such respondents may exist in Northwestern Europe. Furthermore, the fact that the civic and linguistic classes score slightly above the mean on ethnic nationalism indicators (as illustrated in Figure 1) could lead to the conclusion that the civic nationalism finding is driven by thick nationalists lurking in these two groups. We reject this interpretation on two grounds. First, while the proportion of respondents endorsing birth in the country, ancestry, and lifelong residence as criteria of national membership is indeed higher among the civic and linguistic classes than among the constitutional and thin classes, over 70 percent of respondents in each of the former two classes reject these criteria. Second, when we limit the conditional logistic regression to respondents who disavow all three ascriptive criteria (i.e., either “disagree” or “strongly disagree” with them), our finding concerning the association between civic nationalism and anti-Muslim attitudes in Group 3 holds. This attests to the
robustness of our results and the low prevalence of thick nationalism in Northwestern Europe. The results of this supplementary analysis are available upon request.

13 Since Macedonia has a substantial Muslim population (around 40 percent), we also ran a regression with respondents from Macedonia excluded. This robustness check gave substantially similar results to the regression on the full country group, and we therefore report the results from the full model here.

14 Removing the control for anti-immigrant attitudes from the models does not substantially change the associations between boundary configurations and anti-Muslim attitudes in any of the country groups. For Groups 1 and 2, minor changes in effect sizes (but not statistical significance) suggest that in these countries the effect of conceptions of nationhood on anti-Muslim attitudes is partially mediated by anti-immigrant attitudes.

15 We used unstandardized indicators in the initial multilevel analysis, because given the large number of countries and individual-level cases, this resulted in more stable country groupings. For the purposes of examining the content of the classes, however, standardized indicators are preferable, because they account for any remaining differences in variable means between the countries (within each country group).

16 In seeming contrast to the argument advanced here, some authors (Statham 2016, Helbling and Traunmüller 2016) argue that close state-church relations make majority populations more hostile to accommodating Muslims, because such accommodations constitute a greater challenge
to the status quo. As our argument is specific to civic nationalists within each of the two country
groups (Groups 2 and 3), we do not rule out that this alternative argument may hold for
individuals subscribing to more ascriptive conceptions of national symbolic boundaries. This
would indeed be consistent with the finding that a thick class is only found in Group 2 and not
Group 3, and that this class is more anti-Muslim than the others in Group 2.

17 We only focus here on those countries traditionally classified as Northwestern European, as
the present argument is focused on internal divisions within this region. The Eastern European
countries in Group 2 differ from the countries in Group 3 not only in terms of state-church
relations, but more importantly in terms of the historical legacy of communism.