

REORGANIZING
POPULAR POLITICS



PARTICIPATION
and the
NEW INTEREST REGIME
in
LATIN AMERICA



edited by
Ruth Berins Collier
and
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ASSOCIATIONAL LINKAGES TO LABOR UNIONS
AND POLITICAL PARTIES

Candelaria Garay

The premise of this book is that a major shift has occurred in the institutional structures through which urban popular sectors achieve representation and solve problems in Latin America. In this transformation from the UP-Hub, a union-party interest regime, to the A-Net, based in associational networks, the central role of labor unions and labor-affiliated parties has waned and popular associations have gained relevance as agents of popular problem solving and interest intermediation. Since labor unions and political parties nonetheless remain important actors in the A-Net, a key question concerns their interaction with the rising associationalism. In exploring associational linkages to labor unions and to political parties, this chapter begins to investigate how such linkages may affect the problem-solving strategies of popular associations in the A-Net.

Relationships between associations and labor unions are important for several reasons. First these linkages are an indicator of whether common interests are formed across different segments of the popular sectors—those organized in unions, which typically represent wage-earner and work-related concerns, and those participating in associations, which bring together a more variegated constituency around a variety of issues, such as consumption, social services, and housing. Given the traditional segmentation of interests among the popular sectors in Latin America, this question is of particular relevance in the new interest regime. At the same time, associational linkages to unions are important because they can facilitate the diffusion of collective action repertoires

and techniques in the A-Net, potentially influencing the problem-solving activity of associations. As described in chapter 3, the collective action patterns that characterize associations put them at a relative disadvantage compared to labor unions in exerting leverage on behalf of their constituencies. In this light, one might ask whether popular associations linked to unions show distinct patterns of problem solving in which limitations that plague popular associations—such as difficulty in coordination and in making state-targeted demands, especially at the national level—are somewhat reduced.¹

Similarly, although associations in the A-Net rarely have the kind of affiliations to political parties that were more typical of unions in the UP-Hub, it is important to ask what relations they do have to parties. Associational linkages to political parties are fundamental subjects for analysis because they indicate whether associations seek to advance their interests in the electoral arena and what strategies they pursue to do so. Recent studies have often cast such linkages somewhat negatively, pointing to the double-edged nature of party-association relations, in which any advantages may be offset by a loss of autonomy entailed in forging close ties with political parties (see discussion in Oxhorn 1995). Further, analysts tend to see party-association relations from the angle of political party preferences, which are largely centered on electoral concerns. From this perspective, they generally suggest that political parties either pursue clientelistic relations with popular associations, using them as vehicles for vote maximization, or they ignore them altogether, reaching lower-class individuals in unmediated ways.² Equally important is to explore whether associations forge ties with political parties to advance their interests, in what ways they do so, and what roles party-linked associations perform within the broader interest regime.³

Using the CIRELA surveys of associations this chapter describes some aspects of the linkages of popular associations with labor unions and with political parties, and begins to explore the implications of those linkages for patterns

1. On popular associations and their features, see, among others, the discussion in chapters 3 and 6, A. Thompson (1995), Oxhorn (1998a), Campetella and González Bombal (2000), and Foweraker (2001).

2. On clientelistic linkages see Chalmers, Martin, and Piester (1997:566), Auyero (2001), Levitsky (2003: chap. 6), and Oxhorn (1995). On parties/candidates avoiding organizational mediations, see Roberts (1995), Weyland (1996b), and Boas (forthcoming). On types of linkages between parties and associations, see, among others, Keck (1992), C. Schneider (1995), Hipsher (1998), Oxhorn (1995), Chalmers, Martin, and Piester (1997), Roberts (1998), and Schönwälder (2004).

3. There are studies that explore how popular associations and parties relate and how association members view political parties. In particular, see C. Schneider (1995), Levitsky (2003), Roberts (2006), and Oxhorn (1995).



of problem-solving strategies in the A-Net.⁴ The sample of about 240 associations in each of the capital cities of Argentina,⁵ Chile, Peru, and Venezuela ($n = 928$) constitutes a unique source of comparative information on popular associations; yet, since surveys were administered through chain-referral sampling, caution should be employed when interpreting such data.

The first section of this chapter asks whether union-linked associations employ distinct patterns of coordination and problem-solving strategies and explores their implications for the A-Net. The analysis shows that union-linked associations are much more likely to coordinate with other associations, form part of federated entities, organize protests, access the national state, and sit in policy councils than are associations not linked to unions. Given that union-linked associations have a larger number of inter-associational linkages, their pattern of problem solving may be consequential for other associations in the A-Net, particularly in Argentina and Chile, where that pattern is stronger than in Peru and Venezuela, where the distinctiveness of union-linked associations is weaker or nonexistent, respectively. Associations linked to unions in Argentina and Chile may thus play central roles in the A-Net, potentially operating as mobilizing structures that aggregate diverse associations in episodes of contention and in pressing their interests through institutional channels.⁶

The second section of the chapter looks at party-association linkages from two perspectives. First it explores party strategies toward associations, and then it conceptualizes different types of linkages that associations pursue to advance their interests through parties: issue-based, candidate-based, and multifaceted linkages. With respect to party strategy, this analysis indicates that associations are often viewed as sources of electoral or campaign support for candidates running for office, a fact that generally supports the existing literature about party politics in Latin America. At the same time, associations' strategies toward parties show the prevalence of issue-based linkages, by which associations seek to solve problems by contacting party leaders, although cross-country variation in associational strategies is evident. In Argentina and Chile issue-based linkages tend to be the dominant strategy, whereas in Peru strategies to support candidates during campaigns are more prevalent, and in Venezuela

4. See appendix B for a description of the procedure. As detailed there, the surveys were administered to about thirty associations in each of eight districts in each capital city between 2002 and 2003.

5. The capital city of Argentina, Buenos Aires, here refers to *GBA* (Greater Buenos Aires), which includes the City of Buenos Aires and the surrounding *conurbano* (city belt).

6. Mobilizing structures are ties, networks or organizations that facilitate the emergence of contention (Tarrow 1998: chap. 8). Mobilizing structures allow the diffusion of ideas, frames, information, and the recruitment of participants, and they offer "structures of solidarity" incentives that facilitate collective action (McAdam 1999:44).

multifaceted linkages, which involve more complex interaction with political parties, are relatively more frequent. Finally, associations with issue-based linkages and those with multifaceted ones appear to be particularly embedded in the A-Net, as they reported a larger number of inter-associational ties than associations with other types of party linkage or without linkages to parties. By contrast, associations with candidate-based linkages are quite isolated, showing a relatively smaller number of connections within the A-Net. Differential levels of embeddedness suggest that associations with issue-based linkages may play a more central role in the A-Net than associations with candidate-based linkages, whose lower levels of connectivity probably circumscribe the spread of such relationships to some extent. The final section of this chapter discusses the general findings and country-level patterns in union-association linkages and party-association linkages observable in the data.

Union-Association Linkages

Scholars generally suggest that popular associations are limited in their capacity to advance the interests of their constituencies. In particular, associations are assumed to have difficulty coordinating with other associations, organizing protest activity, and accessing the state through formal institutional channels.⁷ Associations are often seen as either atomized and resource-poor (Kurtz 2004a) or connected through fluid associational networks (Chalmers, Martin, and Piester 1997). In either case, they are usually seen as lacking higher-level structures of coordination fundamental for pursuing their interests, particularly beyond the local level (Evans 1996; Fox 1996).

One might expect union-linked associations to show characteristics closer to those of labor unions—and thus be oriented to productionist issues—and to employ a pattern of collective action more oriented toward protest, state contacting, coordination, and the use of state resources. Such a pattern on the part of union-linked associations might arise in two different ways. On the one hand, popular associations that are generally more active in claim making and protesting and that coordinate with a larger number of associations may pursue union links to advance popular interests more effectively and through broader, encompassing coalitions. Those linkages may in turn encourage and

7. On the difficulties faced by popular collective action in Latin America, and on the atomization of popular-sector interests, see Kurtz (2004a) and Oxhorn (1998a). A different view about collective action is presented in Arce and Bellinger (2007).



reinforce such strategies on the part of associations, providing them with additional resources and experience. On the other hand, linkages with unions may be a source of learning and a mechanism of diffusing repertoires and techniques for collective action from unions to associations that would otherwise be less prone to coordination, protest, and national-level demand making.⁸ In the first case, union links facilitate and reinforce a particular problem-solving strategy; in the second case, they are a source of change, promoting the adoption of a different problem-solving repertoire on the part of associations.⁹

This section first presents data concerning the extent to which associations coordinate activities with unions and with which kinds of unions. It then explores whether union-linked associations show distinct problem-solving strategies by examining scaling, claim making, and the use of state resources. Finally, it analyzes the implications of such strategies for the operation of the A-Net by examining the level of embeddedness, understood as the number of inter-associational linkages, of union-linked associations. Higher levels of embeddedness may indicate that these associations are central actors in the A-Net and may transmit strategies to other associations.

Union-Linked Associations

Associations that are linked to unions constitute 15.3 percent of the associations sampled ($n = 142$), with the largest portion corresponding to the Argentine case (22.5 percent) and the smallest to Venezuela (8.75 percent), as summarized in table 8.1.¹⁰

One might expect that associations oriented toward productionist issues would be more likely to work with unions. Yet in each of the countries under study, union-linked associations do not differ significantly from the rest of the

8. On the diffusion and adoption of organizational practices, see in particular Di Maggio and Powell (1991). On the diffusion of information, repertoires, and learning through networks in the social movement literature, see, among others, Diani (2003a). In the case of Latin America, Roberts (1998:64) suggests that labor unions are particularly important in the diffusion of organizational models and methods of collective action to other sectors of civil society.

9. In the literature on social movements, ties among individuals or groups are frequently understood as mobilizing structures (McAdam, MacCarthy and Zald 1996a; Tarrow 1998) or social networks (Diani 2003a) that facilitate the emergence of contention through the diffusion of ideas, cultural frames, and critical information as well as offering "structures of solidarity incentives" (McAdam, MacCarthy and Zald 1988) that facilitate the recruitment of movement members or participants. There is a vast literature about how and what type of linkages matter for collective action. See Gould (1991; 2003), Ansell (1997), and Diani (2003a).

10. The survey question asked: Do you work with labor unions? All associations that responded affirmatively were coded as having union ties.

Table 8.1 Union-Linked Associations

		Percent	Number
Argentina	(<i>n</i> =240)	22.5	54
Chile	(<i>n</i> =208)	17.3	36
Peru	(<i>n</i> =240)	12.9	31
Venezuela	(<i>n</i> =240)	8.8	21
Total	(<i>n</i> =928)	15.3	142

associations sampled in terms of their likelihood of engaging any of the following five issue areas, which are typically pursued by popular associations: consumption (e.g., food distribution, poverty), social services (e.g., education, health), political issues (e.g., advocacy, human rights), production (e.g., employment, job training), and neighborhood improvement and quality of life (e.g., infrastructure and urban services).¹¹

What is of particular importance to the analysis is the kind of unions to which associations reported having linkages. One might identify three types of labor unions in Latin America: traditional corporatist unions, social movement unions, and informal-sector unions.¹² In terms of their characteristics, traditional corporatist unions represent formal-sector workers exclusively, are regulated by labor law, and form part of a corporatist structure of interest intermediation. In general, these unions organize skilled or semi-skilled workers with higher incomes, and constitute the centerpieces of the union structure and its peak labor confederation developed under import-substituting industrialization. These unions were thus the dominant actors of the UP-Hub. Traditional corporatist unions have often, although not always, discouraged internal democracy. Especially during market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, they have prioritized their organizational survival over the interests of their bases, thus limiting their mobilization and often negotiating organizational payoffs in exchange for moderation.¹³ Despite the decline of the UP-Hub, these unions remain important interest organizations (see, e.g., Etchemendy and Collier 2007).

Social movement unions generally reject the role of corporatist unions as “interest organizations” and typically prefer the formation of a broader

11. There are two exceptions. In Peru associations that do not work with unions are significantly more oriented toward consumptionist issues than are union-linked associations, and in Chile they are more likely to engage in neighborhood improvement than union-linked associations.

12. Among others, see Collier and Collier (1991), Cross (1998) Bensusán (2000), and Roeber (2005).

13. In particular, see Murillo (2001), Etchemendy (2004), Bensusán (2000), and Cook (2002).



“workers’ movement.” These unions often seek to develop connections with popular associations and social movements, and they frequently engage in protest around broader political or social issues as well as work-related demands (Seidman 1994; Bensusán 2000). Social movement unions usually participate in alternative peak confederations, most of which were formed in the 1980s and 1990s, and sometimes develop higher levels of internal democracy. Public-sector unions, such as those of teachers, health workers, and other state workers, are generally prominent among social movement unions.

A final type is the informal-sector union, which is formed by specific categories of informal-sector workers, such as street vendors, artisans, and micro-producers. These organizations are generally not considered labor unions because they are not regulated by labor law, neither constrained by it nor receiving the right of collective bargaining. They are typically not formed by “salaried” workers within the informal sector and thus usually do not target their demands to employers. Although they collect membership dues and have some capacity and experience in organizing protests and contacting state agencies,¹⁴ informal-sector unions face steeper challenges than formal-sector unions in representing and even putting together a membership base. In fact, informal-sector workers often compete with one another, a dynamic that may prevent effective collective action (see discussion in Cross 1998:52). It has been further suggested that informal-sector unions do not tend to coordinate with one another in forming higher-level structures, such as federations, although street vendors are sometimes an exception (Roever 2005). In recent years some of these unions have begun to participate in alternative peak labor associations, as is the case in Argentina, but they nevertheless remain largely marginal players in the representation of labor issues.

Although informal-sector unions are generally considered associations rather than labor unions, they are included in the analysis for two reasons. First, leaders of such popular associations who responded to the survey identified them as labor unions and thus perceived them as organizations that fall into the union category rather than the associational category. Second, informal-sector unions are institutionally closer to the labor movement than to cooperatives or other labor-related organizations, generally understood as associations.

Associations have developed linkages to these three types of unions but in

14. For example, in Peru and Mexico, street vendors have been particularly influential (Cross 1998; Roever 2005). In Peru, they got leaders elected to the city council in reaction to attempts to evict them from the streets (Cross 1998:52).

different proportions. Associations do not tend to work with traditional corporatist unions in large proportions. Argentine associations reported working predominantly with social movement unions belonging to the alternative peak association CTA (Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina), which includes public-sector workers' unions, in particular teachers and state workers. In Chile associations reported working with professors' and health workers' unions, and with labor confederations, such as CUT (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores) and especially CAT (Central Autónoma de Trabajadores), as well as with informal-sector unions. Chilean public-sector unions have adopted higher levels of mobilization and claim making in the recent years, in particular among health workers and teachers (Frank 2002a:38–40), which place them closer to social movement unions than to traditional corporatist unions. Peruvian associations reported linkages predominantly with informal-sector unions and to a much lesser extent with public-sector workers' unions. In sectoral terms, public-sector unions (teachers, health workers, and state workers) are dominant among the formal-sector unions with which associations reported linkages. The comparison of these linkages across countries does not include Venezuela, because there were so few observations in the data set.¹⁵

Distinctiveness of Union-Linked Associations

Scaling. Scaling is a fundamental aspect of an interest regime, as it captures the extent to which organizations coordinate activities among themselves, and whether they form higher-level structures explicitly devoted to coordination. Labor unions in the UP-Hub had a high degree of scaling, achieved through a formal, hierarchical organizational structure with a peak national labor confederation at the apex. A large body of literature suggests that popular associations often face difficulty in scaling (Oxhorn 1998a; Roberts and Portes 2006). While some studies suggest that associations tend to coordinate in fluid, associational networks (Chalmers, Martin, and Piester 1997; Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2000) others have suggested the atomization of associations (Kurtz 2004a). A key question thus concerns whether associations linked to unions exhibit higher levels of scaling.

To explore this question, different dimensions of scaling are examined. A first aspect concerns the extent to which associations participate in *federated*

15. Very few Venezuelan associations (only twenty-one) reported union ties of any type. For about 40 percent of these it is unclear what types of unions they work with.

Table 8.2 Participation in Federated Entities by Union Linkage (percent)

	Participation in Federated Entities		
	Argentina	Chile	Peru
Linked to Unions	75.9**	66.7*	51.6
Not Linked to Unions	55.9	47.7	56.0

*Difference (linked versus not linked) statistically significant, $p < 0.05$.

**Difference (linked vs. not linked) statistically significant, $p < 0.01$.

entities, such as federations and *redes*, which explicitly seek to coordinate or represent other associations as their primary function. In principle, such federated entities can be particularly important for expanding problem-solving activity geographically, reaching other groups, and reaching state agencies beyond the local level (see Evans 1996:1125; Fox 1996:1091). One should expect union-linked associations to exhibit a differential pattern in this respect. As shown in table 8.2, associations linked to unions join federated entities at higher rates than do associations unrelated with unions in the cases of Argentina and Chile, while no significant difference is apparent in the Peruvian data.

It should be noted that for the purpose of assessing cross-national differences, this section uses the standard test of the significance of a difference in proportions, despite the assumption, in this test, of a randomly selected sample. Given the chain-referral data presented here, we thus use this test as a "thought experiment." The test simply provides a benchmark that indicates significance if these data had been selected through random sampling.

A second aspect of scaling concerns the extent to which associations are connected or coordinate with other popular associations. That question includes two components, whether associations link with (a) the same type of associations (such as neighborhood associations working with other neighborhood associations, communal kitchens with communal kitchens, etc.), and whether they link with (b) different types associations (e.g., neighborhood associations linked with day-care or women's groups). Linkages with different types of associations can be considered a form "bridging" across different popular-sector interests, a strategy that may be important for building encompassing coalitions. One would expect that associations that coordinate with unions would be more likely to work with a larger variety of associations and hence be part of more diverse networks more generally.¹⁶

16. Associations working with unions obviously interact with other associations, namely unions. The question is whether the networks they form are especially more diverse or not.

Table 8.3 Inter-Associational Ties by Union Linkage (percent)

	With Similar Type of Associations		With Different Types of Associations	
	Union-Linked	Not Union-Linked	Union-Linked	Not Union-Linked
Argentina	92.6**	78.5	90.7**	72.0
Chile	94.4**	63.3	72.2	59.3
Peru	87.1	79.6	77.4	64.6

**Difference (linked versus not linked) statistically significant, $p < 0.01$.

As shown in table 8.3, associations that are linked to unions have more ties to both similar and diverse associations compared to those unrelated to unions. A cautious approach to interpretation would suggest confidence in these differences in the case of Argentina for associations working with different types of associations, and in the case of reported ties with similar associations in Chile. By contrast, in Peru, propensity to work with similar and different associations is not significantly related with union linkage.

Claim-Making Strategies. Claim making can take the form of both institutional (accessing the state) and contentious strategies (protest).¹⁷ Unions have a long tradition of employing contentious strategies, such as protests, strikes, and demonstrations for pursuing worker interests and voicing demands.¹⁸ At the same time, as argued in chapter 3, under the UP-Hub they stood out relative to other popular organizations in their capacity to advance their interests through institutional channels, negotiating with employers and the state. Popular associations, by contrast, are often assumed to face difficulty in organizing protest activity and in pressing demands on the state, especially at the national level, which is often a target for labor union demands.¹⁹

The analysis first turns to an examination of protest. Table 8.4 shows that union-linked associations organize protests at significantly higher rates than associations without such linkages in Argentina and Chile. In Peru, by contrast,

17. For a discussion of institutionalized and contentious politics in the social movement literature, see Goldstone (2003) and Tilly (2003).

18. Associations were asked to respond whether helping organize protest activity was "very important," "important," "not that important," or an activity they "never" did. As I am interested in whether organizations carried out protest activity or not rather than how relevant that activity was for the respondent, I built a dummy variable and coded the first three options 1 and "never," 0.

19. See comparative analysis of collective action in Latin America after market reforms in Kurtz (2004a), which suggests low levels of protest. For an alternative analysis, which shows the opposite argument, see Arce and Bellinger (2007).



Table 8.4 Protest by Union Linkage (percent)

	Protest		
	Argentina	Chile	Peru
Union-Linked	75.9**	61.1**	51.6
Not Union-Linked	28.0	26.7	45.0

**Difference (linked versus not linked) statistically significant, $p < 0.01$.

union-linked associations are not particularly different in their use of contentious strategies. Aside from within-country differences, the propensity of union-linked associations to organize protest is particularly large in the Argentine case compared to both Chile and Peru.

For Argentina and Chile, one can further ask if union-linked associations are simply more likely to protest, or if they also actually tend to carry out protest jointly with unions. The latter is indeed prevalent in Argentina and Chile; respectively, 68 and 63 percent of union-linked associations that engage in protest also reported organizing protests with unions. However, protest is not an unusually frequent form of cooperation compared to other strategies that union-linked associations organize jointly with unions: for example, 78 percent in Argentina and 89 percent in Chile reported making demands on the state jointly with labor unions.²⁰ For union-linked associations, joint action is clearly important across different claim-making strategies.

Are union-linked associations also more likely to engage in claim making through institutional channels? Accessing the state is a crucial element of an interest regime, as it provides opportunities for representing interests, exerting leverage, and bargaining on behalf of constituents. As suggested in chapter 3, unions under the UP-Hub were in many ways better situated to engage in accessing strategies, particularly at the national level, than are popular associations in the A-Net. The question thus arises if union-linked associations are distinctive in the degree to which they engage in accessing strategies. For present purposes, accessing can be examined through (a) contacts with state agencies at any level; (b) contacts with national-level agencies; and (c) participation in state-sponsored fora and/or policy-making councils. Contacts with national agencies are crucial for bringing the demands and concerns of popular associations beyond the neighborhood level, the site where associations tend to do most

20. Associations that reported working with unions were asked a battery of questions about the activities associations and unions did together, including "Do you place joint demands on the state?"

Table 8.5 Accessing the State by Union Linkage (percent)

	Contact State Agencies				Participate in State Fora and/or Councils	
	At Any Level		At National Level		Union- Linked	Not Union- Linked
	Union- Linked	Not Union- Linked	Union- Linked	Not Union- Linked		
Argentina	79.6	76.9	58.1*	32.9	42.6	36.6
Chile	97.2**	71.5	47.2**	17.5	69.4**	35.5
Peru	58.1	56.0	32.3*	14.4	61.3**	36.8

*Difference (linked versus not linked) statistically significant, $p < 0.05$.

**Difference (linked versus not linked) statistically significant, $p < 0.01$.

of their activity. At the same time, participation in policy councils and fora entails a regular institutionalized channel for expressing voice in policy making, usually including deliberation, agenda setting and/or oversight (Schattan Cohelo and Nobre 2004).

As presented in table 8.5, union-linked associations are more likely to engage in accessing strategies in all three countries, but not always in the same ways. The differences between union-linked associations and others are greatest and most consistent in Chile, where union-linked associations are more likely to contact state agencies in general, and particularly to do so at the national level and to participate in state councils. In both Argentina and Peru the difference in union linkages is particularly marked for contacting the state at the national level,²¹ and in Peru it is also strong for participating in policy councils at higher rates than associations not working with unions. To some extent, and in different ways, then, union-linked associations have potentially greater chances to voice their concerns in policy making than associations without such linkages.

Use of State Resources. A final issue concerning union linkages is the use of state resources. Unions in the UP-Hub tended to be well funded through membership dues and sometimes administration of social benefits. Associations, by contrast, tend to find fundraising a tougher activity in general. The use of state resources may be a particularly relevant tool for financing their problem-solving activity. As presented in table 8.6, the use of state resources varies dramatically across countries, with a larger number of Argentine associations

21. Again, a difference with chapter 6 should be noted, in that the analysis in the present chapter is based on the dichotomy of whether or not the association contacts state agencies regardless of how important its leaders consider it to be.

Table 8.6 State Resources by Union Linkage (percent)

	Provides Goods, Services or Information Through State Program		State Funding (Program and/or Organizational Funding)	
	Union-Linked	Not Union-Linked	Union-Linked	Not Union-Linked
Argentina	57.4	52.7	63.0	60.2
Chile	22.2	21.5	50.0	40.7
Peru	9.7	9.6	19.4	26.8

receiving state funding than associations in Chile and more especially in Peru, and with a larger portion of associations that receive funds from state programs in Argentina than in Chile and Peru.²² What is noteworthy for present purposes, however, is that union linkage makes little if any difference in the use of state resources.

Embeddedness of Union-Linked Associations

To some extent, then, union-linked associations are characterized by distinctive problem-solving strategies, in that, depending on the country, they are more likely to participate in coordinating structures or federated entities, to protest, and to present claims at the national level. The question thus arises of how relevant these distinctive profiles might be for the more general operation of the A-Net. We have seen that few associations are linked to unions (about 15 percent of the sample); yet a key question is whether union-linked associations occupy central positions or whether they are marginal players in the A-Net. One way to explore this is to analyze the level of *embeddedness* of union-linked associations, hereby understood as the number of inter-associational linkages reported by associations.²³ Embeddedness offers an important way to assess an association's reach and the extent to which it can potentially engage in joint

22. Social programs mentioned by associations in Argentina principally include national schemes such as *Jefas y Jefes de Hogar Desocupados*, an income support program for the unemployed that requires beneficiaries to perform a workfare obligation in associations or state agencies, and *Fopar*, which involves support for soup kitchens. Both programs were created in 2002. For an analysis of social policy in Argentina and Chile, see Garay (n.d.).

23. The concept of embeddedness and the measure of inter-associational ties is also used in chapter 7, in examining scaling more generally within the A-Net. Since the focus here is specifically on the centrality of a certain group of associations within networks, this chapter distinguishes embeddedness from other aspects of scaling or coordination.

Table 8.7 Embeddedness by Union Linkage (number of ties)

	Linked to Unions	Not Linked to Unions	All
Argentina			
Mean	76.1	14.2	28.1
Median	9	6	6
Chile			
Mean	46.3	13.6	19.1
Median	10	3	4
Peru			
Mean	46.6	24.1	27.0
Median	17	7	8

action with or on behalf of other organizations.²⁴ As shown in table 8.7 union-linked associations across all three countries reported a larger number of mean and median ties than do associations not working with unions. This higher level of embeddedness suggests a more central or nodal representational role of union-linked associations within the A-Net, with the potential implication that their strategic choices may carry greater weight within the A-Net more generally.

In sum, associations linked to unions display a somewhat distinct profile—including coordination with federated entities, organizing protest, and institutionalized access at the national level—when compared to associations without union links. Those differences are more relevant in Argentina and Chile, and much less pronounced in Peru, where union-linked associations show some distinct accessing strategies, but are broadly speaking similar to other associations in terms of organizing protest and scaling. Associations linked to unions, however, do not differ from those lacking such ties with respect to the use of state resources. Finally, although union-linked associations are numerically few in the A-Net, higher levels of embeddedness imply that union-linked associations can be important vehicles of interest representation reaching relatively large numbers of associations and potentially advancing their interests. Given their ability to access the national state and organize protests, they may be central actors in pressing the interests of organized popular-sector constituencies in national policy and in mobilizing other associations for contention.

24. Analysts of social networks have developed different concepts and measures of embeddedness (Diani 2003a; Gould 2003) and have used them to explain different collective outcomes, such as social movement strategies (Ansell 2003) and forms of social movement interactions with the state (Diani 2003b).



In that sense, union-linked associations in Argentina and Chile may be important mobilizing structures in the A-Net, and important bridges articulating common interests and activities across the associational and the union world. Thus, an analysis of contention and interest intermediation in these two country cases should pay particular attention to union-linked associations.

Popular Associations and Political Parties

What kind of relationships do popular associations in the A-Net establish with political parties? And how embedded are associations with party linkages within the A-Net? Answering these questions is important for understanding whether political parties are allies for associations, how associations interact with them in solving problems, and how those party linkages affect the representation of popular-sector interests in the A-Net. The UP-Hub was characterized by labor-based parties, which had organic relationships with unions: they included union leaders in party offices and slates, sometimes participated in union formation, and shared a common ideology or at least some level of programmatic cooperation. To different degrees, parties channeled union demands regarding national policy and provided unions with some resources. Unions, in turn, provided labor-based parties a fundamental linkage to popular-sector voters, policy-making support, and mobilization capacity. With respect to party-association linkages, an extensive literature has settled on negative portrayals. Existing studies suggest that Latin American parties generally either prefer short-term, intermittent, and sometimes patronage-based relationships with associations, or neglect them altogether, reaching lower-class individuals in unmediated ways.²⁵

The first part of this section briefly looks at party-association linkages, focusing on party strategy toward associations and specifically exploring whether parties participate in the formation, funding, and electoral mobilization of popular associations. The second part explores party-association linkages from the opposite perspective by focusing on associations' strategies toward parties. It examines the kinds of linkages that associations establish with parties to advance their interests, builds a typology of party-association linkages, and analyzes its implications for the A-Net.

25. See Oxhorn (1995), C. Schneider (1995), Roberts (1995; 2006; forthcoming), Weyland (1996a), and Levitsky (2003).

Party Strategy Toward Associations

Studies of the subject typically assert that political parties in Latin America have tenuous relationships with popular associations, generally viewing them only as potential vehicles for electoral mobilization or neglecting them altogether. When parties do establish linkages with associations, these linkages tend to be short-term and clientelistic, and just a few parties engage in supporting popular associations more consistently in their problem-solving strategies. Data from the CIRELA surveys of associations corroborates these arguments about party strategies. As presented in table 8.8 the share of associations that were contacted by political candidates soliciting campaign support is notable, especially when compared to the percentage of associations that reported parties had been involved in their formation and in contributing financial support. Indeed, about a third of the associations surveyed reported contacts by candidates soliciting associations' support, while very few associations reported that parties were involved in their formation (6.1 percent), and fewer reported that parties provide funding (3.2 percent).

Cross-national differences in party strategy toward associations are large. At the two extremes, candidate contacts are particularly prevalent in Peru, where half of the associations in the survey reported such contacts, and relatively rare in Venezuela, where such contacts were reported by only 15 percent of the associations at the time of the survey. Chile and Argentina stand in the middle, with about 35 percent of the associations reporting contacts by candidates. These figures contrast sharply with the proportion of associations that reported that political parties participated in their formation and those receiving funding from parties, which is highest in Venezuela and lowest in Peru, although differences are not large.

Associations reported that candidates frequently offered something in exchange for associational cooperation, indicating that politicians tend to pursue clientelistic exchanges during campaigns.²⁶ About 72 percent of the associations contacted by parties were offered some type of support, out of which 62 percent were promised pork-barrel benefits for the community, such as public works and infrastructure, or excludable benefits for associations, such as donations. A smaller proportion were offered help in contacting public authorities (10.5 percent), or the promise of passing specific legislation (8 percent).²⁷

26. There is a rich literature addressing clientelism in Latin America. See for example, Stokes (1995), Chalmers, Martin, and Piester (1997:566), Auyero (2001), Levitsky (2003), and Kitschelt and Willkinson (2007).

27. Unspecified support was offered to 28 percent.

Table 8.8 Political Party Strategy Toward Associations (percent of associations)

Total Associations		Parties Participated in Formation	Parties Provide Funding	Candidates Contacted for Support
Argentina	(n=240)	4.2	1.7	35.4
Chile	(n=208)	5.8	1.4	31.7
Peru	(n=240)	2.5	.4	51.3
Venezuela	(n=240)	12.1	9.2	15.5
Total	(n=928)	6.1	3.2	33.4

Candidates soliciting campaign support displayed particular traits. In all countries, they belonged to parties that spread across the ideological spectrum, including old and new parties as well as right-wing, labor-based, and left-wing parties.²⁸ Further, most of these candidates soliciting support were running in local elections. Over 80 percent of the associations contacted were asked to support local-level candidates (for mayoral or district-level elections), while about 35 percent of associations were asked to support candidates running for national office (for president or for congress). Local politicians, more than those running for national-level positions or governor, appear to be more prone to seek campaign support from associations. This difference may orient party-association exchanges toward local-level political agendas.

In short, party strategy toward associations centers on contacts for support during campaigns, and such contacts are extended by parties in exchange for benefits that generally include promises of state infrastructure investments, and excludable benefits offered by parties to associations. Local-level politicians seem to be more involved in such requests than candidates running for national or gubernatorial office, and overall, these practices are pursued by diverse kinds of parties.

Associational Linkages to Parties

If parties seem primarily interested in electoral exchanges when interacting with associations, how do associations relate to parties seeking to advance their

28. Among others these include, in Argentina the Partido Justicialista (PJ) (57.6 percent), FREPASO (17.6 percent), and Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) (16.6 percent); in Chile the parties that form the Concertación (63 percent) and those on the right, Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and Renovación Nacional (RN) (42 percent); in Peru APRA (26 percent), Somos Perú (35 percent), Cambio 90 (18.7 percent), and Perú Posible (22 percent); in Venezuela Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) and Patria Para Todos (PPT) (32.4 percent), Acción Democrática (AD) (19 percent), and COPEI (5.4 percent).

interests? Do they respond to candidates and support them in elections? Do they form more stable relations with parties, engaging jointly in a combination of activities? Do they contact party leaders to solve their problems? The following analysis lays out three types of linkages that associations may pursue with parties to advance their interests and solve problems affecting their communities (see table 8.9).

The first linkage, which I call *issue-based*, is one in which associations contact parties to advance a cause or gain leverage regarding a particular problem. For example, some associations working on AIDS may contact party leaders to lobby and educate them on AIDS issues and transmit their agenda. These contacts are in principle intermittent and ad hoc, as associations direct messages to the party to solve or garner support for a particular problem or issue of concern. Further, they are also instrumental, as they pertain to an agenda on a particular issue, but not a larger commitment on the part of the association to the party's ideology, more general programmatic orientation, or electoral fate.

A second type of linkage emerges when associations support specific candidates during campaigns by pursuing activities such as mobilizing voters, bringing people to rallies, and promoting the candidate in their respective communities. That type of linkage between associations and political parties can be typified as *candidate-based*. It also consists of an instrumental tie based on the endorsement of a particular candidate, often in the hopes of obtaining either particularistic or public benefits.

Finally, the most complex type of linkage, which I call *multifaceted*, is characterized by regular and broad interactions between associations and political parties. Multifaceted linkages involve associations collaborating with parties on a variety of issues, such as developing joint community projects, training community leaders, engaging in joint claim-making activities, and supporting candidates during campaigns. Especially when such linkages further involve the participation of party militants in the founding of the association, in contributing to the association's budget as well as associations supporting party candidates in elections, such relationships may be organic, that is, involving shared members, a common ideology or programmatic orientation, and concern about the party's electoral fate.

Scoring party-association linkages is not simple. Aside from the challenges involved in typologizing the content of particular linkages, relationships between associations and political parties may change over time. For example, associations with multifaceted linkages to parties may narrow their interactions to only electoral concerns and specific exchanges. Likewise, associations created by party militants may become disengaged from those parties and

Table 8.9 Associational Linkages to Political Parties

	Issue-Based	Candidate-Based	Multifaceted
Subject of Linkage	Associations contact party leaders for problem solving	Associations support candidates	Associations and parties work jointly in different domains
Goal/Arena of Interaction	Interest	Electoral	Interest and Electoral
Characteristics of Linkage	Instrumental, occasional	Instrumental, occasional	Complex, stable

from electoral concerns. With those caveats in mind, it was possible to create measures of linkages between associations and parties based on responses to three questions concerning whether associations contact parties to solve problems, have supported candidates, and, more generally, collaborate with parties.²⁹ Those associations that reported only contacting party leaders to solve problems and that did not report collaborating with parties or supporting candidates are considered to be characterized by *issue-based linkages*. Associations that reported supporting candidates but did not report working with a party are considered to have *candidate-based linkages*. Associations with candidate-based linkages may also contact parties for problem solving, but the distinctive feature is their support for particular candidates. It seems likely that such support was provided in exchange for programmatic issues, for interest-group concerns, or for excludable benefits, but the data do not provide accurate motivations for such support. Associations that reported collaborating with political parties are considered to have a *multifaceted linkage*.

In a pooled analysis, about a quarter of the associations sampled reported issue-based, candidate-based, or multifaceted linkages with political parties (26 percent). The share of associations with party linkages is remarkably similar across countries, ranging from 23.3 in Peru and 24.5 in Chile, to 27.5 and 28.8 percent in Venezuela and Argentina respectively. Table 8.10 shows that the most prevalent type is issue-based, which represents 41 percent of all reported linkages, although these are not that much more prevalent than other linkages.

29. The three survey questions are the following: (1) Does your organization work with political parties? followed by What party? and by a battery of close-ended questions about different activities associations may pursue with parties, such as protest, placing demands on the state, sharing information, joint community projects, training, and receiving goods from political parties. (2) Has your organization supported a political candidate in the past five years? Respondents were further asked to identify the party of the candidate and what position she or he was running for. (3) Do you contact party leaders for problem solving?

Table 8.10 Distribution of Party-Association Linkages (percent)

Issue-Based	Candidate-Based	Multifaceted	Total Associations with Party Linkages
41.3 (100)	29.1 (70)	29.7 (72)	100 (242)

Candidate-based and multifaceted linkages each represent about 29 percent of total linkages.

The pooled data mask some country variation regarding the types of linkages that prevail (see table 8.11). Issue-based linkages are more frequent among associations in Argentina and Chile, and they are less prevalent in Peru and Venezuela. In Peru candidate-based linkages are most common, whereas in Venezuela multifaceted linkages predominate. Multifaceted linkages are particularly infrequent in Chile and comparatively more frequent in Argentina and Venezuela.

Associations with *multifaceted linkages* reported collaborating with parties on multiple issues: exchanging ideas or information with parties (93 percent), placing joint demands on the state (51 percent), carrying out community projects together (61 percent), and, to a lesser extent, protesting with political parties (43 percent). Over half (52 percent) of the associations with multifaceted linkages further reported that they had supported candidates in elections.

In each capital city, *multifaceted linkages* are concentrated rather than dispersed across multiple parties.³⁰ In Argentina, such linkages exist primarily with the Peronist Party (PJ), the traditional labor-based party.³¹ By contrast, Venezuelan associations have developed multifaceted linkages with new parties, primarily with President Hugo Chávez's Movimiento Quinta República (MVR).³² As mentioned, these linkages are less frequent in Peru and, particularly, in Chile. *Candidate-based linkages*, which are infrequent with the exception of the Peruvian case, develop around local-level candidates at higher rates in Argentina and Chile, whereas in Peru and Venezuela associations reported

30. Data collected do not allow me to establish which parties are involved in issue-based linkages.

31. For a discussion of labor mobilizing and elite parties, see Roberts (2002). In Argentina, associations tend to have *multifaceted linkages* with the PJ. Of the associations that work with parties, 62 percent reported to work with the PJ, 24 percent with the UCR, and 14 percent with other smaller parties.

32. Information about the party/parties associations work with is available for 83 percent of the linkages. About 54 percent reported working with MVR or with MVR and allied (at the time) with PPT, 25 percent with AD, and 16 percent only with PPT.



Table 8.11 Party-Association Linkages by Country (percent)

Total Associations	Multifaceted	Candidate-based	Issue-Based	Total Party- Assoc. Linkages
Argentina (n=69)	36.2	14.5	49.2	100
Chile (n=51)	11.7	17.6	70.5	100
Peru (n=56)	23.2	57.1	19.6	100
Venezuela (n=66)	42.4	28.8	28.8	100

supporting candidates running for national office—president and congress—at significantly higher rates.³³ In the latter cases, candidates from new parties, such as Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría (former President Alberto Fujimori's parties) in Peru and MVR in Venezuela reaped the most support.³⁴

Embeddedness of Party-Linked Associations

As with union linkages, we can explore how these different types of linkages matter for the A-Net more generally. An analysis of embeddedness, again understood as the number of inter-associational linkages, shows that associations with issue-based linkages and to a lesser extent those with multifaceted linkages are significantly more connected than associations with candidate-based linkages or without party links. Associations with candidate-based linkages, which probably serve as vehicles of electoral support, appear to be less embedded in associational networks, even compared to associations without party linkages (see table 8.12).

Two points might be suggested. First, the activity pursued through issue-based and multifaceted linkages may be relevant for a larger segment of associations in the A-Net, as it is carried out by associations that exhibit high levels of embeddedness. By contrast, associations with candidate-based linkages are the least involved with other associations, a fact that would seem to circumscribe the spread of their strategic choices and interactions with political parties

33. In Argentina and Chile associations with candidate-based linkages reported supporting local-level candidates at higher rates, 70 percent and 66.7 percent, than national-level candidates, 20 percent and 33 percent respectively. By contrast, 81 percent of the associations in Peru and 89.5 percent in Venezuela reported supporting national-level candidates, and only 18.8 percent in Peru and 10.5 percent in Venezuela supported local-level candidates.

34. Of the associations with candidate-based linkages, 84.5 percent reported supporting MVR in Venezuela and 53 percent Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría in Peru. Caution, however, should be employed when analyzing these data.

Table 8.12 Embeddedness of Associations by Party Linkage

	Issue- Based (100)	Candidate- Based (70)	Multifaceted (72)	Without Party Linkage (686)
Mean Ties	54.3	14.1	32.4	21.0
Median Ties	7	4	6	5

within the A-Net. Second, each type of party linkage may affect associations in different ways. Whereas associations that pursue issue-based and multifaceted linkages also tend to pursue linkages with other associations in the A-Net, associations with candidate-based linkages are relatively cut off from the associational world, perhaps engaging in more particularistic and go-it-alone strategies, without expanding their ties across diverse associational networks. This point is relevant because parties have sometimes been found to disarticulate associational networks or generate divisiveness in the associational world when linking with associations (see Oxhorn 1995). The effects of party linkages on associations thus seem to depend on the types of linkages that are established. Candidate-based linkages are associated with lower levels of embeddedness and more atomized associations.

Associations with candidate-based linkages seem further isolated with respect to other types of linkages, such as union linkages. While about 18 percent of associations linked with political parties are also linked to labor unions, union linkages vary by type of party linkage. Only 10 percent of associations with candidate-based linkages are linked to unions, while about 27 percent of associations with multifaceted and 20 percent with issue-based linkages are connected to unions. This further shows that associations with multifaceted and issue-based linkages are more likely to be engaged in more diverse networks than associations with candidate-based linkages.

In sum, attempts at establishing clientelistic exchanges with associations are an important aspect of party strategy toward the associational world. Candidates running for local-level elections appear to be particularly invested in such attempts, which involve soliciting occasional campaign support from associations, with excludable rather than programmatic goods offered in exchange for cooperation. However, this strategy by parties may not be widely successful. Despite some differences across countries, it is important to emphasize that associations' strategies toward parties were not predominantly centered on electoral issues. Associations with issue-based linkages, which contact parties for problem solving, and/or associations with multifaceted, complex

linkages with parties, were more prevalent than associations with candidate-based links in three of the four countries under study. That associations do not succumb to parties' requests for support may indicate that they have other sources of power or influence or that they perceive better prospects in terms of problem solving by establishing other types of linkages with parties, or even establishing none at all. The data thus suggest that a view of the associational world as vulnerable to clientelism and easily manipulated by a candidate or party strategy may be overstated.

Cross-National Comparisons

The chapter has revealed variation across countries in associational linkages to unions and parties, both in terms of the degree to which union-linked associations are distinctive and in terms of the predominant types of linkages that associations form with parties. This section explores some of the factors that potentially account for this variation and then lays out overall country patterns.

The Distinctiveness of Union-Linked Associations: Argentina and Chile Versus Peru and Venezuela

Compared to other popular associations, the problem-solving repertoires of union-linked associations are distinctive in Argentina and Chile, but not in Peru and Venezuela. In the former two countries union-linked associations are more active in scaling (especially participating in federated entities such as federations or *redes*), in organizing protest, and in accessing the state, particularly at the national level, compared to other popular-sector associations. The fact that union-linked associations also tend to be significantly more embedded in broader associational networks further indicates that their distinctive pattern of activity may be particularly important for the operation of the A-Net more broadly. By contrast, no distinctive pattern of activity characterizes union-linked associations in Peru, except for some tendency toward more frequent state contacting at the national level and participation in policy councils. Any differences in Venezuela are less important, since few associations have union linkages (a fact that precluded the inclusion of Venezuela in this part of the analysis because of insufficient observations).

The distinctive pattern of activity of union-linked associations in Argentina and Chile arises in a particular union context with more mobilized public-sector unions and social movement unions, which have been available for

broader popular-sector alliances. The organization of some of those unions, moreover, takes the institutional form of a national labor central, which serves a broad coordinating function. In Peru and Venezuela no such pattern of active public-sector unions and social movement unions has emerged. In Peru, most associations reported contacts with informal-sector unions, and in Venezuela the few union-linked associations had a higher tendency to be linked to traditional corporatist unions. These two types of unions, informal-sector and traditional-corporatist unions, seem to be less conducive to the pattern of problem solving observed in Argentina and Chile. Thus, the different developments within the union movement in each country seem to affect union-association linkages and the strategies of union-linked associations. Specifically, it seems that ties to social movement unions and/or public-sector unions, in particular teachers' unions, are more likely to be associated with a pattern of problem solving involving contestation and coordination than ties to informal-sector unions or to traditional corporatist ones, especially industrial unions.

This argument is consistent with the literature on labor associations that distinguishes the mobilization strategies of traditional corporatist unions from those that have formed an alternative social movement unionism (Seidman 1994; Bensusán 2000), as well as public-sector unions (Frank 2002b; Murillo and Ronconi 2004). Public-service workers' unions, in particular those of teachers, became the most contentious labor unions in countries such as Mexico (Cook 1996) and Argentina in the 1990s (Murillo and Ronconi 2004). Recent studies have further found public-sector unions to be particularly prone to engaging in institutionalized demand making and in contention in the case of Chile (Frank 2002b:38–40). Indeed, public-sector unions have had a greater propensity to engage in contention than industrial unions, as they are relatively less exposed to competition and protected by job stability clauses.³⁵ Further, some of these unions have left-leaning leadership, with a broader, oppositionist orientation. In the early 1990s some of these unions formed an alternative central or peak association, such as CTA in Argentina, which is frequently led by teachers or public-sector workers' unions, and CAT in Chile, which is relatively smaller and led by unions in the education sector. To a greater or lesser extent these labor centrals began to link up with community organizations, and in turn, studies of specific social movements indicate that popular associations have found social movement unions particularly good coalition partners for contestation and protest. A case in point is the unemployed movement

35. See discussion in Murillo and Ronconi (2004). The authors find causes other than lack of competition and job stability to explain variation in teachers' militancy in Argentina.

in Argentina, which comprises community associations and has forged important ties with social movement unions, especially those in the CTA (Svampa and Pereyra 2003; Garay 2007).

Cross-National Variation in Types of Party-Association Linkage

With respect to party-association linkages, across the national cases there is remarkable stability in the number of associations with party linkages, which constitute about 25 percent of the associations sampled in each case. Yet, countries differ in terms of what type of linkage predominates. Both Argentina and Chile show a predominance of issue-based linkages, although that is more pronounced in Chile than in Argentina, where fewer associations have such linkages and where multifaceted linkages are also important. In both countries, issue-based linkages are formed at higher rates than in Peru and Venezuela. Moreover, associations with issue-based linkages to parties are more embedded than those with other types of party linkage, so the activities of associations with these linkages may be particularly influential within the A-Net as a whole.

Peru is characterized by the dominance of candidate-based linkages, which are much more prevalent than in the other countries. At the same time, Peruvian associations establish very few issue-based linkages. Candidate-based linkages are generally formed by associations with lower levels of embeddedness. Thus, candidate-based linkages are probably not a key strategy of problem solving that diffuses through inter-associational linkages in the broader A-Net. Finally, in Venezuela, multifaceted linkages predominate compared to other types, but the percentage of associations with such linkages, while higher than in Chile and Peru, is similar to that in Argentina, which has an even higher level of issue-based links. Multifaceted linkages tend to be developed by associations with relatively higher levels of embeddedness, which may thus play some role in the operation of the A-Net more broadly.

In accounting for the presence of these diverse party-association linkages, a number of factors may be suggested. The presence of issue-based linkages appears to be related to the institutionalization of the party system. More stable party systems seem to facilitate regular patterns of interaction between associations and political parties. If issue-based linkages require some level of predictability and regularity in the interaction between associations and parties, such contacts can more easily develop in the context of stable party structures. More stable party systems are characterized by greater continuity in party organization and leadership with which associations may establish issue-based

linkages, even through informal ties. These relations may be difficult to form if parties are disrupted and new party organizations fail to consolidate following party system collapse.

Among our cases, Chile and Argentina show higher levels of party system institutionalization than Peru and Venezuela, both of which experienced party system collapse in the 1990s.³⁶ Indeed, Chile has longstanding parties that re-emerged after the democratic transition as key political actors. Likewise, Argentina has higher levels of party stability, even after the recent dismemberment of the Radical Party, which largely occurred after the 2001 financial and political crisis.³⁷

The development of candidate-based linkages appears to be related to the strategy of the party leadership and associational responses to that strategy. When party leadership is not involved in organizational building and instead seeks instrumental support from associations, then the likelihood of finding candidate-based linkages is higher. In Peru party system collapse, which discouraged issue-based linkages, and a party strategy of extending clientelistic interactions with associations may help explain why in that country candidate-based linkages predominate vis-à-vis other forms of party linkage. Regarding the responses to clientelistic party initiatives, recent studies of Lima show that associations appear to adopt a pragmatic strategy of supporting parties that tend to their needs and withdrawing support from parties that do not deliver on their promises (Schönwälder 2004:30). The absence of stronger allies, such as social movement unions, may also generate further incentives for associations in Peru to engage in candidate-based linkages. It should be further noted that Peru has a history of top-down attempts at mobilizing popular-sector associations for political projects (D. Collier 1976; Stokes 1995). Such support-mobilization projects did not lend themselves to the development of multifaceted linkages in the past, and the more recent attempts of interaction with associations launched by the United Left in the City of Lima, which sought to respect the autonomy of popular associations (Schönwälder 2004), vanished with the disappearance of United Left from the partisan arena in the 1990s (Roberts 1998; Schönwälder 2004).

By contrast, when party leadership is involved in developing broader linkages with associations, multifaceted linkages may be more prevalent. In the case of Venezuela, party system collapse and the emphasis placed by the electorally dominant *chavista* movement in building ties with associations—and

36. Cameron and Levitsky (2003), Burgess and Levitsky (2003), Roberts (2006), and Seawright (2006).

37. On the 2001 crisis, see Levitsky and Murillo (2003) and Woodruff (2005).



even fostering their formation—may help explain lower levels of issue-based and candidate-based linkages, and the prevalence of multifaceted linkages.

In Argentina a larger share of multifaceted linkages than in Chile may reflect the strategy, incipient at the time of the surveys, of parties seeking to extend linkages to the organizations of the unemployed and some community-based movements. By contrast, the major Chilean parties are more oriented toward unmediated linkages to society and this more general orientation toward circumventing organized actors may help explain the low levels of multifaceted linkages in that case.

Despite the importance of party strategy, we should not overlook the role of associations themselves in shaping their ties to political parties. Oxhorn (1995) has shown that during the democratic transition in Chile, some associations, fearful that political parties would generate divisiveness in the associational world, intentionally chose a more distant relationship with them. These associations were also concerned about the potentially negative effects of party ties, like the high levels of divisiveness in the context of polarizing partisan competition in the late 1960s and early 1970s.³⁸ Associations in all cases do not readily succumb to party requests for campaign support either. As we saw above, although a large percent of associations received requests for support extended by parties often in exchange for some material benefit, only a few reported—or admitted to—embarking on such exchanges.

Overall Country Profiles

Three country patterns can be discerned regarding associational linkages to unions and parties. Argentina and Chile display a similar profile. More associations have linkages with public-sector or social movement unions, and undertake more mobilizational patterns of problem solving. In addition, there is a greater tendency of associations to form issue-based linkages to parties. In Peru and Venezuela, by contrast, associations do not tend to link specifically to social movement unions, and those that do have union linkages do not engage in distinctive problem-solving strategies. Yet associations in these two countries differ in terms of the nature of party linkages, with ad hoc candidate-based linkages predominating in Peru and multifaceted linkages predominating in Venezuela.

What do these patterns tell us about the operation of the A-Net? In Chile

38. On the relationship of political parties and associations in Chile see C. Schneider (1995) and Hipsher (1998).

and Argentina linkages to parties and to unions may affect a significant number of associations in the A-Net given the embeddedness of union-linked associations and those with issue-based party linkages. Unions seem to be good allies for mobilization and demand making, while parties appear to be more distant, contacted for solving specific problems. In Peru, by contrast, although union-linked associations are well embedded, they do not have a distinct pattern of problem solving, and associations working with parties tend to be quite isolated in the associational world. Thus union and party linkages are not particularly relevant for the activities of a broader network of associations. In the case of Venezuela, parties appear to be a more important institutional actor than labor unions for associations' problem-solving activity. The high embeddedness of associations with multifaceted linkages to parties may make them particularly important actors in the A-Net.

The similarity between Argentina and Chile may come as a surprise for two reasons. First, based on the existing literature we would not have expected such a pattern of union-association ties in Chile. The decline of the union movement during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–89) and its structural weakness thereafter, coupled with the atomization that has been usually understood to be a consequence of sweeping market reforms implemented by the military (Kurtz 2004a), would seemingly make union-association ties improbable. Even though the number of associational ties to unions is not great, the embeddedness of these associations may make their activity consequential for other associations in the A-Net. In this way, union-linked associations in Chile may operate as mobilizing structures for protest and state contacting and as bridges among disparate associations. Second, the similarity in party-association ties is also surprising given that Argentina has a marked reputation for patronage-based organizations and clientelism. This feature of Argentine politics is rooted in the local offices of the Peronist Party, called basic units (*unidades básicas*), which have generally been the focus of most research on clientelism in Argentina. Patterns of partisan engagement of the associational world, however, do not uniformly fit this pattern.³⁹

Conclusion

The new interest regime, the A-Net, is more diverse than the UP-Hub, involving a broader range of popular organizations. Understanding how different

39. On the patronage activity of basic units and militants, see in particular Auyero (2001) and Levitsky (2003).



associations engage in problem solving and how relevant they are for the A-Net is an important issue for future research. Union-association and party-association linkages may provide good starting points for identifying different patterns of problem solving in the A-Net.

With cross-national differences in incidence, linkages between unions and associations are an important feature of the A-Net. In Argentina and Chile they indicate a degree of continuity between the old and emergent interest regimes, as union-linked associations are more likely to adopt strategies of protest and national-level state contacting. Higher levels of protest and scaling on the part of union-linked associations can facilitate episodes of large-scale mobilization, such as the ones spearheaded in Argentina by the associations of the unemployed movement, which emerged largely out of community-based associations but gained further capacity through its connections with unions. National-level accessing strategies of union-linked associations can also be important for policy-making input. Though further research is needed to reveal how influential union-linked associations are, one can observe that although they are not dominant in quantitative terms, they are more embedded in networks of associations, thereby potentially having greater capacity to operate as mobilizing structures through the A-Net more generally. Finally, union-linked associations are important because they may act as bridge organizations, representing structurally different segments of the popular sectors: labor unions, which are focused on work-related concerns and typically represent the wage earner, and popular associations, which focus on a broader array of issues such as social services, consumption, and infrastructure, and represent a more variegated constituency frequently defined territorially, at the neighborhood or community level. This question is particularly interesting given that "bridging" across different segments of the popular sectors in the UP-Hub was generally the task of political parties in the electoral arena rather than of organizations in the interest arena.⁴⁰

With respect to party-association interactions, different types of linkages result from strategies of both parties and associations. The greatest prospects for coalition formation between associations and parties occur through multifaceted and issue-based links, the former involving a broader common agenda and concern about the electoral fate of the party, and the latter involving alliances surrounding particular issues. Associations with issue-based and multifaceted

40. Exceptions to this claim are the social movement unions; see in particular Seidman (1994) and Keck (1992).

links tend to be characterized by higher levels of embeddedness. Candidate-based links, by contrast, reveal a different strategy on the part of associations. They represent a pragmatic, probably more atomized approach to solving problems, involving the exchange of cooperation for (usually) material benefits. Associations with candidate-based linkages tend to have lower levels of inter-associational linkages, and consequently have less potential impact on the activity of other associations in the A-Net. It seems likely that these associations perceive candidate-based linkages as the only viable avenue for problem solving, one that seems more promising or, to them, feasible, than a collective problem-solving strategy. Overall, the relative importance of issue-based and multifaceted linkages, even in the face of extensive efforts of parties to obtain support from associations in exchange for benefits, appears to indicate that associations do not succumb to those efforts *en masse*.

It should be noted, however, that party-association ties are continually negotiated in a fluid ongoing process. Since the surveys were carried out, two of the four countries have witnessed important changes in party politics. In Argentina, multifaceted linkages between parties and associations may have been growing since 2003. Indeed, President Néstor Kirchner (2003–7) governed through a broad coalition in which organizational linkages were critical, including alliances with unemployed groups, community-based social movements, as well as traditional labor unions. Preexisting popular movements were mobilized strategically in attempts to pursue national policy goals, and some associational leaders were appointed to public office and, to a lesser extent, included in party slates. In Venezuela, the formation of popular-sector associations and their mobilization behind his project is one of President Chávez's most salient political strategies and may entail growing levels of multifaceted linkages in the Venezuelan A-Net.

Whether these ongoing changes favor the formation of broader coalitions that include associations in participatory projects, or whether they reinforce or generate fragmentation in the associational world, remains an open question. Based on the analysis here presented, multifaceted linkages do not necessarily fragment the associations involved. The new ties forged by Chávez's MVR and the Kirchner faction in the PJ resemble multifaceted linkages. In both cases, particularly in Venezuela, the risk exists that the broader orientation of the A-Net may be asymmetrical, primarily reflective of the top-down goals and policies of state leaders. Yet, in Argentina, the fact that associations were already connected and active before the extension of party linkages from above may result in the formation of party-association links that afford associations more



influence, with more symmetrical forms of exchange or negotiation between the associations and Kirchner's faction in the PJ. Nonetheless, multifaceted linkages might evolve into candidate-based linkages, with the possible effect of marginalizing some associations. The evolution of party-association linkages in these two cases is still in flux as party systems undergo significant change.