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A-1 Estimation appendix

A-1.1 The shortest paths problem

The model setup is as follows: let $N = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ be an undirected graph representing the Mexican road network, which consists of sets \mathcal{V} of vertices and \mathcal{E} of edges. Traffickers transport drugs across the network from a set of origins to a set of destinations. Trafficking paths connect origins to destinations. Formally, a trafficking path is an ordered set of nodes such that an edge exists between two successive nodes. Each edge $e \in \mathcal{E}$ has a cost function $c_e(l_e)$, where l_e is the length of the edge in kilometers. The total cost to traverse path p is $w(p) = \sum_{e \in p} c_e(l_e)$, which equals the length of the path. Close PAN victories remove edges from the network. Let \mathcal{P}_i denote the set of all possible paths between producing municipality i and the United States. Each trafficker solves:

$$\min_{p \in \mathcal{P}_i} w(p) \tag{A-1}$$

This problem, which amounts to choosing the shortest path between each producing municipality and the nearest U.S. point of entry, can be solved using Dijkstra's algorithm (Dijkstra, 1959).

A-1.2 Solving for the congested trafficking equilibrium

An equilibrium routing pattern must satisfy the following conditions (Wardrop, 1952):

1. For all $p, p' \in \mathcal{P}_i$ with $x_p, x_{p'} > 0$, $\sum_{e \in p'} c_e(x_e, l_e) = \sum_{e \in p} c_e(x_e, l_e)$.
2. For all $p, p' \in \mathcal{P}_i$ with $x_p > 0, x_{p'} = 0$, $\sum_{e \in p'} c_e(x_e, l_e) \geq \sum_{e \in p} c_e(x_e, l_e)$.

where x_p is total flows on path p , x_e is total flows on edge e , and $c_e(\cdot)$ is the cost to traverse edge e . The equilibrium routing pattern satisfying these conditions is the Nash equilibrium of the game.

Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten (1956) proved that the equilibrium can be characterized by a straightforward optimization problem. Specifically, the routing pattern \mathbf{x}^* is an equilibrium if and only if it is a solution to:

$$\min \sum_{e \in E} \int_0^{x_e} c_e(z) dz \tag{A-2}$$

$$s.t. \quad \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P} | e \in p} x_p = x_e \quad \forall e \in E \tag{A-3}$$

$$\sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_i} x_p = 1 \quad \forall i = 1, 2, \dots, \quad \forall p \in \mathcal{P} \quad (\text{A-4})$$

$$x_p \geq 0 \quad \forall p \in \mathcal{P} \quad (\text{A-5})$$

The first constraint requires that the flow of traffic on the paths traversing an edge sum to the total flow of traffic on that edge, the second constraint requires that supply (equal to 1 for each producer i) be conserved, and the third constraint requires flows to be non-negative. By Weierstrass's Theorem, a solution to the above problem exists, and thus a trafficking equilibrium always exists.

While this problem does not have a closed-form solution, for a given network and specification of the congestion costs $c_e(\cdot)$ it can be solved using numerical methods. I use the Frank-Wolfe algorithm (1956), which generalizes Dantzig's simplex algorithm to non-linear programming problems. The Frank-Wolfe algorithm alternates between solving a linear program defined by a tangential approximation of the objective function in (A-2) and a line search that minimizes the objective over the line segment connecting the current iterate and the solution to the linear programming problem. The linear subproblem determines the direction of movement, and the line search selects the optimal step length in that direction. At the end of each iteration, the current iterate is updated to the \mathbf{x}_e selected by the line search problem. The linear subproblem defines a lower bound on the optimal value, which is used in the termination criterion.

The tangential approximation to the objective given in (A-2) is a simple shortest paths problem in which the costs to traverse each edge $c_e(x_e, l_e)$ are evaluated at the current iterate's flows x_e^k . In other words, the linear subproblem finds the shortest path between each producing municipality and the nearest U.S. point of entry given edge costs of $c_e(x_e^k, l_e)$ at iteration k . The linear subproblem is solved using Dijkstra's algorithm (Dijkstra, 1959). The line search problem is solved using the golden section method (Kiefer, 1953).

A-1.3 Moments

In the baseline congestion model, the moments match the mean model predicted and observed confiscations at ports, at terrestrial bordering crossings, and on interior edges. They also match the interactions between port confiscations and the port's container capacity, between terrestrial crossing confiscations and the crossing's number of commercial lanes, between interior confiscations and the length of the interior edge, and between interior confiscations and the length of the detour required to circumvent the edge. Finally, the moment conditions match the model predicted and observed variance of confiscations across U.S. points of entry

and across interior edges. For the congestion models reported in the appendix that estimate six separate crossing congestion parameters, the moment conditions match mean model predicted and observed confiscations for each of the six separate groups of crossings, instead of matching mean confiscations for all ports and for all terrestrial border crossings.

The model with DTO territorial costs and no congestion matches mean confiscations, mean confiscations interacted with DTO presence, and mean confiscations interacted with the share of Mexico’s territory (if any) that the municipality’s DTO controls. The model that includes congestion matches the same moments as in the baseline congestion model as well as the two moments that interact confiscations and DTO presence/share.

The model with a PAN cost parameter and no congestion matches the mean monthly change in confiscations in municipalities that do not have a PAN mayor elected during the Calderón period. The sample is limited to these municipalities because it is plausible that enforcement remains constant. The model also matches the mean monthly change in confiscations in municipalities bordering a municipality with a PAN mayor elected during the sample period. These municipalities are useful for estimating the PAN cost parameter because drug traffic is often diverted to them. The model that includes both a PAN cost parameter and congestion matches the same moments as in the baseline congestion model, as well as the two moments that summarize changes in confiscations.

A-1.4 Maximizing the simulated method of moments objective function

The simulated method of moments (SMM) estimator $\hat{\theta}$ minimizes a weighted quadratic form:

$$\theta = \underset{\theta \in \Theta}{\operatorname{argmin}} \frac{1}{M} \left[\sum_{m=1}^M \hat{g}(X_m, \theta) \right]' \Sigma \left[\sum_{m=1}^M \hat{g}(X_m, \theta) \right] \quad (\text{A-6})$$

where $\hat{g}(\cdot)$ is an estimate of the true moment function, M is the number of municipalities in the sample, and Σ is an $L \times L$ positive semi-definite weighting matrix.

The SMM objective function is not globally convex, and thus standard gradient methods may perform poorly. Instead, I use simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi, 1983), which is more suitable for problems that lack a globally convex objective.¹ Simulated annealing is a non-gradient iterative method that differs from gradient methods in permitting movements that increase the objective function being minimized.

Given a value of $\hat{\theta}_s$ for the congestion parameters at the s th iteration, the algo-

¹See Goffe, Ferrier, and Rogers (1994) for a comprehensive review and Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 347) for a textbook treatment.

rithm perturbs the j th component of $\hat{\theta}_s$ so as to obtain a new trial value of $\theta_s^* = \hat{\theta}_s + [0 \dots 0 (\lambda_s r_s) 0 \dots 0]'$, where λ_s is a pre-specified step length and r_s is a draw from a uniform distribution on $(-1, 1)$. The method sets $\hat{\theta}_{s+1} = \theta_s^*$ if the perturbation decreases the objective function. If θ_s^* does not decrease the objective, it is accepted with probability $\frac{1}{1 + \exp(\frac{\Delta}{T_s})}$, where Δ is the change in value of the objective and T_s is a positive scaling parameter called the temperature. Uphill moves are accepted with a probability that declines with the change in the objective function and increases with the temperature.² The temperature is set to T_0 at the initial iteration and updated according to the temperature schedule $T_k = T_0/k$. The annealing parameter k is initially set equal to the iteration number. If after a given number of iterations convergence has not been achieved, k is set to some value less than the iteration number so that the temperature increases and the algorithm can move to a potentially more promising region of the parameter space. The dependency between the temperature and acceptance probability is such that the current solution changes almost randomly when T is large and increasingly downhill as T goes to zero.

The algorithm runs until the average change in value of the objective function over a given number of iterations is less than some small number ϵ . I choose the starting value using a grid search over the parameter space. Results (available upon request) are robust to the use of different starting values and annealing parameters, with these choices primarily affecting the speed with which the algorithm converges.

A-1.5 Inference

Predicted confiscations on a given edge are not independent of predicted confiscations elsewhere in the network, introducing spatial dependence. Conley (1999) explores method of moments estimators for data exhibiting spatial dependence, showing that the sufficient conditions for consistency and normality require the dependence amongst observations to die away as the distance between the observations increases. This condition appears likely to hold in the current application, since drugs are typically trafficked to relatively close crossings. With the presence of spatial dependence, the asymptotic covariance matrix Λ is replaced by a weighted average of spatial autocovariance terms with zero weights for observations farther than a certain distance (Conley, 1999):

$$\hat{\lambda} = \frac{1}{M} \sum_m \sum_{s \in Mun_m} [\hat{g}(X_m, \theta) \hat{g}(X_s, \theta)'] \quad (\text{A-7})$$

where Mun_m is the set of all municipalities within 250 kilometers of municipality m , in-

²Since both Δ and T_s are positive, the probability of acceptance is between zero and one half.

cluding municipality m . The implicit assumption is that the correlation between observations is negligible for municipalities beyond 250 kilometers.

A-1.6 The government’s resource allocation problem

To apply the trafficking framework to policy analysis, I embed the trafficking model in a Stackelberg network game (Baş and Srikant, 2002). In the first stage, the government (a single player) decides how to allocate law enforcement resources to edges in the road network, subject to a budget constraint. The edges selected by the government are referred to as vital edges. Traffickers’ costs of traversing an edge increase when law enforcement resources are placed on it. The network model best predicts the diversion of drug traffic following PAN victories when I assume that they increase trafficking costs by a factor of three. Thus, I assume that each police checkpoint increases the effective length of selected edges by $3 \times 9 = 27$ kilometers, where 9 kilometers is the average edge length in the network.³ With more information on the resources deployed in PAN crackdowns, it would be possible to construct more precise estimates of the costs that law enforcement resources impose on traffickers.

In the second stage, traffickers simultaneously select least cost routes to the U.S. The government’s objective is to maximize the total costs that traffickers incur, and each trafficker minimizes his own costs. The scenario in which traffickers respond to the government’s action by choosing the shortest path to the U.S. is a special case in which congestion costs are zero. Ball, Golden, and Vohra (1989) showed that this special case is NP hard, and thus it follows that the more general problem is also NP-hard. That is, the time required to solve for the optimum increases quickly as the size of the problem grows. Even if we focused on the simpler model with no congestion costs, solving for the optimum using an exhaustive search would have an order of complexity of $O(V!)$, where V (the number of vertices) equals 13,969, and thus would take trillions of years to run.

Developing algorithms for problems similar to the one described here is an active area of operations research and computer science. For example, researchers have examined the problem of identifying vital edges in critical infrastructure networks, such as oil pipelines and electricity grids, so that these edges can be better defended against terrorist attacks and the systems made more robust (see, for example, Brown, Carlyle, Salmerón and Wood, 2005). To the best of my knowledge there are currently no known algorithms for solving the

³An alternative assumption is that police checkpoints multiply the effective length of edges by a given factor. However, this would imply that checkpoints increase the costs of longer edges by more than they increase the costs of shorter edges. The multiplicative costs assumption appears reasonable for PAN crackdowns, as larger municipalities have more police and are likely to receive larger federal police and military contingents, but the assumption appears less appropriate for police checkpoints.

government's resource allocation problem that are both exact (guaranteed to converge to optimality) and feasible given the size of the network, either for the network with congestion or for the simpler problem in which congestion costs are zero.⁴ Developing a fast, exact algorithm for this problem is a challenging endeavor that is significantly beyond the scope of the current study. Thus, I instead use the following approximate heuristic to solve for the k vital edges:

1. For each of k iterations, calculate how total trafficking costs respond to individually increasing the edge lengths of each of the N most trafficked edges in the network.
2. Assign each element of this set of N edges a rank, $m = 1 \dots N$, such that the removal of edge $m = 1$ would increase trafficking costs the most, the removal of edge $m = 2$ would increase trafficking costs the second most \dots and the removal of edge $m = N$ would increase trafficking costs the least.
3. Increase the effective length of the edge with $m = 1$ by a pre-specified amount.
4. Terminate if k iterations have been completed and return to step 1 otherwise.

Appendix Figure A-28 plots the results of this exercise with $k = 25$ and $N = 250$, highlighting municipalities that contain a vital edge in yellow. The average monthly drug trade-related homicide rate between 2007 and 2009 is plotted in the background. Allocating police checkpoints to these 25 edges increases the total length of the network by 0.043 percent and increases total trafficking costs by 17 percent. Appendix Table A-59 documents that results are similar when I instead: a) choose values of N ranging from 100 to 500, b) alternate in step 3 between selecting the edges with $m = 1$ and $m = 2$, c) alternate in step 3 between selecting the edges with $m = 1$, $m = 2$, and $m = 3$, and d) remove the edge with $m = 2$, $m = 3$, $m = 4$, or $m = 5$ when $k = 1$ and remove the edge with $m = 1$ when $k = 2 \dots 25$.

⁴Malik, Mittal, and Gupta (1989) suggest an algorithm for finding k vital edges in the shortest path problem, but unfortunately it is theoretically flawed (see Israeli and Wood (2002) for a discussion). The most closely related work is by Israeli and Wood (2002), who develop an efficient algorithm for solving for k vital edges in the context of a shortest path problem on a directed graph with a single origin and destination. Even if the algorithm, which involves considerable mathematical machinery, could be extended to this paper's undirected graph with multiple origins, it is unlikely to be feasible on a network of the size examined here and does not accommodate congestion costs. Existing vital edge algorithms focus on shortest path or max flow problems (i.e. Lim and Smith, 2007), and to the best of my knowledge researchers have not examined the vital edge problem in a congested network.

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A-2 Additional Results

A-2.1 Robustness of Balance Checks

Table A-1: Baseline Characteristics (4% vote spread, 2007-2008)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Own municipality				Neighboring muns.		
	5% vote spread PAN won	5% vote spread PAN lost	t-stat on means difference	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate
<i>Political characteristics</i>							
Mun. taxes per capita (2005)	64.52	50.13	(0.96)	53.89	(0.89)	8.76	(0.28)
Turnout	0.61	0.59	(0.58)	0.04	(0.56)	0.01	(0.13)
PAN incumbent	0.26	0.29	(-0.34)	0.07	(0.27)	0.07	(0.63)
PRD incumbent	0.16	0.13	(0.54)	-0.12	(-0.65)	-0.13	(-0.95)
% alternations (1976-2006)	0.31	0.31	(0.08)	0.06	(0.64)	0.00	(0.07)
PRI never lost (1976-2006)	0.08	0.08	(0.03)	-0.21	(-1.52)	-0.10	(-0.96)
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>							
Population (2005)	6.48	5.12	(0.45)	2.47	(0.24)	-3.54	(-0.93)
Population density (2005)	197.63	210.49	(-0.16)	-615.53**	(-1.99)	-376.16**	(-2.02)
Migrants per capita (2005)	0.02	0.02	(-0.80)	0.00	(-0.54)	-0.01	(-1.42)
<i>Economic characteristics</i>							
Income per capita (2005)	4.37	4.40	(-0.06)	-0.56	(-0.37)	0.61	(0.82)
Malnutrition (2005)	32.18	31.52	(0.20)	2.06	(0.23)	-7.76	(-1.20)
Mean years schooling (2005)	6.23	6.17	(0.22)	-1.24	(-1.44)	-0.23	(-0.42)
Infant mortality (2005)	22.35	21.97	(0.30)	1.80	(0.43)	-1.59	(-0.69)
HH w/o access to sewage (2005)	8.05	8.23	(-0.13)	-2.43	(-0.73)	-5.46*	(-1.74)
HH w/o access to water (2005)	17.15	15.93	(0.33)	-15.69*	(-1.84)	-11.22	(-1.48)
Marginality index (2005)	-0.16	-0.12	(-0.26)	-0.06	(-0.13)	-0.44	(-1.25)
<i>Road network characteristics</i>							
Detour length (km)	29.40	24.16	(0.23)	-76.85*	(-1.90)	-33.17*	(-1.71)
Road density	0.15	0.13	(0.80)	-0.10	(-1.61)	-0.11**	(-2.01)
Distance U.S. (km)	708.09	765.78	(-1.05)	-104.77	(-0.59)	-120.37	(-0.68)
<i>Geographic characteristics</i>							
Elevation (m)	1365.84	1398.81	(-0.22)	426.08	(0.84)	392.43	(0.84)
Slope (degrees)	3.65	3.38	(0.57)	0.13	(0.10)	-0.24	(-0.23)
Surface area (km^2)	1951.44	535.23	(1.59)	1048.62	(0.68)	53.41	(0.05)
Average min. temperature, C	7.29	7.76	(-0.46)	-4.20	(-1.20)	-3.79	(-1.15)
Average max. temperature, C	22.52	23.22	(-0.95)	-3.82	(-1.46)	-3.66	(-1.56)
Average precipitation, cm	1160.13	1056.88	(0.78)	21.76	(0.07)	11.08	(0.03)
Observations	61	62		123		123	

Notes: Data on population, population density, mean years of schooling, and migrants per capita are from *II Cuento de Poblacion y Vivienda*, INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography, 2005). Data on municipal tax collection are from *Sistema de Cuentas Municipales*, INEGI. Data on household access to sewage and water are from CONAPO (National Population Council) (2005). Data on malnutrition are from CONEVAL (National Council for Evaluating Social Development Policy), *Indice de Reazgo Social* (2005). Data on infant mortality are from PNUD Mexico (UN Development Program, 2005). The marginality index is from CONAPO (2005). Data on distance to the U.S. and other road network characteristics are from the author's own calculations. Electoral data are from Mexico Electoral-Banamex and electoral results published by the Electoral Tribunals of each state. For 11 states, data on the total number of eligible voters, required to calculate turnout, are not reported. The geographic characteristics are from Acemoglu and Dell (2009). Columns (1) through (5) examine these variables for municipalities with close elections in 2007-2008. Column (6) and (7) examine these characteristics for municipalities that border a municipality with a close election in 2007-2008. Column (3) reports the t-statistic on the difference in means between municipalities where the PAN barely won and where they barely lost. Columns (4) and (6) report the coefficient on PAN win from a standard RD specification where the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, and columns (5) and (7) report the respective t-statistic. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-2: Baseline Characteristics (3% vote spread, 2007-2008)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Own municipality				Neighboring muns.		
	5% vote spread PAN won	5% vote spread PAN lost	t-stat on means difference	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate
Political characteristics							
Mun. taxes per capita (2005)	67.85	48.18	(1.13)	41.17	(0.54)	-31.11	(-0.70)
Turnout	0.60	0.60	(0.27)	0.06	(0.70)	0.00	(0.04)
PAN incumbent	0.23	0.30	(-0.82)	-0.10	(-0.33)	0.00	(0.02)
PRD incumbent	0.21	0.11	(1.32)	0.08	(0.37)	-0.04	(-0.27)
% alternations (1976-2006)	0.32	0.30	(0.51)	0.11	(1.00)	-0.03	(-0.43)
PRI never lost (1976-2006)	0.08	0.11	(-0.41)	-0.24	(-1.64)	-0.03	(-0.28)
Demographic characteristics							
Population (2005)	7.87	5.64	(0.58)	-2.39	(-0.18)	-8.50	(-1.55)
Population density (2005)	218.11	249.33	(-0.30)	-836.07**	(-2.23)	-505.72**	(-2.31)
Migrants per capita (2005)	0.02	0.02	(-0.50)	-0.01	(-0.99)	-0.01**	(-2.08)
Economic characteristics							
Income per capita (2005)	4.46	4.43	(0.05)	-0.95	(-0.50)	-0.18	(-0.19)
Malnutrition (2005)	30.77	31.24	(-0.12)	1.87	(0.18)	-3.61	(-0.46)
Mean years schooling (2005)	6.39	6.24	(0.49)	-1.59	(-1.54)	-0.82	(-1.26)
Infant mortality (2005)	22.00	22.03	(-0.02)	2.05	(0.42)	-1.04	(-0.39)
HH w/o access to sewage (2005)	8.33	8.06	(0.16)	-3.42	(-0.84)	-5.21	(-1.42)
HH w/o access to water (2005)	18.75	16.24	(0.56)	-11.93	(-1.28)	-10.01	(-1.14)
Marginality index (2005)	-0.20	-0.12	(-0.41)	0.21	(0.38)	-0.11	(-0.26)
Road network characteristics							
Detour length (km)	36.72	32.31	(0.15)	-86.28	(-1.63)	-58.93**	(-2.17)
Road density	0.15	0.15	(0.27)	-0.19**	(-2.50)	-0.16***	(-2.65)
Distance U.S. (km)	680.18	770.18	(-1.57)	-67.33	(-0.32)	-79.38	(-0.38)
Geographic characteristics							
Elevation (m)	1439.71	1380.10	(0.34)	432.09	(0.76)	256.36	(0.49)
Slope (degrees)	3.57	3.46	(0.20)	-0.24	(-0.17)	-0.43	(-0.37)
Surface area (km^2)	2246.80	448.90	(1.60)	284.59	(0.11)	-393.16	(-0.23)
Average min. temperature, C	6.62	8.00	(-1.22)	-4.89	(-1.20)	-3.64	(-0.95)
Average max. temperature, C	22.03	23.24	(-1.49)	-3.86	(-1.25)	-3.06	(-1.11)
Average precipitation, cm	1106.39	1071.97	(0.24)	61.04	(0.16)	86.84	(0.23)
Observations	48	46		94		94	

Notes: Data on population, population density, mean years of schooling, and migrants per capita are from *II Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda*, INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography, 2005). Data on municipal tax collection are from *Sistema de Cuentas Municipales*, INEGI. Data on household access to sewage and water are from CONAPO (National Population Council) (2005). Data on malnutrition are from CONEVAL (National Council for Evaluating Social Development Policy), *Indice de Reazgo Social* (2005). Data on infant mortality are from PNUD Mexico (UN Development Program, 2005). The marginality index is from CONAPO (2005). Data on distance to the U.S. and other road network characteristics are from the authors own calculations. Electoral data are from Mexico Electoral-Banamex and electoral results published by the Electoral Tribunals of each state. For 11 states, data on the total number of eligible voters, required to calculate turnout, are not reported. The geographic characteristics are from Acemoglu and Dell (2009). Columns (1) through (5) examine these variables for municipalities with close elections in 2007-2008. Column (6) and (7) examine these characteristics for municipalities that border a municipality with a close election in 2007-2008. Column (3) reports the t-statistic on the difference in means between municipalities where the PAN barely won and where they barely lost. Columns (4) and (6) report the coefficient on PAN win from a standard RD specification where the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, and columns (5) and (7) report the respective t-statistic. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-3: Baseline Characteristics (2% vote spread, 2007-2008)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Own municipality				Neighboring muns.		
	5% vote spread PAN won	5% vote spread PAN lost	t-stat on means difference	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate
<i>Political characteristics</i>							
Mun. taxes per capita (2005)	82.31	50.58	(1.32)	125.10	(1.24)	6.69	(0.12)
Turnout	0.60	0.58	(0.48)	0.06	(0.62)	0.05	(0.73)
PAN incumbent	0.27	0.28	(-0.03)	0.06	(0.14)	0.03	(0.19)
PRD incumbent	0.15	0.14	(0.15)	-0.13	(-0.51)	0.00	(-0.01)
% alternations (1976-2006)	0.32	0.30	(0.28)	0.07	(0.51)	-0.03	(-0.33)
PRI never lost (1976-2006)	0.09	0.14	(-0.57)	-0.26	(-1.42)	0.04	(0.23)
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>							
Population (2005)	10.06	5.43	(0.89)	5.54	(0.30)	3.71	(0.38)
Population density (2005)	257.93	313.69	(-0.36)	-813.01	(-1.52)	-374.10	(-1.26)
Migrants per capita (2005)	0.02	0.02	(-0.19)	0.00	(0.07)	0.00	(-0.53)
<i>Economic characteristics</i>							
Income per capita (2005)	4.65	4.88	(-0.32)	0.61	(0.23)	0.38	(0.32)
Malnutrition (2005)	30.11	26.33	(0.83)	-5.51	(-0.39)	-13.74	(-1.48)
Mean years schooling (2005)	6.49	6.58	(-0.24)	-0.93	(-0.66)	-0.07	(-0.08)
Infant mortality (2005)	22.25	20.90	(0.74)	4.88	(0.71)	-0.10	(-0.03)
HH w/o access to sewage (2005)	8.17	7.22	(0.49)	-1.15	(-0.21)	-8.01	(-1.54)
HH w/o access to water (2005)	17.49	14.63	(0.53)	4.77	(0.42)	-7.35	(-0.61)
Marginality index (2005)	-0.27	-0.28	(0.03)	0.28	(0.37)	-0.37	(-0.70)
<i>Road network characteristics</i>							
Detour length (km)	45.17	49.45	(-0.10)	8.21	(0.16)	-3.35	(-0.07)
Road density	0.17	0.15	(0.48)	-0.16	(-1.49)	-0.06	(-0.74)
Distance U.S. (km)	654.64	740.40	(-1.13)	-262.07	(-0.99)	-263.20	(-1.01)
<i>Geographic characteristics</i>							
Elevation (m)	1473.84	1299.94	(0.81)	62.24	(0.08)	-132.31	(-0.20)
Slope (degrees)	3.55	3.14	(0.58)	-1.22	(-0.63)	-1.17	(-0.70)
Surface area (km^2)	2788.02	528.14	(1.39)	3712.91*	(1.69)	4011.75	(1.56)
Average min. temperature, C	6.26	7.94	(-1.21)	-5.95	(-1.12)	-4.24	(-0.84)
Average max. temperature, C	21.58	23.32	(-1.72*)	-5.68	(-1.43)	-4.67	(-1.30)
Average precipitation, cm	1065.19	1029.42	(0.21)	3.28	(0.01)	96.62	(0.20)
Observations	33	29		62		62	

Notes: Data on population, population density, mean years of schooling, and migrants per capita are from *II Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda*, INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography, 2005). Data on municipal tax collection are from *Sistema de Cuentas Municipales*, INEGI. Data on household access to sewage and water are from CONAPO (National Population Council) (2005). Data on malnutrition are from CONEVAL (National Council for Evaluating Social Development Policy), *Indice de Reazgo Social* (2005). Data on infant mortality are from PNUD Mexico (UN Development Program, 2005). The marginality index is from CONAPO (2005). Data on distance to the U.S. and other road network characteristics are from the authors own calculations. Electoral data are from Mexico Electoral-Banamex and electoral results published by the Electoral Tribunals of each state. For 11 states, data on the total number of eligible voters, required to calculate turnout, are not reported. The geographic characteristics are from Acemoglu and Dell (2009). Columns (1) through (5) examine these variables for municipalities with close elections in 2007-2008. Column (6) and (7) examine these characteristics for municipalities that border a municipality with a close election in 2007-2008. Column (3) reports the t-statistic on the difference in means between municipalities where the PAN barely won and where they barely lost. Columns (4) and (6) report the coefficient on PAN win from a standard RD specification where the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, and columns (5) and (7) report the respective t-statistic. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-4: Baseline Characteristics (13.3% vote spread, 2007-2008)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Own municipality				Neighboring muns.		
	5% vote spread PAN won	5% vote spread PAN lost	t-stat on means difference	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate
Political characteristics							
Mun. taxes per capita (2005)	66.59	58.11	(0.23)	38.85	(1.28)	42.14*	(1.65)
Turnout	0.61	0.59	(0.99)	0.01	(0.15)	0.01	(0.20)
PAN incumbent	0.25	0.32	(-0.61)	0.00	(0.04)	0.02	(0.24)
PRD incumbent	0.14	0.13	(0.63)	0.06	(0.58)	-0.06	(-0.91)
% alternations (1976-2006)	0.32	0.30	(-0.01)	0.02	(0.41)	-0.04	(-1.20)
PRI never lost (1976-2006)	0.12	0.10	(-0.04)	-0.12	(-1.17)	-0.03	(-0.44)
Demographic characteristics							
Population (2005)	5.28	4.34	(0.35)	4.13	(0.70)	1.88	(0.73)
Population density (2005)	207.02	195.96	(0.42)	-197.74	(-1.06)	-69.11	(-0.63)
Migrants per capita (2005)	0.02	0.02	(-0.69)	0.00	(-0.27)	0.00	(0.64)
Economic characteristics							
Income per capita (2005)	4.28	4.36	(-0.53)	-0.12	(-0.15)	0.47	(0.89)
Malnutrition (2005)	33.08	31.79	(0.53)	0.24	(0.04)	-4.22	(-0.97)
Mean years schooling (2005)	6.22	6.11	(0.32)	-0.17	(-0.36)	0.13	(0.35)
Infant mortality (2005)	22.56	22.54	(0.22)	1.14	(0.50)	0.61	(0.38)
HH w/o access to sewage (2005)	8.29	9.04	(0.05)	0.72	(0.32)	-0.63	(-0.33)
HH w/o access to water (2005)	17.52	18.48	(-0.62)	1.80	(0.30)	-2.28	(-0.52)
Marginality index (2005)	-0.10	-0.05	(-0.23)	-0.08	(-0.27)	-0.22	(-0.95)
Road network characteristics							
Detour length (km)	22.65	22.29	(0.19)	-14.57	(-0.35)	6.21	(0.36)
Road density	0.16	0.14	(0.98)	-0.02	(-0.42)	-0.03	(-0.76)
Distance U.S. (km)	732.16	759.47	(-0.55)	-127.59	(-1.37)	-131.39	(-1.41)
Geographic characteristics							
Elevation (m)	1363.85	1367.75	(0.26)	327.64	(1.19)	273.58	(1.08)
Slope (degrees)	3.60	3.32	(1.02)	0.25	(0.29)	-0.02	(-0.02)
Surface area (km^2)	1613.60	748.56	(1.36)	2422.76*	(1.73)	1463.56*	(1.76)
Average min. temperature, C	7.61	7.79	(-0.46)	-3.41*	(-1.92)	-3.04*	(-1.82)
Average max. temperature, C	22.64	23.19	(-0.53)	-2.54*	(-1.91)	-2.38**	(-1.99)
Average precipitation, cm	1217.80	1112.02	(0.65)	-55.13	(-0.28)	-62.91	(-0.32)
Observations	168	212		380		380	

Notes: Data on population, population density, mean years of schooling, and migrants per capita are from *II Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda*, INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography, 2005). Data on municipal tax collection are from *Sistema de Cuentas Municipales*, INEGI. Data on household access to sewage and water are from CONAPO (National Population Council) (2005). Data on malnutrition are from CONEVAL (National Council for Evaluating Social Development Policy), *Indice de Reazgo Social* (2005). Data on infant mortality are from PNUD Mexico (UN Development Program, 2005). The marginality index is from CONAPO (2005). Data on distance to the U.S. and other road network characteristics are from the authors own calculations. Electoral data are from Mexico Electoral-Banamex and electoral results published by the Electoral Tribunals of each state. For 11 states, data on the total number of eligible voters, required to calculate turnout, are not reported. The geographic characteristics are from Acemoglu and Dell (2009). Columns (1) through (5) examine these variables for municipalities with close elections in 2007-2008. Column (6) and (7) examine these characteristics for municipalities that border a municipality with a close election in 2007-2008. Column (3) reports the t-statistic on the difference in means between municipalities where the PAN barely won and where they barely lost. Columns (4) and (6) report the coefficient on PAN win from a standard RD specification where the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, and columns (5) and (7) report the respective t-statistic. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-5: Baseline Characteristics (5% vote spread, 2007-2010)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Own municipality				Neighboring muns.		
	5% vote spread PAN won	5% vote spread PAN lost	t-stat on means difference	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate
Political characteristics							
Mun. taxes per capita (2005)	76.24	85.61	(-0.69)	-27.04	(-0.38)	7.28	(0.17)
Turnout	0.67	0.64	(1.54)	-0.03	(-0.50)	-0.04	(-0.90)
PAN incumbent	0.37	0.37	(0.12)	0.08	(0.51)	0.10	(1.13)
PRD incumbent	0.11	0.10	(0.37)	0.09	(0.82)	-0.05	(-0.67)
% alternations (1976-2006)	0.27	0.29	(-1.04)	0.04	(0.85)	0.04	(1.34)
PRI never lost (1976-2006)	0.13	0.10	(0.90)	-0.09	(-0.78)	-0.16**	(-2.42)
Demographic characteristics							
Population (2005)	3.74	6.11	(-1.43)	1.83	(0.36)	-3.00	(-1.53)
Population density (2005)	136.31	226.96	(-1.32)	-242.43	(-1.46)	-192.40	(-1.57)
Migrants per capita (2005)	0.02	0.02	(-0.15)	0.01	(1.41)	0.00	(0.53)
Economic characteristics							
Income per capita (2005)	4.57	4.94	(-1.58)	-0.58	(-0.69)	-0.09	(-0.17)
Malnutrition (2005)	27.45	26.52	(0.50)	2.30	(0.41)	-3.57	(-0.83)
Mean years schooling (2005)	6.27	6.41	(-0.90)	-0.49	(-0.97)	-0.18	(-0.51)
Infant mortality (2005)	22.76	22.08	(0.79)	-0.30	(-0.11)	0.05	(0.03)
HH w/o access to sewage (2005)	11.11	10.55	(0.41)	-1.47	(-0.31)	-1.27	(-0.41)
HH w/o access to water (2005)	13.98	14.43	(-0.22)	-5.09	(-0.97)	-2.77	(-0.62)
Marginality index (2005)	-0.29	-0.30	(0.17)	-0.12	(-0.41)	-0.17	(-0.71)
Road network characteristics							
Detour length (km)	17.67	17.46	(0.02)	-21.32	(-0.94)	-3.57	(-0.36)
Road density	0.13	0.13	(0.01)	-0.04	(-1.02)	-0.02	(-0.63)
Distance U.S. (km)	776.52	781.72	(-0.10)	-111.11	(-0.72)	-113.45	(-0.74)
Geographic characteristics							
Elevation (m)	1276.19	1264.79	(0.12)	401.26	(1.46)	406.91	(1.57)
Slope (degrees)	3.10	2.84	(0.92)	0.29	(0.31)	0.15	(0.21)
Surface area (km^2)	1372.19	1084.88	(0.73)	911.82	(1.14)	422.22	(0.60)
Average min. temperature, C	7.66	7.83	(-0.28)	-3.01	(-1.56)	-2.86	(-1.54)
Average max. temperature, C	23.22	23.22	0.00	-2.42	(-1.59)	-2.47*	(-1.78)
Average precipitation, cm	948.41	941.35	(0.11)	-72.78	(-0.39)	-61.14	(-0.34)
Observations	155	155		310		310	

Notes: Data on population, population density, mean years of schooling, and migrants per capita are from *II Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda*, INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography, 2005). Data on municipal tax collection are from *Sistema de Cuentas Municipales*, INEGI. Data on household access to sewage and water are from CONAPO (National Population Council) (2005). Data on malnutrition are from CONEVAL (National Council for Evaluating Social Development Policy), *Indice de Reazgo Social* (2005). Data on infant mortality are from PNUD Mexico (UN Development Program, 2005). The marginality index is from CONAPO (2005). Data on distance to the U.S. and other road network characteristics are from the authors own calculations. Electoral data are from Mexico Electoral-Banamex and electoral results published by the Electoral Tribunals of each state. For 11 states, data on the total number of eligible voters, required to calculate turnout, are not reported. The geographic characteristics are from Acemoglu and Dell (2009). Columns (1) through (5) examine these variables for municipalities with close elections. Column (6) and (7) examine these characteristics for municipalities that border a municipality with a close election. Column (3) reports the t-statistic on the difference in means between municipalities where the PAN barely won and where they barely lost. Columns (4) and (6) report the coefficient on PAN win from a standard RD specification where the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, and columns (5) and (7) report the respective t-statistic. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-6: Baseline Characteristics (4% vote spread, 2007-2010)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Own municipality				Neighboring muns.		
	5% vote spread PAN won	5% vote spread PAN lost	t-stat on means difference	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate
<i>Political characteristics</i>							
Mun. taxes per capita (2005)	79.03	78.40	(0.04)	-41.42	(-0.47)	38.88	(0.80)
Turnout	0.67	0.65	(0.53)	-0.06	(-0.75)	-0.04	(-0.70)
PAN incumbent	0.36	0.36	(0.06)	-0.01	(-0.07)	0.08	(0.77)
PRD incumbent	0.11	0.08	(0.72)	0.01	(0.13)	-0.07	(-0.84)
% alternations (1976-2006)	0.27	0.29	(-0.73)	0.06	(1.09)	0.04	(1.21)
PRI never lost (1976-2006)	0.14	0.10	(1.01)	-0.04	(-0.34)	-0.16**	(-2.20)
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>							
Population (2005)	4.14	4.79	(-0.39)	1.65	(0.28)	-2.04	(-0.86)
Population density (2005)	118.32	157.30	(-0.88)	-318.49*	(-1.82)	-225.44*	(-1.96)
Migrants per capita (2005)	0.02	0.02	(-0.08)	0.00	(0.71)	0.00	(0.21)
<i>Economic characteristics</i>							
Income per capita (2005)	4.59	4.82	(-0.85)	-0.40	(-0.40)	0.42	(0.65)
Malnutrition (2005)	27.22	26.91	(0.15)	0.88	(0.13)	-6.53	(-1.38)
Mean years schooling (2005)	6.29	6.34	(-0.32)	-0.58	(-0.98)	0.00	0.00
Infant mortality (2005)	22.74	22.27	(0.51)	-0.14	(-0.05)	-1.76	(-0.98)
HH w/o access to sewage (2005)	10.06	11.48	(-0.95)	-3.13	(-0.55)	-3.72	(-1.03)
HH w/o access to water (2005)	14.34	13.24	(0.49)	-8.96	(-1.54)	-5.65	(-1.13)
Marginality index (2005)	-0.31	-0.26	(-0.42)	-0.21	(-0.58)	-0.38	(-1.40)
<i>Road network characteristics</i>							
Detour length (km)	20.58	16.63	(0.35)	-35.07*	(-1.70)	-8.45	(-0.84)
Road density	0.13	0.13	(0.40)	-0.04	(-1.13)	-0.04	(-1.16)
Distance U.S. (km)	763.38	816.01	(-0.89)	-63.01	(-0.35)	-69.21	(-0.38)
<i>Geographic characteristics</i>							
Elevation (m)	1249.72	1212.67	(0.34)	472.14	(1.49)	476.90	(1.60)
Slope (degrees)	3.22	2.87	(1.09)	0.21	(0.20)	0.08	(0.11)
Surface area (km^2)	1513.15	1028.66	(1.04)	818.71	(0.98)	454.31	(0.55)
Average min. temperature, C	7.71	8.26	(-0.78)	-3.18	(-1.39)	-3.08	(-1.41)
Average max. temperature, C	23.22	23.49	(-0.54)	-2.68	(-1.49)	-2.73*	(-1.67)
Average precipitation, cm	966.66	925.62	(0.57)	-21.92	(-0.11)	-10.31	(-0.05)
Observations	129	122		251		251	

Notes: Data on population, population density, mean years of schooling, and migrants per capita are from *II Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda*, INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography, 2005). Data on municipal tax collection are from *Sistema de Cuentas Municipales*, INEGI. Data on household access to sewage and water are from CONAPO (National Population Council) (2005). Data on malnutrition are from CONEVAL (National Council for Evaluating Social Development Policy), *Indice de Reazgo Social* (2005). Data on infant mortality are from PNUD Mexico (UN Development Program, 2005). The marginality index is from CONAPO (2005). Data on distance to the U.S. and other road network characteristics are from the authors own calculations. Electoral data are from Mexico Electoral-Banamex and electoral results published by the Electoral Tribunals of each state. For 11 states, data on the total number of eligible voters, required to calculate turnout, are not reported. The geographic characteristics are from Acemoglu and Dell (2009). Columns (1) through (5) examine these variables for municipalities with close elections. Column (6) and (7) examine these characteristics for municipalities that border a municipality with a close election. Column (3) reports the t-statistic on the difference in means between municipalities where the PAN barely won and where they barely lost. Columns (4) and (6) report the coefficient on PAN win from a standard RD specification where the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, and columns (5) and (7) report the respective t-statistic. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-7: Baseline Characteristics (3% vote spread, 2007-2010)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Own municipality				Neighboring muns.		
	5% vote spread PAN won	5% vote spread PAN lost	t-stat on means difference	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate
Political characteristics							
Mun. taxes per capita (2005)	85.90	80.76	(0.26)	-72.69	(-0.65)	10.60	(0.19)
Turnout	0.64	0.64	(0.06)	-0.05	(-0.53)	-0.03	(-0.56)
PAN incumbent	0.39	0.35	(0.53)	-0.02	(-0.10)	0.03	(0.29)
PRD incumbent	0.14	0.07	(1.61)	0.09	(0.73)	-0.03	(-0.36)
% alternations (1976-2006)	0.27	0.28	(-0.57)	0.04	(0.63)	0.02	(0.40)
PRI never lost (1976-2006)	0.15	0.11	(0.76)	0.07	(0.51)	-0.10	(-1.19)
Demographic characteristics							
Population (2005)	5.11	4.28	(0.40)	0.12	(0.02)	-3.91	(-1.28)
Population density (2005)	134.39	153.45	(-0.35)	-384.00*	(-1.88)	-259.43**	(-2.17)
Migrants per capita (2005)	0.02	0.02	(0.66)	0.00	(0.61)	0.00	(-0.48)
Economic characteristics							
Income per capita (2005)	4.61	4.80	(-0.56)	-0.50	(-0.41)	0.19	(0.25)
Malnutrition (2005)	26.86	27.05	(-0.08)	-0.93	(-0.12)	-5.56	(-1.04)
Mean years schooling (2005)	6.38	6.39	(-0.05)	-0.57	(-0.82)	-0.12	(-0.26)
Infant mortality (2005)	22.73	22.56	(0.15)	-0.60	(-0.17)	-2.05	(-0.99)
HH w/o access to sewage (2005)	9.79	11.62	(-1.00)	-4.10	(-0.59)	-3.25	(-0.78)
HH w/o access to water (2005)	15.94	13.88	(0.73)	-8.13	(-1.26)	-6.57	(-1.13)
Marginality index (2005)	-0.34	-0.26	(-0.62)	-0.17	(-0.40)	-0.30	(-0.99)
Road network characteristics							
Detour length (km)	26.90	19.51	(0.49)	-41.76*	(-1.73)	-20.51	(-1.56)
Road density	0.13	0.13	(0.13)	-0.07*	(-1.66)	-0.06*	(-1.89)
Distance U.S. (km)	679.02	766.78	(-1.42)	-11.13	(-0.05)	-14.72	(-0.07)
Geographic characteristics							
Elevation (m)	1325.30	1247.59	(0.63)	438.35	(1.22)	379.92	(1.13)
Slope (degrees)	3.39	3.02	(0.95)	-0.58	(-0.49)	-0.35	(-0.41)
Surface area (km^2)	1729.22	1060.67	(1.08)	674.43	(0.54)	818.35	(0.81)
Average min. temperature, C	6.92	7.95	(-1.34)	-3.21	(-1.21)	-2.73	(-1.08)
Average max. temperature, C	22.66	23.24	(-1.01)	-2.29	(-1.08)	-2.01	(-1.04)
Average precipitation, cm	934.10	916.70	(0.21)	-11.08	(-0.05)	17.62	(0.08)
Observations	95	91		186		186	

Notes: Data on population, population density, mean years of schooling, and migrants per capita are from *II Cuento de Poblacion y Vivienda*, INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography, 2005). Data on municipal tax collection are from *Sistema de Cuentas Municipales*, INEGI. Data on household access to sewage and water are from CONAPO (National Population Council) (2005). Data on malnutrition are from CONEVAL (National Council for Evaluating Social Development Policy), *Indice de Reazgo Social* (2005). Data on infant mortality are from PNUD Mexico (UN Development Program, 2005). The marginality index is from CONAPO (2005). Data on distance to the U.S. and other road network characteristics are from the authors own calculations. Electoral data are from Mexico Electoral-Banamex and electoral results published by the Electoral Tribunals of each state. For 11 states, data on the total number of eligible voters, required to calculate turnout, are not reported. The geographic characteristics are from Acemoglu and Dell (2009). Columns (1) through (5) examine these variables for municipalities with close elections. Column (6) and (7) examine these characteristics for municipalities that border a municipality with a close election. Column (3) reports the t-statistic on the difference in means between municipalities where the PAN barely won and where they barely lost. Columns (4) and (6) report the coefficient on PAN win from a standard RD specification where the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, and columns (5) and (7) report the respective t-statistic. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-8: Baseline Characteristics (2% vote spread, 2007-2010)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Own municipality				Neighboring muns.		
	5% vote spread PAN won	5% vote spread PAN lost	t-stat on means difference	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate
<i>Political characteristics</i>							
Mun. taxes per capita (2005)	98.68	89.03	(0.36)	-87.77	(-0.58)	-31.19	(-0.38)
Turnout	0.63	0.65	(-0.39)	-0.04	(-0.35)	0.00	(0.05)
PAN incumbent	0.42	0.37	(0.54)	0.16	(0.59)	0.07	(0.54)
PRD incumbent	0.12	0.08	(0.87)	-0.08	(-0.66)	-0.03	(-0.30)
% alternations (1976-2006)	0.27	0.27	(-0.18)	-0.02	(-0.30)	-0.02	(-0.49)
PRI never lost (1976-2006)	0.15	0.14	(0.25)	0.10	(0.53)	-0.02	(-0.19)
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>							
Population (2005)	5.82	4.15	(0.62)	0.55	(0.06)	-4.98	(-1.31)
Population density (2005)	149.18	170.68	(-0.29)	-474.11*	(-1.81)	-289.46*	(-1.96)
Migrants per capita (2005)	0.02	0.02	(0.80)	0.00	(-0.52)	0.00	(-0.66)
<i>Economic characteristics</i>							
Income per capita (2005)	4.72	5.07	(-0.84)	-0.34	(-0.22)	-0.25	(-0.26)
Malnutrition (2005)	26.37	23.99	(0.83)	1.48	(0.15)	-4.70	(-0.73)
Mean years schooling (2005)	6.42	6.60	(-0.81)	-0.50	(-0.56)	-0.23	(-0.40)
Infant mortality (2005)	23.03	21.86	(0.86)	3.88	(0.80)	1.02	(0.38)
HH w/o access to sewage (2005)	9.79	10.95	(-0.52)	-0.05	(-0.01)	0.00	(-0.00)
HH w/o access to water (2005)	14.48	12.52	(0.61)	2.64	(0.34)	-0.33	(-0.05)
Marginality index (2005)	-0.40	-0.37	(-0.19)	0.07	(0.13)	-0.12	(-0.30)
<i>Road network characteristics</i>							
Detour length (km)	33.06	25.45	(0.36)	-10.91	(-0.41)	-9.92	(-0.54)
Road density	0.14	0.13	(0.59)	-0.11**	(-2.07)	-0.08**	(-2.12)
Distance U.S. (km)	656.29	752.45	(-1.24)	-125.61	(-0.46)	-130.07	(-0.48)
<i>Geographic characteristics</i>							
Elevation (m)	1360.00	1170.44	(1.32)	298.37	(0.69)	279.43	(0.69)
Slope (degrees)	3.53	2.88	(1.37)	-0.09	(-0.06)	0.01	0.00
Surface area (km^2)	2020.80	1218.50	(0.90)	554.11	(0.37)	1515.10	(1.23)
Average min. temperature, C	6.54	8.00	(-1.63)	-3.36	(-1.01)	-3.13	(-0.98)
Average max. temperature, C	22.27	23.35	(-1.58)	-2.75	(-1.04)	-2.65	(-1.09)
Average precipitation, cm	898.98	870.95	(0.29)	-38.56	(-0.15)	3.53	(0.01)
Observations	65	65		130		130	

Notes: Data on population, population density, mean years of schooling, and migrants per capita are from *II Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda*, INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography, 2005). Data on municipal tax collection are from *Sistema de Cuentas Municipales*, INEGI. Data on household access to sewage and water are from CONAPO (National Population Council) (2005). Data on malnutrition are from CONEVAL (National Council for Evaluating Social Development Policy), *Indice de Reazgo Social* (2005). Data on infant mortality are from PNUD Mexico (UN Development Program, 2005). The marginality index is from CONAPO (2005). Data on distance to the U.S. and other road network characteristics are from the author's own calculations. Electoral data are from Mexico Electoral-Banamex and electoral results published by the Electoral Tribunals of each state. For 11 states, data on the total number of eligible voters, required to calculate turnout, are not reported. The geographic characteristics are from Acemoglu and Dell (2009). Columns (1) through (5) examine these variables for municipalities with close elections. Column (6) and (7) examine these characteristics for municipalities that border a municipality with a close election. Column (3) reports the t-statistic on the difference in means between municipalities where the PAN barely won and where they barely lost. Columns (4) and (6) report the coefficient on PAN win from a standard RD specification where the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, and columns (5) and (7) report the respective t-statistic. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-9: Baseline Characteristics (13.3% vote spread, 2007-2010)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Own municipality				Neighboring muns.		
	5% vote spread PAN won	5% vote spread PAN lost	t-stat on means difference	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate	RD estimate	t-stat on RD estimate
Political characteristics							
Mun. taxes per capita (2005)	85.93	88.95	(-0.69)	6.18	(0.15)	16.05	(0.50)
Turnout	0.66	0.64	(1.54)	-0.04	(-0.83)	-0.04	(-1.25)
PAN incumbent	0.38	0.38	(0.12)	0.06	(0.55)	0.04	(0.65)
PRD incumbent	0.11	0.10	(0.37)	0.07	(1.04)	-0.04	(-0.96)
% alternations (1976-2006)	0.28	0.28	(-1.03)	-0.01	(-0.19)	0.01	(0.48)
PRI never lost (1976-2006)	0.13	0.11	(0.90)	0.03	(0.36)	-0.07	(-1.62)
Demographic characteristics							
Population (2005)	4.18	5.39	(-1.43)	2.16	(0.64)	-0.77	(-0.43)
Population density (2005)	160.46	236.82	(-1.32)	-84.14	(-0.76)	-48.70	(-0.62)
Migrants per capita (2005)	0.02	0.02	(-0.15)	0.00	(1.04)	0.00	(1.45)
Economic characteristics							
Income per capita (2005)	4.67	4.86	(-1.58)	-0.39	(-0.72)	0.16	(0.39)
Malnutrition (2005)	27.54	26.80	(0.49)	0.52	(0.14)	-2.73	(-0.91)
Mean years schooling (2005)	6.34	6.38	(-0.90)	-0.20	(-0.65)	-0.01	(-0.03)
Infant mortality (2005)	22.57	22.26	(0.78)	0.57	(0.34)	0.39	(0.34)
HH w/o access to sewage (2005)	10.52	11.12	(0.41)	-3.40	(-1.17)	-2.96	(-1.42)
HH w/o access to water (2005)	14.08	14.64	(-0.22)	1.68	(0.44)	0.24	(0.08)
Marginality index (2005)	-0.29	-0.28	(0.17)	-0.13	(-0.65)	-0.17	(-1.05)
Road network characteristics							
Detour length (km)	15.85	15.96	(0.02)	2.08	(0.09)	8.38	(0.87)
Road density	0.14	0.14	(0.01)	-0.01	(-0.40)	-0.01	(-0.45)
Distance U.S. (km)	777.21	793.53	(-0.10)	-130.20	(-1.35)	-133.43	(-1.38)
Geographic characteristics							
Elevation (m)	1302.49	1265.37	(0.12)	221.93	(1.22)	239.94	(1.40)
Slope (degrees)	3.09	2.91	(0.91)	0.62	(1.01)	0.38	(0.83)
Surface area (km^2)	1272.77	1003.83	(0.73)	1098.05	(1.30)	681.57	(1.20)
Average min. temperature, C	7.68	8.03	(-0.28)	-2.10*	(-1.78)	-2.11*	(-1.86)
Average max. temperature, C	23.20	23.48	0.00	-1.39	(-1.50)	-1.53*	(-1.82)
Average precipitation, cm	988.68	962.91	(0.11)	3.48	(0.03)	-0.68	(-0.01)
Observations	366	398		764		764	

Notes: Data on population, population density, mean years of schooling, and migrants per capita are from *II Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda*, INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography, 2005). Data on municipal tax collection are from *Sistema de Cuentas Municipales*, INEGI. Data on household access to sewage and water are from CONAPO (National Population Council) (2005). Data on malnutrition are from CONEVAL (National Council for Evaluating Social Development Policy), *Indice de Reazgo Social* (2005). Data on infant mortality are from PNUD Mexico (UN Development Program, 2005). The marginality index is from CONAPO (2005). Data on distance to the U.S. and other road network characteristics are from the author's own calculations. Electoral data are from Mexico Electoral-Banamex and electoral results published by the Electoral Tribunals of each state. For 11 states, data on the total number of eligible voters, required to calculate turnout, are not reported. The geographic characteristics are from Acemoglu and Dell (2009). Columns (1) through (5) examine these variables for municipalities with close elections. Column (6) and (7) examine these characteristics for municipalities that border a municipality with a close election. Column (3) reports the t-statistic on the difference in means between municipalities where the PAN barely won and where they barely lost. Columns (4) and (6) report the coefficient on PAN win from a standard RD specification where the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, and columns (5) and (7) report the respective t-statistic. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

A-2.2 Robustness of Regressions Discontinuity Analysis

Table A-10: PAN Elections (2007-2008) and Drug Trade-Related Homicides

	5% bandwidth			4%		3%		2%		13.3%	
	Post inaug.	Lame duck	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Linear	32.981*** (9.346)	4.967 (4.122)	-2.038 (3.776)	36.423*** (8.969)	-2.466 (4.054)	38.064*** (8.587)	-2.710 (4.043)	47.111*** (10.817)	-5.761 (5.830)	25.621*** (8.484)	-0.226 (3.020)
Linear FE	15.899* (8.736)	0.504 (2.815)	-1.211 (2.709)	18.460* (9.923)	-0.675 (2.830)	17.545 (12.540)	-1.087 (3.083)	37.445** (15.209)	1.001 (3.984)	14.901** (6.443)	-0.007 (1.970)
Linear FE controls	16.786** (7.762)	0.505 (3.119)	-0.989 (2.643)	19.488** (8.512)	0.226 (2.883)	20.637* (10.511)	0.445 (3.088)	40.225*** (12.472)	1.782 (3.962)	13.094** (5.973)	-0.567 (1.909)
Quadratic	41.658*** (8.194)	3.875 (3.888)	-4.537 (4.206)	41.436*** (9.663)	-6.135 (5.496)	42.559*** (11.390)	-7.931 (6.876)	29.469* (15.431)	-9.713 (9.152)	34.924*** (9.534)	-3.261 (3.717)
Quadratic FE	29.606*** (9.538)	6.049*** (2.226)	-1.923 (3.661)	29.618** (14.169)	-3.447 (5.045)	35.337** (17.279)	-1.426 (4.428)	22.867 (21.184)	-3.510 (5.155)	18.052** (8.531)	-2.635 (2.993)
Quadratic FE Controls	33.271*** (8.262)	6.958** (2.872)	-0.786 (3.336)	39.390*** (11.498)	0.514 (4.071)	43.177*** (14.609)	1.026 (4.185)	33.605* (16.985)	-0.098 (5.363)	18.331** (7.454)	-2.705 (2.706)
Cubic	40.996*** (11.568)	-1.483 (3.323)	-7.437 (7.088)	40.655*** (13.353)	-9.154 (8.688)	41.769*** (15.468)	-9.228 (9.919)	64.231** (31.015)	-8.159 (14.208)	39.130*** (8.513)	-4.812 (4.040)
Cubic FE	33.755** (14.914)	4.054* (2.200)	-4.527 (6.422)	34.865* (18.264)	-2.385 (6.058)	27.018 (23.226)	-4.183 (6.406)	38.626 (32.752)	-5.144 (10.063)	19.302* (10.265)	-4.082 (3.662)
Cubic FE controls	46.536*** (11.706)	6.879 (4.854)	-0.173 (4.827)	47.227*** (14.629)	2.517 (4.833)	43.331** (18.836)	2.464 (5.633)	90.785*** (29.337)	13.395 (9.779)	21.772** (8.954)	-3.566 (3.137)
Quartic	41.610*** (14.486)	-2.393 (3.823)	-10.522 (9.401)	46.432** (19.849)	-10.306 (11.231)	41.921 (31.551)	-11.420 (14.458)	211.072*** (40.156)	-11.609 (25.841)	43.679*** (8.716)	-4.769 (4.874)
Quartic FE	38.295** (17.054)	2.163 (2.905)	-4.618 (7.136)	25.043 (23.980)	-6.358 (8.132)	15.129 (32.741)	-9.208 (10.622)	144.096*** (48.617)	-10.422 (21.034)	27.573** (11.666)	-3.310 (4.661)
Quartic FE controls	53.362*** (12.543)	5.450 (4.741)	0.487 (5.199)	50.675*** (18.686)	2.585 (6.374)	79.041** (33.582)	9.955 (11.251)	191.858*** (33.138)	9.095 (18.289)	32.852*** (9.666)	-1.926 (3.638)
Observations	152	152	152	123	123	94	94	62	62	380	380

Notes: In columns (1), (4), (6), (8), and (10) the dependent variable is the drug trade homicide rate during the mayor's term; in column (2) it is the drug homicide rate during the lame duck period, and in columns (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11) it is the drug homicide rate during the pre-election period. All rows and columns report the coefficient on the PAN win indicator. The rows correspond to different specifications of the RD polynomial, fixed effects, and controls. The columns correspond to different specifications of the bandwidth. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-11: PAN Elections (2007-2010) and Drug Trade-Related Homicides

	5% bandwidth			4%		3%		2%		13.3%	
	Post inaug.	Lame duck	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Linear	26.735*** (8.560)	6.331 (5.212)	3.830 (4.688)	22.540*** (8.009)	0.391 (4.595)	24.392*** (7.851)	1.003 (5.070)	17.522*** (6.015)	-3.768 (4.338)	15.580** (7.100)	3.644 (3.481)
Linear FE	14.005*** (5.355)	0.918 (5.181)	-0.617 (4.774)	15.259*** (5.087)	-1.513 (4.489)	16.153*** (5.651)	-0.632 (4.817)	10.585 (8.275)	-5.522 (7.776)	8.531* (5.098)	1.289 (3.835)
Linear FE controls	15.807*** (4.394)	-0.375 (4.268)	-1.270 (3.718)	15.881*** (4.672)	-3.950 (3.809)	17.261*** (4.921)	-2.454 (3.864)	15.352* (8.144)	-9.001 (8.285)	8.369* (4.298)	1.049 (3.350)
Quadratic	17.635*** (6.489)	1.132 (4.895)	-4.574 (4.774)	19.315*** (4.995)	-4.247 (5.093)	16.306** (7.680)	-6.675 (5.368)	15.694 (10.340)	-9.375 (7.511)	23.453*** (7.711)	3.223 (4.371)
Quadratic FE	11.567 (7.979)	-2.129 (5.967)	-6.953 (6.622)	15.197** (6.083)	-5.925 (7.100)	10.959 (9.154)	-9.178 (8.471)	6.991 (12.960)	-14.021 (11.187)	15.190*** (5.366)	0.287 (4.933)
Quadratic FE Controls	16.940*** (6.285)	-2.007 (6.163)	-6.367 (5.049)	17.964*** (6.222)	-8.265 (6.641)	16.197 (9.902)	-13.018 (9.788)	12.172 (12.645)	-21.290 (13.616)	15.237*** (4.553)	0.069 (4.108)
Cubic	18.231** (7.872)	-5.530 (6.705)	-5.005 (5.830)	13.206 (9.475)	-8.174 (6.546)	14.817 (11.067)	-8.618 (8.969)	22.139 (18.259)	-12.979 (14.629)	25.350*** (7.313)	-1.705 (4.980)
Cubic FE	9.429 (9.527)	-13.567 (12.302)	-10.918 (9.144)	9.384 (9.814)	-12.567 (9.385)	4.341 (12.967)	-14.086 (11.801)	-3.774 (18.643)	-17.789 (18.066)	15.461*** (5.261)	-5.814 (5.943)
Cubic FE controls	20.247** (9.782)	-16.038 (15.974)	-10.364 (8.426)	14.600 (10.930)	-18.109* (10.576)	14.672 (13.691)	-18.646 (14.287)	23.389 (19.126)	-21.122 (28.663)	16.738*** (4.825)	-5.631 (4.756)
Quartic	12.756 (11.024)	-13.076 (9.225)	-10.507 (7.863)	19.449 (12.099)	-10.388 (10.598)	20.465 (18.263)	-15.134 (15.251)	65.456 (41.376)	3.098 (20.861)	18.435*** (5.228)	-4.338 (4.591)
Quartic FE	4.364 (12.795)	-21.661 (14.819)	-17.814 (11.313)	8.965 (12.962)	-15.172 (11.998)	2.913 (17.952)	-16.848 (16.351)	44.866 (37.167)	3.316 (20.058)	11.722* (6.531)	-8.114 (6.593)
Quartic FE controls	21.000 (13.113)	-21.751 (17.760)	-15.171 (10.061)	18.177 (12.693)	-21.380 (13.262)	21.841 (16.409)	-21.712 (20.772)	58.763 (38.980)	6.117 (21.141)	16.470*** (5.689)	-6.644 (5.142)
Clusters	307	307	307	249	249	186	186	130	130	746	746
Observations	310	310	310	251	251	186	186	130	130	764	764

Notes: In columns (1), (4), (6), (8), and (10) the dependent variable is the drug trade homicide rate during the post-inauguration period; in column (2) it is the drug homicide rate during the lame duck period, and in columns (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11) it is the drug homicide rate during the pre-election period. All rows and columns report the coefficient on the PAN win indicator. The rows correspond to different specifications of the RD polynomial, fixed effects, and controls. The columns correspond to different specifications of the bandwidth. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-12: PAN Elections (2007-2008) and Overall Homicides

	5% bandwidth			4%		3%		2%		13.3%	
	Post inaug.	Lame duck	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Linear	56.630*** (12.768)	2.457 (2.922)	3.088 (4.361)	62.219*** (11.444)	1.626 (4.846)	63.787*** (10.791)	0.185 (5.000)	75.771*** (14.434)	-3.654 (7.532)	44.551*** (11.967)	3.653 (3.245)
Linear FE	32.729** (12.579)	-0.611 (3.541)	0.719 (3.846)	37.478*** (13.862)	1.039 (4.126)	36.449** (17.457)	-0.853 (4.667)	64.781*** (20.262)	1.362 (5.191)	29.187*** (9.669)	3.385 (2.302)
Linear FE controls	34.430*** (11.205)	-1.764 (3.211)	1.432 (4.116)	38.963*** (12.165)	2.962 (4.082)	40.079** (15.365)	2.493 (4.629)	68.696*** (19.228)	4.053 (5.387)	26.189*** (8.872)	3.686* (2.162)
Quadratic	68.550*** (10.105)	4.442 (3.142)	-1.951 (5.571)	68.130*** (12.772)	-5.919 (7.133)	72.084*** (15.029)	-6.299 (8.891)	61.434*** (19.891)	-11.815 (11.625)	59.602*** (12.668)	1.653 (4.382)
Quadratic FE	55.348*** (13.698)	4.903 (3.877)	-1.051 (5.671)	56.208*** (18.629)	-5.167 (7.959)	63.300*** (22.861)	-1.578 (7.156)	51.954* (27.193)	-3.771 (6.880)	37.571*** (11.985)	1.316 (3.699)
Quadratic FE controls	61.415*** (12.687)	4.737 (3.338)	1.091 (5.038)	68.388*** (17.461)	1.399 (6.469)	73.884*** (21.715)	3.581 (7.216)	68.588** (26.084)	3.909 (6.100)	37.970*** (10.544)	2.185 (3.571)
Cubic	71.197*** (15.385)	-0.063 (4.071)	-7.869 (9.184)	71.760*** (17.171)	-9.530 (11.132)	77.883*** (19.531)	-12.089 (12.627)	113.270*** (41.032)	-23.280 (17.777)	66.131*** (10.663)	-0.522 (5.220)
Cubic FE	66.441*** (18.634)	0.464 (5.476)	-6.592 (9.770)	65.402*** (23.193)	-5.492 (9.492)	57.932* (30.227)	-8.386 (9.788)	69.167 (45.054)	-19.462* (10.846)	41.977*** (13.875)	-1.043 (4.911)
Cubic FE controls	87.533*** (16.743)	2.666 (4.582)	1.467 (8.017)	81.458*** (21.835)	2.638 (8.280)	80.244*** (27.709)	5.701 (8.835)	139.902*** (46.836)	0.209 (14.378)	45.912*** (12.494)	0.495 (4.553)
Quartic	70.782*** (18.881)	1.638 (5.898)	-11.846 (12.066)	89.305*** (25.679)	-14.355 (14.014)	88.694** (40.734)	-30.021 (18.335)	314.681*** (52.271)	-20.910 (28.229)	70.807*** (11.108)	-3.820 (6.333)
Quartic FE	66.807*** (22.414)	2.313 (6.869)	-8.116 (11.003)	57.857* (31.878)	-13.788 (11.834)	39.903 (44.767)	-34.190** (13.661)	197.522*** (63.647)	-23.517 (21.813)	54.124*** (15.638)	-3.066 (6.530)
Quartic FE controls	91.760*** (18.590)	5.284 (6.054)	1.810 (8.838)	94.476*** (27.883)	3.435 (10.118)	127.397** (51.547)	-8.209 (14.102)	254.627*** (51.194)	-8.143 (22.945)	62.025*** (14.023)	0.110 (5.564)
Observations	152	152	152	123	123	94	94	62	62	380	380

Notes: In columns (1), (4), (6), (8), and (10) the dependent variable is the drug trade homicide rate during the mayor's term; in column (2) it is the drug homicide rate during the lame duck period, and in columns (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11) it is the drug homicide rate during the pre-election period. All rows and columns report the coefficient on the PAN win indicator. The rows correspond to different specifications of the RD polynomial, fixed effects, and controls. The columns correspond to different specifications of the bandwidth. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-13: PAN Elections (2007-2010) and Overall Homicides

	5% bandwidth			4%		3%		2%		13.3%	
	Post inaug.	Lame duck	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.	Post inaug.	Pre elec.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Linear	44.820*** (12.289)	6.622 (6.665)	4.740 (3.498)	41.830*** (12.027)	3.023 (3.928)	42.184*** (11.541)	2.172 (4.408)	32.247*** (11.685)	-0.352 (4.681)	29.642*** (10.913)	3.697 (2.448)
Linear FE	28.464*** (8.178)	-0.026 (7.283)	1.832 (2.995)	30.120*** (8.758)	2.033 (3.023)	30.030*** (9.547)	1.122 (3.776)	25.638* (13.478)	0.692 (4.421)	19.316*** (7.085)	1.773 (1.990)
Linear FE controls	29.385*** (7.657)	-2.218 (5.595)	2.536 (2.840)	30.469*** (8.045)	2.823 (2.928)	31.591*** (8.600)	2.572 (3.267)	31.589** (13.013)	2.542 (4.620)	18.399*** (6.278)	1.881 (1.929)
Quadratic	35.970*** (9.351)	-2.048 (5.665)	-0.669 (4.767)	32.601*** (10.070)	-2.021 (5.140)	29.678* (15.186)	-1.824 (6.566)	27.229 (20.089)	-5.689 (8.882)	40.799*** (11.827)	3.482 (3.499)
Quadratic FE	30.073*** (10.626)	-7.716 (8.969)	-0.304 (4.756)	28.374** (11.969)	-0.950 (5.538)	24.309 (16.664)	-0.476 (6.281)	21.569 (22.581)	-2.881 (7.404)	29.470*** (8.557)	1.911 (3.189)
Quadratic FE Controls	35.409*** (10.135)	-7.597 (8.362)	0.864 (4.411)	32.156*** (11.135)	1.261 (4.974)	31.735* (16.147)	3.875 (5.719)	30.680 (21.010)	2.655 (6.273)	28.597*** (7.578)	2.278 (3.021)
Cubic	29.008* (15.412)	-6.648 (8.830)	-2.118 (6.928)	25.165 (18.519)	-3.813 (7.934)	25.858 (21.975)	-7.825 (9.977)	51.101* (29.094)	-12.397 (12.282)	43.434*** (10.607)	2.214 (4.409)
Cubic FE	22.361 (16.504)	-22.510 (17.344)	-1.630 (7.818)	21.205 (19.012)	-2.884 (7.928)	14.900 (24.761)	-7.392 (9.479)	10.652 (32.358)	-16.740* (9.676)	30.712*** (9.036)	1.105 (3.995)
Cubic FE controls	33.265** (15.873)	-25.009 (21.577)	2.468 (6.764)	28.943 (18.109)	2.467 (6.864)	31.132 (23.605)	1.552 (7.614)	53.659 (32.662)	-4.170 (8.775)	31.267*** (8.761)	1.820 (3.811)
Quartic	23.244 (21.227)	-12.152 (12.413)	-7.313 (9.323)	36.261 (23.206)	-6.727 (10.635)	50.659* (30.272)	-14.263 (12.929)	106.428* (63.440)	-13.229 (17.926)	36.097*** (9.527)	-1.400 (5.295)
Quartic FE	17.154 (21.824)	-29.959 (20.973)	-7.104 (10.080)	21.076 (25.462)	-7.276 (10.220)	21.133 (33.436)	-17.062 (11.330)	68.771 (59.445)	-19.263 (15.078)	28.960*** (10.966)	-0.596 (5.612)
Quartic FE controls	36.216* (20.522)	-27.800 (24.123)	-1.805 (8.621)	35.657 (22.803)	0.914 (8.362)	52.288* (31.497)	-2.224 (8.857)	95.217 (63.004)	-6.843 (12.119)	34.287*** (10.080)	1.182 (5.354)
Clusters	307	307	307	249	249	186	186	130	130	746	746
Observations	310	310	310	251	251	186	186	130	130	764	764

Notes: In columns (1), (4), (6), (8), and (10) the dependent variable is the drug trade homicide rate during the post-inauguration period; in column (2) it is the drug homicide rate during the lame duck period, and in columns (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11) it is the drug homicide rate during the pre-election period. All rows and columns report the coefficient on the PAN win indicator. The rows correspond to different specifications of the RD polynomial, region fixed effects, and controls. The columns correspond to different specifications of the bandwidth. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-14: PAN Elections and Violence (All Municipalities)

	Drug-Related Hom.		Overall Hom.	
	07-08	07-10	07-08	07-10
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PAN win	13.576 (9.382)	9.418 (6.962)	30.908** (13.109)	17.775* (10.608)
Clusters	621	1166	621	1166
Observations	621	1,205	621	1,205
R-squared	0.032	0.014	0.044	0.019

Notes: The sample includes all elections where the PAN was the winner or runner-up. Columns (1) and (2) examine the drug trade-related death rate and columns (3) and (4) examine the overall homicide rate. Columns (1) and (3) utilize elections that occurred in 2007-2008. Columns (2) and (4) utilize elections occurring in 2007-2010. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

A-2.3 Robustness to Using Differences-in-Differences

Table A-15: Close PAN Elections and Drug Trade-Related Homicides (DD strategy; 5% vote spread)

	Quadratic vote spread polynomial			Linear vote spread polynomial		
	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2007-2008 elections</i>						
PAN win x	1.238	5.902	0.490	1.345	6.205	0.598
lame duck	(5.355)	(5.515)	(3.978)	(5.665)	(5.500)	(4.260)
PAN win x	30.539***	30.539***	26.329**	28.668***	29.448***	24.475*
post-inaug.	(9.517)	(10.197)	(12.443)	(9.904)	(10.182)	(12.571)
R-squared	0.085	0.165	0.085	0.083	0.165	0.083
Clusters	152	152	152	152	152	152
Observations	8,816	8,816	8,816	8,816	8,816	8,816
<i>Panel B: 2007-2010 elections</i>						
PAN win x	-3.212	2.830	-3.191	-3.321	3.456	-3.224
lame duck	(6.173)	(4.643)	(5.006)	(7.011)	(4.468)	(5.695)
PAN win x	22.299**	24.822**	22.391**	18.536*	23.307**	18.963*
post-inaug.	(9.501)	(10.020)	(11.175)	(9.902)	(9.857)	(10.610)
R-squared	0.038	0.103	0.038	0.036	0.103	0.036
Clusters	307	307	307	307	307	307
Observations	17,980	17,980	17,980	17,980	17,980	17,980

Notes: The dependent variable is the homicide rate in a give municipality-month. PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, lame duck is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the lame duck period, and post-inaug. is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the post-inauguration period. Columns (1) through (3) include a quadratic vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators, and Columns (4) through (6) include a linear vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators. All columns include municipality and month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-16: Close PAN Elections and Drug Trade-Related Homicides (DD strategy; 4% vote spread)

	Quadratic vote spread polynomial			Linear vote spread polynomial		
	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2007-2008 elections</i>						
PAN win x	3.030	8.375	2.304	3.755	8.340	3.030
lame duck	(5.809)	(6.494)	(4.176)	(6.083)	(6.290)	(4.437)
PAN win x	34.168***	31.252***	30.221**	30.820**	30.224***	26.897*
post-inaug.	(10.763)	(10.407)	(13.034)	(12.419)	(10.452)	(15.215)
R-squared	0.105	0.186	0.105	0.100	0.186	0.099
Clusters	123	123	123	123	123	123
Observations	7,134	7,134	7,134	7,134	7,134	7,134
<i>Panel B: 2007-2010 elections</i>						
PAN win x	-5.467	4.673	-5.051	-8.284	4.245	-7.718
lame duck	(6.704)	(5.790)	(5.478)	(7.880)	(5.627)	(6.368)
PAN win x	20.104**	26.114**	21.988*	13.610	23.606**	16.115
post-inaug.	(9.893)	(10.446)	(11.811)	(11.134)	(10.342)	(12.877)
R-squared	0.053	0.122	0.053	0.046	0.121	0.046
Clusters	249	249	249	249	249	249
Observations	14,558	14,558	14,558	14,558	14,558	14,558

Notes: The dependent variable is the homicide rate in a give municipality-month. PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, lame duck is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the lame duck period, and post-inaug. is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the post-inauguration period. Columns (1) through (3) include a quadratic vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators, and Columns (4) through (6) include a linear vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators. All columns include municipality and month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-17: Close PAN Elections and Drug Trade-Related Homicides (DD strategy; 3% vote spread)

	Quadratic vote spread polynomial			Linear vote spread polynomial		
	Calendar	Municipality	No	Calendar	Municipality	No
	time trend(s)			time trend(s)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2007-2008 elections</i>						
PAN win x	2.235	7.960	1.593	3.587	7.926	2.952
lame duck	(6.267)	(7.174)	(4.551)	(6.682)	(6.713)	(4.947)
PAN win x	36.940***	31.023***	33.414**	31.573**	30.196***	28.102*
post-inaug.	(11.619)	(9.744)	(13.361)	(14.219)	(10.139)	(16.785)
R-squared	0.120	0.198	0.119	0.111	0.198	0.111
Clusters	94	94	94	94	94	94
Observations	5,452	5,452	5,452	5,452	5,452	5,452
<i>Panel B: 2007-2010 elections</i>						
PAN win x	-3.969	4.632	-4.030	-3.421	4.809	-3.298
lame duck	(7.076)	(5.923)	(5.595)	(8.285)	(6.164)	(6.405)
PAN win x	24.642**	25.171**	24.418*	21.367	24.005**	21.805
post-inaug.	(10.865)	(9.887)	(12.733)	(13.329)	(9.846)	(15.405)
R-squared	0.064	0.133	0.064	0.057	0.132	0.057
Clusters	186	186	186	186	186	186
Observations	10,788	10,788	10,788	10,788	10,788	10,788

Notes: The dependent variable is the homicide rate in a give municipality-month. PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, lame duck is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the lame duck period, and post-inaug. is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the post-inauguration period. Columns (1) through (3) include a quadratic vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators, and Columns (4) through (6) include a linear vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators. All columns include municipality and month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-18: Close PAN Elections and Drug Trade-Related Homicides (DD strategy; 2% vote spread)

	Quadratic vote spread polynomial			Linear vote spread polynomial		
	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2007-2008 elections</i>						
PAN win x	-1.080	-1.839	-2.870	-1.737	-3.311	-3.489
lame duck	(6.138)	(6.136)	(6.034)	(5.298)	(4.431)	(5.591)
PAN win x	62.372***	26.180***	52.288***	65.278***	21.347**	55.200***
post-inaug.	(11.932)	(9.778)	(11.468)	(13.018)	(8.117)	(13.994)
R-squared	0.182	0.254	0.180	0.182	0.253	0.179
Clusters	62	62	62	62	62	62
Observations	3,596	3,596	3,596	3,596	3,596	3,596
<i>Panel B: 2007-2010 elections</i>						
PAN win x	-14.467**	-4.072	-15.206**	-19.703***	-3.825	-20.396***
lame duck	(6.615)	(3.998)	(6.950)	(6.239)	(5.399)	(6.026)
PAN win x	39.583***	20.491**	35.769**	35.248**	21.181***	31.588*
post-inaug.	(13.640)	(8.682)	(15.615)	(15.864)	(7.256)	(18.729)
R-squared	0.096	0.165	0.096	0.092	0.165	0.092
Clusters	130	130	130	130	130	130
Observations	7,540	7,540	7,540	7,540	7,540	7,540

Notes: The dependent variable is the homicide rate in a give municipality-month. PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, lame duck is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the lame duck period, and post-inaug. is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the post-inauguration period. Columns (1) through (3) include a quadratic vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators, and Columns (4) through (6) include a linear vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators. All columns include municipality and month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-19: Close PAN Elections and Drug-Related Homicides (DD strategy; 13.3% vote spread)

	Quadratic vote spread polynomial			Linear vote spread polynomial		
	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2007-2008 elections</i>						
PAN win x	2.626	3.361	1.120	2.405	3.247	0.899
lame duck	(4.321)	(3.841)	(3.072)	(4.450)	(3.907)	(3.170)
PAN win x	29.228***	24.241***	20.968**	29.195***	24.390***	20.938**
post-inaug.	(7.879)	(8.801)	(9.384)	(8.176)	(9.337)	(9.539)
R-squared	0.046	0.140	0.045	0.046	0.139	0.045
Clusters	380	380	380	380	380	380
Observations	22,040	22,040	22,040	22,040	22,040	22,040
<i>Panel B: 2007-2010 elections</i>						
PAN win x	-0.437	3.028	-1.737	-1.333	2.731	-2.605
lame duck	(5.592)	(3.117)	(4.180)	(5.808)	(3.080)	(4.342)
PAN win x	16.231**	13.791*	12.007	15.104**	13.118	10.976
post-inaug.	(7.048)	(8.338)	(7.728)	(7.305)	(8.640)	(7.691)
R-squared	0.026	0.108	0.026	0.026	0.108	0.025
Clusters	746	746	746	746	746	746
Observations	44,312	44,312	44,312	44,312	44,312	44,312

Notes: The dependent variable is the homicide rate in a give municipality-month. PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, lame duck is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the lame duck period, and post-inaug. is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the post-inauguration period. Columns (1) through (3) include a quadratic vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators, and Columns (4) through (6) include a linear vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators. All columns include municipality and month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-20: Close PAN Elections and Overall Homicides (DD strategy; 5% vote spread)

	Quadratic vote spread polynomial			Linear vote spread polynomial		
	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PAN win x lame duck	-9.437** (3.992)	-14.058*** (4.213)	-4.807 (3.575)	-8.880** (4.115)	-13.610*** (4.359)	-4.272 (3.699)
PAN win x post-inaug.	48.463*** (15.376)	41.445*** (15.796)	53.983*** (15.830)	45.426** (18.009)	38.318** (18.406)	50.945*** (18.490)
R-squared	0.178	0.235	0.176	0.167	0.229	0.165
Clusters	152	152	152	152	152	152
Observations	39,269	39,269	39,269	39,269	39,269	39,269
<i>Panel B: 2007-2010 elections</i>						
PAN win x lame duck	-5.948 (5.812)	-8.647 (5.836)	-2.276 (5.258)	-5.914 (5.908)	-8.398 (5.775)	-2.227 (5.289)
PAN win x post-inaug.	37.294*** (11.419)	33.527*** (11.259)	41.576*** (12.324)	32.368*** (12.112)	28.919** (11.835)	36.648*** (12.881)
R-squared	0.072	0.114	0.071	0.068	0.112	0.067
Clusters	307	307	307	307	307	307
Observations	73,875	73,875	73,875	73,875	73,875	73,875

Notes: The dependent variable is the homicide rate in a give municipality-month. PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, lame duck is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the lame duck period, and post-inaug. is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the post-inauguration period. Columns (1) through (3) include a quadratic vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators, and Columns (4) through (6) include a linear vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators. All columns include municipality and month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-21: Close PAN Elections and Overall Homicides (DD strategy; 4% vote spread)

	Quadratic vote spread polynomial			Linear vote spread polynomial		
	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PAN win x lame duck	-6.489** (3.234)	-9.079*** (2.685)	-0.247 (3.109)	-6.002* (3.373)	-7.578** (3.041)	0.251 (3.272)
PAN win x post-inaug.	53.830*** (14.621)	48.647*** (15.404)	61.020*** (15.041)	49.333** (20.426)	44.441** (20.793)	56.573*** (20.817)
R-squared	0.222	0.273	0.220	0.201	0.262	0.198
Clusters	123	123	123	123	123	123
Observations	31,773	31,773	31,773	31,773	31,773	31,773
<i>Panel B: 2007-2010 elections</i>						
PAN win x lame duck	-5.738 (5.293)	-8.013 (5.175)	-1.428 (5.037)	-5.990 (5.178)	-8.388* (5.011)	-1.680 (4.914)
PAN win x post-inaug.	35.409*** (10.123)	32.132*** (10.595)	40.431*** (11.218)	30.298** (11.747)	27.320** (12.309)	35.316*** (12.691)
R-squared	0.089	0.130	0.087	0.080	0.124	0.079
Clusters	249	249	249	249	249	249
Observations	59,809	59,809	59,809	59,809	59,809	59,809

Notes: The dependent variable is the homicide rate in a give municipality-month. PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, lame duck is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the lame duck period, and post-inaug. is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the post-inauguration period. Columns (1) through (3) include a quadratic vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators, and Columns (4) through (6) include a linear vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators. All columns include municipality and month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-22: Close PAN Elections and Overall Homicides (DD strategy; 3% vote spread)

	Quadratic vote spread polynomial			Linear vote spread polynomial		
	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PAN win x lame duck	-6.835** (3.174)	-8.650*** (2.592)	0.010 (3.489)	-6.377** (3.167)	-6.793** (2.855)	0.498 (3.383)
PAN win x post-inaug.	57.304*** (14.212)	53.231*** (15.044)	65.274*** (14.540)	50.182** (21.524)	46.527** (22.163)	58.230*** (21.965)
R-squared	0.251	0.300	0.248	0.225	0.287	0.222
Clusters	94	94	94	94	94	94
Observations	24,287	24,287	24,287	24,287	24,287	24,287
<i>Panel B: 2007-2010 elections</i>						
PAN win x lame duck	-3.055 (5.354)	-5.079 (4.730)	1.863 (5.309)	-3.208 (5.344)	-4.922 (4.695)	1.731 (5.293)
PAN win x post-inaug.	37.070*** (9.057)	33.725*** (10.043)	42.597*** (10.142)	33.486*** (12.046)	30.512** (13.147)	39.035*** (12.884)
R-squared	0.110	0.153	0.108	0.100	0.147	0.097
Clusters	186	186	186	186	186	186
Observations	44,337	44,337	44,337	44,337	44,337	44,337

Notes: The dependent variable is the homicide rate in a give municipality-month. PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, lame duck is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the lame duck period, and post-inaug. is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the post-inauguration period. Columns (1) through (3) include a quadratic vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators, and Columns (4) through (6) include a linear vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators. All columns include municipality and month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-23: Close PAN Elections and Overall Homicides (DD strategy; 2% vote spread)

	Quadratic vote spread polynomial			Linear vote spread polynomial		
	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PAN win x lame duck	-8.361* (4.809)	-7.806 (6.089)	-1.053 (5.492)	-9.827** (3.804)	-8.574 (6.182)	-2.597 (4.428)
PAN win x post-inaug.	73.958*** (15.766)	72.483*** (15.425)	83.504*** (15.613)	75.102*** (17.163)	73.956*** (17.102)	84.659*** (16.919)
R-squared	0.342	0.394	0.338	0.342	0.394	0.338
Clusters	62	62	62	62	62	62
Observations	16,022	16,022	16,022	16,022	16,022	16,022
<i>Panel B: 2007-2010 elections</i>						
PAN win x lame duck	-19.603*** (6.879)	-17.354*** (6.217)	-13.408** (6.599)	-19.280** (7.985)	-17.239** (8.041)	-13.088* (7.721)
PAN win x post-inaug.	27.907** (13.194)	29.123** (13.414)	35.356*** (12.948)	27.354* (14.920)	28.422* (15.790)	34.802** (14.718)
R-squared	0.157	0.203	0.153	0.156	0.202	0.152
Clusters	130	130	130	130	130	130
Observations	30,997	30,997	30,997	30,997	30,997	30,997

Notes: The dependent variable is the homicide rate in a give municipality-month. PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, lame duck is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the lame duck period, and post-inaug. is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the post-inauguration period. Columns (1) through (3) include a quadratic vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators, and Columns (4) through (6) include a linear vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators. All columns include municipality and month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-24: Close PAN Elections and Overall Homicides (DD strategy; 13.3% vote spread)

	Quadratic vote spread polynomial			Linear vote spread polynomial		
	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No	Calendar	Municipality time trend(s)	No
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PAN win x lame duck	-6.633* (3.788)	-8.904** (3.857)	-3.021 (3.095)	-6.556* (3.729)	-9.019** (3.875)	-2.944 (3.060)
PAN win x post-inaug.	38.091*** (12.821)	33.937*** (13.028)	42.530*** (13.477)	38.525*** (14.080)	34.262** (14.026)	42.961*** (14.790)
R-squared	0.128	0.187	0.127	0.124	0.185	0.123
Clusters	380	380	380	380	380	380
Observations	98,179	98,179	98,179	98,179	98,179	98,179
<i>Panel B: 2007-2010 elections</i>						
PAN win x lame duck	-1.024 (4.232)	-3.555 (4.634)	1.429 (3.874)	-1.298 (4.163)	-3.859 (4.619)	1.152 (3.848)
PAN win x post-inaug.	24.537** (9.642)	21.508** (9.488)	27.357*** (10.566)	23.302** (10.316)	20.458** (10.083)	26.117** (11.239)
R-squared	0.047	0.089	0.046	0.044	0.087	0.043
Clusters	746	746	746	746	746	746
Observations	182,104	182,104	182,104	182,104	182,104	182,104

Notes: The dependent variable is the homicide rate in a give municipality-month. PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, lame duck is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the lame duck period, and post-inaug. is an indicator equal to one if the observation occurred during the post-inauguration period. Columns (1) through (3) include a quadratic vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators, and Columns (4) through (6) include a linear vote spread polynomial interacted with the lame duck and post-inauguration indicators. All columns include municipality and month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

A-2.4 Police-Criminal Confrontations

Table A-25: Close PAN Elections and Deaths in Police-Criminal Confrontations

	Confrontation Probability						Confrontation Deaths					
	Quadratic RD Polynomial			Linear RD Polynomial			Quadratic RD Polynomial			Linear RD Polynomial		
	Post inaug.	Lame duck	Pre election	Post inaug.	Lame duck	Pre election	Post inaug.	Lame duck	Pre election	Post inaug.	Lame duck	Pre election
<i>Panel A: 2007-2008 Elections</i>												
PAN win	0.031 (0.058)	0.014 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.035 (0.037)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.015 (0.026)	8.658** (3.697)	0.805 (1.388)	0.181 (4.332)	23.454*** (8.559)	3.636 (2.983)	4.040 (6.613)
Obs.	152	152	152	152	152	152	152	152	152	152	152	152
R^2	0.037	0.051	0.020	0.021	0.031	0.016	0.360	0.331	0.209	0.222	0.212	0.124
<i>Panel B: 2007-2010 Elections</i>												
PAN win	0.002 (0.033)	-0.007 (0.019)	0.001 (0.018)	0.025 (0.021)	0.017 (0.016)	0.015 (0.016)	15.261** (7.537)	-0.104 (0.160)	0.007 (0.406)	26.770* (14.120)	0.453* (0.263)	0.649 (0.549)
Clusters	307	307	307	307	307	307	307	307	307	307	307	307
Obs.	310	310	310	310	310	310	310	310	310	310	310	310
R^2	0.036	0.010	0.011	0.016	0.005	0.008	0.231	0.100	0.072	0.200	0.047	0.038

Notes: The dependent variable is deaths in police-criminal confrontations. PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, and the sample includes elections in which the PAN was first or second by a 5 percentage point or less vote spread margin. Columns (1) through (3) and (7) through (9) include a quadratic RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. Columns (4) through (6) and (10) through (12) include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

A-2.5 Robustness of Heterogeneity Results

Table A-26: Heterogeneity (4% bandwidth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dep var: Drug-related homicide rate</i>								
	<i>2007-2008 sample</i>				<i>2007-2010 sample</i>			
PAN win	36.423*** (8.969)	43.631*** (7.710)	43.031*** (9.187)	-5.666 (5.176)	22.540*** (8.009)	26.106*** (9.068)	23.836*** (7.502)	-1.974 (9.517)
PAN win x far from U.S.		-53.324*** (12.090)				-30.772*** (10.673)		
PAN win x low violence			-59.589*** (11.335)				-34.939*** (8.642)	
PAN win x local gang				9.405 (14.139)				2.972 (11.099)
PAN win x rival				38.511*** (10.418)				19.979 (15.344)
PAN win x ally				21.861** (8.341)				7.098 (10.815)
R-squared	0.392	0.504	0.499	0.587	0.203	0.269	0.308	0.322
Observations	123	123	123	123	251	251	251	251
PAN win effect (far from US)		-9.693 (9.312)				-4.666 (5.629)		
PAN win effect (low violence)			-16.560** (6.639)				-11.10** (4.290)	
PAN win effect (local gang)				3.738 (13.160)				0.997 (5.713)
PAN win effect (rival)				32.840*** (9.041)				18.00 (12.04)
PAN win effect (ally)				16.190** (6.541)				5.123 (5.139)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, far from U.S. is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality is above median distance from the U.S., low violence is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality had a below median homicide rate during 2004-2006, local gang is an indicator equal to one if the municipality contains only a local gang, rival is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and borders territory controlled by a rival DTO, and ally is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and does not border territory controlled by a rival DTO. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. In addition to the interactions, main effects are also included. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-27: Heterogeneity (3% bandwidth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	<i>Dep var: Drug-related homicide rate</i>							
	<i>2007-2008 sample</i>				<i>2007-2010 sample</i>			
PAN win	38.064*** (8.587)	43.333*** (7.603)	45.302*** (9.429)	-6.287 (6.072)	24.392*** (7.851)	26.675*** (9.634)	24.302*** (6.978)	-2.064 (10.529)
PAN win x far from U.S.		-52.538*** (12.854)				-27.999** (10.992)		
PAN win x low violence			-62.145*** (11.631)				-34.104*** (8.230)	
PAN win x local gang				11.489 (13.437)				2.932 (12.005)
PAN win x rival				43.227*** (10.780)				22.253 (16.695)
PAN win x ally				22.037** (9.044)				14.141 (11.810)
R-squared	0.414	0.524	0.523	0.612	0.162	0.238	0.277	0.291
Observations	94	94	94	94	186	186	186	186
PAN win effect (far from US)		-9.206 (10.360)				-1.324 (5.292)		
PAN win effect (low violence)			-16.840** (6.810)				-9.802** (4.365)	
PAN win effect (local gang)				5.203 (11.990)				0.868 (5.768)
PAN win effect (rival)				36.940*** (8.907)				20.19 (12.96)
PAN win effect (ally)				15.75** (6.702)				12.08** (5.351)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, far from U.S. is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality is above median distance from the U.S., low violence is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality had a below median homicide rate during 2004-2006, local gang is an indicator equal to one if the municipality contains only a local gang, rival is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and borders territory controlled by a rival DTO, and ally is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and does not border territory controlled by a rival DTO. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. In addition to the interactions, main effects are also included. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-28: Heterogeneity (2% bandwidth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	<i>Dep var: Drug-related homicide rate</i>							
	<i>2007-2008 sample</i>				<i>2007-2010 sample</i>			
PAN win	47.111*** (10.817)	62.914*** (9.889)	36.860** (15.046)	-0.535 (5.435)	17.522*** (6.015)	18.520*** (6.453)	16.788* (9.411)	-16.849 (10.499)
PAN win x far from U.S.		-70.701*** (19.085)				-14.475 (9.007)		
PAN win x low violence			-46.786*** (16.454)				-23.494** (10.567)	
PAN win x local gang				26.902 (25.339)				9.362 (13.192)
PAN win x rival				49.399*** (16.378)				45.104*** (14.824)
PAN win x ally				25.980*** (7.390)				31.971** (13.610)
R-squared	0.349	0.542	0.558	0.663	0.125	0.221	0.232	0.311
Observations	62	62	62	62	130	130	130	130
PAN win effect (far from US)		-7.788 (16.320)				4.045 (6.284)		
PAN win effect (low violence)			-9.926 (6.661)				-6.705 (4.806)	
PAN win effect (local gang)				26.370 (24.750)				-7.487 (7.987)
PAN win effect (rival)				48.860*** (15.450)				28.25*** (10.47)
PAN win effect (ally)				25.450*** (5.008)				15.12* (8.661)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, far from U.S. is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality is above median distance from the U.S., low violence is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality had a below median homicide rate during 2004-2006, local gang is an indicator equal to one if the municipality contains only a local gang, rival is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and borders territory controlled by a rival DTO, and ally is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and does not border territory controlled by a rival DTO. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. In addition to the interactions, main effects are also included. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-29: Heterogeneity (13% bandwidth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dep var: Drug-related homicide rate</i>								
	<i>2007-2008 sample</i>				<i>2007-2010 sample</i>			
PAN win	25.621*** (8.484)	30.701*** (9.108)	30.306*** (8.886)	-0.196 (2.251)	15.580** (7.100)	16.849** (8.130)	18.495** (8.038)	-1.914 (4.817)
PAN win x far from U.S.		-36.108*** (10.792)				-17.739** (8.673)		
PAN win x low violence			-36.721*** (10.478)				-22.662*** (8.601)	
PAN win x local gang				-6.559 (9.654)				3.113 (6.083)
PAN win x rival				29.027** (11.311)				20.675* (10.954)
PAN win x ally				7.817 (6.854)				5.565 (5.905)
Observations	380	380	380	380	764	764	764	764
R-squared	0.184	0.289	0.302	0.365	0.080	0.145	0.166	0.191
PAN win effect (far from US)		-5.408 (5.789)				-0.890 (3.020)		
PAN win effect (low violence)			-6.415 (5.552)				-4.167 (3.062)	
PAN win effect (local gang)				-6.755 (9.388)				1.199 (3.715)
PAN win effect (rival)				28.83*** (11.08)				18.76** (9.838)
PAN win effect (ally)				7.622 (6.474)				3.652 (3.416)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, far from U.S. is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality is above median distance from the U.S., low violence is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality had a below median homicide rate during 2004-2006, local gang is an indicator equal to one if the municipality contains only a local gang, rival is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and borders territory controlled by a rival DTO, and ally is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and does not border territory controlled by a rival DTO. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. In addition to the interactions, main effects are also included. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-30: Heterogeneity (overall homicides, 5% bandwidth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	<i>Dep var: Overall homicide rate</i>							
	<i>2007-2008 elections</i>				<i>2007-2010 elections</i>			
PAN win	56.630*** (12.768)	66.235*** (11.669)	59.683*** (12.309)	-8.798 (5.511)	44.820*** (12.289)	54.553*** (12.727)	46.371*** (11.620)	-3.656 (5.031)
PAN win x far from U.S.		-84.627*** (16.106)				-58.341*** (14.732)		
PAN win x low violence			-71.613*** (14.238)				-49.256*** (12.985)	
PAN win x borders local gang				8.137 (17.539)				1.838 (7.406)
PAN win x borders rival				73.191*** (14.488)				56.724*** (17.764)
PAN win x borders ally				16.045 (18.960)				18.612** (8.874)
R-squared	0.396	0.521	0.536	0.593	0.237	0.360	0.419	0.412
Observations	152	152	152	152	310	310	310	310
PAN win effect (far from US)		-18.39 (11.10)				-3.787 (7.421)		
PAN win effect (low violence)			-11.930* (7.156)				-2.885 (5.796)	
PAN win effect (borders local gang)				-0.661 (16.65)				-1.818 (5.435)
PAN win effect (borders rival)				64.39*** (13.40)				53.07*** (17.04)
PAN win effect (borders ally)				7.247 (18.140)				14.96** (7.311)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, far from U.S. is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality is above median distance from the U.S., low violence is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality had a below median homicide rate during 2004-2006, local gang is an indicator equal to one if the municipality contains only a local gang, rival is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and borders territory controlled by a rival DTO, and ally is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and does not border territory controlled by a rival DTO. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. In addition to the interactions, main effects are also included. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-31: Heterogeneity (overall homicides, 4% bandwidth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	<i>Dep var: Overall homicide rate</i>							
	<i>2007-2008 elections</i>				<i>2007-2010 elections</i>			
PAN win	62.219*** (11.444)	73.706*** (8.838)	68.397*** (10.357)	-10.449 (6.978)	41.830*** (12.027)	50.865*** (12.344)	42.132*** (10.954)	-5.963 (6.135)
PAN win x far from U.S.		-86.308*** (13.098)				-58.565*** (15.181)		
PAN win x low violence			-84.534*** (12.926)				-52.656*** (12.458)	
PAN win x local gang				14.898 (17.122)				4.629 (8.135)
PAN win x borders rival				70.733*** (11.601)				39.302** (17.728)
PAN win x borders ally				35.434*** (12.708)				27.689*** (8.589)
Observations	123	123	123	123	251	251	251	251
R-squared	0.491	0.625	0.625	0.708	0.341	0.448	0.515	0.573
PAN win effect (far from US)		-12.60 (9.666)				-7.700 (8.836)		
PAN win effect (low violence)			-16.14** (7.735)				-10.52* (5.936)	
PAN win effect (local gang)				4.449 (15.64)				-1.334 (5.342)
PAN win effect (borders rival)				60.28*** (9.268)				33.34** (16.63)
PAN win effect (borders ally)				24.99** (10.62)				21.73*** (6.011)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, far from U.S. is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality is above median distance from the U.S., low violence is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality had a below median homicide rate during 2004-2006, local gang is an indicator equal to one if the municipality contains only a local gang, rival is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and borders territory controlled by a rival DTO, and ally is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and does not border territory controlled by a rival DTO. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. In addition to the interactions, main effects are also included. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-32: Heterogeneity (overall homicides, 3% bandwidth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	<i>Dep var: Overall homicide rate</i>							
	<i>2007-2008 elections</i>				<i>2007-2010 elections</i>			
PAN win	63.787*** (10.791)	73.082*** (8.694)	72.177*** (10.543)	-9.727 (8.295)	42.184*** (11.541)	49.743*** (12.927)	38.528*** (11.385)	-4.302 (6.195)
PAN win x far from U.S.		-84.231*** (13.801)				-57.544*** (16.251)		
PAN win x low violence			-88.859*** (13.198)				-50.016*** (12.954)	
PAN win x local gang				13.886 (16.519)				-0.710 (8.705)
PAN win x (borders rival)				74.466*** (12.398)				39.961** (18.960)
PAN win x borders ally				36.957*** (13.382)				31.599*** (8.882)
Observations	94	94	94	94	186	186	186	186
R-squared	0.505	0.640	0.638	0.721	0.325	0.449	0.506	0.567
PAN win effect (far from US)		-11.15 (10.72)				-7.801 (9.848)		
PAN win effect (low violence)			-16.68** (7.939)				-11.49* (6.179)	
PAN win effect (local gang)				4.159 (14.28)				-5.011 (6.116)
PAN win effect (borders rival)				64.74*** (9.213)				35.66** (17.92)
PAN win effect (borders ally)				27.23*** (10.50)				27.30*** (6.365)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, far from U.S. is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality is above median distance from the U.S., low violence is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality had a below median homicide rate during 2004-2006, local gang is an indicator equal to one if the municipality contains only a local gang, rival is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and borders territory controlled by a rival DTO, and ally is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and does not border territory controlled by a rival DTO. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. In addition to the interactions, main effects are also included. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-33: Heterogeneity (overall homicides, 2% bandwidth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	<i>Dep var: Overall homicide rate</i>							
	<i>2007-2008 elections</i>				<i>2007-2010 elections</i>			
PAN win	75.771*** (14.434)	96.269*** (12.337)	72.528*** (21.121)	8.121 (10.202)	32.247*** (11.685)	39.775*** (10.970)	25.745 (15.891)	-16.421 (12.704)
PAN win x far from U.S.		-98.543*** (21.964)				-45.118*** (16.766)		
PAN win x low violence			-80.222*** (22.263)				-30.323* (17.450)	
PAN win x local gang				31.688 (32.210)				21.240 (16.391)
PAN win x borders rival				71.176*** (18.826)				50.482** (21.573)
PAN win x borders ally				36.708** (14.588)				39.946*** (15.055)
Observations	62	62	62	62	130	130	130	130
R-squared	0.428	0.641	0.644	0.757	0.269	0.430	0.465	0.582
PAN win effect (far from US)		-2.273 (18.17)				-5.344 (12.68)		
PAN win effect (low violence)			-7.694 (7.039)				-4.577 (7.209)	
PAN win effect (local gang)				39.81 (30.55)				4.820 (10.36)
PAN win effect (borders rival)				79.30*** (15.82)				34.06** (17.44)
PAN win effect (borders ally)				44.83*** (10.43)				23.53*** (8.079)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, far from U.S. is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality is above median distance from the U.S., low violence is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality had a below median homicide rate during 2004-2006, local gang is an indicator equal to one if the municipality contains only a local gang, rival is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and borders territory controlled by a rival DTO, and ally is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and does not border territory controlled by a rival DTO. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. In addition to the interactions, main effects are also included. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-34: Heterogeneity (overall homicides, 13.3% bandwidth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	<i>Dep var: Overall homicide rate</i>							
	<i>2007-2008 elections</i>				<i>2007-2010 elections</i>			
	<i>Dep var: Overall homicide rate</i>				<i>Dep var: Overall homicide rate</i>			
PAN win	44.551*** (11.967)	53.398*** (12.223)	50.809*** (11.327)	-7.332* (4.139)	29.642*** (10.913)	35.266*** (11.489)	33.976*** (10.643)	-4.248 (3.401)
PAN win x far from U.S.		-59.568*** (13.565)				-36.590*** (12.464)		
PAN win x low violence			-56.665*** (12.876)				-36.536*** (11.563)	
PAN win x local gang				-1.677 (12.021)				3.859 (5.596)
PAN win x borders rival				60.679*** (14.663)				42.509*** (13.802)
PAN win x borders ally				21.912** (11.029)				19.623*** (6.379)
Observations	380	380	380	380	764	764	764	764
R-squared	0.270	0.389	0.435	0.481	0.165	0.256	0.328	0.326
PAN win effect (far from US)		-6.170 (5.883)				-1.324 (4.833)		
PAN win effect (low violence)			-5.856 (6.124)				-2.561 (4.520)	
PAN win effect (local gang)				-9.010 (11.29)				-0.389 (4.443)
PAN win effect (borders rival)				53.35*** (14.07)				38.26*** (13.38)
PAN win effect (borders ally)				14.58 (10.22)				15.38*** (5.397)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, far from U.S. is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality is above median distance from the U.S., low violence is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality had a below median homicide rate during 2004-2006, local gang is an indicator equal to one if the municipality contains only a local gang, rival is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and borders territory controlled by a rival DTO, and ally is an indicator equal to one if it contains a major DTO and does not border territory controlled by a rival DTO. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. In addition to the interactions, main effects are also included. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

A-2.6 Robustness of Results on Local Politics and Violence

Table A-35: Local Politics and Drug-Related Homicides (4% Bandwidth)

	Dependent variable: drug-related homicide rate											
	2007-2008 elections						2007-2010 elections					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
PAN win	36.423*** (8.969)	32.789*** (7.886)				36.208*** (10.325)	22.540*** (8.009)	22.382*** (7.429)				19.403*** (4.842)
PAN win x PAN incumb. Alter (PAN)		-34.597*** (8.380)	8.687 (6.370)					-21.279** (9.181)	10.157** (4.625)			
PRI win Alter (PRI/PRD)				15.729 (10.347)	2.396 (3.747)					18.913 (11.687)	1.049 (4.852)	
PAN win x PAN gov.						31.377* (18.741)						-0.538 (20.765)
Observations	123	123	123	116	116	123	251	251	251	147	147	251
R-squared	0.392	0.523	0.155	0.087	0.017	0.410	0.203	0.282	0.170	0.053	0.003	0.227
PAN win effect (PAN incumb.)		-1.808 (2.832)						1.103 (5.394)				
PAN win effect (PAN gov.)						67.580*** (15.640)						18.870 (20.190)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, PAN incumbent is an indicator equal to 1 if the PAN held the mayorship during the previous term, PAN governor is an indicator equal to 1 if the state has a PAN governor, PRI win is an indicator equal to 1 if the PRI won the election, and alter is a dummy equal one if the party controlling the mayorship changed. Columns (1) - (3), (6) - (9), and (12) limit the sample to municipalities where a PAN candidate was the winner or runner-up; and columns (4), (5), (10), and (11) limit the sample to municipalities with a close election between PRI and PRD candidates. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. In columns (2), (6), (8), and (12), main effects are also included. Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-36: Local Politics and Drug-Related Homicides (3% Bandwidth)

	Dependent variable: drug-related homicide rate											
	2007-2008 elections						2007-2010 elections					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
PAN win	38.064*** (8.587)	33.036*** (8.252)				36.967*** (10.135)	24.392*** (7.851)	22.590*** (7.352)				20.684*** (4.763)
PAN win x PAN incumb. Alter (PAN)		-34.499*** (8.817)	9.565 (6.895)					-18.065* (9.301)	10.193** (4.639)			
PRI win Alter (PRI/PRD)				13.467 (13.211)	3.406 (3.948)					19.929 (14.989)	3.002 (4.830)	
PAN win x PAN gov.						31.166 (18.793)						1.625 (21.532)
Observations	94	94	94	92	92	94	186	186	186	116	116	186
R-squared	0.414	0.537	0.149	0.086	0.028	0.424	0.162	0.244	0.147	0.053	0.014	0.196
PAN win effect (PAN incumb.)		-1.463 (3.107)						4.525 (5.698)				
PAN win effect (PAN gov.)						68.130*** (15.830)						22.310 (21.000)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, PAN incumbent is an indicator equal to 1 if the PAN held the mayorship during the previous term, PAN governor is an indicator equal to 1 if the state has a PAN governor, PRI win is an indicator equal to 1 if the PRI won the election, and alter is a dummy equal one if the party controlling the mayorship changed. Columns (1) - (3), (6) - (9), and (12) limit the sample to municipalities where a PAN candidate was the winner or runner-up; and columns (4), (5), (10), and (11) limit the sample to municipalities with a close election between PRI and PRD candidates. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. In columns (2), (6), (8), and (12), main effects are also included. Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-37: Local Politics and Drug-Related Homicides (2% Bandwidth)

	Dependent variable: drug-related homicide rate											
	2007-2008 elections						2007-2010 elections					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
PAN win	47.111*** (10.817)	45.537*** (13.285)				49.828*** (11.089)	17.522*** (6.015)	11.839* (7.031)				17.962** (7.159)
PAN win x PAN incumb. Alter (PAN)		-48.438*** (15.258)	8.199 (11.059)					-2.714 (12.234)	10.104*** (3.747)			
PRI win Alter (PRI/PRD)				20.407 (21.406)	5.782 (5.602)					37.953 (23.165)	5.272 (5.961)	
PAN win x PAN gov.						58.136 (52.287)						-15.975 (26.105)
Observations	62	62	62	61	61	62	130	130	130	78	78	130
R-squared	0.349	0.529	0.218	0.116	0.040	0.401	0.125	0.263	0.225	0.089	0.009	0.134
PAN win effect (PAN incumb.)		-2.901 (7.504)						9.125 (10.010)				
PAN win effect (PAN gov.)						108.000** (51.100)						1.987 (25.100)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, PAN incumbent is an indicator equal to 1 if the PAN held the mayorship during the previous term, PAN governor is an indicator equal to 1 if the state has a PAN governor, PRI win is an indicator equal to 1 if the PRI won the election, and alter is a dummy equal one if the party controlling the mayorship changed. Columns (1) - (3), (6) - (9), and (12) limit the sample to municipalities where a PAN candidate was the winner or runner-up; and columns (4), (5), (10), and (11) limit the sample to municipalities with a close election between PRI and PRD candidates. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. In columns (2), (6), (8), and (12), main effects are also included. Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-38: Local Politics and Drug-Related Homicides (13.3% Bandwidth)

	Dependent variable: drug-related homicide rate											
	2007-2008 elections						2007-2010 elections					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
PAN win	25.621*** (8.484)	23.614*** (7.872)				28.131** (11.573)	15.580** (7.100)	16.280** (7.999)				14.132** (5.945)
PAN win x PAN incumb. Alter (PAN)		-20.390** (8.201)	6.226 (5.897)					-15.939* (8.478)	1.966 (4.649)			
PRI win Alter (PRI/PRD)				10.211 (6.461)	-0.103 (3.514)					12.150 (8.680)	-6.476 (6.558)	
PAN win x PAN gov.						-2.449 (14.720)						0.260 (13.237)
Observations	380	380	380	308	308	380	764	764	764	423	423	764
R-squared	0.184	0.292	0.026	0.028	0.023	0.213	0.080	0.161	0.029	0.038	0.041	0.084
PAN win effect (PAN incumb.)		3.224 (2.301)						0.341 (2.794)				
PAN win effect (PAN gov.)						25.680*** (9.097)						14.390 (11.830)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, PAN incumbent is an indicator equal to 1 if the PAN held the mayorship during the previous term, PAN governor is an indicator equal to 1 if the state has a PAN governor, PRI win is an indicator equal to 1 if the PRI won the election, and alter is a dummy equal one if the party controlling the mayorship changed. Columns (1) - (3), (6) - (9), and (12) limit the sample to municipalities where a PAN candidate was the winner or runner-up; and columns (4), (5), (10), and (11) limit the sample to municipalities with a close election between PRI and PRD candidates. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. In columns (2), (6), (8), and (12), main effects are also included. Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-39: Local Politics and Overall Homicides (5% Bandwidth)

	Dependent variable: drug-related homicide rate											
	2007-2008 elections						2007-2010 elections					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
PAN win	56.630*** (12.768)	60.482*** (10.886)				54.009*** (16.849)	44.820*** (12.289)	48.163*** (12.096)				35.723*** (11.052)
PAN win x PAN incumb. Alter (PAN)		-66.399*** (14.555)	15.459 (9.431)					-35.106*** (13.335)	8.151 (8.311)			
PRI win Alter (PRI/PRD)				11.550 (11.069)	4.611 (4.626)					-0.279 (12.198)		0.168 (5.845)
PAN win x PAN gov.						13.028 (23.868)						23.645 (24.192)
Observations	152	152	152	142	142	152	310	310	310	183	183	310
R-squared	0.396	0.535	0.167	0.033	0.016	0.407	0.237	0.401	0.202	0.032	0.043	0.262
PAN win effect (PAN incumb.)		-5.918 (9.661)						13.060** (5.615)				
PAN win effect (PAN gov.)						67.040*** (16.910)						59.370*** (21.520)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, PAN incumbent is an indicator equal to 1 if the PAN held the mayorship during the previous term, PAN governor is an indicator equal to 1 if the state has a PAN governor, PRI win is an indicator equal to 1 if the PRI won the election, and alter is a dummy equal one if the party controlling the mayorship changed. Columns (1) - (3), (6) - (9), and (12) limit the sample to municipalities where a PAN candidate was the winner or runner-up; and columns (4), (5), (10), and (11) limit the sample to municipalities with a close election between PRI and PRD candidates. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. In columns (2), (6), (8), and (12), main effects are also included. Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-40: Local Politics and Overall Homicides (4% Bandwidth)

Dependent variable: drug-related homicide rate												
	2007-2008 elections						2007-2010 elections					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
PAN win	62.219*** (11.444)	62.176*** (9.870)				58.842*** (14.619)	41.830*** (12.027)	39.053*** (11.061)				33.253*** (10.035)
PAN win x PAN incumb. Alter (PAN)		-64.698*** (11.624)	18.822** (9.277)					-25.380** (12.536)	13.929* (7.751)			
PRI win Alter (PRI/PRD)				14.721 (11.353)	2.195 (5.120)					16.324 (11.589)	2.942 (5.356)	
PAN win x PAN gov.						51.309* (28.299)						20.409 (26.612)
Observations	123	123	123	116	116	123	251	251	251	147	147	251
R-squared	0.491	0.612	0.217	0.080	0.021	0.514	0.341	0.456	0.242	0.056	0.020	0.370
PAN win effect (PAN incumb.)		-2.522 (6.141)						13.670** (5.900)				
PAN win effect (PAN gov.)						110.200*** (24.230)						53.660** (24.650)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, PAN incumbent is an indicator equal to 1 if the PAN held the mayorship during the previous term, PAN governor is an indicator equal to 1 if the state has a PAN governor, PRI win is an indicator equal to 1 if the PRI won the election, and alter is a dummy equal one if the party controlling the mayorship changed. Columns (1) - (3), (6) - (9), and (12) limit the sample to municipalities where a PAN candidate was the winner or runner-up; and columns (4), (5), (10), and (11) limit the sample to municipalities with a close election between PRI and PRD candidates. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. In columns (2), (6), (8), and (12), main effects are also included. Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-41: Local Politics and Overall Homicides (3% Bandwidth)

Dependent variable: drug-related homicide rate												
	2007-2008 elections						2007-2010 elections					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
PAN win	63.787*** (10.791)	62.869*** (10.277)				60.846*** (14.205)	42.184*** (11.541)	38.620*** (11.030)				34.289*** (10.218)
PAN win x PAN incumb. Alter (PAN)		-76.492*** (13.065)	20.314** (9.804)					-24.135* (12.663)	13.468* (7.698)			
PRI win Alter (PRI/PRD)				10.639 (14.420)	4.147 (5.200)					16.570 (14.910)	5.525 (5.157)	
PAN win x PAN gov.						49.664* (28.316)						24.475 (27.341)
Observations	94	94	94	92	92	94	186	186	186	116	116	186
R-squared	0.505	0.617	0.222	0.082	0.029	0.525	0.325	0.440	0.250	0.054	0.031	0.370
PAN win effect (PAN incumb.)		-13.620* (8.066)						14.480** (6.220)				
PAN win effect (PAN gov.)						110.500*** (24.500)						58.760** (25.360)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, PAN incumbent is an indicator equal to 1 if the PAN held the mayorship during the previous term, PAN governor is an indicator equal to 1 if the state has a PAN governor, PRI win is an indicator equal to 1 if the PRI won the election, and alter is a dummy equal one if the party controlling the mayorship changed. Columns (1) - (3), (6) - (9), and (12) limit the sample to municipalities where a PAN candidate was the winner or runner-up; and columns (4), (5), (10), and (11) limit the sample to municipalities with a close election between PRI and PRD candidates. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. In columns (2), (6), (8), and (12), main effects are also included. Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-42: Local Politics and Overall Homicides (2% Bandwidth)

	Dependent variable: drug-related homicide rate											
	2007-2008 elections						2007-2010 elections					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
PAN win	75.771*** (14.434)	76.052*** (17.870)				83.108*** (13.776)	32.247*** (11.685)	25.649* (14.457)				38.182*** (12.392)
PAN win x PAN incumb. Alter (PAN)		-107.590*** (21.737)	20.723 (15.258)					-10.149 (17.514)	13.151** (6.376)			
PRI win Alter (PRI/PRD)				17.005 (23.166)	6.374 (6.586)					34.548 (22.297)	7.765 (6.305)	
PAN win x PAN gov.						63.032 (94.414)						-17.389 (30.307)
Observations	62	62	62	61	61	62	130	130	130	78	78	130
R-squared	0.428	0.609	0.316	0.105	0.028	0.518	0.269	0.461	0.400	0.088	0.025	0.304
PAN win effect (PAN incumb.)		-31.540** (12.380)						15.500 (9.885)				
PAN win effect (PAN gov.)						146.100 (93.400)						20.790 (27.660)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, PAN incumbent is an indicator equal to 1 if the PAN held the mayorship during the previous term, PAN governor is an indicator equal to 1 if the state has a PAN governor, PRI win is an indicator equal to 1 if the PRI won the election, and alter is a dummy equal one if the party controlling the mayorship changed. Columns (1) - (3), (6) - (9), and (12) limit the sample to municipalities where a PAN candidate was the winner or runner-up; and columns (4), (5), (10), and (11) limit the sample to municipalities with a close election between PRI and PRD candidates. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. In columns (2), (6), (8), and (12), main effects are also included. Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-43: Local Politics and Overall Homicides (13.3% Bandwidth)

	Dependent variable: drug-related homicide rate											
	2007-2008 elections						2007-2010 elections					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
PAN win	44.551*** (11.967)	44.067*** (10.326)				44.774*** (17.080)	29.642*** (10.913)	29.863*** (10.696)				24.342** (10.818)
PAN win x PAN incumb. Alter (PAN)		-35.807*** (11.183)	12.353 (9.046)					-21.865* (11.368)	4.950 (6.344)			
PRI win Alter (PRI/PRD)				6.837 (7.239)	-0.304 (4.503)					7.093 (8.149)		-3.752 (5.855)
PAN win x PAN gov.						3.274 (22.402)						11.455 (20.187)
Observations	380	380	380	308	308	380	764	764	764	423	423	764
R-squared	0.270	0.379	0.039	0.012	0.020	0.287	0.165	0.285	0.035	0.016	0.019	0.173
PAN win effect (PAN incumb.)		8.260* (4.294)						7.997** (3.827)				
PAN win effect (PAN gov.)						48.050*** (14.490)						35.800** (17.040)

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, PAN incumbent is an indicator equal to 1 if the PAN held the mayorship during the previous term, PAN governor is an indicator equal to 1 if the state has a PAN governor, PRI win is an indicator equal to 1 if the PRI won the election, and alter is a dummy equal one if the party controlling the mayorship changed. Columns (1) - (3), (6) - (9), and (12) limit the sample to municipalities where a PAN candidate was the winner or runner-up; and columns (4), (5), (10), and (11) limit the sample to municipalities with a close election between PRI and PRD candidates. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. In columns (2), (6), (8), and (12), main effects are also included. Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

A-2.7 Corruption and Other Results

Table A-44: Corruption

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Bandwidth				
	5%	4%	3%	2%	13.3%
<i>Panel A: Means comparison</i>					
PAN win	-0.022 (0.087)	-0.023 (0.097)	0.021 (0.121)	0.054 (0.152)	-0.007 (0.055)
R-squared	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.003	0.000
<i>Panel B: RD analysis</i>					
PAN win	0.091 (0.159)	0.013 (0.174)	-0.034 (0.215)	-0.324 (0.295)	-0.005 (0.091)
R-squared	0.124	0.164	0.133	0.109	0.027
Observations	102	84	62	44	237
Mean dep. var.	0.245	0.262	0.323	0.409	0.231

Notes: PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, and the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if official government records document the mayor engaging in corruption in 2008. Close elections from 2007 where the mayor had take office by the beginning of 2008 are included in the sample. Panel B includes a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-45: Violence and Corruption of the Losing Party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Bandwidth		
	5%	5%	13.3%	13.3%
PAN win	81.584* (42.919)	43.017 (37.565)	37.418* (21.431)	16.686 (13.875)
Loser corrupt		12.160 (24.946)		3.582 (8.288)
PAN win x Loser corrupt		109.946** (50.657)		83.278** (33.414)
Observations	61	61	165	165
R-squared	0.200	0.303	0.099	0.204

Notes: The dependent variable is the homicide rate during the one year following the mayor's inauguration. PAN win is an indicator equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, and loser corrupt is an indicator equal to 1 if official government records document that the losing party was engaged in corruption during the previous mayor's term, in 2008. The only way to observe this is if the losing party is the incumbent party, so in all municipalities with PAN win= 1, the PAN did not hold the mayorship previously. 2009-2010 close elections where the incumbent party lost form the sample. All columns include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-46: Political Competition and Violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Drug trade-related homicide rate		Overall		Drug trade-related homicide probability		Overall	
	07-08	07-10	07-08	07-10	07-08	07-10	07-08	07-10
5% bandwidth								
abs(spread)	-1.165** (0.535)	-0.160 (1.152)	-0.604 (0.719)	-0.338 (0.627)	-0.021* (0.011)	-0.000 (0.009)	-0.057 (0.643)	0.025 (0.428)
4% bandwidth								
abs(spread)	-1.234 (0.809)	-0.864 (0.924)	-1.128 (1.188)	-1.247 (0.842)	-0.036** (0.016)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.186 (0.988)	-0.229 (0.566)
3% bandwidth								
abs(spread)	-1.008 (0.988)	-0.913 (1.106)	-1.440 (1.677)	-1.216 (1.285)	-0.042* (0.025)	-0.021 (0.016)	1.472 (2.351)	1.413 (1.405)
2% bandwidth								
abs(spread)	0.621 (3.194)	3.290 (2.905)	3.037 (2.811)	2.859 (2.150)	-0.101* (0.058)	-0.020 (0.033)	-0.458 (2.778)	2.269 (2.254)
13.3% bandwidth								
abs(spread)	-0.298* (0.172)	-0.265 (0.251)	-0.020 (0.202)	-0.158 (0.155)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.059 (0.189)	-0.083 (0.110)

Notes: The table reports coefficients from regressing violence measures on the absolute value of the vote spread. Each row considers a different vote spread bandwidth.

A-2.8 Robustness of Spillover Results

Table A-47: The Diversion of Drug Traffic (2007-2010 Elections)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Full Sample			Limited Sample			Full Sample		
	Domestic Illicit Drug Confiscations								
	Dummy	Value	Value	Dummy	Value	Value	Dummy	Value	Value
	Cocaine Confiscations								
<i>Panel A: Shortest Paths</i>									
Predicted	0.008*	0.080		0.007	0.048		-0.001	0.005	
routes dummy	(0.005)	(0.060)		(0.008)	(0.093)		(0.005)	(0.025)	
Predicted			0.018***			0.016			0.004
routes count			(0.006)			(0.010)			(0.003)
<i>Panel B: Model with Congestion Costs</i>									
Predicted	0.006*	0.062		0.008	0.093		0.004	0.021	
routes dummy	(0.004)	(0.041)		(0.006)	(0.061)		(0.004)	(0.020)	
Predicted			0.005*			0.007*			0.003
routes count			(0.003)			(0.004)			(0.002)
Municipalities	1,816	1,816	1,816	937	937	937	1,816	1,816	1,816
Observations	88,984	88,984	88,984	45,913	45,913	45,913	88,984	88,984	88,984

Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1), and (4) is an indicator equal to 1 if domestic illicit drug confiscations are made in a given municipality-month; the dependent variable in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) is the log value of domestic illicit drug confiscations (or 0 if no confiscations are made); the dependent variable in column (7) is an indicator equal to 1 if cocaine confiscations are made in a given municipality-month; and the dependent variable in columns (8) and (9) is the log value of confiscated cocaine (or 0 if no confiscations are made). Columns (4) through (6) limit the sample to municipalities that do not border a municipality that has experienced a close PAN victory from 2007 to 2010. Panel A predicts trafficking routes using the shortest paths model, and Panel B uses the model with congestion costs. All columns include month x state and municipality fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality and month x state are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-48: Violence Spillovers (2007-2010 Elections)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Full Sample					Limited Sample				
	<i>Dep. var.: Drug trade-related homicide</i>					<i>Dep. Var.: Drug trade-related homicide</i>				
	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>
<i>Panel A: Shortest Paths</i>										
Predicted	0.003	1.833				-0.011	1.215			
routes dummy	(0.005)	(1.368)				(0.009)	(2.058)			
Predicted			0.478**					0.406		
routes count			(0.222)					(0.263)		
One route				-0.001	-3.669				-0.018	0.460
				(0.006)	(3.286)				(0.012)	(1.345)
More than				0.007	6.022**				-0.007	1.759
one route				(0.007)	(2.553)				(0.011)	(2.902)
<i>Panel B: Model with Congestion Costs</i>										
Predicted	0.003	1.278				0.003	0.601			
routes dummy	(0.004)	(0.787)				(0.007)	(1.057)			
Predicted			0.036					0.066		
routes count			(0.045)					(0.076)		
One route				-0.004	0.803				-0.006	0.029
				(0.006)	(1.293)				(0.009)	(0.893)
More than				0.006	1.430				0.007	0.811
one route				(0.005)	(0.976)				(0.007)	(1.199)
Municipalities	1,816	1,816	1,816	1,816	1,816	937	937	937	937	937
Observations	88,984	88,984	88,984	88,984	88,984	45,913	45,913	45,913	45,913	45,913

Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1), (4), (6) and (9) is an indicator equal to 1 if a drug trade-related homicide occurred in a given municipality-month, and the dependent variable in columns (2), (3), (5), (7), (8), and (10) is the drug trade-related homicide rate per 100,000 municipal inhabitants. Columns (6) through (10) limit the sample to municipalities that do not border a municipality that experienced a close PAN victory between 2007 and 2010. All columns include month x state and municipality fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality and month x state are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-49: The Diversion of Drug Traffic (Controlling for PAN mayors)

	Dep. var.: Domestic Illicit Drug Confiscations						Cocaine Confiscations		
	Dummy	Value	Value	Dummy	Value	Value	Dummy	Value	Value
	Full Sample			Limited Sample			Full Sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Panel A: Shortest Paths</i>									
Predicted routes dummy	0.016*** (0.005)	0.170*** (0.050)		0.016** (0.007)	0.170*** (0.065)		0.004 (0.004)	0.028 (0.020)	
Predicted routes count			0.022*** (0.008)			0.015* (0.009)			0.006 (0.006)
<i>Panel B: Model with Congestion Costs</i>									
Predicted routes dummy	0.013** (0.005)	0.149*** (0.057)		0.011* (0.006)	0.129** (0.065)		0.002 (0.004)	0.009 (0.025)	
Predicted routes count			0.004 (0.004)			0.002 (0.004)			0.001 (0.002)
Municipalities	1869	1869	1869	1562	1562	1562	1869	1869	1869
Observations	69153	69153	69153	57,794	57,794	57,794	69153	69153	69153

Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1), and (4) is an indicator equal to 1 if domestic illicit drug confiscations are made in a given municipality-month; the dependent variable in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) is the log value of domestic illicit drug confiscations (or 0 if no confiscations are made); the dependent variable in column (7) is an indicator equal to 1 if cocaine confiscations are made in a given municipality-month; and the dependent variable in columns (8) and (9) is the log value of confiscated cocaine (or 0 if no confiscations are made). Columns (4) through (6) limit the sample to municipalities that do not border a municipality that has experienced a close PAN victory. Panel A predicts trafficking routes using the shortest paths model, and Panel B uses the model with congestion costs. All columns include month x state and municipality fixed effects, as well as an indicator equal to 1 if the PAN currently controls the mayorship in the municipality. Standard errors clustered by municipality and month x state are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-50: Violence Spillovers (Controlling for PAN mayors)

	Dep var: drug trade-related homicide					Dep var: drug trade-related homicide				
	dummy	rate	rate	dummy	rate	dummy	rate	rate	dummy	rate
	Full sample					Limited sample				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Panel A: Shortest Paths</i>										
Predicted routes dummy	0.014*** (0.005)	1.175 (1.200)				0.006 (0.006)	-0.514 (1.164)			
Predicted routes count			0.554* (0.307)					0.460 (0.287)		
One route				0.017** (0.007)	-6.064 (3.758)				0.014 (0.010)	-5.278 (3.421)
More than one route				0.011 (0.008)	10.190** (4.702)				-0.000 (0.010)	6.179 (4.493)
<i>Panel B: Model with Congestion Costs</i>										
Predicted routes dummy	0.017*** (0.005)	1.813** (0.802)				0.019*** (0.006)	1.834** (0.934)			
Predicted routes count			-0.007 (0.015)					0.001 (0.013)		
One route				0.010 (0.006)	2.256 (1.638)				0.01 (0.007)	1.48 (0.956)
More than one route				0.020*** (0.006)	1.639 (1.049)				0.023*** (0.007)	1.988* (1.035)
Municipalities	1869	1869	1869	1869	1869	1562	1562	1562	1562	1562
Observations	69,153	69,153	69,153	69,153	69,153	57,794	57,794	57,794	57,794	57,794

Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1), (4), (6) and (9) is an indicator equal to 1 if a drug trade-related homicide occurred in a given municipality-month, and the dependent variable in columns (2), (3), (5), (7), (8), and (10) is the drug trade-related homicide rate per 100,000 municipal inhabitants. Columns (6) through (10) limit the sample to municipalities that do not border a municipality that has experienced a close PAN victory. All columns include month x state and municipality fixed effects, as well as an indicator equal to 1 if the PAN currently controls the mayorship in the municipality. Standard errors clustered by municipality and month x state are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-51: A Reduced Form Spillovers Model: Confiscations

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Domestic Confiscations		
	Dummy	Value	Value
RF predicted routes dummy	0.002 (0.006)	0.056 (0.067)	
RF predicted routes count			0.029 (0.057)
R-squared	0.39	0.44	0.44
Municipalities	1869	1869	1869
Observations	69,153	69,153	69,153

Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is an indicator equal to 1 if domestic illicit drug confiscations are made in a given municipality-month, and the dependent variable in columns (2) and (3) is the log value of domestic illicit drug confiscations (or 0 if no confiscations are made). The RF predicted routes dummy is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality borders a municipality that has inaugurated a closely elected PAN mayor during the sample period. The RF predicted routes count is a count variable equal to the number of bordering municipalities that have inaugurated a closely elected PAN mayor during the sample period. All columns include month x state and municipality fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality and month x state are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-52: A Reduced Form Spillovers Model: Violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>Dep. var.: Drug trade-related homicide</i>				
	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>
RF predicted routes dummy	-0.005 (0.007)	3.136 (2.292)			
RF predicted routes count			2.204 (1.596)		
One RF route				-0.003 (0.007)	3.235 (2.443)
More than one RF route				-0.017 (0.014)	2.522 (1.976)
R-squared	0.34	0.42	0.42	0.34	0.42
Municipalities	1869	1869	1869	1869	1869
Observations	69,153	69,153	69,153	69,153	69,153

Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (4) is an indicator equal to 1 if a drug trade-related homicides occurred in a given municipality-month, and the dependent variable in columns (2), (3), and (5) is the drug trade-related homicide rate per 100,000 municipal inhabitants. The RF predicted routes dummy is an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality borders a municipality that has inaugurated a closely elected PAN mayor during the sample period. The RF predicted routes count is a count variable equal to the number of bordering municipalities that have inaugurated a closely elected PAN mayor during the sample period, and analogously for the one RF route and more than one RF route indicators. All columns include month x state and municipality fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality and month x state are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-53: Trafficking Model Parameter Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Crossing Costs		Full
	parsimonious model	flexible model	congestion costs
ϕ_t	62.34*** [2.72] (1.41)		
ϕ_p	36.48*** [2.07] (1.40)		
ϕ_t^{Q1}		3.24*** [0.30] (0.25)	13.00*** [1.27] (1.19)
ϕ_t^{Q2}		13.19*** [2.14] (1.89)	9.29*** [0.34] (0.33)
ϕ_t^{Q3}		13.86*** [4.37] (4.08)	21.26*** [0.54] (0.52)
ϕ_t^{Q4}		18.81*** [0.86] (0.83)	20.22*** [0.62] (0.57)
ϕ_p^{small}		64.47*** [9.76] (9.16)	70.990*** [1.29] (1.28)
ϕ_p^{large}		55.34*** [8.43] (7.46)	43.50** [21.73] (17.03)
ϕ_{int}			0.015*** [0.004] (0.003)
δ	1.88*** [0.05] (0.04)	1.57*** [0.15] (0.12)	1.86*** [0.17] (0.16)
γ			0.11** [0.06] (0.05)
κ	0.763*** [0.07] (0.06)	0.91*** [0.08] (0.07)	0.79*** [0.07] (0.06)

Notes: Column 1 reports the simulated method of moments parameter estimates for the model with parsimonious congestion costs on U.S. points of entry, Column 2 reports the parameter estimates for the model with flexible congestion costs on U.S. points of entry, and Column 3 reports the parameter estimates for the model with congestion costs on both U.S. points of entry and interior edges. Conley (1999) standard errors are in brackets, and robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A-54: The Diversion of Drug Traffic (Alternative Congestion Models)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Full Sample			Limited Sample			Full Sample		
	Domestic Illicit Drug Confiscations			Domestic Illicit Drug Confiscations			Cocaine Confiscations		
	Dummy	Value	Value	Dummy	Value	Value	Dummy	Value	Value
<i>Panel A: Congestion Model (8 Parameters)</i>									
Predicted routes dummy	0.010*** (0.004)	0.106*** (0.041)		0.006 (0.004)	0.063 (0.048)		0.003 (0.003)	0.009 (0.027)	
Predicted routes count			0.005 (0.005)			-0.002 (0.005)			-0.004 (0.004)
<i>Panel B: Congestion Model (10 Parameters)</i>									
Predicted routes dummy	0.011*** (0.004)	0.128*** (0.041)		0.009** (0.004)	0.105** (0.043)		0.002 (0.003)	0.014 (0.025)	
Predicted routes count			0.001 (0.004)			-0.005 (0.004)			-0.005 (0.004)
Municipalities	1869	1869	1869	1562	1562	1562	1869	1869	1869
Observations	69,153	69,153	69,153	57,794	57,794	57,794	69,153	69,153	69,153

Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1), and (4) is an indicator equal to 1 if domestic illicit drug confiscations are made in a given municipality-month; the dependent variable in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) is the log value of domestic illicit drug confiscations (or 0 if no confiscations are made); the dependent variable in column (7) is an indicator equal to 1 if cocaine confiscations are made in a given municipality-month; and the dependent variable in columns (8) and (9) is the log value of confiscated cocaine (or 0 if no confiscations are made). Columns (4) through (6) limit the sample to municipalities that do not border a municipality that has experienced a close PAN victory. Panel A predicts trafficking routes using the shortest paths model, and Panel B uses the model with congestion costs. All columns include month x state and municipality fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality and month x state are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-55: Violence Spillovers (Alternative Congestion Models)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Full Sample					Limited Sample				
	<i>Dep. var.: Drug trade-related homicide</i>					<i>Dep. Var.: Drug trade-related homicide</i>				
	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>
<i>Panel A: Congestion Model (8 Parameters)</i>										
Predicted	0.014***	0.568				0.013***	0.035			
routes dummy	(0.004)	(0.421)				(0.005)	(0.386)			
Predicted			0.006					0.020		
routes count			(0.022)					(0.019)		
One route				0.011*	1.094				0.010	0.105
				(0.006)	(1.305)				(0.008)	(0.970)
More than				0.015***	0.309				0.015***	0.001
one route				(0.005)	(0.727)				(0.005)	(0.540)
<i>Panel B: Congestion Model (10 Parameters)</i>										
Predicted	0.009**	0.765				0.008*	0.320			
routes dummy	(0.004)	(0.840)				(0.004)	(0.916)			
Predicted			0.014					0.024		
routes count			(0.024)					(0.023)		
One route				0.007	1.643				0.008	0.806
				(0.005)	(1.395)				(0.006)	(0.834)
More than				0.010**	0.360				0.008	0.080
one route				(0.005)	(1.122)				(0.005)	(1.100)
Municipalities	1869	1869	1869	1869	1869	1562	1562	1562	1562	1562
Observations	69,153	69,153	69,153	69,153	69,153	57,794	57,794	57,794	57,794	57,794

Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1), (4), (6) and (9) is an indicator equal to 1 if a drug trade-related homicide occurred in a given municipality-month, and the dependent variable in columns (2), (3), (5), (7), (8), and (10) is the drug trade-related homicide rate per 100,000 municipal inhabitants. Columns (6) through (10) limit the sample to municipalities that do not border a municipality that experienced a close PAN victory between 2007 and 2008. All columns include month x state and municipality fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality and month x state are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-56: Accounting for DTO Territory when Predicting Routes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Confiscations			Homicides				
	dummy	value	value	dummy	rate	rate	dummy	rate
<i>Panel A: Shortest Path Model</i>								
Predicted routes dummy	0.008** (0.004)	0.039 (0.044)		0.009* (0.005)	0.350 (0.609)			
Predicted routes count			0.012* (0.006)			0.337* (0.201)		
One route							0.014** (0.007)	-2.251 (1.891)
More than one route							0.003 (0.006)	3.618 (2.495)
<i>Panel B: Model with Congestion Costs</i>								
Predicted routes dummy	0.007** (0.003)	0.104*** (0.038)		0.007** (0.003)	1.277 (0.782)			
Predicted routes count			0.004 (0.003)			0.068* (0.041)		
One route							0.008* (0.004)	1.154* (0.620)
More than one route							0.006 (0.004)	1.378 (0.951)
Municipalities	1869	1869	1869	1869	1869	1869	1869	1869
Observations	69,264	69,264	69,264	69,264	69,264	69,264	69,264	69,264

Notes: All columns include month x state and municipality fixed effects and omit municipalities that experienced a closed PAN victory. Standard errors clustered by municipality and month x state are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-57: Violence Spillovers in a Model that Estimates Political Costs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Full Sample					Limited Sample				
	<i>Dep. var.: Drug trade-related homicide</i>					<i>Dep. Var.: Drug trade-related homicide</i>				
	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>rate</i>	<i>dummy</i>	<i>rate</i>
<i>Panel A: 2007-2008 Elections</i>										
Predicted	0.010***	0.814*				0.008*	0.983**			
routes dummy	(0.004)	(0.458)				(0.004)	(0.494)			
Predicted			0.209*					0.171		
routes count			(0.116)					(0.104)		
One route				0.013**	-1.947				0.011	-0.595
				(0.006)	(1.834)				(0.008)	(1.608)
More than				0.009*	2.153**				0.006	1.843**
one route				(0.005)	(1.071)				(0.005)	(0.921)
Observations	69,153	69,153	69,153	69,153	69,153	57,794	57,794	57,794	57,794	57,794
<i>Panel B: 2007-2010 Elections</i>										
Predicted	0.011***	1.586**				0.010*	0.912			
routes dummy	(0.004)	(0.643)				(0.006)	(0.713)			
Predicted			0.214**					0.129		
routes count			(0.104)					(0.100)		
One route				0.013**	-0.318				0.009	1.541**
				(0.006)	(1.727)				(0.009)	(0.684)
More than				0.009**	2.490**				0.011*	0.563
one route				(0.004)	(1.028)				(0.007)	(0.874)
Observations	88,984	88,984	88,984	88,984	88,984	45,913	45,913	45,913	45,913	45,913

Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1), (4), (6) and (9) is an indicator equal to 1 if a drug trade-related homicide occurred in a given municipality-month, and the dependent variable in columns (2), (3), (5), (7), (8), and (10) is the drug trade-related homicide rate per 100,000 municipal inhabitants. Columns (6) through (10) limit the sample to municipalities that do not border a municipality that has experienced a close PAN victory. All columns include month x state and municipality fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality and month x state are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A-58: Economic Spillovers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Full sample			Limited sample		
	Male participation	Female participation	Formal sector log wages	Informal log wages	Female participation	Informal wages
<i>Panel A: Shortest Paths</i>						
Predicted routes dummy	-0.124 (0.513)	-0.756 (1.038)	0.020 (0.022)	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.784 (1.622)	-0.030 (0.027)
<i>Panel B: Model with Congestion Costs</i>						
Predicted routes dummy	-0.242 (0.302)	-1.261** (0.570)	0.013 (0.012)	-0.022* (0.013)	-1.558** (0.673)	-0.028* (0.017)
State x quarter FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Municipality FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
R^2	0.52	0.79	0.18	0.09	0.79	0.09
Municipalities	880	880	879	871	709	703
Observations	9,821	9,821	407,204	148,302	7,887	114,633

Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is average municipal male labor force participation, the dependent variable in columns (2) and (5) is average municipal female labor force participation, the dependent variable in column (3) is log wages of formal sector workers, and the dependent variable in columns (4) and (6) is log wages of informal sector workers. All columns include quarter x state and municipality fixed effects. Column (1) weights by the square root of the municipality's male population and columns (2) and (5) weight by the square root of the municipality's female population. The sample in columns (5) and (6) excludes municipalities that border a municipality that has experienced a close PAN victory. Standard errors clustered by municipality and quarter x state are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

A-2.9 Law Enforcement Allocation Table


Table A-59: Robustness of Policy Algorithm

	(1)
	Percentage increase in total costs
Baseline ($N = 250$)	0.168
$N = 100$	0.168
$N = 500$	0.168
Alternate between selecting edges with $m = 1$ and $m = 2$	0.105
Alternate between selecting edges with $m = 1$, $m = 2$, and $m = 3$	0.106
Select edge with $m = 2$ when $k = 1$	0.168
Select edge with $m = 3$ when $k = 1$	0.168
Select edge with $m = 4$ when $k = 1$	0.168
Select edge with $m = 5$ when $k = 1$	0.168

Notes: The left column describes the variation in the policy algorithm (as described in the estimation appendix) and the right column gives the percentage increase in total trafficking costs when the respective variant of the algorithm is used to select edges.

A-2.10 Map of Close PAN Elections


Figure A-1: Close Elections




Notes: Black circles denote PAN victories and gray squares denote PAN losses. The sample is limited to municipalities with a vote spread of five percentage points or less.

A-2.11 Balance Figures for Pre-Characteristics


Figure A-2: Covariate Plots




(a) Mun. taxes per capita (2005)




(b) PAN incumbent




(c) PRD incumbent



(d) % alternations (1976-2006)




(e) PRI never lost (1976-2006)




(f) Population (2005)


Figure A-3: Covariate Plots




(a) Population density (2005)




(b) Migrants per capita (2005)




(c) Income per capita (2005)



(d) Malnutrition (2005)




(e) Mean years schooling (2005)




(f) Infant mortality (2005)


Figure A-4: Covariate Plots




(a) Households w/o access to sewage (2005)




(b) Households w/o access to water (2005)




(c) Marginality index (2005)



(d) Road density (km/km^2)




(e) Distance U.S. (km)




(f) Elevation (m)


Figure A-5: Covariate Plots




(a) Slope (degrees)




(b) Surface area (km^2)



(c) Average min. temperature, C (1950-2000)




(d) Average max. temperature, C (1950-2000)




(e) Average precipitation, cm (1950-2000)

A-2.12 Balance Figures for the Predicted Homicide Rate


Figure A-6: PAN victories and predicted homicides




(a) Predicted drug-related homicide probability



(b) Predicted drug-related homicide rate



(c) Predicted overall homicide probability




(d) Predicted overall homicide rate

Notes: This figure plots predicted homicide measures against the PAN margin of victory. The homicide measures are predicted using the characteristics in Table 1 and pre-period violence data. Each point represents the average value of predicted homicides in vote spread bins of width one half of a percentage point. The solid line plots predicted values from an RD regression with separate vote spread polynomials estimated on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.


A-2.13 McCrary Plots

Figure A-7: Vote Spread Density (2007-2008 Elections)



Notes: This figure shows the frequency of mayoral elections (2007-2008) in one percentage point vote spread bins. The solid line plots predicted values from a local linear regression of frequency on vote spread, with separate vote spread trends estimated on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. The bandwidth is chosen using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth selection rule (2009), and a rectangular kernel is used.


Figure A-8: Vote Spread Density (2007-2010 Elections)




Notes: This figure shows the frequency of mayoral elections (2007-2010) in one percentage point vote spread bins. The solid line plots predicted values from a local linear regression of frequency on vote spread, with separate vote spread trends estimated on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. The bandwidth is chosen using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth selection rule (2009), and a rectangular kernel is used.

A-2.14 Homicide RD Figures - Robustness


Figure A-9: Drug trade-related homicide RD figures (2007-2010 elections)




(a) Post-inauguration (extensive margin)




(b) Post-inauguration (homicide rate)




(c) Lame duck (extensive margin)



(d) Lame duck (homicide rate)




(e) Pre-election (extensive margin)




(f) Pre-election (homicide rate)

Notes: This figure plots violence measures against the PAN margin of victory, with a negative margin indicating a PAN loss. Each point represents the average value of the outcome in vote spread bins of width one half of a percentage point. The solid line plots predicted values, with separate quadratic vote spread trends estimated on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.


Figure A-10: All homicides RD figures (2007-2010 elections)




(a) Post-inauguration (extensive margin)




(b) Post-inauguration (homicide rate)




(c) Lame duck (extensive margin)



(d) Lame duck (homicide rate)




(e) Pre-election (extensive margin)




(f) Pre-election (homicide rate)

Notes: This figure plots violence measures against the PAN margin of victory, with a negative margin indicating a PAN loss. Each point represents the average value of the outcome in vote spread bins of width one half of a percentage point. The solid line plots predicted values, with separate quadratic vote spread trends estimated on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.


Figure A-11: Drug trade-related homicide negative binomial RD figures




(a) Post-inauguration (2007-2008 elections)




(b) Post-inauguration (2007-2010 elections)




(c) Lame duck (2007-2008 elections)



(d) Lame duck (2007-2010 elections)




(e) Pre-election (2007-2008 elections)




(f) Pre-election (2007-2010 elections)

Notes: This figure plots violence measures against the PAN margin of victory, with a negative margin indicating a PAN loss. Each point represents the average value of the outcome in vote spread bins of width one half of a percentage point. The solid line plots predicted values from a negative binomial regression, with separate vote spread trends estimated on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.


Figure A-12: All homicides negative binomial RD figures




(a) Post-inauguration (2007-2008 elections)




(b) Post-inauguration (2007-2010 elections)




(c) Lame duck (2007-2008 elections)



(d) Lame duck (2007-2010 elections)




(e) Pre-election (2007-2008 elections)




(f) Pre-election (2007-2010 elections)

Notes: This figure plots violence measures against the PAN margin of victory, with a negative margin indicating a PAN loss. Each point represents the average value of the outcome in vote spread bins of width one half of a percentage point. The solid line plots predicted values from a negative binomial regression, with separate vote spread trends estimated on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A-13: Monthly homicide RD figures




(a) Drug-related homicide rate



(b) All homicides


Notes: In Panel A, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of a close PAN victory on the drug-related homicide rate in a municipality-month. In Panel B, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of a close PAN victory on the overall homicide rate in a municipality-month. The lines plot 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A-14: Total homicides quarterly RD estimates (extensive margin)




Notes: Each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of a close PAN victory on whether a homicide occurred in a municipality-quarter. The lines plot 95% confidence intervals.


Figure A-15: PAN Victories and Homicides (4% bandwidth)



(a) Drug-related homicides (extensive margin)




(b) Drug-related homicide rate




(c) All homicides

Notes: In Panel A, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the average probability that a drug-related homicide occurred in a municipality-month. In Panel B, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the drug-related homicide rate in a given quarter. In Panel C, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the overall homicide rate in a given quarter. All regressions include a quadratic RD polynomial, estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The thin lines plot 95% confidence intervals, and the thick lines plot 90% confidence intervals.


Figure A-16: PAN Victories and Homicides (3% bandwidth)



(a) Drug-related homicides (extensive margin)




(b) Drug-related homicide rate




(c) All homicides

Notes: In Panel A, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the average probability that a drug-related homicide occurred in a municipality-month. In Panel B, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the drug-related homicide rate in a given quarter. In Panel C, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the overall homicide rate in a given quarter. All regressions include a quadratic RD polynomial, estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The thin lines plot 95% confidence intervals, and the thick lines plot 90% confidence intervals.


Figure A-17: PAN Victories and Homicides (2% bandwidth)



(a) Drug-related homicides (extensive margin)




(b) Drug-related homicide rate




(c) All homicides

Notes: In Panel A, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the average probability that a drug-related homicide occurred in a municipality-month. In Panel B, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the drug-related homicide rate in a given quarter. In Panel C, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the overall homicide rate in a given quarter. All regressions include a quadratic RD polynomial, estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The thin lines plot 95% confidence intervals, and the thick lines plot 90% confidence intervals.


Figure A-18: PAN Victories and Homicides (13.3% bandwidth)



(a) Drug-related homicides (extensive margin)




(b) Drug-related homicide rate




(c) All homicides

Notes: In Panel A, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the average probability that a drug-related homicide occurred in a municipality-month. In Panel B, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the drug-related homicide rate in a given quarter. In Panel C, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the overall homicide rate in a given quarter. All regressions include a quadratic RD polynomial, estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The thin lines plot 95% confidence intervals, and the thick lines plot 90% confidence intervals.


Figure A-19: PAN Victories and Homicides (5% bandwidth, fixed effects)



(a) Drug-related homicides (extensive margin)




(b) Drug-related homicide rate




(c) All homicides

Notes: In Panel A, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the average probability that a drug-related homicide occurred in a municipality-month. In Panel B, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the drug-related homicide rate in a given quarter. In Panel C, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the overall homicide rate in a given quarter. All regressions include a quadratic RD polynomial, estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The thin lines plot 95% confidence intervals, and the thick lines plot 90% confidence intervals.


Figure A-20: PAN Victories and Homicides (4% bandwidth, fixed effects)



(a) Drug-related homicides (extensive margin)




(b) Drug-related homicide rate




(c) All homicides

Notes: In Panel A, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the average probability that a drug-related homicide occurred in a municipality-month. In Panel B, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the drug-related homicide rate in a given quarter. In Panel C, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the overall homicide rate in a given quarter. All regressions include a quadratic RD polynomial, estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The thin lines plot 95% confidence intervals, and the thick lines plot 90% confidence intervals.


Figure A-21: PAN Victories and Homicides (3% bandwidth, fixed effects)



(a) Drug-related homicides (extensive margin)




(b) Drug-related homicide rate




(c) All homicides

Notes: In Panel A, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the average probability that a drug-related homicide occurred in a municipality-month. In Panel B, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the drug-related homicide rate in a given quarter. In Panel C, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the overall homicide rate in a given quarter. All regressions include a quadratic RD polynomial, estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The thin lines plot 95% confidence intervals, and the thick lines plot 90% confidence intervals.


Figure A-22: PAN Victories and Homicides (2% bandwidth, fixed effects)



(a) Drug-related homicides (extensive margin)




(b) Drug-related homicide rate




(c) All homicides

Notes: In Panel A, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the average probability that a drug-related homicide occurred in a municipality-month. In Panel B, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the drug-related homicide rate in a given quarter. In Panel C, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the overall homicide rate in a given quarter. All regressions include a quadratic RD polynomial, estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The thin lines plot 95% confidence intervals, and the thick lines plot 90% confidence intervals.


Figure A-23: PAN Victories and Homicides (13.3% bandwidth, fixed effects)



(a) Drug-related homicides (extensive margin)



(b) Drug-related homicide rate




(c) All homicides


Notes: In Panel A, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the average probability that a drug-related homicide occurred in a municipality-month. In Panel B, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the drug-related homicide rate in a given quarter. In Panel C, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of close PAN victories on the overall homicide rate in a given quarter. All regressions include a quadratic RD polynomial, estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The thin lines plot 95% confidence intervals, and the thick lines plot 90% confidence intervals.

A-2.15 Homicide RD Figures - Neighbors' Homicide Rates


Figure A-24: Neighbor Homicide RD Figures



(a) Drug-related homicides (extensive margin)



(b) Drug-related homicide rate




(c) All homicides


Notes: In Panel A, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of a close PAN victory on whether a drug-related homicide occurred in a municipality's bordering municipalities. In Panel B, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of a close PAN victory on the drug-related homicide rate in a municipality's bordering municipalities. In Panel C, each point plots a separate RD estimate of the impact of a close PAN victory on the overall homicide rate in a municipality's bordering municipalities. The thin lines plot 95% confidence intervals, and the thick lines plot 90% confidence intervals.

A-2.16 Robustness to Varying the Length of the Analysis Period


Figure A-25: Robustness to period length: drug-related homicides



(a) Pre-period




(b) Lame duck period




(c) Post period

Notes: Panel A reports RD estimates of the impact of PAN victories on the drug trade-related homicide rate from separate regressions that vary the length of the pre-period from one to six months. Panel B varies the length of the lame duck period, and Panel C varies the length of the post-period. The thin lines plot 95% confidence intervals, and the thick lines plot 90% confidence intervals.


Figure A-26: Robustness to period length: overall homicides



(a) Pre-period



(b) Lame duck period




(c) Post period

Notes: Panel A reports RD estimates of the impact of PAN victories on the overall homicide rate from separate regressions that vary the length of the pre-period from one to 205 months. Panel B varies the length of the lame duck period, and Panel C varies the length of the post-period. The thin lines plot 95% confidence intervals, and the thick lines plot 90% confidence intervals.

A-2.17 Spillovers Model Placeo Check


Figure A-27: Placebo Exercise



Notes: This figure plots the distribution of coefficients from the placebo exercise described in the text. β^* is the baseline coefficient from Table 6, column (2). The mean of the distribution equals -0.005.

A-2.18 Law Enforcement Allocation Figure

Figure A-28: Law Enforcement Allocation



Notes: Municipalities that contain a selected edge are highlighted in yellow. The average monthly drug trade-related homicide rate between 2007 and 2009 is plotted in the background.