Deliberative democracy has often been associated with classical Athens. “The idea of deliberative democracy and its practical implementation are as old as democracy itself,” wrote Jon Elster in 1998. “Both came into being in Athens in the fifth century B.C.” ¹ Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson agree, drawing on Thucydides to suggest that the Athenians “saw discussion ‘not as a stumbling-block in the way of action’ but as an ‘indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all’,” and calling Aristotle “the first major theorist to defend the value of a process in which citizens publicly discuss and justify their laws to one another.” ² David Held characterized Athenian public deliberation in Habermasian terms as “free and unrestricted discourse” governed by the “force of the better argument,” while Ryan Balot holds that Athenian democrats aimed at “true democratic deliberation—a public conversation in which ideas are floated freely, objections and dissent are confidently and respectfully aired, further revisions and refinement of different opinions can take place, and a collectively supported decision issues in the end.” ³ More recently, Mirko Canevaro has argued that the Athenian assembly employed “deliberative procedures and institutions meant to foster debate, exchange of points of view and ideas, and reasoned arguments, and geared towards reaching, ultimately, consensus.” Such procedures, he claims, “were the key presupposition for the legitimacy of the democratic system.” ⁴

These accounts unmistakably evoke deliberation as defined by many political theorists: briefly, a special form of group discussion, often judged essential for democratic legitimacy, in which the give-and-take of arguments concerning a public matter among diverse participants will, it is hoped, lead to a better understanding

¹ Earlier versions were presented at meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association (2012), the Northeastern Political Science Association (2013), the Association for Political Theory (2019), and at Harvard, Cambridge, Stanford, Yale, and Berkeley. As well as those audiences, I thank Seyla Benhabib, Daniel Betti, Paul Cammack, Paul Cartledge, Stefan Eich, Amos Elster, Bryan Garsten, Robert Goodin, David Grewal, Kinch Hoekstra, Hélène Landemore, Vanessa Lim, Josiah Ober, Gary Remer, David Runciman, Daniel Schillinger, Joel Schlosser, George Scialabba, Shannon Stimson, Richard Tuck, Philippe Urfalino, and several anonymous referees. Unless otherwise noted, translations are mine, using the Loeb Classical Library for the Greek texts. This article is dedicated, with love and profound thanks, to Jane Mansbridge.

² Gutmann and Thompson 2004, p. 8, citing Thucydides 2.40 and Aristotle, Politics 1281a-b. Cammack 2013a argues against this interpretation of Aristotle’s argument.


of the issues involved and thus to a more reasonable outcome. Yet how far and where such activity appeared in the classical Athenian political system is open to question. The assembly certainly “deliberated,” as represented by bouleuomai, rendered “deliberate” since the earliest English versions of ancient Greek texts. Yet assembly meetings were attended by six thousand or more citizens, the vast majority of whom listened and voted but did not speak publicly—a situation unconvincingly described as group discussion. Athenian dikastai (judges/jurors, henceforth “judges”), who did not “speak together” (koinolegeomai), also deliberated (bouleuomai) without discussing. Something more dialogical may have occurred in the council but, intriguingly, Athenians almost always represented its activity by other words: bouleuo (“plan,” “advise” or “perform council activity”) and probouleuo (“preconsider,” “preconsult” or “prepare”).

These observations suggest that, in classical Athens, “deliberation” and discussion were to some extent distinguishable, and the distinction was reflected in political terminology. Ancient Greek deliberative terminology—that is, terminology relating to situations that are often called “deliberative” today—was highly variegated. As well as bouleuomai, bouleuo, and probouleuo, key terms included symbouleuo (“advise”), demegoreo (“address the demos”) and dialego (“address” or “converse”). Not all these terms were associated with all contexts or with all personae within those contexts. Establishing what actions were performed by whom both illuminates the Athenian political system and may be useful to those interested in deliberative systems more generally.

This article seeks to establish as accurately as the evidence allows the character of the deliberation and/or discussion that took place in five Athenian political arenas: courts, assembly, council, local assemblies, and street. This exercise in philology for political theorists suggests, to begin, that the key term bouleuomai implied coming to a decision. Next, in democratic Athens, discussion and deliberating/deciding were inversely related. The most decisive arenas (the assembly and

6 E.g. Thucydides 189 [1629] and Hobbes 1847 [1637].
8 While either “judges” or “jurors” is acceptable, I prefer “judges” since although, like modern jurors (and much more seldom modern judges), dikastai sat in panels, unlike modern jurors they did not discuss cases among themselves, and like modern judges they had full authority to decide fact, law, and penalties.
9 Aristotle, Politics 1268b5-10; Boegehold 1995, pp. 21-42.
10 Mansbridge 1999; Mansbridge and Parkinson ed. 2012.
11 A companion article, Cammack forthcoming, focuses on the meaning of bouleuomai in relation to assemblies. It shows that bouleuomai could represent three distinct forms of deliberation, namely internal, dialogical, and what I call audience deliberation, and argues that assembly deliberation was almost always represented as audience deliberation.
12 Here I translate bouleuomai as “deliberate/decide” to make my meaning clear. Henceforth, for ease of reading, in translating bouleuomai I normally use “deliberate” or “decide” alone (sometimes “come to a decision” or “make up one’s mind”). But the reader should understand that throughout I mean both “deliberate” and “decide”.
the courts) were the least discursive, in the sense of being least marked by the exchange of reasons admired by many contemporary theorists, while the most discursive arenas (the street, perhaps the local assemblies, perhaps the council) were the least authoritative. This finding makes sense. Mass democracy relies ultimately on the vote. Mass settings are not conducive to iterated, back-and-forth, mutually responsive discussion. It does not follow that discussion was unimportant to Athenian democracy; indeed, it seems very likely (though impossible to prove or to disprove) that the decision-making powers of ordinary citizens in the assembly and courts prompted increased discussion of political issues outside those bodies, and that such “everyday talk” affected votes. But there was significantly little organized political discussion. This point bears emphasizing in a theoretical context where both everyday talk and mass voting have in recent decades received less attention than organized dialogical deliberation and consensus-building.

1. The Courts
I begin with Athens’ lawcourts, both because the character of judicial deliberation is widely accepted and relatively easy to establish and because it provides a useful benchmark against which to compare the activities of the assembly and other bodies. Athenian trials lasted no more than a day, and litigants had a fixed amount of time to present their cases to the judges, who were randomly selected every morning from those eligible who wished to serve. A minimum of 201 judges decided private charges (dikai), and a minimum of 501 decided public ones (graphai), which included all political charges. Larger panels could be created by adding panels together, and the largest panel we know of had six thousand judges. As soon as the litigants and any co-pleaders had finished speaking, the judges received ballots and voted by dropping them, secretly, into an urn. The ballots were then counted, and a simple majority decided the case.

During the proceedings, judges often reacted audibly to speakers. The judges could also engage in private conversations, both during the speeches and when heading down to the voting urns. Nonetheless, Aeschines, defending himself against a charge of false embassy, praised his hearers “exceedingly” for “listening in silence,” showing that judges were not required to speak to one another while the litigants were presenting their cases. More significantly, in striking contrast to modern jury practice, there was no formal opportunity for group discussion after the presentation of the case. This seems to have been standard practice across ancient Greece. Aristotle remarks that unlike arbitrators, who worked in small

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13 Mansbridge 1999.
14 Judges had to be over thirty and to have sworn the judicial oath (partially quoted in the Conclusion). Alternative arrangements were made for certain cases, most importantly homicide: see Cammack 2015.
16 Sometimes referred to as “dikastic thorubos” (“judicial clamor”). Bers 1985; Schwartzberg 2010. Isocrates 15.272; Demosthenes 18.52, 23.19; Lycurgus 1.52, 127; Hypereides 1 frag. 2.
17 Andocides 1.69-70; Demosthenes 47.44, 50.3.
18 As argued by Boegehold 1995, p. 39, and possibly implied by Lycurgus 1.127.
19 Aeschines 2.24.
groups and were expected to discuss cases with one another, judges in most communities were prohibited from “speaking together” (koinolegeomai, a term that also means “come to an agreement”).

Judges thus arrived at their verdicts more or less by themselves: no doubt informed by the reactions of other judges while the speeches were progressing, but without being accountable to anyone else, without any pressure to justify their reasoning to others or to agree with others in their assessment of the case, and indeed without engaging with anyone at all during the trial unless they wished to do so. They simply made up their minds, rather quickly, which way to vote, and voted. Moreover, the Athenians took the secrecy of judicial voting extremely seriously and repeatedly refined the process to make it more secure. This fact seems highly significant given that open voting, by raised hands, was the norm in the assembly, council, and local assemblies.

What language represented the judges’ activity? The key term is bouleuomai, “deliberate.” As elaborated by Aristotle and supported by all the available evidence, to bouleuesthai (“deliberation”) had four features. 1) It implied coming to a decision about an action within one’s power. 2) It involved choosing between at least two options (i.e. to do or not to do the action). 3) It was typically internal to the decision-maker. 4) It had two stages: the run-up to the decision (indicated by the present tense) and the making of the decision (indicated, somewhat puzzlingly to today’s reader, by past tenses).

The use of bouleuomai in judicial contexts reflected these features. 1) The judges’ task was to establish a verdict by voting. 2) Each judge had two options: to vote either for the prosecutor or for the defendant. 3) The judges made up their minds which way to vote internally. Each judge, as we have seen, was responsible for his own secret vote, and the litigants’ language reflected this, in that they consistently used bouleuomai in the plural when referring to their audience, implying that they conceived of their hearers as deliberating severally, not collectively. The contrast with English usage is illuminating. In English, a singular noun and verb is often used to represent the collective (discursive) deliberation of jurors: “the jury is deliberating.” The Greeks did have a singular collective noun meaning “jury” or “judicial panel” (dikasterion), but it appeared only rarely and is never found as the subject of bouleuomai. The subject of bouleuomai, in judicial contexts, was typically andres dikastai, “gentlemen judges,” or hymas, “you” (plural). The impression of distributed internal deliberation is moreover reinforced by other internally-focused verbs used when addressing judges, such as “consider,” “examine,” “reflect on,” “think,” and “contemplate.”

20 Aristotle, Politics 1268b5-10.
21 For details, see Boegehold 1995, pp. 21-42.
22 An exception was citizenship votes, when a secret ballot was used.
23 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1112a-b, 1150b. On internal deliberation, see Goodin 2003, 2008; Manin 2011; Cammack 2013b; Cammack forthcoming.
Finally, 4) the decision-making process had two phases, both represented by *bouleuomai*. In the first stage, the judges considered the speeches of the litigants. Lycurgus, opening a prosecution for treason, addressed his audience as “You who are now deliberating (*bouleuomenos*, present tense) on behalf of your fathers, wives, children, country and temples,” while Dinarchus, prosecuting Demosthenes, told his listeners to “deliberate (*bouleuesthe*, present tense) carefully,” and asked “will you… save him? Not if you deliberate (*bouleuesthe*, present tense) well.” In these cases, *bouleuomai* implied the consideration involved in the run-up to the decision.

In the second stage, judges cast their ballots, deciding the matter, and in this connection *bouleuomai* appeared in past tenses, particularly the aorist tense (often in the form of an imperative). “Do not discover too late that you have put to death an innocent man,” pleaded a client of Antiphon. “Rather make the right decision (*bouleusasthe*, aorist tense) in the first place.” *Bouleuomai* in past tenses did not necessarily imply action in the past, as in English. Rather, in imperatives (as in this example), participles, and infinitives, tense revealed aspect, that is, whether the action referred to was conceived as ongoing (present tense) or complete (usually the aorist tense, sometimes the perfect tense). Aeschines, closing his prosecution of Demosthenes in “On the Crown,” used both tenses in quick succession. He asked his hearers to “deliberate (*bouleuesthe*, present tense) not as though for some foreign city, but for your own… decide (*bouleusasthe*, aorist tense) not with the help of your ears alone, but with your eyes, looking sharply around you to see who among you may aid Demosthenes.” In the first use, the deliberator was represented as still making up his mind, i.e. deliberation was ongoing; in the second, the mind was being made up, i.e. the deliberation was coming to a close.

This distinction of tenses within a single verb is significant, because it implies that speakers of ancient Greek treated the run-up to a decision and the final decision-making moment as two phases of the same continuous action, even when that action took place over several hours and involved listening to and judging lengthy opposing speeches (as was the case in trials). Like the interpretation of deliberation advanced by Gutmann and Thompson, *bouleuomai* implied both considering and deciding. Yet in the case of *bouleuomai*, considering and deciding were still more tightly bound, since both parts of the action had to be performed by the same agent. They could not be assigned to different people at different times.

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26 Antiphon 5.71, cf. 5.90-1.
27 Aeschines 3.255.
28 Gutmann and Thompson 2004, p. 5: the deliberative process “aims at producing a decision that is *binding* for some period of time” (italics original).
29 Contrast Gutmann and Thompson 2004, p. 5: the participants in the deliberative process “intend their discussion to influence a decision the government will make.” The fact that the discussants will not be making the decision themselves means that they could not be called “deliberators” in the ancient Greek sense. The Conclusion of this article discusses implications of this argument for the idea of the deliberative system.
Accordingly, and especially in light of longstanding disagreement over the significance of decision-making to the modern concept “deliberation,” the best translations of bouleuomai are probably “come to a decision” or “make up one’s mind,” rather than the more ambiguous “deliberate.”

The independence of judges and the finality of their decisions made some litigants nervous. Several revealed anxiety about the judges’ lack of accountability, urging that the gods would know how each had voted and that friends and family members were also likely to ask. But these anxious comments simply underscore the Athenians’ commitment to this form of decision-making. It would certainly have been possible to include an element of group discussion in the judicial process, or to make the judges more accountable to one another, and/or to the audience in the court-room and beyond, by using open voting, either among themselves or in full public view in the courtroom. The fact that the Athenians did not adopt any of these procedures suggests that they valued the privacy of judicial deliberation.

2. The Assembly

In many respects, the situation in the Athenian assembly resembled that in the courts. A mass audience, whose members were free to react audibly to speeches and to engage in private conversations if they wished, was addressed by a small number of speakers, prior to voting for one of two options. Differences between the assembly and courts included the size of the assembly audience—typically six thousand citizens or more; the number of assembly speakers—greater than in the courts, though still relatively small; the substance of assembly votes—to approve or to reject proposals rather than to support a prosecutor or defendant; the manner of voting in the assembly—by show of hands, except when awarding citizenship, when a secret ballot was used; and the number of decisions made in the assembly, which appears to have been an average minimum of nine per meeting.

Importantly, many decisions were not debated. Meetings opened with a series of votes (procheirontonia, “preliminary raising of hands”), and only proposals that were not unanimously approved, or which themselves stipulated that speakers should be heard, resulted in a call for speakers. After any debate came another vote (diacheirontonia, “double raising of hands”: one call for ayes, another for nays). During debates, amendments—and, in so-called “open” debates, fresh proposals—

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30 Cf. the rendering “change one’s mind” normally used for the related term metabouleuomai. On the relationship between deliberation and decision-making, see Bächtiger et al. 2010.
31 Lysias 12.100; Lycurgus 1.146; Aeschines 3.247; Demosthenes 59.110-11.
33 All citizens not under the penalty of partial atimia (disenfranchisement) were eligible to address the assembly, a practice known as isegoria, “equality of speech.” But how many actually spoke is debatable. Hansen estimates that 700-1400 citizens acted occasionally as rhetores (“speakers”) in the years 355-22, in addition to the ten or twenty citizens who spoke regularly at any given time (Hansen 1989, pp. 93-127; Hansen 1999, p. 272). But his calculations concern the number of proposers and amenders found in extant decrees, and, as we shall see below, we know—thanks not least to Hansen himself (1989, p. 98)—that not all those men spoke in the assembly.
could also be submitted in writing from the assembly floor, read aloud by the secretary, and immediately put to a vote.\textsuperscript{36} Many amendments probably passed this way, for instance the suggestions that a reference to “Skiathos” be corrected to “Old Skiathos,” that certain Samians be given a dinner, or that a third brother be honoured alongside two others.\textsuperscript{37} Altogether, it was probably fairly common for assembly decisions not to receive oral debate.

A key difference between the assembly and courts was the porousness of the line between public speakers and audience at meetings. Unlike speakers in trials, who never acted as judges, assembly speakers sat with the rest of the audience when not speaking and when called to vote, raised their hands along with everybody else. Nonetheless, our sources reveal an important functional distinction between speech-makers and audience. \textit{Bouleuomai}, “deliberate,” frequently appeared in reference to assemblies, yet the subject of the verb, and consequently its meaning, varied significantly. Sometimes both public speakers and listeners were represented as deliberating, as in Diodotus’ speech on the Mytilenaeans in Thucydides: “We (\textit{hemas}) are deliberating (\textit{bouleuesthai}) not about the present but the future…we are not litigating with the Mytilenaeans but deliberating (\textit{bouleuometha}) about them.”\textsuperscript{38} Similarly, Aeschines praised Solon for laying down “the proper manner of deliberating (\textit{bouleuesthai}) when we (\textit{hemas}) gather at meetings,” while Demosthenes asked histrionically, alluding to problems that might arise from insufficient taxation, “are we never to meet and make decisions (\textit{bouleusometh})?” \textsuperscript{39} \textit{Bouleuomai}, in these cases, was used in a global sense. Everything that took place at assembly meetings counted as deliberation, because everything pertained to the decision-making process; hence everyone present was a deliberator.

Yet \textit{bouleuomai} also appeared in a more limited sense, namely as the special function of the listening audience as \textit{distinct from} those who spoke from the stage. The vast majority of examples of \textit{bouleuomai} referring to assemblies are of this sort.\textsuperscript{40} The Demosthenic \textit{Exordia}, a collection of fifty-six openings to assembly speeches, is typical. \textit{Bouleuomai} appears thirty times, twenty-six in the second person plural, indicating the audience, for example: “You have come here today not to pass judgment on wrongdoers but to decide (\textit{bouleusomenoi}) about the current state of affairs”; “As becomes men deliberating (\textit{bouleumenous}) on behalf of the city, put aside your personal rivalries and consider the common good”; and “It is your duty when deliberating (\textit{bouleumenous}) on the most important public issues to listen to all your advisers.”\textsuperscript{41}

\begin{enumerate}
\item See e.g. Aeschines 2.64, 68, 83-4.
\item IG I\textsuperscript{2} 110, IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1, 212. Ps. Aristotle, \textit{Constitution of the Athenians} 29.1, 45; Hansen 1989, p. 97, with notes; Rhodes 1972, pp. 52-87, cf. 2016, pp. 247-8.
\item Thucydides 3.44.
\item E.g. Thucydides 3.37-8, 1.72, 73, 78, 80, 4.87, 6.17, 6.36, 92, 7.14; Andocides 1.73, 75, 2.19, 3.12, 33; Aeschines 2.50, 60-1, 70, 82, 134; 3.69, 120, 150-1, 251-2. Demosthenes 3.1, 4.1, 5.2. 4.33, 41, 5.3, 6.28, 8.1, 9.20, 10.1, 28-30, 13.2, 15.1-2, 6, 13, 21, 31, 18.24, 65, 86, 19.5, 13, 34, 96, 206, 23.109, 115, 24.32; Dinarchus 1.14.
\item Demosthenes, \textit{Exordia} 11, 12, 26.
\end{enumerate}
What were assembly speakers represented as doing when *bouleumai* was not used? One verb used was *agoreuo*, literally “speak in the *agora* (public square),” as in the herald’s call for speakers: “Who wishes to speak (*agoreuein*)?”42 Another option was *lego*, “speak,” as in Demosthenes’ complaint, “if you are examining (*skopeite*) and deliberating (*bouleuesthe*), it is wrong to stop those who wish to speak (*legein*).”43 Another was *demegoreo*, “address the assembly” or “speak publicly.” Timotheus “addressed the assembly” (*edemegoresen*), asking “Are you deliberating (*bouleuesthe*) how you will deal with the Thebans?” Demosthenes, similarly, identified speaking (*demegorein*) before decision-makers (*be-bouleumenoi*) as his life’s only privilege.44

Another possible choice was *dialogo*, origin of the English “dialogue.” Used without a personal object, *dialogo* could imply “discuss” or “converse,” as it often did in Plato’s dialogues.45 But when used with a personal object, it often implied “speak to” or “address,” as in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*: “I would not speak to (*dia-lechtheien*) the others, even if I met them in the street.”46 That appears several times with “Athenians” or “assembly” (*demos*) as the object of the verb.47 Gorgias “addressed (*dieleghe*) the Athenians about the alliance,” Aesches drew attention to Solon’s bearing “as he used to address (*dielegeto*) the assembly of the Athenians,” and Demosthenes argued that if another politician’s intentions had been honest, he would first have asked for an audience before the council and then “addressed (*dialechthenai*) the assembly.”48 *Dialogo* implying “discuss” or “converse” does not appear in this context.

Most often, the activity of speakers was represented by *symbouleuo*, “advise.”49 Speaking of the Athenians in the *Protagoras*, Socrates argues: “When they have to decide (*bouleusasthai*) something to do with…the city, the man who rises to advise (*symbouleut*) them…may equally well be a smith, a shoemaker, a merchant, a naval captain, rich, poor, well-born or otherwise.”50 The pseudo-Platonic *Alcibiades I* contains many similar examples, such as “what subject do the Athenians propose to decide (*bouleusthai*), that you should stand up to advise (*symbouleuson*) them?”51 Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* represented topics considered by assemblies as those “about which all men deliberate (*bouleusthai*) and those who advise (*hoi symbouleuontes*) speak publicly.”52 Lysias described an orator “advising (*synebouleuse*) you while you were deliberating (*bouleumenos*),” and Aesches recalled Demosthenes declaring that he was “amazed at both parties, the listeners as well as the ambassadors, for wasting time—the listeners the time for deliberating

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42 Aeschines 1.27.
43 Demosthenes, Exordium 10.
44 Demosthenes 8.74, 18.236.
45 Discussed below.
46 Aristophanes, *Clouds* 424-5.
47 On *demos* meaning “assembly,” see Cummack 2019.
48 Gorgias, frag. 4, line 10; Aeschines 1.25; Demosthenes 24.48.
50 Plato, *Protagoras* 319d.
51 Ps. Plato, *Alcibiades I*, 106c; cf. 107a-e.
(bouleuesthai), the ambassadors the time for advising (symbouleuein).” Demosthenes provides many further examples. “If in times past your regular speakers had advised (synebouleusan) what was necessary, there would have been no need for you to deliberate (bouleuesthai) today; “It is your duty when deliberating (bouleuomenos)…to allow freedom of speech to each of your advisers (ton symbouleonton),” and so on. Perhaps most revealing, the ancient Greeks called assembly speech “advisory rhetoric” (symbouleutike rhetorike) or “public rhetoric” (demegorike rhetorike). The English rendering “deliberative rhetoric” is misleading: the equivalent Greek term would be bouleutike rhetorike, but that term is unattested.

The frequency with which symbouleuo and bouleumai appeared together may be explained by their common etymology. Both terms derived from bouleuo, which in archaic and early classical Greek could mean “plan,” “plot,” advise,” “consult,” “deliberate” or “decide.” Bouleuo was related to boule, which in both archaic and classical Greek could imply “plan,” “will,” “counsel” or “council.” But by the mid-classical era, the meaning of bouleuo had narrowed to “be a councillor,” “perform council activity,” and, less often, “advise.” “Advise” had been largely taken over by symbouleuo, literally “co-plan” or “co-advice” according to the earlier usage. At the same time, “deliberate” and “decide” had come to be expressed solely by bouleumai, literally “make a plan for oneself” (not, technically, a different verb but the middle voice of bouleuo).

Accordingly, in classical Athens, derivatives of bouleuo represented three political roles: ho bouleutes, “councillor”; ho symboulos, “advisor”; and ho bouleuomenos, “deliberator/decider.” We shall consider the functions of councillors below. Here we may simply elaborate on the complementarity of advising and deliberating/deciding in the assembly, perhaps best suggested in English by the ideas of giving and receiving counsel. At meetings, speakers and audiences were explicitly supposed to do different things. Speakers were meant to take a “broad view,” “explore best policy,” discern the trend of events, forecast results, and offer warnings when necessary. By contrast, “it was your task,” Demosthenes said to

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53 Lysias 6.54; Aeschines 2.49.
54 Demosthenes 4.1, Exordium 27. Cf. Thucydides 3.43, 38; Plato, Protagoras 322d-24c, Gorgias 455b-56a, Alcibiades I 106c-7d; Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.6, Hellenica 1.7.16, 19, 2.2.15, 2.4.40; Andocides 4.12; Lysias 25.27, 33.3; Isocrates 3.19, 21, 4.3, 19, 170-1, 5.88, 143, 7.77-8, 8.1-2, 8-13, 27, 52-55, 12.170-1, 15.256; Aeschines 1.26, 64, 1.110-11, 120, 180, 186, 2.29, 65, 157, 165, 3.158, 225-6; Demosthenes 4.1, 8.1-3, 10.17, 75, 14.8, 15.1, 18.86, Exordia 1, 3, 6, 11, 20, 26, 30, 33, 35-6, 56; Dinarchus 1.31, 35-6, 40, 72, 76-8, 81, 93, 2.14, 15; Hypereides 5 col. 28; Ps. Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians 23-4, 29.
55 As seen in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, e.g. 1354b, 1358b.
56 Discussed further in Cammack forthcoming.
57 The middle voice of a verb was often used to show that the action had some special connection to the agent beyond merely being performed by them. E.g. bouleu, “plan” (active voice), bouleumai, “deliberate,” i.e. make a plan for oneself, rather than for someone else (middle voice). Smyth 1956; Cammack forthcoming.
58 Distinct from ho bouleumenos, “whoever wishes”—another important political figure whose name also derived from boule (will), via boule, “will” or “wish.”
59 Dinarchus 1.35; Demosthenes 16.1, 18.246.
the assembly, “first to listen to the situation, next to make your decision (bouleusathai), and finally to carry it out.” His obligation was “to tell you what I have convinced myself is advantageous,” his audience’s “to listen, to judge, and if it is your pleasure, to adopt.” Scholars have sometimes portrayed non-speaking assemblygoers as relatively passive (or have worried that they may be perceived that way), but contemporaries do not seem to have shared that impression. To the contrary, speakers emphasized the audience’s agency as the city’s decision-making body, and represented themselves as playing a supporting (albeit indispensable) role. “Who went to help the Byzantines and saved them? Who prevented the entrapment of the Hellespont in that crisis?” Demosthenes asked. He answered: “You, Athenians, and when I say you I mean the city.” He went on: “Who advised the city, moved resolutions, took action…? I did.”

The representation of public speakers as advisors as opposed to deliberators/deciders accords perfectly with Aristotle’s definition of bouleomai, sketched above. Bouleomai implied coming to a decision, i.e., in this case, a decision about whether to vote “aye” or “nay” to a given proposal. But those who came forward to address the assembly had invariably already decided which way they would vote. The audience was supposed to have an open mind during meetings: Demosthenes argued specifically that sound judgment meant “not having decided (bebouleusathai) before you have heard that upon which you should base your decision (bouleusathai).” Yet “that upon which you should base your decision” was the result of speakers’ prior deliberation, that is, speakers’ internal considerations and the conclusions they had reached. “The same arguments we use when, in speaking, we persuade others, we employ also when we deliberate (bouleomenoi),” Isocrates explained. Aeschines attributed both his speeches and his silences to “having come to a decision (bouleusamenos),” while Demosthenes reported that “it is difficult…not only to say before you what must be done, but even to have found it out by solitary reflection.” Good policies were “rare and hard to discover”; still he wished “to tell you what I have convinced myself is expedient.” Demosthenes was proud of his preparations and sometimes even mentioned the notes he had made, but such forethought was not unusual. Alcidamas mocked those who wrote out their speeches in full, yet did not recommend “speaking offhandedly.” Public speakers “ought to prepare carefully, choosing in advance their arguments and overall organization”; only “the actual words should be supplied at the time of speaking.”

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60 Demosthenes 19.34.
61 Demosthenes, Exordium 33, trans. DeWitt.
64 Demosthenes, Exordium 18. Cf. Exordia 10, 47, 56.
65 Isocrates 15.236.
Public speech in the Athenian assembly was thus monological (“plebiscitary rhetoric,” to use Chambers’ felicitous term), in that speakers presented a connected argument in defence of a single position—their own. Moreover, as others have emphasized, speakers sought to persuade the audience, not one another. Clearly, this is a long way from the Habermasian ideal. Nonetheless, there are two other ways that the deliberations of assemblygoers may be interpreted as discursive. Audience reaction in the form of thorybos, “clamor,” may be interpreted as a contribution to a conversation, and the semi-private conversations of audience members with one another may also have played a significant role.

Thorybos could certainly affect debate. Demosthenes, addressing the assembly by letter in 323, regretted that this format did not allow him to respond to the reactions of his audience. “You Athenians have a way of opposing many suggestions without waiting to understand them. In the case of a speaker, of course, it is possible to perceive what you want and easy to correct your misapprehensions; but the written page possesses no such aid against those who raise a clamour (tous thorybountas).” Sometimes, thorybos could drive speakers from the stage or effect outcomes in other ways, as when the enthusiasm of the crowd resulted in Cleon receiving an unexpected military commission in 424. Additionally, as Canevaro has argued, in open debates, where several proposals might be advanced, thorybos may have helped to determine which would be put to the vote by the meeting’s chairmen (“facilitators,” as Canevaro terms them).

Nonetheless, our sources represent thorybos quite differently from either advisory speech or deliberation. While those activities were consistently portrayed as the proper functions of speakers and audience respectively, thorybos was typically portrayed as an interruption of the deliberative process, not as part of it. To be sure, that portrayal is normally advanced by the speakers themselves, who we may think were merely defending their own turf. But there is no sign that speakers feared that their audiences might feel offended by the representation of crowd noise as an undesirable interruption—quite the contrary. Demosthenes regularly exhorted his hearers to listen quietly and twice represented thorybos and to bouleuesthai as mutually exclusive. Aeschines liked to use audience reaction against his opponents, as when in a trial speech against Timarchus he made much of the laughter provoked by a series of double entendres at Timarchus’ expense at an earlier assembly meeting. Yet it is significant that at the time, the chairmen had not taken this laughter in their stride but rather scolded the audience for seeming to disrespect the speaker. As Canevaro argues, Dikaiopolis’ heckling at the beginning of Aristoph-

70 Chambers 2009.
72 See e.g. Roisman 2004; Tacon 2001; Thomas 2016; Villacèque 2012; Wallace 2004.
75 Canevaro 2018, p. 128.
76 Demosthenes 5.3, 8.3. Cf. Demosthenes 1.1, 13.3, Exordia 5, 21, 26, 56.
78 Aeschines 1.84.
anes’ Acharnians shows that thorybos could be regarded as a prerogative of assemblygoers.⁷⁹ But Dikaiopolis himself indicates that his intention in heckling is to shut down the day’s deliberations, not to participate in them.⁸⁰ Altogether, there are many signs that thorybos was regarded as a form of disruption, albeit a frequent and tolerable one, and few, if any, that it was regarded as an important way of gauging the audience’s opinion. The audience’s opinion was solicited at the same time as its decision—through its votes.

How significant was dialogue among audience-members? This question arises particularly because whereas (as we saw above) judges were always represented as deliberating severally, using the plural, assembly audiences were often represented as deliberating collectively, using the singular. Bouleuomai commonly appeared with the singular collective subject demos, referring to the listening crowd.⁸¹ Can intra-audience discussion help to explain that usage? That is, did the Athenians suppose that local conversations among the audience created a single agent, engaged in a single act of collective deliberation? That interpretation is possible, though I do not know of any supporting evidence.

An alternative interpretative strategy is to ask what differences between the courts and assembly may explain the representation of deliberation as distributive in the one case and collective in the other. As we have seen, both judges and assemblygoers heard the same sets of speeches, and both groups were free to heckle and to engage in conversation if they wished. But judges voted by secret ballot, assemblygoers by raising hands, and that, arguably, goes to the heart of the matter. In the final decision-making moment, judges acted independently, dropping their ballots into an urn one by one. But assemblygoers voted en masse, publicly, and often unanimously, certainly at the preliminary vote (procheirotonia) and probably at the final diacheirotonia too (as Jon Elster has taught us to expect in cases of non-simultaneous public voting).⁸² Moreover, assemblygoers’ votes were not counted individually but estimated en bloc, “clumped” rather than “counted.”⁸³ Arguably, it was above all in voting that Athenian assemblygoers looked and acted as a collective agent, coming to a common will.

Substantial evidence supports the claim that it was mass public voting, rather than intra-audience discussion or even hearing public speech, that essentially defined “deliberation” in the Athenian assembly. Two sources describe the demos as deliberating, using bouleuomai, at a meeting in 346 when no speeches took place, only a series of votes—indeed, the demos is described as deliberating (ebouleueto) and voting (epepsephizeto) at the same time.⁸⁴ Bouleuomai in the aorist tense, representing the culmination of deliberation, was especially closely associated with

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⁷⁹ Canevaro 2018, p. 133.
⁸⁰ Aristophanes, Acharnians 37-9, 170-1.
⁸¹ E.g. [Xenophon] 1.16; Aeschines 2.60, 67, 109-10, 3.67, 142; Demosthenes 18.74, 165; Aristotle, Politics 1298b20-30; Dinarchus 1.90; Theophrastus 26.1; IG I3 34; IG II3 1 337. Cf. Demosthenes, Letter 1.2; Aristotle, Politics 1298b15.
⁸⁴ Aeschines 2.67 with Demosthenes 19.13. Speeches had been made the previous day, but this meeting was reserved for voting only.
voting. In a decree quoted at Aeschines 2.60, bouleuomai in the present tense denoted the ongoing deliberations of the Athenian demos, while the aorist denoted the result of the vote. The aorist also appeared throughout the decrees quoted at Aeschines 3.67-9, which concerned Demosthenes’ attempt to hurry the Athenians into a decision on peace and an alliance (not hurriedly to begin deliberating about them). An inscribed decree, IG II³ 1 337, which records a decision of the Athenian council in 333/2, is especially informative. A group of Kitians had asked for permission to found a sanctuary of Aphrodite on Athenian territory, and the council agreed “that the assembly, having heard the Kitians…and any other Athenian who wishes, shall come to a decision (bouleusasthai, aorist tense) as seems to it best.” Coming to a decision was to take place after hearing speeches: bouleusasthai, here, can only refer to a vote.  

Further support appears in Aristotle. Politics 1281b, the defence of rule by the many sometimes known as the “doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude,” has often been cited in support of a discursive interpretation of assembly deliberation.  

Yet the only example of such activity Aristotle mentions is elections, which seem not to have involved speeches. Another significant line is, “They will deliberate/decide (bouleusontai) better when all deliberate/decide (bouleuomenoi) together, the dēmos with the notables and they when with the masses.” Evidently Aristotle envisaged a joint meeting of demos and notables, in which all heard the same speeches and considered the same proposals (as distinct from two separate meetings, as in the UK’s House of Commons and House of Lords). Yet why should a decision made jointly by demos and notables be “better”? Context supplies a clue. Aristotle was discussing how to improve to bouleusthai in communities where the demos was maximally powerful, and to this end he proposed several possible strategies: increasing the number of elite citizens on the deliberative body; fining elite citizens for non-attendance—the prompt for the line about deciding better when all deliberate together, quoted above; electing deliberators or choosing them equally by lot from each class; giving payment for attendance to no more than the number of non-elite citizens needed to balance those in the political class; and eliminating by lot any excess of the former over the latter. In every case, the goal was to balance the number of non-elite and notable citizens who would take part in deliberation, which implies that Aristotle hoped to influence the outcome of votes.

3. The Council

The absence of group discussion in the courts and assembly has led several scholars to represent Athens’ council (boule) as the city’s most dialogical venue. This body of five hundred citizens was the city’s administrative centerpiece, responsible for overseeing all public officials, receiving foreign visitors and military reports, and

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85 Cf. IG II² 1, IG I³ 40, and Thucydides 6.39: “The many, having listened, judge (krinai) the best.”
87 Hansen 1983, pp. 119-21; Piéart 1974; Rhodes 1981.
88 Aristotle, Politics 1298b20.
89 Aristotle, Politics 1298b10-28.
preparing the agenda for assembly meetings. Like a judicial panel, it was selected by sortition from among those eligible and willing to serve; unlike a judicial panel, it was constituted not for a single day but for a whole year, meeting most days. Unlike either the assembly or courts, it was a geographical microcosm of the polis, in that seats were allotted to every deme (village-level administrative unit) in proportion to its size.91 Each deme also belonged to one of Athens’ ten tribes, among which headship of the council rotated, so that every prytany (council month of 35 or 36 days) a new group of fifty councillors took over the presidency, a third of whom, at any one time, would dine and sleep together in a dedicated building called the prytaneum.92 Also unlike either the assembly or courts, stints on the council were limited to twice in a lifetime, inhibiting the development of a professional councillor class.

What terms represented the activity of councillors (bouleutai)? Strikingly, bouleuomai was very seldom used. In classical Athenian sources, that word is associated with councils only eight times.93 In three cases the council was acting as a court, as it occasionally did.94 In two, the subject was the “council of the future” designed by oligarchical conspirators in 411 but never realized.95 Two more cases appear in Lycurgus, in reference to one of fourth-century Athens’ greatest crises, its defeat by Philip of Macedon at Chaeronea in 338.96 Only Pseudo-Xenophon’s claim that “the council has to deliberate (bouleuesthai) many issues... war, revenues, law-making, things do with the polis, allies, tribute, care of dockyards and shrines,” uses bouleuomai to denote the normal activity of the democratic council, and it must be observed that that text is notorious for its sloppy writing.97

Why does bouleuomai appear so few times in reference to the council? The explanation seems to lie in the term’s association with decision-making. When acting as judges, councillors did make final decisions, justifying Lysias’ and Demosthenes’ uses of bouleuomai with respect to councillors’ judicial activity.98 Equally, oligarchical councils made decisions for the polis—that was a defining feature of oligarchy.99 So did democratic councils in emergencies of the kind described in Lycurgus’s speech. But, in normal circumstances, the votes of the Athenian council were not final. Nearly all its determinations were subject to scrutiny, revision or rejection by either the assembly or the courts. It had a preparatory and provisional role.

That role was represented by two verbs: bouleuo, “plan,” “advise” or “perform council activity,” and probouleuo, “preconsult,” “preconsider” or “prepare.”

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92 Rhodes 1972, p. 16.
93 IG I3 34 is another possible case, but the subject of the verb is unclear.
95 Ps. Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians 30.4.
96 Lycurgus 1.37, 126.
97 Ps. Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians 3.2; Marr and Rhodes 2008, p. 8.
98 Ps. Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians 44.
99 Aristotle, Politics 1298b.
Both *bouleuo* and *probouleuo* could be used in a general sense, to suggest planning/advising\(^{100}\) or giving a matter forethought, respectively.\(^{101}\) But both also had special political meanings. When used of single men, *bouleuo* implied “serve on the council,”\(^{102}\) and when used with the collective subject *boule*, “council,” it implied “sit as the council.”\(^{103}\) In one case, referring to the 411 oligarchical coup, *bouleuo* was even used to imply that the *assembly* had been sitting as an advisory council. Power being at that point in the hands of the oligarchs, Thucydides used *bouleuo*, not *bouleuomai*, to refer to the activity of both the assembly and the regular (non-oligarchical) council.\(^{104}\)

*Probouleuo* developed the special meaning “frame or pass a *probouleuma*,” i.e. prepare, in writing, a preliminary or provisional decree—a proposal—that would go to the assembly for final approbation or rejection. The author of the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* wrote that the council “prepares resolutions (*probouleuei*) to go to the assembly, and it’s not possible for anything that hasn’t been thus prepared or that the presidents haven’t published in writing in advance of the meeting to be voted (*psephizasthai*) by the assembly.”\(^{105}\) This two-stage process, known to historians as *probouleusis*, was the norm in all ancient Greek democracies, not only in Athens.\(^{106}\) As Aristotle emphasized, “A council is a popular *(demotikos)* body, for there is bound to be some institution of this sort to prepare resolutions (*probouleuein*) on behalf of the assembly, in order for the assembly to do its business.”\(^{107}\) Strikingly, *probouleuo* in the sense “prepare a resolution” does not appear to have been used of individual councillors, but only of the council as a whole, implying that adopting a proposal was necessarily a collective action.\(^{108}\) If a councillor wanted to say that he personally had drafted or submitted a proposal, the conventional locution seems to have been *grapho bouleuo*, literally “write [a proposal] as councillor.”\(^{109}\) The final decision to put a proposal on the assembly’s agenda was made in the same way as decisions in the courts and assembly: by majority vote, in this case by show of hands.\(^{110}\)

\(^{100}\) Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.1.31; Antipthon 6.18.

\(^{101}\) Herodotus 1.133; Thucydides 3.82; Aristophanes, *Knights* 1342; Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 4.3.17.


\(^{103}\) Andocides 1.90; Lysias 13.19, 20, 74, 30.22.

\(^{104}\) Thucydides 8.66. Along similar lines, the Athenians use a cognate of *probouleua*, namely *probol*, to name a vote of the assembly that was purely advisory: Rhodes 1992, p. 527.

\(^{105}\) Ps. Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians*, 45.4; cf. Dem. 22.5, 25 hypoth. 1. See also Hansen 1999, 138: “The rule *meden aprobouleuon*, nothing without a *probouleuma*, seems to have been a fundamental principle of Athenian democracy.”

\(^{106}\) Andrewes 1954.

\(^{107}\) Aristotle, *Politics* 1299b33. A less democratic option was to give power to *probouloi*, or “preliminary councillors.” See Thucydides, 8.1.3; Aristotle, *Politics* 1298b30, 1299b30, 1322b16.

\(^{108}\) Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.7.7, 7.1.2, 7.1.11; Demosthenes 18.53, 169, 19.34, 185, 20.4, 21.162; Aeschines 2.58.


\(^{110}\) Ps. Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 44.3.
How dialogical was the process of generating proposals? We know relatively little about council meetings, in part because, while some court and assembly speeches were preserved for the purpose of teaching rhetoric, nothing similar exists for the council.\(^{111}\) That in itself may imply that something more improvised and dialogical took place there, and that may be right. The size and acoustics of the Athenian council-chamber would certainly have allowed for conversations across the floor, and Antiphon represents “voicing (legon)…opinions” as part of a councillor’s role.\(^ {112}\) Also, Andocides notes that councillors, unlike assemblygoers, had the opportunity to consider (skepsasthai) issues “at leisure,” which suggests ample time for discussion.\(^ {113}\)

On the other hand, a group of five hundred seems too large for genuine (i.e. Habermasian-style) group discussion, and other aspects of proceedings suggest something closer to the oratorical model pursued in the assembly and courts. Meetings followed an agenda set by the tribe “in prytany” (i.e. acting as presidents), and speakers spoke one after another from a central platform.\(^ {114}\) Additionally, both Demosthenes and Aeschines distinguished the small number of “talkers” (legontes) or “orators” (rhetores) on the council from the rest,\(^ {115}\) while audience reaction often took the form of thorybos.\(^ {116}\)

Most significant, there is no evidence that proposals had to be discussed or debated by the council before being voted onto the assembly’s agenda. Some discussion or debate is normally assumed,\(^ {117}\) but it is remarkably difficult to confirm, and the alternative—that at least some items could be entered on the agenda, read aloud by the secretary, and voted up or down without any debate—is not, in principle, impossible. The council is not attested as the subject of any verb unambiguously suggesting discussion or debate. Dialego does appear once, but the context is a conversation between two men standing on the stage, not a conversation among the council as a whole: “Philocrates here himself joined me on the tribune and conversed (dielegeto) with me, his hand on my arm, addressing me by my name as I addressed him by his.”\(^ {118}\) Perhaps most surprising, the one source where the council’s functions are spelled out in detail, the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians, fails to specify the discussion of proposals as part of its role, though it describes a great many other responsibilities, both secular and religious.\(^ {119}\)

We do know that every motion considered by either the council or the assembly was attributed to a named proposer, who could later be indicted for having made an illegal proposal.\(^ {120}\) In “open” assembly debates, any citizen who wished

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\(^ {111}\) For this reason, the material discussed in Ober 2008 and 2013 is inevitably speculative.

\(^ {112}\) Johnstone 1996, pp. 105-6; Antiphon 6.45.

\(^ {113}\) Andocides 2.19.


\(^ {116}\) Andocides 1.43-5, 2.15; Xenophon, Hellenica 2.3.50; Aeschines 3.9.

\(^ {117}\) E.g. Hansen 1999, p. 140.

\(^ {118}\) Antiphon 6.40.


\(^ {120}\) Hansen 1974.
could submit a proposal, while proposals that emerged from the council were attributed to the councillor who originally submitted it.\(^{121}\) The Athenians also distinguished between decrees passed by the assembly alone (those headed *edoxe to demo*, “it seemed [good] to the assembly,” about half of the extant decrees) and those passed by both the council and assembly (headed *edoxe te boule kai to demo*, “it seemed [good] to the council and assembly”).\(^{122}\) In both cases, however, proposals were submitted in writing. As noted above, *grapho*, “propose,” literally meant “write,” and the council retained a secretary to read proposals and other documents aloud and to assist councillors in drafting when necessary.\(^{123}\)

Did a councillor who wrote a proposal have to defend it orally before either the council or, later, the assembly? Perhaps: in the decrees published after an assembly decision, proposers are always identified by *eipe*, “spoke.” Yet that usage may have been a legacy from the days before proposals were submitted in writing and read aloud by the assembly secretary, and to the extent that having to make a speech before hundreds or thousands of one’s fellow citizens can be expected to have put some people off, any such requirement may have been regarded as anti-democratic. Hyperides argued that there was “nothing more demotic” (i.e. advantageous to ordinary citizens) than the practice of allowing co-pleaders to speak on behalf of inexperienced litigants in court, and a similar consideration may have applied to the making of proposals in the council and assembly.\(^{124}\) We do know that on one famous occasion he who drafted an important proposal was not he who defended it publicly: in 411, when the oligarchs overthrew the democracy and set up the government of the Four Hundred, “Melobius speaking on behalf of the decree, Pythodorus of Anaphylstus having drafted the motion.”\(^{125}\) Other evidence shows that some men paid or persuaded others to sponsor proposals on their behalf.\(^{126}\) Altogether, we cannot assume that all or even most men named as the proposer of a decree actually made a speech defending it.

The council may even have had a procedure analogous to the assembly’s preliminary vote (*procheiriotonia*), through which the council could, if it wished, vote an item directly onto the assembly’s agenda without hearing speeches for and against it. We know of nothing against that possibility, and we know that the assembly had a large number of standing items on its agenda, such as receiving ambassadors and petitioners, which seem unlikely to have been contentious.\(^{127}\) Were at least some proposals withdrawn or reworded as a result of discussion in the council? We must assume so. Nonetheless, it seems significant that the council did not take collective responsibility for proposals, even though it was, presumably, regarded as having validated them by its vote (as the collective usage of *probouleuo*

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122 For discussion of this location and its implications, see Cammack 2020.


124 Hypereides 4.11.


127 Ps. Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 43.4-6.
Legal responsibility lay with the proposer alone, and the penalty for “making an illegal proposal” was significant—on the third conviction, disenfranchisement.

The situation is illuminated by a comparison with the oligarchical regime that ruled Athens in 404 (the “Thirty Tyrants,” as they were later called). Our sources suggest that dialogical deliberation was the norm at their meetings. Xenophon reports on a series of exchanges between Theramenes and Critias using the verbs *lego*, “speak,” and *antelego*, “reply.” Lysias, too, used those verbs when interrogating Eratosthenes, another member of the Thirty, on the subject of his contributions to the Thirty’s meetings. Dialogue is naturally easier to pull off in a group of this size, but the nature of the regime prevents it from being a model for democrats.

However much council meetings did or did not involve group discussion, councillors surely discussed political issues outside formal meetings, especially the fifty councillors “in prytany,” a third of whom lived and dined together at any one time. One imagines proposals being drafted over dinner, ready for presentation to the full council the following morning. Many of the benefits of group discussion could have been brought into the political process this way, and this may even have been a factor in having the *prytaneis* live together. Yet if so, such discussion seems not to have played a significant role in Athenian political ideology, since we find no mention of it.

4. Deme Assemblies
There were some 139 demes (demoi) in classical Athens, each of which held its own meetings separate from the primary assembly. These meetings were the closest thing the Athenians had to a New England town meeting today and at first glance look well suited to Habermasian-style deliberation. The number of attendees seems to have been relatively low—the only source mentions seventy-three voters—and all or almost all demesmen can be expected to have known one another. Indeed, the main responsibility of the demes was to establish the citizenship status of its members, through personal testimony and witnesses followed by a secret ballot under oath. Other powers included selecting councillors and other officials, organizing festivals, making dedications and passing decrees, especially honorific and financial decrees.

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128 This was not because of any discomfort with the idea of collective responsibility or expected difficulty in enforcing it. As Demosthenes 22 shows, the entire Council was held collectively responsible, and punished, for its failure to see that adequate ships were provided for the city.
129 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.3.15-49.
130 Lysias 12.25, 49, 50.
131 Cf. Lafont 2015.
133 On New England town meetings, see Mansbridge 1983.
134 Demosthenes 57.9.
135 Ps. Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 42.1; Isaeus 12; Demosthenes 57.62.
136 Aeschines 3.41, 44, 45; SEG 46.154, 59.142, IG II² 1177, IG I² 258.
How discursive were these assemblies? On the one hand, verbs of discussion and dialogue are not found in this context. The only source that depicts a deme meeting in any detail, a court speech from a defendant appealing his fellow demesmen’s vote to exclude him from citizenship, represents the actions of speakers (of whom only two are mentioned) by demegoreo, “speak publicly” or “address the demos,” grapho, “propose,” and blasphemo, “speak against” or “vilify,” while the actions of the audience (initially seventy-three demesmen, but only thirty by the end of the meeting) are represented only by (dia)sephizo, “vote.” Moreover, the meeting is portrayed as heavily dominated by the demarch (“mayor”), who had called it. This man is said to have “wasted the entire day making speeches (demegoron) and proposals (graphon),” and then to have rigged the vote against the defendant both by taking the citizenship votes late in the day, when many demesmen had gone home, and by distributing extra ballots to his associates.137

On the other hand, we have only one source, and must be doubly cautious given that it suited this defendant’s case to portray the meeting as dominated by his personal enemy. The defendant also makes it clear that had he had friends or relatives in the audience, he would have expected them to act as witnesses in his support, although whether that would have meant making a speech or simply swearing to his testimony is not indicated.138

Aside from the voting irregularities, this deme meeting seems to have resembled both the courts and the assembly, with speeches offered by very few attendees—in this case, one current and one former demarch—and voting as the primary if not only way that the other citizens made their views known. Might other deme functions have given rise to more discussion? Selecting councilors and other officials was determined by sortition from among those willing and almost certainly did not involve speech-making, but deciding who to honour and making financial decisions could well have been a more discursive process. Deme meetings could also have provided an opportunity to discuss issues coming up in the primary assembly, courts, or council, although studies of deme activity have found little overlap between local and “national” politics.139 The demarch in the case just described was also, in fact, a councillor, and yet there is no sign that he represented either the views of the council to the deme, or those of the deme to the council.140

5. The Street
Finally, we turn to what Alex Gottesman has recently termed “the Street”: Athens’ public squares, shops, gymasia, and private homes—something close to Habermas’s public sphere.141 We have more evidence of extra-institutional conversations on political issues than one might expect, including court speeches, the plays of Aristophanes, and Socratic dialogues by both Plato and Xenophon. How were these exchanges represented?

137 Demosthenes 57.8-16.
138 Demosthenes 57.12.
139 Osborne 1985; Whitehead 1987. The evidence available is, however, very thin.
140 Demosthenes 57.8.
Two verbs frequently found in descriptions of extra-institutional conversations are *dialego*, “converse” or “speak with,” and *anakoinoo*, “communicate,” “confer” or “consult with.” Both Xenophon and Plato used *dialego* and *anakoinoo* to represent discussions with Socrates on political and other topics, as did Isocrates in reference to his political writings, portraying them as a kind of a discussion with readers. In Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, the promise of political glory held out to Strepsiades included not only getting proposals passed in the assembly but also “always having many seated at your gates, wishing to communicate with you *(anakoinoustat)* and have a conference with you.” The Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* used *dialego* to represent conversations among people gathered outside the house of Ephialtes, the popular politician, while Xenophon portrayed Hermocrates, the Syracusan politician, as telling *(anekoinouto)* his associates about what he planned to say and do and soliciting their opinions in return.

An especially revealing source is a Socratic dialogue written by Xenophon, featuring Plato’s uncle Charmides, later one of the Thirty Tyrants. “Seeing that Glaucon’s son, Charmides, was a worthy man and much more capable than those who were then practising politics, but nevertheless shrank from coming before the assembly,” Socrates takes Charmides to task, suggesting that he is a coward for not making better use of his powers as revealed in his conversations with public men. “Whenever they consult *(anakoinontai)* with you, I find that you give excellent advice *(symbouleuonta)*, and whenever they make a mistake, your criticism is sound.” Charmides objects, directly contrasting dialogue with public speaking: “A private conversation *(idia te dialegesathai)* is not the same thing as a debate before the masses *(en to plethi agonizethai)*.” Socrates responds that Charmides need not be bashful in front of the “idiots and weaklings…the fullers or the cloggers or the builders or the smiths or the farmers or the merchants, or the traffickers in the market-place…who make up assembly meetings,” and continues: “You talk *(dialegomenos)* easily with the leading men in the state, some of whom despise you, and you are a much better talker *(dialegesathai)* than the usual politicians; yet you are shy of speaking *(legein)* to men who never gave a thought to public affairs and haven’t learnt to despise you—all because you fear ridicule!” Although the thrust of Socrates’ argument is that Charmides’ skill in political conversation *(dialego, anakoinoo)* could and should translate into skill in public debate *(agonizo, lego)*, the distinction between the two types of speech is clear.

The difference between performative speech aimed at persuading large audiences and smaller-scale, less combative dialogue also pervaded Plato’s works. The latter is portrayed positively in the opening pages of the *Protagoras*, as Socrates and his companion arrive at the house where Protagoras is staying. “When we got to the threshold, we stood discussing *(dielegometha)* some issue that had occurred to us on the way; and so as not to leave it unfinished, but to get it settled

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143 Isocrates 8.18.3, 9.34.8.
144 Aristophanes, *Clouds* 432, 470.
146 Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.7.
before we went in, we stood there and discussed (dielegometha) in front of the door, until we had come to an agreement with each other (synomologesan allelois).”

Such discussion is implicitly contrasted with the more antagonistic monologues that constitute Socrates’s later interactions with Protagoras. The same contrast appears in the Gorgias, where “our present way of discussion (dialegometha), by alternate question and answer” is explicitly preferred to “that lengthy style of speech of Polus.” Altogether, *dialego* was (at least in post-Socratic philosophy) strongly associated with non-agonistic discussion, including the extra-institutional discussion of political issues.

Was the word *bouleuomai*, “deliberate,” ever used to represent street-level political conversation? I have not found such an example. The only case that comes near appears at the beginning of Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata*. Standing before the Propylaia at the entrance to the Acropolis, the eponymous heroine complains that though the women have been “summoned to consider (*bouleusomenaisin*) the most important matters,” still they stay at home, snuggling in bed. But although the women are not here being summoned to the assembly, they are being called to a political meeting, where they will consider and arrive at a joint decision on how to get their husbands to end the war with Sparta. The reason that this meeting takes place in the street is, of course, simply that the women lack a regular political meeting-place. *Bouleuomai* also appeared in street-level conversations about politics when referring to individuals’ internal consideration of the way they would vote, as when in *Lysistrata* a woman, Myrrhine, says to her husband Kinesias, “But remember that you’re going to vote (psephie) for peace,” and he replies “I’ll deliberate on it (*bouleusomai*),” meaning he will think about it and decide. But *bouleuomai* was not used to represent the kind of conversation about political issues that might, eventually, affect a vote.

It does not follow that street talk had no impact on decision-making in Athens’ political institutions. A powerful example appears in Thucydides: having voted for mass execution of the Mytileneans following their rebellion against Athenian hegemony, the Athenians changed their minds following overnight discussions and a second debate in the assembly. Particularly striking, Thucydides implies that the second meeting was called specifically in response to widespread conversations, registered by the council presidents, revealing a change of heart (along with some lobbying by the Mytilenaean ambassadors then in Athens, and by those Athenians who supported them—presumably including Diodotus, who had argued against mass executions at the first meeting and who spoke again, against Cleon, at the second). According to Xenophon, Alcibiades, the controversial politician, was also the subject of widespread public discussion, and it is beyond belief that such discussion did not affect votes, especially when it was proposed to reinstate him as general. As Xenophon notes, “nobody spoke against him because the assembly

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152 Thucydides 3.36.
would not have accepted it.”

Additionally, Aristophanes’ *Wasps* represents judges gloating, on their way to a trial, about their intentions to vote down the defendant, who was known to them—although it should be noted that not long after that, the Athenians transitioned to choosing judges at random on the morning of trials, which put a stop to that kind of partial prior collusion.

Other authors confirm the existence of extra-institutional conversation but question its connection to voting outcomes. Isocrates wrote, mockingly: “We are so irrational that we do not hold the same views about the same question on the same day; on the contrary, what we condemn before we go up to the assembly, we vote for when we are assembled…and a little later, when we go home, we disapprove of the resolutions we made there.”

Demosthenes, too, remarked on the gulf between informal conversation and organized debates. “Before we come up to meetings, any one of you is ready to say how the present state of affairs may be improved, and then again, the minute you leave, each man is just as ready to say what we ought to do. But when we are actually gathered together and considering these problems…you hear nothing of this from certain speakers.” These passages suggest not only that the Athenians used different terminology to represent extra-institutional talk and institutional political activity, but also that at least some citizens believed that the imminence of decision-making could make a substantive difference to the way that assemblygoers thought about political issues.

The significance of the difference between non-consequential discussion and consequential deliberation—culminating in a binding vote—is brought home in another way in our texts. We have quite a lot of evidence that political activity was widely discussed after meetings. For example, Blepyrus and Chremes, in Aristophanes’ *Assemblywomen*, admit that they “go around babbling incessantly about whatever happens at the council,” while Theophrastus characterized a boor as one who “distrusts his friends and relatives, but talks (anakoinousthai) confidentially to his own slaves on the most important matters; and recounts all the news from assembly meetings to the hired labourers working on his land.”

Some of the most interesting of these passages feature dialogue between citizen men and women. Aristophanes has Lysistrata say: “Many a time we’d hear in our homes about a bad decision (bouleusamenos) you’d made on some great issue of state. Then, masking the pain in our hearts, we’d put on smile and ask you, ‘How did the assembly go today? Any decision (bebouleutai) about a rider to the peace treaty?’ And the husband would say, ‘What’s it to you?’” Another significant passage appears in Apollodorus’ speech, *Against Neaera*:

And when each one of you [judges] goes home, what will he find to say to his own wife or his daughter or his mother, if he has acquitted this woman?—when the question is asked you, “Where were you?” and you answer, “We sat as jury.” “Trying whom?” it will at once be asked, “Neaera,”

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154 Isocrates 8.52.
you will say, of course, will you not? “because she, an alien woman, is living as wife with an Athenian contrary to law, and because she gave her daughter, who had lived as a harlot, in marriage to Theogenes, the king, and this daughter performed on the city’s behalf the rites that none may name, and was given as wife to Dionysus.” And you will narrate all the other details of the charge, showing how well and accurately and in a manner not easily forgotten the accusation covered each point. And the women, when they have heard, will say, “Well, what did you do?” And you will say, “We acquitted her.” At this point the most virtuous of the women will be angry at you for having deemed it right that this woman should share in like manner with themselves in the public ceremonial and religious rites; and to those who are not women of discretion you point out clearly that they may do as they please, for they have nothing to fear from you or the laws.158

These male writers represented non-voting women citizens as being interested in public affairs. Yet the association of women with extra-institutional political talk but not decision-making also highlights the difference between discussion and deliberation/decision in classical Athens. Women’s influence on politics was limited to discussion, to moral suasion, often after the event. Dialogue, in this setting, was a tool of the excluded, that is, those who could at most influence political decisions, rather than participate directly in making them. What Lysistrata would not have preferred to be able to vote herself? Why did Praxagora and her associates, in Assemblywomen, take over the assembly, if not to swing a vote on the future of the polis? Again, the balance of our evidence suggests that although talk was important in Athens, decision-making, often through voting, was the crucial feature of the central concept of bouleuomai.

6. Conclusion
As defined by Jane Mansbridge and others, a deliberative system is “one that encompasses a talk-based approach to political conflict and problem-solving—through arguing, demonstrating, expressing and persuading.”159 Did classical Athens have a deliberative system of that sort?

The answer to that question depends, of course, on what we mean by “talk-based.” Talk certainly played a role in all parts of the political system: oratory in the courts and assembly, oratory mixed, perhaps, with some dialogue in the council and deme assemblies, and everyday talk in the street. From the extant sources we can derive a relatively clear sketch of these parts and their functions. Judges (dikastai) heard cases and came to a decision, revealed through voting (bouleuomai). Public speakers (rhetores) addressed the assembly (demegoreo) and offered advice (symbouleuo), while the audience (demos) listened—perhaps with some difficulty—and came to a decision, revealed through voting (bouleuomai). Councillors (bouleutai) drafted resolutions, presumably discussed many if not all, and passed them on to the assembly through voting (probouleuo). Demesmen (demotai) voted resolutions, presumably after some discussion, though evidence is

159 Mansbridge et al 2012, p. 5.
lacking. Dialogue (dialego), which resembles the back and forth mutual questioning and responding that is today often associated with the English word “deliberation,” was chiefly associated with extra-institutional settings, although it could be practiced in the interstices of the entire political system.

If “talk-based” implies that talk was the principal means through which Athenian citizens took part in the political process, however, then it is less clear that the Athenians had a “deliberative system” in the above-defined sense. “Political conflict and problem-solving” was managed, above all, by voting, both secret and public, in every formal political venue—council, assembly, courts, and deme assemblies. The distinctive feature of Athenian democracy was that citizens gathered in large numbers to decide actions by the result of votes, not that they took part in discussions or debates on a grand scale. Discussion was not represented as an integral part of the decision-making system in either the courts or the assembly (the supreme political bodies), while debates involved relatively few people and aimed at influencing votes, either immediately following or soon thereafter. Moreover, had Athens’ mass audiences not been empowered decision-makers, those debates would not have taken place, or rather, they would have occurred not before those audiences but before or among whatever smaller group was in power (as happened in 404). In that respect, public debate was itself a direct effect of mass voting.

More fundamentally, to the extent that a deliberative system presupposes “distributed deliberation,” i.e. the decoupling of considering issues from deciding them and the distribution of these functions among a variety of institutions, and to the extent that bouleuomai is the closest ancient Greek equivalent to “deliberate,” it is not clear that the ancient Greeks would have understood either the concept or its goals. As noted above, bouleuomai is probably best rendered “come to a decision” or “make up one’s mind.” Both considering and deciding were performed by the subject of the verb: to consider a matter without deciding it was, on the ancient Greek conception, not to “deliberate” at all. Accordingly, decision-making power could not be transferred to another agent without the one who merely considered or discussed the action ceasing to be a “delerator,” that is, the agent in whose power the considered action actually lay. In short, the Athenians would have had a ready answer to Mansbridge’s question: “In what sense can we say that whole societies, demoi, peoples or even different communities deliberate together?” People deliberate (bouleuomai) together when they decide together, whether or not they share their reasoning with one another.

What about legitimacy? A key theme in the literature on deliberative democracy is that, as Mansbridge puts it, “the legitimacy of a democracy depends in part on the quality of [discursive] deliberation that informs citizens and their representatives.” It is not clear that the Athenians thought this. Discursive deliberation was certainly not required, as revealed by both judicial practice and the preliminary votes in the assembly. That is not to suggest that the Athenians were oblivious to the quality of the arguments that informed citizens’ decisions (here thinking about

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160 Goodin 2005.
both internal deliberation and the speeches made by litigants and assembly speakers). There were, in fact, no limits on what litigants could argue, although they might be accused of slander by an opponent if they went too far. But there were guidelines for the judges’ internal deliberations, in that they swore to judge “in accordance with the laws and votes of the demos of the Athenians and the council of Five Hundred, and concerning matters about which there are no laws, by the most just understanding.” On the other hand, it was up to the judges, individually, to determine what arguments they found most relevant to their judgments, and as we have seen, they were neither required nor expected to share their reasoning with anyone else. Argumentation in the assembly and council was subject to stricter controls: for instance, speakers could be prosecuted for “lying to the demos,” while the proposers of decrees could be prosecuted for “making an illegal proposal.” But, again, it was up to individual assembly-goers to determine what arguments they deemed most relevant to their judgments. More crucially, there is no sign that the transgressions of speakers in any political arena were regarded as affecting the legitimacy of democracy. To the contrary, it was a frequently repeated trope of democratic ideology that the demos was always right and that any faults or errors of judgment lay exclusively with the speakers who had misled them.

As far as we can tell, the Athenians believed that the legitimacy of their democracy lay elsewhere, namely in the persons and procedures that defined the decision-making process. Decision-makers had to be eligible citizens of the appropriate age, as verified by the deme assemblies; items voted on by the assembly had to have been entered onto its agenda by the council, and so on. At each stage, the currency of legitimation was not the quality of deliberation (on either the ancient Greek or modern conception) but votes performed by the right people at the right time.

Most important among those procedures was the commitment to simple majority rule. Majoritarianism was not exclusive to democracies. As Aristotle argued, “one ought not to define democracy…merely as that system in which the majority (plethos) is authoritative, for even in oligarchies and everywhere the greater part (to pleon meros) [of the decision-making group] is authoritative.” But majoritarianism was particularly significant to democrats, since it provided an attractive way of drawing consensus, even unanimity, out of large-scale public disagreements. Homonoia, same-mindedness or concord, was (as Mirko Canevaro has recently reiterated) extremely important to the Athenians and other ancient Greeks. But such concord was not necessarily first-order, that is, the concord constituted by sharing a policy or judicial opinion. In many cases, the Athenians relied on second-order concord, namely, a shared willingness to abide by the decision procedure they

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163 Homicide trials were a significant exception: see Cammack 2015.
165 The classic treatment of iterated prosecutions is Osborne 1985b.
166 Ps. Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians 2.17; Thucydidès 2.59 (although cf. 2.60), 8.1; Xenophon, Hellenica 1.7.35; Demosthenes 20.3-4, 23.97; Ps. Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians 28.3.
167 Politics 1290a30-34. See further Schwartzberg 2013.
had adopted, in this case the decision of the majority as revealed by a vote. This commitment to majoritarianism was publicly valorized. Demosthenes sharply criticized Athenian speakers who failed to get behind decisions once they had been made. The Spartans, he argued, had the right idea about collective decision-making, “for they say, men of Athens, that among them each man airs any opinion he may have until the question is put, but when the decision is ratified, they all approve it and work together, even those who opposed it.” It was this, Demosthenes argued, that had enabled Sparta’s past successes and, *mutatis mutandis*, those of Athens too.

Once again, it does not follow that discussion was irrelevant to Athenian politics. Decision-making and discussion were mutually supportive, albeit largely distinct in space and time. In an important article of 1999, Jane Mansbridge argued that, “Everyday talk was once revered as the prime locus of the foundation of public judgment... It is time to broaden our descriptive and analytic horizons again and give adequate credit, as a critical component of democracy, to the entire deliberative system, including its centerpiece, the citizen’s everyday talk.” The discursive habits of the classical Athenians support this, with one qualification. Plausibly, it was the prospect of upcoming votes—including the possibility of as yet unscheduled votes—that stimulated high levels of everyday talk about politics in Athens. For obvious reasons, that hypothesis can neither be proved nor disproved. Yet if the ancient *polis* truly was, as Hannah Arendt suggested, “the most talkative of all bodies politic,” the likely reason is not that discussion was deliberately fostered within political institutions, but that the widespread right to take part in making political decisions prompted conversations about politics in all corners of Athenian society. While the legitimacy of Athenian democracy was secured by the participation of huge numbers of citizens in voting, both *en masse* and in smaller groups, one effect of that system may have been to encourage a great deal of meaningful dialogue about political issues—deliberation in the modern sense, if not the ancient Greek.

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169 Canevaro 2018 argues energetically against this claim. But while he convincingly shows that narrow votes were the exception rather than the norm in classical and (especially) Hellenistic Greek assemblies, he does not show what his argument requires, namely that large majorities, consensus, or near-unanimity were necessary for legitimate decision-making. I find it perfectly plausible that many proposals commanded very large majorities, even unanimity, as in the *procheirotonia*. But it does not follow that the Athenians or others did not accept the principle of majority rule—a view that is supported by considerable evidence, including much that Canevaro has not yet discussed.

170 Demosthenes, Exordium 35.3.

171 Mansbridge 1999, p. 228.


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