

**DAVID C. MARTIN**

<https://scholar.harvard.edu/david-martin>

[dmartin@hbs.edu](mailto:dmartin@hbs.edu)

**HARVARD UNIVERSITY**

Placement Director: Amanda Pallais  
Placement Director: Nathan Hendren  
Assistant Director: Brenda Piquet

<a href="mailto:APALLAIS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU">APALLAIS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU</a>	617-495-2151
<a href="mailto:NHENDREN@FAS.HARVARD.EDU">NHENDREN@FAS.HARVARD.EDU</a>	617-496-3588
<a href="mailto:BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU">BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU</a>	617-495-8927

**Office Contact Information**

Littauer Center G6  
1805 Cambridge Street  
Cambridge, MA 02138  
206-295-5082

**Personal Information:**

Citizenship: United States

**Undergraduate Studies:**

B.A., Economics, Pomona College, *magna cum laude*, 2009

**Graduate Studies:**

Harvard University, 2014 to present  
Ph.D. Candidate in Business Economics  
Thesis Title: "Essays in Labor and Behavioral Economics"  
Expected Completion Date: May 2020

**References:**

Professor Amanda Pallais  
Harvard University  
617-495-2151  
[apallais@fas.harvard.edu](mailto:apallais@fas.harvard.edu)

Professor Lawrence Katz  
Harvard University  
617-495-5148  
[lkatz@harvard.edu](mailto:lkatz@harvard.edu)

Professor Andrei Shleifer  
Harvard University  
617-495-5046  
[ashleifer@harvard.edu](mailto:ashleifer@harvard.edu)

Professor Brian Hall  
Harvard University  
617-495-5062  
[bhall@hbs.edu](mailto:bhall@hbs.edu)

**Teaching and Research Fields:**

Primary fields: Labor, Economics of Education  
Secondary field: Behavioral

**Teaching Experience:**

Spring 2018	Econ 970, "The Economics of Education," Harvard University, Instructor
Fall 2017	MET MA113, "Introductory Statistics," Boston University Metropolitan College Prison Education Program, Teaching Assistant for Dr. Thomas Peteet, MD
Spring 2017	Econ 1030, "Psychology & Economics," Harvard University, Teaching Fellow for Professors David Laibson and Tomasz Strzalecki
Fall 2016	MET PY105, "Introductory Physics," Boston University Metropolitan College Prison Education Program, Teaching Assistant for Dr. Thomas Peteet, MD

**Research Experience and Other Employment:**

Oct 2009 – Jun 2014      Cornerstone Research, Research Associate / Senior Analyst / Analyst

**Professional Activities:**

Jun 2017 – present      Harvard Economics Peer Support Network, Co-Founder

**Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:**

2019	Dissertation Completion Fellowship (Harvard University)
2018	Derek Bok Center Certificate of Distinction in Teaching (Harvard University)
2017	Derek Bok Center Certificate of Distinction in Teaching (Harvard University)
2009	Morris B. Pendleton Prize in Economics (Pomona College)

**Job Market Paper:**

“Discipline Reform, School Culture, and Student Achievement” (with Ashley Craig)

Does relaxing strict school discipline policies improve student achievement, or lead to classroom disorder? We study a 2012 reform in New York City public middle schools that eliminated suspensions for non-violent, disorderly behavior, replacing them with less disruptive interventions. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we exploit the sharp timing of the reform and natural variation in its impact to measure the effect of reducing suspensions on student achievement. Math scores of students in more-affected schools rose by 0.05 standard deviations relative to other schools over the three years after the policy change. Reading scores rose by 0.03 standard deviations. Only a small portion of these aggregate benefits can be explained by the direct impact of eliminating suspensions on students who would have been suspended under the old policy. Instead, test score gains are associated with improvements in school culture, as measured by the quality of student-teacher relationships and perceptions of safety at school. These improvements benefited students even if they were unlikely to be suspended themselves.

**Research Papers in Progress:**

“Cognitive Biases: Mistakes or Missing Stakes?” (with Benjamin Enke, Uri Gneezy, Brian Hall, Vadim Nelidov, Theo Offerman, and Jeroen Van de Ven)

A large body of laboratory experiments documents systematic violations of the rational economic model. Surprisingly, empirical evidence of the effect of incentives (particularly, very large ones) on the strength of biases is scant. The current paper targets this gap in the literature, testing the effect of incentives on four widely documented cognitive biases: base rate neglect, anchoring, failure of contingent thinking (the Wason test), and intuitive reasoning in the Cognitive Reflection Test. In pre-registered laboratory experiments with students from a large, elite university in Nairobi, we test the four biases with three incentive levels: hypothetical (no incentives), standard lab payments (low incentives), and very high incentives that increase stakes by a factor of 100. We are currently in the process of collecting expert predictions from a set of behavioral economists, so we cannot yet share our experimental results.

“Political Partisanship and Wages in the Public Sector”

Wage setting in the public sector is an inherently political process. Unions bargain with state and local government officials, to whom their members are also important constituents. The unions themselves are politically active through donations to candidates, lobbying, and voter mobilization, with the vast majority of support going to Democrats. Looking specifically at fire fighters, police officers, and teachers, I provide preliminary evidence that strong unions can moderate partisan differences in public sector spending. In particular, wages and employment are higher under Democratic mayors than under Republican mayors in states with weak union laws, but not in those with strong union laws. I obtain these results using two empirical strategies: (1) a

difference-in-differences analysis using variation in state union laws; and (2) a regression discontinuity analysis of close mayoral elections.

**Publications:**

Eleanor Brown and David Martin, "Individual Giving and Volunteering," *The State of Nonprofit America*, ed. Lester M. Salamon. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 495-517.