Is civic nationalism necessarily inclusive? Conceptions of nationhood and anti-Muslim attitudes in Europe

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Abstract. Despite the centrality of national identity in the exclusionary discourse of the European radical right, scholars have not investigated how popular definitions of nationhood are connected to dispositions toward Muslims. Moreover, survey-based studies tend to conflate anti-Muslim attitudes with general anti-immigrant sentiments. This article contributes to research on nationalism and out-group attitudes by demonstrating that varieties of national self-understanding are predictive of anti-Muslim attitudes, above and beyond dispositions toward immigrants. Using latent class analysis and regression models of survey data from 41 European countries, it demonstrates that conceptions of nationhood are heterogeneous within countries and that their relationship with anti-Muslim attitudes is contextually variable. Consistent with expectations, in most countries, anti-Muslim attitudes are positively associated with ascriptive – and negatively associated with elective (including civic) – conceptions of nationhood. Northwestern Europe, however, is an exception to this pattern: in this region, civic nationalism is linked to greater antipathy toward Muslims. It is suggested that in this region, elective criteria of belonging have become fused with exclusionary notions of national culture that portray Muslims as incompatible with European liberal values, effectively legitimating anti-Muslim sentiments in mainstream political culture. This may heighten the appeal of anti-Muslim sentiments not only on the radical right, but also among mainstream segments of the Northwestern European public, with important implications for social exclusion and political behaviour.

Keywords: anti-Muslim attitudes; nationalism; symbolic boundaries; social exclusion; latent class analysis

Take a walk down the street and see where this is going. You no longer feel like you are living in your own country. There is a battle going on and we have to defend ourselves. Before you know it there will be more mosques than churches. (Geert Wilders, Leader of the Party for Freedom, The Netherlands, in an interview with the Dutch daily newspaper De Pers, 13 February 2007)

Islam was never part of Europe. It’s the rulebook of another world. (Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary, in an interview with German weekly newspaper Focus, 17 October 2017)

I believe that almost all values of Islam are incompatible with the values of Danish society. (Martin Henriksen, spokesman on foreigners and integration for the Danish People’s Party, in Debatten, a live debate on Danish national television (DR), 19 May 2016)

Islam has no place in Slovakia. (Robert Fico, Prime Minister of Slovakia, in an interview with Slovakian news agency TASR, 25 May 2016).
Introduction

Across Europe, Islam has become central to debates about collective identity. As illustrated by the quotes above, prominent politicians frequently depict Muslims' beliefs and practices as incompatible with their nations' core values, and these viewpoints appear to resonate with segments of the European population (Foner & Simon 2015). Yet, despite the existence of research on individual-level predictors of anti-Muslim attitudes (e.g., Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2007; Helbling 2014; Spruyt & Elchardus 2012) and on the relationship between nationalism and anti-immigrant attitudes (Kunovich 2009), scholars have not considered whether popular conceptions of nationhood affect attitudes toward Muslims.

To address this gap in scholarship, our study asks whether definitions of national symbolic boundaries (i.e., the criteria perceived as necessary for legitimate national membership) are associated with preferences regarding interactions with Muslims. We examine this question using survey data from 41 European countries. Given that most studies of anti-Muslim attitudes are limited to one or a few – typically Western European – countries, the broader analytical scope of our project allows us to make more general claims, while attending to previously unexamined cross-national variation. In particular, we use inductive methods to show that the relationship between specific conceptions of nationhood and anti-Muslim attitudes is context-dependent: civic nationalism, seen in the literature as broadly inclusive, is associated with particularly strong anti-Muslim sentiments in Northwestern Europe but not in other countries in the sample.

These results resonate with recent arguments that a secular variety of anti-Muslim political rhetoric is gaining ground in Western Europe, both on the radical right and in mainstream public discourse (Brubaker 2017; Mouritsen & Olsen 2013; Tonkens & Duyvendak 2016). This rhetoric presents Islam as a threat to fundamental ‘European values’, such as civic republicanism, cultural progressivism, secularised Christian collective identity and the belief that overt religious practices have no place in public life.

Anti-Muslim attitudes

The question that has received the most attention in existing scholarship is whether anti-Muslim attitudes are distinct from attitudes toward other out-groups, particularly immigrants. To answer this question, some studies compare the levels of antipathy directed toward multiple groups. Others examine whether anti-Muslim attitudes are associated with the same explanatory factors as anti-immigrant attitudes. A handful of studies do both.

Research comparing the relative levels of prejudice toward Muslims and other groups has generated mixed findings. For instance, while Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007: 5) argue that ‘the points of difference [between Muslims and non-Muslims] are so visible and go so deep’, they find that the Dutch have similar dispositions toward immigrant groups from Muslim-majority and non-Muslim countries. This finding is echoed by Strabac et al. (2014), who use data from a survey experiment conducted in Norway, Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom to show that Muslim immigrants are viewed no more negatively than immigrants in general.

Other studies, however, come to the opposite conclusion. Using data from a survey experiment among Belgian university students, Spruyt and Elchardus (2012) find that
anti-Muslim sentiments are more intense than anti-foreigner feelings, on a host of criteria (see also Spruyt et al. 2016; Spruyt & Van der Noll 2017). While the authors do not test their proposed explanation, they suggest that hostility toward Muslims is more ‘accessible’ than hostility toward immigrants in general, and that this is so for three reasons. First, a liberal critique of Muslims focusing on equality, democracy, individual rights and tolerance has become widespread in public discourse. This may induce negative feelings about Muslims in liberally minded people, even if they may be otherwise less prone to prejudice. Second, Muslims are potential victims of prejudice along multiple axes of differentiation (i.e., religious, cultural and ethnic), which may cumulatively heighten negative sentiments toward them (see also Helbling & Traunmüller forthcoming). Finally, the authors claim that the practices of Muslim groups may themselves contribute to an identity-based backlash, because they display ‘differences in norms, attitudes and ways of life’ (Spruyt & Elchardus 2012: 802). While none of the studies in this tradition test the notion that the opposition to Muslims is driven by a sense of identity incompatibility, several of them formulate hypotheses about the ways in which the social construction of the Muslim ‘Other’ challenges national values and ideals.

The only comparative study we know that includes more than a few countries also finds a higher level of anti-Muslim sentiment in comparison with anti-immigrant attitudes (Strabac & Listhaug 2008). However, the authors find that both outcomes are predicted by the same sociodemographic variables (in particular, age, education and occupation, but not religious variables), leading to the conclusion that ‘we are not dealing with a novel or exceptional phenomenon. A particular minority group has become especially exposed to prejudice, but we find little evidence that religious or cultural elements play a prominent role’ (Strabac & Listhaug 2008: 282). As an extension of this argument, the study identifies the same empirical associations in both Eastern and Western European countries, which the authors interpret as evidence for the ‘increasingly global nature of dissemination of information about Islam and Muslims’ (Strabac & Listhaug 2008: 283). This research echoes the broader finding that xenophobia, understood as hostility toward foreigners in general, is a strong predictor of attitudes toward Muslims and Islam (Van der Noll & Saroglou 2015; Helbling 2014; Wike & Grim 2010; Kalkan et al. 2009).

In sum, while there is mixed evidence for whether the level of opposition to Muslims is higher than toward immigrants, there is more agreement across studies that similar factors explain attitudes toward both groups and that xenophobia is an important driver of hostility towards Muslims. We incorporate these insights in our analysis by controlling for anti-immigrant sentiment. Our study stands apart, however, by explicitly theorising and testing the notion that anti-Muslim attitudes are shaped – at least in part – by shared understandings of legitimate criteria of national belonging. To do so, we engage with the literature on national symbolic boundaries.

National symbolic boundaries and exclusionary attitudes

Exclusionary attitudes toward religious, ethnic and racial out-groups are predicated on particular understandings of the in-group’s collective identity. This insight has been at the core of a voluminous literature on nationalism, which has traced how divergent national self-conceptions have historically shaped national political cultures and continue
to inform contemporary social attitudes and political preferences. This work has frequently employed a binary distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism to describe definitions of national belonging based on ascriptive and elective criteria, respectively. The former include relatively fixed attributes, such as race, ethnicity, native-born status and national ancestry, as well as deeply socialised cultural traits like religious beliefs. The latter consist of more voluntary dispositions, such as subjective identification with a given nation, commitment to its political values and formal citizenship.2

These two configurations of national membership criteria – or of symbolic boundaries drawn around the nation (Bail 2008; Lamont & Molnár 2002) – were initially conceptualised as expressions of distinct forms of national character (Kohn 1944; Lipset 1990), but over time, scholars came to acknowledge their co-existence and competition within countries. Operationalised at the individual rather than country level, these dispositions have been shown to predict racial resentment, anti-immigrant attitudes and a variety of social policy preferences (Citrin et al. 1990; Schildkraut 2011; Wright 2011; Wright & Reeskens 2013). It is likely, therefore, that how people understand the boundaries of their nation is also an important factor shaping anti-Muslim attitudes.

Much of the empirical research on national symbolic boundaries is based on two assumptions that deserve further scrutiny: (1) that the binary civic/ethnic typology is sufficiently exhaustive to capture the variation in national identity across contemporary democracies; and (2) that civic nationalism is unambiguously inclusive. The first assumption has been challenged by recent research, which has shown contemporary nationalism to be multidimensional, varying in its content both across countries (Bail 2008; Bonikowski 2017) and within them (Bonikowski & DiMaggio 2016). This research suggests that nationalist beliefs cannot be reduced to two competing perspectives and that inductive approaches hold considerable promise in mapping symbolic boundaries using attitudinal data.

The second assumption rests on the view that political principles are voluntary rather than ascribed. The nation is portrayed as a community of choice – ‘a daily plebiscite’ (Renan [1882] 1996: 42) – in which membership depends primarily on one’s commitment to the nation’s political values. Because civic nationalism rejects barriers to national belonging rooted in immutable individual characteristics like ancestry and place of birth, it has been shown to correlate with more positive attitudes toward minorities and immigrants (Kunovich 2009; Pehrson et al. 2009) and, as a result, has been equated with social inclusion in general (Simonsen 2016).

It is not self-evident, however, that placing a premium on voluntary criteria of belonging makes civic nationalism immune from the vilification of out-groups. Commitment to a nation’s political principles – the mainstay of civic nationalism – may be seen by some as a deeply rooted cultural disposition that is inherently lacking among immigrants and ethno-religious minority groups (Mouritsen & Olsen 2013; Tonkens & Duyvendak 2016). Indeed, as Brown (2000: 290) argues, ‘the civic nation similarly [to the ethnocultural nation] clothes itself in the myths and symbols of family’ in order to offer its members a coherent sense of temporally durable community.

The idea that essentialist narratives concerning national political culture can serve as bases of social exclusion is borne out in recent European history, with anti-immigrant movements and parties – most notably, the Dutch Party for Freedom, and the Pim Fortuyn List before it – supporting liberal principles (e.g., gender equality and protection of sexual...
minorities) while at the same time rejecting Muslim immigrants on the basis of their ostensibly illiberal values (Akkerman 2005; Halikiopoulou et al. 2013; Brubaker 2017; Mudde 2007; Minkenberg 2000; Rydgren 2004; Wren 2001). This suggests that, contrary to dominant arguments in the nationalism literature, some varieties of civic nationalism may be associated at the individual level with out-group antipathy, and anti-Muslim attitudes in particular (Spruyt & Elchardus 2012). The inductive methods employed by configurational studies of nationalism (Bail 2008; Kunovich 2009; Bonikowski & DiMaggio 2016) could in principle be used to explore this possibility, but thus far that research tradition has shown civic nationalism to be exclusionary only when combined with ethnic nationalism (i.e., when respondents simultaneously endorse the importance of all criteria of national membership).

Despite the established link between national self-understanding and out-group attitudes in general, research in this tradition has rarely focused specifically on anti-Muslim attitudes. The few studies that do exist touch on nationalism tangentially and operationalise it narrowly. Kalkan et al. (2009), for instance, demonstrate that patriotism, defined as positive affect toward the nation combined with strong national identification, has a negative relationship with attitudes toward out-groups, which indirectly affects perceptions of Muslims. Dekker and Van der Noll (2012) rely on a similar patriotism scale, but compare it with a measure of nationalism, understood as perceptions of national superiority; only the latter is a statistically significant predictor of antipathy toward Muslims. Ernst and Bornstein (2012) conceptualise nationalism in terms of ‘whether or not it is to the benefit of other countries to be influenced by the United States and for the United States to gain more power’; this measure is correlated with anti-Muslim attitudes. None of these studies consider respondents’ perceptions of the legitimate criteria of national belonging.

We address this gap in research by examining how within-country variation in the configuration of symbolic boundaries of the nation affects attitudes toward Muslims. We expect individuals who subscribe to elective conceptions of the national community to be less likely to view Muslims as outsiders. However, following the above discussion, we also investigate whether this relationship may be reversed in some European countries, particularly those where liberal values are framed by politicians in culturally essentialist terms. If so, this would challenge accepted understandings of civic nationalism and suggest that anti-Muslim attitudes in Europe may be more pervasive and durable than typically assumed.

Data

We use data from the 2008 European Values Study (EVS). Fielded in 47 countries and subnational regions, this survey includes measures of attitudes toward Muslims, as well as a battery of questions concerning national symbolic boundaries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only dataset to feature this unique combination of items; yet, thus far, the relationship between these items has not been empirically studied.3

Given our focus on beliefs about Muslims held by non-Muslim majority populations, we eliminate from the analysis six samples collected in Muslim-majority countries. These include Albania, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Northern Cyprus and Bosnia Herzegovina.
We also exclude first- and second-generation immigrants, whose understanding of the nation and attitudes toward minorities are likely to differ considerably from those of respondents with native-born parents. After listwise deletion of 4,230 cases with missing values on the five symbolic boundary variables, the sample for the initial latent class analysis consists of 51,829 respondents from 41 countries or subnational regions,\(^4\) that number further decreases to 47,986 in the final regression models because of missing values on the dependent variable and control variables.\(^5\)

Our dependent variable captures respondents’ preference against having Muslims as neighbours. The measure is dichotomous, coded ‘1’ if Muslims are among the groups the respondent does not want as neighbours, and ‘0’ otherwise. By focusing on residential proximity, the item confronts respondents with a personal choice that has relevance (at least hypothetically) for their everyday lives. This is likely to make salient their anti-Muslim sentiments in ways that more abstract questions about the accommodation of Muslim practices in public life would not.\(^6\) Given the widespread availability of cultural scripts about religious and ethnic inclusion, responses to this item may underestimate anti-Muslim sentiments due to social desirability bias. If so, the estimates generated by our analyses are likely to be conservative.\(^7\)

**Methods**

*Latent class analysis: An inductive approach to identifying symbolic boundaries within country groups*

To examine how anti-Muslim attitudes are related to respondents’ beliefs about the nation’s symbolic boundaries, we rely on a battery of questions about the relative importance of multiple criteria of national belonging, including ancestry, birth in the country, respect for the country’s laws and institutions, ability to speak the country’s official language and long-term residence in the country – measures that have been routinely used in other national identity surveys.\(^8\) Unlike studies that use these items selectively or aggregate them into factor or additive scales, however, we use latent class analysis (LCA) to inductively group respondents based on their patterns of responses to all five items. Based on the common insight from cultural sociology that meaning is relational – that is, that it is derived from the set of similarities and oppositions between multiple entities, not from the entities themselves (Mohr 1998) – this allows us to measure unique configurations of boundary-related beliefs. These configurations can be thought of as elements in overarching schemas through which subsets of respondents understand the domain of nationhood (Bonikowski & DiMaggio 2016).

LCA estimates a latent categorical variable based on observed responses to a set of indicators. Every respondent in the sample is assigned a probability of obtaining a particular value on the latent categorical variable (i.e., of being assigned to a particular latent class), conditional on his or her responses to the indicators of interest. The model is estimated based on the assumption that the indicators are independent of one another, conditional on the latent variable (Hagenaars 1993). This assumption can be relaxed for certain pairs of indicators to improve model fit (Vermunt 1997) – a strategy that we employ in our analysis.
One way to conduct comparisons across countries within an LCA framework is to include country fixed effects in a pooled model. This multiple-group design, however, raises the question of between-country comparability in the composition of the latent classes, because it imposes the same latent class structure on the samples from all the countries (Kankaraš et al. 2011). This glosses over country-level heterogeneity, which is likely to be considerable in our data, given the highly varied cases included in the sample. On the other hand, allowing a unique class structure for every country would make between-country comparison impossible.

To overcome this problem, we employ an innovative two-stage approach. First, we generate a multilevel LCA model that groups respondents into latent classes and simultaneously assigns the 41 countries into discrete groups, based on the distribution of the classes within countries. This allows us to identify countries that share similar profiles of nationalism variables (in particular, our analysis generates four distinct country groups). We do so in keeping with the configurational logic discussed above, which suggests that not only is the meaning of nationhood likely to depend on how individuals combine multiple boundary-related beliefs into overarching schemas, but the meaning of these schemas is also likely to be context-dependent because those who subscribe to a given nationalist schema may do so partly in reaction to competing schemas in the population. Second, we run a new LCA model with country fixed effects using a pooled sample within each country group (in most cases a four-class model was optimal, but in one country group a three-class model provided a better fit to the data). Finally, having optimised the models, we examine the content of the latent classes (i.e., the posterior distribution of the nationalism indicators in each class) and assign each of them a label that best reflects their most distinctive characteristics. The result is a set of symbolic boundary configurations specific to four groups of countries. These configurations are invariant within each country group and heterogeneous between them, thus representing an empirically grounded compromise between a fully uniform pooled model and a series of 41 unique country-level LCA models. We return to a discussion of the observed boundary configurations below.

Examining associations between symbolic boundaries and anti-Muslim attitudes within country groups

Having obtained the latent class estimates for each of the four groups of countries, we assign each respondent to a specific class using the modal probability of class membership. We then use conditional logistic regression with country fixed effects to regress the dependent variable – preference against living near Muslims – on respondents’ class membership. We run these models separately for each country group to ensure that our results are comparable across respondents. We apply country fixed effects to focus the analysis on individual-level differences within each country group. This modeling strategy eliminates concerns about omitted variables at the country level, as all variation in the dependent variable that can be attributed to the country level is included in the country-specific error term. Since we are not estimating parameters for country-level covariates or analysing cross-level interactions in a multilevel framework, the small number of country cases in each country group is not a concern for our models.
All models include a range of individual-level control variables found to correlate with anti-Muslim attitudes in previous research. These include gender (male), age, education (less than high school, high school or vocational education and university or higher), employment status (in job or not) and religious denomination (Catholic, mainline Protestant, Evangelical, Muslim, Orthodox and none/atheist; denominations represented by fewer than 50 respondents in a given country group are coded as ‘other’). The models also include a measure of attachment to the nation, coded ‘1’ if the respondent mentions the nation as the geographical group she or he belongs to ‘first of all’ among five geographical groups, and ‘0’ otherwise. Including this variable allows us to investigate whether strong attachment to the nation drives anti-Muslim attitudes in and of itself, or whether what matters is the respondent’s conception of the boundaries of the national community. As we have argued, the latter is likely to be most important for anti-Muslim attitudes, but previous studies have only examined the effects of the former.

Finally, all models also include a control for anti-immigrant sentiment. Given the links demonstrated in previous studies between conceptions of nationhood and out-group attitudes (especially anti-immigrant attitudes), this will enable us to examine whether symbolic boundary configurations independently affect attitudes toward Muslims or whether this potential effect is fully mediated by anti-immigrant attitudes. The fact that in some counties there is considerable overlap between the categories ‘immigrant’ and ‘Muslim’ may raise concerns about the inclusion of anti-immigrant attitudes in our models. Empirically, however, the correlation between the two variables is only moderate in our sample ($r = 0.46$). Note, too, that removing this control variable does not substantially alter the findings – a robustness check that further strengthens our confidence in this model specification (see also Note 14 below). The variable is coded as ‘1’ when immigrants are mentioned among the groups of people whom the respondent would not like as neighbours, and ‘0’ otherwise. All data and code used in our analyses are available in the Online Appendix.

After having run conditional logistic regressions for each country group, we compare the results across them to determine whether certain configurations of symbolic boundaries are more likely to be associated with anti-Muslim attitudes in particular sets of countries. While we can reasonably make the theoretical claim that abstract symbolic boundaries affect preferences for socially exclusionary behaviour, we are not able to empirically ascertain the direction of causality on the basis of our data. Indeed, it is possible that individuals use certain understandings of national membership as justification for their antipathy toward Muslims. We return to this point below. Given this possibility, we interpret our results in terms of associations between boundary configurations and anti-Muslim attitudes, rather than the causal effects of the former on the latter.

**Results: Latent class analysis**

We first carry out a multilevel LCA model in order to inductively generate groups of countries with similar profiles of nationalism variables. We chose a six-class specification because it generated between three and four meaningful classes within each country; adding more classes to the model increased the complexity of the solution without yielding substantively distinct results. The country distribution of classes is presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Results of multilevel LCA: Proportions of latent classes by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Class 1</th>
<th>Class 2</th>
<th>Class 3</th>
<th>Class 4</th>
<th>Class 5</th>
<th>Class 6</th>
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<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.54</td>
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<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>0.46</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the table demonstrates, there is considerable variation in the size of the classes across countries – and therefore in the distribution of the symbolic boundary indicators themselves – which would make the use of a single aggregate LCA model problematic. This variation, however, is patterned, with some countries exhibiting relatively similar configurations of symbolic boundaries. These similarities allowed the multilevel LCA model to combine the countries into four groups, as shown in Table 1.

As a second step, we run a separate LCA model within each country group – that is, we discard the classes produced by the multilevel model but retain the country groupings (for a detailed discussion of our modeling strategy, see Online Appendix A). We then examine the posterior distribution of the nationalism indicators by class within each country group in order to interpret the content of the classes. The results are shown in Figure 1. The x-axis in each graph in Figure 1 lists the five boundary criteria and the y-axis displays their normalised means within each class. The classes are labeled based on their most distinctive features, which we discuss below.

**Group 1: Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ireland, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Northern Ireland, Serbia, Ukraine**

The first group is primarily composed of countries from Central and Eastern Europe, with two exceptions: Ireland and Northern Ireland. While Ireland and Northern Ireland have a distinct history and geographic location, they share a similar set of symbolic boundary configurations with the remaining countries in this group, and these configurations differ from those observed in other Western European countries (notably, Ireland was also grouped with Eastern European countries in Kohn’s [1944] classic work on ethnic nationalism). Group 1 is characterised by four distinct conceptions of nationhood. The first, which we call *thin*, does not place any strong restrictions on national belonging. The second, *constitutional*, views respect for the laws and institutions of the country as the primary basis of national membership. This country group also features an *undifferentiated* boundary configuration that equally prioritises all criteria of national belonging at a level roughly equal to the national mean and a *thick* boundary that treats all criteria of membership as very important.

---

**Table 1. Continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Class 1</th>
<th>Class 2</th>
<th>Class 3</th>
<th>Class 4</th>
<th>Class 5</th>
<th>Class 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>0.11</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All posterior probabilities were generated by the Latent GOLD software package. The proportions in bold correspond to latent classes that have a prevalence greater than 0.1 within each country. Taken together, these results suggest that each country group consists of a unique combination of three or four classes, out of the six classes estimated from the aggregate data.
IS CIVIC NATIONALISM NECESSARILY INCLUSIVE?

Thin Constitutional Undifferentiated Thick
(0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.19)
Thin Civic Linguistic Thick
(0.35) (0.3) (0.18) (0.17)
Thin Civic Constitutional Linguistic
(0.17) (0.51) (0.18) (0.15)
Thin Linguistic Thick
(0.38) (0.35) (0.27)

Group 4: Eastern and Southern Europe

Figure 1. LCA results: Configurations of symbolic boundaries by country group.
Note: For each country group, the figure presents class-specific partial probabilities of nationalist variable responses, as well as latent class sizes in parentheses.

Group 2: Armenia, Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain

The second country group is composed of a wide range of countries from multiple regions: Central and Eastern Europe, but also Southern and Northern Europe. Across all these cases, we observe four classes, of which two resemble those found in Group 1. In addition to a thin and thick understanding of the nation's symbolic boundaries, this group includes one boundary configuration that places a high priority on language (we refer to it as the linguistic class) and one that views both language and respect for the country’s laws and institutions as prerequisites for national membership. We label the latter boundary
configuration civic because of its consistency with standard accounts of inclusive forms of nationalism predicated on criteria of belonging that enable full political and economic participation in society (Kohn 1944; Brubaker 1992).

Group 3: Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland

The third group consists entirely of Western and Northern European countries. In this group, we find variants of the constitutional, thin, linguistic and civic configurations observed elsewhere, but, interestingly, no thick definition of the nation's symbolic boundaries. Even the class with the highest mean values on all the indictors (i.e., the civic class) is primarily composed of respondents who do not believe that ancestry is important for national membership and who exhibit only modest agreement with the importance of native birth and lifelong residence as sources of national belonging. This fits with standard depictions of Northwestern Europe as more progressive and inclusive toward minorities and immigrants than the rest of the continent (e.g., Kohn 1944).

Group 4: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia

The fourth group is composed of countries from Eastern and Southern Europe. We chose a three-class model for this group because a four-class model produces two redundant classes with similar composition. The resulting symbolic boundary configurations in this group include thick, thin and linguistic definitions of the nation.

As many of the classes (i.e., those with the same labels) are analogous across country groups, we can compare regression results across groups to assess the degree to which the same nationalist beliefs are similarly or differently associated with anti-Muslim attitudes in different countries. Existing theories would lead us to expect consistent effects regardless of geographic and institutional context, while our intuitions about the specific meaning of cultural identity in Northwestern Europe suggest the possibility of heterogeneous effects across place.

Results: Anti-Muslim attitudes

The classes generated by LCA can be used to formulate expectations for the subsequent regression analyses, based on our theorisation of the potential connections between national symbolic boundaries and anti-Muslim attitudes. In all country groups but Group 3 there is a thick versus thin divide, which does not squarely fit into the traditional civic-ethnic distinction because the thick boundary configuration combines civic/elective and ethnic/ascriptive elements. This finding is in line with previous configurational studies (e.g., Kunovich 2009), and it demonstrates the value of an inductive approach to the measurement of nationalist beliefs. As the difference between the two classes is that either all or no criteria of national belonging are highly prioritised, those who ascribe to the thick boundary configuration should display greater opposition to any out-group that does not satisfy all...
of the membership criteria compared to individuals who subscribe to the thin boundary configuration.

In addition, we expect boundary configurations of a more elective form to be associated with less opposition to Muslims, compared to configurations of a more ascriptive variety. We understand elective boundary configurations to include those termed constitutional, civic and linguistic because the criteria that stand out in each are not inherently exclusionary. However, our earlier discussion of ‘civilisational’ nationalism in Western Europe suggests a possible alternative hypothesis: that civic conceptions of nationhood may also be associated with anti-Muslim attitudes in countries where Muslims have been framed in culturally exclusionary terms as a group whose values are incompatible with Western secularism and progressive ideals (Brubaker 2017; Tonkens & Duyvendak 2016). Finally, we expect the undifferentiated boundary configuration to resemble the thin configuration, but possibly with greater opposition to Muslims due to the somewhat higher priority placed on all boundary criteria.

In what follows, we present results from conditional logistic regressions with country fixed effects for each country group in turn. We illustrate these in Figure 2 with pairwise comparison plots of association of class membership and anti-Muslim sentiment. Full regression tables displaying coefficient estimates for all variables can be found in Online Appendix B.

In Group 1, which is composed of Eastern European countries, Ireland and Northern Ireland, we find that the thick boundary configuration stands out in its association with higher levels of opposition to having a Muslim neighbour in comparison with the other three classes. This is consistent with our expectation that individuals who subscribe to thinner or more elective boundary configurations should be less prone to anti-Muslim sentiments than individuals who endorse all criteria of belonging, including both ascriptive and elective ones. In addition, it appearsthat thin and elective conceptions of nationhood are equally inclusive of Muslims in this country group as there is no statistically significant difference between the constitutional and thin classes or between the undifferentiated and thin classes. This suggests that a low bar for national membership is not the only path toward more inclusive attitudes toward Muslims in these countries. Indeed, individuals who place emphasis on respecting the country’s laws and institutions as a basis for national membership are equally inclusive of Muslims as individuals who place relatively little emphasis on any criterion of national membership.

Next, we turn to Group 2, comprising Armenia, Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. Here too, we find the thick class to be associated with greater opposition to Muslims than the other three classes. In a further parallel to Group 1, an elective conception of nationhood is equally inclusive of Muslims as a thin conception as there is no statistically significant difference in the associations with anti-Muslim attitudes between the civic and thin classes. Viewing civic duties – respect for the country’s laws and knowing the language – as important criteria of national membership thus seems to foster an open attitude toward Muslims in one’s private social space. The Group 2 results, however, differ from those for Group 1 in one respect: the linguistic class is associated with greater dislike of Muslim neighbours than the thin class, but not the civic class. As discussed above, it is reasonable that placing relatively little weight on any criteria of national membership should result in less opposition to out-group members in
comparison with valuing any one criterion. What is interesting, however, is that this logic does not apply to the constitutional and civic classes in Groups 1 and 2, respectively. Neither of these classes is significantly different from the thin class in its association with anti-Muslim attitudes, which suggests that the prioritisation of the country’s basic political norms fosters inclusive attitudes toward outsiders.

The results for Group 3, comprising Northwestern European countries, are strikingly different. In this group, there is a pairwise hierarchy of classes; the civic and linguistic classes are associated with more opposition to living near a Muslim than both the constitutional and
thin classes, with no statistically significant differences between the classes on either side of this divide. This contradicts common assumptions in the nationalism literature, which led us to predict no difference between classes focused on elective criteria of national membership (i.e., the civic and constitutional classes and, somewhat more ambiguously, the linguistic class). The fact that the key distinction is between the constitutional and thin boundary configurations, on the one hand, and the civic and linguistic boundary configurations, on the other, is consistent with the notion that civic principles and language have taken on a culturally exclusionary character in Northwestern Europe – at least when it comes to Muslims.12

To ensure that our group-level findings are not mere artifacts of the models but instead reflect actual empirical patterns observed within the countries in question, we run additional analyses on two particularly relevant cases from Group 3: the Netherlands and Sweden. The results, reported in Online Appendix C, are consistent with those obtained at the group level.

These results indicate that in Northwestern Europe it is not necessary for civic nationalism to be coupled with ascriptive criteria of membership (as in the thick boundary configuration) for the former to foster exclusionary attitudes. That being said, it does appear that the crucial distinction is between a cultural and a purely elective understanding of what it means to respect the political institutions and laws of the country since the main difference in the composition of the constitutional and civic classes is whether language skills are also seen as an important criterion of national membership. We will expand on this interpretation below.

Finally, we turn to Group 4, which comprises Southern and Eastern European countries.13 Here, the thin class stands out as less anti-Muslim than the linguistic and thick classes, with no difference between the latter two. The fact that the linguistic boundary configuration is associated with equal antipathy toward Muslims as the thick conception stands in contrast to the findings from Group 2 and further underscores the results from Group 3. As was the case with the civic boundary configuration, it suggests that the implications of a linguistic definition of national membership are context-dependent: while the value placed on language may signal a culturally exclusionary understanding of national membership in some parts of Europe (Groups 3 and 4), it appears not to do so in other parts of the continent (Group 2).

One possible reason for the differential associations of the linguistic class with anti-Muslim attitudes is the relative size and composition of the Muslim population in the different country groups. In Group 2, the Muslim share of the population is either very small (in Armenia, Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Slovakia it is below 1 per cent [Hackett 2017]) or consists primarily of labour migrants from the 1960s and 1970s (and their children and grandchildren born in the country) who are largely proficient in the countries’ dominant languages. Thus, language may not be an effective criterion of differentiation in these countries. In contrast, several of the countries in Group 4 are home to large Muslim populations consisting of national minorities (e.g., Caucasian and Turkic ethnicities in Russia or Turks in Bulgaria), while in countries belonging to Group 3, the Muslim population includes not only labour migrants but also more recent refugees. Thus, in both cases, language may be a central component of the ‘otherness’ of Muslims. This interpretation suggests that the differences in results across countries may stem in part from the relative resonance of a particular criterion of national belonging as a basis for marking social boundaries.
Discussion and conclusion

Addressing a significant gap in the literature on anti-Muslim attitudes, this study has proposed a theoretical argument for why conceptions of nationhood should be related to the drawing of social boundaries against Muslims and tested it on a unique dataset consisting of respondents from 41 European countries. In what follows, we highlight three distinct contributions of our research. First, we have demonstrated that conceptions of nationhood are strongly associated with anti-Muslim attitudes, even when controlling for a number of correlates emphasised by other studies. In particular, as our models control for anti-immigrant attitudes, the associations between boundary configurations and opposition to having a Muslim neighbour function above and beyond any hostility toward Muslims qua foreigners. Although anti-immigrant attitudes are a strong predictor of anti-Muslim attitudes in all four country groups (in line with findings from past studies), introducing boundary configurations into the explanatory framework provides an independent contribution to understanding individual differences in exclusionary attitudes.14

Also, in contrast to other studies (Kalkan et al. 2009; Dekker & Van der Noll 2012; Ernst & Bornstein 2012), we find that anti-Muslim sentiments are not driven by national attachment in any of the country groups. Rather than the strength of national identity, what drives anti-Muslim attitudes is the content of beliefs about criteria of national belonging, which underscores the importance of taking meaning seriously when examining nationalist exclusion. Finally, concerning the notion that anti-Muslim attitudes should be more ‘accessible’ than negative sentiments toward other minority groups, as suggested by Spruyt and Elchardus (2012), our results offer qualified support. Namely, in Northwestern Europe, we find that respondents who subscribe to a civic conception of nationhood are not immune from exclusionary beliefs. This only holds, however, when liberal principles are interpreted in cultural terms, as those who subscribe to a purely constitutionalist boundary configuration are less likely to hold anti-Muslim attitudes. In addition, the greater propensity of civic nationalists to be anti-Muslim is specific to the Northwestern group, suggesting that anti-Muslim attitudes are not equally ‘accessible’ to liberally minded people in other countries.

This leads us to the second contribution of the study. Utilising a large cross-national sample and an inductive analytical approach, we have shown that the ideological climate in a given national context conditions individual-level effects of national symbolic boundaries. This contradicts the conclusions made in the only other study we know of that has also examined individual-level predictors of anti-Muslim attitudes across Eastern and Western European countries: Strabac and Listhaug (2008) argue that the drivers of anti-Muslim sentiments are of a ‘global nature’ because the same individual-level predictors are significant in both contexts. In contrast, we show that there are important differences in anti-Muslim attitudes across European regions, which likely stem from the distinct ways in which Muslims are framed in political discourse on national – and European – identity. Only by connecting the literature on anti-Muslim attitudes with the literature on national boundary drawing, and by inductively separating countries into groups sharing similar nationalism profiles in our analysis, were we able to arrive at these insights.

To be sure, it is possible that the results may also be driven in part by social desirability. This alternative interpretation is context dependent in another way: because
ethnonationalism is deemed politically incorrect in Western Europe, it may be ‘covered up’ by a civic vocabulary (Fozdar & Low 2015; Halikiopoulou et al. 2013). If this is the case, respondents subscribing to the civic boundary configuration are not ‘truly’ civic but rather express their ethnonationalism in civic terms. While we are not able to determine which of these interpretations is correct, the fact that ostensibly civic notions of nationhood can lead to exclusionary attitudes in some contexts but not others is a significant finding, which we hope will inspire further research.

Finally, we wish to highlight the empirical contribution of our study, as we believe the results help us understand the particular make-up of anti-Muslim attitudes among (some) liberals in Northwestern Europe. Our results suggest that in this region, distancing oneself from Muslims is premised on a cultural understanding of liberal-democratic values, whereas in other parts of Europe, exclusionary attitudes toward Muslims have their basis in a more traditional ethnonationalist understanding of national membership (cf. Turgeon et al. 2018). Given that the results point to the different bases of anti-Muslim sentiment across European countries, scholars should exercise caution when making general claims about this phenomenon without taking into account country-level heterogeneity (see also Mijs et al. 2016).

While space limitations prevent us from offering a full analysis of the potential causes of the observed cross-national variation, the contemporary resonance of exclusionary civic arguments in Northwestern Europe is likely to have deeper historical roots. In particular, what appears to distinguish Western European countries in Groups 2 and 3 (the two country groups with a civic class) is the degree to which religion has historically been relegated to the private sphere. This is the case in all Group 3 countries, either through church-state separation (France, Luxembourg and parts of Switzerland), pillarisation (the Netherlands, Belgium and parts of Switzerland) or adherence to Lutheranism (Scandinavian countries). In contrast, the church has historically enjoyed a more privileged position in relation to the state in Group 2 countries. We hypothesise that civic nationalists in Northwestern European countries have come to see the exclusion of religion from the public sphere not only as an important political principle but also a cultural value constitutive of the nation itself – and of European ‘civilisation’ more broadly (Mouritsen 2006; Brubaker 2017). In this light, the contemporary presence of religious ‘others’ (i.e., Muslims) who (are perceived to) openly signal their faith in public settings and make claims for religious accommodation is interpreted by civic nationalists as a threat to the nation’s secular ideals and progressive political principles (see also Fetzer & Soper 2003; Soper & Fetzer 2003; Carol & Koopmans 2013; Statham 2016; Helbling & Traunmüller 2016). We offer a more systematic discussion of these mechanisms and an analysis of the underlying cross-national variation in Online Appendix D.

This historical-institutional account helps explain the resonance of the civilisational-nationalist discourse of radical-right – and increasingly liberal – parties in Group 3 countries. Such discourse depicts Muslims as backward and fundamentally unassimilable due to their lack of cultural rootedness in the secular liberal-democratic tradition (Mouritsen 2006: 83). In contrast, among Group 2 countries, where a civic conception of nationhood is not at odds with the presence of religion in the public sphere, the stigmatisation of Muslims as essentially un-civic is less common and has less resonance (note that this interpretation bolsters Brubaker’s [2017] argument regarding the absence of civilisational discourse in
Great Britain and Germany). This, of course, does not preclude the presence of anti-Muslim attitudes in Group 2, but it suggests that they are likely to be associated with ‘thick’ rather than civic-nationalist beliefs. We consider this a promising hypothesis that should prompt further research.

Even though we believe that our study offers important empirical and theoretical insights, it also has some limitations. In particular, the cross-sectional character of our data prohibits causal claims. While theory leads us to anticipate that symbolic boundary configurations shape social behaviour, reluctance to interact with specific out-groups could also lead people to form more abstract ideas of who is part of their imagined community. In addition, particular understandings of nationhood can be used as justifications for disliking particular out-groups. If so, our results suggest that different conceptions of national membership have different justificatory power or resonance in different contexts. Given the possibility that the direction of causality runs in the opposite direction than what the literature suggests, all we can conclude is that boundary configurations are associated with anti-Muslim attitudes. We hope that our study can serve as a foundation for future research seeking to test this relationship in causal terms.

A second limitation is temporal, as our survey data are from 2008. This means that we cannot attend to time-varying effects – another form of context that may influence the individual-level consequences of boundary configurations. That our data were collected before the intense politicisation of Islam in Europe has one advantage, however, as the patterns we identify can serve as a reference point for future studies based on more current data. We speculate that the link between civic definitions of nationhood and anti-Muslim attitudes is even stronger today in Northwestern Europe because views linking Islam with anti-democratic and anti-liberal values have been increasingly espoused not only by radical-right, but also centre-right politicians. An interesting question for future research is whether this understanding of national culture has diffused to countries in Southern and Eastern Europe or whether its resonance in these regions continues to be limited, as our historical hypothesis suggests.

Despite these limitations, our article demonstrates the value of an inductive approach to comparative research on nationalist beliefs. Rather than assuming that symbolic boundaries based on ostensibly elective criteria effectively inoculate respondents from anti-Muslim sentiments, our country-group analysis of attitudinal patterns reveals striking regional differences in the political correlates of civic nationalism. In countries where political culture has taken on the character of civil religion (Bellah 1992), out-groups are more likely to be stigmatised for being culturally distinct than for their ethno-racial characteristics. This reveals the dark side of Western European cultural progressivism: the acceptance of diversity in particular domains of social life, like gender or sexuality, can be used as a powerful ideological weapon against perceived out-groups. Such exclusionary practices are easily masked by a veneer of open-mindedness that purports to defend Western European secular beliefs from dangerous outsiders.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful for valuable feedback from Brent Nelsen, Juan Díez Medrano, Paul DiMaggio, Jeff Manza, Michael McQuarrie, Matthijs Rooduijn, Sarah de Lange, Jeff Guhin,
and audience members at the 2017 International Conference of Europeanists, the 2017 ASEN Conference, and departmental workshops and colloquia at the London School of Economics and Political Science, New York University and the University of Amsterdam. Both authors contributed equally to this research.

**Online Appendix**

Additional supporting information may be found in the Online Appendix section at the end of the article:

**Appendix A. LCA model fit statistics**
**Appendix B. Regression results for each country group**
**Appendix C. Case-specific analyses of symbolic boundaries and anti-muslim attitudes**
**Appendix D. The historical roots of exclusionary civic nationalism**

**Notes**

1. To be clear, other scholars show that differences in values between Western majority populations and Muslim/non-Western immigrant minorities are small or negligible (e.g., Breidahl & Larsen 2016; Gundelach 2010).

2. Ability to speak the country’s dominant language is also a common criterion of national belonging, but its status as an attribute of civic or ethnic nationalism has been contested. On the one hand, language can be acquired, like other elective traits. On the other hand, language can serve as a proxy for cultural belonging, so that imperfect fluency or the presence of an accent – both of which are common in adult language acquisition – can become markers of otherness. This ambiguity is reflected in our results: the expectation that ‘true’ nationals should speak the country’s dominant language takes on either an inclusive or exclusive meaning depending on national context.

3. The downside of the EVS’s unique combination of variables is that our results cannot at this time be replicated using other data. While we are confident in our chosen dependent variable, we hope that in the future scholars will collect more systematic data on the relationship between nationalism and anti-Muslim sentiments.

4. Because of its cultural distinctness, we treat Northern Ireland as a national case comparable to the other countries in the sample. This is facilitated by the EVS’s collection of a separate sample for Northern Ireland.

5. The variables that contribute most toward the decrease in the final sample size are the dependent variable and the control for anti-immigrant attitudes. This may suggest that these questions are sensitive to some people – a concern which we discuss throughout the article. Other questions in the same battery as our dependent variable (e.g., attitudes toward right-wing extremists) generate a similar proportion of missing responses, which reassures us that the sensitivity concern is not specific to issues concerning Muslims or immigrants.

6. While some may question the grounds for positing a relationship between local-level preferences and conceptions of national symbolic boundaries, our results clearly demonstrate that these two sets of beliefs are closely associated. Theoretically, beliefs about national symbolic boundaries determine whom respondents perceive to be legitimate co-nationals and it is intuitive that some respondents will prefer not to live near people they perceive as outsiders to the nation. Such residential preferences are a frequent manifestation of xenophobia (i.e., fear of foreigners/strangers).

7. Social desirability is likely to be of particular concern in more liberal countries, such as those in Northwestern Europe. Yet, it is in those countries that we find a strong relationship between civic nationalism and reluctance to live near Muslims. Given that the civic nationalist respondents in this region should be particularly prone toward socially desirable responses, we interpret this finding as
conservative. Were we able to eliminate any possible social desirability effect, the association between civic nationalism and anti-Muslim attitudes would likely be even stronger. In less liberal countries outside of this region, social desirability should be a less relevant concern.

8. The EVS does not ask about three criteria of membership typically found in other surveys: subjective identification, religion and citizenship. Identification and citizenship are commonly interpreted as measures of civic nationalism and religion as a measure of ethnocultural nationalism. While our analyses of symbolic boundaries may be less nuanced than those based on more extensive survey items, we are able to identify ascriptive and elective forms of nationalism in the data and observe considerable variation in these beliefs within countries. Moreover, while the omission of religious membership criteria may appear to be a problem for a study of anti-Muslim attitudes, in practice, it is unlikely that its inclusion would alter our results because past inductive studies (Bonikowski & DiMaggio 2016; Bonikowski 2017) have consistently found religion to cluster together with, and only with, symbolic boundaries based on ancestry, lifelong residence, and birth in the country – attitudes that do not figure prominently in the primary contribution of our article.

9. This discards information about non-zero probabilities of assignment to the remaining classes, but makes the models easier to implement and interpret.

10. We do not provide a substantive interpretation of the classes in Table 1 because we use them solely for deriving the country groupings used in the next step of the LCA analysis.

11. Note, however, that the linguistic versus civic comparison is on the boundary of statistical significance, suggesting a possible hierarchy of boundary conceptions in which civic and thin classes are the least anti-Muslim, the thick class most anti-Muslim and the linguistic class is in-between.

12. One possible objection to our results is that the LCA did not identify any thick nationalists in Group 3, even though such respondents may exist in Northwestern Europe. Furthermore, the fact that the civic and linguistic classes score slightly above the mean on ethnic nationalism indicators (as illustrated in Figure 1) could lead to the conclusion that the civic nationalism finding is driven by thick nationalists lurking in these two groups. We reject this interpretation on two grounds. First, while the proportion of respondents endorsing birth in the country, ancestry and lifelong residence as criteria of national membership is indeed higher among the civic and linguistic classes than among the constitutional and thin classes, over 70 per cent of respondents in each of the former two classes reject these criteria. Second, when we limit the conditional logistic regression to respondents who disavow all three ascriptive criteria (i.e., either ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’ with them), our finding concerning the association between civic nationalism and anti-Muslim attitudes in Group 3 holds. This attests to the robustness of our results and the low prevalence of thick nationalism in Northwestern Europe. The results of this supplementary analysis are available from the authors upon request.

13. Since Macedonia has a substantial Muslim population (around 40 per cent), we also ran a regression with respondents from Macedonia excluded. This robustness check gave substantially similar results to the regression on the full country group, and we therefore report the results from the full model here.

14. Removing the control for anti-immigrant attitudes from the models does not substantially change the associations between boundary configurations and anti-Muslim attitudes in any of the country groups. For Groups 1 and 2, minor changes in effect sizes (but not statistical significance) suggest that in these countries the effect of conceptions of nationhood on anti-Muslim attitudes is partially mediated by anti-immigrant attitudes.

References


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