Abstract: Foreign aid is a policy instrument of limited budgetary scope that nonetheless generates highly contentious debate. While extant literature focuses almost exclusively on aid as a novel foreign policy tool in the post-World War II era, we argue that considering various types of aid-like activities in earlier historical periods can shed light on deeper international political dynamics of aid allocation. Building on extant research in political science and economics on aid donor interests, we introduce a novel framework linking aid giving to regional and international politics, particularly instances involving major and rival donors. We argue that donor aid allocation can often be understood based on its orientation to a regional or international political status quo. We populate the framework with a diverse set of historical and contemporary cases. In addition to highlighting the extensive but previously neglected historical role of aid in world politics, we show how accounting for both historical and contemporary cases helps differentiate aid allocation across different foreign policy objectives. Using these insights, we are able to provide concrete suggestions on how to sharpen future empirical research on the allocation of aid and other forms of state financing.

1 For helpful feedback and discussion, we thank participants from the Harvard University Department of Government’s International Relations Workshop in April 2017 and three excellent anonymous reviewers from a journal that rejected this paper.
2 BA Candidate, Department of Government and Law, Lafayette College, markovid@lafayette.edu
3 Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Government, Harvard University, strange@g.harvard.edu
4 Professor of Government, Harvard University, dtingley@gov.harvard.edu
1) Introduction

“Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid.” --Hans Morgenthau, 1962

Morgenthau (1962)’s treatment of aid as a new phenomenon in international relations reflects the persistent paucity of historical context in contemporary academic and policy debates surrounding foreign aid. The Marshall Plan, the celebrated $100 billion (in 2017 constant dollars) foreign aid program put in place by the U.S. following the Second World War, is typically perceived as the birthplace of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy (Wood 1986). Even those who acknowledge the existence of foreign aid that pre-dates the Marshall Plan tend to view 1945 as a “convenient starting point” for foreign aid research (Easterly 2002).

Nor is the focus on post-1945 aid a uniquely contemporary phenomenon: in the decades immediately following the Marshall Plan, many researchers considered foreign aid as a novel foreign policy phenomenon (Mckinley and Little 1977, Bauer and Yarney 1982).

However, the empirical record strongly suggests otherwise: foreign aid is not a new phenomenon in international relations. The historical roots of foreign aid predate the Marshall plan by centuries, even millennia. Pre- and early modern history contain innumerable examples of how decision makers from diverse political systems and geographic regions employed foreign aid as a strategic tool in regional and global geopolitics, particularly between major and rival powers.

Many of these historical instances of foreign aid-like activities bear remarkable resemblance to contemporary foreign aid, particularly when discussing the role of donor interests in aid allocation. In particular, we argue that throughout history foreign aid allocation has often been, and remains, closely linked to the status quo in regional or international politics.

We examine a wide sample of foreign aid cases in world history and consider donor motivations in the context of regional or political status quos. As we will detail below, we find that donors have consistently deployed foreign aid to restore, maintain or revise the geopolitical status quo across different periods and geographies. We document cases of status quo restoration in Greek city states and post-Westphalian Europe. We also describe various instances of status quo

---

5 Significant exceptions to this scholarly assumption exist, most notably research focused on the colonial roots of aid (Eyben 2014) and work that acknowledges the possibility of earlier aid but does not integrate pre-war cases into mainstream analyses (Picard and Buss 2009).
maintenance in China, Rome, and elsewhere. Aid to upset the status quo cases include French and British aid to America during the revolutionary period as well as Germany during World War I. To demonstrate how our simple typology of donor interests stretches across different time periods to the current day, we also provide modern analogs for each of these categories.

Beyond simply demonstrating the existence of pre-Marshall Plan foreign aid, we leverage these historical cases to provide concrete suggestions for improving future research on foreign aid. Specifically, patterns across historical cases can enrich our understanding of fundamental international political dynamics of foreign aid giving which are often neglected in the extant literature. While political scientists and economists have identified a diverse set of economic, political and security interests that motivate donors, the research community has made less progress on understanding how aid relates to deeper regional or international political positioning and competition. This is particularly true for the contemporary period---after the Second World War and, especially, since the end of the Cold War---during which humanitarian norms have coalesced around aid provision and have pressured donors to pursue altruism as a principle of aid provision.

Despite its special role in the post-war international order, our historical and contemporary cases suggest that aid has been and remains a classic foreign policy tool similar to military deployments, diplomacy or economic sanctions. This helps explain why nearly half of all countries worldwide are now aid donors, including 44 states which themselves are classified by the World Bank as low- or middle-income countries (Fuchs and Mueller 2017). Grasping the basic foreign policy objectives that underlie aid provision are thus as important as ever. This is particularly the case for researchers and decision makers grappling with aid flows from “emerging” non-Western donors often perceived as challengers to an incumbent, “status quo” aid regime dominated by Western states (Manning 2006; Walz and Ramachandran 2011). With these issues in mind, we leverage our analysis of aid and the status quo to offer concrete suggestions for how future research on aid and other forms of state financing can effectively capture these deeper international political dynamics.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We first take stock of the extant literature on foreign aid with special attention to the role of donor political interests in aid

---

6 Nor, of course, are aid and these other foreign policy tools independent of each other. For example, aid flows may increase following more direct, aggressive foreign policy tactics such as covert operations to change political status quos in order to maintain stability of a political outcome (Berger et al. 2013).
allocation and research on pre-Marshall Plan aid. Next, we build on this literature and introduce a simple framework using a broad definition of foreign aid that facilitates linking contemporary and historical cases for our analysis. The framework connects aid allocation with donors’ objectives regarding a regional or international political status quo and include a simple typology of three categories of donor intent vis-à-vis the status quo: restoration, maintenance, and disruption. We employ our typology to survey historical and contemporary cases of aid allocation, positing that generalizable patterns in aid allocation deeply tied to international politics endure across diverse time periods. Finally, we conclude by suggesting ways to further enrich contemporary aid debates and research.

2) Donor Interests and Pre-Marshall Plan Aid

In this section we preface our analysis of historical aid by surveying existing research on aid donor interests as well as pre-Marshall Plan foreign aid. While donor interests are widely acknowledged, much of the discussion focuses on specific political interests rather than deeper links between aid and international political dynamics. Comparatively, historical aid is scarcely covered in the literature, and suggest that greater attention to it may help shed light on underlying relationships between aid and international politics.

A. Aid Donor Interests and International Politics

Scholars widely recognize aid as a tool used by donor countries to pursue their interests. While Morgenthau described aid as “baffling,” the post-war proliferation of this foreign policy tool was less puzzling for other observers. Around the same period, other scholars recognized that the success of foreign aid, from the perspective of donors, was just as much linked to international politics as it was to recipient development outcomes (Mcguire 1952; Friedman 1958). In subsequent decades aid scholars have consistently unearthed evidence that donors use foreign aid to further their own political interests, often at the expense of recipient societies (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Burnside and Dollar 2000). Indeed, tension between recipient and

7 Others have recognized aid as but one of many forms of economic statecraft (Baldwin 1985).
donor needs has been a ubiquitous feature of the aid literature over the past seven decades (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Hoeffler and Outram 2011).

The donor side of this discussion has overwhelmingly focused on specific variables that measure a wide range of donor motivations linked to political, military and economic ends. Politically, these include securing UN votes (Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008), influencing the political behavior of states serving in international institutional leadership positions (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009), satisfying members of the winning coalition in the donor country (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007), fulfilling donors’ moral obligations to the international community (Lumsdaine 1993) and generally competing with rival donors (Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; Dunning 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2016).\(^8\) Militarily, aid has been deployed to maintain regional spheres of influence and alliances (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Younas 2008); invest in states with high levels of military potential (Lebovic 1988). Aid is also used for donor economic needs, such as securing economic and commercial advantages for donor firms (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Thangamani, Xu and Zhong 2011) and more generally responding to domestic foreign economic policy preferences in donor countries (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Milner and Tingley 2010; Milner and Tingley 2015).\(^9\) While donors differ significantly in their propensity to pursue each of these specific interests (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Berthélemy 2006), this stockpile of evidence forcefully demonstrates how donors use aid in pursuit of specific political, military and economic objectives.\(^10\)

Comparatively, however, we understand considerably less about how donors’ foreign aid reflects their deeper preferences regarding the international system.\(^11\) On the one hand, scholars

\(^8\) Further examples include the discussion of whether traditional western donor states prefer to proffer aid to autocratic or democratic regimes (Kono 2009) and the extent to which corruption may (Bodenstein and Faust 2017) may or may not (Alesina and Werder 1999) affect aid flows.

\(^9\) Even multilateral donors deliver aid in ways that reflect their interests, which often reflect the national interests of their constituent donors (Kilby 2006; Stone 2010; Vreeland and Dreher 2014).

\(^10\) Moreover, while there is a large body of research connecting aid with the political status quo, much of this research focuses on politics within recipient societies rather than international politics. This explores the potential effects of foreign aid on political stability (Yuichi Kono and Montinola 2009; Licht 2010; Bader 2015) and social stability more generally, such as levels of violent conflict (Savun and Tirone 2011; Nielsen et al. 2011; Dube and Naidu 2015; Bermeo 2016; Strange et al. 2017).

\(^11\) There are exceptions. Scholars of Japan’s foreign aid program have linked Japanese foreign aid to Tokyo’s international ambitions. Japan’s foreign aid provision has been used as an indicator of its international leadership and preference to maintain a capitalist world order in which Japan’s economy plays a prominent role (Rix 1989; Chan 1992; Tuman, Strand and Emmert 2009). An additional exception includes discussions of the impact of the
have explored major shifts in the provision of aid based on donor security interests the international development regime, including interstate competition during the Cold War and the reorientation of aid in line with donor interests in fighting terrorism (Poe and Meernik 1995; Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; Hook and Zhang 1998; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998; Dunning 2004; Fleck and Kilby 2010; Dreher and Fuchs 2011; Bapat 2011; Tuman, Strand and Shirali 2017). While both inter-donor competition and the effect of aid on the status quo are existing topics of inquiry, conversations are heavily focused on the implications of these dynamics for recipient development and the incumbent international development regime rather than implications for international politics (Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima and Moore 2006; De Mesquita and Smith 2009; Fuchs, Nunnenkamp, and Öhler 2015; Hernandez 2017; Swedlund 2017; Annen and Moers forthcoming).

Neglect of underlying international political drivers within research on aid contrasts starkly with work in other areas of foreign policy. Other foreign policy tools—such as military spending and development; security behavior during and outside of interstate crises; trade, investment, currency and other foreign economic policies; and aggregate national capabilities—are commonly used to gauge state intentions in the international system. In contrast, foreign aid research has tended to approach but not touch directly on the role of aid in international politics. For example, a recent literature explores the popular but questionable “rogue donor” narrative applied to China and other non-Western donors, which suggests aid from these donors is aimed solely at resource extraction and the construction of political alliances (Naím 2007). This work typically has not examined how Chinese aid reflects Beijing’s broader international political goals; it is focused primarily on the implications of non-Western aid for recipient societies and the international development regime. Still, the proliferation of contemporary Chinese foreign aid is a promising area in which scholars are beginning to consider the deeper politics of aid. For instance, scholars have explored the extent to which Chinese foreign allocation may be explained

---

12 Empirically, Chinese aid does not appear “rogue” since it is responsive to recipient economic needs and is no more tied to donor interests than Western aid (Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Dreher et al. 2017a).

13 Chinese aid may threaten the incumbent aid regime if it qualitatively changes the effectiveness (and therefore the incentives to provide) certain kinds of aid, such aid flows with high levels of conditionality. There is already evidence that Chinese aid makes it more difficult for donors such as the World Bank to issue conditional aid (Kilama 2016; Hernandez 2017; Swedlund 2017). In contrast, researchers have explored the deeper political motivations of Chinese security behavior, military expenditures, participation in international institutions, and diplomatic activities (Johnston 2008; Kastner and Saunders 2012).
by a strategic affinity for authoritarian regimes potentially rooted in a challenge to the western liberal democratic order (Bader 2015).

B. Pre-Marshall Plan Aid

If scholars have begun to grasp deeper interstate dynamics of aid, the same cannot be said for the historical origins of aid provision, which remain utterly absent from contemporary research. Consider a survey we performed in preparing this paper: we examined the 30 most influential journal articles on foreign aid between 1945 and 2017. As Table 1 illustrates below, authoritative research on foreign aid has almost entirely omitted pre-World War II instances of foreign aid.  

Part of the problem is likely related to data availability, as the empirical study of foreign aid typically relies on data over a much shorter time period---1950 to the present day---than for that of other foreign policies. For example, thanks to initiatives such as the Correlates of War project, international relations scholars are able to leverage data on militarized interstate disputes, state membership in the international system, interstate alliances, national capabilities, bilateral trade volumes, and participation in international organizations that dates to 1816.

Does the omission of foreign aid in pre-World War II history matter for contemporary aid research, particularly regarding the above discussion on donor interests? If post-war aid is not representative in terms of donor interests for aid in previous periods, then presumably contemporary aid research risks misrepresenting the underlying political motivations of foreign aid provision. One area of concern in this regard is the construction of altruistic humanitarian norms around foreign aid after World War II. Beginning with the Marshall Plan, with even earlier roots in colonial era aid, foreign aid grew into a foreign policy tool distinct from other ones such as military development and the use of force, diplomatic activities, and various foreign economic policies (Lumsdaine 1993). Specifically, for much of the post-war period foreign aid has been partially conceptualized as a vehicle for international humanitarian objectives, not simply donor interests. Many of the most cited scholarly works on the subject have correspondingly discussed the balance between humanitarian objectives and realpolitik for either

---

14 There are some studies that emphasize aid in earlier periods (Hjertholm and White 2000; Picard and Buss 2009; Eyben 2014).

15 Of course, humanitarian aid---even aid used for disaster relief---is also highly political and sensitive to donor interests (Drury, Olson and Van Belle 2005; Strömberg 2007).
specific countries (Pratt 1994, Brown et al. 1994) or have assumed humanitarian or development goals more generally (Moyo 2009;). While many studies referenced above emphatically demonstrate that donor interests often dominate altruistic, humanitarian ones, expectations that foreign aid is intended to be used in part to benefit recipient societies are far stronger.

In summary, while political scientists and economists have thoroughly explored the role of donor interests in foreign aid allocation, much of this research is mainly focused on concrete donor interests rather than more fundamental donor objectives regarding international politics. This orientation is potentially related to the outright omission of pre-war cases in empirical scholarship on foreign aid, which occurred in international political environments quite distinct from that of the contemporary period. As Table 1 demonstrates, the majority of the most influential studies on foreign aid are predominantly focused on the implications of aid for recipient societies rather than donor interests. Below we introduce a wide range of historical cases that demonstrate how aid has been deployed to pursue broad international political goals of donors for centuries. For example, European imperial powers used the allocation of aid as attempts to restore, maintain or revise geopolitical status quos throughout early modern and medieval history. Similarly, official government aid was an important policy tool of imperial Chinese regimes to impact the status quo both within and beyond the empire.

3) Aid Provision and the Status Quo

In this section we bring to light several important foreign aid cases in pre-World War II history. We first define aid broadly to enable rough comparisons of historical and analogous cases. We then conceptualize aid provision as being linked to international political status quos, integrating historical and contemporary instances of aid provision to demonstrate the persistence of fundamental donor interests over time.

A. Defining Foreign Aid

To facilitate our categorization of aid based on donor intent, and enable comparisons of aid-like activities across different periods and geographic locations, we adopt an expansive definition of foreign aid. We consider aid as any and all resources transferred from one government to another foreign government on concessional terms that attempts to accomplish a foreign policy
objective of the aid-granting government. This definition is broader than current authoritative definitions of “foreign aid” in the strict sense, such as the OECD’s definition of official development assistance (ODA). To qualify as ODA, a given financial flow from a donor government must have both have a minimum level of concessionality (meaning a 25 percent or higher grant element) as well as be primarily intended, at least nominally, for development in the recipient country. We prefer this broad definition since ODA was only institutionalized after World War II and we are interested in incorporating earlier cases of aid. Moreover, as ODA represents a shrinking fraction of global development flows, particularly given the rise of non-Western development finance (Dreher et al. 2017b), we prefer an expansive definition to capture other types of flows that also reflect broad donor interests.

More specifically, our definition is intentionally broad across three dimensions. First, we include aid across diverse issue domains and sectors, such as humanitarian and military aid. Second, we consider aid flows transferred through various channels, including direct cash and other material resource transfers such as in-kind aid, but also aid in the form of training and other services delivered by individuals of the donor government. Third, we include a broad palette of actors as potential donors and recipients. While we exclude independent non-state actors as donors, we allow for foreign aid provided by private entities closely aligned with the states they represent, including state-influenced enterprises. Similarly, we include rebel groups and dissident political factions in our aid recipient definition. We justify this decision by drawing on literature addressing the targeting of aid to specific intra-governmental factions. In the context of assessing past aid, establishing a definition that is sufficiently broad to allow for sub-categorization and to avoid omitting pertinent historic examples is the first step towards assessing the full body of aid-related evidence.

This flexible definition has multiple advantages for a historically-informed analysis of aid. It enables us to move beyond the predominantly humanitarian focus of aid research discussed above, as we include military and other forms of aid sometimes excluded from these analyses. We think this flexibility is especially valuable given that the future of the “rules of the game” regarding how to measure and report aid—such as the fundamental guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC)—is highly uncertain.
B. Defining and Applying Aid Categories through History

Having established a broad definition of aid, we introduce three sub-categories of donor intent. Broadly, the intentions of aid-granting powers can be described as falling into one of three categories: those that attempt to restore a previously destabilized geopolitical status quo, those that attempt to maintain such a status quo, and those that attempt to upset it.\(^\text{16}\) Below we demonstrate the value of decomposing donor interests into these categories as it enriches our understanding of the diverse ways in which donors employ aid as a foreign policy tool.

Each of the following subsections addresses a specific aid sub-category by providing historical examples and modern analogues. This evidence serves to address hitherto under-explored areas of aid scholarship by illuminating pre-Marshall plan aid, addressing non-developmental aid and discussing the broader strategic motivations of donors. For each subcategory we also comment on its evolution over time and relations to contemporary foreign aid.

I. Aid to Restore the Status Quo

Status quo restoring (SQR) aid is aid offered in the aftermath of a sudden, destabilizing shock. The most common source for such a shock has historically been a catastrophic natural disaster. While in a modern context such assistance is viewed primarily through a humanitarian lens, surveying historical cases reveals a greater focus on donor geo-strategic concerns. Unlike most geopolitical phenomena, earthquakes, cyclones, and tsunamis often occur absent warning and can cause sudden, unexpected shocks. In modern times, states important to regional or international status quos are less severely affected by natural disasters than they would have been centuries ago. They possess the technology and infrastructure (and, often, surplus supplies of food and other necessities) to withstand significant disaster-induced damage. However, in the past natural disasters had substantial geopolitical consequences due to the fragility of the societies of the time. As in modern times, historical politics surrounding the acceptance of such

\(^{16}\) Alternatively one could classify aid based on method (i.e., the precise instrument that is used). Classifying based upon method is certainly simpler, as it is readily apparent whether a nation has provided aid in the form of military advisors or through financial assistance.
aid were complex - with modern concerns surrounding “neo-colonialism” foreshadowed by similar fears of loss of sovereignty\textsuperscript{17}.

The Ancient Greek city-states provide several clear examples of SQR aid. These city-states, most famously Athens and Sparta, were historically interdependent. They were members of the so-called “Delian League,” a trade and security alliance. In 464 BC an earthquake of such magnitude that it was labelled by the historian Plutarch as the greatest yet recorded, devastated Sparta. It inflicted serious damage upon the city-state’s social, political and military infrastructure. The earthquake also provided an opening for rebels serfs (known as Helots) to launch an open revolt against Spartan rule. In response, various members of the Delian league acted swiftly to send a relief expedition intended to preserve Sparta’s political viability. The expedition included both military assistance in suppressing the Helot revolt and aid in rebuilding (Warner 1954, 101). The other members of the alliance were interested in protecting Sparta’s viability as a military power. The earthquake occurred less than 30 years after the famous allied Greek victory at the Battle of Marathon and in the midst of a series of attempted Persian invasions of Greece.

The parallels to modern foreign aid do not end with the physical aid itself. Also similar was the reluctance of the aid-receiving nation to accept foreign assistance for fears of creeping foreign control (Nelson 2010). That these complex interplays of aid and politics occurred among the Greek city-states was no coincidence. Their economic and military co-dependence led to frequent instances of proffered foreign aid and complex politics surrounding its acceptance. One of the principal origins of Spartan aid was the city-state of Athens. Sparta, while allied to Athens, maintained a dramatically different, and profoundly less democratic, social order and worldview. There were resulting substantial fears among the Spartan ruling class that the acceptance of Athenian aid would lead to the erosion of Spartan cultural and political independence - and in fact Athenian troops were sent back out of fears of creeping Athenian influence in Sparta. As in modern times internal fear of foreign “meddling “or some similar complaint, have led to myriad refusals of proffered foreign aid.

18th century Europe provides another example of SQR aid. In 1755 the Portuguese capital of Lisbon was devastated by an earthquake that is estimated to have approached a 9 on

\textsuperscript{17} Carnegie and Dolan (2011) argue that rejecting foreign aid can boost governmental status, both internally and to potential external adversaries by “cultivating an image of self-sufficiency”
the moment magnitude scale. The damage to the city itself and to the Portuguese economy was instantaneous and catastrophic. The international response was equally forceful. Portugal played a vital role in the European balance of power and the earthquake’s immense destruction created a temporary “revolution” in European geopolitics. As a result, several nations, including the main imperial rivals of the time, Britain and France, sent aid to the stricken Portuguese nation. This aid included the provision of advisors, both architectural and political, and of re-building supplies and direct financial assistance (Araújo, 2006).18

That this aid came from both sides of a fierce political and religious conflict demonstrates how pivotal a strong Portugal was in avoiding all-out conflict. SQR aid to Portugal also seems to have been highly successful from Lisbon’s perspective. While the exact causes of such an outcome are of course multifaceted, Portugal experienced an economic renewal in the aftermath of the 1755 earthquake (Pereira 2009). In this, as in future cases, efforts to restore the often precarious European balance of power led to myriad examples of SQR aid.

In previous millennia, natural disasters decimated political power structures and altered the balance of power. For example, the 1755 Lisbon earthquake is estimated to have led to an initial decrease in Portuguese GDP of between 32 and 48% (Pereira, 2009). However, in today’s world the profusion of surplus resources and economic prosperity might limit the geo-political utility of SQR aid, as sudden events might no longer have the broader geopolitical impact they once did. Some scholars have argued that “Economic development provides implicit insurance against nature’s shocks” (Kahn 2005) and that the vulnerability of such a populace (Strömberg 2007) is integral to calculating the threat posed by natural disasters. If true then SQR aid has become increasingly divorced from direct national interest. For example, American aid to Haiti (in the aftermath of the devastating 2010 earthquake) aid to Indonesia (in the wake of the 2004 Tsunami) are not characterized as significantly advanced US national security despite immense costs (Hyndman 2011).19 While functionally parallel, the geopolitical relevance of SQR aid may have evolved away from matters of immense geopolitical consequence.

18 An interesting path for future exploration would be to consider how much was aid in the Greek/Portugal cases about making sure elites stayed in power versus making sure damaged societies prospered to remain valuable strategic/economic partners.

19 U.S. aid did appear to help to spur a dramatic improvement in Indonesian people’s views of the United States (Tomorrow 2006). The SQR aid of ancient times was an often grievously expensive effort to restore balances of power and saved nations from ruin; today’s version accomplishes the far more subtle but still significant task of shifting public opinion and potentially expanding spheres of influence through primarily humanitarian interventions.
II. Aid to Maintain the Status Quo

Status quo maintaining (SQM) aid is designed to maintain a regional or international geopolitical status quo. Specifically, it refers to aid designed to avoid systemic shocks and maintain a regional or international status quo acceptable to the donor state. SQM aid tends to be subtler than other forms of aid and has greater longevity as a policy instrument. Correspondingly, historical SQM aid has been the province of empires or states with stable bureaucracies capable of long-term planning and coordination.

One of the earliest large-scale adopters of this technique was the Roman Republic (Gordon 1949). Rome’s peer and near-peer competitors traditionally emerged from the east (including Parthia and Sassanian Persia) and Judea, ruled most famously by King Herod, formed a useful buffer protecting Roman territory from potential incursions. However, Herod was besieged both by internal religious factions, specifically the Pharisees and the Sadducees, (Jacobson 2001, 24) and by external military threats, a situation parallel to the circumstances of modern US client rulers in the same region. The periodic revolts of these groups led to chaos and conflict including the famous destruction of the Second Temple (Cohen 1988). Further, the fractured religious and social fabric of Herod’s territory made direct conquest difficult. As a result, the Roman Republic provided direct military assistance, advisors and financial assistance to Herod. Members of Herod’s family were also educated in Rome. On a cultural level, Greek scholars and artists played a role in “Hellenizing Judea.” These factors combined to turn Herodian Judaea into a territory more culturally in line with Rome and one that played a vital role in keeping the eastern border of Rome “remarkably free from military strife.” (Fowler 1920, 259). Rome, as a well-established regional hegemon in both its republican and imperial iterations was profoundly interested in the maintenance of the status quo.

The Ottoman Empire was an entity of such fragility that it was known contemporaneous to its decline as the “sick man of Europe” (Çırakman2002). Yet as a member of the Central Powers alliance, the stability of the Ottoman state was of vital interest to its ally the German Empire. German Kaiser Wilhelm II personally saw the Ottoman state as both a vital bulwark against both the Russian Empire (Rogan 2017) and the locus of potential aggression against
British colonial possessions in the Middle East. Germany provided significant aid intended to stabilize and reinforce the military position of the Ottoman Empire (Demirci 2017). Specifically, German officers and technical experts were dispatched to Ottoman territory. Notable among these was General Otto Liman von Sanders, who led a reorganization of the Ottoman military and commanded the successful defense of Gallipoli against the Franco-British invasion. Germany also provided advanced military material including early model monoplanes, modern capital ships and artillery batteries. The failure of this broader strategy can be clearly read in the subsequent collapse of the Ottoman Empire. But Germany’s intent was clear – to preserve a powerful counterweight to Britain and Russia in the Middle East.

A prominent and controversial historical example of SQM aid can be found in the long-term, diplomatic relationships between the imperial China and its so-called “tributary” states. Despite its popularity among scholars and pundits, the “tributary system” in practice was less of a cohesive foreign policy structure than a set of largely independent bilateral diplomatic and economic relationships between the Chinese empire and foreign countries (Deng 1997; Perdue 2015). In any case, Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) emperors and their officials persisted in maintaining tribute relations with neighboring countries, often running at an economic loss and creating severe debt issues for Chinese officials responsible for receiving tribute missions, to nominally maintain China’s superior political position in the region. In particular, China’s imperial court was known for giving larger gifts than it received, and trade associated with tribute visits was not taxed in the early Ming period. Surrounding states including Japan, Korea and Vietnam sent “tributary” envoys to the reigning Chinese Emperor that facilitated trade and cultural exchange. These missions were reciprocated as Chinese envoys travelled to neighboring states. Tributes allowed for the exchange of goods and for a Sino-centric worldview centered around Confucianism to permeate surrounding states (at least in the eyes of Chinese leaders). The tributary system gradually declined throughout late imperial China and disappeared during the Qing Dynasty.

The colonial period offered several examples of European powers supporting regional potentates in order to prevent the emergence of hostile or rival powers. One of the most prominent such examples occurred in India, where the British Empire and related proxies paid subsidies and provided military material to a host of native rulers, most notably the Nizam of Hyderabad (Chancey 2006, Kaushik 2011). Until the final British consolidation of control of the
Indian subcontinent circa 1860, British forces in India were consistently outnumbered by their native adversaries. Complex webs of local alliances and subsidies were vital to ensuring the survival (Barua 2011) of friendly local potentates and to preventing advances on British territory from multiple geo-political adversaries, including France and several successive alliances of regional warlords. Britain eventually shifted to an offensive strategy in India, absorbing and conquering independent rulers, but for several decades Britain was interested in preserving its position as the dominant, but not absolute power on the subcontinent.

Status-quo maintaining aid has remained an important dimension of aid provision over past two millennia. The basic mechanism of providing resources and support to nations that are favorably inclined towards the donor nation, and whose stability is crucial for donor preferences regarding the status quo, has remained unchanged. Contemporary research on foreign aid acknowledges that aid has been used to prop up various types of regimes (Kona and Montinola 2009; Bader 2015). Related aspects of SQM aid have similarly remained constant, including the tendency to employ aid to support repressive or unstable regimes; consider U.S. aid to former Egyptian President Mubarak, or Chinese aid to North Korea’s Kim regime. One long-term lesson of SQM aid is that it often functions as a cost effective replacement for military force when superpowers are unwilling or unable to directly intervene in bordering trouble spots. These states are typically status quo powers intent on preserving the regional or global balance of power. However, despite such parallels, contemporary SQM aid is not identical to its ancient antecedents: As a consequence of the global reach and power projection capabilities of modern nation states, SQM aid has evolved from a regional, geography-constrained policy instrument to a global one.

One of the most well known contemporary examples of SQM aid is assistance rendered from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the totalitarian government of North Korea. Despite the North Korean regime's erratic and dangerous behavior, its continued existence is of the utmost importance to the PRC. If the North Korean state were to collapse it would produce two geo-political byproducts that would threaten the regional status quo. First, it would create a flow of potentially millions of starving, unemployed refugees who would flood into China’s northeastern Liaoning Province, creating a massive refugee crisis for China (Cha 1999). Secondly, the collapse of the North Korean regime would create a power vacuum in the Korean peninsula which would likely be filled by South Korea and the United States, both nations that
are potential rivals of China in the region. As a result, China provides enough humanitarian aid to keep the regime relatively stable and “effectively finances” North Korea’s massive trade deficit (Nanto 2009). Repeated attempts by the United States and its allies to move China away from its SQM position have unsurprisingly failed, however, China no longer encourages aggressive or provocative North Korean actions and recent relations between the two nations are widely seen as having deteriorated.

In summary, whoever, this pattern—the support, through SQM aid, of an important regime in a turbulent region—is consistently visible in the history of foreign aid giving. Indeed, similarly to China, contemporary U.S. aid provision prominently features SQM aid, primarily in the form of military aid to Israel and other players important for maintaining equilibria in fragile regional environments (McArthur 2011).

III. Aid to Upset the Status Quo

The third type of aid we discuss in this paper involves considerably more ambitious donor intent than do the previous two. Status quo-upsetting (SQU) aid is assistance proffered by donors states with the goal of fomenting unrest within, promoting aggression against, or otherwise de-stabilizing an adversary state. Foreign aid is often seen as a non-disruptive and pacific policy instrument relative to military and other foreign policy tools. However, such a view omits a crucial way in which donors have used aid to disrupt status quos throughout history. Given SQU aid’s inherently aggressive posture, it often takes the form of military material or hardware targeted for use in aggressive military action. However, this aid category also includes all assistance rendered with the purpose of facilitating aggressive action on the part of the recipient entity, including a wide range of logistical and financial support. SQU aid differs primarily from other aid types in that it is seen as fundamentally destabilizing. SQU assistance often provokes accusations of aggressive or expansionist designs on behalf of the aid-granting power and frequently involves the violation of an adversary state’s sovereignty. Crucially the practitioners of status quo upsetting aid often harbor revisionist intentions towards regional status quos.

---

20 This stands in sharp contrast to military SQM aid which is generally intended to serve as a deterrent to state aggression. This is a further example of the failings of method-based aid classification.
The American Revolutionary War prominently featured SQU aid. When the thirteen british colonies in America jointly declared independence in 1776, France was committed to disrupting British hegemony in North America. As such the French government provided substantial aid to the American colonies before and during the American war against the British Empire. French government officials offered financial support for colonists seeking to purchase arms, directly shipped military material past the Royal Navy and into the rebellious colonies, and dispatched military advisors to train the initially amateurish and undisciplined colonial army, the most illustrious of these being Gilbert Du Motier and the Marquis de Lafayette (Van Tyne 1925, 21). The precise causes of the eventual American victory are complex, but French assistance, irrespective of its precise effectiveness on the outcome, functionally resembled SQU foreign aid. France employed economic assistance and subtler forms of military assistance, such as advisors and armaments, to supplement more traditional military involvement in what was then still a British territory.

Further accentuating the parallels to modern aid, the formal treaty between France and the incipient American States, signed in 1778, had a stated purpose of effecting the “liberty, sovereignty and independence absolute and unlimited of said United States” (Hill 1922, 17) - a sharp contrast to the pre-war status quo of a prosperous and strategically vital British colony. Of any past example of foreign aid, French SQU aid to the American colonies most closely resembles its modern successors in both its stated purpose and its structure. France encouraged an insurgency hostile to its main geopolitical foe, a circumstance which is perhaps the most common pattern of SQU aid.

Not 50 years later, after having its American colonies receive substantial SQU aid from France, the U.K. itself began to employ aid of the same nature to weaken a powerful adversary. There is evidence of British employment of minimal financial SQM and SQR aid as early as the 14th century (CPH, 1931). However, by the time of the Napoleonic conflicts in the late 18th century, the British state had dramatically expanded the scope and complexity of its financial aid mechanisms. By the middle stages of the 1790s Great Britain actively and repeatedly employed subsidies as a form of SQU aid intended to undermine the French revolutionary (and later imperial) states. For example, from 1794-1796, £2,500,000 was granted to Frederick William, II, the King of Prussia, in order to facilitate Prussian aggression against France.
Almost 20 years later, during the closing stages of the Napoleonic War Britain continued to employ SQU aid to accomplish its political and military objectives. In March of 1814, Britain concluded treaties with Prussia, Russia and Austria in which it promised to “furnish a Subsidy of £5,000,000” to those powers to facilitate the “salutary purpose of putting an end to the misfortunes of Europe.” British financial foreign aid over the last four years of the Napoleonic War (including the 100 days campaign) totaled somewhere between 30,000,000 and 50,000,000 pounds, an amount approximately equivalent to 50% of annual public spending (in constant pounds) at the beginning of the conflict (Mitchell, 1971). These followed earlier attempts to provide humanitarian aid (Götz 2014) and, during the so-called “second coalition” (Schroeder 1987) build an enduring anti-French alliance, in part through the provision of subsidies. In the long run, these aid mechanisms were so ubiquitous in British foreign policy that they became known as “the Golden Cavalry of St. George.” (Calomiris and Haber, 99, 2014).

The First World War is widely acknowledged as the locus of an aborted power transition between the German and British Empires. In the decade leading up to that conflict, Germany provided military SQU aid to the incipient Irish Easter Rebellion. Long a disaffected British territory, Ireland was ripe for rebellion in the early 20th century. Prominent Irish rebels saw the outbreak of the First World War as an excellent opportunity to instigate an open conflict with Britain. Seeking a means to open a second front against British interest, Germany saw Irish discontent as a prime opportunity. On the 24th of August, 1914 the German Ambassador to the United States met with representatives of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and its American counterpart, Clan Na Gael. There, and at further meetings with German officials both in neutral nations and within Germany itself, plans were made for the provision of “arms and munitions” to Irish republican forces. While many of these war materials were intercepted in route by British forces after the war started, as late as 1913 German weapons were arriving un-impeded in Ireland (Sloan, 2013). Further, German propaganda attempted to stir up anti-British sentiment in Ireland. These efforts culminated in the ultimately unsuccessful Easter Rising of 1916. However, German SQU aid succeeded in that it turned a significant portion of previously peaceful British territory into “a theatre for political warfare.”21

---

21 As discussed in the section describing status quo maintaining aid, the strategic importance of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War was paramount. Here too we see a role played by British and French SQU aid to foment and support rebellion. Both Britain and France provided significant financial and material support to an Arab nationalists rebellion lead by Sharif Husayn, the ruler of the Hejaz in
SQU aid remains an important foreign policy tool for contemporary aid donors. One recent and notorious example is Russian aid to Eastern European and other states, including even the United States, as part of a broader attempt to re-expand its regional and international influence. Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia has become a global pioneer in de-stabilizing aid (Smith and Harari 2014). The Russian government or its subsidiaries have provided funding, materiel and technical support to a host of pro-Russian political parties, states and insurgencies on a truly global scale. In France, a bank linked to the Russian government has provided in excess of $10 million to the anti-Atlanticist, Russophilic National Front. In the Ukraine, anti-government rebels have been provided with military hardware (including, as alleged by an international report\(^{22}\), the “BUK” surface to air missile that was used to shoot down a Malaysian civilian airliner, technical expertise and financial support (Gibney 2015).

These actions have the common goal of expanding Russian influence and weakening anti-Russian alliances. In a contemporary geo-political climate where open aggression would be far more likely to provoke retaliation or intervention, de-stabilizing aid allows revisionist states to accomplish their objectives by subtlety and subversion. A high ranking Russian army officer described this strategy as follows: “The use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other-non military measures” to transform “thriving” adversaries into a “web(s) of chaos, catastrophe and civil war” (Kirchik 2017, 215).

Status-quo upsetting aid differs from our other aid categories in that it is a fundamentally aggressive policy instrument. Further, it is one that may increase in potency in the years to come. French aid to the US colonies had to be smuggled past a British blockade on a month-long shipborne journey across a hostile ocean. Today, military material can shipped through legitimate trade channels, or in the form of technical information, be transmitted seamlessly through electronic channels. This new reality is reflected in policy making. A 2017 report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence identified several security priorities that are closely linked to the provision of foreign aid - including countering subversive Russian assistance in eastern Europe, balancing against China’s growing influence and aid allotments throughout the

---

\(^{22}\) https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-vliegramp/presentaties/presentation-joint/
global south, and reacting to several instances of de-stabilizing aid in the Middle East (Coats 2017).

4) Conclusion

In sampling foreign aid cases across diverse historical periods and geographic regions, we have attempted to lay out fundamental but persistent donor interests regarding the international status quo. These deep donor interests, we contend, pervade not only historical but contemporary aid giving, even in an era featuring relatively strong humanitarian norms around aid as well as precise rules and definitions about what counts as aid. While pre-existing scholarship explores an eclectic menu of donor interests, the underlying international politics of aid have remained relatively elusive. By integrating historical and modern aid provision into a unified discussion, we have attempted to shed some initial light on consistent role of foreign aid as a central foreign policy tool across political systems and historical eras.

Our objective is not simply to point out the omission of historical cases, though doing so is an important contribution to a massive literature that almost entirely omits aid activities before World war II. Rather, while our argument calls for paying more attention to pre-war aid, it also offers concrete ways to enrich contemporary empirical research on foreign aid donor interests. In other words, these historical cases and the conceptual framework they fit into regarding aid and the status quo provide hints about where to look to better understand contemporary aid donors.

In particular, the bulk of empirical research on donor interests relies on cross-national, time series analyses that often include all developing countries regardless of their strategic significance to a particular donor. Data of this nature is unlikely to fully reveal the nature of donor interests because donors are relatively uninterested in many of the recipients included in these studies. Specifically, future empirical studies could explore whether and how status quo concerns factor heterogeneously into aid allocation decisions. For example, one recent study explores whether recipients with new governments, particularly in countries that are allies to the United States and thus are arguably more relevant for tipping the geopolitical status quo, are politically attractive to China (DiLorenzo and Cheng 2017). Future work could develop strategies for identifying recipients likely to be most relevant for a given donor in terms of restoring, maintaining or disrupting a regional or international status quo. For example, many donor aid agencies, such as Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japanese
government’s primary aid unit, maintains and updates a list of priority recipients in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that provides an ostensible list of foreign policy priorities (Fuchs et al. 2017). More broadly, for a particular donor or set of donors, scholars can ask the question, if a donor was interested in restoring, maintaining or disrupting a regional or international status quo, which recipients would it target, and how?

In addition, our historical survey strongly suggests that there is significant research value in escaping narrow definitions of foreign aid when studying potential links between donor interests and aid allocation. Existing studies that integrate both economic and military aid are certainly a positive first step in this regard, yet we lack reliable military aid data for many important donors. Moreover, the proliferation of non-ODA financing by state government such as China and other BRICS donors---such as India in South Asia---provides contemporary fodder for adapting an relatively open-ended definition of aid that lowers the risk of omitting key flows that reveal true donor intentions (Bräutigam 2011; Walz and Ramachandran 2011). Our historical cases above perform the same function: they demonstrate that whether or not these various examples would qualify as “aid” under current international standards is perhaps less important than capturing the full extent of donor activities. Doing so can more validly identify deeper donor interests and help further explain the status quo politics of aid allocation.

References


Çırakman, A. (2002). *From the" terror of the World" to the" sick Man of Europe": European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth* (Vol. 43). Peter Lang.


Fuchs, Andreas; Nunnenkamp, Peter; Öhler, Hannes (2013) : Why donors of foreign aid do not coordinate: The role of competition for export markets and political support, The World Economy 38.2: 255-285


Swedlund, Haley J. "Is China eroding the bargaining power of traditional donors in Africa?." International Affairs 93, no. 2 (2017): 389-408.


