Why New Parties Split: The Schism of Peru’s United Left in Comparative Perspective

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Abstract. Why do new parties split? Scholars of new party schisms shy away from leadership-centred explanations for fear of excessive voluntarism and thus fail to conceptualise differences between leaders systematically. This article challenges that trend, arguing that externally appealing, internally dominant leaders generate cohesion in new parties. It analyses why some externally appealing leaders are internally dominant, while others are not, and argues that this variation can make the difference between schism and survival. The article supports its argument through a representative case study: the fatal (and consequential) schism of Peru’s United Left coalition in the late 1980s.

Keywords: political parties, Latin America, cohesion, leadership, theory construction

Introduction

The vast majority of new political parties die. Nevertheless, existing scholarship largely ignores unsuccessful cases of party-building and focuses on the small number of success stories. This selection on the dependent variable is

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2 For example, scholars have written hundreds of book-length studies on successful new parties in Latin America but only a few such studies on unsuccessful cases. See Brandon Van Dyck,
problematic: without understanding why some new parties fail, we cannot fully understand why others succeed.

Schisms — defined as the defection of a major leader or faction — are a common cause of new party failure.\(^3\) New parties typically lack strong brands, which in established parties raise the electoral cost of exit, thus discouraging elite defection. They also tend to lack institutionalised procedures for conflict adjudication. Consequently, low cohesion is the Achilles’ heel of many new parties: parties often split shortly after creation, and when they do, they usually fail. Recently in Latin America, numerous prominent new parties have fatally split: Venezuela’s La Causa Radical (Radical Cause, LCR), which attained prominence in the early 1990s; Guatemala’s Partido de Avanzada Nacional (National Advancement Party, PAN), which won the presidency in 1995; Colombia’s Partido Verde Colombiano (Colombian Green Party, PVC), which finished second in the 2010 presidential election; Argentina’s third most successful party in the 1980s, Unión del Centro Democrático (Union of the Democratic Centre, UCEDE); and Peru’s leading Left coalition in the 1980s, Izquierda Unida (United Left, IU).

But schisms are far from inevitable in heterogeneous new parties. Many new parties avoid or survive schisms, often despite deep divisions. Take, again, recently emerged Latin American parties. More than a dozen survived intact and took root, including several highly factionalised ones: Brazil’s Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, PT), El Salvador’s Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, FMLN) and Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance, ARENA), Chile’s Unión Democrática Independiente (Independent Democratic Union, UDI), Mexico’s Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution, PRD), and Nicaragua’s Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front, FSLN).\(^4\)

What explains this variation? Recent research has shed important light on the determinants of new party schisms. Although scholars have long held that parties rely on patronage to prevent defection,\(^5\) recent scholarship argues that

\(^{3}\) Levitsky et al., ‘Introduction: Challenges of Party-Building’.

patronage does not generate robust cohesion, as patronage seekers may ‘jump ship’ amid electoral crisis.\(^6\) Patronage-based cohesion is especially fragile in new parties, which typically have weak brands and are thus susceptible to electoral crisis.\(^7\) Recent analyses thus emphasise the importance of getting ‘beyond patronage’,\(^8\) arguing that new parties are less vulnerable to schism if they have alternative, or ‘non-material’,\(^9\) sources of cohesion such as a shared ideology\(^10\) or esprit de corps generated by conflict.\(^11\)

This article contributes to the emerging scholarship on new party cohesion by highlighting an understudied, undertheorised variable: the role of the party leader. Scholars of party-building tend to shy away from leadership-centred explanations for fear of excessive voluntarism and therefore fail to conceptualise differences between leaders systematically. Those who do focus on the role of leaders tend to view dominant or charismatic political leaders as impediments to successful party-building.\(^12\) This article challenges both trends, arguing that externally appealing, internally dominant leaders generate cohesion in new parties.

How does this argument work? A striking proportion of electorally successful new parties owe their success to an externally appealing leader.\(^13\) But external appeal, by itself, does not make a leader dominant within his party. Internal dominance requires additional sources of internal power, namely moral

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\(^{8}\) Many patronage-based new parties in Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama and elsewhere suffered debilitating schisms during the third wave. See, for example, Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

\(^{9}\) Levitsky and Way, ‘Beyond Patronage’.

\(^{10}\) Stephen Hanson, Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).


\(^{13}\) Levitsky et al., ‘Introduction: Challenges of Party-Building’.
authority, cross-factional ties, and ideological representativeness. Thus, whereas some externally appealing leaders are internally dominant, others are not. This variation can make the difference between schism and survival. Externally appealing, internally dominant leaders do not merely provide coat-tails, which discourage elite defection; they facilitate collective decision-making and conflict resolution, and, because of their pre-eminence, they seldom have incentives to defect. Leaders who are not internally dominant, no matter how externally appealing, are less capable of facilitating collective decision-making and conflict resolution, and because of the limitations on their internal power, they are more liable to defect. The consequences of such defections for fledgling parties can be harmful, even fatal.

The article demonstrates this argument’s causal mechanisms at work in the ‘typical’, or ‘representative’, case of Peru’s IU. The collapse of IU was a consequential political event in Peru, and the article’s empirical contribution is to shed new light on this previously studied event through an application of the above theoretical argument. The case study illustrates how a new party with numerous assets and advantages, IU, can fatally splinter due to the presence of an electorally indispensable leader who is not internally dominant (i.e., Alfonso Barrantes). It argues, more specifically, that Alfonso Barrantes’s weak cross-factional ties, lack of moral authority and low ideological representativeness limited his power within IU, especially during the second half of the 1980s; that his lack of internal dominance led to his defection; and that, because he was electorally indispensable, his defection resulted in IU’s collapse.

The case study draws on interviews with IU members and scholars, archival materials, and underutilised secondary literature in Spanish. These information sources provide otherwise hard-to-obtain case details, both

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15 During a five-week trip to Lima, Peru, I conducted interviews with 14 IU members and one scholar who was not an IU member but has researched IU in depth (Martín Tanaka). In this article, I cite interviews with seven of those individuals: six IU members (Javier Diez Canseco, Henry Pease, Aldo Panfichi, Santiago Pedraglio, Mario Munive, Antonio Zapata) and the aforementioned Martín Tanaka.

16 I found the archives of the left-leaning La República particularly useful. See below.

17 Here, I refer especially to Guillermo Herrera, Izquierda Unida y el Partido Comunista (Lima: Tرمil, 2002). Herrera, Izquierda Unida is a factual and painstakingly detailed account of IU’s genesis, development and fatal split. Many of the highest-quality sources on IU were written before the publication of Herrera, Izquierda Unida, including Maxwell Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru: Political Coalitions and Social Change (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); Kenneth Roberts, Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Martín Tanaka, Los espejismos de la democracia. El colapso del sistema de partidos en el Perú (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1998). However, see Alberto Adriánzén (ed.), Apogeo y crisis de la izquierda peruana: hablan sus protagonistas (Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2011).
factual\(^{18}\) and perspectival;\(^{19}\) (2) furnish evidence of the theory’s causal mechanisms at work;\(^{20}\) and (3) support the article’s comparative argument concerning IU and Brazil’s PT.\(^{21}\)

The article presents additional evidence for its theoretical argument through a brief analysis of two shadow cases, Brazil’s PT and Mexico’s PRD. It treats the early PT and PRD as the ‘most similar’ cases to IU and argues that, despite analytically relevant similarities to IU, both parties had electorally indispensable leaders who were internally dominant (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, respectively), helping them to avoid schism.

The article does not purport to prove or even test its argument. Rather, the article is an exercise in theory-building: it presents a theoretical argument and provides initial evidence of plausibility and generalisability in the form of a representative case study and a brief most-similar-cases comparison. The primary contribution of the article, thus, is the proposition of a new, empirically grounded theory.

Finally, although the evidence in this article relates to IU (and secondarily to the PT and the PRD), the argument should apply to all new parties, regardless of where they fall on the Left/Right spectrum.

The article is organised in three sections. The first section elaborates the theory. The second operationalises the dependent and independent variables. The third presents the IU case study, addresses alternative explanations, and compares IU to the PT and PRD. A brief conclusion follows.

\textit{The Argument}

Party-building is the process by which new parties develop into electorally significant and enduring political actors. To be considered a case of successful

\(^{18}\) In my interview with moderate, independent IU leader Henry Pease, he noted that 150,000 IU membership cards were distributed in the late 1980s. Moderate, independent IU cadre, Aldo Panfichi, and IU scholar, Martín Tanaka, provided valuable details concerning the sources of Barrantes’s appeal to ordinary voters. Radical IU cadre and PUM member, Mario Munive, informed me of PUM’s rapid expansion in 1985 and 1986. (See case study section ‘The Argument at Work’ below.)

\(^{19}\) The aforementioned Panfichi observed, based on personal experience, that IU members did not regard Barrantes as their true ‘leader’ (see case study section below).

\(^{20}\) Both Left editorialist Fernando Tuesta, in a \textit{La República} editorial, and radical IU elite and member of Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Union of the Revolutionary Left, UNIR), Horacio Zevallos, in a quotation cited in Herrera, \textit{Izquierda Unida}, indicated that Barrantes’s unspectacular record prior to joining IU made him a questionable choice as coalition leader (see case study section below). These pieces of evidence support my argument that, in the case of IU, Barrantes’s background significantly affected his position of power within IU.

\(^{21}\) The aforementioned Henry Pease, radical IU leader Javier Diez Canseco, IU leader Santiago Pedraglio, and IU scholar Martín Tanaka all opined, in conversation with me, that differences in the leadership characteristics of Lula and Barrantes played a significant role in the parties’ divergent outcomes (see case study section below).
party-building, a new party must both persist over time and consistently win a large proportion of the national vote. Unsuccessful new parties include those that do not take off electorally, those that collapse after experiencing brief electoral success, and those that persist over time but receive only a tiny share of the vote.\textsuperscript{22}

When new parties collapse after experiencing brief electoral success, schisms are often the cause.\textsuperscript{23} Internal conflict is a normal feature of party life, as parties must take collective decisions on numerous issues (e.g., candidate selection, platforms, alliances) and, more fundamentally, agree on decision-making procedures. Because groups may conflict in these areas, schisms are a risk for parties.

New parties are especially prone to schisms. Why? First, most parties, in their early years, are in the process of developing their partisan brands, which requires them to differentiate themselves from other parties and demonstrate consistency over time.\textsuperscript{24} New partisan brands thus tend to be works-in-progress – and hence too weak and fragile to discourage elite defection. Second, new parties tend to lack institutionalised rules and procedures for collective decision-making and conflict settlement.

Largely due to the weakness of new partisan brands, only a tiny fraction of new parties take off electorally in the first place.\textsuperscript{25} A striking proportion of this tiny subset owe their electoral success to a popular leader’s coat-tails.\textsuperscript{26} Particularly in presidential systems, leaders’ external appeal can be a crucial source of mass support for incipient parties.\textsuperscript{27} In Latin America, which is uniformly presidential, founding leaders have laid the foundation for several lasting partisan brands (e.g., Peronism in Argentina, \textit{Fujimorismo} in Peru, \textit{Chavismo} in Venezuela), and in more institutionalised parties like the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, APRA) and Acción Popular (Popular Action, AP) in Peru; the Partido de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Party, PLN) in Costa Rica; Acción Democrática (Democratic Action, AD) and Comité de Organización Política Electoral e Independiente (Independent Electoral Political Organization Committee, COPEI) in Venezuela; the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (Dominican

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{22} Levitsky \textit{et al.}, ‘Introduction: Challenges of Party-Building’.
\bibitem{23} \textit{Ibid}.
\bibitem{26} Levitsky \textit{et al.}, ‘Introduction: Challenges of Party-Building’.
\end{thebibliography}
Revolutionary Party, PRD) and Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (Dominican Liberation Party, PLD) in the Dominican Republic; and, more recently, El Salvador’s ARENA, Brazil’s PT and Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy Party, PSDB), and Mexico’s PRD, founding leaders have played a vital role in mobilising early support.

In effect, popular leaders substitute for strong brands. Their coat-tails, like strong brands, guarantee electoral relevance and therefore discourage defection. But popular leaders do not ensure cohesion. Indeed, new parties that electorally depend on a leader are vulnerable to fatal schisms because, if the leader defects, they collapse. In recent decades, several new Latin American parties have collapsed because a popular leader defected. Peru’s IU crumbled after Alfonso Barrantes’s 1989 exit. Guatemala’s PAN virtually disappeared after Álvaro Arzú and presidential candidate Óscar Berger left the party in the early 2000s. Colombia’s PVC did not survive the departure of its presidential candidate and best-known figure, Antanas Mockus. In other cases, popular leaders, despite providing coat-tails, fail to prevent mass defection. Venezuela’s LCR, for example, fell into obscurity after the defection of the bulk of its active members, who backed factional leader Pablo Medina against popular leader Andrés Velásquez.18

This article’s central argument is that if leaders combine external appeal with internal dominance, the risk of such schisms decreases substantially. Why should this be so? And where does internal dominance come from?

### The Sources of Internal Dominance

Internal dominance is defined as uncontested, pre-eminent power within one’s party. When a leader dominates, he stands ‘head and shoulders’ above the rest of the party elite. No elite can seriously challenge him for the presidential nomination, vie with him for control of the party, or advocate his expulsion without being marginalised.29

Internal power comes from multiple sources. One, undoubtedly, is external appeal. If party members depend on a leader’s coat-tails, they have material incentives to accommodate and support him, and not to defect. Nevertheless, external appeal, by itself, does not make a leader internally dominant. Why? There are two broad reasons. First, in some parties, important factions are not driven primarily, or even at all, by electoral incentives

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29 This article does not assume that leaders are always male, but there are several passages in the coming pages that require the use of gender pronouns, and instead of using ‘he or she’, ‘his or her’, and ‘him or her’ repeatedly, I use masculine gender pronouns for purposes of readability and uniformity. The article could have used feminine pronouns, but this might have confused readers, given that all the leaders cited in the article are male.
(e.g., Mexico’s early PRD; Peru’s IU). Insofar as members are ideologues, not pragmatic office seekers, popular leaders do not gain internal leverage from their external appeal. Second, there are multiple sources of internal power; external appeal is just one, and internal dominance requires additional sources.

One additional source is cross-factional ties. In factionalised parties, a leader with constructive relationships across factions may be ‘indispensable’ for brokerage and mediation. Leaders who are disengaged, or who refuse to negotiate with major factions, cannot serve as cross-factional mediators and brokers. Because it takes time to develop cross-factional ties, a leader with strong pre-existing cross-factional ties may be critical in the case of incipient parties. Here, one encounters variation. Some leaders have strong pre-existing cross-factional ties because they led their parties’ founding struggles and, in the process, collaborated with most party feeder organisations (e.g., Lula of Brazil’s PT). Others have weak pre-existing cross-factional ties. Indeed, individuals may be made leaders precisely because they are relative outsiders and thus do not empower any faction at the expense of others (e.g., Barrantes of Peru’s IU).

Moral authority is a second internal power source. Moral authority means a leader’s credibility and respect among party members, usually due to his pre-party background. Here, too, we encounter variation. Certain leaders command respect or reverence among their base. Some even have a mystical quality, or are considered fundamental to the party’s identity or the incarnation of its animating cause. Such stature may result from revolutionary ancestry (e.g., Cárdenas of Mexico’s PRD); class status (e.g., Lula of Brazil’s PT); heroism (e.g., Charles de Gaulle of the French Republicans); public hardship (e.g., Nelson Mandela of South Africa’s African National Congress [ANC]); leadership in founding struggles (e.g., Lula; Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union [ZANU]); and more. Moral authority can also be rooted in personal charisma. By contrast, some figures are made leaders despite lacking moral authority. This might happen when, as described above, a new party chooses an outsider as leader (e.g., Barrantes of Peru’s IU).

A third source of internal power is ideological/programmatic representativeness of the active base. Although rank-and-file attitudes are usually heterogeneous, and although leaders tend to have significant autonomy from the

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ideological agreement between leader and base matters. Naturally, leaders tend to have more internal support, and thus more internal power, to the extent that their stances align with those of active members. Insofar as their stances deviate from prevailing base-level ones, they are more vulnerable to internal challenges.

In sum, internal power does not merely come from external appeal. It also comes from cross-factional ties, moral authority and ideological representativeness. Each of these sources is potentially independent of the rest, although some often reinforce others. Regardless, they contribute to a leader’s internal power independently and will be treated as roughly equal in weight (see Figure 1). The more of these sources, and the more of each source, that a leader possesses, the more internally powerful he will be. Consequently, new party leaders, even externally appealing ones, vary in internal power. Simply put, some are internally dominant, while others are not (see section ‘Operationalisation’ below).

This argument is primarily structuralist, not voluntarist. To be sure, a leader’s internal dominance is not wholly static; external events, as well as a leader’s own contingent decisions, can lead to short-term changes in his cross-factional ties, moral authority and ideological representativeness. Nevertheless, a leader’s prior endowments (e.g., pre-existing cross-factional ties, political background) largely determine the parameters and likelihood of such changes. It is much easier to maintain pre-existing cross-factional ties, for example, than to establish them from scratch after a party is founded. Similarly, it is much easier to establish moral authority if one has a symbolically resonant pedigree, or a background as a hero or leader of a political or social movement. Seldom is internal dominance a pure product of individual effort, prudence or savvy. Internal dominance tends to be based, in large measure, on objective endowments: electoral clout, pre-existing cross-factional links, ancestry, and backgrounds of leadership, heroism, or hardship. Cárdenas

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33 See, for example, Steven Levitsky, *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

34 Some party brokers establish cross-factional ties without moral authority or ideological appeal – e.g., Helmut Kohl (Ansell and Fish, ‘The Art of Being Indispensable’), Carlos Menem (Levitsky, *Transforming Labor-Based Parties*). Some have moral authority but lack, or come to lack, cross-factional ties (e.g., Cárdenas after retiring from active involvement in the PRD) or ideological/programmatic representativeness (e.g., Lula in the mid-1990s, when radicals controlled the PT). And, of course, a party member may align ideologically with most active rank-and-file members but, not occupying a leadership position, lack moral authority and cross-factional ties. On Lula in the PT, see Wendy Hunter, *The Transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil, 1989–2009* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

35 Ideological representativeness (and consistency) can contribute to a leader’s moral authority (e.g., Cárdenas vis-à-vis the PRD base). Both ideological representativeness and moral authority make it easier for a leader to forge cross-factional links (e.g., Lula, Cárdenas).
of Mexico’s PRD, for example, was not a once-in-a-generation leader like Lula da Silva in Brazil’s early PT, but he still dominated internal PRD affairs due to his endowments (see case study section ‘The Argument at Work’ below for details).

How Externally Appealing, Internally Dominant Leaders Prevent Schisms

How do externally appealing, internally dominant leaders prevent new party schisms? As noted earlier, most new parties, especially heterogeneous, mass-based ones, lack strong internal institutions. Often, a new party’s feeder groups lack horizontal linkages. Consequently, new parties often cannot, through institutional channels, aggregate preferences and collectively take decisions and settle conflicts. Some parties eventually develop strong institutions, but new parties must do so from scratch and avoid alienating key players in the process. Institution building, thus, is delicate and slow. Many new parties lack formal decision-making procedures in important areas (e.g., Venezuela’s LCR, Mexico’s early PRD). Others establish unanimity or near unanimity requirements for collective decision-making (e.g., Peru’s IU). Under these circumstances, schism becomes a risk, as conflicts may persist without resolution, and reforms may be obstructed.

Externally appealing, internally dominant leaders can solve these problems. First, they can found dominant factions, which control party machinery and

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36 E.g., the primary system in the major US parties.
simplify collective decision-making (e.g., Lula; Cárdenas). Second, they can influence internal debates (e.g., on platforms, alliances), often in their own favour. Morally authoritative leaders, for example, can convince members to moderate or compromise for the party’s electoral gain (e.g., Lula). Internally dominant leaders can leverage party candidacies and posts in internal debates (e.g., Cárdenas). The inability to influence debates in these ways may motivate a leader to defect (e.g., Barrantes). Third, internally dominant leaders can informally function as preference aggregators, decision-makers and arbiters. In parties with limited internal democracy and weak horizontal ties between factions, a leader with cross-factional links can collect viewpoints and factor them into party decision-making (e.g., Cárdenas). Importantly, internally dominant leaders enjoy considerable leeway to take decisions in the name of their parties (e.g., Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre in Peru’s APRA; Juan Perón of Argentina’s Partido Justicialista [Justicialist Party or Peronist Party, PJ]; Roberto D’Aubuisson in El Salvador’s ARENA; Jaime Guzmán in Chile’s UDI; Cárdenas; Lula). In many cases, their word is effectively law, meaning that they can arbitrate conflict and impose party lines, even controversial ones, unilaterally (e.g., Cárdenas). Morally authoritative leaders are less likely to be viewed as fakes, traitors or sell-outs if they moderate over time or sacrifice party principles for practical gain (e.g., Lula in the early 2000s). Leaders denied such leeway are more liable to defect (e.g., Barrantes). In short, just as popular leaders substitute for strong brands, internally dominant leaders can substitute for institutions of decision-making and conflict resolution.

Moreover, externally appealing, internally dominant leaders can win presidential nominations with limited internal resistance (e.g., Lula; Cárdenas). This is critical for cohesion, as presidential nominations are winner-take-all choices with singular stakes. Internally non-dominant leaders, even highly popular ones, may face serious competition for presidential nominations. In such cases, schism might result, as whoever is not nominated, or fears not being nominated, could defect (e.g., Barrantes).

Externally appealing, internally dominant leaders are neither necessary nor sufficient for new party cohesion. Parties can hang together initially without such leaders (e.g., Mexico’s Partido Revolucionario Institucional [Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI]; El Salvador’s FMLN). Conversely, new parties may splinter and collapse despite the presence of such leaders (e.g., Argentina’s Frente País Solidario [Front for a Country in Solidarity,
FREPASO]. The argument here is probabilistic: externally appealing, internally dominant leaders decrease the likelihood of schisms in new parties.

**Operationalisation**

This brief section operationalises the dependent (DV) and independent (IV) variables, then previews the third section and comparative conclusion by scoring IU and two most similar cases, Brazil’s PT and Mexico’s PRD.

**New party schism (DV):** New party schisms occur if a party, after winning 10 per cent of the vote in one to four consecutive congressional elections, permanently falls below 10 per cent due to a leader or faction’s defection.\(^4\)

**External appeal (IV):** During a party’s first decade, what ratio of major factional leaders considered the leader the party’s most electable member? If most or all factional leaders did, the leader’s external appeal is high; if a large minority did, his external appeal is medium; otherwise, his external appeal is low.

**Cross-factional ties (IV):** During a party’s first decade, what ratio of major factional leaders did the leader consistently meet with, and what ratio of major factions did he consistently support including in the party? If the answer is a large majority or all of the major factions, his cross-factional ties are strong; if the answer is a large minority or small majority, his cross-factional ties are medium; otherwise, his cross-factional ties are weak.

**Ideological representativeness (IV):** During a party’s first decade, what ratio of active members generally supported the leader in ideological/programmatic debates? If most did, the leader’s ideological representativeness is high; if a large minority did, his representativeness is medium; if a small minority did, his representativeness is low.

**Moral authority (IV):** If the leader entered the party with an extraordinary source of mystique, credibility or respect such as revolutionary pedigree or a background of heroism, public hardship or leadership in founding struggles, his moral authority is high; if he played a consistent but lower-profile role as a cadre or leader in party-related movements in the years or decades before the party’s creation, his moral authority is medium; otherwise, his moral authority is low.

**Internal dominance (composite IV):** A leader’s internal dominance is scored by adding his scores on external appeal, cross-factional ties, ideological

\(^4\) FREPASO’s leader, Carlos ‘Chacho’ Álvarez, was electorally indispensable and internally dominant, but FREPASO collapsed in the early 2000s after Álvarez’s exit. See, for example, Juan Abal Medina, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Argentine Center-Left: The Crisis of Frente Grande’, *Party Politics*, 15: 3 (2009), pp. 357–75.

\(^5\) The 10 per cent minimum serves to exclude niche or regional parties, which may persist but do not seriously contend for national power. The four-election minimum serves to exclude flash parties, which rise to national prominence but quickly collapse (e.g., IU, Argentina’s FREPASO).
representativeness and moral authority. Two ‘high’ and two ‘medium’ scores are required for internal dominance; lower sums indicate lack of internal dominance.

IU is thus a case of new party schism, having met the 10 per cent threshold only twice (1985, 1990) and collapsing due to Alfonso Barrantes’s defection. The conclusion’s most similar cases, the PT and PRD, did not split, surviving early development intact and taking root. They have stayed above 10 per cent in seven (1990–2014) and eight (1994–2015) consecutive congressional elections, respectively.

Tables 1 and 2 provide scores for IU (highlighted) as well as for the PT and PRD. The case study and conclusion, to which we now turn, provide supporting information for these scores. Figure 2 illustrates, visually, that whereas IU’s popular leader, Barrantes, lacked internal dominance, the popular leaders of the PT and PRD, Lula and Cárdenas, were internally dominant.

The Argument at Work: The Schism of Peru’s IU

IU was a socialist electoral coalition founded in September 1980, shortly after the May 1980 general election that marked Peru’s full transition from military rule to democracy. In both the May 1980 general election and the 1978 constituent assembly election, the Peruvian Left ran divided, with numerous parties and coalitions competing on separate tickets. Although the Left fared well in 1978, riding a wave of social mobilisation and benefiting from the absence of rival party AP on the ballot, its relatively poor showing in the 1980 general election demonstrated that, under normal electoral conditions, Left success would require Left unity. Thus was born IU, which comprised most of Peru’s major Left forces and which was established in advance of the November 1980 municipal elections.

During the 1980s, IU established itself as one of Peru’s three leading electoral forces, alongside APRA and AP. But in late 1989, IU fatally split. Less than a year before the 1990 presidential election, and less than two months before nationwide municipal elections, Alfonso Barrantes, IU’s ex-president and perennial lead candidate, decided after months of political jockeying and tortuous negotiations to defect from IU with a small group of allies and contest the 1989 municipal and 1990 general elections independently. Barrantes’s defection resulted in IU’s collapse. In the 1990 presidential election, IU and Barrantes split the Left vote. Both performed abysmally, and neither recovered. In the early 1990s, Barrantes retired from politics, and IU disbanded.

IU’s collapse was a consequential event, given the coalition’s potential prior to the collapse and the likely effects of its disintegration. In the four national

44 AP boycotted the election.
elections that IU contested with Barrantes as its lead candidate – nationwide municipal elections in 1980, 1983 and 1986, and the 1985 general election – it averaged nearly 30 per cent of the national vote. At the time of its schism, IU had an opportunity to capitalise on the electoral weakness of its two main competitors, APRA and AP. Pre-election polls conducted prior to Barrantes’ defection, throughout 1988 and 1989, indicated that Barrantes and right-wing candidate Mario Vargas Llosa would be the two top finishers...
in the 1990 presidential election (thus entering a run-off), and that Alberto Fujimori would not reach the second round. IU’s schism, thus, may have made possible Fujimori’s pivotal 1990 presidential victory. It also weakened potential opposition to the authoritarian, neoliberal and populist Fujimori government (or to a hypothetical Vargas Llosa government).

What explains IU’s collapse?

**Alfonso Barrantes’s external appeal**

Alfonso Barrantes was electorally indispensable to IU. Despite varying in their ideologies and international alignments, the parties of IU were overwhelmingly Marxist-Leninist. Roughly half of its leaders were openly revolutionary. Most had been engaged in semi-clandestine struggle under the military dictatorship that immediately preceded Peru’s democratisation and IU’s formation. Thus, outside their organised constituencies, IU parties had little organisational reach, and their leaders had scant appeal.

Among Left politicians in the 1980s, Alfonso Barrantes was singularly popular with lower-income voters, a massive, floating and decisive segment of the national electorate. Although lower-income Peruvians tended to support redistribution during this period, they did not support any party and certainly did not support the partisan Left. But many supported Barrantes, who humanised and softened the Left’s radical, militant image. In contrast to most of his Left contemporaries in Peru, Barrantes was seen not only as professional and competent, but also as non-militant and personable. He was articulate, educated and well-informed on a wide range of political and economic issues. He was friendly, good-humoured and non-combative in speeches and interviews. He avoided rhetoric that alienated ordinary voters. He had provincial roots, hailing from the Cajamarca region, and conveyed a rural simplicity. He displayed particular fondness for children, regularly invoking them in his speeches and coming to be known, affectionately, as Tío Frejolito (Uncle Bean) by the Peruvian public. Barrantes’s signature policy as Lima mayor (1983–6) guaranteed one glass of milk per day to every child in Lima. Barrantes was known for being honest. Despite his high public profile, and even after becoming Lima mayor, he did not enrich himself or develop expensive habits, always (for example) driving the same sky-blue

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46 IU parties had ties to a range of popular and middle-sector organisations, both class-based (e.g., peasant, labour and teachers’ unions) and territorially based (e.g., shanty-town associations). Some of these ties dated back many decades (e.g., the Partido Comunista Peruano’s [Peruvian Communist Party, PCP] ties to the Confederación General de Trabajadores Peruanos [General Confederation of Peruvian Workers, CGTP]).
Volkswagen Beetle. He also demonstrated media and television savvy, in contrast to other major Left figures in Peru such as Hugo Blanco. Although Peru’s broadcast networks and most of its national newspapers opposed IU, Barrantes, especially his election as mayor of Lima in 1983, was a frequent interviewee and transmitted an image of competence and charm. These characteristics made Barrantes very popular, and because of his popularity, he drew in pragmatic, left-leaning voters attracted to the combination of the united partisan Left and an electable leader.

Barrantes’s singular electoral clout was not disputed, for the most part, even by his rivals, and even after he lost two elections in the mid-1980s. After winning the Lima mayoral election in 1983 and briefly reaching the apogee of his internal power, Barrantes finished a distant second in the 1985 presidential election and narrowly lost his 1986 re-election bid for the Lima mayoralty. These losses partially tainted Barrantes’s image of electoral prowess, leading some IU members and observers – especially those generally opposed to Barrantes – to overestimate IU’s electoral prospects without him. But as Maxwell Cameron observes in his in-depth analysis of IU’s schism, IU radicals, even in the late 1980s, ‘recognized that Barrantes was the leader with the widest popular appeal – and that the withdrawal of Barrantes could weaken the [IU’s] electoral prospects’. Supporters of Barrantes’s presidential nomination in 1990 repeatedly underlined in internal debates that he remained IU’s strongest candidate and was probably the only Left candidate in Peru who stood any chance of winning. They warned that if Barrantes departed, a large segment of the electorate would leave with him and likely shift its support from IU to APRA, causing an electoral setback or disaster for IU and a potential victory for its rival, APRA. Top IU leaders thus vigorously sought to prevent Barrantes’s exit until the end. The Secretary General of the Partido Comunista Peruano (Peruvian Communist Party, PCP), Jorge del Prado, for example, made ‘excessive concessions, seeking [Barrantes’s] reincorporation in the failed hope that he would accept being the front’s 1990 presidential candidate’.

47 Interview with Aldo Panfichi, a moderate, independent IU cadre, 27 Dec. 2010.
48 Interview with Martín Tanaka, IU scholar, 13 Jan. 2011.
50 Roberts, Deepening Democracy?, pp. 254, 324. See also Herrera, Izquierda Unida, p. 359.
51 Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru, p. 80.
53 Herrera, Izquierda Unida, p. 345.
54 Ibid., p. 379. See also Tanaka, Los espejismos, p. 137. This paragraph shows that Barrantes meets the operational criteria for high external appeal (i.e., most factional leaders considered him IU’s most electable member).
In short, no Left figure emerged in Peru during the 1980s who could rival Barrantes in electoral clout. Barrantes’s lack of dominance within IU, thus, did not stem from a shortage of external appeal. Indeed, a noteworthy feature of IU’s internal politics was that Barrantes’s unrivalled external appeal, almost universally recognised, did not translate into internal dominance. As Martín Tanaka writes of Barrantes in 1988 and 1989: ‘It is interesting to note the enormous distance between a Barrantes well positioned in the electoral preferences of the citizenry and his situation of extreme weakness within the Left … The separation between the electoral arena and internal party arena, the difficulty of investing the capital accumulated in one in the other, appears clearly.’

Barrantes’s electoral indispensability did not translate into internal dominance for two broad reasons. First, radical IU elites, who constituted approximately half of the coalition’s national leadership, were not primarily motivated by the desire to maximise vote share or govern on a large scale, and, by the end of the 1980s, some of them regarded the prospect of an IU presidential victory as threatening (about which more below). This reduced Barrantes’s internal electoral leverage. Second, Barrantes had few sources of internal power other than his external appeal: his moral authority was limited; his relationship with powerful radical leaders was contentious and ultimately broke down completely; and radical IU members, who constituted a majority of the coalition’s active rank-and-file, differed with Barrantes on major questions of programme and principle. These problems also worsened toward the end of the 1980s, and, consequently, Barrantes’s internal power came to rest on little more than electoral leverage.

Clearly, Barrantes’s internal challenges must be understood in the context of IU’s moderate–radical divide. Like many successful new Left parties in Latin America, IU was composed of radical and moderate tendencies. Although IU members were uniformly socialist and almost uniformly Marxist-Leninist, radicals and moderates differed on how to pursue socialist transformation. Whereas moderates sought to transform Peru through participation in its democratic institutions, radicals sought to make revolution in the short to medium term. Radicals, of course, did value democratic participation; otherwise, they would not have joined IU or contested elections. But they participated in elections largely in order to campaign and engage in legislative

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55 Tanaka, *Los espejismos*, p. 139.
56 El Salvador’s FMLN, Uruguay’s Frente Amplio (Broad Front, FA), Brazil’s PT, Mexico’s PRD.
57 Among IU’s constituent parties, only the tiny Partido Socialista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Socialist Party, PSR) was not Marxist-Leninist. Also, independent Left Christians such as Henry Pease and Rolando Ames did not identify as Marxist-Leninist.
opposition, both of which provided visibility and attracted members. They were more ambivalent and cautious than moderates about taking executive power locally or nationally. Some argued that governing might dilute IU’s message, deliver unspectacular results, and therefore harm the Left’s image.\(^{58}\)

Polarisation between moderates and radicals intensified in the late 1980s, as hyperinflation, recession and the Shining Path insurgency convulsed Peru. A central question arose: How should IU respond to Peru’s security and economic crises, which threatened democratic stability? Moderates wanted to preserve democracy and capitalise electorally on the reputational collapse of IU’s two main rivals, APRA and AP.\(^{59}\) Since this would require attracting middle-sector voters, IU, they believed, needed to moderate its rhetoric and proposals.\(^{60}\) Accordingly, moderates rejected armed struggle and advocated collaborating with the APRA government and Peruvian armed forces to stabilise the economy and defeat the Shining Path. Radicals offered a different response to the crisis of the late 1980s. They judged – arguably rationally\(^ {61}\) – that the country was entering a revolutionary situation. Thus, in their view, organisational preparedness for revolution took priority over victory in the 1990 presidential election.\(^ {62}\) Radicals opposed allying with APRA\(^ {63}\) and the military\(^ {64}\) and resisted shifting to the ideological centre. Many were hesitant to reject armed struggle categorically.\(^ {65}\) Such actions and positions, they argued, could dilute the partisan Left’s image\(^ {66}\) and might put IU in power at a time of insoluble crisis.\(^ {67}\) Both would impede recruitment of foot soldiers – a top priority.


\(^{59}\) Ibid., pp. 251, 252.

\(^{60}\) Herrera, *Izquierda Unida*, p. 441.


\(^{63}\) Radicals reserved a special animosity for APRA given APRA’s ideological shiftiness and opportunism in previous decades, and therefore advocated ‘frontal opposition to [Alán García’s] APRA government’ (Roberts, *Deepening Democracy?*, p. 250).

\(^{64}\) Radicals in IU opposed the Shining Path but also held the Peruvian state responsible for engaging in a brutal ‘dirty war’. They accused both organisations of intentional, unconscionable brutality and criticised IU moderates for referring to military human rights violations as mere ‘excesses’ (Herrera, *Izquierda Unida*, p. 308). Radicals preferred to struggle against the Shining Path on their own, without collaborating with the armed forces. For more, see Tamara Feinstein, ‘How the Left Was Lost: Remembering Izquierda Unida and the Legacies of Political Violence in Peru’, unpubl. Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2013. Feinstein details the difficulty, for IU radicals, of simultaneously opposing – and, at times, simultaneously confronting – both the Shining Path and the Peruvian state.

\(^{65}\) See ibid., where Feinstein argues that, amid the escalating political violence of the Shining Path in the late 1980s, differences within IU concerning the permissibility of armed struggle led to the coalition’s rupture.


\(^{67}\) Roberts, *Deepening Democracy?*, pp. 252–3.
A key implication of the radicals’ worldview was that, for them, Barrantes’s electoral coat-tails held limited value. Throughout the 1980s, IU radicals did not regard electoral failure – their own, much less IU’s – as an existential risk or their ultimate concern. Some were wary of governing and hence of winning the executive positions that Barrantes sought. These perspectives hardened toward the end of the decade. In the late 1980s, radicals ‘were less interested in building the widest possible electoral base for the United Left than in building an organised, revolutionary alternative to existing power structures’. Many radicals considered a 1990 presidential victory secondary; some considered it counterproductive and potentially threatening. All of these realities reduced Barrantes’s internal electoral leverage.

Even more unfortunately for Barrantes, however, popular appeal was the main ‘card’ that he had to ‘play’ within IU. His most significant shortcoming as IU leader was that his internal power rested principally on electoral leverage – particularly as the 1980s drew to a close.

That Barrantes lacked additional sources of internal power followed, in large measure, from the conditions of his selection as coalition leader. Because the IU constituent parties were sectarian, IU founding leaders were not willing to cede the coalition’s reins and lead nomination to a partisan rival. Barrantes was unaffiliated with the parties and regarded as fairly neutral between them. His independence and neutrality, combined with

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68 Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru, p. 80.
69 In late June 1989, Jorge Hurtado Pozo (a.k.a. ‘Ludovico’), one of the leading figures in UNIR, stated that ‘elections should not be the priority; it is necessary to mobilize the struggle of the workers’ (La República, 29 June 1989, cited in Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru, p. 93). See also Roberts, Deepening Democracy?, pp. 253–4.
71 Barrantes briefly joined the Soviet-aligned PCP but exited amid rising Sino-Soviet tensions. Barrantes also briefly joined the Unión Democrática Popular (Popular Democratic Union, UDP) coalition to run on the 1980 presidential slate of the larger coalition, the Alianza Revolucionaria de Izquierda (Revolutionary Left Alliance, ARI); he did not, however, belong to or affiliate with any of the UDP’s constituent parties (i.e., Vanguardia Revolucionaria [Revolutionary Vanguard, VR], Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria [Movement of the Revolutionary Left, MIR]). The ARI coalition ultimately selected Hugo Blanco as its candidate. During this time, Barrantes did maintain a fairly close, though informal, relationship with Patria Roja (Red Fatherland, PR), the core constituent party of UNIR.
72 Barrantes was one of relatively few figures on the Peruvian Left who had participated in both the traditional Marxist Left (through his brief affiliation with the PCP) and the new Left forces that proliferated in Peru in the 1960s and 1970s (through his brief affiliation with the UDP). One of the PCP’s top leaders during the 1980s, Guillermo Herrera, thus described Barrantes as a hinge between the old and new Lefts in Peru. IU members and analysts commonly used terms such as ‘balancing factor’, ‘balancing leader’ and ‘transactional element’ to refer to Barrantes. Political analyst Fernando Tuesta, in a 1987 editorial, described Barrantes as a ‘sum of opposites, equal to zero’ (Fernando Tuesta, ¿Era Barrantes imprescindible?, editorial in La República, 3 June 1987).
his electoral potential, made him the consensus choice as leader. But neutral, independent members are – almost by definition – weakly rooted in their parties. They typically lack the background and factional ties associated with internally dominant leaders. And so it was with Barrantes. His external origins made him acceptable but limited his internal power.

When made IU leader, Barrantes was an unknown labour lawyer and minor figure on the Peruvian Left. As a youth and young adult, he had belonged to APRA and, in the late 1940s, served as APRA president of the University of San Marcos Student Federation. He had never held public office. More importantly, for three decades, he had not played a leadership role on the Left. Unlike various IU figures, he had not constructed or headed a party. He had not visibly engaged in the popular mobilisations stimulated by General Juan Velasco (1968–75) or the mass movement to topple General Morales Bermúdez (1975–80). Barrantes, in short, was not a founder of IU, in contrast to coalition leaders such as Javier Diez Canseco of the Partido Unificado Mariateguista (Mariateguista Unified Party, PUM) and Jorge del Prado of the PCP. One pro-Barrantes IU elite observed, Barrantes ‘did not found IU but was called to preside over it’.75

Barrantes thus entered IU without moral authority. Throughout the 1980s, IU elites and commentators openly argued that he did not deserve to be IU leader. In December 1981, IU congressman Horacio Cevallos wrote: ‘[Barrantes] does not represent any of the organised political sectors, nor does he represent the masses. He is a novice lawyer, and we have made him, a substitute, a centre-forward in the leadership of the Left.’76 After Barrantes resigned as IU president in the summer of 1981, left-leaning editoralist Fernando Tuesta critically highlighted Barrantes’s pre-IU record:

On what basis did they elect [Barrantes] [IU leader]? […] For his political record …? That does not appear to be the reason. […] [I]t is enough to review what is noted as most noteworthy in his political career: a dip in the San Marcos pool when he was the Aprista president of the [San Marcos Student Federation] in an act against Nixon; the pen given to him by Zhou Enlai on a trip to China in 1976 with which he signed his entry application for the PCP; and from then until … 1980 [final ellipsis in the original].77

74 Barrantes was a vice-presidential candidate on the ARI ticket in 1980.
75 Marcial Rubio, paraphrased in Tuesta, ‘¿Era Barrantes imprescindible?’ This paragraph makes clear that Barrantes did not meet the operational criteria for high or medium moral authority (i.e., he did not enter IU with an extraordinary source of mystique, credibility or respect, nor had he been a consistently active Left cadre or leader).
76 Quoted in Herrera, *Izquierda Unida*, p. 119. Original source not provided.
77 Tuesta, ‘¿Era Barrantes imprescindible?’
Members have retrospectively articulated similar views. Osmar Gonzales states: ‘[T]he parties sustained that Barrantes was their creation; that the front was the result of the popular movement, and that [Barrantes’s] personalised leadership was a contingent consequence.’\(^{78}\) In the clever formulation of a moderate cadre: ‘Barrantes was accepted as a candidate but contested as a leader.’\(^{79}\)

In addition to lacking moral authority, Barrantes, a moderate, did not ideologically represent the predominantly radical base—especially in the late 1980s. From IU’s inception, radical parties collectively had more members than did moderate parties, and radical leaders held an uninterrupted majority on the IU’s national executive committee. Radicals’ upper hand strengthened in the mid- to late 1980s: in the 1985 congressional election, the two dominant radical parties—PUM and Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Union of the Revolutionary Left, UNIR) —won significantly more seats than their moderate counterparts; PUM expanded greatly in 1985 and 1986;\(^{80}\) and, in the late 1980s, IU’s three largest parties—PUM, UNIR, and the moderate PCP—shifted left and established military arms.\(^{81}\) The presence of a moderate like Barrantes at the helm thus became more of a structural problem for IU during the second half of the 1980s.

As IU shifted to the Left, and, later, as Peru plunged into crisis, the ideological gulf between Barrantes and IU radicals widened. First, radicals objected to the close relationship that developed between Barrantes and APRA leader Alan García in the mid-1980s. Radicals argued that García was using Barrantes to marginalise IU radicals and thus tame and divide IU. This perception fuelled two pivotal conflicts between Barrantes and IU activists in 1986 and 1987 that precipitated Barrantes’s mid-1987 resignation as IU president.\(^{82}\) Second, as Peru plunged into security and economic crisis, Barrantes argued that IU should commit to democracy, work to preserve Peru’s democratic regime by collaborating with APRA and the army, and prioritise presidential victory in 1990. Barrantes’s arguments, echoed by coalition moderates, had virtually no influence on radicals. Throughout 1989, IU’s leading radical party, PUM, refused to repudiate armed struggle categorically.\(^{83}\)

Finally, Barrantes lacked strong cross-factional ties. Because he was an outsider, he did not enter IU with strong pre-existing relationships across factions. Moreover, as IU president, he did not act as a cross-factional broker or arbiter. He ‘tended to be an aloof leader who was disengaged from the internal affairs


\(^{79}\) Interview with Panfichi.

\(^{80}\) Interview with Mario Munive, radical cadre, PUM member, 22 Dec. 2010.


\(^{82}\) Herrera, Izquierda Unida, p. 360.

\(^{83}\) Ibid., p. 460–2, 475. The previous two paragraphs show that Barrantes did not meet the operational criteria for high ideological/programmatic representativeness (i.e., most of IU’s active members did not generally support Barrantes’s ideological/programmatic positions).
of IU coalition ...’\(^8^4\) By the mid-1980s, he advocated the expulsion of PUM and UNIR.\(^8^5\) In resigning as IU president in mid-1987, he abandoned the formal pretence of standing above faction or representing the entire coalition.\(^8^6\) Thereafter, he opted for ‘marginalisation from the practical affairs of the alliance’.\(^8^7\)

For most of the 1980s, the role of cross-factional broker was assumed by leaders of the neutral bloc, a moderate faction composed of the PCP and Left Christian independents.\(^8^8\) The neutral bloc constituted the organisational core of IU’s moderate wing, and its leaders firmly opposed any divisions or expulsions within IU.\(^8^9\) During the second half of the 1980s, neutral bloc leaders – especially Henry Pease – sought to fuse the radical and moderate sectors of IU into a single party.\(^9^0\) Toward the end of the 1980s, neutral bloc leaders such as Pease and Jorge del Prado regularly met with Barrantes, on the one hand, and radical leaders, on the other, in an attempt to maintain coalition unity. Thus, far from having cross-factional ties, Barrantes headed one of the two factions between which neutral bloc leaders mediated.\(^9^1\)

Schism and Collapse

By the late 1980s, Barrantes’s status in IU had become a highly polarising topic within the coalition. Debate at the first IU congress in January 1989 centred on whether he should receive the 1990 presidential nomination.\(^9^2\) The national executive committee, controlled by radicals, dictated that a closed

\(^8^4\) Roberts, *Deepening Democracy?*, p. 248.
\(^8^6\) Herrera, *Izquierda Unida*, p. 370.
\(^8^7\) Roberts, *Deepening Democracy?*, pp. 324–5 note 60.
\(^8^9\) Neutral bloc leaders opposed divisions within IU for several reasons: they did not want to annul the decade-long effort to institutionalise a united Left party; they believed that a future IU government would need the support of the radical parties and their social movement partners; and they worried that the radical parties, if separated from IU, would be less capable of steering Left youth away from the Shining Path. See Cameron, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru*, Chapter 5. Roberts, *Deepening Democracy?*, pp. 250, 324 note 59.
\(^9^0\) In Jan. 1989, IU held its first and only national congress, and, in the lead-up to the congress, 130,000–150,000 IU membership cards were distributed.
\(^9^1\) The last two paragraphs demonstrate that Barrantes did not meet the operational criteria for strong cross-factional ties (i.e., he did not meet with, or consistently support the inclusion of, a large majority of IU factions).
\(^9^2\) Herrera, *Izquierda Unida*, p. 484. Cameron, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru*, p. 79. For a comprehensive historical analysis of the IU’s polarised first congress – and, in particular, of the dispute between moderates and radicals regarding whether to reject armed struggle categorically – see Feinstein, ‘How the Left Was Lost’.
primary election would determine the nominee. Radicals stated their intention
to field an alternative candidate. Although members of the neutral bloc sup-
ported Barrantes’s nomination, they were not willing to threaten to defect
with him to support a separate presidential bid; instead, they pressed
Barrantes to run in the primary election. Consequently, Barrantes lacked
sufficient leverage to persuade IU radicals to nominate him without an internal
election.

Unable to impose his candidacy undemocratically, Barrantes faced a
dilemma: he could run in a closed IU primary and risk being defeated by a
radical candidate, or he could defect from IU with a small club of moderate
allies and run in the first round of the presidential election without IU’s
label and machines behind him. Barrantes believed, with reason, that he
might lose a closed IU primary, as the parties of the radical bloc, given their
numbers and capacity to mobilise members, had an advantage over moderates.
Barrantes calculated that his best chance of winning Peru’s presidency was to
contest the first round on a new, non-IU ticket. If he reached the second round
(a plausible prospect in late 1989), a Centre–Left coalition that included the
core of IU would be likely to coalesce around him. By this rationale, Barrantes
defected from IU – and ultimately killed it. In the 1990 presidential election,
IU candidate Henry Pease won 8 per cent of the vote, while Barrantes, newly
divorced from IU and competing against its label and machines, garnered a
mere 5 per cent. Shortly after, Barrantes retired from politics, and IU, mortally
wounded, continued to splinter and collapsed.

Objections and Alternative Explanations

One might object to the foregoing case study by arguing that IU was bound to
collapse regardless of who led it. After all, IU was not a party but a coalition of
parties, and, despite a shared socialist orientation, these parties were sectarian
and ideologically divergent, with social democratic elements and unreformed,
revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ones. Moreover, the crises of the late 1980s
deeply polarised IU and rendered the revolutionary Left anathema to many
Peruvian voters. It might be argued, in light of these facts, that IU’s split
was inevitable, and that, even if IU had not split, it would have electorally col-
lapsed. Along the same lines, one might argue that no Left leader in Peru could
have simultaneously maintained the support of IU radicals – who controlled
the IU’s machinery – and appealed to the wider Peruvian electorate.

93 Roberts, *Deepening Democracy?* Interview with Antonio Zapata, Jr., radical cadre and intel-
clectual and PUM member, 13 Jan. 2011.
94 I wish to thank several anonymous referees for urging me to grapple more thoroughly and
explicitly with the objections raised in this paragraph.
These objections are unpersuasive for several reasons. First, they rest on the premise that, by the end of the 1980s, IU moderates and radicals were too polarised to collaborate or remain in alliance with each other. But this premise is demonstrably false. As already observed, only a small subset of IU moderates – Barrantes and a club of allies – chose defection over continued collaboration in 1989. The neutral bloc, which was composed of moderates, and which surpassed the Barrantista reformist bloc in size and organisational strength, remained in IU. If Barrantes had not defected, the neutral bloc’s efforts to convert IU into a party might well have succeeded. Thus, it would be ahistorical to argue that, during the polarising, pressure-laden period of the late 1980s, IU radicals and moderates were fated to split.

Second, it is not obvious that IU, on balance, faced greater obstacles to cohesion and survival than other new Left parties in Latin America that survived intact. A number of Latin America’s successful new Left parties were, like IU, initially characterised by factionalisation, ideological difference and internecine conflict over programme, strategy and resources (e.g., Uruguay’s Frente Amplio [Broad Front, FA], Brazil’s PT, Mexico’s PRD, El Salvador’s FMLN). Moreover, there were important factors working in IU’s favour. First, territorial organisation is critical for successful party-building, and IU had one of the strongest territorial organisations on the Latin American Left during the third wave, with constituent party branches stretching across Peru and, by the end of the 1980s, a total of 130,000–150,000 active members. Second, IU did not attain national power during its formative years. Although this may not sound like an advantage, several high-profile new Left parties in Latin America suffered brand dilution and electorally collapsed because they quickly rose to national power and, once in government, shifted to the Right by adopting unpopular austerity policies. By contrast, IU remained in the opposition and firmly anti-neoliberal throughout its formative decade. This benefited IU by enabling it to develop a clear Left programmatic brand. Third,

95 To be sure, there is a difference between a coalition composed of parties and a party composed of factions. Yet, as noted earlier, the neutral bloc did seek to make IU a party – and almost succeeded. Had Barrantes not defected in 1989, IU might well have become a party. Why Barrantes defected before IU could become a party is, in a sense, the question of my case study.


98 Tanaka, Los espejismos, p. 135. The higher estimate (150,000) comes from the author’s interview with Henry Pease, moderate, independent IU leader, 21 Dec. 2010.


and crucially, although the crisis of the late 1980s exacerbated IU’s internal contradictions, it also discredited IU’s main rival, APRA, which was in power during the crisis. APRA’s reputational collapse created an opportunity for IU to establish itself as Peru’s strongest partisan organisation – and thus provided an incentive for its factions to remain united. In short, it was not necessarily obvious or inevitable, ex ante, that IU faced a more unfavourable mix of circumstances than other, ultimately successful new Left parties in Latin America.

Third, even if we concede, for the sake of argument, that IU did face a more unfavourable mix of circumstances, it does not follow that these circumstances made IU’s fatal schism inevitable. Indeed, it would be facile to claim, with the benefit of hindsight, that IU’s external challenges and organisational structure doomed it to failure. IU’s challenges may have rendered collapse more likely than in other new Left cases, but events have multiple causes, and this article purports to identify one decisive variable in IU’s split, not the only one. As noted earlier, I focus on this particular variable – the type of party leader – because it remains undertheorised in existing literature on party-building, and because it sheds new light on IU’s collapse.

Fourth, although one might suppose that, if IU had not split, it still would have electorally collapsed due to voters’ rejection of IU radicals’ revolutionary leftism, there is evidence to the contrary. Even in the early months of 1989, as the Shining Path was encircling Lima, national polls forecast that Barrantes and IU would finish either first or second in the 1990 general election. Moreover, IU performed remarkably well after Barrantes’ defection. In the 1990 congressional election, although 5 per cent of voters supported Barrantes’ Izquierda Socialista (Socialist Left, IS), and although an unknowable and almost certainly larger number of former and prospective IU supporters flocked to non-Left alternatives – especially Alberto Fujimori and his Cambio 90 (Change 90) – IU still garnered 10 per cent of the vote. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that, if a split had not occurred, IU, while

102 Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru, p. 78). See also Taylor, ‘One Step Forward’.
103 The 1990 presidential election results are consistent with the view that Barrantes had unrivalled external appeal within the IU, and that his coat-tails decisively contributed to the coalition’s national rise. A large segment of voters fled to non-Left tickets, especially that of Alberto Fujimori. The IU retained the parties’ organised constituencies and the IU brand. Barrantes retained the hard-core personalistic vote. The fact that the former (the IU parties’ organised constituencies plus the IU brand) defeated the latter (Barrantes’ personal brand) is notable but does not suggest that Barrantes’ coat-tails were unnecessary for the IU’s national rise. Barrantes may have needed the IU, but the IU evidently needed Barrantes as well.
it might not have won a national election, would have remained a major electoral force at the national level regardless of whether Barrantes remained at the top of the ticket.

Fifth and finally, there are two forms of evidence supporting the basic counterfactual assumption on which this article rests— that an externally appealing, internally dominant IU leader could have existed and prevented a schism. First, there is within-case evidence. As already observed, several figures in IU had strong cross-factional ties, even at the end of the 1980s (e.g., Pease, Ames, del Prado). Other figures had considerable moral authority among IU’s base (e.g., Diez Canseco, PUM’s leader). To imagine an externally appealing, internally dominant IU leader, we need only conceive a hypothetical scenario in which one of these leaders (e.g., Pease, del Prado, Diez Canseco) also happened to be popular with voters, or had the potential to become popular. Unless this hypothetical scenario is implausible, IU’s leadership deficit was a product of misfortune, not necessity. That is, it may have been unfortunate, not necessary, that IU, instead of having a single leader who combined external appeal and internal dominance, had one leader with unrivaled popularity (i.e., Barrantes) and other leaders with key sources of internal dominance (e.g., Pease, del Prado, Diez Canseco).

Of course, one might claim that the above hypothetical scenario is implausible. One could argue, for example, that, by the late 1980s, no leader could be acceptable to IU radicals and, simultaneously, externally appealing. Yet, such an argument implies, among other things, that IU radicals demanded a coalition leader who shared their revolutionary leftism. They did not. Although radicals opposed Barrantes’s presidential nomination in 1990, they did not demand his expulsion from IU, nor did they state that they would defect, or refuse to support him, if he won the nomination in the aforementioned closed primary. Moreover, after Barrantes’s defection, radicals ultimately assented to and supported the presidential candidacy of a moderate— independent Henry Pease.

Second, there is cross-national comparative evidence for the article’s basic counterfactual premise. The ‘most similar’ cases of Brazil’s PT and Mexico’s PRD further suggest that an externally appealing, internally dominant leader could have emerged in Peru during the 1980s. Admittedly, there are no perfect cross-national comparisons, and the early PT and PRD differed from IU in numerous ways. In particular, as already noted, the early PT and PRD were both parties, not coalitions, and neither encountered circumstances as extreme as those that IU faced in the late 1980s. Yet, the early PT and PRD did share a number of analytically relevant characteristics with IU. They were left-wing. They were born in the opposition, with limited access to state resources and mass media. They did not emerge from armed struggle—as, for example, the FMLN and FSLN did—which is relevant because shared
violent struggle can generate organisational cohesion.\textsuperscript{104} They had powerful grassroots organisations during their formative periods that mobilised masses of voters. They were heterogeneous fronts composed of revolutionary and reformist factions frequently engaged in ideological conflicts and power struggles. The PT and PRD depended on externally popular leaders — Lula da Silva and Cárdenas, respectively — for their early electoral competitiveness.\textsuperscript{105} Their leaders, like Barrantes, suffered electoral setbacks after early breakout performances and saw their images of external appeal decline as a result.\textsuperscript{106} While sharing all of these characteristics with IU, the early PT and PRD differed on (1) the dependent variable and (2) the independent variable highlighted in this article; that is, they survived intact rather than splitting (DV), and they had leaders who combined external appeal with internal dominance (IV). On this basis, I treat the PT and PRD as ‘most similar’ cases to IU.\textsuperscript{107}

The cases of the PT and PRD are both instructive for the IU case, albeit in different ways. Lula was a moderate within the PT, but he still had enormous clout with the party’s ‘extreme Left’.\textsuperscript{108} Cárdenas was a radical within the PRD but was still, by far, the party’s most electable figure. Although, again, there are many differences between IU, PT and PRD, these basic facts at least suggest that, in a possible world, an IU moderate could have acquired the support of IU radicals, or an IU radical could have been externally appealing.

Let us look a bit closer at both cases, beginning with the PRD. Cárdenas had immense moral authority on the Mexican Left, largely due to his lineage.\textsuperscript{109} He cultivated cross-factional ties as PRD leader.\textsuperscript{110} He ideologically represented


\textsuperscript{106} Following his near victory in the 1989 Brazilian presidential election, Lula unexpectedly lost the 1994 presidential election in a landslide. After near victory in Mexico’s 1988 presidential election, Cárdenas finished a distant third in Mexico’s 1994 presidential election.

\textsuperscript{107} Seawright and Gerring, ‘Case Selection Techniques’.

\textsuperscript{108} Perhaps most tellingly, in 1993, at the peak of internal moderate/radical tensions, and just months after the PT’s ‘extreme Left’ factions had won the internal election for the National Directory and National Executive Council, Lula’s ‘candidacy as party president met with overwhelming internal consensus’ (Hunter, Transformation of the Workers’ Party, pp. 121, 122). Shortly afterward, the party, still under radical control, unanimously nominated Lula as its 1994 presidential candidate.

\textsuperscript{109} Borjas, Partido de la Revolución Democrática, p. 293.

the predominantly radical PRD rank-and-file. Consequently, he dominated the PRD’s internal affairs. He played a ‘substituting role for the [PRD’s] lack of institutionalisation’, regularly making key party decisions and adjudicating internal conflicts without debate or negotiation. In contrast to Barrantes, he succeeded in securing the PRD’s presidential candidacy repeatedly in 1988, 1994 and 2000, with limited internal resistance.

Lula was similarly dominant within the PT. He was a morally authoritative figure, given his humble origins, working-class status, and leadership role in the PT’s founding labour and democratising struggles. He had strong pre-existing cross-factional ties and maintained them as PT leader, serving as the party’s main negotiator and guarantor of agreements. In ideological and programmatic terms, he represented the predominantly moderate PT rank-and-file, drawn primarily from Lula’s own labour union movement. Lula secured the PT’s presidential candidacy four times, with virtually no internal contestation, and prevailed upon the PT’s radical tendencies to moderate their rhetoric and demands in an effort to broaden the party’s electoral appeal.

The divergent fates of IU, PT and PRD suggest the vital role that party leaders can play in new party survival. Lula and Cárdenas dictated the internal affairs of their parties and repeatedly won their parties’ presidential nominations with ease, even when their ideological opponents controlled their national party organisations (e.g., Lula in 1994), and even when their images of electoral clout had suffered due to landslide losses in presidential elections (e.g., Lula in 1998; Cárdenas in 2000). Because they were internally dominant, they never had strong incentives to defect from the early PT and PRD.

Barrantes’s experience as IU leader starkly contrasts with Lula’s and Cárdenas’s. In contrast to Lula, Barrantes showed almost no capacity to

112 Borjas, *Partido de la Revolución Democrática*, p. 299.
119 Hunter, *Transformation of the Workers’ Party*. 
tame IU radicals. In contrast to Cárdenas, Barrantes did not function as IU’s informal decider or arbiter. In contrast to both leaders, Barrantes was never described as the ‘moral’ leader of IU. Most importantly, he ultimately proved unable to secure IU’s presidential nomination, which triggered his fatal defection.

It is also worth noting that in unprompted statements during interviews with the author, three top IU elites, all belonging to different factions, cited leadership as a key variable, or the key variable, that distinguished IU from the PT (Henry Pease, Javier Diez Canseco and Santiago Pedraglio).

Conclusion

This article has argued that externally appealing, internally dominant leaders can prevent new party schisms, and it has illustrated the mechanisms of this argument at work in the representative case of Peru’s IU. The article makes several main contributions. First, it proposes an original, empirically grounded theory that contributes to an emerging body of literature on the sources of new party cohesion (see Introduction). Second, through an application of this theory, it sheds new light on a consequential event, IU’s schism. Third, and most broadly, the article posits that the type of leader a new party has can be critical for its success or failure. As noted in the Introduction, scholars of party-building rarely focus on the role of leaders, for fear of excessive voluntarism. Consequently, the relationship between leader type and party-building outcome – particularly in its positive variants – remains undertheorised. Given the weakness of party systems in much of the developing world, and the importance of strong parties to democratic quality and stability, this relationship merits serious research, and the current article is an attempt to contribute to that research.

Briefly in closing, does the argument in this article contain any lessons for Peru’s new Left party, the Frente Amplio (Broad Front, FA), and its leader, Verónica Mendoza? In the 2016 general election, the FA became the first left-wing party in decades to achieve electoral success at the national level. Mendoza was placed third in the first round of the presidential election, with 19 per cent of the vote, and FA candidates garnered 14 per cent of the overall congressional vote. But party-building is a very difficult task. In order to take root, new parties generally need to have, among other things,

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120 For example, whereas Cárdenas unilaterally vetoed early calls for a unanimity requirement in the PRD’s national executive committee, Barrantes tried and failed to do the same in the early 1980s.

121 These interviews took place on 13, 6, and 10 Jan. 2011, respectively. In addition, in the already cited interview with the author, Tanaka, when prompted, argued that the differences between Barrantes and Lula were analytically significant.

a strong territorial organisation composed of committed activists, which IU had, and which FA lacks. On the other hand, FA is not facing some of IU’s contextual or organisational challenges (e.g., sectarian factions; profound national crisis). The article’s theoretical argument carries lessons for FA leader, Verónica Mendoza. At present, FA depends on Mendoza’s external electoral appeal. Yet, to be an internally dominant figure, and thus to minimise the likelihood of schism, Mendoza cannot rely on external appeal alone. She must strive to represent her active base, to forge constructive relationships across the factions, and, to the extent possible, to draw upon any special sources of moral authority that she might have (e.g., fluency in Quechua). These measures may help her to keep FA united, which in turn will help FA’s electoral (and therefore survival) prospects.

**Spanish and Portuguese abstracts**

**Spanish abstract.** ¿Por qué se dividen los partidos nuevos? Los estudiosos de las rupturas de nuevos partidos se alejan de explicaciones centradas en liderazgos por miedo a caer en un voluntarismo excesivo y por ende fracasan sistemáticamente en conceptualizar las diferencias entre líderes. Este artículo desafía tal tendencia, argumentando que líderes con popularidad externa y dominio interno son capaces de generar cohesión en los nuevos partidos. Analiza por qué algunos líderes populares al exterior son internamente dominantes, mientras que otros no lo son, y defiende que tal variación puede marcar la diferencia entre la ruptura y la supervivencia. El argumento se apoya en un caso de estudio representativo: la fatal (y significativa) división de la coalición Izquierda Unida de Perú a fines de los años 1980.

**Spanish keywords:** partidos políticos, América Latina, cohesión, liderazgo, teoría de construcción

**Portuguese abstract.** Por que partidos novos se separam? Acadêmicos que estudam as cisões dos novos partidos se afastam de explicações centradas em lideranças por receio de um voluntarismo excessivo, logo falhando sistematicamente em conceituar as diferenças entre líderes. Esse artigo contesta essa tendência, e argumenta que líderes que têm apelo externo e dominância interna geram coesão em partidos novos. Também analisa o porquê de alguns líderes com apelo externo serem dominantes internamente enquanto outros não, e argumenta que essa variação pode fazer diferença entre cisão e sobrevivência. Este artigo corrobora seu argumento através de um estudo de caso representativo: a fatal (e significativa) divisão da coligação da Esquerda Unida do Peru, no final dos anos 80.

**Portuguese keywords:** partidos políticos, América Latina, coesão, liderança, teoria de construção