Growth or Glamour?
Fundamentals and Systematic Risk in Stock Returns

John Y. Campbell, Christopher Polk, and Tuomo Vuolteenaho

1Campbell: Department of Economics, Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138, and NBER. Email john_campbell@harvard.edu. Phone 617-496-6448 Polk: Department of Finance, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, UK. Email c.polk@lse.ac.uk. Vuolteenaho: Arrowstreet Capital, LP, 200 Clarendon St., 30th floor, Boston, MA 02116. Email tvuolteenaho@arrowstreetcapital.com. We are grateful to Campbell Harvey and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier version. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0214061 to Campbell.
Abstract

The cash flows of growth stocks are particularly sensitive to temporary movements in aggregate stock prices, driven by shocks to market discount rates, while the cash flows of value stocks are particularly sensitive to permanent movements, driven by shocks to aggregate cash flows. Thus the high betas of growth (value) stocks with the market’s discount-rate (cash-flow) shocks are determined by the cash-flow fundamentals of growth and value companies. Growth stocks are not merely “glamour stocks” whose systematic risks are purely driven by investor sentiment. More generally, the systematic risks of individual stocks with similar accounting characteristics are primarily driven by the systematic risks of their fundamentals.

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Why do stock prices move together? If stocks are priced by discounting their cash flows at a rate that is constant over time, although possibly varying across stocks, then movements in stock prices are driven by news about cash flows. In this case common variation in prices must be attributable to common variation in cash flows. If discount rates vary over time, however, then groups of stocks can move together because of common shocks to discount rates rather than fundamentals. For example, a change in the market discount rate will have a particularly large effect on the prices of stocks whose cash flows occur in the distant future (Cornell, 1999; Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman, 2004; Lettau and Wachter, 2007), so these stocks will tend to rise together when the market discount rate declines, and fall together when the market discount rate increases. It is also possible for groups of stocks to experience changes in the discount rates applied to their cash flows specifically. In the extreme, irrational investor sentiment can cause common variation in stock prices that is entirely unrelated to the characteristics of cash flows; Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) and Greenwood (2005) suggest that this explains the common movement of stocks that are included in the S&P 500 and Nikkei indexes.

Common variation in stock prices is particularly important when it affects the measures of systematic risk that rational investors use to evaluate stocks. In the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the risk of each stock is measured by its beta with the market portfolio, and it is natural to ask whether stocks’ market betas are determined by shocks to their cash flows or their discount rates (Campbell and Mei 1993). Recently, Campbell (1993, 1996) and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) have proposed a version of Merton’s (1973) Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM), in which investors care more about permanent cash-flow-driven movements than about temporary discount-rate-driven movements in the aggregate stock market. In their model, the required return on a stock is determined not by its overall beta with the market, but by two separate betas, one with permanent cash-flow shocks to the market, and the other with temporary shocks to market discount rates. They call the first beta with respect to cash-flow shocks, “bad beta”, because investors demand a high price to bear this risk. The second beta with respect to discount-rate shocks, “good beta”, because its price of risk is relatively low.

In this paper we ask whether firms’ systematic risks are determined by the characteristics of their cash flows, or whether instead they arise from the discount rates that investors apply to those cash flows. We use bad and good betas as systematic risk measures that are suggested by the two-beta model, but we do not test the implications of that model for the cross-section of average stock returns, instead treating
the comovements of stocks with market cash flows and discount rates as objects of inherent interest. We first study the systematic risks of value and growth stocks, and then we examine other common movements in stock returns that can be predicted using firm-level equity market and accounting data.

At least since the influential work of Fama and French (1993), it has been understood that value stocks and growth stocks tend to move together, so that an investor who holds long positions in value stocks or short positions in growth stocks takes on a common source of risk. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) argue that this common risk should command a high price if their two-beta asset pricing model is correct. Using a vector autoregression (VAR) approach to disentangle cash-flow and discount-rate shocks at the market level, they find that value stocks have relatively high bad betas with market cash-flow shocks. This pattern is consistent over time, but while in the 1929-62 period value stocks also have relatively high good betas with market discount-rate shocks, in the period since 1963 value stocks have relatively low good betas and low overall betas with the market. Thus the high average return on value stocks, which contradicts the CAPM in the post-1963 period (Basu, 1977, 1983; Ball, 1978; Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein 1985; Fama and French 1992), is predicted by the two-beta model if Campbell and Vuolteenaho’s VAR specification is correct.²

An open question is what determines the comovements of value and growth stocks. One view is that value and growth stocks are exposed to different cash-flow risks. Fama and French (1996), for example, argue that value stocks are companies that are in financial distress and vulnerable to bankruptcy. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) suggest that growth stocks might have speculative investment opportunities that will be profitable only if equity financing is available on sufficiently good terms; thus they are equity-dependent companies of the sort modeled by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003). According to this fundamentals view, growth stocks move together with other growth stocks and value stocks with other value stocks because of the characteristics of their cash flows, as would be implied by a simple model of stock valuation in which discount rates are constant.

The empirical evidence for the fundamentals view is mixed. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) study long-horizon (up to 5-year) returns on value and growth portfolios, which should reflect cash-flow shocks more than temporary shocks to discount rates. They find little evidence that long-horizon value stock returns covary

²Chen and Zhao (2008) point out that changing the VAR specification can reverse this result, a critique we address below.
more strongly than long-horizon growth stock returns with the aggregate stock market or the business cycle. On the other hand, Fama and French (1995) document common variation in the profitability of value and growth stocks, and Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2008) find that value stocks’ profitability covaries more strongly with market-wide profitability than does growth stocks’ profitability. Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2003, 2005) and Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2005) use econometric methods similar to those in this paper to show that value stocks’ cash flows have a higher long-run sensitivity to aggregate consumption growth than do growth stocks’ cash flows.3

An alternative view is that the stock market simply prices value and growth stocks differently at different times. Cornell (1999) and Lettau and Wachter (2007), for example, argue that growth stock profits accrue further in the future than value stock profits, so growth stocks are longer-duration assets whose values are more sensitive to changes in the market discount rate. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) argue that value stocks lack common fundamentals but are merely those stocks that are currently out of favor with investors, while growth stocks are merely “glamour stocks” that are currently favored by investors. According to this sentiment view, changes in investor sentiment—or equivalently, changes in the discount rates that investors apply to cash flows—create correlated movements in the prices of stocks that investors favor or disfavor.

In this paper, we set up direct tests of the fundamentals view against the sentiment view, using several alternative approaches. Our first and simplest test avoids the need for VAR estimation. We use accounting return on equity (ROE) to construct direct proxies for firm-level and market cash-flow news, and the price-earnings ratio to construct a proxy for market discount-rate news. Since ROE is subject to short-term fluctuations, we lengthen the horizon to emphasize longer-term trends that correspond more closely to the revisions in infinite-horizon expectations that are relevant for stock prices. We consider a range of horizons from two to five years and show how the choice of horizon influences the results. We find that at all these horizons, the ROE of value stocks is more sensitive to the ROE of the market than is the ROE of growth stocks, consistent with the findings of Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2008). We also report the novel result that in the period since 1963, the ROE of growth stocks is more

3Liew and Vassalou (2000) show that value-minus-growth returns covary with future macroeconomic fundamentals. However, it is not clear that this result is driven by business-cycle variation in the cash flows of value stocks; it could arise from correlation between discount rates and the macroeconomy.
sensitive to the market’s price-earnings ratio than is the ROE of value stocks. These results support the fundamentals view that the risk patterns in value and growth stock returns reflect underlying patterns in value and growth stock cash flows.

In a second test, we estimate VARs for market returns in the manner of Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Mei (1993), and for firm-level returns in the manner of Vuolteenaho (2002), to break market and firm-level stock returns into components driven by cash-flow shocks and discount-rate shocks. This approach has the advantage that if we have correctly specified our VARs, we can measure the discounted effects of current shocks out to the infinite future, and not merely over the next few years. We aggregate the estimated firm-level shocks for those stocks that are included in value and growth portfolios, and regress portfolio-level cash-flow and discount-rate news on the market’s cash-flow and discount-rate news to find out whether fundamentals or sentiment drive the systematic risks of value and growth stocks. According to our results, the bad beta of value stocks and the good beta of growth stocks are both determined primarily by their cash-flow characteristics. To address the concern of Chen and Zhao (2008) that VAR results are sensitive to the particular VAR specification that is used, we consider several alternative market-level VARs.

In a third test, we continue to rely on VAR methodology but avoid portfolio construction by running cross-sectional regressions of realized firm-level betas onto firms’ book-to-market equity ratios. We find that a firm’s book-to-market equity ratio predicts its bad beta positively and its good beta negatively, consistent with the results of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). When we decompose each firm’s bad and good beta into components driven by the firm’s cash-flow news and discount-rate news, we find that the book-to-market equity ratio primarily predicts the cash flow component of the bad beta, not the discount-rate component.

All three tests tell us that the systematic risks of value and growth stocks are determined by the properties of their cash flows. These results have important implications for our understanding of the value-growth effect. While formal models are notably lacking in this area, any structural model of the value-growth effect must relate to the underlying cash-flow risks of value and growth companies. Growth stocks are not merely glamour stocks whose comovement is driven purely by correlated sentiment. Our results show that there’s more to growth than just “glamour.”

While Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) concentrate on value and growth portfolios, the two-beta model has broader application. In Section 3 of this paper we use cross-sectional stock-level regressions to identify the characteristics of common
stocks that predict their bad and good betas. We look at market-based historical risk measures, the lagged beta and volatility of stock returns; at accounting-based historical risk measures, the lagged beta and volatility of a firm’s return on assets (ROA); and at accounting-based measures of a firm’s financial status, including its ROA, debt-to-asset ratio, and capital investment-asset ratio.

Accounting measures of stock-level risk are not emphasized in contemporary finance research, but were sometimes used to evaluate business risk and estimate the cost of capital for regulated industries in the period before the development of the CAPM (Bickley, 1959). This tradition has persisted in the strategic management literature. Bowman (1980), for example, used the variance of return on equity (ROE) as a measure of risk, and documented a negative relationship between this risk measure and the average level of ROE. This finding has come to be known as “Bowman’s paradox,” since one normally expects to find a positive association between risk and return; it has generated a large literature surveyed by Nickel and Rodriguez (2002). Some papers in this literature have used alternative accounting measures of risk including profitability betas (Aaker and Jacobson, 1987) and leverage (Miller and Bromiley, 1990).

Recently, Morningstar Inc. has used accounting data to calculate the costs of capital for individual stocks in the Morningstar stock rating system. Morningstar explicitly rejects the use of the CAPM and argues that accounting data may reveal information about long-run risk, very much in the spirit of Campbell and Vuolteenaho’s “bad beta”:

In deciding the rate to discount future cash flows, we ignore stock-price volatility (which drives most estimates of beta) because we welcome volatility if it offers opportunities to buy a stock at a discount to its fair value. Instead, we focus on the fundamental risks facing a company’s business. Ideally, we’d like our discount rates to reflect the risk of permanent capital loss to the investor. When assigning a cost of equity to a stock, our analysts score a company in the following areas: Financial leverage - the lower the debt the better. Cyclicality - the less cyclical the firm, the better. Size - we penalize very small firms. Free cash flows - the higher as a percentage of sales and the more sustainable, the better. (Morningstar 2004.)

Even in the CAPM, accounting data may be relevant if they help one predict
the future market beta of a stock. This point was emphasized by Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970) and Myers and Turnbull (1977) among others, and has influenced the development of practitioner risk models. Our cross-sectional regressions show that accounting data do predict market betas, consistent with the early results of Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970). Importantly, however, some accounting variables have disproportionate predictive power for bad betas, while lagged market betas and volatilities of stock returns have disproportionate predictive power for good betas. This result implies that accounting data are more important determinants of a firm’s systematic risk and cost of capital in the two-beta model than in the CAPM. The best accounting predictors of bad beta are leverage and profitability, two variables that are emphasized by Morningstar although they are not the main focus of attention in the strategic management literature.

Finally, we use the cross-sectional regression approach in combination with our firm-level VAR methodology to predict the components of a firm’s bad and good beta that are determined by its cash flows and its discount rates. We find that stock-level characteristics generally predict the cash-flow components of a firm’s bad and good beta, not the discount-rate components. The systematic risks of stocks with similar accounting characteristics are primarily driven by the systematic risks of their cash flows, an important extension of our finding for growth and value stocks.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 explains the decomposition of stock returns and presents our direct test of differences in the cash-flow risks of value and growth stocks. Section 2 explores these risks using a VAR approach. This section presents aggregate and firm-level VAR estimates, reports the decomposition of betas for value and growth portfolios implied by those estimates, and explores the robustness of the decomposition to alternative VAR specifications. Section 3 discusses cross-sectional regressions using firm-level characteristics to predict good and bad betas, and Section 4 concludes.

1. Decomposing Stock Returns and Risks

1.1 Two components of stock returns

The price of any asset can be written as a sum of its expected future cash flows, discounted to the present using a set of discount rates. The price of the asset changes when expected cash flows change, or when discount rates change. This holds true for any expectations about cash flows, whether or not those expectations are rational, but financial economists are particularly interested in rationally expected cash flows and
the associated discount rates. Even if some investors have irrational expectations, there should be other investors with rational expectations, and it is important to understand asset price behavior from the perspective of these investors.

There are at least two reasons why it is interesting to distinguish between asset price movements driven by rationally expected cash flows, and movements driven by discount rates. First, investor sentiment can directly affect discount rates, but cannot directly affect cash flows. Price movements that are associated with changing rational forecasts of cash flows may ultimately be driven by investor sentiment, but the mechanism must be an indirect one, for example working through the availability of new financing for firms’ investment projects. (See Subrahmanyam and Titman, 2001, for an example of a model that incorporates such indirect effects.) Thus by distinguishing cash-flow and discount-rate movements, we can shrink the set of possible explanations for asset price fluctuations.

Second, conservative long-term investors should view returns due to changes in discount rates differently from those due to changes in expected cash flows (Merton, 1973; Campbell, 1993, 1996; Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004). A loss of current wealth caused by an increase in the discount rate is partially compensated by improved future investment opportunities, while a loss of wealth caused by a reduction in expected cash flows has no such compensation. The difference is easiest to see if one considers a portfolio of corporate bonds. The portfolio may lose value today because interest rates increase, or because some of the bonds default. A short-horizon investor who must sell the portfolio today cares only about current value, but a long-horizon investor loses more from default than from high interest rates.

Campbell and Shiller (1988a) provide a convenient framework for analyzing cash-flow and discount-rate shocks. They develop a loglinear approximate present-value relation that allows for time-varying discount rates. Linearity is achieved by approximating the definition of log return on a dividend-paying asset, \( r_{t+1} = \log \left( \frac{P_{t+1} + D_{t+1}}{P_t} \right) \), around the mean log dividend-price ratio, \( (\bar{d}_t - \bar{p}_t) \), using a first-order Taylor expansion. Above, \( P \) denotes price, \( D \) dividend, and lower-case letters log transforms. The resulting approximation is \( r_{t+1} \approx k + \rho p_{t+1} + (1 - \rho) d_{t+1} - p_t \), where \( \rho \) and \( k \) are parameters of linearization defined by \( \rho \equiv 1 / (1 + \exp(\bar{d}_t - \bar{p}_t)) \) and \( k \equiv -\log(\rho) - (1 - \rho) \log(1/\rho - 1) \). When the dividend-price ratio is constant, then \( \rho = P/(P + D) \), the ratio of the ex-dividend to the cum-dividend stock price. The approximation here replaces the log sum of price and dividend with a weighted average of log price and log dividend, where the weights are determined by the average
relative magnitudes of these two variables.

Solving forward iteratively, imposing the “no-infinite-bubbles” terminal condition that \( \lim_{j \to \infty} \rho^j (d_{t+j} - p_{t+j}) = 0 \), taking expectations, and subtracting the current dividend, one gets:

\[
p_t - d_t = \frac{k}{1 - \rho} + E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j [\Delta d_{t+1+j} - r_{t+1+j}],
\]

where \( \Delta d \) denotes log dividend growth. This equation says that the log price-dividend ratio is high when dividends are expected to grow rapidly, or when stock returns are expected to be low. The equation should be thought of as an accounting identity rather than a behavioral model; it has been obtained merely by approximating an identity, solving forward subject to a terminal condition, and taking expectations. Intuitively, if the stock price is high today, then from the definition of the return and the terminal condition that the dividend-price ratio is non-explosive, there must either be high dividends or low stock returns in the future. Investors must then expect some combination of high dividends and low stock returns if their expectations are to be consistent with the observed price.

Campbell (1991) extends the loglinear present-value approach to obtain a decomposition of returns. Substituting (1) into the approximate return equation gives:

\[
r_{t+1} - E_t r_{t+1} = (E_{t+1} - E_t) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta d_{t+1+j} - (E_{t+1} - E_t) \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j r_{t+1+j}
\]

where \( N_{CF,t+1} \) denotes news about future cash flows (i.e., dividends or consumption), and \( N_{DR,t+1} \) denotes news about future discount rates (i.e., expected returns). This equation says that unexpected stock returns must be associated with changes in expectations of future cash flows or discount rates. An increase in expected future cash flows is associated with a capital gain today, while an increase in discount rates is associated with a capital loss today. The reason is that with a given dividend stream, higher future returns can only be generated by future price appreciation from a lower current price.

If the decomposition is applied to the returns on the investor’s portfolio, these return components can be interpreted as permanent and transitory shocks to the
investor’s wealth. Returns generated by cash-flow news are never reversed subsequently, whereas returns generated by discount-rate news are offset by lower returns in the future. From this perspective it should not be surprising that conservative long-term investors are more averse to cash-flow risk than to discount-rate risk. Note however that if an investor’s portfolio changes over time, the return decomposition for the portfolio is not the same as the decomposition for the components that make up the portfolio at a point in time. In the empirical work of this paper, we are careful to decompose the returns to stocks that appear in value and growth portfolios at a point in time, rather than the returns to a managed portfolio of such stocks whose composition changes over time.

1.2 Decomposing betas

Previous empirical work uses the return decomposition (2) to investigate betas in several different ways. Campbell and Mei (1993) break the returns on stock portfolios, sorted by size or industry, into cash-flow and discount-rate components. They ask whether the betas of these portfolios with the return on the market portfolio are determined primarily by their cash-flow news or their discount-rate news. That is, for portfolio \( i \) they measure the cash-flow news \( N_{i,CF,t+1} \) and the (negative of) discount-rate news \( -N_{i,DR,t+1} \), and calculate \( \text{Cov}(N_{i,CF,t+1}, r_{M,t+1}) \) and \( \text{Cov}(-N_{i,DR,t+1}, r_{M,t+1}) \).

Campbell and Mei define two beta components:

\[
\beta_{CF,i,M} = \frac{\text{Cov}_t(N_{i,CF,t+1}, r_{M,t+1})}{\text{Var}_t(r_{M,t+1})}
\]  

(3)

and

\[
\beta_{DR,i,M} = \frac{\text{Cov}_t(-N_{i,DR,t+1}, r_{M,t+1})}{\text{Var}_t(r_{M,t+1})}
\]  

(4)

which add up to the traditional market beta of the CAPM,

\[
\beta_{i,M} = \beta_{CF,i,M} + \beta_{DR,i,M}.
\]  

(5)

In their empirical implementation, Campbell and Mei assume that the conditional variances and covariances in (3) and (4) are constant. They do not look separately at the cash-flow and discount-rate shocks to the market portfolio.

Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), by contrast, break the market return into cash-flow and (negative of) discount-rate news, \( N_{M,CF,t+1} \) and \( -N_{M,DR,t+1} \). They measure
covariances $\text{Cov}(r_{i,t+1}, N_{M,CF,t+1})$ and $\text{Cov}(r_{i,t+1}, -N_{M,DR,t+1})$ and use these to define cash-flow and discount-rate betas,

$$\beta_{i,CFM} = \frac{\text{Cov}_t (r_{i,t+1}, N_{M,CF,t+1})}{\text{Var}_t (r_{M,t+1})}$$

and

$$\beta_{i,DRM} = \frac{\text{Cov}_t (r_{i,t+1}, -N_{M,DR,t+1})}{\text{Var}_t (r_{M,t+1})},$$

which again add up to the traditional market beta of the CAPM,

$$\beta_{i,M} = \beta_{i,CFM} + \beta_{i,DRM}. \tag{8}$$

Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) show that the ICAPM implies a price of risk for $\beta_{i,DRM}$ equal to the variance of the return on the market portfolio, and a price of risk for $\beta_{i,CFM}$ that is $\gamma$ times higher, where $\gamma$ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of a representative investor. This leads them to call $\beta_{i,DRM}$ the “good” beta and $\beta_{i,CFM}$ the “bad” beta, where the latter is of primary concern to conservative long-term investors.

Empirically, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) estimate a reasonable VAR specification that implies that value stocks have always had a considerably higher bad beta than growth stocks. This finding is surprising, since in the post-1963 sample value stocks have had a lower CAPM beta than growth stocks. The higher CAPM beta of growth stocks in the post-1963 sample is due to their disproportionately high good beta. Campbell and Vuolteenaho also find that these properties of growth and value stock betas can explain the relative average returns on growth and value during this period. These results are dependent on the particular VAR system that Campbell and Vuolteenaho estimate, and it is possible to specify other reasonable VAR systems that deliver different results (Chen and Zhao, 2008).

In this paper we combine the asset-specific beta decomposition of Campbell and Mei (1993) with the market-level beta decomposition of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). We measure four covariances and define them as:

$$\beta_{CFi,CFM} = \frac{\text{Cov}_t (N_{i,CF,t+1}, N_{M,CF,t+1})}{\text{Var}_t (r_{M,t+1})}, \tag{9}$$
\[ \beta_{DR_i,CFM} = \frac{\text{Cov}_t(-N_{i,DR,t+1}, N_{M,CF,t+1})}{\text{Var}_t(r_{M,t+1})}, \quad (10) \]

\[ \beta_{CF_i,DRM} = \frac{\text{Cov}_t(N_{i,CF,t+1}, -N_{M,DR,t+1})}{\text{Var}_t(r_{M,t+1})}, \quad (11) \]

and

\[ \beta_{DR_i,DRM} = \frac{\text{Cov}_t(-N_{i,DR,t+1}, -N_{M,DR,t+1})}{\text{Var}_t(r_{M,t+1})}. \quad (12) \]

These four beta components add up to the overall market beta,

\[ \beta_{i,M} = \beta_{CF_i,CFM} + \beta_{DR_i,CFM} + \beta_{CF_i,DRM} + \beta_{DR_i,DRM}. \quad (13) \]

The bad beta of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) can be written as:

\[ \beta_{i,CFM} = \beta_{CF_i,CFM} + \beta_{DR_i,CFM}; \quad (14) \]

while the good beta can be written as:

\[ \beta_{i,DRM} = \beta_{CF_i,DRM} + \beta_{DR_i,DRM}. \quad (15) \]

This four-way decomposition of beta allows us to ask whether the high bad beta of value stocks and the high good beta of growth stocks are attributable to their cash flows or to their discount rates.

An interesting early paper that explores a similar decomposition of beta is Pettit and Westerfield (1972). Pettit and Westerfield use earnings growth as a proxy for cash-flow news, and the change in the price-earnings ratio as a proxy for discount-rate news. They argue that stock-level cash-flow news should be correlated with market-wide cash-flow news, and that stock-level discount-rate news should be correlated with market-wide discount-rate news, but they assume zero cross-correlations between stock-level cash flows and market-wide discount rates, and between stock-level discount rates and market-wide cash flows. That is, they assume \( \beta_{DR_i,CFM} = \beta_{CF_i,DRM} = 0 \) and work with an empirical two-way decomposition: \( \beta_{i,M} = \beta_{CF_i,CFM} + \beta_{DR_i,DRM} \). Comparing value and growth stocks, our subsequent empirical analysis shows that there is interesting cross-sectional variation in \( \beta_{CF_i,DRM} \), contrary to Pettit and Westerfield’s assumption that this beta is always zero.

A recent paper that explores the four-way decomposition of beta, written subsequent to the first draft of this paper, is Koubouros, Malliaropulos, and Panopoulou
The authors estimate separate risk prices for each of the four components of beta. Consistent with theory, they find that risk prices are sensitive to the use of cash-flow or discount-rate news at the market level, but not at the firm or portfolio level.

1.3 A direct measurement strategy

We begin by taking the most direct approach, constructing direct proxies for firm-level and market-level cash-flow news, and for market-level discount-rate news.

Our firm-level data come from the merger of three databases. The first of these, the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) monthly stock file, provides monthly prices; shares outstanding; dividends; and returns for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. The second database, the Compustat annual research file, contains the relevant accounting information for most publicly traded U.S. stocks. The Compustat accounting information is supplemented by the third database, Moody’s book equity information for industrial firms, as collected by Davis, Fama, and French (2000). This database enables us to estimate cash-flow news over the full period since 1929. Our data end in 2001, enabling us to report results through the year 2000.

1.3.1 Portfolio construction

Our analysis is driven by a desire to understand the risk characteristics of publicly traded companies. It is important to note that those risks cannot be measured from the risk characteristics of cash flows generated by dynamic trading strategies. The dividends paid by a dynamically rebalanced portfolio strategy may vary because the dividends of the firms in the portfolio change, but they may also vary if the stocks sold have systematically different dividend yields than stocks bought at the rebalance. For example, consider a dynamic strategy that buys non-dividend-paying stocks in recessions and dividend-paying stocks in booms. The dividends earned by this dynamic trading strategy will have a strong business-cycle component even if the dividends of all underlying companies do not.\(^4\)

Therefore, any sensible attempt to measure the risks of firms’ cash flows at a

\(^4\)A similar point applies to bond funds, which trade bonds over time and thus do not have the simple cash-flow properties of individual bonds. Chen and Zhao (2008) report a decomposition of bond returns into cash-flow and discount-rate news, but they ignore this issue and thus their analysis is invalid.
portfolio level must use a “three-dimensional” data set, in which portfolios are formed each year and then those portfolios are followed into the future for a number of years without rebalancing. Such data sets have been used by Fama and French (1995) and Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003, 2008), and we adopt their methodology.

Each year we form quintile portfolios based on each firm’s value as measured by its book-to-market ratio \( BE/ME \). We calculate \( BE/ME \) as book common equity for the fiscal year ending in calendar year \( t - 1 \), divided by market equity at the end of May of year \( t \).\(^5\) We require the firm to have a valid past \( BE/ME \). Moreover, to eliminate likely data errors, we discard those firms with \( BE/ME \)s less than 0.01 and greater than 100 at the time of the sort. When using Compustat as our source of accounting information, we require that the firm must be on Compustat for two years before using the data. This requirement alleviates the potential survivor bias due to Compustat backfilling data.

Each portfolio is value-weighted, and the \( BE/ME \) breakpoints are chosen so that the portfolios have the same initial market capitalization and therefore are all economically meaningful.\(^6\) Our definition of the market portfolio is simply the value-weight portfolio of all of the stocks that meet our data requirements. After portfolio formation, we follow the portfolios for five years keeping the same firms in each portfolio while allowing their weights to drift with returns as would be implied by a buy-and-hold investment strategy. The long horizon is necessary since over the course of the first post-formation year the market learns about not only the unexpected component of that year’s cash-flow realizations but also updates expectations concerning future cash flows. Because we perform a new sort every year, our final annual data set is three dimensional: the number of portfolios formed in each sort times the number of

\(^5\)Following Fama and French (1992), we define \( BE \) as stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes (Compustat data item 74) and investment tax credit (data item 208) (if available), plus post-retirement benefit liabilities (data item 330) (if available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use redemption (data item 56), liquidation (data item 10), or par value (data item 130) (in that order) for the book value of preferred stock. We calculate stockholders’ equity used in the above formula as follows. We prefer the stockholders’ equity number reported by Moody’s, or Compustat (data item 216). If neither one is available, we measure stockholders’ equity as the book value of common equity (data item 60), plus the book value of preferred stock. (Note that the preferred stock is added at this stage, because it is later subtracted in the book equity formula.) If common equity is not available, we compute stockholders’ equity as the book value of assets (data item 6) minus total liabilities (data item 181), all from Compustat.

\(^6\)The typical approach allocates an equal number of firms to each portfolio. Since growth firms are typically much larger than value firms, this approach generates value portfolios that contain only a small fraction of the capitalization of the market.
years we follow the portfolios times the time dimension of our panel.\footnote{Missing data are treated as follows. If a stock was included in a portfolio but its book equity is temporarily unavailable at the end of some future year \(t\), we assume that the firm’s book-to-market ratio has not changed from \(t-1\) and compute the book-equity proxy from the last period’s book-to-market and this period’s market equity. We treat firm-level observations with negative or zero book-equity values as missing. We then use the portfolio-level dividend and book-equity figures in computing clean-surplus earnings at the portfolio level.}

1.3.2 Proxies for cash-flow news

To proxy for cash-flow news, we use portfolio-level accounting return on equity (ROE). Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003, 2008) have argued for the use of the discounted sum of ROE as a good measure of firm-level cash-flow fundamentals. Thus, our ROE-based proxy for portfolio-level cash-flow news is the following:

\[
N_{i,CF,t+1} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \rho^{k-1} \text{ROE}_{i,t,t+k},
\]

(16)

where \(\text{ROE}_{i,t,t+k}\) is the log of real profitability for portfolio \(i\) (1 for growth through 5 for value, and \(m\) for market), sorted in year \(t\), measured in year \(t+k\). We emphasize longer-term trends rather than short-term fluctuations in profitability by examining horizons \((K)\) from two to five years.

Specifically, we track the subsequent stock returns, profitability, and book-to-market ratios of our value and growth portfolios over the years after portfolio formation. We aggregate firm-level book equities by summing the book-equity data for each portfolio. We then generate our earnings series using the clean-surplus relation. In that relation, earnings, dividends, and book equity satisfy:

\[
BE_t - BE_{t-1} = X_t - D_t^{\text{net}},
\]

(17)

where book value today equals book value last year plus clean-surplus earnings \((X_t)\) less (net) dividends. This approach is dictated by necessity (the early data consist of book-equity series but do not contain earnings). We construct clean-surplus earnings with an appropriate adjustment for equity offerings so that:

\[
X_t = \left[ \frac{(1+R_t)ME_{t-1} - D_t}{ME_t} \right] \times BE_t - BE_{t-1} + D_t,
\]

(18)
where $D_t$ is gross dividends, computed from CRSP.

The correct way to adjust profitability for inflation is somewhat unclear, because both reported ROE and reported ROE less inflation or the Treasury bill rate covary strongly with the levels of inflation and interest rates, suggesting that inflation-related accounting distortions make reported ROE a number that is neither purely real nor purely nominal. Over the full sample, a regression of reported ROE on the level of the Treasury bill rate, reported in the online Appendix, delivers a coefficient of 0.4. We use this estimated coefficient to define

$$
roe_{i,t,t+k} = \log(1+ROE_{i,t,t+k}) - 0.4 \log(1+y_{t+k}),
$$

where $ROE_{i,t,t+k} \equiv X_{i,t,t+k}/BE_{i,t,t+K-1}$ is the year $t+k$ clean-surplus return on book equity for portfolio $i$ sorted at $t$, and $y_{t+k}$ is the Treasury bill return in year $t+k$. This approach ensures that our measure of real profitability is orthogonal to variations in the nominal interest rate during our sample period; it is a reasonable compromise between the view that reported ROE is a real number and the view that it is a nominal number.\(^8\)

### 1.3.3 Proxy for market discount-rate news

To proxy for discount-rate news at the market level, we use annual increments in the market’s log P/E ratio, $\ln(P/E)_M$. This reflects the findings of Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b), Campbell (1991), and others that discount-rate news dominates cash-flow news in aggregate returns and price volatility. The resulting news variable is:

$$
-N_{M,DR,t+1} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} [\rho^{k-1} \Delta_{t+k} \ln(P/E)_M].
$$

Figure 1 plots our proxies for the market’s cash-flow news and discount-rate news for the investment horizon of five years. The figure shows some periods where both cash flows and discount rates pushed stock prices in the same direction. In the early 1930s, for example, cash-flow news was negative and market discount rates increased, driving down the market. In the late 1990s the same process operated in reverse, and the market rose because cash flows improved and discount rates declined. However, there are also periods where the two influences on market prices push in

---

\(^8\)Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2008) make no inflation adjustment to reported ROE, implicitly taking the stand that this is a real number. Their approach delivers results that are fairly similar to those reported here. Thomas (2007) discusses the effects of inflation on reported corporate earnings.
opposite directions. In the mid-1970s, for example, cash-flow news was positive while
discount rates were rising, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s cash-flow news was
negative while discount rates were falling. Since we are interested in separating the
effects of discount-rate and cash-flow news, periods of this latter sort are particularly
influential observations.

1.3.4 Direct beta measures

Table 1 reports the regression coefficients of our portfolio-level proxies for cash-flow
news onto our proxies for the market’s cash-flow news and discount-rate news. We
break the sample into two subsamples, 1929-1962 and 1963-2000. The top two panels
of the table report regressions of portfolio-level cash-flow news onto the market’s cash-
flow news, first in the 1929-1962 period and then in the 1963-2000 period. The bottom
two panels repeat this exercise for regressions of portfolio-level cash-flow news onto
the market’s discount-rate news.

In each panel of Table 1, the rows represent investment horizons from two to five
years, while the first five columns represent quintile portfolios sorted on the book-
to-market equity ratio, with extreme growth portfolios at the left and extreme value
portfolios at the right. The final column reports the difference between the extreme
growth and extreme value coefficients.

Table 1 shows that growth stocks’ cash flows have lower betas with the market’s
cash-flow news in both the 1929-1963 and 1963-2001 periods, while they have lower
betas with the market’s discount-rate news in the first period and higher betas in the
second period. This result is striking for two reasons. First, it reproduces the cross-
sectional patterns reported by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) without relying on
a VAR model. These patterns imply that a two-beta asset pricing model, with a
higher price of risk for beta with the market’s cash-flow news, can explain both the
positive CAPM alpha for value stocks in the 1963-2001 period and the absence of
such an alpha in the 1929-1963 period.

Second, Table 1 generates these patterns using direct measures of cash flows for
value and growth stocks, not the returns on these stocks. This implies that the
risks of value and growth stocks are derived in some way from the behavior of their
underlying cash flows, and do not result merely from shifts in investor sentiment.
1.3.5 Robustness

The online Appendix to this paper, Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2008), reports several robustness checks. First, we show that results are similar if we run multiple, rather than simple, regressions on our two proxies for aggregate discount-rate news and cash-flow news. Second, we address the concern that our results may be driven by predictable components in our discounted ROE sums.

One reason there may be predictable components is purely mechanical. We compute clean-surplus ROE in the first year after the sort by using the change in BE from $t - 1$ to $t$. But that initial book equity is known many months before the actual sort occurs in May of year $t$. Thus a portion of the cashflows we are using to proxy for cash-flow news are known as of the time of the sort and cannot be news. In response to this problem, we adjust our discounted ROE sums to start with ROE in year $t + 2$ instead of year $t + 1$.

More generally it is possible that the level of our left-hand side variable is naturally forecastable. We can include an additional independent variable to make sure that this forecastability does not drive our results. As a firm’s level of profitability is quite persistent, a natural control is the difference in past year $t$ ROE for the firms currently in the extreme growth and extreme value portfolios.

The online Appendix shows that all these results are consistent with the general pattern shown in Table 1.

2. A VAR Approach

2.1 VAR methodology

In this section we use a VAR approach to estimate cash-flow and discount-rate news. This approach allows us to calculate the effects of today’s shocks over the discounted infinite future, without assuming that these effects die out after two to five years. It also creates properly scaled news terms that add to the overall return, as implied by the identity (2). We use the version of the VAR methodology proposed by Campbell (1991), first estimating the terms $E_t r_{t+1}$ and $(E_{t+1} - E_t) \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j r_{t+1+j}$ and then using realizations of $r_{t+1}$ and Equation (2) to back out the cash-flow news.

We assume that the data are generated by a first-order VAR model:

$$z_{t+1} = a + \Gamma z_t + u_{t+1},$$

(20)
where \( z_{t+1} \) is a \( m \)-by-1 state vector with \( r_{t+1} \) as its first element, \( a \) and \( \Gamma \) are \( m \)-by-1 vector and \( m \)-by-\( m \) matrix of constant parameters, and \( u_{t+1} \) an i.i.d. \( m \)-by-1 vector of shocks. Of course, this formulation also allows for higher-order VAR models via a simple redefinition of the state vector to include lagged values.

Provided that the process in Equation (20) generates the data, \( t+1 \) cash-flow and discount-rate news are linear functions of the \( t+1 \) shock vector:

\[
N_{DR,t+1} = e_1' \lambda u_{t+1},
\]

\[
N_{CF,t+1} = (e_1' + e_1' \lambda) u_{t+1}.
\]

Above, \( e_1 \) is a vector with the first element equal to unity and the remaining elements equal to zeros. The VAR shocks are mapped to news by \( \lambda \), defined as \( \lambda = \rho \Gamma (I - \rho \Gamma)^{-1} \). \( e_1' \lambda \) captures the long-run significance of each individual VAR shock to discount-rate expectations. The greater the absolute value of a variable’s coefficient in the return prediction equation (the top row of \( \Gamma \)), the greater the weight the variable receives in the discount-rate-news formula. More persistent variables should also receive more weight, which is captured by the term \( (I - \rho \Gamma)^{-1} \).

Chen and Zhao (2008) claim that the results of this methodology are sensitive to the decision to forecast expected returns explicitly and treat cash flows as a residual. This claim is incorrect. The approximate identity linking returns, dividends, and stock prices, \( r_{t+1} \approx k + \rho p_{t+1} + (1 - \rho) d_{t+1} - p_t \), can be rewritten as \( r_{t+1} \approx k - \rho (d_{t+1} - p_{t+1}) + (d_t - p_t) + \Delta d_{t+1} \). Thus a VAR that contains \( r_{t+1}, (d_{t+1} - p_{t+1}) \), and an arbitrary set of other state variables is equivalent to a VAR that contains \( \Delta d_{t+1}, (d_{t+1} - p_{t+1}) \), and the same set of other state variables. The two VARs will generate exactly the same news terms. The news terms will be extremely similar even if the log dividend-price ratio is replaced by some other valuation ratio that captures the long-term variation in stock prices relative to accounting measures of value. Of course, the news terms are sensitive to the other state variables in the VAR system. Therefore, the important decision in implementing this methodology is not the decision to forecast returns or cash flows, but the choice of variables to include in the VAR, an issue we discuss below.

2.2 Aggregate VAR

In specifying the aggregate VAR, we follow Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) by choosing the same four state variables. Consequently, our VAR specification is one that has proven successful in cross-sectional asset pricing tests. However, we implement the VAR using annual data, rather than monthly data, in order to correspond
to our estimation of the firm-level VAR, which is more naturally implemented using annual observations.\(^9\)

### 2.2.1 State variables

The aggregate-VAR state variables are defined as follows. First, the excess log return on the market \((r^e_M)\) is the difference between the annual log return on the CRSP value-weighted stock index \((r_M)\) and the annual log risk-free rate, constructed by CRSP as the return from rolling over Treasury bills with approximately three months to maturity. We take the excess return series from Kenneth French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).

The term yield spread \((TY)\) is provided by Global Financial Data and is computed as the yield difference between ten-year constant-maturity taxable bonds and short-term taxable notes, in percentage points. Keim and Stambaugh (1986) and Campbell (1987) point out that \(TY\) predicts excess returns on long-term bonds. These papers argue that since stocks are also long-term assets, \(TY\) should also forecast excess stock returns, if the expected returns of long-term assets move together. Fama and French (1989) show that \(TY\) tracks the business cycle, so this variable may also capture cyclical variation in the equity premium.

We construct our third variable, the log smoothed price-earnings ratio \((PE)\), as the log of the price of the S&P 500 index divided by a ten-year trailing moving average of aggregate earnings of companies in the index. Graham and Dodd (1934), Campbell and Shiller (1988b, 1998), and Shiller (2000) advocate averaging earnings over several years to avoid temporary spikes in the price-earnings ratio caused by cyclical declines in earnings. This variable must predict low stock returns over the long run if smoothed earnings growth is close to unpredictable. We are careful to construct the earnings series to avoid any forward-looking interpolation of earnings, ensuring that all components of the time \(t\) earnings-price ratio are contemporaneously observable. This is important because look-ahead bias in earnings can generate spurious predictability in stock returns while weakening the explanatory power of other variables in the VAR system, altering the properties of estimated news terms.

Fourth, we compute the small-stock value spread \((VS)\) using the data made available by Kenneth French on his website. The portfolios, which are constructed at

\(^9\)Our annual series for the VAR state variables \(TY\), \(PE\), and \(VS\) are exactly equal to the corresponding end-of-May values in Campbell and Vuolteenaho’s data set. We estimate the VAR over the period 1928-2001, with 74 annual observations.
the end of each June, are the intersections of two portfolios formed on size (market equity, $ME$) and three portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to market equity ($BE/ME$). The size breakpoint for year $t$ is the median NYSE market equity at the end of June of year $t$. $BE/ME$ for June of year $t$ is the book equity for the last fiscal year end in $t - 1$ divided by $ME$ for December of $t - 1$. The $BE/ME$ breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. At the end of June of year $t$, we construct the small-stock value spread as the difference between the $\log(BE/ME)$ of the small high-book-to-market portfolio and the $\log(BE/ME)$ of the small low-book-to-market portfolio, where $BE$ and $ME$ are measured at the end of December of year $t - 1$.

We include $VS$ because of the evidence in Brennan, Wang, and Xia (2001), Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), and Eleswarapu and Reinganum (2004) that relatively high returns for small growth stocks predict low returns on the market as a whole. This variable can be motivated by the ICAPM itself. If small growth stocks have low and small value stocks have high expected returns, and this return differential is not explained by the static CAPM, the ICAPM requires that the excess return of small growth stocks over small value stocks be correlated with innovations in expected future market returns. There are other more direct stories that also suggest the small-stock value spread should be related to market-wide discount rates. One possibility is that small growth stocks generate cash flows in the more distant future and therefore their prices are more sensitive to changes in discount rates, just as coupon bonds with a high duration are more sensitive to interest-rate movements than are bonds with a low duration (Cornell, 1999; Lettau and Wachter, 2007). Another possibility is that small growth companies are particularly dependent on external financing and thus are sensitive to equity market and broader financial conditions (Ng, Engle, and Rothschild, 1992; Perez-Quiros and Timmermann, 2000). Finally, it is possible that episodes of irrational investor optimism (Shiller, 2000) have a particularly powerful effect on small growth stocks.

### 2.2.2 Aggregate VAR dynamics

Table 2 reports the VAR model parameters, estimated using OLS. Each row of the table corresponds to a different equation of the VAR. The first five columns report coefficients on the five explanatory variables: a constant, and lags of the excess market return, term yield spread, price-earnings ratio, and small-stock value spread.

The first row of Table 2 shows that three out of our four VAR state variables have some ability to predict annual excess returns on the aggregate stock market. Unlike monthly returns that exhibit momentum, annual market returns display a
modest degree of reversal; the coefficient on the lagged excess market return is a statistically insignificant -0.0354 with a $t$-statistic of -0.3. The regression coefficient on past values of the term yield spread is positive, consistent with the findings of Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell (1987), and Fama and French (1989), though the associated $t$-statistic of 1.4 is modest. The smoothed price-earnings ratio negatively predicts the return with a $t$-statistic of 2.6, consistent with the finding that various scaled-price variables forecast aggregate returns (Rozeff, 1984; Campbell and Shiller, 1988ab, 1998; Fama and French, 1988, 1989). Finally, the small-stock value spread negatively predicts the return with a $t$-statistic of 2.1, consistent with Brennan, Wang, and Xia (2001) and Eleswarapu and Reinganum (2004). In summary, the estimated coefficients, both in terms of signs and $t$-statistics, are generally consistent with our prior beliefs and findings in previous research.

The remaining rows of Table 2 summarize the dynamics of the explanatory variables. The term spread can be predicted with its own lagged value and the lagged small-stock value spread. The price-earnings ratio is highly persistent, and approximately an AR(1) process. Finally, the small-stock value spread is also a highly persistent AR(1) process.

The sixth column of Table 2 computes the coefficients of the linear function that maps the VAR shocks to discount-rate news, $e_1' \lambda$. We define $\lambda \equiv \rho \Gamma (I - \rho \Gamma)^{-1}$, where $\Gamma$ is the estimated VAR transition matrix from Table 2, and we set $\rho$ equal to .95.\footnote{Results are robust to reasonable variation in $\rho$. The coefficients of $e_1' \lambda$ are very similar to those estimated by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) from monthly data, with the exception of the coefficient on the stock-return shock, which increases in absolute value in the annual VAR. As a further robustness check, we compared our annual news terms to twelve-month sums of Campbell and Vuolteenaho’s news terms and observed a high degree of consistency (a correlation of .98 for $N_{DR}$ and .88 for $N_{CF}$).}

The persistence of the VAR explanatory variables raises some difficult statistical issues. It is well known that estimates of persistent AR(1) coefficients are biased downwards in finite samples, and that this causes bias in the estimates of predictive regressions for returns if return innovations are highly correlated with innovations in predictor variables (Stambaugh, 1999). There is an active debate about the effect of this on the strength of the evidence for return predictability (Lewellen, 2004; Torous, Valkanov, and Yan, 2005; Campbell and Yogo, 2006; Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho, 2006; Ang and Bekaert, 2007). Our interpretation of the findings in this literature is that there is some statistical evidence of return predictability based on
variables similar to ours. However, an additional complication is that the statistical significance of the one-period return-prediction equation does not guarantee that our news terms are not materially affected by the above-mentioned small-sample bias and sampling uncertainty. This is because the news terms are computed using a nonlinear transformation of the VAR parameter estimates.\footnote{The Appendix to Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), available online at http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~campbell/papers/BBGBAppendix20040624.pdf, presents evidence that there is little finite-sample bias in the estimated news terms used in that paper.} With these caveats, we proceed with news terms extracted using the point estimates reported in Table 2. In the next section of the paper, we explore the robustness of our results to alternative proxies for these news terms.

2.3 Firm-level VAR

2.3.1 State variables

We implement the main specification of our firm-level VAR with the following three state variables, measured annually at the end of May each year. First, the log firm-level return ($r_i$) is the annual log value-weight return on a firm’s common stock equity.\footnote{Annual returns are compounded from monthly returns, recorded from the beginning of June to the end of May. We substitute zeros for missing monthly returns. Delisting returns are included when available. For missing delisting returns where the delisting is performance-related, we assume a -30\% delisting return, following Shumway (1997). Otherwise, we assume a zero delisting return.} The log transformation of a firm’s stock return may turn extreme values into influential observations. Following Vuolteenaho (2002), we avoid this problem by unlevering the stock by 10\%; that is, we define the stock return as a portfolio consisting of 90\% of the firm’s common stock and a 10\% investment in Treasury bills.

Our second firm-level state variable is the log book-to-market ratio for unlevered equity, which we denote by $BM$ in contrast to simple equity book-to-market $BE/ME$. We measure $BE$ for the fiscal year ending in calendar year $t - 1$, and $ME$ (market value of equity) at the end of May of year $t$. To avoid influential observations created by the log transform, we first shrink the $BE/ME$ towards one by defining $BM \equiv \log[(.9BE + .1ME)/ME]$.

We include $BM$ in the state vector to capture the well-known value effect in the cross-section of average stock returns (Graham and Dodd, 1934). In particular, we choose book-to-market as our scaled price measure based on the evidence in Fama
and French (1992) that this variable subsumes the information in many other scaled price measures concerning future relative returns.

Third, we calculate long-term profitability, $\text{ROE}$, as the firm’s average profitability over the last one to five years, depending on data availability. We define $\text{ROE}$ as the trailing five-year average of clean-surplus earnings from Equation (18), divided by the trailing five-year average of $(0.9BE + 0.1ME)$. We choose $\text{ROE}$ as the final element of our firm-level state vector to capture the evidence that firms with higher profitability (controlling for their book-to-market ratios) have earned higher average stock returns (Haugen and Baker, 1996; Kovtunenko and Sosner, 2003). Vuolteenaho (2002) uses just the previous year’s profitability in his firm-level VAR. We instead average over as many as five years of past profitability data due to the fact that unlike Vuolteenaho, we use much noisier clean-surplus earnings instead of GAAP earnings.

The firm-level VAR generates market-adjusted cash-flow and discount-rate news for each firm each year. Since relatively few firms survive the full time period; since conditioning on survival may bias our coefficient estimates; and since the average number of firms we consider is greater than the number of annual observations, we assume that the VAR transition matrix is equal for all firms and estimate the VAR parameters with pooled regressions.

We remove year-specific means from the state variables by subtracting $r_{M,t}$ from $r_{i,t}$ and cross-sectional means from $BM_{i,t}$ and $\text{ROE}_{i,t}$. Instead of subtracting the equal-weight cross-sectional mean from $r_{i,t}$, we subtract the log value-weight CRSP index return instead, because this will allow us to undo the market adjustment simply by adding back the cash-flow and discount-rate news extracted from the aggregate VAR.

After cross-sectionally demeaning the data, we estimate the coefficients of the firm-level VAR using WLS. Specifically, we multiply each observation by the inverse of the number of cross-sectional observations that year, thus weighting each cross-section equally. This ensures that our estimates are not dominated by the large cross sections near the end of the sample period. We impose zero intercepts on all state variables, even though the market-adjusted returns do not necessarily have a zero mean in each sample. Allowing for a free intercept does not alter any of our results in a measurable way.
2.3.2 Firm-level VAR dynamics

Parameter estimates, presented in Table 3, imply that expected returns are high when past one-year return, the book-to-market ratio, and profitability are high. Book-to-market is the statistically most significant predictor, while the firm’s own stock return is the statistically least significant predictor. Expected profitability is high when past stock return and past profitability are high and the book-to-market ratio is low. The expected future book-to-market ratio is mostly affected by the past book-to-market ratio.

These VAR parameter estimates translate into a function $e_{1}^{1'}\lambda$ that has positive weights on all state-variable shocks. The $t$-statistics on the coefficients in $e_{1}^{1'}\lambda$ are 2.1 for past return, 2.6 for book-to-market, and 1.8 for profitability. Contrasting the firm-level $e_{1}^{1'}\lambda$ estimates to those obtained from the aggregate VAR of Table 2, it is interesting to note that the partial relation between expected-return news and stock return is positive at the firm level and negative at the market level. The positive firm-level effect is consistent with the literature on momentum in the cross-section of stock returns.\(^{13}\)

Table 3 also reports a variance decomposition for firm-level market-adjusted stock returns. The total variance of the return is the sum of the variance of expected-return news (0.0048, corresponding to a standard deviation of 7%), the variance of cash-flow news (0.1411, corresponding to a standard deviation of 38%), and twice the covariance between them (0.0046, corresponding to a correlation of 0.18). The total return variance is 0.1551, corresponding to a return standard deviation of almost 40%. Thus the firm-level VAR attributes 97% of the variance of firm-level market-adjusted returns to cash-flow news, and only 3% to discount-rate news. If one adds back the aggregate market return to construct a variance decomposition for total firm-level returns, cash-flow news accounts for 80% of the variance and discount-rate news for 20%. This result, due originally to Vuolteenaho (2002), is consistent with a much lower share of cash-flow news in the aggregate VAR because most firm-level cash-flow news is idiosyncratic, so it averages out at the market level.

We construct cash-flow and discount-rate news for our $BE/ME$-sorted portfolios as follows. We first take the market-adjusted news terms extracted using the firm-

\(^{13}\)Differences between the aggregate and firm-level results may also reflect the different weighting schemes in the VARs. The aggregate VAR uses value-weighted data, whereas the firm-level VAR weights firms equally within each cross-section, and weights each cross-section equally.
level VAR in Table 3 and add back the market’s news terms for the corresponding period. This add-back procedure scales our subsequent beta estimates, but does not affect the differences in betas between stocks. Then, each year we form portfolio-level news as the value-weighted average of the firms’ news. The portfolios are constructed by sorting firms into five portfolios on their $BE/ME$’s each year. As before, we set $BE/ME$ breakpoints so that an equal amount of market capitalization is in each quintile each year. As a result, we have series that closely approximate the cash-flow and discount-rate news on these quintile portfolios.

### 2.4 Cash-flow betas of value and growth stocks

Table 4 puts these extracted news terms to work. The first panel estimates the bad cash-flow betas ($\beta_{i,CF}$), and the fourth panel estimates the good discount-rate betas ($\beta_{i,DR}$) for portfolios of value and growth stocks. We regress these portfolios’ simple returns on the scaled news series $N_{M,DR} \times \text{Var}(r^e_M)/\text{Var}(N_{M,DR})$ and $N_{M,CF} \times \text{Var}(r^e_M)/\text{Var}(N_{M,CF})$. The scaling normalizes the regression coefficients to correspond to our definitions of $\bar{\beta}_{i,DR}$ and $\bar{\beta}_{i,CF}$, which add up to the CAPM beta.

The point estimates in Table 4 show that value stocks have higher cash-flow betas than growth stocks in both our subperiods. The estimated difference between the extreme growth and value portfolios’ cash-flow betas is $-0.09$ in the first subperiod and $-0.14$ in the second. In contrast, the pattern in discount-rate betas changes from one subperiod to another. Growth stocks’ discount-rate betas are significantly below one in the early subperiod and greater than one in the later subperiod, while value stocks’ discount-rate betas decline from 0.89 in the first subsample to 0.62 in the second subsample. These numbers imply that value stocks have higher market betas than growth stocks in the early subperiod, and lower market betas in the later subperiod; but in the later subperiod the cash-flow betas of value stocks remain high, justifying their high CAPM alphas. All these patterns are consistent with those found by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) using a monthly VAR.\footnote{The full-period estimates of bad and good beta for the market portfolio sum up to approximately one. Curiously, however, the sum of estimated bad and good betas is above one for the first subperiod and below one for the second subperiod. The fact that these subperiod betas deviate from one is caused by our practice of removing the conditional expectation from the market’s return ($N_{M,CF} - N_{M,DR}$ equals the unexpected return) but not from the test asset’s return. Because the aggregate VAR is estimated from the full sample, in the subsamples there is no guarantee that the estimated conditional expected return is exactly uncorrelated with unexpected returns. Thus, in the subsamples, the expected test-asset return may contribute to the beta, moving it away from unity.}
The standard errors in Table 4, as well as the standard errors in all subsequent tables that use estimated news terms, require a caveat. We present the simple OLS standard errors from the regressions, which do not take into account the estimation uncertainty in the news terms. Thus, while the \( t \)-statistics in Table 4 are often high in absolute value, the true statistical precision of these estimates is likely to be lower.

The remaining four panels of Table 4 use the portfolio-level and market-level news terms to decompose the CAPM beta into four components: \( \beta_{CFi,CFM} \), \( \beta_{DRi,CFM} \), \( \beta_{CFi,DRM} \), and \( \beta_{DRi,DRM} \). For each portfolio, we run four simple regressions, of the two portfolio-level news terms on two scaled market-level series \( N_{M,DR} \times \text{Var} (r^e_M)/\text{Var}(N_{M,DR}) \) and \( N_{M,CF} \times \text{Var}(r^e_M)/\text{Var}(N_{M,CF}) \). The portfolio \( i = 1 \) is the extreme growth portfolio (low \( BE/ME \)) and \( i = 5 \) the extreme value portfolio (high \( BE/ME \)). In the table, “1-5” denotes the difference between extreme growth (1) and value (5) portfolios.

Table 4 shows that the cross-sectional patterns we have seen in firms’ good and bad betas are primarily due to cross-sectional variation in the cash-flow components of these betas: primarily \( \beta_{CFi,DRM} \), with some contribution also from \( \beta_{CFi,CFM} \). In other words, value and growth stocks have different systematic risks primarily because their cash flows covary differently with market news. Covariation of the discount rates of value and growth stocks with market news, measured by the components \( \beta_{DRi,CFM} \) and \( \beta_{DRi,DRM} \), is an important determinant of the overall level of betas, but is approximately constant across value and growth portfolios. A similar result holds for changes in betas over time. The beta components that are driven by firms’ cash flows are responsible for changes over time in the good and bad betas of growth and value stocks.

Figure 2 presents a graphical summary of these results. The horizontal axis in the figure orders the portfolios from extreme growth at the left to extreme value at the right. The top panel shows market beta and its four components for the 1929–62 period, while the bottom panel repeats the exercise for the 1963–2001 period. The dominant importance of \( \beta_{CFi,DRM} \), the covariance of firms’ cash-flow news with the market discount rate, is clearly visible both within and across the two panels of the figure.

2.5 Robustness of the VAR approach

The results reported in Table 4 are striking, but it is important to establish that they are robust to reasonable changes in specification. We do this in the online Ap-
2.5.1 Estimating the VAR over a subsample

A specific concern is that the pattern in Table 4 may be the inevitable result of the high share of firm-level variance that is attributed to cash-flow news, together with the high share of market variance that is attributed to discount-rate news. It is certainly true that these two components are of dominant importance, but we do find a larger share for discount-rate news in firm-level variance when we estimate the firm-level VAR over the 1963–2001 period. In this VAR, the implied variance of discount-rate news is 0.025, corresponding to a standard deviation of almost 16%, and the variance of cash-flow news is 0.166, corresponding to a standard deviation of 41%. Nonetheless we get the same cross-sectional pattern as in our baseline VAR: the covariance of firm-level cash flows with market discount rates is primarily responsible for the variation in betas across value and growth portfolios.

2.5.2 Simple versus multiple regression

Another concern is that changes over time in simple betas may be influenced by changes over time in the correlation between the two components of the market return. Suppose that the technology employed by value and growth firms is such that firms’ cash flows are determined by a constant linear function of the market-wide discount-rate and cash-flow news, plus an error term. Then, the simple regression coefficients (and thus our beta decomposition) may be subject to change as the correlation between the market’s news terms changes. In particular, the in-sample correlation of $N_{M,CF,t+1}$ and $-N_{M,DR,t+1}$ is positive in the early subsample but slightly negative in the modern subsample.

To examine the partial sensitivity of firms’ cash flows to the market’s discount-rate and cash-flow news, in the Appendix we regress the portfolio-level cash-flow news on the estimated $N_{M,CF,t+1}$ and $-N_{M,DR,t+1}$ in a multiple regression. For convenience, and to avoid an excessive notational burden, we continue to refer to these multiple regression coefficients as betas and write them as $\beta_{CF_i,CFM}$ and $\beta_{CF_i,DRM}$, even though they no longer correspond exactly to the simple regression betas that determine risk premia in the ICAPM.

The multiple regression estimates of $\beta_{CF_i,CFM}$ for growth and value stocks are roughly constant over time and similar to the simple regression estimates. The
extreme growth stocks’ cash-flow news has a beta with the market’s cash-flow news of 0.07 in the early subsample and 0.03 in the second subsample, while the extreme value stocks’ cash-flow news has a beta with the market’s cash-flow news of 0.13 in the early subsample and 0.15 in the second subsample. Thus, the partial sensitivities to the market’s cash-flow news seem to be relatively stable over time, with value stocks’ sensitivity at a higher level than that of growth stocks.

The multiple regression estimates of $\beta_{CFi,DRM}$, by contrast, change across samples. In the early sample, value stocks’ cash flows are slightly more sensitive to the market’s valuation levels than growth stocks’ cash flows (the $1-5$ difference is $-0.11$, with a $t$-statistic of $-2.0$). (This difference is not as economically and statistically significant as the corresponding simple regression results of Table 4, which are influenced by the sample-specific correlation of the market’s news terms.) In the modern subsample, this pattern is reversed: growth stocks now have a higher multiple-regression coefficient on $-N_{M,DR,t+1}$ than value stocks (the $1-5$ difference is 0.44, with a $t$-statistic of 4.1).

2.5.3 Alternative aggregate VAR systems

It is well-known that VAR return decompositions depend on the forecasting variables included in the VAR, and in general little can be said about how these decompositions change when additional variables are used. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) explore the sensitivity of their results to changes in VAR specification and report that value stocks have higher bad betas than growth stocks only in VARs that include the small-stock value spread (a variable that should be included if the ICAPM indeed explains the value effect) and an aggregate valuation ratio with predictive power for the aggregate market return.

We extend this sensitivity analysis by reporting results for two alternative aggregate VAR systems. The first allows the two components of the small-stock value spread, the log book-to-market equity ratios for small value and small growth stocks,
to enter the VAR system separately rather than together. The second replaces the log price-smoothed earnings ratio with the log book-to-market ratio. The Appendix reports the coefficient estimates for these VARs. Portfolio-level cash-flow news estimates, constructed either from the firm-level VAR or directly from 3- to 5-year movements in portfolio-level ROE, are regressed on these alternative market news series.

Results for the first alternative VAR system are extremely similar to those for the benchmark VAR, and are robust to the use of a firm-level VAR or direct proxies for firm-level cash-flow news. Results for the second alternative VAR system are also similar to the benchmark case when we use the firm-level VAR to construct firm-level cash-flow news, but there are some differences when we use firm-level cash-flow proxies. In this case we still find that the betas of growth stocks’ cash flows have increased from the early period to the late period, and we still find that growth stock cash flows have higher good betas with the market’s discount rate in the late period, but we now find that growth stock cash flows also have higher bad betas with the market’s cash flows in the late period. Thus, this specification does not deliver a cash-flow-based explanation of the beta patterns documented by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004).

Chen and Zhao (2008) estimate several other reasonable VARs that imply lower bad betas for value stocks than for growth stocks. They do not distinguish between the portfolio-level cash-flow and discount-rate components of these bad betas. Specifically, Chen and Zhao show that value stocks have lower bad betas than growth stocks in recent data if a valuation ratio is excluded from the VAR system, or if the log price-smoothed earnings ratio is replaced with either the log price-earnings ratio using current one-year earnings without smoothing, the level of the dividend-price ratio, or the level of the book-to-market ratio. We have verified these results.

While our main purpose in this paper is not to respond in detail to Chen and Zhao, we offer four comments. First, some of Chen and Zhao’s specifications merely verify Campbell and Vuolteenaho’s (2004) report that a VAR system must include an aggregate valuation ratio with predictive power for the aggregate market return if it is to generate a higher bad beta for value stocks than for growth stocks. It is not surprising that Campbell and Vuolteenaho’s results disappear in VAR specifications that exclude valuation ratios altogether, or that use a noisy ratio with little predictive power such as the log price-earnings ratio without earnings smoothing, or that use a
marginally predictive ratio such as the dividend-price ratio.\textsuperscript{16}

Second, none of the specifications that we have considered produce bad betas for value stocks that are statistically significantly lower than the bad betas for growth stocks, whereas some of them do produce bad betas for value stocks that are statistically significantly higher than the bad betas for growth stocks. The data are clearly noisy, and the results vary with specification, but the reverse result is never statistically significant.

Third, almost all the specifications that produce lower bad betas for value stocks than for growth stocks have the property that the spread in bad betas between value stocks and growth stocks is much smaller than the spread in good betas. In other words, the differences in CAPM betas between value stocks and growth stocks are disproportionately accounted for by differences in good betas. This implies that the two-beta asset pricing model can explain a positive CAPM alpha for value stocks, even if it cannot account for a positive excess return on value stocks over growth stocks.\textsuperscript{17}

A fourth, related point is that almost all these specifications deliver a much smaller spread between bad and good betas in the 1929-1962 period than in the 1963-2001 period. Therefore the two-beta asset pricing model robustly explains the fact that the CAPM fits the cross-section of stock returns better in the earlier period than in the later period.

3. Bad Beta, Good Beta, and Stock-Level Characteristics

In this section, we run regressions predicting a firm’s bad and good betas using annual observations of firm characteristics. Thus we no longer rely on portfolio construction to reveal cross-sectional patterns in stock returns.

We use two alternative approaches. Our first approach takes advantage of the fact that estimating covariances is generally easier with higher frequency data. Specifically, we average the cross products of each firm’s monthly simple returns with contempo-

\textsuperscript{16}In recent years the dividend-price ratio has been affected by a corporate shift away from dividends and towards share repurchases. Boudoukh et al (2007) report that correcting for this effect improves the predictive power of the dividend-price ratio for stock returns.

\textsuperscript{17}The one exception to this statement is that a VAR with the level of the dividend-price ratio generates equal spreads in bad and good betas between growth and value stocks. Including the log of the dividend-price ratio recovers the unequal spread.
aneous and one-month lagged monthly market news terms over all months within the year in question. The use of lagged monthly news terms, following Scholes and Williams (1977), captures sluggish responses of some stocks to market movements. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) find that this is important in estimating bad and good betas, particularly for smaller stocks. Our regressions can be written as a system:

$$
\sum_{j=1}^{12} \left[ \frac{N_{M,CF,t,j} - N_{M,DR,t,j} + N_{M,CF,t,j-1} - N_{M,DR,t,j-1}}{N_{M,CF,t,j} + N_{CF,t,j-1}} * R_{t,j} \right] = X_{t-1}B + \epsilon_{i,t},
$$

(22)

where \( t \) indexes years, \( j \) indexes months, \( i \) indexes firms, and the dependent variables in the three rows are firm- and year-specific ex post market beta, bad beta, and good beta respectively.

In order to further split betas into components that are attributable to firm-specific cash-flow and discount-rate news, we are forced to turn to annual returns, as the firm-specific return decomposition relies on the annual firm-level VAR. In this case we estimate:

$$
\left[ \frac{(N_{M,CF,t} - N_{M,DR,t}) * (N_{i,CF,t} - N_{i,DR,t})}{(N_{M,CF,t}) * (N_{i,CF,t} - N_{i,DR,t})} \right] = X_{t-1}B + \epsilon_{i,t}.
$$

(23)

In either approach, we estimate simple regressions linking the components of firms’ risks to each characteristic, as well as multiple regression specifications using all variables. We remove year-specific means from both the dependent and independent variables. After cross-sectionally demeaning the data, we normalize each independent variable to have unit variance. We then estimate regression coefficients in Equations (22) and (23) using WLS. Specifically, we multiply each observation by the inverse of the number of cross-sectional observations that year, weighting each cross-section equally. This ensures that our estimates are not dominated by the large
cross-sections near the end of the sample period. Finally, we report every regression coefficient after dividing by the estimated market return variance. As a result, each coefficient represents the effect on beta of a one-standard-deviation change in an independent variable. The sample period for all regressions is the Compustat data period, 1963–2000, and we measure firm characteristics at the end of May in each year.

3.1 The value effect in stock-level regressions

As a first empirical exercise, we use stock-level regressions to reconfirm the results on value and growth stocks reported in the previous section. Table 5 shows the coefficients of simple regressions of annual cross-products onto market capitalization, book-to-market equity ratios, and lagged market betas. The first column shows the effect of each explanatory variable on market beta, the second and third columns break this down into the effect on bad and good beta, and the fourth column reports the fraction of the variable's effect on market beta that is attributed to its effect on bad beta. The last two columns of the table explore the four-way decomposition into bad and good betas that are driven by firm cash flows and firm discount rates. These columns report the fraction of each variable's effect on bad and good beta, respectively, that is accounted for by firm-level cash flows.

The first four columns of Table 5 reconfirm earlier findings about bad and good betas. Large stocks typically have lower betas, and about 30% of the beta difference is attributed to bad beta. Value stocks have lower betas than growth stocks in this sample period, but this is entirely due to their lower good betas; value stocks actually have slightly higher bad betas with market cash flows. Stocks with high past betas have higher future betas, but this beta difference is entirely due to a difference in good beta, not bad beta. These patterns were used by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) to account for the size and value effects, and the excessively flat security market line, in recent decades.

The last two columns of Table 5 show that these beta patterns are driven by the cash-flow behavior of stocks sorted by size, value, and past beta. These characteristics have very little ability to forecast the discount-rate behavior of stocks. Accordingly, we find cash-flow shares close to one when decomposing good and bad beta into components driven by the cash-flow and discount-rate behavior of individual stocks. Thus the cross-sectional regression approach confirms the portfolio results that we
reported in the previous section.\textsuperscript{18}

3.2 Firm-level determinants of systematic risk

Within the cross-sectional regression approach, there is no reason to confine our attention to firm characteristics such as value, size, and beta that have been found to predict average stock returns. Instead, we can consider variables that have been proposed as indicators of risk at the firm level. We first run monthly regressions in Table 6. These regressions give us relatively precise estimates but only allow us to decompose market betas into their bad and good components. We then go on to run annual regressions, which allow us to calculate four-way beta decompositions. Table 7 reports regression results and the implied beta shares. All these tables use multiple regressions; the online Appendix reports the corresponding simple regression results.

In each of these tables, we consider variables that might be linked to cross-sectional variation in systematic risk exposures. Rolling firm-level monthly market-model regressions are one obvious source of such characteristics, providing two measures. The first measure of risk from this regression is estimated market beta, \( \hat{\beta}_{i,t} \). We estimate betas using at least one and up to three years of monthly returns in an OLS regression on a constant and the contemporaneous return on the value-weight NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ portfolio. We skip those months in which a firm is missing returns. However, we require all observations to occur within a four-year window. As we sometimes estimate beta using only twelve returns, we censor each firm’s individual monthly return to the range (-50%,100%) to limit the influence of extreme firm-specific outliers. The residual standard deviation from these market-model regressions, \( \hat{\sigma}_{i,t} \), provides our second measure of risk.

We also generate intuitively appealing measures of risk from a firm’s cash flows, in particular from the history of a firm’s return on assets, \( ROA_i \). We construct this measure as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat data item 18) over the book value of assets (Compustat data item 6). First and most simply, we use a firm’s most current \( ROA_i \) as our measure of firm profitability. We then measure the degree of systematic risk in a firm’s cash flows by averaging the product of a firm’s cross-sectionally demeaned \( ROA \) with the marketwide (asset-weighted) \( ROA \) over the last five years. We call this average cross product \( \beta^{ROA} \). Our final profitability

\textsuperscript{18}In the Appendix we report similar results for multiple regressions that include size, book-market, and lagged betas simultaneously.
measure captures not only systematic but also idiosyncratic risk and is the time-series volatility of each firm’s ROA over the past five years, \( \sigma_i(ROA_i) \).

Capital expenditure and book leverage round out the characteristics we use to predict firm risks. We measure investment as net capital expenditure—capital expenditure (Compustat data item 128) minus depreciation (Compustat data item 14)—scaled by book assets, \( CAPX_i/A_i \). Book leverage is the sum of short- and long-term debt over total assets, \( Debt_i/A_i \). Short-term debt is Compustat data item 34 while long-term debt is Compustat data item 9.

Table 6 shows that lagged market beta and idiosyncratic risk have strong predictive power for a firm’s future market beta. Only 10% of this predictive power, however, is attributable to bad beta. Thus sorting stocks on past equity market risk measures does not generate a wide spread in bad beta. If the two-beta model of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) is correct, this popular approach will not generate accurate measures of the cost of capital at the firm level.

Accounting variables can also be used to predict market betas at the firm level. The volatility of ROA, which has been the main focus of attention in the strategic management literature following Bowman (1980), behaves like market-based risk measures in that it primarily predicts good beta. The beta of ROA with aggregate ROA is a relatively weak predictor of both bad and good beta, perhaps because it is estimated using only five years of annual data and thus contains a great deal of noise, a point emphasized by Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970). Other accounting variables, however, do have strong explanatory power for bad beta. Profitable companies with high ROA tend to have low market betas, and over two-thirds of this effect is attributed to the low bad betas of these companies. These results support the emphasis of the Morningstar stock rating system (Morningstar, 2004) on leverage and profitability as determinants of a company’s cost of capital.

Table 7 repeats these results using annual regressions that allow a four-way decomposition of beta. The main results are consistent with Table 6, although with higher standard errors. Equity market risk measures primarily predict good beta, while profitability and leverage have substantial predictive power for bad beta. The new finding in these tables is that all these effects are attributed to the systematic risks in company cash flows, rather than the systematic risk in company discount rates. The cash-flow shares in the last two columns of Table 7 are consistently close.
to one. Systematic risks, as measured by firm-level accounting data, seem to be driven primarily by fundamentals.

4. Conclusion

This paper explores the economic origins of systematic risks for value and growth stocks. The search for the sources of systematic risks is part of a broader debate, going back at least to LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981), about the economic forces that determine the volatility of stock prices.

The first systematic risk pattern we analyze is the finding of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) that value stocks’ returns are particularly sensitive to permanent movements in aggregate stock prices (driven by market-wide shocks to cash flows), while growth stocks’ returns are particularly sensitive to temporary movements in aggregate stock prices (driven by movements in the equity risk premium). We use several tests to discover whether these patterns are driven by the behavior of value and growth firms’ cash flows, or the discount rates that investors apply to these cash flows.

In a first test, we use movements in profitability over several years to proxy for firm-level and market news about cash flows, and movements in the market price-earnings ratio to proxy for market news about discount rates. We regress firm-level cash-flow news proxies onto market cash-flow and discount-rate news proxies. In a second test, we use a firm-level VAR to break annual firm-level returns of value and growth stocks into components driven by cash-flow shocks and discount-rate shocks. We then aggregate these components for value and growth portfolios. We regress portfolio-level cash-flow and discount-rate news on the market’s cash-flow and discount-rate news to find out whether sentiment or cash-flow fundamentals drive the systematic risks of value and growth stocks. In response to concerns about the robustness of VAR methods recently expressed by Chen and Zhao (2008), we conduct a careful sensitivity analysis. In a third test, we run cross-sectional firm-level regressions of ex post beta components onto the book-to-market equity ratio.

All three of these approaches give a similar answer: the high annual betas of growth stocks with the market’s discount-rate shocks, and of value stocks with the market’s cash-flow shocks, are determined by the cash-flow fundamentals of growth and value companies. Thus, growth stocks are not merely “glamour stocks” whose systematic risks are purely driven by investor sentiment.
This paper also begins a broader exploration of firm-level characteristics that predict firms’ sensitivities to market cash-flow and discount-rate shocks. Using monthly and annual data, we find that historical return betas and return volatilities strongly predict firms’ sensitivities to market discount rates, but are much less useful for predicting sensitivities to market cash flows. Accounting variables, however, particularly the return on assets and the debt-asset ratio, are important predictors of firms’ sensitivities to market cash flows. This finding implies that accounting data should play a more important role in determining a firm’s cost of capital in a two-beta model like that of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), which stresses the importance of cash-flow sensitivity, than in the traditional CAPM. A large literature in strategic management has emphasized accounting measures of risk, although not the particular measures that appear to be most effective in predicting firms’ sensitivities to market cash flows; our finding offers partial support to this tradition.

Finally, we show that the effects of firm characteristics on firm sensitivities to market cash flows and discount rates operate primarily through firm-level cash flows rather than through firm-level discount rates. This result generalizes our finding for growth and value stocks, and suggests that fundamentals have a dominant influence on cross-sectional patterns of systematic risk in the stock market.

Our empirical results challenge both rational and behavioral finance theorists. The results do not imply that investor sentiment has no effect on the comovement of stock prices. But they do rule out a story in which the stock market is a sideshow, and investor sentiment causes certain types of stocks to move together without regard for the underlying comovement of cash flows. Any model in which sentiment creates common variation in stock prices must explain how sentiment generates common variation in corporate profitability. Similarly, fundamental models of stock prices must confront the tendency for value and growth stocks to display correlated movements in profitability, and more generally the ability of accounting variables to predict comovements in profitability at the firm level.
References


Table 1: Direct firm-level cash-flow news proxies on direct market news proxies

The table reports sub-period multiple regression betas of cash-flow-news proxies on the market’s discount-rate and cash-flow news proxies for quintile portfolios formed each year by sorting firms on year-\(t\) BE/ME. We allocate 20% of the market’s value to each of the five value-weighted portfolios. The portfolio Growth is the extreme growth portfolio (low BE/ME) and Value the extreme value portfolio (high BE/ME). “G-V” denotes the difference between extreme growth and value portfolios. BE/ME used in sorts is computed as year-\(t\) BE divided by May-year-\(t\) ME. Each portfolio’s cash-flow news is directly proxied by \(P_{K=L}=1 \sum_{k=1}^{K} \rho_{k-1} [\text{roe}_{i,t+t+k} - 0.4 \log(1 + r_{f,t+k})]\), where \(\text{roe}_{i,t+t+k}\) is \(\log(1 + \text{ROE}_{i,t+t+k})\), with \(\text{ROE}_{i,t+t+k}\) the year \(t+k\) clean-surplus return on book equity (for portfolio \(i\) sorted at \(t\)) and \(r_{f,t+k}\) the Treasury-bill return. \(\sum_{k=1}^{K} \rho_{k-1} \Delta_{t+k} \ln(P/E)\) and \(\sum_{k=1}^{K} \rho_{k-1} [\text{roe}_{M,t+k} - 0.4 \log(1 + r_{f,t+k})]\) are used as direct proxies for the market’s discount-rate and cash-flow news, where \(\Delta_{t+k} \ln(P/E)\) is the change in log smoothed price-earnings ratio from \(t+k-1\) to \(t+k\).

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>(\beta_{CFi,CFM}^{k}:) 1929-1962</th>
<th>(\beta_{CFi,DRAM}^{k}:) 1929-1962</th>
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<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
<td>(8.37)</td>
<td>(7.13)</td>
<td>(5.99)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K=5</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.72)</td>
<td>(6.94)</td>
<td>(7.51)</td>
<td>(5.79)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K=2</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.72)</td>
<td>(-2.01)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(-1.90)</td>
<td>(4.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K=3</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.17)</td>
<td>(-1.69)</td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td>(-1.50)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K=4</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(-3.76)</td>
<td>(1.94)</td>
<td>(-1.74)</td>
<td>(1.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K=5</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.07)</td>
<td>(-3.13)</td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table reports sub-period multiple regression betas of cash-flow-news proxies on the market’s discount-rate and cash-flow news proxies for quintile portfolios formed each year by sorting firms on year-\(t\) BE/ME. We allocate 20% of the market’s value to each of the five value-weighted portfolios. The portfolio Growth is the extreme growth portfolio (low BE/ME) and Value the extreme value portfolio (high BE/ME). “G-V” denotes the difference between extreme growth and value portfolios. BE/ME used in sorts is computed as year-\(t\) BE divided by May-year-\(t\) ME. Each portfolio’s cash-flow news is directly proxied by \(P_{K=L}=1 \sum_{k=1}^{K} \rho_{k-1} [\text{roe}_{i,t+t+k} - 0.4 \log(1 + r_{f,t+k})]\), where \(\text{roe}_{i,t+t+k}\) is \(\log(1 + \text{ROE}_{i,t+t+k})\), with \(\text{ROE}_{i,t+t+k}\) the year \(t+k\) clean-surplus return on book equity (for portfolio \(i\) sorted at \(t\)) and \(r_{f,t+k}\) the Treasury-bill return. \(\sum_{k=1}^{K} \rho_{k-1} \Delta_{t+k} \ln(P/E)\) and \(\sum_{k=1}^{K} \rho_{k-1} [\text{roe}_{M,t+k} - 0.4 \log(1 + r_{f,t+k})]\) are used as direct proxies for the market’s discount-rate and cash-flow news, where \(\Delta_{t+k} \ln(P/E)\) is the change in log smoothed price-earnings ratio from \(t+k-1\) to \(t+k\).
Table 2: Aggregate VAR parameter estimates

The table shows the OLS parameter estimates for a first-order aggregate VAR model including a constant, the log excess market return \( r_{M,t}^e \), term yield spread \( TY_t \), log price-earnings ratio \( PE_t \), and small-stock value spread \( VS_t \). Each set of two rows corresponds to a different dependent variable. The first five columns report coefficients on the five explanatory variables, the sixth column reports the corresponding adjusted \( R^2 \), and the last column shows the resulting estimates of the coefficients of the linear function, \( e1' \lambda \), that maps the VAR shocks to discount-rate news. In that function, \( e1 \) is a vector with the first element equal to unity and the remaining elements equal to zeros and \( \lambda \equiv \rho \Gamma (I - \rho \Gamma)^{-1} \), where \( \Gamma \) is the point estimate of the VAR transition matrix and \( \rho \) is the linearization parameter, which we set equal to .95. Thus, the market’s \( N_{DR} \) is computed as \( e1' \lambda u \) and \( N_{CF} \) as \( (e1' + e1' \lambda)u \) where \( u \) is the matrix of residuals from the VAR. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period for the dependent variables is 1928-2001 resulting in 74 annual data points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( r_{M,t+1}^e )</th>
<th>( TY_t )</th>
<th>( PE_t )</th>
<th>( VS_t )</th>
<th>( \overline{R^2} )</th>
<th>( e1' \lambda )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( r_{M,t}^e )</td>
<td>( .8967 )</td>
<td>( -.0354 )</td>
<td>( .0643 )</td>
<td>( -.2133 )</td>
<td>( -.1642 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( TY_{t+1} )</td>
<td>( -.0479 )</td>
<td>( .0250 )</td>
<td>( .3437 )</td>
<td>( -.1303 )</td>
<td>( .5173 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( PE_t )</td>
<td>( .6345 )</td>
<td>( .0810 )</td>
<td>( .0478 )</td>
<td>( .8354 )</td>
<td>( -.1149 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( VS_t )</td>
<td>( .3166 )</td>
<td>( .0291 )</td>
<td>( -.0429 )</td>
<td>( -.0515 )</td>
<td>( .9133 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Firm-level VAR parameter estimates
The table shows the pooled-WLS parameter estimates for a first-order firm-level VAR model. The model state vector includes the log stock return ($r$), log book-to-market ($BM$), and five-year average profitability ($ROE$). All three variables are market-adjusted, $r$ by subtracting $r_m$ and $BM$ and $ROE$ by removing the respective year-specific cross-section means. Rows corresponds to dependent variables and columns to independent (lagged dependent) variables. The first three columns report coefficients on the three explanatory variables, the fourth column reports the corresponding $R^2$, and the last column shows the resulting estimates of the coefficients of the linear function, $e1^\prime \lambda$, that maps the VAR shocks to discount-rate news. In that function, $e1$ is a vector with first element equal to unity and the remaining elements equal to zeros and $\lambda \equiv \rho \Gamma (I - \rho \Gamma)^{-1}$, where $\Gamma$ is the point estimate of the VAR transition matrix and $\rho$ is the linearization parameter, which we set equal to $.95$. Thus, firm-specific news $N_{i,DR}$ is computed as $e1^\prime \lambda u_i$ and $N_{i,CF}$ as $(e1^\prime + e1^\prime \lambda) u_i$ where $u_i$ is the firm-specific matrix of residuals from the VAR. The table also shows the variance-covariance matrix of these news terms, which in turn implies a variance decomposition of market-adjusted firm-level returns. Specifically, the total variance of the return is 0.1551 which corresponds to the sum of the variance of expected-return news (0.0048), the variance of cash-flow news (0.1411), and twice the covariance between the two news components (0.0046). Standard errors (in parentheses) take into account clustering in each cross section. The sample period for the dependent variables is 1929-2001, resulting in 72 annual cross-sections and 158,878 firm-years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$r_{i,t}$</th>
<th>$BM_{i,t}$</th>
<th>$ROE_{i,t}$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$e1^\prime \lambda$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$r_{i,t+1}$</td>
<td>.0655</td>
<td>.0410</td>
<td>.0817</td>
<td>.28%</td>
<td>.0803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log stock return)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0375)</td>
<td>(.0156)</td>
<td>(.0443)</td>
<td>(.0381)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$BM_{i,t+1}$</td>
<td>.0454</td>
<td>.8631</td>
<td>-.0499</td>
<td>.7222%</td>
<td>.2075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log book-to-market)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0278)</td>
<td>(.0238)</td>
<td>(.0517)</td>
<td>(.0807)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ROE_{i,t+1}$</td>
<td>.0217</td>
<td>-.0249</td>
<td>.6639</td>
<td>.5845%</td>
<td>.2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(five-year profitability)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0045)</td>
<td>(.0033)</td>
<td>(.0306)</td>
<td>(.1112)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variance-Covariance Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$N_{i,DR}$</th>
<th>$N_{i,CF}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected-return news ($N_{i,DR}$)</td>
<td>.0048</td>
<td>.0046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0037)</td>
<td>(.0080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash-flow news ($N_{i,CF}$)</td>
<td>.0046</td>
<td>.1411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0080)</td>
<td>(.0191)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Firm-level news and the market’s cash-flow and discount-rate news

The table reports the firm-level news components of the "good" discount-rate and "bad" cash-flow betas measured for BE/ME-sorted portfolios in Table 1. These components are

\[ \beta_{DR,DRM} = \frac{\text{Cov}(-N_{i,DR,t+1}, N_{M,DR,t+1})}{\text{Var}(r_{M,t+1})}, \beta_{CF,DRM} = \frac{\text{Cov}(N_{i,CF,t+1}, -N_{M,DR,t+1})}{\text{Var}(r_{M,t+1})}, \]

\[ \beta_{DR,CFM} = \frac{\text{Cov}(-N_{i,DR,t+1}, N_{M,CF,t+1})}{\text{Var}(r_{M,t+1})}, \text{ and } \beta_{CF,CFM} = \frac{\text{Cov}(N_{i,CF,t+1}, N_{M,CF,t+1})}{\text{Var}(r_{M,t+1})}. \]

The market’s \( N_{DR} \) and \( N_{CF} \) are extracted using the VAR of Table 2. To construct portfolio news terms, firm-level \( N_{i,DR} \) and \( N_{i,CF} \) are first extracted from the market-adjusted firm-level panel VAR of Table 3, then the corresponding market-wide news terms are added back, and finally the resulting firm-level news terms are value-weighted. The \( t \)-statistics (in parentheses) ignore estimation uncertainty in the extraction of the news terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>G-V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{CF,FM} ): Growth and value ( -N_{DR} + N_{CF} ) on the market’s ( N_{CF} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1962</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.35)</td>
<td>(.34)</td>
<td>(.39)</td>
<td>(.45)</td>
<td>(.44)</td>
<td>(-3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-2000</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.21)</td>
<td>(.95)</td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
<td>(2.76)</td>
<td>(2.81)</td>
<td>(-3.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{DR,CFM} ): Growth and value ( -N_{DR} ) on the market’s ( N_{CF} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1962</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(2.0)</td>
<td>(-2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-2000</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.80)</td>
<td>(-.78)</td>
<td>(-.72)</td>
<td>(-.71)</td>
<td>(-.69)</td>
<td>(-.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{CF,CFM} ): Growth and value ( N_{CF} ) on the market’s ( N_{CF} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1962</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.49)</td>
<td>(7.0)</td>
<td>(6.8)</td>
<td>(6.3)</td>
<td>(8.7)</td>
<td>(-3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-2000</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td>(8.8)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(9.3)</td>
<td>(5.8)</td>
<td>(-3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{DR,FM} ): Growth and value ( -N_{DR} + N_{CF} ) on the market’s ( -N_{DR} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1962</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>-.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.5)</td>
<td>(17.8)</td>
<td>(14.5)</td>
<td>(12.6)</td>
<td>(12.8)</td>
<td>(-3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-2000</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(.90)</td>
<td>(.81)</td>
<td>(.73)</td>
<td>(.62)</td>
<td>(.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{DF,DRM} ): Growth and value ( -N_{DR} ) on the market’s ( -N_{DR} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1962</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(69)</td>
<td>(78)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(88)</td>
<td>(-5.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-2000</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(114)</td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td>(91)</td>
<td>(-1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{CF,DFM} ): Growth and value ( N_{CF} ) on the market’s ( -N_{DR} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1962</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.02)</td>
<td>(.63)</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
<td>(2.3)</td>
<td>(-2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-2000</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.92)</td>
<td>(-.89)</td>
<td>(-2.4)</td>
<td>(-2.6)</td>
<td>(-3.6)</td>
<td>(4.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Predicting beta’s components: firm-level simple regressions, annual covariances

The table shows pooled-WLS parameter estimates of firm-level simple regressions forecasting the annual cross products \((N_{DF} + N_{CF}) \times (N_{CF,i} + N_{DF,i})\), \((N_{CF}) \times (N_{CF,i} + N_{DF,i})\), and \((N_{DF}) \times (N_{CF,i} + N_{DF,i})\) in columns 1, 2, and 3. As the regression coefficients are divided by the estimated market annual return variance, these regressions essentially forecast firms’ betas \((\beta_i)\) as well as their bad \((\beta_{i,CFM})\) and good \((\beta_{i,DRM})\) components. The table also shows the resulting bad-beta and firm-level-CF share of those estimates in columns 4, 5, and 6 respectively. The market’s \(N_{DF}\) and \(N_{CF}\) are extracted using the VAR of Table 2. All variables are market-adjusted by removing the corresponding year-specific cross-section mean. Independent variables, described in the text, are normalized to have unit variance. All \(t\)-statistics (in parentheses) and standard errors (in braces, calculated using the delta method) take into account clustering in each cross-section but do not account for the estimation uncertainty in extraction of the market’s news terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forecasting regressions</th>
<th>(\beta_i)</th>
<th>(\beta_{i,CFM})</th>
<th>(\beta_{i,DRM})</th>
<th>(\frac{\beta_{i,CFM}}{\beta_i})</th>
<th>(\frac{\beta_{CF,CFM}}{\beta_{i,CFM}})</th>
<th>(\frac{\beta_{CF,DRM}}{\beta_{i,DRM}})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(ME_i) (size)</td>
<td>-0.130</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.54)</td>
<td>(-1.91)</td>
<td>(-1.23)</td>
<td>[0.16]</td>
<td>[0.07]</td>
<td>[0.08]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BE_i/ME_i) (book-to-market ratio)</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>1.178</td>
<td>1.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.86)</td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td>(-2.27)</td>
<td>[0.17]</td>
<td>[0.33]</td>
<td>[0.07]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\beta_i) (market beta)</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>1.775</td>
<td>0.865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.21)</td>
<td>(-0.02)</td>
<td>(2.45)</td>
<td>[0.11]</td>
<td>[36.01]</td>
<td>[0.02]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.71%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.76%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Predicting beta’s components: firm-level multiple regressions, monthly covariances

The table shows pooled-WLS parameter estimates of firm-level multiple regressions annually forecasting the subsequent average monthly cross products \((N_{i,t} + N_{i,t-1} + N_{i,t-1} + N_{i,t-1}) \times (R_{i,t})\), \((N_{i,t} + N_{i,t-1}) \times (R_{i,t})\), and \((N_{i,t} + N_{i,t-1}) \times (R_{i,t})\). As the regression coefficients are divided by the estimated market monthly return variance, these regressions essentially forecast firms’ betas \((\beta_i)\) as well as their bad \((\beta_{i,CFM})\) and good \((\beta_{i,DRM})\) components. The table also shows the resulting bad-beta share of those estimates in column 4. The market’s \(N_{DR}\) and \(N_{CF}\) are the monthly news terms from Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). All variables are market adjusted by removing the corresponding year-specific cross-section mean. Independent variables, described in the text, are scaled to have unit variance. All \(t\)-statistics (in parentheses) and standard errors (in braces, calculated using the delta method) take into account clustering in each cross-section but do not account for the estimation uncertainty in extraction of the market’s news terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forecasting regressions</th>
<th>(\beta_i) (Market Beta)</th>
<th>(\beta_{i,CFM}) (Bad Beta)</th>
<th>(\beta_{i,DRM}) (Good Beta)</th>
<th>Shares (\frac{\beta_{i,CFM}}{\beta_i})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\beta_i) (market beta)</td>
<td>0.1212</td>
<td>0.0117</td>
<td>0.1095</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma_i(r_i)) (idiosyncratic risk)</td>
<td>0.1207</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.1167</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\beta_i^{ROA}) (profitability beta)</td>
<td>-0.0060</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
<td>-0.0096</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma_i(ROA_i)) (profitability volatility)</td>
<td>0.0579</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
<td>0.0479</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ROA_i) (firm profitability)</td>
<td>-0.0316</td>
<td>-0.0216</td>
<td>-0.0100</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Debt_i/A_i) (book leverage)</td>
<td>0.0197</td>
<td>0.0073</td>
<td>0.0125</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CAPX_i/A_i) (capital expenditure)</td>
<td>-0.0154</td>
<td>-0.0060</td>
<td>-0.0095</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.89%</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7: Predicting beta’s components: firm-level multiple regressions, annual covariances

The table shows pooled-WLS parameter estimates of firm-level multiple regressions forecasting the annual cross-products \((N_{DR} + N_{CF}) \times (N_{CF,i} + N_{DR,i})\), \((N_{CF}) \times (N_{CF,i} + N_{DR,i})\), and \((N_{DR}) \times (N_{CF,i} + N_{DR,i})\) in Columns 1, 2, and 3. As the regression coefficients are divided by the estimated market annual return variance, these regressions essentially forecast firms’ betas \((\beta_i)\), as well as their bad \((\beta_{i,CFM})\) and good \((\beta_{i,DRM})\) components. The table also shows the resulting bad-beta and firm-level-CF share of those estimates in Columns 4, 5, and 6 respectively. The market’s \(N_{DR}\) and \(N_{CF}\) are extracted using the VAR of Table 2. All variables are market adjusted by removing the corresponding year-specific cross-section mean. Independent variables, described in the text, are normalized to have unit variance. Regression coefficients are scaled by an estimate of the market’s variance. All \(t\)-statistics (in parentheses) and standard errors (in braces, calculated using the delta method) take into account clustering in each cross-section but do not account for the estimation uncertainty in extraction of the market’s news terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forecasting regressions</th>
<th>(\beta_i) (Market Beta)</th>
<th>(\beta_{i,CFM}) (Bad Beta)</th>
<th>(\beta_{i,DRM}) (Good Beta)</th>
<th>(\frac{\beta_{i,CFM}}{\beta_i})</th>
<th>(\frac{\beta_{CF,CFM}}{\beta_{i,CFM}})</th>
<th>(\frac{\beta_{CF,DRM}}{\beta_{i,DRM}})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\beta_i) (market beta)</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>1.277</td>
<td>0.840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma_i(r_i)) (idiosyncratic risk)</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>0.964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma_i(ROA_i)) (profitability volatility)</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>1.574</td>
<td>0.961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{Beta}_i^{ROA}) (profitability beta)</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.859</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>2.584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{ROA}_i) (firm profitability)</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td>1.372</td>
<td>1.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Debt_i/A_i) (book leverage)</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td>0.889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CAPX_i/A_i) (capital expenditure)</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>1.643</td>
<td>0.950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.36%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>1.22%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: The figure plots direct proxies for aggregate return news. Specifically, the proxies are $\sum_{k=1}^{5} \rho^{k-1} \Delta_{t+k} \ln(P/E)$ and $\sum_{k=1}^{5} \rho^{k-1} [\text{roe}_{M,t+k} - .4 \log(1 + r_{f,t+k})]$ for $-N_{M,DR}$ (line with squares) and $N_{M,CF}$ (thick solid line) respectively, where $\Delta_{t+k} \ln(P/E)$ is the change in log smoothed price-earnings ratio from $t+k-1$ to $t+k$, $\text{ROE}_{M,t+k}$ is the year $t+k$ clean-surplus return on book equity, and $r_{f,t+k}$ the Treasury-bill return. The two time series are demeaned.
Figure 2: This picture plots the components of beta for portfolios sorted by BE/ME, reported in Table 4. Growth portfolios are shown at the left, and value portfolios at the right. The thick solid line is the market beta, the thick solid line with circles is $\beta_{CF_i,DRM}$, the thin solid line is $\beta_{DR_i,DRM}$, the dashed line is $\beta_{CF_i,CFM}$, and the dotted line is $\beta_{DR_i,CFM}$. 