

Appendix 3.3: Robustness Checks: Ratification

Appendix 3.3a: Influences on the Rate of ICCPR Ratification Cox proportionate hazard model

Explanatory Variables:	ICCPR Preferences	ICCPR Domestic Institutions	ICCPR Strategic Behavior	ICCPR World Culture	ICCPR Coercion
<i>Indicators of preferences:</i>					
Democracy (Polity score)	1.043*** (p=.007)	1.090*** (p=.001)	1.045** (p=.012)	1.075*** (p=.001)	1.092*** (p=.000)
Democracy ² (Polity score ²)	.999 (p=.864)	--	--	--	--
Democratic improvements (3 year lag)	1.06** (p=.011)	1.05** (p=.038)	1.060** (.027)	1.05* (p=.095)	1.069** (p=.044)
Protestant	2.20* (p=.076)	2.68** (p=.040)	2.32** (.044)	2.24* (p=.089)	2.91** (p=.024)
Catholic	2.67*** (p=.000)	2.099*** (.010)	2.16*** (p=.007)	2.85*** (p=.001)	3.40*** (p=.000)
Islam	1.10 (p=.756)	--	--	--	--
Left Government	1.91*** (p=.009)	1.98*** (p=.010)	1.76** (.481)	1.46 (p=.26)	1.22 (p=.518)
Military government	.965 (p=.887)	--	--	--	--
<i>Domestic Institutions producing false negatives:</i>					
British Legal Heritage	--	.559**	.687 (p=.136)	.732 (p=.292)	.418** (p=.031)
Presidential System	--	1.18 (p=.212)	--	--	--
Ratification Process	--	1.16 (p=.204)	--	--	--
Ratification barriers in democracies	--	.974 (p=.155)	--	--	--
Degree of Federalism	--	.974 (p=.747)	--	--	--
<i>Strategic behavior producing false positives:</i>					
Regional Ratifications	--	--	1.02** (p=.020)	1.024** (p=.026)	1.029*** (p=.003)
Year of government's term	--	--	1.026* (p=.090)	1.032 (p=.123)	1.037** (p=.032)
<i>Alternative Explanations: World Culture:</i>					
World ratifications	--	--	--	.983 (p=.567)	--
Trade intensity	--	--	--	.669 (p=.436)	--
Embeddedness	--	--	--	1.01	--

				(p=.278)	
Conferences	--	--	--	3.87 (p=.236)	--
Average regional political rights				1.323* (p=.084)	1.41** (p=.029)
<i>Alternative Explanations: Coercion:</i>					
Log of GDP/capita (wealth)	--	--	--	.755** (p=.018)	.623*** (p=.083)
Log of GDP (size)	--	--	--	--	1.17** (p=.047)
Overseas Development Assistance/GDP	--	--	--	--	.716 (p=.772)
Use of IMF credits	--	--	--	--	.400** (p=.152)
British Colony	--	--	--	--	3.98 (p=.152)
British Effect	--	--	--	--	.325 (p=.226)
French Colony	--	--	--	--	.475 (p=.288)
French Effect	--	--	--	--	2.283 (p=.326)
#of countries	115	111	112	83	101
#of ratifications	86	84	85	65	77
#of observations	1491	1442	1460	1018	1314
Prob >chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* significant at the .10 level ** significant at the .05 level ***significant at the .01 level

Appendix 3.3b: Influences on the Rate of ICESCR Ratification
Cox proportionate hazard model

Explanatory Variables:	ICESCR Preferences	ICESCR Domestic Institutions	ICESCR Strategic Behavior	ICESCR World Culture	ICESCR Coercion
<i>Indicators of preferences:</i>					
Democracy (Polity score)	1.060*** (p=.003)	1.107*** (p=.00)	1.066*** (p=.001)	1.091*** (p=.000)	1.091*** (p=.000)
Democracy ² (Polity score ²)	.996 (p=.454)	--	--	--	--
Democratic improvements (3 year lag)	1.03 (p=.354)	--	--	--	-
Protestant	1.49 (p=.491)	--	--	2.60* (p=.064)	3.01** (p=.030)
Catholic	2.53*** (p=.000)	2.08*** (.010)	2.34*** (p=.006)	2.865*** (p=.002)	3.17*** (p=.000)
Left Government	1.96** (p=.011)	1.93** (p=.011)	1.87** (p=.014)	1.73** (p=.043)	1.66** (p=.050)
GDP growth	.965** (p=.042)	.960*** (p=.008)	.958*** (p=.008)	.980 (p=.400)	.971* (p=.086)
GDP per capita	.945 (p=.561)	--	--	--	.647** (p=.016)
<i>Domestic Institutions producing false negatives:</i>					
British Legal Heritage	--	.488** (p=.014)	.643 (p=.138)	.732 (p=.292)	.413** (p=.074)
Presidential System	--	.805 (p=.147)	--	--	--
Ratification Process	--	.710* (p=.066)	.623** (p=.012)	.555*** (p=.003)	.597** (p=.016)
Degree of Federalism	--	.894 (p=.217)	--	--	--
<i>Strategic behavior producing false positives:</i>					
Regional Ratifications	--	--	1.027*** (p=.001)	1.037*** (p=.001)	1.034*** (p=.003)
Year of government's term	--	--	1.018 (p=.359)	--	--
<i>Alternative Explanations: World Culture:</i>					
World ratifications	--	--	--	.981 (p=.460)	--
Trade intensity	--	--	--	1.85 (p=.179)	--
Embeddedness	--	--	--	1.23*** (p=.005)	--
Conferences	--	--	--	.558 (p=.527)	--
Reg. Economic freedom	--	--	--	.400*** (p=.002)	.490** (p=.012)

(Inverse Ave. regional govern't size)					
<i>Alternative Explanations: Coercion:</i>					
Log of GDP (size)	--	--	--	--	.997 (p=.77)
Overseas Development Assistance/GDP	--	--	--	--	.046* (p=.055)
Use of IMF credits	--	--	--	--	.276*** (p=.005)
British Colony	--	--	--	--	.866 (p=.897)
British Effect	--	--	--	--	1.34 (p=.787)
French Colony	--	--	--	--	.451 (p=.265)
French Effect	--	--	--	--	2.22 (p=.346)
#of countries	98	104	104	84	101
#of ratifications	71	74	74	64	77
#of observations	1203	1257	1257	958	1314
Prob >chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* significant at the .10 level ** significant at the .05 level ***significant at the .01 level

Appendix 3.3c: Influences on the Rate of CERD Ratification
Cox proportionate hazard model

Explanatory Variables:	CERD Preferences	CERD Domestic Institutions	CERD Strategic Behavior	CERD World Culture	CERD Coercion
<i>Indicators of preferences:</i>					
Democracy (Polity score)	1.017 (p=.307)	1.043** (p=.012)	1.01 (p=.434)	1.01 (p=.436)	1.004 (p=.800)
Democracy ² (Polity score ²)	1.002 (p=.555)	--	--	--	--
Democratic improvements (3 year lag)	.972 (p=.479)	--	--	--	-
Protestant	1.31 (p=.374)	1.55 (p=.123)	1.57 (p=.113)	1.45 (p=.185)	1.72* (p=.090)
Catholic	1.82** (p=.021)	1.25 (.306)	1.38 (p=.137)	1.14 (p=.566)	1.54* (p=.081)
Socialist orientation	1.87* (p=.057)	2.25*** (p=.001)	1.91** (p=.011)	2.93*** (p=.001)	2.86*** (p=.008)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.216 (p=.619)	--	--	--	--
<i>Domestic Institutions producing false negatives:</i>					
British Legal Heritage	--	.796 (p=.317)	--	--	--
Presidential System	--	.794* (p=.061)	--	--	--
Ratification Process	--	.968 (p=.843)	--	--	--
Degree of Federalism	--	.920 (p=.190)	--	--	--
<i>Strategic behavior producing false positives:</i>					
Regional Ratifications	--	--	1.016*** (p=.000)	1.030*** (p=.000)	1.017** (p=.011)
<i>Alternative Explanations: World Culture:</i>					
World ratifications	--	--	--	.968*** (p=.001)	--
Embeddedness	--	--	--	1.04 (p=.479)	--
Conferences	--	--	--	.801 (p=.719)	--
<i>Alternative Explanations: Coercion:</i>					
Log of GDP (size)	--	--	--	--	1.035 (p=.645)
Overseas Development Assistance/GDP	--	--	--	--	.098 (p=.255)
Use of IMF credits	--	--	--	--	.743 (p=.354)
British Colony	--	--	--	--	1.31

					(p=.546)
British Effect	--	--	--	--	.933 (p=.878)
French Colony	--	--	--	--	1.097 (p=.853)
French Effect	--	--	--	--	2.16 (p=.212)
#of countries	127	135	138	138	116
#of ratifications	93	122	125	124	102
#of observations	1153	1500	1518	1504	1277
Prob >chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* significant at the .10 level ** significant at the .05 level ***significant at the .01 level

Appendix 3.3d: Influences on the Rate of CAT Ratification
Cox proportionate hazard model

Explanatory Variables:	CAT Preferences	CAT Domestic Institutions	CAT Strategic Behavior	CAT World Culture	CAT Coercion
<i>Indicators of preferences:</i>					
Democracy (Polity score)	1.039** (p=.029)	1.058*** (p=.002)	1.061*** (p=.001)	1.051*** (p=.010)	1.053** (p=.015)
Democracy ² (Polity score ²)	.994 (p=.117)	.994 (p=.165)	.994* (p=.066)	.993** (p=.031)	.992** (p=.021)
Democratic improvements (3 year lag)	.967 (p=.583)	--	--	--	-
Protestant	2.91*** (p=.001)	2.13** (p=.030)	1.61 (p=.193)	--	--
Catholic	2.03** (p=.019)	1.12 (p=.685)	--	--	--
Islam	1.60 (p=.108)	1.25 (p=.417)	--	--	--
Left Government	1.23 (p=.365)	--	--	--	--
Military government	.770 (p=.355)	--	--	--	--
<i>Domestic Institutions producing false negatives:</i>					
British Legal Heritage	--	.392*** (p=.000)	.526** (p=.011)	.554** (p=.022)	.639 (p=.244)
Presidential System	--	1.051 (p=.693)	--	--	--
Ratification Process	--	.994 (p=.975)	--	--	--
Degree of Federalism	--	1.09 (p=.155)	--	--	--
<i>Strategic behavior producing false positives:</i>					
Regional Ratifications	--	--	1.026*** (p=.000)	1.028*** (p=.000)	1.023*** (p=.000)
Year of government's term	--	--	1.021 (p=.131)	1.021 (p=.167)	1.017 (p=.291)
<i>Alternative Explanations: World Culture:</i>					
World ratifications	--	--	--	.992 (p=.621)	--
Embeddedness	--	--	--	1.104* (p=.053)	1.07 (p=.141)
Conferences	--	--	--	.463 (p=.282)	--
<i>Alternative Explanations: Coercion:</i>					
Log of GDP (size)	--	--	--	--	1.11 (p=.111)

Log of GDP/capita (wealth)					.876 (p=.331)
Overseas Development Assistance/GDP	--	--	--	--	.036* (p=.085)
Use of IMF credits	--	--	--	--	.703 (p=.358)
British Colony	--	--	--	--	.699 (p=.433)
French Colony	--	--	--	--	1.120 (p=.695)
#of countries	138	146	149	149	137
#of ratifications	90	103	105	105	96
#of observations	1420	1552	1586	1544	1425
Prob >chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* significant at the .10 level ** significant at the .05 level ***significant at the .01 level

Appendix 3.3e: Influences on the Rate of CEDAW Ratification
Cox proportionate hazard model

Explanatory Variables:	CEDAW Preferences	CEDAW Domestic Institutions	CEDAW Strategic Behavior	CEDAW World Culture	CEDAW Coercion
<i>Indicators of preferences:</i>					
Democracy (Polity score)	1.025 (p=.110)	1.133*** (p=.000)	1.147*** (p=.000)	1.14*** (p=.000)	1.12** (p=.004)
Democracy ² (Polity score ²)	.994* (p=.053)	.996 (p=.150)	--	--	--
Democratic improvements (3 year lag)	1.027 (p=.502)	--	--	--	-
Protestant	1.27 (p=.502)	--	--	--	--
Catholic	1.66** (p=.033)	1.097 (p=.663)	--	--	--
Islam	.603** (p=.040)	.516*** (p=.009)	.593*** (p=.010)	.552*** (p=.006)	.553*** (p=.003)
Left Government	1.45 (p=.068)	1.29 (p=.184)	--	--	--
Log GDP/capita	1.055 (p=.449)	--	--	--	--
<i>Domestic Institutions producing false negatives:</i>					
British Legal Heritage	--	.566*** (p=.008)	.610** (p=.030)	.583** (p=.015)	.602 (p=.102)
Presidential System	--	1.007 (p=.953)	--	--	--
Ratification Process	--	1.47** (p=.021)	1.11 (p=.507)	1.08 (p=.600)	.918 (p=.620)
Ratification Process in strong democracies		.949*** (p=.002)	.932*** (p=.000)	.931*** (p=.000)	.943*** (p=.006)
Degree of Federalism	--	.987 (p=.832)	--	--	--
<i>Strategic behavior producing false positives:</i>					
Regional Ratifications	--	--	1.027*** (p=.000)	1.020*** (p=.000)	1.024*** (p=.000)
Year of government's term			1.004 (p=.710)	--	--
<i>Alternative Explanations: World Culture:</i>					
World ratifications	--	--	--	1.007 (p=.542)	--
Embeddedness	--	--	--	1.115** (p=.020)	1.16*** (p=.006)
Conferences	--	--	--	1.79	--

					(p=.161)
<i>Alternative Explanations: Coercion:</i>					
Log of GDP (size)	--	--	--	--	.882 (p=.702)
Log of GDP/capita (wealth)					.950 (p=.331)
Overseas Development Assistance/GDP	--	--	--	--	.361 (p=.519)
Use of IMF credits	--	--	--	--	.627 (p=.175)
British Colony	--	--	--	--	.473** (p=.044)
British Effect					2.72*** (p=.023)
French Colony	--	--	--	--	.408 (p=.191)
French Effect					2.219 (p=.265)
#of countries	119	139	144	145	129
#of ratifications	103	121	130	131	118
#of observations	1149	1280	1370	1382	1206
Prob >chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* significant at the .10 level ** significant at the .05 level ***significant at the .01 level

Appendix 3.3f: Influences on the Rate of CRC Ratification
Cox proportionate hazard model

Explanatory Variables:	CRC Preferences	CRC Domestic Institutions	CRC Strategic Behavior	CRC World Culture	CRC Coercion
<i>Indicators of preferences:</i>					
Democracy (Polity score)	1.025** (p=.030)	1.044*** (p=.001)	1.032** (p=.014)	1.031*** (p=.007)	1.029** (p=.012)
Democracy ² (Polity score ²)	.997 (p=.198)	--	--	--	--
Democratic improvements (3 year lag)	1.026 (p=.267)	--	--	--	-
Protestant	1.264 (p=.401)	--	--	--	--
Catholic	1.55** (p=.029)	1.422** (p=.037)	1.23 (p=.220)	--	--
Islam	.971 (p=.880)	--	--	--	--
Left Government	1.06 (p=.732)	--	--	--	--
Log GDP/capita	.826*** (p=.001)	.815*** (p=.001)	.826*** (.001)	.834*** (p=.002)	.756** (p=.011)
<i>Domestic Institutions producing false negatives:</i>					
British Legal Heritage	--	.714* (p=.053)	.661*** (p=.010)	.657** (p=.014)	.464*** (p=.008)
Presidential System	--	.893 (p=.349)	--	--	--
Ratification Process	--	.765* (p=.056)	.743** (p=.029)	.759** (p=.043)	.750** (p=.034)
Degree of Federalism	--	.959 (p=.322)	--	--	--
<i>Strategic behavior producing false positives:</i>					
Regional Ratifications	--	--	1.013*** (p=.004)	1.016*** (p=.000)	1.017*** (p=.000)
Year of government's term			1.005 (p=.565)	--	--
<i>Alternative Explanations: World Culture:</i>					
World ratifications	--	--	--	1.029** (p=.035)	1.018 (p=.268)
Embeddedness	--	--	--	1.036 (p=.315)	--
<i>Alternative Explanations: Coercion:</i>					
Log of GDP (size)	--	--	--	--	1.018 (p=.752)
Overseas	--	--	--	--	.489

Development Assistance/GDP					(p=.459)
Use of IMF credits	--	--	--	--	.693 (p=.192)
British Colony	--	--	--	--	1.53 (p=.104)
French Colony	--	--	--	--	.954 (p=.827)
#of countries	119	128	129	131	129
#of ratifications	116	126	127	129	118
#of observations	415	442	444	450	1206
Prob >chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* significant at the .10 level ** significant at the .05 level ***significant at the .01 level