Why Not Anti-Populist Parties?

Theory with Evidence from the Andes and Thailand

Brandon Van Dyck

Political parties are critical for democracy, but where do they come from? Recent analyses, building on classic works like Lipset and Rokkan and Huntington, show that episodes of extraordinary conflict and polarization spawn enduring parties.¹ Such episodes—civil war, authoritarian repression, populist mobilization—furnish raw materials for party building. Polarization generates differentiated political identities. Extra-institutional conflict motivates groups to develop ground organizations. Adversity weeds out careerists, selecting for ideologues. Intragroup shared struggle and intergroup animosity and grievance cement in-group loyalties, discouraging defection. Through these mechanisms, polarization and conflict birth parties with distinct brands, territorial infrastructures, committed activists, and cohesion.

Often, such episodes produce party systems. In Latin America, civil wars spawned stable two-party systems in Uruguay, Colombia, and (more recently) El Salvador, as warring sides evolved into parties after conflict ceased. In Brazil and Chile, bureaucratic authoritarianism generated stable right and left parties founded by the supporters and opponents of outgoing dictatorships.²

It is noteworthy, then, that populism typically generates just one strong party: a populist, not an anti-populist, one.³ Where successful, populists—defined as personalistic political outsiders who electorally mobilize the popular classes against the political and/or economic elite⁴—almost invariably polarize society and may engender sustained, even violent conflict between populist and anti-populist forces.⁵ Numerous populist parties have emerged from such conflicts. In the mid-twentieth century, populism produced Argentina’s Peronist party (PJ) and Peru’s American Revolutionary Popular Alliance (APRA). More recently, Thai and Andean populist movements have evolved, or are evolving, into institutionalized parties. Bolivia’s Movement toward Socialism (MAS) has established itself as a perennial force, and Venezuela’s Chavismo, Peru’s Fujimorismo, and Thailand’s Pheu Thai Party (PTP) are doing the same.⁶
Although these populist movements have triggered intense opposition from middle- and high-income sectors, and although anti-populist forces have occasionally challenged populists electorally, no competitive anti-populist party has taken root in the above-cited cases. Why?

This question matters for a few reasons. First, where populists govern and there is no competitive anti-populist party, anti-populist forces may take extra-electoral or undemocratic measures to advance their interests. Such measures include coups (e.g., Thailand in 2006 and 2014), police rebellions, the proscription or dissolution of populist parties, territorial autonomy movements, strikes, protests, attacks on public buildings, and the creation of tutelary privileges and authoritarian enclaves. Second, in the absence of strong anti-populist parties, populist executives face fewer checks and may subvert procedural democracy (e.g., Argentina in the mid-1950s; Peru in the 1990s; Thailand in the first decade of the 2000s; contemporary Turkey, Hungary, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador). Third, in the longer term, successful populism tends to produce asymmetric party systems in which a single party of populist origin dominates (e.g., Peronism, perhaps Fujimorismo).

This article argues that successful populism, by its nature, impedes anti-populist party building. Populism, at its core, is anti-elite, anti-establishment politics. Successful populists discredit elites and cripple institutionalized parties. Since anti-populist leaders typically belong to the tarnished elite, they are unpopular where populists succeed. Moreover, since successful populists discredit a wide spectrum of elites and organizations, anti-populists are heterogeneous in ideological and class terms, preventing cohesion. Additionally, party system breakdown allows populists to dominate elections and concentrate power, weakening anti-populists’ incentive to prioritize elections. Insofar as anti-populists do invest in elections, they often have access to party “substitutes” (e.g., finance, media), weakening their electoral incentive to invest in parties. Due to these factors, robust, competitive anti-populist parties rarely emerge.

This argument, however, has a temporal dimension. During the initial years of populist government, conditions for anti-populist party building are virtually prohibitive. Yet, where populists govern for extended periods, conditions tend to become less unfavorable. Over time, anti-populist forces commit to elections and undergo leadership renovation. Incumbent populists face crisis, scandal, voter fatigue, and the departure of charismatic leaders. These circumstances do not make successful anti-populist party building likely—just less unlikely. Robust anti-populist parties may then emerge if additional facilitating factors are present.

The article supports these arguments by comparing four cases where populists have recently taken power: Thailand, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. (See the online appendix for a fifth case study, on Peru under President Alberto Fujimori.) In all four cases, as well as in the Peruvian case, anti-populist parties did not emerge initially. In three cases, populists held on to power for over a decade (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador), and in one of these three (Venezuela), an anti-populist party almost took root, sustaining national electoral relevance for the better half of a decade before recently disintegrating (Democratic Unity Roundtable [MUD]).
The Argument

Party building is the process by which new parties become enduring, electorally relevant actors. Following Downs, Sartori, and recent publications, I define party minimally, as a group that competes in elections to place candidates in office. A case of successful party building is a new party that achieves sustained electoral relevance at the national level. Operationally, it must receive 20 percent of the vote in national elections for at least a decade.

Populist leaders rarely invest in parties. Most gain popularity on anti-party appeals and resist creating parties that could limit their autonomy (e.g., Argentina’s Juan Perón, Peru’s Alberto Fujimori, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, and Ecuador’s Rafael Correa). Yet, however unintentionally, many populists do in fact spawn parties. Successful populists like Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre of Peru’s APRA, Perón, Fujimori, and Chávez earned intense support from lower-income sectors while triggering intense opposition from middle- and high-income sectors. In Argentina, Peru, and (more recently) Venezuela, the result was prolonged, sometimes violent conflict between populist and anti-populist movements. These conflicts produced clear (albeit personalized) populist electoral brands, powerful populist identities and subcultures, and populist movements that fed into strong territorial organizations (Peronism, APRA, Chavismo, Fujimorismo).

Why do anti-populist parties not emerge from the same contexts? I argue that successful populism, by its very nature, inhibits anti-populist party building. Populism, at its core, is anti-elite, anti-establishment politics. Populists only attain power where elites and institutionalized parties have lost support, usually amid crisis. Campaigning populists group these elites and parties into a corrupt “establishment” and, where successful, discredit them. In government, populists maintain the rhetoric and orientation that catapulted them to office. Successful populism thus tarnishes institutionalized partisan brands, leading to party system fragmentation. Elites defect from institutionalized parties in droves. Ambitious young politicians do not join institutionalized parties. New electoral vehicles and independent politicians proliferate. As Figure 1 illustrates, these processes have occurred dramatically in the Andes and, to a lesser extent, Thailand in the lead-up to and wake of populist victories.

To create a competitive, robust party, anti-populists—i.e., actors centrally and explicitly opposed to populists—must build from the wreckage of the establishment. Yet, they tend to have weak incentives and limited capacities to perform this task. Why?

Incentives Amid populist ascendancy, party systems break down and oppositions fracture. Opposition fragmentation allows populists, first, to dominate elections. As Figure 2 illustrates, successful populists typically dominate elections for at least a decade, repeatedly winning by wide margins. Opposition fragmentation allows populists, second, to concentrate power. Many populist figures, facing weak oppositions, become more authoritarian, using the state as a weapon against opposition groups and media (e.g., Perón, Fujimori, Chávez, Morales, Correa, Thaksin).
These realities weaken anti-populists’ incentives for party building. Under conditions of electoral domination and increasing authoritarianism, anti-populists may conclude that they cannot win elections in the short term. Thus, they may de-prioritize elections and take extraelectoral action. Illustrative examples include the coup against Perón (1955); proscriptions of APRA (1930s-60s) and the Peronists (1950s-60s); the coup against Chávez (2002); anti-populist electoral boycotts in Thailand (2006) and Venezuela (2006, 2017); territorial autonomy movements in Bolivia and Ecuador (first decade of the 2000s); and protests, judicial actions, and coups in contemporary Thailand.

Insofar as anti-populists do invest in elections, they often have access to party “substitutes,” weakening their incentives for party building. Anti-populists’ elite connections virtually guarantee them generous financing. Anti-populists typically control mass media or receive favorable coverage; indeed, for anti-populists, media

---

**Figure 1** Collapse or Decline of Institutionalized Parties (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Thailand)
control may be a singularly valuable political asset. Paradoxically, this financial and media access inhibits party building. To compete electorally, anti-populists tend to rely on media and paid staffers, forgoing the work of activist recruitment and organization building.

**Capacities** Anti-populists also have limited party building capacities. First, successful populists discredit a wide spectrum of elites and organizations spanning the left/right and capital/labor divides. Thus, anti-populist forces are ideologically and socio-economically heterogeneous and have conflicting agendas. The result is low cohesion and incoherence (e.g., opponents of Peronism, Fujimorismo, Chavismo, MAS, Correa, Thaksin).

Second, populists only succeed where voters reject, even despise, the establishment. Anti-populists belong to this tarnished elite and establishment. Without leadership Ecuador’s 2011 referendum and popular consultation included ten questions. To compute the overall result, I divided the total number of “yes” votes (i.e., for all ten questions) by the total number of votes. Thailand’s constitutional court invalidated the 2014 general election.
renovation—i.e., the emergence of leaders with new names, backgrounds, and (often) complexions—anti-populist forces cannot easily avoid the “establishment” label. But leadership renovation takes time. Where populism succeeds, institutionalized parties crumble, but their leaders do not retire. Especially for younger leaders, politics is a living or vocation, and long careers lie ahead. These figures typically stay in politics, but they cannot hide their names, backgrounds, or complexions and thus have difficulty avoiding the “oligarchy” tag (e.g., Venezuela’s Leopoldo López). These realities limit anti-populist electoral success, particularly among popular sectors (e.g., Argentina, mid-twentieth century; Peru, 1990s; contemporary Thailand, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador).

The Temporal Dimension

Anti-populist party building, then, is almost prohibitively difficult during the first decade of populist government. This first decade is consequential; often, it is the only window for anti-populist party building, as many populists govern for less, or little more, than a decade (e.g., Perón, Fujimori, Thaksin).

Yet, where populist movements govern for a longer period (e.g., contemporary Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador), conditions for anti-populist party building become less unfavorable. Why? First, when populists take power, anti-populists may contest populist rule, initially, by nonelectoral means (e.g., protests, coups). If these measures fail—and they often do (e.g., Venezuela, 2002–2004; Bolivia, 2007–2009)—anti-populists typically adapt by prioritizing elections. Second, the passage of time leads to anti-populist leadership renovation, as older generations give way to newer generations less connected to the establishment. Third, over time, governing populists tend to suffer scandal, crisis, voter fatigue, or the departure of charismatic leaders. Such developments create electoral opportunities for anti-populists.

So, where populists govern for long periods, conditions for anti-populist party building become less unfavorable. Robust anti-populist parties then have a reasonable chance of emerging if additional facilitating factors are present. What are some such factors?

In this article, I highlight the variable of intensely polarized, adverse origins (for more, see Levitsky et al. and Van Dyck). Where governments are illiberal and repressive, and where polarization between government and opposition is intense, opposition forces tend to have stronger incentives and higher capacities for party building. This argument is useful for explaining not only the near success of Venezuela’s MUD, but also the success, more broadly, of recently emerged parties across the developing world.

How do polarized, adverse origins (paradoxically) facilitate successful party building? Intense polarization between groups generates intragroup cohesion and facilitates intergroup brand differentiation (and hence brand development). Under illiberal governments, opposition forces, given their limited access to state resources and
mass media, have a strong electoral incentive to invest in grassroots organization—assuming they have an electoral route to power. In addition, state repression, provided that it is not too extreme, has the unintended effect of hardening the opposition’s collective identity and generating opposition cohesion. Finally, insofar as opposition forces operate under adverse, threatening circumstances, they attract a more ideologically committed membership and leadership, as careerists tend to defect or not to join in the first place. Notably, all the above conditions have existed in Venezuela during the last decade. Uncoincidentally, the anti-populist MUD almost took root during this time—and very well might have taken root if the Maduro government had not recently blocked electoral and constitutional channels of political contestation (about which more below).

The Argument at Work

This section supports the above arguments by comparing four countries where populists have recently taken power: Bolivia (Morales), Ecuador (Correa), Venezuela (Chávez), and Thailand (Thaksin Shinawatra). In these four cases—as well as in Peru under President Alberto Fujimori (see online appendix)—no successful anti-populist party emerged during the first decade of populist government. In three of the cases (Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador), populists remained in power longer than a decade, and in one of these three (Venezuela), an anti-populist party almost took root. I will use the above arguments to shed light on this range of outcomes.

Sources of Populism in the Andes and Thailand

The Andes and Thailand provide fertile terrain for populism. Populism thrives where voters respond favorably to anti-elite appeals. Latin America is the world’s most unequal region, and it is characterized, particularly in the Andes, by state weakness, as indicated by poor tax collection, rampant homicide, deficient public services, and large ungoverned spaces. Similarly, Thailand, historically, has had the highest Gini coefficient in Southeast Asia, and basic services do not reach many poor Thais.

Inequality breeds popular resentment of economic elites, while deficient services generate popular dissatisfaction with political elites. Where these ills exist and politicians do not address them, populists often fill the representational vacuum. In the Andes and Thailand, chronic inequality and state weakness, combined with short-term crisis, have led voters to reject institutionalized parties (Figure 1).

Unlike classic Latin American populists, who represented organized popular classes (e.g., unions) and promoted statist policies, neopopulists in the Andes and Thailand represent the unorganized poor (urban and rural) and are programmatically heterogeneous. They include statist figures like Chávez, neoliberals like Fujimori, and individuals who, in different ways, fall between these poles (e.g., Correa, Morales, Thaksin).
All the leaders featured in the article and appendix were outsiders who campaigned against the establishment. They belonged to new parties, or to young parties that had not experienced dictatorship or major crisis. Their co-partisans and policy advisers came from outside the establishment. They rose amid crisis, popular discontent and party system decline (Thailand) or collapse (the Andes) (Figure 1). In all five cases, democratic institutions were weak at the time of populist ascendency.

The relevant leaders took office over a sixteen-year span (1990–2006): Fujimori in 1990, Chávez in 1998, Thaksin in 2001, Morales in 2005, and Correa in 2006. They won initial victories in landslides over institutionalized parties (see Figure 2). They were electorally dominant (Figure 2). They shifted, to varying degrees, in an authoritarian direction. Their political success largely rested on economic performance: under Fujimori, hyperinflation ended and growth resumed; under Thaksin, Thailand speedily recovered from the Asian financial crisis; and under Chávez, Morales, and Correa, commodity booms bolstered growth and financed social policy expansions.


The below case studies and online appendix show that in all five countries, successful populism initially impeded anti-populist party building. In Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, conditions for anti-populist party building became less unfavorable as populists persisted in power. Only in Venezuela, however, did additional facilitating factors—namely, intense polarization and adversity for the opposition—furnish many of the raw materials for party building. Consequently, only in Venezuela did a competitive anti-populist party, MUD, almost take root.

In the case studies to follow, I begin with Thailand because, in Thailand, anti-populists have repeatedly defeated populists nonelectorally (e.g., through coups) and thus have not needed to win elections to neutralize populism. This fact analytically distinguishes Thailand from the Andean cases, where anti-populists initially or ultimately sought power electorally.

**Thailand**

In 2001, amid an economic downturn and eroding support for the institutionalized, governing Democrat Party, Thai political outsider and telecommunications mogul, Thaksin Shinawatra, led his new party, Thais Love Thais (TRT), to general election victory. Thaksin’s nationalist, redistributive economic program partially accounted for his popular appeal, but he drew “even more” attention “because of his novelty . . . and . . . wealth.”

Thaksin governed from 2001 to 2006, was deposed in a 2006 military coup, and fled Thailand. His co-partisans retook office in 2007 but were quickly ousted judicially.
In 2011, his co-partisans were elected again, and his sister, Yingluck, became prime minister. In 2014, Yingluck’s government was toppled in a second military coup. A junta, the National Council for Peace and Order, currently governs Thailand.

Although institutionalized parties did not collapse in the wake of Thaksin’s ascent, they declined. The Democrat Party lost substantial support and has not challenged pro-Thaksin parties electorally. A competitive anti-populist party remains elusive.

**Party System Decline** Thaksin’s 2001 victory hurt Thailand’s institutionalized parties (see Figure 1). After winning over half the national vote in 1995 and 1996, these parties garnered under a third in 2001. Thaksin’s populist transformation in office further damaged the partisan establishment. Due to a recovering economy, redistributive policies, and his media-savvy, folksy style, Thaksin became a popular prime minister. Elites defected from the Democrats and other institutionalized parties. The Democrats’ constituency shrunk. Thailand’s party system became increasingly fragmented (see Figures 1 and 2).

**Incentives** Since Thaksin’s 2001 victory, anti-populists have had weak incentives to invest in electoral competition, for two reasons. First, populist electoral dominance has rendered the prospect of anti-populist victory remote. Second, the nonelectoral, often anti-democratic strategies pursued by anti-populists have succeeded.

Before the 2014 military coup, TRT and its successors, the People Power Party (PPP) and For Thais Party (PTP), dominated elections for over a decade (see Figure 2). This dominance was made possible, partly, by opposition fragmentation. Opposition fragmentation also facilitated Thaksin’s authoritarian shift as prime minister. Thaksin undertook “a broad offensive against critical media coverage” and adopted a “hawkish approach” in confronting southern Thai insurgents. He “encouraged people to draw parallels between himself” and past “authoritarian military leaders.”

Since Thaksin’s 2005 reelection—a “complete and utter landslide”—the opposition has de-prioritized elections and repeatedly taken nonelectoral measures to neutralize Thaksin’s movement. In 2006, opposition leaders, no longer considering elections “a viable option,” organized protests calling for Thaksin’s resignation. Thaksin called snap elections for April 2006. After Thaksin won resoundingly, the judiciary voided the election. A new election was scheduled for October 2006. Weeks before the election, the military toppled Thaksin and dissolved TRT, “clearly want[ing] to halt the electoral process.” Thaksin fled Thailand. New elections were held in December 2007. Again, the populists (PPP) won comfortably. Shortly afterward, the judiciary deposed Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej and dissolved PPP. Between 2009 and 2011, a military-installed, Democrat-led government “used violence to suppress the electorate’s political demands and ... derail the electoral process.” New elections were held in 2011. Yet again, the populists (PTP) won in a landslide. Yingluck became prime minister. In 2013, Yingluck’s government proposed amnesty for Thaksin and those involved in 2010 pro-Thaksin protests. Democrat-aligned grassroots forces responded with mass protests for over half a year. The Democrat parliamentary bloc
resigned, leading Yingluck to dissolve her government. New elections were held in February 2014. The judiciary invalidated the election before the results were announced. In May 2014, the judiciary deposed Yingluck. Two weeks later, the military seized power, suspended the constitution, and declared martial law. In January 2015, a military-appointed assembly banned Yingluck from politics for five years. Facing charges of abuse of power, Yingluck fled Thailand instead of awaiting the verdict. (She was found guilty in absentia.) A junta, the National Council for Peace and Order, currently governs Thailand.

In summary, then, Thai populists, over roughly a decade, repeatedly dominated elections, and anti-populists repeatedly seized power from them through military and judicial action. Thailand’s anti-populists have not needed to win elections to neutralize populism.

Insofar as Thai anti-populists have invested in elections, they have had access to substitutes (e.g., finance, media). Economic elites have generously financed the opposition, and Thaksin’s offensive against opposition media was limited and short-lived; mainstream media, for example, supported the 2006 coup51 and Democrats’ 2011 election campaign.52

Capacities Since Thaksin’s 2001 victory, anti-populists have had limited party building capacity. Heterogeneity and strategic differences have prevented anti-Thaksin forces from creating a lasting alliance. Thaksin’s opponents cut across class and urban-rural lines. Their grievances span the “economic, social, political and cultural” spheres.53 Anti-populist players include dominant factions of the monarchy, royalist bureaucracy, and military; once-protected industries; Democrats; smaller parties; most of the urban middle class; public unions; and numerous urban and rural movements and organizations that are popular or serve the popular classes.54 These players have not coalesced in a meaningful, enduring way. For example, elite and grassroots groups formed the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) to demand Thaksin’s resignation, but they frequently conflicted, and several important grassroots groups declined to join.55 After Thaksin’s 2006 ouster, anti-Thaksin forces quickly splintered, as “the generals showed themselves to be in contradiction to social and political aspirations of many in the anti-Thaksin movement.”56 Subsequent cooperation between the repressive, Democrat-led government (2009–2011) and the military and entrenched bureaucracy was based on a temporary desire to neutralize Thaksin’s movement, not on deeper, strategic interests.57

The Situation at Present After taking power in 2014, the junta, National Council for Peace and Order, banned political activity and sent regime critics to “reeducation camps.” In August 2016, under a repressive climate, Thai voters approved a new constitution that granted the military extensive powers and privileges and, through a new voting system, reduced the likelihood of any party holding a parliamentary majority. These measures, along with Thaksin’s exile and Yingluck’s proscription and prison sentence, have temporarily kept Thai populism at bay. However, if Thaksin’s
movement maintains itself, the uneasy relationship between Thai populism and democracy may persist.

Bolivia

In 2005, Evo Morales won Bolivia’s presidency in a context of stagnation, rising poverty and inequality, and unpopular neoliberal policies. Months before, President Sánchez de Lozada of the Revolutionary National Movement (MNR) had resigned in response to violent anti-government protests. Morales vowed in his campaign to reverse the recent neoliberal turn and combat centuries of colonial domination.

Morales and his party, Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), have held power since 2005. Despite significant polarization between populist and anti-populist forces, no competitive opposition party has taken root.58

Party System Collapse Morales’ 2005 victory triggered the collapse of a partisan establishment already in serious decline. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the congressional seat share of Bolivia’s institutionalized parties fell to roughly 50 percent from over 90 percent in 1989 (Figure 1). In 2005, the institutionalized parties were decimated, winning under 10 percent of congressional seats. The top three presidential finishers, who together won roughly 90 percent of the vote, belonged to new parties, not institutionalized ones. Of the three leading institutionalized parties, neither ADN nor MIR fielded a candidate, and MNR’s candidate won just 6 percent. The partisan establishment subsequently collapsed (Figure 1). Today, excluding MAS, personalistic vehicles and regional electoral organizations called “citizen groupings” (agrupaciones ciudadanas) predominate.

Incentives Since Morales took office, the opposition has had weak incentives to prioritize elections due to MAS’s dominance. MAS won presidential and legislative landsides in 2005 and, in the 2006 constituent assembly election, more than tripled the vote share of its nearest competitor. Also in 2006, 60 percent of voters sided with MAS, rejecting a regional autonomy referendum initiated by eastern department leaders.

In this context, opposition sectors resorted to non-electoral strategies. From 2007 to 2009, violent regional autonomy protests intermittently racked Bolivia. Some legislators called for secession. A strong anti-populist party, Eaton notes, would have “[offered] more institutionalized means for the expression of territorial interests and demands.”60

Although polarization has abated in recent years, MAS remains preeminent, while the opposition remains weak and fragmented. Through the mid-2010s, MAS and Morales dominated opponents in national and local elections (Figure 2).

Opposition weakness has facilitated a moderate authoritarian shift by Morales.61 Morales’ 2009 constitution increased state control of the hydrocarbon industry. His government has periodically repressed social movements, moderately suppressed opposition media, and used state funds to co-opt and outspend opponents. Morales
packed Bolivia’s supreme court, which allowed him to run for a third term. Morales lost a 2016 referendum that would have permitted him to run for a fourth term, but in late 2017, the supreme court effectively overturned this result, removing term limits for all public offices and thus allowing Morales to run for a fourth term (in October 2019).

Insofar as MAS opponents have invested in elections, they have had access to party substitutes, including substantial finance and, still, most of Bolivian mass media. This has further weakened party building incentives.

**Capacities** Anti-MAS forces have had a limited capacity for party building since Morales’ inaugural victory in 2005. Take the case of conservative party, Social Democratic Power (PODEMOS). In the lead-up to the 2005 election, Jorge Quiroga, ex-president and former ADN member, founded PODEMOS. The party included, in addition to Quiroga’s close allies, various groups and elites from Bolivia’s established parties. PODEMOS’ roots in the old order, however, proved electorally fatal. In the 2005 presidential election, Quiroga finished second with 29 percent of the vote (well behind Morales). PODEMOS suffered another landslide loss in 2006 and disbanded in 2009.

Elites from Bolivia’s old establishment remain politically active and have “obstructed processes of leadership renewal,” limiting the electoral appeal of anti-MAS forces. Divisions within and between the economic and political elite have impeded opposition cohesion. Although opposition governors have joined in national organizations and makeshift coalitions, personal rivalries have prevented these from stably cohering. Even within departments, including the opposition bastion, Santa Cruz, personal rivalries and left-right ideological divisions have led to extreme fragmentation among opponents of MAS. Finally, anti-populists’ access to mobilizing structures is limited. Due to internal conflict, the once powerful Pro Santa Cruz Committee (CPSC) has recently declined; Eaton considers this a critical factor in the failure of anti-populist party building in Bolivia’s eastern departments.

**The Situation at Present** Morales has held the presidency since January 2006. With the passage of more than a decade under populist government, conditions for anti-populist party building in Bolivia have become less unfavorable in some respects. In particular, anti-MAS forces are now committed to electoral competition, and MAS and Morales are no longer as popular as they used to be; as noted above, Bolivian voters opted in 2016 not to grant Morales a fourth presidential term, and Morales’s approval rating and likely voter support have recently declined. If Morales wins the October 2019 presidential election, Bolivian anti-populist forces will spend another five years in the wilderness; it is conceivable that, during this time, anti-populist party building could begin to occur.

On balance, though, prospects for anti-populist party building in Bolivia are dim. Anti-MAS forces remain highly fragmented and divided, and to this day, virtually no opposition coalition building has occurred at the national level. Moreover, if Morales remains in power through the first half of the 2020s, anti-MAS forces are unlikely, during this time, to face the degree of illiberalism and repression that anti-Chavistas
have recently faced in Venezuela (see below). On the other hand, if Morales loses in 2019, Bolivia’s populist era will certainly end without a robust, competitive anti-populist party having formed. And he may lose: some recent polls forecast victory for 2019 presidential candidate, ex-president Carlos Mesa (2003–2005).72

Ecuador

In 2006, after a decade of extreme governmental instability, and in a context of economic crisis, unpopular neoliberal policies, and eroding trust in institutionalized parties, Ecuador’s voters elected Rafael Correa president. Correa was a political outsider who portrayed himself as a common man and denounced neoliberalism and Ecuador’s *partidocracia* (“partyocracy”). Correa governed Ecuador from 2006 to 2017, whereupon his co-partisan and former vice president, Lenín Moreno, assumed office. To date, no viable opposition party has emerged.

Party System Collapse Correa’s 2006 victory damaged Ecuador’s already declining institutionalized parties (Figure 1).73 Whereas in 2002 these parties won about two thirds of congressional seats, in 2006, they won about one third. After 2006, they virtually disappeared; their seat share fell to roughly one tenth in 2009 and below one twentieth in 2013. Today, Ecuador’s highly fluid party system “increasingly resembles those of neighboring countries, Peru [see online appendix] and Bolivia.”74 Personalistic vehicles and short-term coalitions have filled the electoral space that relatively stable parties once occupied.

Incentives Since Correa took office, the opposition has had weak incentives to invest seriously in electoral competition due to populist electoral dominance. Opposition fragmentation has allowed Correa and his party, the Proud and Sovereign Fatherland (PAIS) Alliance, to win elections repeatedly and convincingly. Correa won the 2006, 2009, and 2013 presidential elections by landslides; the opposition progressively weakened during this time, and Correa’s margins of victory steadily grew (Figure 1). Correa’s movement won four additional elections between 2007 and 2011 (Figure 1). Until 2015, Correa’s approval rating never fell below 50 percent.75

Opposition disunity facilitated a moderate authoritarian shift on Correa’s part.76 Correa’s 2008 constitution “[vastly]” concentrated power within the executive branch and permitted consecutive reelection.77 His administration “ended judicial autonomy,” and the PAIS-controlled legislature “became a rubber stamp.”78 “Every conceivable angle of policy making has become subject to greater executive control.”79 Correa also clamped down, to a limited degree, on opposition civil society and media.80

Correa’s electoral dominance and growing power diverted opposition activity from national elections. Anti-populist forces in the state of Guayas resisted Correa, largely, by prioritizing regional autonomy and subnational politics.81 Meanwhile, mass protest, some of it violent, recurred from 2009 onward.
Insofar as the opponents of Correa and PAIS have invested in elections, they have relied heavily on substitutes. The opposition has had consistent sources of elite funding since Correa’s initial victory in 2006. Until recently, mass media were overwhelmingly anti-Correa, and despite Correa’s recent crackdown, anti-PAIS forces retain substantial media access.

**Capacities** The opposition to Correa has had a limited capacity for party building since Correa first took office. Anti-populist mobilizing structures are relatively weak—even weaker than in Bolivia. Longstanding elites still lead the opposition. Ideological differences and personal rivalries have undermined opposition cohesion and brand building. Opposition parties ranging from neoliberals and conservatives on the right to unions, environmental activists, indigenous groups, civil liberties organizations, and students on the left have yet to coalesce in a meaningful, enduring fashion. With respect to internal divisions, PAIS opponents compare unfavorably even to Bolivia’s highly fragmented anti-populist forces.

**The Situation at Present** Correa’s co-partisan and former vice president, Lenín Moreno, narrowly prevailed in the 2017 presidential election. Thus, PAIS, which came to power in 2006 with Correa’s initial presidential victory, will almost certainly remain the governing party until at least 2021. As in Bolivia, with the passage of time under populist government, conditions for anti-populist party building have become less unfavorable. Anti-PAIS forces are committed to the electoral process, and PAIS has become more politically vulnerable in the last couple of years. Correa’s approval rating fell after 2015, causing him to retract plans for a constitutional amendment that would have allowed indefinite reelection. Ideological conflict between Correa and Moreno recently led to Moreno’s expulsion from PAIS and has divided the party.

Nevertheless, anti-populist party building in Ecuador remains unlikely. The opposition to PAIS has not produced a major national leader. Anti-PAIS forces remain highly fragmented, and there has been little movement toward meaningful coalition building at a national level. Notably, the opposition did not band together to defeat a vulnerable PAIS in the February 2017 general election. Also, since Moreno’s election, Ecuador has taken steps toward the restoration of full democracy. This shift, while positive, lowers the probability that PAIS’s main electoral opponent at present—the conservative Creating Opportunities (CREO, est. 2012)—will face intense polarization and adversity in the coming years. As in Bolivia, then, prospects for the formation of a cohesive, organizationally strong anti-populist party in Ecuador remain dim.

**Venezuela**

Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez was a paradigmatic Latin American populist. In 1998, amid economic decline and party system breakdown, Chávez decisively won the Venezuelan presidency. He was the election’s most radical, untraditional candidate.
Lower-middle-class, dark-skinned, and politically inexperienced, he called the elite a corrupt oligarchy and promised to write a new constitution and dissolve congress.

Chávez and his handpicked successor, Nicolás Maduro, have held the presidency since 1998. For years, little in the way of anti-Chavista party building occurred. Late in the first decade of the 2000s, however, the anti-Chavista coalition, MUD, emerged and established itself as a perennial national contender. If elections had not become irrelevant under the dictatorial Maduro government, MUD might have taken root instead of disintegrating.

**Party System Collapse**  
Chávez’s 1998 victory accelerated the collapse of a partisan establishment in serious decline. Venezuela’s once-stable two-party system, consisting of Democratic Action (AD) and the Independent Electoral Political Organization Committee (COPEI), began to break down in the early 1990s after years of recession. Venezuela’s economic woes persisted through the 1990s, such that, remarkably, in the 1998 presidential election, AD and COPEI did not even field candidates, and every contender was an anti-establishment outsider. In the concurrent congressional election, AD and COPEI’s combined vote share fell to below 50 percent—from roughly 80 percent just five years earlier. AD and COPEI collapsed entirely after suffering additional defeats in 1999 and 2000 (Figure 1).

**Incentives**  
For most of Chávez’s tenure, anti-Chavistas had weak incentives to invest in elections due to Chavismo’s electoral dominance. Chávez and his movement, facing a fragmented and weak opposition, won four national electoral landslides from 1998 to 2000. After Chávez’s resounding 1998 presidential victory, Chavista candidates won 92 percent of the 1999 constituent assembly vote. The resulting constitution passed with 72 percent voter approval. In 2000, Chávez won another presidential landslide, and his Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) defeated its nearest congressional competitor, AD, 44 to 16 percent.

Shortly after assuming office, Chávez shifted in an authoritarian direction. His 1999 constitution made him the most powerful president in Venezuelan history. It abolished the senate, weakened the legislature, and enhanced the state’s economic role, giving governments, especially presidents, increased economic power over society. It also eliminated public financing for parties. Crucially, it allowed Chávez to serve as president for up to thirteen years.

The opposition thus “turned increasingly to extra-institutional measures to contest Chávez’s rule . . .” A general strike in December 2001 failed to force Chávez’s resignation. A short-lived coup followed in April 2002. The opposition then organized a strike within the public oil company (PDVSA) that, again, failed to topple Chávez. Finally, the opposition forced a recall referendum, but Chávez won in a landslide, causing the opposition coalition, Democratic Coordinator, to collapse. Chávez thus survived an onslaught of extra-electoral—and at times anti-democratic—assaults.

During this period, the opposition also participated in electoral contests, but had access to party substitutes. Economic elites and business groups—including
Venezuela’s largest business association, FEDECAMARAS—financed and helped to lead the opposition. Top private media outlets supported the anti-Chávez strikes and coup and assailed Chávez through the 2000s.93

**Capacities**  The opposition to Chavismo had a limited capacity for party building during most of Chávez’s tenure. Despite anti-Chavistas’ links to Venezuela’s largest labor and business confederations, which might have served as mobilizing structures, the opposition faced fundamental problems of brand building and cohesion. Chávez’s leading opponents belonged to the old elite; this was a serious, even prohibitive, electoral liability. Take the case of Project Venezuela (PV). In the lead-up to the 1998 general election, Henrique Salas Römer, ex-governor and former COPEI member, founded PV and garnered a respectable 40 percent of the vote. In the wake of Chávez’s victory, however, PV quickly collapsed, discredited by its establishment roots.94

The opposition was also heterogeneous in ideological and class terms, composed “of multiple sectors that did not always agree on many political issues—business and labor groups, civic organizations and parties, new parties and old parties, parental associations and teachers, and many former chavistas.”95 These “fragmented opposition forces repeatedly failed to coalesce behind a new party organization or political movement capable of challenging Chavismo in the electoral arena.”96

**The Emergence of MUD**  Late in the first decade of the 2000s, though, prospects for anti-Chavista party building began to brighten. In part, this was because, as in Bolivia and Ecuador, the passage of time under populist government led to less unfavorable conditions for anti-populist party building. After failing to oust Chávez extra-electorally in the 2002–2004 period, anti-populist forces in Venezuela made electoral competition their top priority.97 More key developments came in the first half of the 2010s. First, there was leadership renovation within the anti-Chavista movement. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles, in particular, lacked connections to the traditional political class. Second, Chavismo lost electoral legitimacy due to Venezuela’s economic woes, Chávez’s death (2013), and President Maduro’s relative lack of charisma.

Yet, as argued in the theoretical section, the emergence of less unfavorable conditions does not, by itself, make successful anti-populist party building likely. Whether anti-populist party building occurs also depends on the presence of additional factors that facilitate party building.

Importantly, additional facilitating factors did emerge in Venezuela, unlike in Bolivia and Ecuador. In particular, Chavismo became increasingly authoritarian in the second half of the first decade of the 2000s. After surviving the challenges of 2002–2004 and winning reelection comfortably in 2006, Chávez radicalized politically. He heavily politicized state institutions and the use of state resources.98 He clamped down on independent media, terminating, for example, the licenses of thirty-two radio stations and a leading television station in 2007. He began to arrest and exile opponents. He changed the constitution to permit indefinite reelection. Then, under Maduro, Chavismo took a more repressive turn. State forces arrested prime opposition leaders
Leopoldo López and Antonio Ledezma in 2014 and 2015, respectively, and violently clashed with protesters in 2014 and 2017, with the latter episode resulting in over 100 deaths.

Paradoxically, these conditions contributed to anti-Chavista party building in several ways. Limited access to state resources and mass media compelled anti-Chavistas to organize at the ground level; an opposition student leader stated in a 2014 interview, for example, that “there are some advantages to being shut out of the media. It’s forcing us to organize.”

Growing polarization sharpened distinctions between government and opposition; escalating repression steeled opposition commitments; and both polarization and repression generated opposition cohesion. The opposition’s sense of threat and alarm heightened steadily after the mid-2000s, first as Chávez radicalized economically and politically, then as Venezuela descended into profound economic crisis and full-blown dictatorship under Maduro. Increasingly, anti-Chavistas had an incentive to overlook internal differences and unite around a strategy for defeating Chavismo.

Not coincidentally, significant progress toward anti-populist party building occurred. A competitive anti-Chavista electoral coalition, MUD, formed in 2008 and steadily gained in strength for the better part of a decade. MUD consisted of an ideologically heterogeneous set of opposition parties, which united around a strategy of defeating Chavismo electorally. They came close to succeeding. In 2010, MUD nearly won the midterm legislative elections, garnering 47 percent of the vote. Subsequently, despite being outspent massively, the aforementioned Henrique Capriles (MUD) almost won both the 2012 and 2013 presidential elections (against Chávez and Maduro, respectively). In 2015, amid severe economic crisis, MUD defeated PSUV in a congressional landslide—Chavismo’s first electoral defeat in seventeen years.

To be sure, MUD faced significant challenges during this period. Its constituent parties, as suggested, were quite heterogeneous, spanning the left and right. In a 2015 survey, “77 percent of Venezuelans perceive[d] the opposition as very divided,” and a “clear majority” agreed that the opposition “did not have a program of its own, except to replace the Maduro government.” MUD also never gained a foothold among Venezuela’s poor. Many of its leaders were light-skinned elites—including the prominent opposition leader, Leopoldo López. In a 2015 survey, 85 percent of respondents assented to the need for “new people leading the opposition.”

Nevertheless, MUD, unlike any other anti-populist force covered in this article, established itself as a perennial contender for national power. It contested four national elections in half a decade—two presidential (2012, 2013), two congressional (2010, 2015)—and won 44–56 percent of the vote every time. By some measures, these results would qualify MUD as a successful party. By the more stringent criteria of this article, MUD would have had to sustain these results for several more years to be considered a successful case of party building.

Following MUD’s congressional victory in 2015, however, the Maduro government became a full-blown dictatorship. In 2016, the packed National Electoral Council canceled a recall referendum against the president (support for which MUD had
spearheaded). In early 2017, the packed judiciary temporarily stripped the MUD-controlled legislature of its power, which led to mass protests that state forces severely repressed, resulting (as already noted) in over 100 deaths. Later in 2017, President Maduro held a constituent assembly election without putting the proposal to a referendum, biased the voting rules in the PSUV’s favor, and threatened to fire public-sector workers who did not turn out to vote.

These developments killed MUD. The coalition began to splinter in 2017, as some factions remained committed to electoral participation while others concluded that electoral participation had become futile and served only to legitimize Maduro’s dictatorship. MUD boycotted both the 2017 constituent assembly elections (which Chavismo won virtually unopposed) and the May 2018 presidential elections (which Maduro won in a landslide). In late 2018, MUD officially dissolved.\footnote{Comparative Politics April 2019}

Conclusion

Having analyzed obstacles to anti-populist party building, I, in closing, address a related issue. As the above case studies show, although successful populists almost invariably dominate their opponents electorally, anti-populists may or may not organize coups in response. In Venezuela in 2002, anti-Chavistas orchestrated a short-lived, ultimately unsuccessful coup. In Thailand, anti-populists staged successful coups in 2006 and 2014. By contrast, there were (or have been) no major coup attempts against Fujimori in Peru, the MAS in Bolivia, or PAIS in Ecuador. Under what conditions do anti-populist coups occur?

I would highlight two variables. First, anti-populist coups are more likely where populists are regarded as more threatening. Take Venezuela. Circa 2002, President Chávez’s opponents felt a sense of threat and alarm that, arguably, was unique among our cases. Chávez’s 1999 constitution gave the government the right of expropriation, which triggered massive capital flight during the first year of Chávez’s term. The constitution, more broadly, “produced . . . a ‘high-stakes’ political system” in which “the acceptability to the opposition of the status quo [shrunk].”\footnote{Comparative Politics April 2019} Chávez was utterly dominant electorally, winning four landslide elections in under three years (1998–2000). After the July 2000 general election, there were virtually no horizontal checks on his power: he controlled the presidency, legislature, judiciary, and electoral council. In the months after the election, Chávez militarized the executive branch by appointing numerous military officers to cabinet positions; his government altered educational curricula and textbooks, displaying (according to some) a totalitarian streak; and he escalated polarization by stimulating the creation of neighborhood cells across the country, by casting the struggle between Chavismo and the opposition in Manichean terms, and by speaking of “apocalyptic” times. To top it all off, Chávez secured constitutional license to remain president for over a decade. Thus, by 2002, anti-Chavistas felt powerless, threatened, and motivated to retake power by any means.

Second, to the extent that militaries come under civilian control in the decades before the rise of populism, populist governments, naturally, are less likely to be toppled.
in coups. Here, Thailand differs sharply from the Andean cases. In Latin America, the resurgence of populism in the 1990s and 2000s postdated the consolidation of civilian control of the military. Andean neopopulists came to power in 1990 (Fujimori), 1998 (Chávez), 2005 (Morales), and 2006 (Correa). By the 1980s, democratic breakdown had become quite rare in Latin America, largely due to changes in the regional and global environment.\(^\text{107}\) Coup attempts were few, successful coups even fewer.\(^\text{108}\) In the four Andean countries featured in this article, there were a total of four coup attempts between the regional onset of the third wave of democratization (1978) and the initial victories of Fujimori, Morales, Correa, and Chávez: two in Venezuela in the early 1990s, one in Peru in 1992, and one in Ecuador in 2000. Of these, one succeeded (Alberto Fujimori’s 1992 self-coup in Peru). By contrast, in the single country of Thailand, between 1973, the year of the country’s democratic revolution, and 2001, the year of Thaksin’s first victory, there were six coup attempts and three successful coups.\(^\text{109}\) Thus, the Thai military, in intervening to topple the Thaksin and Yingluck governments, was conforming to recent historical trends, not deviating from them. Viewed from this perspective, it should not be surprising that anti-populist coups have occurred more often, and been more successful, in Thailand than in the Andes.

NOTES


3. One might object that warfare has more powerful, systemic effects than other types of polarization and conflict, such as populist mobilization. This argument is true but should not be overstated. First, episodes of polarization and conflict that are less violent and extreme than warfare still facilitate party building (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck). Second, it is not clear why the lower intensity of populist mobilization should impede the formation of anti-populist parties without also impeding the formation of populist parties.

4. Scholars have defined populism in various ways. This article employs the minimalist, political definition used in Kenneth Roberts, “Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America,” *Comparative Politics*, 38 (January 2006), 127–48; Robert Barr, “Populism, Outsiders, and Anti-Establishment Politics,” *Party Politics*, 15 (January 2009), 29–48; and Steven Levitsky and James Loxton, “Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Andes,” *Democratization*, 20 (January 2013), 107–36. On this definition, populism is a type of top-down political movement, not a type of ideology; by contrast, Mudde and Hawkins define populism as a Manichean ideology pitting the “people” against the “elite.” Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” *Government and Opposition*, 39 (September 2004), 541–63. Hawkins, Kirk, *Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Also, on this definition, populism does not denote a specific economic program or historical period; populists can be left-wing (e.g., Chávez) or right-wing (e.g., Fujimori) and classic (e.g., Perón) or neopopulist (e.g., Fujimori, Chávez, and Correa). This article does not adjudicate between competing definitions or examine...
whether borderline cases should count as populist. The article only includes relatively uncontroversial cases, i.e., those that clearly meet its definition or are widely considered populist in comparative politics literature.


10. Peru’s American Revolutionary Popular Alliance (APRA) and Argentina’s Peronist Party (PJ) were proscribed in the mid-20th century. The Thai judiciary dissolved Thais Love Thais (TRT) and its successor, People’s Power Party (PPP), in the late 2000s.

11. E.g., Bolivia’s eastern lowland departments; Ecuador’s state of Guayas.

12. E.g., Venezuela (early to mid-2000s).


15. E.g., Contemporary Thailand.


18. Due to space constraints, the Appendix is not in the print version of this article. It can be viewed in the online version, at www.ingentaconnect.com/cuny/cp.


22. De la Torre. Hawkins.


25. In Figure 1, institutionalized parties are operationalized as parties or coalitions born at least twenty years before the populist’s first victory. Institutionalized parties that garnered under 1 percent of the vote in the
relevant elections are not included. For Bolivian and Ecuadorian legislative elections, seat share figures are used.

26. In Figure 2, only opposition parties and coalitions that won at least 5 percent of the vote/seats are included. For the countries with majority runoff systems (Peru, Ecuador), presidential election figures show second-round results unless the winning candidate garnered a first-round majority.


30. Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck. Van Dyck. LeBas. Slater.

31. Levitsky et al. LeBas.


33. Van Dyck.

34. LeBas. Levitsky and Way.


39. One might hypothesize that left populists generate stronger incentives for counter-mobilization, given that right populists’ economic policies often align with elite interests. Elites reconciled with Fujimori, for example, more quickly and thoroughly than with Chávez (Roberts, 2006). Still, no viable anti-populist party emerged during the first decade of Chavismo.


41. Pye and Schaffar, 64.

42. Ibid., 65.

43. Democrat Party, Thai Nation (PCT), Thai Citizen Party (PPT), Social Action Party (PKS), Muanchon Party.


45. Pye and Schaffar, 52.


47. Phongpaichit and Baker, 2011.

48. Pye and Schaffar, 55.


50. Kongkirati, 404–405.


52. Phongpaichit and Baker, 2011.

53. Pye and Schaffar, 56.

55. Ibid. Pye and Schaffar, 42.
56. Pye and Schaffar, 56–57. See also Kongkirati, 405.
59. MNR, Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN), Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), United Left (IU), Free Bolivia Movement (MBL).
60. Eaton, 2016, 387.
64. Eaton, 2016, 405.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., 386.
67. Ibid., 405.
68. Ibid., 392.
69. Ibid., 406–408.
73. Social Christian Party (PSC), Christian Democratic Union (UDC), Ecuadorian Roldosista Party (PRE), Democratic Left (ID), Democratic Popular Movement (MPD), Alfarista Radical Front (FRA).
75. Conaghan, 114.
77. Conaghan, 2016, 112.
78. Ibid., 110.
79. Ibid., 113.
82. Conaghan and De la Torre, 277–78.
85. Ibid. Conaghan, 114.
86. Eaton, 2016, 385.
87. Conaghan, 117.
89. Hawkins.
90. AD, COPEI, Radical Cause (LCR), Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), People’s Electoral Movement (MEP), Democratic Republican Union (URD), Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV).
91. Corrales and Penfold, 45.
95. Corrales and Penfold, 21.
96. Roberts, 2012, 156.
97. Anti-populists shifted their focus back to the extraelectoral sphere in the late 2010s.
98. See Corrales and Penfold, 45.
100. Ibid.
102. Middlebrook.
103. Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck. Van Dyck.
106. Hawkins.
108. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán find that the likelihood of democratic breakdown in Latin America fell by a factor of twenty after 1978, as compared to the 1945–1978 period.
109. Feb. 1976 (unsuccessful); October 1976 (successful); 1977 (successful); 1981 (unsuccessful); 1985 (unsuccessful); 1991 (successful).