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## HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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## **Office Contact Information:**

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### **Personal Information:**

Date of birth: February 17, 1984 Citizenship: France

#### **Undergraduate Studies**:

Ecole Normale Supérieure Ulm, Major in Economics, Paris, 2005-2009 M.A. in Economics, Paris School of Economics, with highest honours, 2006-2008 B.A. in Econometrics, University Paris-I Panthéon-Sorbonne, with highest honours, 2005-2006

#### Graduate Studies:

Harvard University, 2010 to present <u>Thesis Title</u>: "*Essays on the Political Economy of Information*" <u>Expected Completion Date</u>: June 2014

References:	
Professor Nathan Nunn	Professor Richard Hornbeck
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#### **Teaching and Research Fields**:

Primary fields: Political Economy, Economic History Secondary fields: International Trade, Development Economics, Industrial Organization

## **Teaching Experience:**

Spring 2014	Aid, Debt and International Finance (graduate), Paris School of Economics (lecturer)
Fall 2013	Economics of the Media (graduate), CELSA (lecturer)
Fall 2012	Development Economics (graduate), Telecom ParisTech (lecturer)
Spring 2010	Political Economy (graduate), Sciences Po (teaching fellow)
Summer 2009	Political Economy of Development, Advanced Graduate Workshop on Poverty,
	Development and Globalization, Manchester (teaching fellow)
Fall 2009	Macroeconomics (graduate), Paris School of Economics (teaching fellow)
Spring 2009	Macroeconomics (undergraduate), Harvard (teaching fellow)
Fall 2008	Distribution and Development (undergraduate), Harvard (teaching fellow)

## **Research Experience and Other Employment:**

2013	European Commission (EuropeAid), Junior Expert
2008-2009	World Bank, Consultant
2008-2009	French Agency for Development, Consultant
2007	French Ministry for the Foreign Affairs, Centre of Analysis and Forecast, Intern
2006-2007	OECD Development Centre, Research Assistant

## **Professional Activities**:

**Refereeing**: Economics of Transition; International Journal of Industrial Organization; Journal of International Trade and Economic Development; Journal of Public Economics; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Review of Economics and Statistics.

## Academic Visits:

Fall 2009: Oxford University, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, Visiting research fellow.

## Invited Seminars and Conferences:

2013: Big Data for Media Analysis (Paris)

2013: Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (Yokohama).

2012: NYU, Department of Politics; IPD African Task Force (Columbia University).

2011: Foro de Biarritz (Santo Domingo); CAP/IDEAS (Madrid).

2010: World Bank Workshop on Economic Growth.

2009: Oxford University; Foro de Biarritz (Quito); African Task Force (Pretoria); French Agency for Economic Development.

## **Other Seminars and Conferences:**

2013: TILEC Workshop; Working Group in African Political Economy (WGAPE); Harvard Economic History Tea; Harvard Industrial Organization Lunch; Harvard Research Workshop in Political Economy; Harvard Macro Lunch; MIT Political Economy Breakfast; Harvard Development Lunch; Harvard Organizational Economics Lunch; PSE Applied Economics Lunch Seminar.

2012: Harvard Macro Lunch; MIT Political Economy Breakfast; Harvard Economic History Tea; Harvard Industrial Organization Lunch.

2011: Media Economics Workshop (Moscow); IEA (Beijing); Harvard International Lunch; Harvard Development Lunch.

2010: PSE Applied Economics Lunch.

2009: AFSE Congress (Paris); EEA-ESEM Congress (Barcelona); PET (Galway); PSE Applied Economics Lunch; North American Meeting of the Econometric Society (Boston); MIT Political Economy Breakfast; Harvard Research Workshop in Political Economy; Harvard Labor-Public Finance Lunch.

2008: Advanced Graduate Workshop on Poverty, Development and Globalization (Manchester); PSE Macroeconomic Tea Break.

### Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2013-2014	Roger L. Martin Cornerstone Graduate Student Fellowship Fund, Harvard
2013	NET Institute research grant
2012-2013	Center for European Studies (Harvard University) Krupp Foundation Graduate
	Dissertation Research Fellowship
2011 & 2012	Warbung Funds research grant, Department of Economics, Harvard University
2011-present	LEAP research grant, Department of Economics, Harvard University
2010-2013	CEPREMAP research grant
2010 & 2012	Paris School of Economics research grant
2010-present	Harvard Grant
2008-2009	Herchel-Smith ENS-Harvard exchange fellowship

### **Research Papers:**

#### "Media Competition, Information Provision and Political Participation" [Job Market Paper]

This paper investigates the impact of increased media competition on the quantity and quality of news provided and, ultimately, changes in political participation. Drawing from the literature on vertical product differentiation to model the production choices of newspapers, I show how an increase in the number of newspapers can decrease both the quantity and quality of information provided. I build a new county-level panel dataset of local newspaper presence and political turnout in France, from 1945 to 2012. I estimate the effect of newspaper entry by comparing counties that experience entry to similar counties in the same years that do not. These counties exhibit similar trends prior to newspaper are also associated with fewer news articles and lower information provision. These effects are concentrated in counties with homogeneous populations, as predicted by the model, with little impact on counties with heterogeneous populations. Newspaper entry, and the associated decline in information provision, is ultimately found to decrease voter turnout.

# "Improving "National Brands": Reputation for Quality and Export Promotion Policies" (with Dorothée Rouzet)

#### R&R at the Journal of International Economics.

Why do "made in" labels matter? We study the effect of firm and country reputation on exports when buyers cannot observe quality prior to purchase. Firm-level demand is determined by expected quality, which depends on both past experience with the good and the country of origin's reputation for quality. Asymmetric information acts as a barrier to entry for high-quality firms but facilitates sales by "fly-by-night" low-quality firms. We derive two types of steady-state equilibria with endogenous reputation. In a high-quality equilibrium, imperfect information does not hinder entry into export markets, but there is a distortion in profits and in the quality composition of exports. In a low-quality equilibrium, we obtain a sorting of firms into exporting that is non-linear in quality. A range of relatively high-quality firms are permanently kept out of the market by the informational friction, so that countries with bad quality reputation can be locked into exporting low-quality, low-cost goods. Export subsidies then have a positive welfare effect on the exporting country, by improving the average quality of its exports and its terms of trade. However, a subsidy has the opposite longrun effects in a country that initially exports relatively high-quality products. The model is consistent with empirical patterns of export prices. Measuring national reputations by analyzing the content of US newspaper articles about foreign countries over 1988-2006, we find that more positive news coverage of foreign countries and companies is associated with higher unit values of their exports to the US, particularly in sectors with a larger scope for vertical differentiation.

#### "The Long-Term Effects of the Printing Press in sub-Saharan Africa" (with Valeria Rueda) (submitted)

This article examines the long-term consequences of the introduction of the printing press in the 19th century on newspaper readership and other civic attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, Protestant missionaries were the first both to import the printing press technology and to allow the indigenous population to use it. We build a new geocoded dataset locating Protestant missions in 1903. This dataset includes, for each mission station, the geographic location and its characteristics, as well as the educational and health related investments undertaken by the mission. We show that proximity to a historical missionary settlement endowed with a printing press significantly increases newspaper readership today within regions located close to historical mission settlements. We also find a positive impact on political participation at the community level. Results are robust to a variety of identification strategies that attempt to address the potential endogenous selection of missions into printing and externalities on education and literacy.

"Tax Revenues, Development, and the Fiscal Cost of Trade Liberalization, 1792-2006" (with Lucie Gadenne) (*submitted*)

This paper puts the recent evolution of tax revenues in developing countries in historical perspective. Using a novel dataset on total and trade tax revenues we compare the fiscal cost of trade liberalization in developing countries and in today's rich countries at earlier stages of development. We find that trade liberalization episodes led to larger and longer-lived decreases in total tax revenues in developing countries since the 1970s than in rich countries in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The fall in total tax revenues lasts more than ten years in half the developing countries in our sample.

## "Asymmetric Information, Rent Extraction and Aid Efficiency" (2009)

Official Development Aid flows are volatile, non-predictable and not delivered in a transparent way. All these features reinforce asymmetric information between the citizens and the recipient government about the amount of aid flows received by developing countries. This article uses a political economy model of rent extraction to show how this asymmetry (i) encourages rent extraction by kleptocratic regimes, thus reducing aid efficiency, and (ii) increases the negative impact of aid volatility. It identifies a new channel - the "asymmetric information" channel - through which aid volatility is costly for recipient countries. The empirical relevance of the model is confirmed on a panel data of developing countries. Using various specifications and econometric methods, and developing new yearly estimates of aid volatility. I show that (i) introducing more information increases aid efficiency, that (ii) the negative impact of aid volatility on aid efficiency vanishes once one controls for information, and that (iii) this positive impact of information does not come from the fact that more transparent countries tend to have better institutions.

## **Research in Progress**

"Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Evidence from the Newspaper Industry" (with Charles Angelucci and Romain De Nijs).

### In Preparation

"The Economics of the African Media" in preparation for the *Handbook of Africa and Economics* (Oxford University Press).