Why Party Organization Still Matters: The Workers’ Party in Northeastern Brazil

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ABSTRACT

Does party organization still matter? Much of the party literature suggests that politicians, who can use substitutes like mass media to win votes, lack incentives to invest in party organization. Yet it remains an electoral asset, especially at lower levels of government. Evidence from Brazil’s Workers’ Party (PT) indicates that party elites invest in organization when they prioritize lower-level elections and that this investment delivers electoral returns. In the mid-2000s, the PT strengthened its support across levels of government in the conservative, clientelistic Northeast. Drawing from underutilized data on party offices, this article shows that organizational expansion contributed substantially to the PT’s electoral advances in the Northeast. While President Lula da Silva’s (PT) 2006 electoral spike in the Northeast resulted from expanded conditional cash transfers, the PT’s improvement at lower levels followed from top-down organization building. The PT national leadership deliberately expanded the party’s local infrastructure to deliver electoral gains.

Is party organization becoming irrelevant to electoral politics? Much of the current party literature suggests that in Latin America and other regions, contemporary politicians increasingly lack electoral incentives to invest in party organization because they can use less time-consuming and labor-intensive party substitutes, especially mass media, to win elections (Katz 1990; Landi 1995; Scarrow 1996; Mainwaring 1999; Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Hale 2006). This article challenges that view, arguing that local party infrastructure remains an important electoral asset for vote-seeking elites. Specifically, it emphasizes that in lower-level elections, where candidates do not need national or large subnational constituencies to win, party organization plays a key role; and lower-level elites, as well as major national parties whose leaders prioritize lower-level elections, therefore retain incentives to invest in party infrastructure.1

To support this argument, the article presents evidence on the Workers’ Party (PT) in Brazil. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the programmatic, center-left PT was elected to the Brazilian presidency in 2002 and re-elected in 2006. Between 2002 and 2006, his vote share stagnated or decreased in most of Brazil but skyrocketed in the traditionally conservative and clientelistic Northeast region, home to over a fourth of the national population. Lula’s spike in the Northeast (henceforth NE) garnered much scholarly attention, but an important, simultaneous development

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went largely unnoticed: from the early to mid-2000s, at all levels of government, the PT improved more in the NE than nationally.

Lula’s spike resulted primarily from Bolsa Família (BF), a federal conditional cash transfer program implemented between the 2002 and 2006 elections that disproportionately benefited poor northeastern families. Northeastern beneficiaries and supporters of BF, however, overwhelmingly identified the program with Lula, not with the PT (Samuels 2006; Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008; Figueiredo and Hidalgo 2009; Singer 2009; Borges 2011). This article thus raises and examines the puzzle, what factors contributed to the PT’s electoral improvement in the NE—as distinct from Lula’s—during the early to mid-2000s?

The article demonstrates that local organization building, initiated and directed by the PT’s national office (Diretório Nacional), played a key role. Since the PT’s inception, the national party leadership has put a premium on grassroots organization building and has used its campaign infrastructure, brand, and financial resources to recruit members and stimulate the formation of permanent local party offices (Keck 1992). In the early 2000s, this trend continued. Capitalizing on a spike in party finances, a strengthening party label, and a national campaign infrastructure (all associated with the 2002 election preparations and aftermath), the PT national office set out to expand the PT’s membership base and local branch network and devoted considerable resources to this purpose. Through these efforts, the national leadership sought, in large part, to improve the PT’s performance in lower-level elections across Brazil.

The national office focused disproportionately on the NE, a region of historical weakness for the PT, both organizationally and electorally (Ribeiro 2010). Drawing from underutilized data, this article will demonstrate a strong and robust empirical relationship between the PT’s organizational expansion and lower-level vote share improvement in northeastern municipalities from the early to mid-2000s.

The article is organized in three main sections. The first section challenges the frequently expressed view that with increased access to mass media and other party substitutes, contemporary politicians lack electoral incentives to invest in party organization. It emphasizes that party organization can make a key difference in lower-level elections and that elites who seek lower-level electoral success therefore have incentives to invest in local infrastructure. The second section presents the empirical puzzle and hypothesis. Why, from the early to the mid-2000s, did the PT’s electoral performance, across levels of government, improve more in the Northeast than in Brazil as a whole?

This section first presents evidence that the conditional cash transfer program, Bolsa Família, does not correlate systematically with the lower-level PT’s vote share change in the NE from the early to mid-2000s. Then it shows that during the early 2000s, the PT national leadership, in order to achieve greater electoral success at lower levels of government, invested heavily in organization building across Brazil, disproportionately in the NE. It hypothesizes that the PT’s organizational expansion systematically correlates with increased electoral support for the lower-level PT in the NE from the early to mid-2000s. The third section confirms the hypothesis with
an empirical test, drawing from underutilized, municipal-level data on the PT organization. The conclusions also draw on emerging literature to argue that organizational strength, in addition to increasing parties’ electoral support, makes new parties more likely to survive in the long term.

**DOES PARTY ORGANIZATION STILL MATTER?**

This article defines organizational strength as a party’s infrastructural penetration of society: to the extent that parties possess territorially extensive networks of offices, activists, and members, they have strong organizations. Strong party organizations benefit vote-seeking elites. At the most basic level, organizationally strong parties have large memberships, and party members tend to be more likely than nonmembers to show up at the polls and support their party’s candidates.

What’s more, strong party organizations facilitate and strengthen on-the-ground electoral mobilization. Party activists do campaign work organizing rallies, going door to door distributing written information, and transporting people to polling booths, while local party offices provide financial, material, and logistical support for these activities. Local activist networks also enable patronage-based parties to channel resources to constituents more efficiently than they could otherwise (Zarazaga 2011; Levitsky 2003).

Strong organization provides parties with electorally valuable “legitimacy benefits”: a party’s membership statistics may be widely disseminated via mass media; a large membership may act as an effective symbolic representation of a party’s existing or target constituencies; a vibrant internal life may enhance perceptions in the wider electorate that the party in question is broad-based, participatory, and internally democratic. In all these ways, a strong organization can make a party more appealing to undecided voters, thus strengthening its electoral performance (Scarrow 1996, 42).

Yet building a strong party organization is time-consuming and labor-intensive. Party builders must recruit members and activists, establish local offices and communication systems, and secure financing for infrastructure, transportation, and staff salaries, often through membership dues and regular grassroots fundraising. Shefter (1994), in his examination of party formation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, stresses the difficulty of organization building, observing that party elites in the turn-of-the-twentieth-century United States and Europe could attract support more quickly and easily through the distribution of patronage: “to acquire popular support by distributing patronage ... can be accomplished far more rapidly and with far less difficulty than building a party organization from scratch” (35–36). Literature on contemporary parties emphasizes that mass media, like patronage resources, represent an easy substitute for organization building. Given the broad penetration of television, radio, and the Internet in most countries, contemporary political elites, instead of doing the slow, labor-intensive work of organization building, can link with millions of voters instantaneously and at relatively low cost through broadcast media appeals and advertisements.
Mass media, it is argued, have therefore changed the incentive structure for political elites. If elites have access to mass media, they will not have a strong incentive to invest in traditional organization. Describing contemporary electoral politics in Russia, Hale writes that “a political entrepreneur no longer needs a mass organization of the kind traditionally wielded by parties ... one simply needs enough money to purchase advertising time or a flair for obtaining coverage on television news” (2006, 242). Levitsky and Cameron similarly argue that mass media weaken Peruvian elite incentives for organization building: “As the success of media-based candidates ... suggests, contemporary politicians may reach millions of voters through television and may do so more quickly and at lower cost ... than through party organizations” (2003, 24). In the late 1980s, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, leader of Brazil’s PSDB, famously remarked that for Brazilian politicians, “a TV channel is worth more than a party” (Mainwaring 1999, 150).

The empirical record suggests that party organization has indeed declined in recent decades. In various regions, mass media have replaced party organization as the main instrument for winning and maintaining political office. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, media-based, personalistic political vehicles have proliferated in Russia (e.g., the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Fatherland–All Russia), but not a single organizationally strong party has emerged (Hale 2006, 66–68, 81–83). Katz observes that in contemporary Western Europe, “the party meeting, the party canvasser, [and] the party press” are “all supplanted in importance by the party leader speaking directly to his or her supporters on the small screen” (1990, 146). In South America during the 1990s, three of the most important new left parties, Colombia’s M19, Argentina’s FREPASO, and Chile’s PPD, rose to national prominence primarily through mass media appeals, lacking minimal party organizations (Boudon 2001; Abal Medina 1998; Plumb 1998).

In his successful 1988 bid for the Brazilian presidency, Fernando Collor de Mello, the “telepopulist,” depended largely on televised advertisements, appeals, and debate performances; his Party of National Reconstruction (PRN) lacked members, local structures, and lower-level candidates. Encapsulating such developments, Landi notes that in contemporary Latin America, “television, radio, and the media in general outstrip the intermediating function of the local party organization.... At the local level ... it is difficult to replace [party organization], given the current structure of the media” (1995, 211–12).

Yet arguments about the decline of party organization in the contemporary era should not be overstated. Due to several factors, the mass media have not eliminated electoral incentives for organization building. First, even when parties and candidates can use state resources and mass media to win votes, they may be able to secure additional votes (i.e., marginal electoral benefits) by pursuing additional electoral strategies, like organization building (Scarrow 1996, 36; Epstein 1980, 375). Second, organization building is electorally necessary for contemporary parties that originate outside of state structures and cannot use mass media to build electoral support. In recent decades, a number of major new parties, many born in opposition to authoritarian rule, have formed without significant access to state resources or
mass media. In Latin America, for example, Brazil’s PT, Mexico’s PRD, and Uruguay’s FA—three of the region’s enduring new left parties—emerged in opposition to authoritarian regimes and developed in hostile, closed media environments. All three parties, in order to build an initial support base, were compelled to invest heavily in local party infrastructure. Although no longer deprived of access to broadcast media today, these parties, for several reasons, continue to invest in organization and reap electoral benefits across levels of government (Van Dyck 2014).4

Third, and crucially for the purposes of the article, local party infrastructure often plays a decisive role in lower-level elections; that is, elections in which candidates can win by building local, geographically concentrated constituencies, as opposed to national or large subnational constituencies. To win presidential elections, gubernatorial elections, and mayoral elections in major cities, candidates typically need to acquire national or large subnational followings, but to win legislative elections at the national and subnational levels, as well as most mayoral elections, candidates can win with more local, territorially concentrated support bases. As a result, in lower-level elections, ground-level party workers can have face-to-face contact with a larger percentage of a candidate or party’s target constituency. Moreover, media-based campaigns tend to be less cost-efficient and more logistically difficult on a local scale, reducing the incentive for politicians and party elites to invest in media for small elections: “Television debates and advertisements are more easily planned (and, in the case of paid advertising, cheaper to produce) the fewer the locally based interests to which special appeals have to be made” (Ware 1992, 74). Due to the above factors, local party infrastructure is a particularly important asset for contemporary politicians and parties seeking electoral success in lower-level elections.

In sum, despite the growing role of mass media in contemporary politics, elite incentives for organization building have not disappeared, and under certain circumstances they remain strong. Local party structures continue to provide electoral benefits, and for contemporary parties that prioritize lower-level elections, as well as new parties that lack access to the media and state, local organization is vital. The next section presents evidence that party elites who seek lower-level electoral success will invest resources in local organization building, and that this investment will deliver electoral returns. In the early 2000s, the national leadership of Brazil’s PT, intending to strengthen the party’s performance in lower-level elections, invested heavily in building local infrastructure. The PT leadership stimulated the creation of local branches across Brazil, but disproportionately in the Northeast, which helps to explain why the PT, from the early to mid-2000s, systematically improved more in the Northeast than nationally.
THE EMPIRICAL PUZZLE AND HYPOTHESIS

Brazil is a consolidated democracy and emerging global power, now boasting the world’s sixth-largest economy. During the last decade, the center-left PT has firmly established its position as Brazil’s leading party, having retained the presidency in 2006 and 2010 after Lula da Silva’s first successful presidential bid in 2002. Given Brazil’s large size and increasing significance on the global stage, the PT is not just the most important new party in Latin America, but one of the most important new parties in the world.

Since the early 2000s, the PT has increasingly become a party of the Northeast. The Northeast is Brazil’s second most populous region after the Southeast, comprising nine states and, due to low population density, containing roughly a third of Brazil’s municipalities (more than any other region). The North and Northeast are Brazil’s poorest regions, with per capita GDPs roughly two times lower than those of the South and Central West and roughly three times lower than that of the Southeast. In the mid-2000s, the NE had a Human Development Index of 0.72, compared to 0.82 for the Central West and Southeast and 0.83 for the South.5

Largely due to high poverty levels, the NE is a historical stronghold for Brazil’s clientelistic parties and elites of the center and right (Montero 2010, 2012a, b; Borges 2011). Subnational patronage machines organized within the PL, PMDB, PFL (DEM), and PSDB have dominated state and local politics in the region since Brazil’s transition to democracy in 1985 (Borges 2011). In the Chamber of Deputies from 1986 to 2002, for example, the PFL, one of Brazil’s strongest right parties, averaged 19 percent of seats nationally but 33 percent in the NE. During the same period, the PT, Brazil’s main left-of-center party, averaged 10 percent of seats nationally but only 5 percent in the NE. In the 1989 presidential election, the conservative Fernando Collor de Mello defeated Lula by a wide margin in the NE, relying partly on the support of allied right-wing mayors with control over local patronage (Ames 1994).

The mid-2000s marked a watershed in the contemporary electoral history of the PT and the NE region. During this period, poor northeastern voters, on an unprecedented scale, rejected traditional clientelism and cast their ballots for the PT, a programmatic party of the left.6 Current scholarship on the PT in the NE focuses on the 2006 presidential election, in which Lula da Silva, the PT incumbent, won re-election because of a major electoral spike in the NE. This focus is understandable, given the relative magnitude of Lula’s improvement in the NE from 2002 to 2006. Lula lost vote share outside the Northeast—dropping from 47 to 43 percent, for example, in his traditional stronghold, the Southeast—but increased his vote share by nearly half in the Northeast, jumping from 46 to 67 percent. At no other level of government did the PT, during the mid-2000s, become so electorally dominant in the NE.

Nevertheless, from the early to mid-2000s, the PT, at all levels of government, improved more in the NE than in the nation as a whole (figure 1). From 2000 to 2004, the number of elected PT municipal councilors increased by roughly half...
nationally but nearly doubled in the NE, and the number of elected PT mayors roughly doubled nationally but more than tripled in the NE. From 2002 to 2006, the number of elected PT state deputies increased 3 percent in the NE, compared to a 14 percent decline nationally, and the number of elected PT federal deputies increased 35 percent in the NE, also compared to a national decline of 2 percent. At the gubernatorial level, the PT in the NE improved dramatically from 2002 to 2006: whereas in 2002 the PT fielded three winning gubernatorial candidates nationally, including one from the NE (Wellington Dias in Piauí), in 2006 the PT fielded five winning gubernatorial candidates nationally, with three coming from the NE (Wellington Dias in Piauí, Marcelo Deda Chagas in Sergipe, and Jaques Wagner in Bahia, the most populous state in the NE). Why, from the early to mid-2000s, did the PT improve more in the NE than in the country as a whole?

**Bolsa Família and Its Electoral Impact**

In 2003, during Lula’s first presidential term (2002–6), the Lula administration implemented Bolsa Família (BF), a conditional cash transfer program of unprecedented scope in Brazilian history, which is still in effect to the present day. BF provides monthly payments of US$60 or less to poor Brazilian families, and in exchange, the children of recipient families are required to attend public school and receive periodic vaccinations and health check-ups. BF was built on preexisting programs, the most important Bolsa Escola, a conditional cash transfer program pio-
neered by PSDB administrations in Campinas, São Paulo, and the Federal District during the mid-1990s and subsequently implemented at the federal level, in limited form, by the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) presidential administration (1995–2003). In 2003, the Lula administration massively expanded the cash transfers, added healthcare conditions, and renamed the program Bolsa Família. By late 2006, BF transfers reached 11 million poor families in Brazil, totaling over 40 million citizens; these figures make BF the largest conditional cash transfer program in the world. From the program’s inauguration to the present, BF has disproportionately benefited poor individuals and families living in the NE. Although home to roughly a quarter of the national population, northeastern households receive roughly half of Brazil’s monthly BF disbursements (IPEA n.d.).

By directly benefiting millions of poor recipients and stimulating poor local economies through increased consumer spending (Zucco 2013), BF created a large new constituency for the program, concentrated in the NE. Scholars agree that this constituency overwhelmingly credited Lula for BF and supported him for the first time in the 2006 presidential election (Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008, n.d.; Singer 2009; Hunter 2010). The members of Lula’s new constituency, by and large, did not become PT partisans or transfer their votes to “down-ticket” candidates of the PT and left allies (Hunter and Power 2007; Figueiredo and Hidalgo 2009; Singer 2009; Hunter 2010; Terron and Soares 2010; Montero 2010, 2012a; Zucco and Samuels n.d.). Evidence indicates that this divergence resulted partly from lack of political information; many northeastern voters associated BF with Lula but not with the PT (Figueiredo and Hidalgo 2009), and in some cases, non-PT state and local-level politicians successfully claimed credit for the program (Montero 2010). In addition, some poor northeastern voters may have chosen to maximize their own returns by accepting BF transfers from the PT, accepting state-level clientelistic transfers from other parties, and splitting their 2006 ballot accordingly (Montero 2010; see also Magaloni et al. 2007). Although the electoral bases of Lula and the PT diverged in the mid-2000s, there is also evidence that BF, by raising poor household incomes and thus partially disrupting conservative clientelistic networks, did lead to modest electoral increases for 2006 state-level PT candidates in the NE (Borges 2011).

Simple bivariate OLS tests yield results consistent with the current literature, indicating that in the NE, the relationship between the scope of 2006 BF transfers and municipal vote share change from 2002 to 2006 is positive and statistically significant not just for Lula, but for PT gubernatorial, federal legislative, and state legislative PT candidates as well. For Lula, as expected, the scope of BF has a much larger modeled effect in absolute substantive terms; the BF coefficient for Lula exceeds the BF coefficients for lower-level PT candidates by multiples ranging from six (for PT gubernatorial candidates) to ten (for PT federal legislative candidates). Figure 2 presents this striking result visually, each plot illustrating the bivariate relationship between municipal vote share change for the PT from the early to mid-2000s in northeastern municipalities (y axis) and monthly BF disbursements per 100 households in the latter, mid-2000s election cycle (x axis).
Although the absolute modeled effect of BF is much greater for Lula than for the lower-level PT, there is also much more electoral improvement to be explained for Lula; as stated above, from the early to mid-2000s in the NE, Lula improved much more than the lower-level PT, increasing his regional vote share by a staggering 21 percent (i.e., from 46 percent in 2002 to 67 percent in 2006). Even in proportional terms, however, BF explains much more variation in vote share change for Lula ($r = 0.41$) than for the lower-level PT; at the gubernatorial, federal legislative, and state legislative levels, the linear fit is substantially weaker ($0.06 < r < 0.1$).

Furthermore, for PT mayoral and municipal council candidates, who made considerable electoral gains from 2000 to 2004 (as shown in figure 1), the bivariate relationship between the scope of 2004 BF transfers and 2000–2004 municipal vote share change is statistically insignificant ($0.17 < p < 0.24$). Figure 3 presents plots for the mayoral and municipal council elections.

In sum, BF has a relatively weak modeled effect on the PT’s lower-level improvement in the 2006 federal and state elections and a statistically insignificant effect on improvement in the 2004 municipal elections. Separate OLS tests estimating Lula’s coattail effects yield similar results, both statistically and substantively.\textsuperscript{11}
In light of these results, the question arises, what separate factors might have contributed systematically to the PT’s lower-level gains in the NE?

The PT’s Territorial Penetration of the Northeast

The classic literature on the PT emphasizes the party’s organizational strength and vitality during the formative years (Meneguello 1989; Keck 1992). Yet few scholars have noted the party’s top-down organizational expansion since 2000. Literature on the PT’s recent electoral performance in the NE thus overlooks the role of party organization (but see Ribeiro 2010; Zucco and Samuels forthcoming).

Between the early and mid-2000s, the Lula administration implemented BF, but a separate and important development occurred simultaneously: the PT achieved territorial penetration of Brazil, strengthening its organizational presence across the country and disproportionately in the NE. According to Panebianco’s original definition, territorial penetration, as distinct from territorial diffusion, “occurs when the center ... leads ... the formation of local ... party associations. Territorial diffusion occurs when ... local elites construct party associations which are only later integrated into a national organization” (Panebianco 1988, 50). For the purposes of the article, the penetration-diffusion distinction matters because territorial diffusion is typically endogenous to local electoral factors. In cases of territorial diffusion, local party activist networks, instead of producing viable local candidates, tend to form around preexisting ones. In cases of territorial penetration, the party’s central leadership attempts to strengthen the party organization in areas where offices and membership networks have not sprouted spontaneously. Territorial penetration thus tends to be more exogenous to electoral factors.

Unlike the PT’s more recent organizational expansion, its expansion in the 1980s and 1990s occurred via diffusion. Infrastructural growth during this period
did not result from the top-down material and logistical support of the PT’s Diretório Nacional. Instead, it was decentralized and spontaneous, led by “distinct party elites in different regions, without the presence of a strong center in charge of expansion” (Ribeiro 2010, 251–52, author’s translation). Through territorial diffusion, the PT, by 1993, had established a municipal office or committee in 44 percent of Brazil’s municipalities, and by 2000 in 75 percent of them (Ribeiro 2010, 24).

The PT’s territorial diffusion occurred primarily, but not exclusively, in Brazil’s large urban centers, home to the party’s core feeder organizations and constituencies (e.g., unions, Catholic grassroots communities, Marxist networks, middle-class progressives). Of Brazil’s roughly 5,500 municipalities, the NE contains almost 2,000, over half of which possess fewer than 10,000 inhabitants (Ribeiro 2010, 248). Due to the high proportion of small, rural municipalities in the NE and the historical clout of conservative, clientelistic machines in the region (Montero 2010; Borges 2011), the PT’s organizational diffusion left much of the NE untouched during the 1980s and 1990s. As of 2001, the PT’s presence was weakest in the NE, whether measured as the percentage of PT members in the population or the percentage of municipalities with a local PT branch (Ribeiro 2010, 240, 242, 248).

Endemic poverty and clientelism make local party infrastructure especially important for opposition parties in the NE. As the mid-2000s approached, the PT had little access to state and local patronage resources in the region. In the 2000 municipal elections, the PT elected a lower percentage of mayors in the NE than in any other Brazilian region (data from Nicolau n.d.). In the 2002 state elections, the PT elected only one northeastern governor, in the small state of Piauí. Residents of poor northeastern communities tend to have limited political information and depend on public handouts for their material well-being (Montero 2012a). To make electoral inroads in the NE, parties without strong local patron-client networks, like the PT, need local operatives who can travel deep into the interior, schedule events, hold meetings, claim credit for policies, and actively encourage individuals to support a candidate or ticket. Party infrastructure is most effective for unseating local elites (e.g., mayors, state legislators) in the NE. Politicians with smaller, geographically concentrated support bases are more vulnerable than state- and national-level elites to locally organized opposition parties (Montero 2012c), and mass media play a less dominant role in the lower-level elections, leaving more room for local organization to affect electoral outcomes (Ribeiro 2012).

After 20 years of organizational weakness in the NE, the PT, in the early 2000s (especially 2003–4), leveraged its financial resources, party brand, and 2002 campaign organization to penetrate the region from the top down. Before the 2002 presidential election, the PT had developed a massive “ground operation” and also, for the first time, had made an open, concerted, national effort to court the business community and solicit corporate contributions (Ribeiro 2010, 108–9). Consequently, corporate donations spiked, and the PT’s financial situation dramatically improved. In 2001, overall party revenue increased by more than 20 percent from the previous year (Ribeiro 2010, 111). Between 2000 and 2004, corporate contributions to the PT quadrupled (Ribeiro 2010, 108).
The PT’s financial situation improved even further following Lula’s 2002 victory. The party’s internal statutes mandate that all party members with public sector positions, elected or unelected, contribute 30 percent of their salary to the party. When the PT assumed control of the federal executive branch in January 2003, the party began to receive a huge yearly influx of salary contributions (contribuições estatutárias) from petistas who had received appointments in the federal bureaucracy. With significant financial resources at its disposal and a national campaign infrastructure to build on, the Diretório Nacional, controlled by the moderate tendência, Campo Majoritário, embarked on a “centralized project … to establish roots in the regions with the weakest PT presence.” The northeastern states, in addition to Tocantins, Goiás, and Mato Grosso, were the main targets of this effort (Ribeiro 2010, 245, author’s translation).

In September 2003, the PT’s top-down organizational push began in earnest. Lula’s presidential victory had increased the PT’s national visibility and given a major boost to the party brand (Ribeiro 2010, 243). Capitalizing on the party’s rising popularity, the office of the national secretary of organization, Sílvio Pereira, launched a yearlong, nationwide membership drive (campanha de filiação).

The timing of the drive (late 2003 to mid-2004) reflected the Campo Majoritário’s lower-level electoral motivations. Municipal elections were to be held in October 2004, and the PT leadership, by recruiting new members and stimulating the creation of new branches in the preceding months, sought to broaden the PT’s participation in the elections and thereby to strengthen the party’s presence in municipal government (Ribeiro 2010, 243–45).

The PT national leadership prioritized local organization and elections partly because of the institutional context. Brazilian federal law prohibits parties from fielding municipal council or mayoral candidates unless local party members hold a nominating convention (Ribeiro 2010). Although this law is often “papered over” or violated, the formal requirement provides at least some incentive for parties with municipal electoral designs to build genuine local party structures. Furthermore, open-list PR and the nonconcurrence of municipal and higher-level elections make Brazilian voters more likely to focus on local issues, not national issues, during local elections. As a consequence, parties benefit from having local activists and local politicians who can draw explicit links between their national and subnational candidates. In addition, Brazil’s federal system gives significant autonomy to local and state governments, furnishing opportunities for Brazilian parties to “scale up” through subnational programmatic experimentation and brand building.

To maximize the impact of the voting drive, the PT national office created an Internet site and toll-free phone service to collect the contact information of prospective members. The party leadership intended to attract both newcomers and former PT members (petistas históricos): “The goal was to reach 700,000 members between the end of 2003 and the middle of 2004” (Ribeiro 2010, 243, author’s translation). The membership drive succeeded. PT records indicate that between 2001 and 2005, party membership quadrupled from roughly 200,000 to 800,000, and local branch penetration (i.e., the presence of a DM or CPM) increased from...
75 to 93 percent of Brazilian municipalities. A disproportionate share of the expansion occurred in the NE (Ribeiro 2010, 248). From 2001 to 2005, the number of PT municipal branches increased by 40 percent in Brazil as a whole, but by over 75 percent in the Northeast.15

Through the organizational efforts of the Campo Majoritário in the early 2000s, the PT achieved territorial penetration, as distinct from diffusion, for the first time: “Processes totally led from the center ... with the deliberate intention to stimulate the formation of local branches only took off in the era of the Campo Majoritário” (Ribeiro 2010, 251–52, author’s translation). This result suggests that the PT’s organizational expansion during the early to mid-2000s was largely exogenous to local electoral conditions and prospects. The empirical analysis of PT organizational expansion and electoral improvement in this study explicitly checks for endogeneity by controlling for a series of variables that, according to recent research (Zucco and Samuels forthcoming) and my own extensions of this research, might confound the relationship between the PT’s organization and electoral performance.

**THE EVIDENCE**

Did the PT’s territorial penetration of the NE produce electoral gains? This section presents evidence that it did, demonstrating a strong, robust empirical relationship between the PT’s organizational expansion in the NE during the early 2000s and the party’s municipal vote share improvement across lower levels of government in the mid-2000s.

**Organizational Data and Measurement**

In the early 2000s, the PT created up-to-date, centralized records of its organizational size. Historically, the PT national headquarters had not kept records of the numbers of local PT branches in existence, the number of members in each branch, or the time of branches’ founding. Brazil’s Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) had kept such records, but the TSE’s figures were simply sums of all the individuals who had become PT members at some point in the party’s history; the TSE made no distinction between active and “historical” members (Ribeiro 2010, 239).

In 1999, the PT held its second congress, during which the Campo Majoritário spearheaded the passage of a party statute instituting biannual direct elections (PEDs) of the party leadership at all levels, to begin in 2001. Before the implementation of PEDs, the PT organization’s leaders had been selected by local, directly elected party delegates. The imminent prospect of direct member elections provided incentives for the PT’s national leadership to develop precise estimates of the party organization’s size for the first time (Ribeiro 2010, 274).

Between 1999 and 2001, the PT national headquarters centralized the membership registration process and updated the PT’s membership estimates through a national “reregistration” drive (recadastramento). To prevent fraud and detect repetitions and inconsistencies in preparation for the first PED, the national headquar-
ters mandated that all PT members obtain a national membership card (Carteira Nacional de Filiação) and that their information be recorded in a central database in the office of the secretary of organization. As a result of the reregistration drive, the PT’s internal membership estimates, by 2001, had been revised downward from approximately seven hundred thousand to two hundred thousand. Since 2001, these estimates have risen substantially, accurately reflecting the organizational expansion that has occurred during the last decade (Ribeiro 2010, 242–4). The PT’s updated, centralized records have enabled researchers, for the first time, to perform municipal-level, large-N research on the relationship between local organization and electoral performance. Yet to date, very few researchers have used the PT’s organizational data for this purpose.

The PT’s organizational data indicate, by northeastern municipality, whether PEDs were held in 2001 and 2005. Forming a local branch—either a DM or a CPM—is a precondition for holding a PED. The PED data therefore were used to determine, by northeastern municipality, whether the PT possessed a local branch in 2001 and 2005. I coded organizational expansion as a binary dummy variable: if a municipality did not possess a PT branch in 2001 or 2005, I coded it as zero and described it as having no branch before 2005; if a municipality contained a branch in 2005 but not in 2001, I coded it as 1 and described it as having built a branch between 2001 and 2005. Three hundred and twenty northeastern municipalities received a 0 while 652 received a 1. Of the 834 remaining northeastern municipalities, the vast majority (783) had branches in 2001 and 2005; a small minority (36) had branches in 2001 but not in 2005; and for 15 municipalities, the data were insufficient to provide a score. To isolate the effect of building local branches, I only compared 0’s and 1’s, excluding the remaining 834 municipalities from all regressions and plots.

The PT did not hold a PED cycle in 2003. Otherwise, the article would have examined the effect of local branch construction during the time period 2003–2005 rather than 2001–2005. The vast majority of the branches built between 2001 and 2005, however, formed in 2003 and early 2004, during the mass membership drive. Therefore, the article treats the construction of these branches as an “intervention” between both the October 2000 and 2004 municipal elections and the October 2002 and 2006 federal and state elections.

Data Analysis

As a first approximation of the relationship between the PT’s organizational expansion and municipal vote share change, figure 4 presents six simple bivariate plots. In each plot are two columns of observations. The left column contains all northeastern municipalities in which the PT possessed no branch before 2005, and the right column contains all northeastern municipalities in which the PT built a branch between 2001 and 2005. The y axis measures the PT’s percent change in northeastern municipal vote share for the 2002–6 federal and state elections (left and center plots, respectively) and 2000–2004 municipal elections (right plots). The solid hor-
Figure 4. PT Municipal Vote Share Change Against Organizational Expansion in NE
horizontal segments mark the mean percentage changes in municipal vote share for both columns of observations in all six plots.

The plots illustrate that at the four lowest levels of government—federal and state legislative, mayoral, and municipal legislative—organizational expansion between the early and mid-2000s is associated with substantially higher municipal vote share change. In northeastern municipalities where the PT built a branch between 2001 and 2005, mean vote share change was 2.2 percent greater at the municipal council level, 3.3 percent greater at the mayoral level, 1.8 percent greater at the state legislative level (2002–6), and 2.2 percent greater at the state legislative level, with a very high degree of statistical significance in all four cases (p < .001). At the gubernatorial level, mean vote share change was marginally higher (0.9 percent) in municipalities where branches formed, but the bivariate relationship is statistically insignificant (p = .64). At the presidential level, mean vote share change was 2.9 percent lower in municipalities where a branch formed, with a high degree of statistical significance (p < .01).

To what extent do these empirical relationships hold if we control for potential confounding variables? Although driven by the national party elite, the creation of local PT branches in the NE during the early 2000s could still have been partially endogenous to municipal-level factors that affected the party’s municipal vote share change from the early to mid-2000s. In particular, the national leadership might have targeted municipalities in which the PT seemed to have electoral potential. To minimize the risk of endogeneity, I controlled—where possible—for potential confounders, including variables that we might expect national PT leaders to take into account if they were choosing municipalities on the basis of their potential receptivity to the PT.21

Zucco and Samuels (forthcoming) find that in the 2000s, the PT national office tended to invest in branch building where municipal civil society density was higher.22 I replicated Zucco and Samuels’s logit regression for northeastern municipalities and found comparable results (see table 2 in the appendix).23 I thereby controlled for civil society density, using Zucco and Samuels’s operationalization.24 I also controlled for municipal HDI (log), scope of BF, prior PT vote share (for state and federal elections), the gain or loss of PT mayors and governors between elections, distance to the capital city of the relevant state (log), and the proportional size of the Pentecostal (log) and nonwhite populations.25

For each of the six levels of government, I drew one thousand simulations (King et al. 2000) from an OLS model regressing municipal vote share change on local branch formation, with the above controls held at their means. In short, the tests estimated the average difference in mean vote share change between municipalities where a branch was created between 2001 and 2005 and municipalities where no branch existed before 2005, all else equal.

For the federal legislative, state legislative, mayoral, and municipal council elections, the estimated effect of branch formation on municipal vote share change remained positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The model estimated a 1.6 percent increase at the federal legislative level, a 1.8 percent increase at
the state legislative level, a 2.9 percent increase at the mayoral level, and a 3.5 percent increase at the municipal council level. At the gubernatorial level, the estimate remained insignificant (p = .38) and, at the presidential level, became insignificant (p = .86). Table 1 presents these results, and figure 5 illustrates them visually. (The full results of the linear regressions are presented in the appendix, table 3.)

The above results strongly indicate that party organization matters for electoral performance. The PT’s organizational investment in the NE paid off in lower-level elections, where the estimated effect of establishing a branch ranged from roughly 2 percent in the federal and state legislative elections to almost 4 percent in the municipal council elections. My statistical model also provides suggestive evidence of an effect at the gubernatorial level; the estimated effect is positive and substantial but not statistically significant. The model provides no evidence of an effect at the presidential level. The latter results suggest that in the larger executive elections from 2002 to 2006, especially the presidential elections, the dominant role of mass media left less “room” for an organizational effect.

**CONCLUSIONS: ORGANIZATION AND NEW PARTY SURVIVAL**

Through an in-depth analysis of the PT, this article has argued that party organization delivers substantial electoral benefits in lower-level elections, and that politicians and party elites who seek lower-level electoral success therefore retain incentives to invest in party organization. In the early 2000s, the PT national leadership, seeking to strengthen the party’s representation at lower levels of government, stimulated the creation of local PT branches across Brazil, and disproportionately in the Northeast. Evidence indicates that this organizational expansion contributed systematically to the lower-level PT’s electoral gains in the NE from the early to mid-2000s.

Party organization affects more than electoral performance. New research on Latin America demonstrates that local organization makes new parties more durable (Cyr 2012; Van Dyck 2014). In recent decades, numerous new parties and politicians in Latin America have built large electoral constituencies and become serious contenders for national power through mass media appeals alone. Because these par-
ties’ elite founders enjoyed access to mass media, they did not have a strong incentive to invest in organization, and their parties rose to prominence without even minimal organization.

Parties with weak organization depend primarily or exclusively on their reputation in the national electorate, built on the rhetoric and actions of party elites in or out of government. As a result, they are ill-equipped to survive electoral disappointments and setbacks. If they fail to establish a positive reputation in the electorate, or if their once-positive reputation becomes tarnished, perhaps due to weak performance in government or the emergence of a strong competitor, they have no activist networks to fall back on and are therefore more likely to fold. In organizationally strong parties, party elites, amid electoral disappointments and even crises, can fall back on party activist networks. Argentina’s FREPASO and Colombia’s M-19, two major media-based new left parties in Latin America, possessed almost no infrastructure when they suffered early electoral crises—FREPASO in the early 2000s, the M-19 in the early 1990s—and both folded soon afterward. In contrast, organizationally strong Latin American parties like Mexico’s PRI and PRD and Peru’s APRA have survived major electoral setbacks and crises through the persistence of party activist networks in regional strongholds (Van Dyck 2014).

The current literature overlooks or understates the importance of party organization to contemporary politics. Although the costs of organization building are
high, the benefits of organizational strength, in terms of electoral performance and long-term survival, are higher. Party builders should heed this lesson.

**APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL MEASUREMENTS**

Table 2. Determinants of Local Branch Construction in the NE Between 2001 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society density (binary)</td>
<td>.440</td>
<td>(.15)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to capital</td>
<td>-.199</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>-1.41</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitting PT governor</td>
<td>-.123</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Presidential vote share</td>
<td>-1.42</td>
<td>(.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Federal legislative vote share</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>(2.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Gubernatorial vote share</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>(.78)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 State legislative vote share</td>
<td>9.54</td>
<td>(3.18)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 912

*** p < .001, ** p < .01

Source: Zucco and Samuels 2012b
Table 3. OLS Regressions of Municipal Vote Share Change on Branch Creation, with Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.005**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lula 2002</td>
<td>-.732</td>
<td>.035***</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>.099*</td>
<td>-.061</td>
<td>.025*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT gubernatorial 2002</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>.035***</td>
<td>-.467</td>
<td>.082***</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>.025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT federal leg. 2002</td>
<td>-.100</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.746</td>
<td>.214***</td>
<td>-.577</td>
<td>.074***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT state leg. 2002</td>
<td>-.385</td>
<td>.099***</td>
<td>-.370</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT governor gained</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>.011***</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.021***</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>.008**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT mayor gained</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.005***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.064</td>
<td>.016***</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to capital (log)</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.011***</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolsa Familia 2006</td>
<td>.349</td>
<td>.037***</td>
<td>-.141</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI (log)</td>
<td>-.115</td>
<td>.043**</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.001***</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal (log)</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
NOTES

The author gratefully acknowledges Juliana Ricci for her assistance in data collection and Jorge Domínguez, Steve Levitsky, Fran Hagopian, Al Montero, three anonymous reviewers, and the members of Harvard’s Comparative Politics Workshop for comments on earlier drafts of this article.

1. Ware 1992 advances a similar argument.

2. Mass media also change ordinary citizens’ incentives. In the current era of widespread media use, party membership has become less essential for individuals seeking political information or channels of communication with elites. Furthermore, there is evidence that broadcast media consumption causes individuals to disengage from civil society; e.g., local party organizations (Putnam 1995, 678–80). Katz also finds evidence of these effects, identifying a strong inverse relationship between individuals’ TV and radio consumption and party membership (Katz 1990, 157).

3. The assumption that parties are unitary, vote-seeking actors does not always hold. Certain parties might prioritize large memberships for nonelectoral reasons; and within parties, competing elites may have individual incentives to recruit members, independently of whether the party as a whole would benefit electorally from increased membership (Scarrow 1996, 36).

4. What factors cause such parties to continue investing in organization? Organizational strength continues to provide marginal electoral benefits that elites may value. Organizational maintenance and expansion become easier over time; leaders and activists accumulate party-building experience, and electoral success improves parties’ financial situation through increased state funding and outside contributions. The initial period of organization building gives rise to internal constituencies that benefit materially, socially, and psychologically from the party organization and that press for its maintenance or expansion. The parties may develop an internal culture in which elites value the party organization for its own sake and continue to invest in organization regardless of the electoral benefits (Van Dyck 2014). Finally, party leaders, having already paid the sunk costs of infrastructural penetration, may choose to continue investing in organization even as the electoral benefits decrease.

5. The HDI index is a composite of economic, health, and educational indices, commonly used as an indicator of economic development.

6. This article defines clientelism as the individualized, contingent exchange of benefits for votes (Stokes 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2006), and it follows Magaloni et al. (2007) in classifying national conditional cash transfer programs as nonclientelistic, given that criteria for the receipt of transfers are set at the national level and involve individuals’ income levels, not their votes. Although subnational politicians in Brazil have frequently claimed credit for Bolsa Família transfers (Montero 2010; Van Dyck and Montero forthcoming), they have little to no control over actual disbursements (Fried 2012). Bolsa Família thus qualifies as a programmatic policy and does not undermine this article’s characterization of the PT as a programmatic party. In stating publicly that a PT loss in the 2010 presidential election would lead to the discontinuation of Bolsa Família, Lula may have engaged in economic populism (compare Dornbusch and Edwards 1991) but not in traditional clientelism. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising these issues.

7. Also in 2006, left-wing gubernatorial candidates allied with—but not belonging to—the PT defeated conservative incumbents in the large northeastern states of Ceará and Maranhão.

8. Evidence indicates that BF supporters also transferred their support to Lula’s handpicked successor, Dilma Rousseff, in 2010 (Zucco n.d.; Montero 2012a).
9. In 2002, the PT fielded gubernatorial candidates in all nine northeastern states, but in 2006, the PT backed non-PT candidates in four northeastern states, fielding PT candidates in only five states: Alagoas, Bahia, Pernambuco, Piauí, and Sergipe. Only in these five states could vote share change be measured, and thus, municipalities in Ceará, Maranhão, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Norte were excluded from the gubernatorial multiple regression sample. This probably accounts for the lower degree of statistical significance (p < .06) in the gubernatorial regression. Household data obtained from the public IBGE; BF data obtained from IPEA.

10. In the presidential and gubernatorial plots (top left and center), the residuals distribute normally, indicating that the OLS model is appropriate for the data. In the remaining plots, the residuals do not distribute normally, indicating that a nonlinear model might be more appropriate. The current aim, however, is to gain a rough sense of the bivariate relationship between BF transfers and electoral outcomes, not to construct a detailed model of this relationship.

11. To test for coattail effects, I ran OLS regressions of the PT’s vote share change at lower levels on Lula’s vote share change. Coefficients, p-values, and r-values were similar at all lower levels.

12. In 1995, the Campo Majoritário won internal PT elections and took control of the party’s National Executive Committee.

13. Tocantins is a state in Brazil’s North region; Goiás and Mato Grosso are states in Brazil’s Central-West region.

14. For the observations on open-list PR and federalism, I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer.

15. In Brazil, the number of Brazilian municipalities with a DM or CPM increased from 2,593 to 3,634 (Zucco and Samuels forthcoming). Using the PT’s own dataset, I calculated that in the Northeast, the number increased from 819 to 1,435.

16. Each PED cycle, in turn, has aided the national leadership in information gathering, providing exact figures on the number of PED participants in each local branch every two years.

17. See Ribeiro 2010 and Zucco and Samuels forthcoming for notable exceptions. Ribeiro 2010 finds suggestive evidence of an empirical relationship between the PT’s organizational expansion and electoral improvement in the NE during the mid-2000s. At the national level, Zucco and Samuels find evidence of a strong, robust relationship between the PT’s organizational expansion and electoral improvement in federal legislative elections.

18. Zucco and Samuels (forthcoming) take a similar approach at the national level.

19. From 2001 to 2003, the PT membership increased from two hundred thousand to four hundred thousand, but in a conversation with the author, Ribeiro surmised that most of this occurred in 2003, after the mass membership drive had been launched.

20. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for stressing this possibility. As detailed in the main text, I incorporated several controls into my OLS models in order to minimize the risk of endogeneity. I would add, however, that even if the national office did target municipalities where the party seemed to have more potential, the PT’s top-down branch building still activated that potential (or so I presume). Thus, in my view, if the reviewer’s hypothetical were correct, my argument would remain intact.

21. Ideally, I would control for the PT’s local media access in my regressions. To my knowledge, no good indicator of the PT’s local media access currently exists. I intend in future research to create such an indicator using community radio data. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
22. In the only existing quantitative study of the determinants of PT municipal branch formation during the early to mid-2000s, Zucco and Samuels (forthcoming) model municipal branch formation as a function of civil society density, distance from the state capital, economic development (HDI), the presence of a sitting governor from 2002 to 2006, and the PT’s 2002 vote share at the presidential and federal legislative levels. Zucco and Samuels find that civil society presence has a positive, statistically significant modeled effect at the national level, implying that the PT, in choosing where to build local offices during the 2000s, targeted municipalities “where civil society was already well organized” (29). They also find that the PT’s 2002 vote shares in the presidential and federal legislative elections have a positive, statistically significant modeled effect. This suggests that the PT’s organizational efforts were more likely to succeed where the party recorded a stronger performance in 2002.

23. I replicated Zucco and Samuels’s (forthcoming) logit regression for northeastern municipalities, adding controls for the PT’s vote share in the 2002 gubernatorial and state legislative elections. Civil society presence has roughly the same modeled effect on the likelihood of municipal branch formation, in statistical and substantive terms, and 2002 PT vote shares at the gubernatorial and state legislative levels—rather than the presidential and federal legislative levels—also have a positive, statistically significant modeled effect.

24. As in the model favored by Zucco and Samuels (forthcoming), I operationalize civil society presence as a binary dummy. Using 2002 NGO data from the IBGE, Zucco and Samuels give a 1 to municipalities with one or more NGO employees and a 0 to the rest. I do the same for northeastern municipalities.

25. Ames finds that sitting mayors, particularly in the NE, helped Fernando Collor win the 1989 presidential election (Ames 1994). Zucco, in his municipal-level analysis of the 2006 Brazilian presidential election, incorporates dummy controls indicating whether PT mayors and governors were in office during the 2006 election (Zucco 2008). In his analysis of Lula’s performance in the 2006 presidential elections, Zucco controls for nonwhites and Pentecostals, citing both groups’ low socioeconomic status, Lula’s emphasis on racial inequality during his first presidential term, and the fact that Lula’s running mate, in 2002 and 2006, was a Pentecostal (Zucco 2008, 37).

26. The gubernatorial estimate increased from 0.9 percent to 1.3 percent, the presidential estimate from –2.9 percent to 0.1 percent.

27. Federal law requiring local nominating conventions for municipal government candidates contributed to the particularly large estimated effects of organizational expansion for PT mayoral and municipal council candidates. In a small number of northeastern municipalities, the PT fielded mayoral or municipal council candidates in the 2000 municipal elections without reporting a local branch in 2001; this occurred either because no nominating convention was held in 2000 (in violation of the law), or because the participants in the 2000 convention did not form a longer-term branch. In most of the relevant northeastern municipalities, however, the PT, if it did not report a local branch in 2001, also did not participate in the 2000 municipal elections. Thus, in general, the establishment of a local branch between mid-2003 and mid-2004 enabled the PT, in 2004, to compete in the municipal elections for the first time.
REFERENCES


