A SOCIAL RESISTANCE PERSPECTIVE FOR DELINQUENT BEHAVIOUR AMONG NON-DOMINANT MINORITY GROUPS

RONI FACTOR*, DAVID MAHALEL, ANAT RAFAEI AND DAVID R. WILLIAMS

Non-dominant minorities, compared with majority groups, often have greater engagement in risky and delinquent behaviours. This study develops an innovative theoretical model for understanding risky/delinquent behaviour among non-dominant groups based on the social resistance framework, which suggests that power relations within society bring non-dominant minorities to actively engage in various forms of everyday resistance that can include delinquent behaviours. We tested this model on traffic violations, surveying 1,060 non-dominant and majority drivers in Israel. Structural equation models suggest that different mechanisms underlie delinquent behaviours in the two groups: social resistance plays a direct role in traffic violations among non-dominants, while, for the majority, procedural justice and non-commitment to the law have a stronger impact. Implications for understanding delinquent and risky behaviour and as an extension of the well-known procedural justice model are discussed.

Keywords: non-dominant groups, ethnic and racial minorities, socio-economic status, traffic violations, legal disobedience, procedural justice

Introduction

In many countries, certain non-dominant ethnic, racial and/or low socio-economic status minority groups are overrepresented in the criminal justice system and engage at higher rates in delinquent and risky behaviours (see, e.g. Booth et al. 2008; Braver 2003; Bui 2009; Marshall 1997; Stucky 2012; Veen et al. 2011; Williams and Mohammed 2009). The literature offers different and sometimes overlapping explanations for these well-known disparities, including economic deprivation, structural factors (e.g. relating to the physical environment, social isolation or family structure), cultural differences, acculturation problems, legal cynicism, the legacy of colonialism, and racism and discrimination in criminal justice processes (see, e.g. Bui 2009; Gabbidon 2010; Hawkins 1993; Hipp 2011; Kirk and Matsuda 2011; Marshall 1997; Phillips and Bowling 2003). However, most current theories suffer from an important shortcoming, in that, in different ways, they generally regard individuals as passive—that is, as passively influenced by the conditions under which they live, or as failing to make ‘good’ choices.

The current paper suggests a new approach based on the recently developed social resistance framework (Factor et al. 2011a; 2013b), which aims to shed light on high-risk behaviour among non-dominant minority groups. The framework is relevant here because delinquent and risky behaviours share common underlying causes and have been found to be correlated to each other (Begle et al. 2011; Booth et al. 2008; Cooper...
et al. 2003; Frank and Bjornstrom 2011). The social resistance framework suggests that, because of historical and/or present discrimination, members of non-dominant minority groups may feel a lack of attachment to the country and alienation from the larger society. In response, members of these groups may actively engage, consciously or unconsciously, in a variety of everyday social resistance behaviours. These everyday social resistance acts might include risky and delinquent behaviours. By engaging in such behaviours, members of such groups express their willingness and ability to defy the country and the dominant group, in addition to signalling to the dominant group that their power is not without limits.

The social resistance framework offers an important addition to the well-known procedural justice model, which attempts to explain why people willingly comply with the law (Jackson et al. 2012; Lind and Tyler 1988; Sunshine and Tyler 2003). That is, the notions of alienation and active social resistance that are central to the social resistance framework may play a pivotal role in the link between perceptions of procedural justice and non-compliance with the law, or engagement in risky and delinquent behaviours.

The present study develops a theoretical model for understanding risky and delinquent behaviour among members of non-dominant groups, and presents an empirical test of this innovative theoretical model in relation to traffic violations by members of non-dominant minority and majority groups in Israel. Traffic violations generally appear to be understudied in the context of criminology, despite being a widespread phenomenon, and despite previous findings that traffic violations are correlated with different delinquent behaviours (Booth et al. 2008; Junger et al. 2001). Moreover, traffic violations increase the risk of involvement in and injury from road traffic accidents (see, e.g. Blows et al. 2005; Sullman et al. 2002), which exact a huge toll in human, social and economic costs; indeed, globally, they are considered to be the ninth leading cause of death (Mathers et al. 2008; Peden et al. 2004). Israel was chosen as the setting for the study because, as a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society, Israel can be considered a ‘natural laboratory’ (Rattner et al. 2001) where one may explore relationships between membership in non-dominant minority versus dominant majority groups on the one hand, and various behaviours and outcomes on the other.

In the following, we use the terms ‘minority’ and ‘non-dominant minority’ interchangeably, although we are aware that there are some differences between these terms. Likewise, we use ‘majority’ to mean ‘dominant majority’.

Non-Dominant Minorities and the Social Resistance Framework

Non-dominant minorities, attachment to the country and alienation

Members of non-dominant minority groups are viewed by others in the larger society as ‘different’ in biological, cultural, behavioural or organizational terms (Turner 1986), leading to formal or informal segregation of the minority group. This segregation increases interactions among members of the minority group, and so intensifies their cultural, organizational and behavioural distinctiveness, which in turn enhances the prejudice and sense of threat felt by majority group members. The result is likely to be greater alienation of non-dominant minorities from society at large, and lower levels of attachment to the country (Huynh et al. 2011; Sidanis et al. 1997; Tsfati 2007).
Procedural justice and non-commitment to the law

Studies suggest that alienation and social exclusion among non-dominant minority groups may, in turn, lead to reduced commitment to and compliance with the law, and increase engagement in delinquent and risky behaviours (Marczynski et al. 1999; Palosuo 2000; Rattner and Yagil 2004; Williams et al. 2010). That is, in societies marked by ethnic or other types of segregation, members of non-dominant minority groups will perceive greater levels of injustice than members of other groups. They may therefore tend to see the legal culture of the majority as less than legitimate, and regard compliance with the law as less of a social obligation (Rattner and Yagil 2004). Buckler and Unnever (2008), for example, suggested that perceived injustice is significantly more common among African Americans and Hispanics than among white Americans. This explanation chimes with Tyler and colleagues’ procedural justice theory, which attempts to explain why people willingly comply with the law (Lind and Tyler 1988; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 1988). According to this theory, perceptions of fairness regarding the processes through which institutions of social control exercise their power influence the perceived legitimacy of those institutions, which in turn affects the degree to which citizens are willing to comply with the laws and regulations they promulgate. That is, the ‘fairness (or unfairness) [of social control institutions] can play a role in altering or modulating the behaviour of the individuals involved’ (Jackson et al. 2012: 1062). Jackson et al. (2012) found that procedural justice explains significant variation in non-compliance involving everyday crimes such as buying stolen goods, vandalism and shoplifting.

Two extensions of the procedural justice model are of particular relevance to the social resistance framework—namely (1) the notion of social identity and (2) motivational postures theory. The idea behind social identity theory is that people derive their self-concept in part from identification with a particular social group (Bradford 2012). When citizens perceive themselves as receiving fair treatment from law enforcement institutions, they are likely to identify with the social group these enforcement institutions represent—namely the dominant group. This identification with the dominant group should then encourage cooperative and pro-social behaviour, along with a perception of the dominant authority as legitimate. In contrast, perceptions of unfair treatment—namely perceptions that the processes employed by the enforcement institutions are not transparent and impartial—may heighten pre-existing feelings of difference and alienation from society at large, which in turn will discourage pro-social behaviours (Bradford 2012; Jackson et al. 2012). In his inspiring study, Bradford (2012) found that, among people with multiple national identities (i.e. immigrant minorities), a perception of fairness in policing was associated with a social identity which in turn predicted cooperation with the police. Thus, these results suggest that non-dominant minorities who experience fair procedures by institutions of social control might increase their identification with the majority group and their sense of belonging to the larger society, which then may encourage cooperation with the police.

Motivational postures theory suggests that citizens ‘place social distance between themselves and authority, communicating the nature of that distance through a narrative that protects the self from negative appraisal’ (Braithwaite et al. 2007: 137). Motivational postures are the beliefs, attitudes and feelings that express the degree to which individuals accept the agenda of the authority; they include, among others,
capitulation to the authority, resistance and disengagement (Braithwaite et al. 2007). Braithwaite et al. further posit that these motivational postures are related to coping sensibilities by which individuals deal with the implicit threat of censure or punishment for non-compliance; these include ‘feeling oppressed’, ‘taking control’ and ‘thinking morally’. Braithwaite et al. (2007) found that the coping sensibility of ‘feeling oppressed’ was positively related to the motivational posture of resistance—the degree to which respondents do not like, approve of or agree with the goals of the authority and how it does its job—and was behaviourally expressed through weakened cooperation. Further, lower perceptions of procedural justice among their sample (Australian taxpayers who were surveyed on their attitudes toward the Australian Taxation Office) were associated with greater resistance and reduced cooperation.

There is evidence, moreover, that alienation decreases compliance with the law through reduced commitment to the law. Rattner and Yagil (2004), for instance, suggested that alienation decreases commitment to state laws, which in turn increases the readiness to take the law into one’s own hands. Rattner et al. (2001) found non-Jewish (Arab) respondents—a non-dominant minority group in Israel—to have the lowest level of support for state laws, as well as greater readiness to take the law into their own hands, and less supportive attitudes towards the police, relative to other social groups in Israel. The authors concluded that ‘as a minority group, [the Arabs] are likely to feel the need to protect their group identity in various ways, among them, by “beating the Israeli–Jewish system”‘ (Rattner et al. 2001: 280).

Social resistance

While the theories described above offer a compelling explanation for risky and delinquent behaviour among non-dominant minorities, we believe they are insufficient. Specifically, we argue that these theories neglect an important component in the link between alienation, low perceptions of procedural justice, non-commitment to the law, and risky and delinquent behaviours. This component is social resistance. The social resistance framework (Factor et al. 2013a; 2013b) adds an active dimension to the behaviour of non-dominant groups in their response to high alienation and perceived injustice. That is, rather than passively reacting to events and circumstances around them, we argue that members of non-dominant minorities actively express their defiance of the dominant group, and signal to the dominant group that their power extends only so far.

According to Scott (1985; 1990), all dominance systems routinely produce affronts to human dignity. Moreover, as Chrysochoou and Volpato (2004) note, it is reasonable to assume that members of non-dominant minority groups typically lack the power to exert direct influence towards social change. Thus, because powerless groups only occasionally have the opportunity to publicly resist the dominant group, general and broad resistance is relatively rare. ‘Everyday resistance’, however, is much easier to carry out, since ‘everyday acts of resistance make no headlines’ (Scott 1985: xvii). Everyday resistance encompasses all means by which non-dominant minority groups can adapt to the ruling power while protecting their interests and identity (Ewick and Silbey 2003), ranging from humour, rumours, gestures, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance and slander up through arson and sabotage. Many of these tactics allow members of the minority group to criticize the dominant group from the relative safety of anonymity,
but nonetheless involve some active behaviour, whether verbal, cognitive or physical (Hollander and Einwohner 2004; Scott 1990). According to the social resistance framework, these acts of everyday resistance may include risky and delinquent behaviours (Factor et al. 2013b).

By engaging in these everyday social resistance acts, non-dominants demonstrate their willingness and ability to defy the country and the dominant group, and express their dissatisfaction with their social status. This practice can be perceived as a ‘safety valve’ (Gluckman 1963) that helps to reduce stress. At the same time, everyday social resistance acts may serve to demarcate the limits of the dominant group’s power by signalling to the dominant group that their control over the individual has its limits. In this way, these behaviours may parallel the deliberate self-injury and self-mutilation sometimes performed by prisoners as a means of asserting their autonomy (Klonsky 2007; Suyemoto 1998).

Applying the social resistance framework through the lens of the theoretical models described above—procedural justice, social identity theory and motivational postures theory—we can say that perceptions of unjust treatment by the institutions of social control may enhance social resistance to the authorities among members of non-dominant minorities. It is the urge to perform acts of social resistance that may eventually bring members of non-dominant groups to engage in risky and delinquent behaviours.

The context of the current study

The next two sections present background relevant to the social resistance framework in the Israeli context and in relation to traffic violations.

The non-Jewish minority in Israel

Israel’s population comprises a Jewish majority, along with various non-Jewish minorities—Muslims, Christians, Druses, Bedouins and Circassians—which together make up about 20 per cent of the Israeli population. Most of the country’s non-Jewish citizens live in three main areas—the Galilee in the north, the ‘Triangle’ in central Israel and the Negev in the south—along with scattered villages and a few mixed cities (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2011; Yiftachel 1999). The non-Jewish minority groups have a great deal in common, including religious foundations, a common language (Arabic) and shared culinary traditions. For the purposes of this study, we consider all these groups to be a single non-dominant minority group.

Non-Jewish Israelis are a non-assimilating working-class minority that, effectively, is segregated in all senses—culturally, linguistically, geographically and economically (Moore 2000). The historical origins of this segregation date to the military rule that limited the movements of Israel’s Arab-speaking minority following the country’s war of independence in 1948. Though formal restrictions on the movements of Israeli Arabs were lifted in 1966, informal segregation continues today (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2011). Perhaps due to the ongoing Middle East conflict (Yiftachel 1997), a large proportion of the Jewish majority perceive Israel’s non-Jewish citizens as a ‘hostile minority’: they regard them with suspicion and treat them as second-class citizens (Moore 2000; Yiftachel 1997). The main tensions between the Jewish majority and non-Jewish minorities involve conflicts over land and budget allocations, in addition to an underlying struggle over identity due to the status of non-Jews as minority residents in a Jewish
state whose main symbols mirror the culture of the Jewish majority (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2011). Moreover, over the years, the Jewish majority has, to some degree, blocked access by the non-Jewish minority to positions of power and authority, thus reducing their ability to participate in shaping policy (Mehozay 2012).

Consequently, non-Jews find themselves on the margins of Israeli society. Discriminated against and relatively powerless, they suffer from higher rates of poverty and low quality of public services, and are separated from the Jewish majority by a socio-economic gap. Thus, the Jewish–Arab divide might be considered the deepest schism in Israeli society (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2011).

Two factors might, then, contribute to social resistance among Israel’s non-Jewish minority. First, the Jewish–Palestinian and Arab–Israeli conflicts have helped to create a social exclusion of Israel’s non-Jewish minority and might evoke a desire among them to resist the social order. Second, political and socio-economic barriers prevent members of this non-dominant minority group from acquiring significant political influence. Their relative powerlessness might lead to expressions of frustration through non-organized activity.

Non-dominant minorities and traffic violations
Non-dominant minority groups are often over-involved in road traffic accidents (Department for Transport 2001; Hilton 2006; Traffic Safety Center 2003), and they have higher rates of traffic violations. In the United States, for instance, rates of seat-belt use are lower among African Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans than among non-Hispanic whites (Briggs et al. 2005; Romano et al. 2005b). Other studies have shown that Hispanics also drive faster, are less likely to wear motorcycle helmets and drive more often under the influence of alcohol (Harper et al. 2000; Romano et al. 2005a). African Americans have been shown to be more likely than whites to run red lights (Porter and England 2000).

Similar ethnic-religious differences exist in Israel, where non-Jewish drivers are more involved than Jewish drivers in road traffic accidents and traffic violations. For example, the likelihood that a non-Jewish driver will be involved in a fatal or severe accident over nine years is up to 1.6 times greater than the probability for Jewish drivers (Factor et al. 2008). Similarly, non-Jews have lower rates of seat-belt use (National Road Safety Authority 2010), and they receive on average more traffic tickets than Jews (Factor and Mahalel 2012).

Research Model
In sum, the innovative social resistance framework (Factor et al. 2011a) suggests that power relations in society can lead members of non-dominant minority groups to develop a hidden transcript (Scott 1990) that includes anonymous everyday acts of resistance against the majority group. These acts of everyday resistance may include risky and delinquent behaviours, such as speeding and not using seat belts. Moreover, the social resistance factor may play an important role, which is yet to be explored, in linking procedural justice with commitment to and compliance with the law. In order to capture the importance of social resistance independent of procedural justice and commitment to the law, perceptions of procedural justice and non-commitment to the law were included in the following analysis.
The current study empirically tests the following innovative theoretical model in order to better understand risky and delinquent behaviours. The model, presented in Figure 1, proposes that demographic and socio-economic variables are related to people’s perceptions of procedural justice, and their attachment to and alienation from the larger society and country. When attachment to the country and perceptions of procedural justice are low and alienation high, general social resistance and non-commitment to the law are likely to result. General social resistance relates to the willingness to express resistance in different ways (resistance-action), which in turn correlates directly and indirectly—through non-commitment to the law—with engaging in more traffic violations.

![Figure 1 The social resistance framework for risky and delinquent behaviours](image)

**Methodology**

**Sample and procedure**

We conducted a national random-digit telephone survey among 530 Jewish (dominant majority) and 530 non-Jewish (non-dominant minority) Israeli drivers who had driven at least once in the past three months. The first person in each household who met the criterion was interviewed. The survey was conducted by trained interviewers from a
university survey institute. Interviews were conducted in Hebrew or Arabic according to
the mother tongue of the respondent (Jewish or non-Jewish). To ensure adequate repre-
sentation of the sub-samples and a high response rate, up to ten contacts were attempted
for each sampled household on different days and at different hours, and, in cases where
a refusal was encountered, the household was contacted repeatedly by experienced
interviewers.

The distribution of the final sub-samples by gender, age and years of schooling was
similar to the distribution for the two populations in the national data from the census
and the driver licensing authority (data available upon request). The response rate
was 55 per cent and the cooperation rate was 74 per cent (for a description of the rate
calculations, see American Association for Public Opinion Research 2009). It should be
noted that these rates are comparable to those found in other large telephone surveys
(see, e.g. Lee et al. 2009; Schneider et al. 2010).

The Driving Resistance Questionnaire

The Driving Resistance Questionnaire (DRQ) was developed by the authors for the cur-
rent study to measure the concepts central to the research model. An initial version of
the questionnaire was developed following in-depth interviews with non-Jewish drivers
and reviewed by a panel of three judges. Only items approved by all three judges were
included in a pilot DRQ that was tested with 15 Jewish and 15 non-Jewish drivers fol-
lowing translation and back-translation into Hebrew and Arabic to ensure comparable
versions in both languages.

Variables

The main survey items appear in Appendix 1. The factor ‘Attachment to the country’
of procedural justice were measured by a short three-item version of Rattner and Yagil’s
(2004) scale. The alienation scale was adapted from the Harris Poll Survey (Weckliem
and Borch 2006) and included three items. Non-commitment to the law was measured
by a short (five-item) scale adopted from Rattner et al. (2001) and Rattner and Yagil
(2004). This measure can also be seen as a measure of legitimacy, since obligation to
obey the law is traditionally one of the main components of legitimacy, although some
recent studies have sought to reconceptualize this central concept of the procedural
justice model (see, e.g. Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; Tankebe 2013; Tyler and Jackson
2012).

The measure of social resistance included two constructs. (1) Resistance-general
was measured with a three-item scale designed to capture drivers’ general resistance
to the country (typical item: ‘I object to the values that the state of Israel represents’).
(2) Resistance-action included five items assessing respondents’ willingness to express
resistance in different ways (e.g. ‘My situation sometimes makes me want to damage
public property’).

Exploratory factor analysis for the six main independent variables, using factor
analysis with Varimax rotation, revealed six different factors, which were consistent
with our research model and stable over the two sub-samples. A further confirmatory
factor analysis, based on the factors obtained in the exploratory factor analysis, indicated a good fit to the data for the non-Jewish and Jewish groups (Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.97, Root Mean Square of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.03; CFI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.04, respectively). Moreover, to test whether the models were invariant between the groups, we compared the models of both groups by fixing and freeing certain parameters, using the procedure suggested by Byrne (2009). Since chi-square is sensitive to sample size, it is preferable to compare the CFIs of different models. A difference between CFIs that is equal to or smaller than 0.01 indicates that there are no meaningful differences between the groups (Byrne 2009; Cheung and Rensvold 2002). A comparison between the two groups found no meaningful differences in the factor loadings between the two samples (∆CFI = 0.01), suggesting the model is invariant across the research groups.

Our dependent variables, traffic violations while driving, were measured through four items which are among the prevalent traffic violations in the Israeli context (Factor and Mahalel 2012): speeding in a residential area; speeding on an inter-urban road; non-use of seat belts; and driving under the influence of alcohol. The respondents were asked to indicate how often they had engaged in each of these violations in the past 12 months while driving, on a six-point scale (‘never’ to ‘nearly all the time’).

Socio-economic status of the participant’s city or municipality was measured by the SES index produced by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (2006) and calculated from 14 variables (such as percentage of motor vehicle purchases involving new vehicles; average income per capita; percent of the population identified as work-seekers; and percentage of the population identified as earning less than the minimum wage). The SES index of the city was included to capture ‘institutional discrimination’, which may be manifested in different levels of SES and may influence involvement traffic violations. Information on control variables known to be related to road accidents and traffic violations was also collected (see, e.g. Factor et al. 2011b). Socio-economic status of the respondent was measured through a nine-item asset index that assesses ownership of various assets as suggested by Filmer and Pritchett (2001) (presented in standard scores). Additional controls included two variables assessing driving exposure: one question (distance travelled) asked respondents to estimate the distance in kilometres they had travelled during the past year (up to 5,000, 5,001–10,000, 10,001–15,000, 15,001–20,000 or more than 20,001) and one variable that represented the estimated time travelled in hours in the past five years. In addition, we collected the following demographic variables: gender, age, years of schooling and religiosity. Descriptive statistics of the research variables are presented in Table 1, and the bivariate correlations among the seven research factors are shown in Table 2.

Data analysis

We analysed the data using structural equation modelling (SEM), which may be seen as a bridge between the way social scientists think and the way they analyse their data (Bollen 1989). Several aspects of SEM are particularly attractive for the current study. For instance, SEM allows the analysis of both latent and observed variables, and provides explicit estimates of measurement errors, thus helping reduce inaccuracies (Byrne
Some of the variables in our model included a small proportion of observations with missing data (0.2–4.7 per cent). In order not to lose these observations, we employed maximum likelihood estimation, which is a direct and theoretically based estimation (Arbuckle 1996; Bradford 2012; Byrne 2009).

**Results**

Non-Jewish drivers had significantly higher rates of traffic violations per distance travelled than Jewish drivers (see Table 1). Consistently with the social resistance framework predictions, attachment to the country was significantly stronger among Jewish drivers, while feelings of alienation, non-commitment to the law and resistance (general and action) were stronger among the non-Jewish drivers. The bivariate correlation matrix (Table 2) indicates that, among the non-Jewish respondents, traffic violations

### Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the research variables and t-tests, by population group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of items</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Jews α</th>
<th>N Mean SD</th>
<th>Non-Jews α</th>
<th>N Mean SD</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observed variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17–83</td>
<td>530 42.21</td>
<td>15.33</td>
<td>530 36.92</td>
<td>13.40</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1 = female)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
<td>530 0.44</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>530 0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>3.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of schooling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0–28</td>
<td>530 13.58</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>530 11.55</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>10.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset index</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(–2.92)–1.11</td>
<td>521 0.29</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>530 –0.29</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>9.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0–10</td>
<td>528 4.41</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>528 6.06</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>–8.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES index</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1–10</td>
<td>530 5.86</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>530 3.10</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>31.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latent variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment to the country</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0–10</td>
<td>0.82 527 9.36</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0.86 518 6.61</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>18.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural justice</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1–5</td>
<td>0.79 486 2.99</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.81 526 3.11</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>–1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1–5</td>
<td>0.71 520 3.35</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.60 526 3.65</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>–4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-commitment to law</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1–5</td>
<td>0.71 517 1.61</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.67 527 2.04</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>–7.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance-general</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1–5</td>
<td>0.72 529 1.42</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.72 493 2.24</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>–12.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance-action</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1–5</td>
<td>0.57 511 1.63</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.65 519 1.99</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>–6.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic violations per distance travelled (log)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(–0.51)–0.62</td>
<td>504 0.22</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.63 512 0.29</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>–2.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2
Bivariate correlation matrix for the research factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Attachment to the country</td>
<td>0.28**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>–0.11*</td>
<td>–0.43**</td>
<td>–0.16**</td>
<td>–0.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Procedural justice</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>–0.15**</td>
<td>–0.12**</td>
<td>–0.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>–0.12**</td>
<td>–0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Non-commitment to general law</td>
<td>–0.09*</td>
<td>–0.16**</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>0.32**</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Resistance-general</td>
<td>–0.34**</td>
<td>–0.12**</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>0.33**</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Resistance-action</td>
<td>–0.11*</td>
<td>–0.12**</td>
<td>0.34**</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Traffic violations</td>
<td>–0.10*</td>
<td>–0.17**</td>
<td>–0.08</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The correlations for the non-Jewish sample are presented above the diagonal and those for the Jewish sample below; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
were most strongly correlated with resistance-action and lack of attachment to the country, while, among the Jewish respondents, they were most strongly correlated with non-commitment to the law and low perceptions of procedural justice.

The fit indices of the SEM analysis for the non-Jewish sample ($\chi^2_{(469)} = 780.94$, $CFI = 0.92$, $RMSEA = 0.04$) indicate a better fit than the indices for the Jewish sample ($\chi^2_{(469)} = 964.52$, $CFI = 0.87$, $RMSEA = 0.04$). Figure 2 presents the models for the non-Jewish (a) and Jewish drivers (b). To simplify, the figure shows only the key research variables and the standardized regression coefficients; significant structural paths at $p \leq 0.05$ are presented with black arrows (the insignificant paths are presented in grey). The models are structurally identical and include all the indicators (observed variables), hypothesized correlations and control variables (see Appendix 2 for the regression weights of the significant ($p \leq 0.05$) control variables). The figure clearly indicates meaningful differences between the social groups.

Figure 2a suggests the following model for traffic violations among non-Jewish drivers: drivers who have low attachment to the country have a higher level of general resistance to the country, and this general resistance is correlated with a willingness to express resistance in different ways (resistance-action, e.g. damaging public property or not paying taxes). Resistance-action is related to non-commitment to the law, and is associated directly with traffic violations (drinking and driving, speeding, not using seat belts). Procedural justice, however, appears not to be related to social resistance and/or traffic violations.

A different mechanism for Jewish drivers is presented in Figure 2b. Drivers who have low attachment to the country and high alienation from society have a higher level of resistance to the country, which is related to willingness to express resistance in different ways. Resistance-action is associated with non-commitment to the law (but not with traffic violations), which in turn is related to traffic violations. Regarding procedural justice, it is negatively associated with social resistance to the country and non-commitment to the law, which, as aforesaid, is associated with traffic violations.

Thus, among the non-Jewish drivers, social resistance appears to be directly related to traffic violations, while non-commitment to the law is not related to traffic violations. In contrast, among the Jewish drivers, social resistance is not directly associated with traffic violations, while non-commitment to the law is. It is interesting to note here that these differences can be observed in the estimations of the standardized total effects (direct and indirect) of resistance-action and non-commitment to the law on traffic violations. Among non-Jews, the total effect of resistance-action on traffic violations (0.36) is higher than the total effect of non-commitment to the law (0.11), while, among Jews, the total effect of non-commitment to the law on traffic violations (0.28) is a bit higher than the total effect of resistance-action (0.23). Moreover, among Jewish drivers, procedural justice appears to have a significant association with traffic violations through social resistance and non-commitment to the law, while, among non-Jewish drivers, procedural justice is not associated with social resistance, non-commitment to the law or traffic violations.

It is plausible that the relationships among the variables might be better captured by a modified model which specifies alternative paths between attachment to the country and alienation, on the one hand, and procedural injustice on the other. Under this modified model, which follows the group-value model of procedural justice and the social identity rationale (see, e.g. Bradford 2012; Jackson and Bradford 2010; Lind and
Fig. 2 Structural equation models for (a) non-Jewish and (b) Jewish drivers
* Note: standardized regression coefficients; significant structural paths at p ≤ 0.05 are presented with black arrows.
perceived procedural injustice may reduce people’s identification with and attachment to the group, rather than attachment to the country and alienation being antecedents of procedural justice perceptions, as in our original SEM model. To examine this possibility, we ran a modified model with direct paths from procedural justice to alienation and attachment to the country. This model produced similar results to the original model, with the model fit indices and the structural paths for both groups remaining almost the same. However, among the Jewish drivers, the path between procedural justice and alienation became significant and, among the non-Jewish drivers, the indirect effect of procedural justice on traffic violations became significant, although with a weak standardized effect (–0.041). Therefore, it appears that both models produce roughly the same results.

Discussion and Conclusions

The current paper developed and tested a new approach to understanding risky and delinquent behaviours among non-dominant minority groups, through the social resistance framework. According to this framework, individual behaviour is not only passively influenced by the social structure or representative of ‘bad’ choices, but also includes active, conscious or unconscious, behaviours that express protest against the social order and the individual’s social position. In addition, in the context of the well-known procedural justice model, the social resistance component by itself may serve as a mediating factor in the association between perceptions of procedural justice and risky and delinquent behaviours. We used this innovative theoretical model to explore the involvement of drivers in traffic violations, comparing non-dominant minority (non-Jewish) and majority (Jewish) drivers in Israel, with structural equation models using a representative sample of 1,060 drivers.

Indeed, the non-Jewish drivers in our sample had higher levels of traffic violations (drinking and driving, speeding in residential and inter-urban areas, and not using seat belts) per distance travelled than Jewish drivers. Consistently with the premises of the social resistance framework, the non-dominant minority group in the present research also had weaker attachment to the country and stronger feelings of alienation, non-commitment to the law and social resistance compared to the majority group tested. Our empirical analyses suggest that the social mechanisms underlying traffic violations differ significantly between non-dominant minority and majority drivers. As we hypothesized, the social resistance framework appears more suitable for non-dominant minority groups than for the dominant majority group. In the non-dominant minority group, we found a direct path between a lack of attachment to the country and traffic violations—lack of attachment to the country is correlated with social resistance, which in turn is associated with a willingness to express this resistance in different ways, which eventually is correlated with traffic violations. However, contrary to the framework premises and the procedural justice model, procedural justice and alienation are not associated with social resistance, and non-commitment to the law is not correlated with traffic violations. On the other hand, among the majority group, social resistance does not have a direct correlation with traffic violations, while non-commitment to the law is associated directly with traffic violations. Nevertheless, perceptions of procedural justice were found to be linked to social resistance and non-commitment to the law, which is
then associated with traffic violations. All in all, it appears that social resistance plays a more direct and important role in traffic violations among the non-dominant minority group than the majority group, and that procedural justice and non-commitment to the law have a stronger impact on traffic violations among the majority group, compared to the non-dominant minority group.

It is interesting to note here that an alternative model which follows the group-value model of procedural justice and social identity theory, and which specifies direct paths from procedural justice to attachment to the country and alienation (instead of the other way around) produced results similar to those of the original model. Thus, the precise mechanisms of causation in the relationship between procedural justice and attachment to the country and alienation remain an empirical question. Further longitudinal studies are required in order to elucidate the mechanisms underlying the associations between these variables and their relationship to social resistance and compliance with the law.

To the extent that the results of the current research are ultimately replicated by other studies, our theoretical social resistance model for understanding risky and delinquent behaviours among non-dominant minorities has several important implications. Most notably, our model implies that efforts to reduce unwanted behaviours need to address fundamental social causes (Friedman et al. 2009; Link and Phelan 1995; Marshall 1997). This might be accomplished at several levels. First, it is important to increase the attachment to the country felt by members of non-dominant minority groups, thus decreasing their social resistance. In this context, citizen participation strategies could be useful (Healy 2009; Lu and Liang 2011; van Steden et al. 2011). Second, it may be possible to channel non-dominant minority groups’ frustration and resistance elsewhere, to avert their expression to risky and delinquent behaviour. Programmes tailored to the community’s culture and attitudes and with the cooperation of the local leadership may offer effective means to do this. Third, it might be found effective to shift the target of the resistance. A good example here is the Florida ‘truth campaign’, which successfully reduced youth smoking. The programme was designed around telling young people the ‘truth’ about efforts by tobacco firms to manipulate them into smoking. It thus shifted young people’s resistance from their parents to the firms and, by doing so, changed their patterns of behaviour, reducing smoking rates (Hersey et al. 2005; Niederdeppe et al. 2004).

Finally, perceptions of procedural justice play different roles among non-dominant minority and majority groups. As might be predicted from the original procedural justice model, we found that, among the majority group, procedural justice is linked with non-compliance with the law and risky and delinquent behaviour (through social resistance and non-commitment to the law). However, among the non-dominant group, perceptions of procedural justice are not related to non-compliance with the law and risky and delinquent behaviour, either directly or indirectly. One reason that procedural justice is not significant in the social resistance model among the non-dominant group is that the police and other enforcement institutions, as representatives of the state, may increase social resistance feelings simply because they represent the state, and not because their acts are perceived as fair or unfair. These interesting findings, however, call for further investigation of the effect of social resistance on the procedural justice model among different societies and power groups, and the interplay between social identity (Bradford 2012), motivational postures (Braithwaite et al. 2007), and social resistance in the context of the procedural justice model.
Of course, the results of the current study should be considered in light of its limitations. First, the study is based on cross-sectional data that may raise questions of temporal order and causation, which are common issues in many studies. Our data, therefore, do not allow us to draw conclusions about causation and can only indicate associations between our dependent and independent variables. Nevertheless, it is difficult to posit a reverse causation, whereby traffic violations per se increase resistance and other perceptions estimated in our model. Most obviously, this is because we measured traffic violations through self-reports of behaviours—speeding, non-use of seat belts and driving under the influence of alcohol—and not reports of stops by the police or tickets issued. Future research efforts, however, should address this issue by using, for instance, an experimental research design, panel data and longitudinal analyses.

Second, the self-reported measures we used are subject to different biases. We made a considerable effort to reduce the effects of bias due to cultural differences between the Jewish and non-Jewish respondents, but it is still possible that there were differences in how the two samples understood some of the items in the DRQ. Additional research that validates the DRQ with different samples and social groups, as well as over time, is essential.

Third, some of the items of our procedural justice measure may not perfectly represent the original concept. Nevertheless, we used this scale since it was widely tested in the Israeli context in a series of studies (see, e.g. Rattner and Yagil 2004). It thus was validated in the languages of our respondents and appears to be culturally appropriate. In addition, empirically, the measurement’s Cronbach’s alpha was high in both groups. This seems to indicate that the items measure the same concept, albeit with some distinctions among them. Future studies, nevertheless, should explore whether different measures that include other items produce results that are similar to the current findings.

Future research should explore the extent to which this framework and the contribution of an active everyday resistance approach can be applied to other types of delinquent behaviours and to behaviours at differing levels of severity, as well as in different social and historical contexts. Future studies may also collect data from larger samples, which would make it possible to systematically compare different social groups, both within non-dominant minority groups and within the entire population, according to age, socio-economic status, ethnicity and so forth. In addition, they may also use multilevel models to explore hierarchical aspects of the social resistance framework.

In conclusion, the social resistance framework—as a social framework that highlights agents’ active participation—may play an important role in explaining delinquent behaviours, including but not limited to traffic violations. Moreover, this innovative framework, and particularly the notions of alienation and social resistance, provides an important addition to the well-known procedural justice model. We hope that this framework will help to close disparities in risky and delinquent behaviours among different segments of the population.

**Funding**

Israel National Road Safety Authority.
A SOCIAL RESISTANCE PERSPECTIVE FOR DELINQUENT BEHAVIOUR

References


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**Appendix 1: DRQ Items**

*Attachment to the country (0 = completely disagree, 10 = completely agree)*
- Israel is my nation
- I feel Israeli
- Israel is a country to which I belong

*Procedural justice (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree)*
- The Israeli police fulfill their functions equally towards one and all
- People like you are treated fairly and equally by the police
- The severity of reactions imposed by the police is proportional to the severity of the offense

*Alienation (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree)*
- The people running the country don’t really care what happens to you
- What you think doesn’t count much anymore
- Most people with power try to take advantage of people like yourself

*Non-commitment to the law (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree)*
- If a law is unjust, you don’t have to obey it
- You can disobey a law on condition that you don’t harm anyone
- It is not necessary to obey traffic laws that seem unreasonable to me
- It is okay to disobey a traffic law if I do not cause any harm to anybody
- Sometimes it is okay to disobey unimportant traffic laws

*Resistance-general (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree)*
- Often I find myself objecting to the symbols of the state (e.g., the flag, the national anthem, the state emblem)
- People like me object to the state
- I object to the values that the state of Israel represents
- People that are in a difficult situation may sometimes disobey the law
- My situation sometimes makes me want to damage public property
- Due to my situation, sometimes I don’t want to pay my local taxes
- Sometimes my situation makes me want to show the state that I am angry at it
- The situation of people like me makes them drive in an aggressive way

*Traffic violations (1 = never, 6 = almost always)*
- Drive even though you realize that you may be over the legal blood-alcohol limit
- Disregard the speed limit on a residential road
- Drive without using a seat belt
- Disregard the speed limit on a highway

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### Appendix 2: SEM regression weights for the significant ($p \leq 0.05$) control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Non-Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female = 1)</td>
<td>→ Distance travelled</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of schooling</td>
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<td>Asset index</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>→ Attachment to the country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>→ Alienation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of schooling</td>
<td>→ Alienation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>→ Resistance-general</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender (female = 1)</td>
<td>→ Non-commitment law</td>
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<tr>
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