

THOUGHTS ABOUT ROLES AND RELATIONS: AN OLD DOCUMENT REVISITED

Christopher WINSHIP

*Northwestern University **

Historical overview

“Thoughts about roles and relations – Part I: Theoretical considerations”, was written in the fall of 1974 at the beginning of my second year of graduate study at Harvard. It was a memorandum to Harrison White’s research group on blockmodel analysis. “Part II: Methodological considerations” was never written. The major purpose of the memo was to outline a theory of roles that would allow a researcher not only to identify individuals who were in the same roles in the same population but individuals who were in similar roles in different populations.

The main ideas in “Thoughts about roles and relations” were not followed up until Mike Mandel and I started working together in 1977. At the time Mike was an undergraduate at Harvard. This collaboration resulted in Mike writing an undergraduate senior honors thesis (Mandel 1978) that not only extended the theory, but carried out extensive empirical analyses.

There were, however, considerable personal obstacles to bringing our work to publication. Mike had decided to pursue a graduate degree in economics at Harvard. I had moved on to post-docs at the University of Wisconsin and the University of Chicago, and my interests had moved away from social networks to social stratification and economic modelling. It was not until 1983 that we published two papers (Winship and Mandel 1983; Mandel 1983) that presented most of the core ideas in my original memorandum and our later unpublished work. By that time though, the pull of different intellectual agendas

* Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201, U.S.A.

neant that neither of us further pursued research on social networks.

At least as early as Sailer's 1978 article, individuals outside of Harrison White's group had begun to question the robustness of the concept of roles as sets of structurally equivalent individuals. In 1982 I became aware that Doug White quite independently was pursuing a line of analysis similar to that of mine and Mandel's (White 1982; White and Reitz 1983). In fact, the awareness of Doug's work did much to motivate Mandel and me to finish our two papers and submit them for publication. Since that time a number of researchers have worked on a theory of roles that would allow a researcher not only to identify individuals in the same roles in a single population, but individuals who were in similar roles in different populations (Wu 1983; Everett 1985; Breiger and Pattison 1986; Boyd and Everett 1987).

It is, perhaps, worth briefly discussing why I did not pursue at the time it was written the line of research outlined in "Thoughts about roles and relations". It is a somewhat interesting story for the sociology of science.

At the time I wrote my memo the only published paper on blockmodels was Lorrain and White's 1971 paper "Structural equivalence of individuals in social networks". As a close reading of that article will reveal what Lorrain and White were trying to do was to generalize the concept of structural equivalence. They were analyzing homomorphic reductions of graphs as a possible way of arriving at an underlying structure for a network. What they wanted to do was "fold" networks onto themselves (also see Lorrain 1972).

The Lorrain and White approach led to the development of the "blocker" algorithm (Heil and White 1976) and the attempt to identify blocks as homomorphic reductions using the zero block criteria. The problem with blocker was that it often provided many solutions, and data were frequently consistent with several different blockmodels. In short, it was an unsatisfactory data analytic tool.

In the fall of 1973 I began graduate school in sociology at Harvard. Harrison White was visiting the University of Edinburgh and Ron Breiger was busy trying out different ways of analyzing network data into blockmodels. I had already started developing the ideas for "Thoughts about roles and relations".

I believe that it was during the winter of 1974 that Ron discovered that if you did correlations of correlation matrices the result would originally converge into a matrix of one and minus one correlations

creating a dichotomous partition of the original variables. By stacking the row and column vectors from relational matrices into variable vectors, Breiger found he could generate nice blockmodels. Thus the "Concor" algorithm was invented. (The algorithm had actually been invented previously by McQuitty. See McQuitty (1968), and McQuitty and Clark (1968).)

The invention of Concor pushed blockmodeling in a direction different than that found in Lorrain and White. Individuals were now put together not because of some abstract similarity in their positions, but because they shared many of the same ties with the same individual. Structural equivalence became generalized in a statistical instead of a homomorphic sense.

Concor resulted in a lot of very good and important work (e.g., Breiger *et al.* 1975; White *et al.* 1976; Breiger 1976, 1979). When Harrison White came back from Scotland in the fall of 1974, he was presented with this important new tool called Concor, and some ideas of mine suggesting that the concept of role as structurally equivalent individuals was too narrow. With Concor one could analyze real data and get interesting results. In fact, Breiger had already analyzed a number of data sets. My ideas only promised empirical results some time in the future. Thus Concor and the generalization of structural equivalence implicit within it took center stage.

By the late 1970s individuals in Harrison White's group started to become interested in the ideas in "Thoughts about roles and relations." Philippa Pattison and I did some work together that was never written up (though see Pattison 1982), and Mandel completed his dissertation. It was, however, too late, at least for Mandel and me, since we had both moved on to pursue research in other areas. It was a struggle to write our two papers (Winship and Mandel 1983; Mandel 1983).

Over the years I have occasionally received requests for the original "Thoughts about roles and relations" paper and I have been pleased that a few individuals have cited my obscure and almost lost document. Thus, from time to time, it had occurred to me that there might be some historical interest in having the paper published. I discussed this recently with Malcolm Dow and Martin Everett and with their encouragement I sent it to Lin Freeman and asked if he had any interest as editor, in publishing the paper in *Social Networks*. He said that he would, and I am grateful to him for his generous offer.

What follows as the main text of this paper is the original "Thoughts about roles and relations" memorandum. I have done some minor editing in order to correct spelling and grammar and in a few places to clarify meaning. Basically, however, it is the original document.

It is wonderful to have the opportunity to publish an old paper that was virtually buried and forgotten. I can no longer claim to be current with the literature in social networks. My sense, though, is that research in the field has gone considerably beyond the original ideas in my memorandum. Despite this, my hope is that people will at least find the document of historical interest.

Thoughts about roles and relations, Fall 1974. Part I: Theoretical considerations

In the past year I have spent a lot of time thinking about roles and relations along the lines of White and his coworkers. My efforts to date have been to attempt to extend the ideas and methods of White's group in a way which would provide for a richer analysis of sociometric structure. The purpose of this paper is to describe some of the thoughts that have been born of this effort and to examine new directions for research.

Before heading off into the land of mathematical abstraction, I would like to state three of the issues that are a motivating force in this work and to discuss the concept of a "role". All of this will sound like familiar jargon to many of you, especially those in the White group. The three issues are:

- (1) The need for precise language, perhaps mathematical, in which one is able to give concrete description of the social structure of groups and in which one is able to pose theoretical issues.
- (2) The desire to explain how it is that people are in new situations everyday, that they have never been in before, yet in which they know how to act (an idea of Chomsky's that the ethnomethodologists have translated into a sociological context).
- (3) A desire to gain an explicit understanding of the duality that seems to exist between roles and relations: i.e. the fact that if we know the roles people have within a group we should be able to derive the relationships which exist between them; conversely, the relationships

which exist in a group should determine the roles that the people have within the group.

These three issues are the motivating force in my attempt to build a "calculus of roles". Before building such a calculus, we need to examine the concept of a role.

I will differentiate between two types of roles and two ways of looking at a role. My intuition tells me that two people are in the same role if the position they maintain in a social structure is identical or at least similar in some sense. Clearly two people are in the same role if they are in the same relation to the same people. This is precisely what Lorrain and White (1971) mean by two individuals being structural equivalents. When we think of roles in this sense they are tied into the relational structure of a group in a very concrete way. They not only specify what types of relationships a person has, but also the specific people that he has those relationships with. I will refer to roles of this type as "concrete roles". Concrete roles are very important in social structure. In fact, it may be reasonable to conjecture that they are the primitive building blocks of social structure. When we think of someone being an American, a Republican or a Harvard student, these are all examples of concrete roles.

Not all roles are of a concrete nature. In fact, many roles are not of a concrete nature. A role may specify that a person has certain types of relations, but not with whom a person has those roles. Thus we may think of a person as a citizen, a party member or a student. We will call roles of this type "abstract roles". The difference between concrete roles and abstract roles is that the former are concerned with the specific relations that one has with specific people, whereas the latter are concerned only with the specific types of relations one has. People who have the same concrete roles have identical positions within the social structure, whereas people who have the same abstract roles are people who have "similar" positions within the social structure. Thus we have the difference between two individuals who are students at the same school and two individuals who are students at two different schools.

The above example of students is illustrative of another distinction that we need to make. If I am a student at a school I may recognize that a student from my school and a student at another school have from an "objective" point of view similar roles. However, from my own

subjective” point of view they have very different roles. I may see one as my ally, a classmate or whatever, and the other as a foe, or a hater. We need to make a distinction between looking at roles from an objective versus subjective points of view. The fact that two people are objectively equivalent is stronger than the fact that they are subjectively equivalent. When we ask whether two people are equivalent from a subjective point of view, we need not only ask whether their positions in a social structure are similar, but whether the person whose point of view is being taken “plugs into” their social structure in the same sort of way”. We may have two brothers, for instance. The son of one will see one brother as a father, and the other as uncle.

mathematical considerations

The discussion above has been vague and imprecise. At this point I will try to develop a mathematical framework within which to understand some of these ideas. I have already mentioned the Lorrain-White concept of structural equivalence as being related to the concept of a concrete role. For the moment I will deal with the concept of structural equivalence in its strictest sense. I will examine extensions of this idea at the end of part I. We define the concept:

Definition. Two people, a and b , are structurally equivalent if and only if for each relationship R , person a is in relationship R to a person c , if and only if person b is in relationship R to c .

$aRc \leftrightarrow bRc$ for all R and c .

Our discussion above of concrete and abstract roles suggests that the concept of structural equivalence is appropriate for concrete roles, but that it is inadequate for the abstract roles. Figure 1 illustrates this inadequacy. Each person in the group clearly has the same abstract role, but no one is structurally equivalent to any other person in the group.

It is clear from its definition that structural equivalence is based on having identical relationships with *exactly the same people*.

The mathematical concept of an automorphism will be of some help in overcoming this problem. An automorphism of a graph is a one to




Fig. 1. Nonstructurally equivalent individuals who have similar roles.

one onto mapping of a graph into itself that preserves adjacency. More precisely:


Definition. An automorphism, $f(\cdot)$, is a one to one onto mapping of a graph into itself such that

aRb if and only if $f(a)Rf(b)$.

This is identical to saying that there is a permutation of the matrix of the graph such that the original matrix and the permuted matrix are equivalent.

If we reconsider Figure 1 we will notice that there is an automorphism which equates (i.e. $f(i) = j$) each node with each other node. To equate any two nodes we need only rotate the graph by either 90, 180 or 270 degrees. We will speak of any two people who can be identified through an automorphism as being automorphically equivalent. Two people that are automorphically equivalent are structurally equivalent except that we have had to relabel all the points with the appropriate names. The idea of automorphic equivalence is closely related to what I have meant by an abstract role. Two people that are automorphically equivalent have the same relations in their social structure, though these relations may be with different people. Thus their positions in the social structure are similar, though not identical. To go back to some concrete examples, we might think of two quarterbacks on opposing football teams. Clearly they are not structurally equivalent as they have very different types of relationships with different people. They are however, automorphically equivalent. By interchanging the two quarterbacks, and each of the respective members of the opposing team, the structure of the groups is clearly preserved.

In my discussion of roles I made a distinction between considering roles from an objective point of view and a subjective point of view. Two people are in objectively equivalent roles if they are automorphically equivalent, but when are they subjectively equivalent? If we go



ig. 2. Male lineage hierarchy.

back to our quarterbacks and consider things from the point of view of the umpire we can see that the umpire considers them to be in equivalent roles with respect to him. Thus, if we are interchanging the respective members of each of the football teams, the umpire can still remain the same umpire.

We can make the above discussion a little more precise by making the following:

Definition. Two people, a and b , are automorphically equivalent with respect to point c if and only if there exists an automorphism such that $f(a) = b$ and $f(c) = c$.

The above mathematical characterization is exactly what we have meant by two people being in the same role with respect to another person. It should be clear, however, that two people may be equivalent with respect to one person but not with respect to one and another. The following oversimplified example of an “ideal” American male lineage serves to elucidate this point.

The grandfather sees both fathers as being equivalent and all of the sons. Both fathers see each of their own sons as being equivalent, but see the other two sons as nephews. Each of the sons sees the two others differently – one as a father and one as an uncle. They see their uncle’s sons as being equivalent with each other, but not with their mothers.

At this point structural equivalence has been lost from sight. There is a very simple relationship between structural equivalence and automorphic equivalence at a point.

Proposition. Two people are structurally equivalent if and only if they are automorphically equivalent with respect to every person in the group.

This is a reassuring result. In sociological terms it states that if two

people are seen as being equivalent in the subjective structure of each person in the group, then they must also be equivalent in the concrete structure.

At this point I have developed some ideas for thinking about roles. However, I have not yet developed a way of characterizing sociometric structure, nor have I classified what I mean by a relation. We turn to this task now.

Characterization of sociometric structure

The problem of how to characterize sociometric structure is very important and delicate. In the literature there are essentially two different ways of looking at sociometric structure: one way represented by the work of Davis, Holland and Leinhardt (see papers by these authors in Leinhardt 1977), and the other represented by the work of White and his group. The approach of the former group is to consider sociometric structure as consisting of various configurations. Configurations are isomorphic classes of subgraphs, and the various sets of relations within them. Davis, Holland and Leinhardt have principally been concerned with the analysis of triads and triplets. It would seem reasonable to think of trying to characterize roles as consisting of various configurations. Thus we might think of a role as consisting of various triad types. For example, a leader might be a member of a triad in which he only chose people that choose him.

This approach has some inherent difficulties. There is strong evidence to suggest that there is no configuration of a fixed size that is sufficient to determine whether two people are automorphically equivalent in an arbitrarily large graph. Without going into details, the evidence consists in the fact that there is a one to one correspondence between the size of a configuration and some n -dimensional binary matrix with fixed marginals. The configurations are sufficient to determine whether two people are automorphically equivalent if and only if the marginals of the appropriate dimension matrix are sufficient to determine the matrix. Since there seems to be no hope that there is an n such that any binary matrix of that dimension would be determined by its marginals, this approach seems to have little hope of being very powerful¹.

¹ At one time I had constructed some examples illustrating this point, but they are now lost.

White's group has thought of relations in terms of paths. We think of a graph as consisting of two relations, P , the raw matrix of data, and P^t , the transpose of the raw matrix. Other relationships are created by multiplying the matrices by themselves and by each other. This multiplication can be carried out in two ways – by doing ordinary multiplication and binary multiplication. When we do regular multiplication, the i - j entry in matrix P^n can be interpreted as the number of paths of length n that exist between i and j . When we do binary multiplication, a zero in the i - j cell means that there does not exist a path of length n between i and j . If there is a one in the i - j cell this implies that there is at least one path of length n between i and j . By combining the various “primitive” relationships we arrive at different compound relationships between the people in a group. Using regular matrix multiplication gives us a characterization that puts emphasis on the quantitative differences in relations that exist between people whereas binary multiplication only puts emphasis on the qualitative differences that exist between people.

At this point I have been unable to determine whether the above characterization of relations and sociometric structure is appropriate for implementing our ideas concerning roles and automorphism. I think there is some worth in examining what is involved in this approach. The rest of this paper does this.

the relation box

For the present I want to think about relations and their compounds in terms of regular matrix multiplication. Thus I am interested in quantitative rather than just the qualitative aspects of relationships. Using regular matrix multiplication we generate all the compound relationships that exist between the various relationships. Since we are using regular matrix multiplication, this will generate an infinite, but countable number of matrices. For the moment we will ignore any problems generated by this. Now we will line each of these matrices up behind the other, into an infinitely long rectangle. The first n matrices are presented in Figure 3 as the vertical sheets of the box. What we are interested in are the horizontal planes of this rectangle and the columns within these planes. Each plane can be associated with one individual in the group. A plane represents all the various relationships that a




Fig. 3. Box of relations.

person has with the people in a group. Any column can be associated with two specific people. A column represents the relationships a person i (whose plane the column is a member of) has with person j . Thus a plane represents the relational structure that a person is part of from his point of view, and a column represents the relationships that exist between two people. We will say that two people are congruent or that they have congruent relational structures if their planes are equal to within a permutation of their columns.

At this point I would like to tie the above ideas in with the previous discussion of roles and automorphisms. Unfortunately at this time I can only hypothesize about the interrelationship between these two sets of ideas.

In my discussion of roles and automorphisms, I examined both concepts from two points of view. I described roles from an objective and subjective point of view, and analogously I discussed automorphisms in terms of two people being automatically equivalent, and in terms of them being automorphically equivalent with respect to another person. This duality is also found in our discussion of planes and columns. If a plane truly describes a person's relational structure, it would seem reasonable to hypothesize that two people who have planes

that are equivalent to within a permutation of their columns are automorphically equivalent. If two people are not automorphically equivalent then their positions in the relational structure are different and this should be reflected in their planes. This is our first conjecture.

Conjecture 1. Two people are automorphically equivalent if and only if they are congruent.

It would also seem reasonable to think that if a column describes the relationships between two people in an appropriate way that two people that have equivalent columns with respect to another person should be automorphically equivalent with respect to that person.

Conjecture 2. If column ij equals column ik then j and k are automorphically equivalent with respect to i .

The above two conjectures lead to the obvious corollary:

Corollary. If two people have columns with respect to another person that are equivalent, then they are congruent.

The above conjectures are very powerful ones, and if true would indicate that the compound relationships approach is quite appropriate for the study of roles and automorphisms. For the moment attempts are being made to find either a proof or a counterexample².

Roles and automorphism reconsidered

From the above discussion of automorphisms as one to one onto mappings and our definition of congruence in terms of regular multiplication, it is clear that the concept of an automorphism is directly connected to not only the qualitative aspects of a structure, but also to the quantitative. It is not at all clear that roles depend on the quantitative aspects of structure. Thus whether someone is a father or not is not determined by whether he has two sons or three, or analogously whether he is a leader or not is not determined by whether he has ten

I no longer believe that these conjectures are true.

followers or forty. This seems like a major inadequacy of my treatment of roles in terms of automorphic equivalence.

Fortunately our discussion of congruence and its hypothesized relationship with automorphism suggests a natural way out of this dilemma. One of Lorrain and White's (1971) ideas was that matrix multiplication should be done in a binary manner. This has a number of advantages in the present situation. First, it guarantees that there will be only a finite number of compound relational matrices. (There are arguments why even in the case of regular multiplication only a finite number of matrices need be considered.) Second, binary multiplication provides a shift from the quantitative considerations of congruence, to purely qualitative considerations. This can be shown best by defining the concept of similarity.

Definition. Two people are similar if and only if for each column in their respective binary planes there exists an equivalent column in the other's plane.

Note that the mapping we have defined above is not one-one or onto. Two people may have differing numbers of columns of the same type. It is only essential that they have one column of each type that the other person has. The following modified "ideal" American male lineage kinship example illustrates why the concept of similarity is closer to the concept of what we mean by role than that of automorphism.

In the above example, both fathers are similar, although they are certainly not structurally equivalent or automorphically equivalent. Table 2 contains the first ten powers of their planes indicating their




Fig. 4. Modified male lineage hierarchy.

Table 1
Raw data for Figure 4

	GF	F	F	S	S	S	GS	GS	GS	GS	GS
GF	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
S	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-
S	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
S	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
GS	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GS	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GS	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
GS	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
GS	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-

similarity. Put in another way, one could say they have the same type of relationships with people although they may not have the same number of each type of relationship. Similarity is what we mean by two people being qualitatively in the same type of situation in the social structure.

At this point we have defined similarity in terms of an objective view of a role. One would hope that the natural counterpart to the case in congruence with respect to a subjective point of view would hold here. We hypothesize:

Conjecture 3. If the binary columns of j , k with respect to i are equal, then j and k are similar.

Table 3 represents the first n elements for the plane of the grandfather, and indicates that he sees the fathers, sons, and grandsons, each being respectively similar to the others.

It would be nice to relate the idea of similarity back to automorphisms. The only way I can think of to do this is by means of the following conjecture:

Conjecture 4. If two people a, b are similar then there exists a family of isomorphic subgraphs, the union of which equals the graph. In addition there is a set of mappings which map the graph into each subgraph, such that if $f_i(a)$ is automorphically equivalent to $f_i(b)$, then $f_i(a)$, $f_i(b)$, a , and b are all similar to each other.

Table 2

First father's plane											
	F	E	B	S	N	N	GS	GS	GN	GN	GN
R	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R2	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-
R3	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
R4	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
R5	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
R6	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
R7	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
R8	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
R9	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
R10	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
R11	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-

Second father's plane											
	F	B	E	N	S	S	GN	GN	GS	GS	GS
R	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
R2	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1
R3	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
R4	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
R5	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
R6	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
R7	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
R8	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
R9	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
R10	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
R11	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-

E = Ego F = Father B = Brother S = Son N = Nephew GS = Grandson GN = Grandnephew

The above conjecture is awkward to say the least, but it does capture the fact that when two people are similar it means that there is some underlying structure from which the graph has been built within which the two people are automorphically equivalent.

Another issue we have examined in the past is the relationship between abstract structure and concrete structure. The notion of similarity seems like a relatively weak way of looking at abstract structure. Still the relationship between abstract and concrete that existed for automorphism exists here also.

Proposition. If two people are similar with respect to every person in a group, then they are structurally equivalent.

Table 3

Grandfather's plane

	E	S	S	GS	GS	GS	GG	GG	GG	GG	GG
	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
3	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
4	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
5	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
6	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
7	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
8	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
0	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1

= Ego F = Father B = Brother S = Son GS = Grandson GG = Greatgrandson
 Note: I have drawn the graph symmetrically, ego and grandsons are indistinguishable.

This allows us to again conclude that what abstract structure is doing is allowing us, or perhaps better, people within a group, to see similarities where others see differences. When there is no difference in any of the abstract structures then there can be no differences in the concrete structure.

How are we to think of roles?

Having shown that the concept of automorphism is too strong an idea for what we mean by a role, we should consider the adequacy of the idea of similarity. I think it is clear that this is too strong an idea also. Implicit in the discussion so far has been the idea that a role is associated with a single type of position in a social structure and that any position in the social structure is descriptive of only one role. In my discussions it has been implicit that there is only one sort of role that exists between two different people. It is certainly clear that people may assume more than one role in their social structures, and that they may have more than one role with respect to each other. Thus a person may be a doctor, a parent, and a friend. Or two people may be both classmates, roommates, and friends.

How should we define a role? If we are thinking about things from a subjective point of view it seems that we should most simply define a

role as a set of specific relationships that exist between two people. For objective roles it is clear that this is just a specific set of subjective roles. One must conclude that this is a surprisingly simple definition of what one means by a role. Given that we have arrived at such a simple conception, why have we gone through such elaborate pains to get here? The point of the paper is not just to suggest that roles can be defined analytically, but that conceptualizing roles in this manner points to a deep way of thinking about social structure. I have tried to argue that as relations add up into roles, roles can be added up into similarities, which in turn can be looked at in terms of congruences, automorphisms, and structural equivalence. What I am trying to suggest is that the above discussion reveals that we have a simple tool that is capable of pointing out similarities in social structure when desired yet is also able to make distinctions when they are important. The real proof will come when we analyze real social structures in part II.

Algebra

Most of the work in kinship studies has emphasized the importance of looking at things algebraically. Up until this point I have adopted an algebraic method to examine social structures at a very specific level: the patterns of relationship that exist between two people. It would be of some use to examine whether we could use an algebraic method to analyze social relations at a higher level of aggregation. A first step of aggregation would be to consider the properties that are common to all the relationships a single person has with the other people in a group. A second and final level of aggregation would be to consider properties that are common to all relationships in a group. It is from this latter level of aggregation that most algebraic considerations of sociometric structure have been made, most prevalently in kinship studies. Typically one performs binary multiplication, and is interested in whether different matrices are equal to each other or whether they are subsets of each other. For instance, White (1963) in *An Anatomy of Kinship* has shown that a bilateral kinship system is defined by the conditions $W^2 = I$ and $WC = CW$. These two statements imply for *everyone* in the group that (1) one's categorical wife's categorical's brother's categorical wife is one's categorical sister, and (2) my categorical wife's brother's children must be married by my categorical children. In sociometry

There has been much concern with the transitivity of positive sentiment. Algebraically this can be represented as $P^2 = P$. This can be interpreted as saying that whenever someone is a friend of a friend, then he is also a friend.

It seems wise to consider first properties that are true of all relationships of a single individual's relations, before trying to discuss the properties of all relations. We can do this by thinking of each individual as having his own semigroup.

The semigroup is generated by multiplying the primitive relational matrices in the usual binary fashion, but the equating the elements whose rows are equal for the individual under consideration. Clearly then the semigroup of the individual will just be a homomorphic reduction of the semigroup of the relational matrices. The semigroup is required, associate and closed. Multiplication however is defined only with respect to left-hand substitution. That is, if $A = B$ then $C = BC$, but it is *not* the case that $CA = CB$ (right-hand substitution). If we are going to use this "algebra of rows", it makes sense to define Z, U, I as the appropriate rows of the zero matrix, the one matrix and the identity matrix. For the present I will give some simple illustrations of how these equations might be used to think of roles. For instance if P is a matrix of positive sentiment we might want to think of a leader as someone for whom $P \subset P^t$ is true. That is he likes only people that like him. An isolate is clearly someone for whom $P = P^t = Z$. Finally we might want to think of a "hanger-on" as $P \neq P^t = Z$.

In thinking of equality of relations for a person we need only think in terms of the sets of relations that are equal. The subset relation is a bit more complicated. We need to think of there being a set of relations associated with each set such that each relation within the set is a superset of that relation. We will call this the superset of a relation.

The question that needs to be answered at this point is what does all this consideration of semigroups have to do with roles. For the moment let us consider the case where $P = P^2$. This tells us that any role that contains either P or P^2 as one of its defining relations must contain the other. In a sense then this forms an element of a basis for constructing any role out of those relations. If we instead have the case where $P^2 \subset P$, then we only know that any role that contains the relation P^2 must also contain the relation P . Thus the equality sets of a role and the supersets of a role tell us which relations *must* be included in a role when others already have been included.

If we are willing to make some stronger assumptions about the matrices then we can derive some more interesting results. First let us look at the case where we have two or more people that have identical semigroups. Then we can think of the sets of equivalent relations representing a minimal set of roles that is part of the relation structure of each person.

Another interesting case to look at is when the elements of the semigroup are disjoint, or equivalently rows of a person's plane are either equal or disjoint. First we need to conclude that if the rows are either equal or disjoint, then the columns of the plane are also either equal or disjoint. Assume that this is not the case. Take two columns that are neither disjoint nor equal. Then there is some relation for which they are both 1 and some relation for which one is 1 and the other is 0. But then these two relations are neither equal nor disjoint which contradicts our assumption. Given this result we then know that the algebra of the group or the algebra of the subset of the group represents a set of maximal set of roles such that each person's role structure is a subset of this structure.

The above two results imply the following lemma which is of some interest.

Lemma: Given two individual semigroups for a, b , such that the elements of the semigroup are disjoint, if their semigroups are identical then the two individuals are similar.

From the above discussion it is arguable that similarity is a concept that it really makes sense to talk about in algebraic terms. This is because algebraic considerations are blind to differences of quantity (since we are using binary multiplication) and to differences of orientation (something that structural equivalence is sensitive to). The surprising result though is that algebraic considerations only seem to really pin a structure down when we have disjoint elements in the semigroup. This also leads to the observation that algebraic considerations only classify structure when we have disjoint roles, i.e. in cases where we are thinking of roles as either columns or subsets of columns.

Other notions of structural equivalence

In the preceding discussion of structural equivalence I mentioned that structural equivalence was being used in its strongest sense. The idea of structural equivalence has been used in other less restrictive ways. It is only fair that I attempt to compare these methods with the ones that have been developed above.

The principal idea of Lorrain and White (1971) is that one should identify a number of various elements of a semigroup, then look for structurally equivalent individuals in the graph that has been formed taking the union of the various relations. I think the above discussion of algebra and similarities suggests one approach that should make sense.

If we could partition a semigroup into sets of elements such that the elements between sets were disjoint, then it would make sense to identify all the elements within sets. This type of disjointness is present in the kinship examples where the White-Lorrain technique has been more successful, although I admit I have not done any sort of thorough examination of the matter. It should be pointed out though that this type of disjointness only implies similarity of the people, which is a much weaker idea than structural equivalence. Certainly our analysis has not yet given any comprehensive evaluation of applicability of Lorrain and White's hypothesis, although I think the above analysis suggests that it may be applicable under fairly special conditions.

The other approach that has been considered for structural equivalence is the lean fit idea. In this approach two people are structurally equivalent if there is a set of individuals such that they both are not related to these individuals. The idea in this approach is that people who are in similar roles are structurally equivalent by this weaker definition. For instance, if we have two hierarchies within a group then we could identify each of the two leaders and the appropriate subordinates all the way down the hierarchies. Figure 5 illustrates this idea. There are a number of problems with this type of approach. First there are a whole class of models that are resistant to this type of approach. These are models that include cycles. For instance, if we go back to Figure 1, each person is automorphically equivalent, but there is no identification which will provide the appropriate sort of mapping. Second, this approach is dependent on there being a lack of relations in very crucial places. For instance, in the above example, if there was




Fig. 5. Identification of two cliques.

animosity between the two cliques then in the reduced picture we would have a single hierarchy in which there is animosity between everyone. Admittedly if we have the ability to know which relationships to ignore and which to consider in certain cases this approach might work, but this seems more like guess work than anything else. The final problem with this approach is, that it is sensitive to small differences in the structure. For instance, if one hierarchy had one more level than another then this type of identification can not work.

Conclusion

“Part II: Methodological considerations” has for the most part been thought out, and awaits for me to find time to do some examples, analysis of data and to write it up. I hope that I have at least suggested if not convinced you of the deep richness of approach that has been discussed in this paper. Personally I feel that what has been discussed is only the surface, and that there are many more deeper and rich developments to come from this approach. Finally I should say that even though this work departs in many ways from the work of Whiting and his associates, it should be clear that many of my ideas are heavily indebted to theirs.

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