

Altruistic or Expected Leadership?

Laboratory Evidence on What Motivates Pro-Social Influence*

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Online Appendix

A Additional Tables

Contribution in Influence Contingency	Contribution in No-Influence Contingency														Total
	0	1	5	10	15	20	25	30	33	35	38	40	45	50	
0	47	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	48
5	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
10	3	0	0	14	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	21
20	1	0	0	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
25	1	0	0	1	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
30	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	2	12
33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
35	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
40	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	6	0	0	0	5	0	1	14
45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
50	2	1	0	0	0	5	0	2	0	0	0	6	0	36	52
52	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
60	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	7
65	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
70	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	6
75	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
80	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	6
85	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
99	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
100	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6
Total	57	1	4	17	2	23	7	20	1	1	1	14	2	56	206

Table 6: Joint Frequency of Contributions in the Influence and No-Influence Contingencies: First Half

Contribution in Influence Contingency	Contribution in No-Influence Contingency														Total
	51	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	88	90	95	98	99	100	
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
40	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
45	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
50	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	9
51	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
55	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
60	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
65	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
70	0	0	1	0	8	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	11
75	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5
80	0	0	3	0	2	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	16
85	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
88	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
90	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	6
94	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
99	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
100	0	0	1	0	2	1	4	0	0	1	0	0	1	113	123
Total	1	4	8	1	17	6	16	4	1	8	2	1	2	117	188

Table 7: Joint Frequency of Contributions in the Influence and No-Influence Contingencies: Second Half

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Seeks	Seeks	Seeks
	Primacy	Primacy	Primacy
Contribution in Influence Contingency	0.00311** (0.000710)	0.00244** (0.000842)	0.00128 (0.00106)
Dep Variable Mean	0.612	0.612	0.612
Observations	273	273	273
R^2	0.066	0.128	0.185
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the coefficient β of the model $Y_i = \beta X_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$, with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover seeks primacy (that is, implements the influence contingency). The independent variable, 'Contribution in Influence Contingency', is the amount contributed by the first-mover in the influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: The More First-Movers Contribute in the Influence Contingency, the More Likely They Are To Seek Primacy, Although Significance Disappears When We Control for Beliefs

B Experimental Procedures in the US and Mexico Pools

B.1 US Pool

Procedure. Participants were recruited through the Harvard Decision Science Lab subject pool. They were paid a 5 USD show-up fee. A session is composed of two sign-up times, twenty minutes apart. The first group was composed of first-movers, the second of second-movers. Subjects were received in a lobby, where they were asked to sign a consent form with the experimenter’s contact information as well as that of the Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research at Harvard University. Once all subjects finished filling out the consent forms, they drew a piece of paper and a key. The paper assigned them to their cubicles; the key opened a personal locker in a private room where they could pick up the payment at the end of the session. The random key assignment and the personal locker ensured that the subjects’ decisions would be anonymous to the experimenter.

First-movers and second-movers were in separate rooms. Each room had twelve cubicles, and 15 slots were offered per room during recruitment to account for attrition. First-movers are randomly and anonymously matched to one second-mover each. If there were more first-movers than second-movers in a given session, first-movers were matched to a second-mover in a future session. Once seated, the introductory instructions were read out loud. Special attention was paid to make sure the instructions were clear (several pilot sessions were conducted to test for comprehension). All reading material was in English.

The rest of the instructions were read by each subject on their own computer screen, which ran the session using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).

Subjects were endowed with 10 USD.

Randomization of contribution decisions. First-movers were asked to first make their contribution in one of the contingencies, and then in the other. We randomized in which contingency first-movers first made their contribution decision. In Appendix C.2 we analyze ordering effects for this sample.

Implementation decision. First-movers were told that they would make three decisions of how

to divide their endowment, with the first two decisions being the contribution decisions in the influence and no-influence contingencies. In the third decision made by the first-mover, she must choose which of the first two decisions she would like to replicate. That is, suppose she had originally decided to contribute x in the influence contingency, and y in the no-influence contingency. Then in her third decision she has two options: a influence contingency in which she again contributes x , or a no-influence contingency in which she again contributes y . Since only one of the three decisions is implemented with equal probability, the third decision then simply doubles the probability with which one of her first two contingencies and corresponding decisions is implemented (from $1/3$ to $2/3$).

Second-movers. Second-movers were assigned into three treatments. One group, corresponding to the no-influence contingency, observed what first-movers contributed after making their own decision. There were two groups of second-movers whose decision corresponded to that of the influence contingency. Both groups observed what their first-mover chose before making their own contribution decision. Before making their contribution decision, they guessed what first-movers in the influence contingency contributed on average. One group knew that nobody would observe their contribution decision. The other group knew that their contribution decision would be observed by a group of first-movers (different than their own first-mover) who had no more decisions to make. The analysis of these second-movers can be found in Fernández-Duque and Hiscox (2022).

After making their contribution decisions, second-movers played the same guessing game played by first-movers, and answered personality and socio-demographic questions.

B.2 Mexico Pool

Procedure. Participants were recruited through emails sent to undergrad listservs, and through reaching out to professors to implement the experiment in their classes. Subjects were not paid a show-up fee.

First-movers and second-movers answered their surveys in different moments. In a first phase

of the experiment, we implemented the part of the experiment that corresponded to first-movers. Once that phase was done, we implemented the part that corresponded to second-movers (at later dates). First-movers answered the survey through Qualtrics on their phone, tablets, or computers. They filled out and signed a physical consent form. There was always a proctor present. First-movers' survey lasted thirty minutes, and responded the survey in a classroom with a proctor present. Second-movers' survey lasted five minutes, and responded to the survey online. They acknowledged reading the consent form as part of their online survey.

All reading materials were in Spanish, and all instructions except their consent form was read on their screens.

We implemented a series of checks to make sure that subjects would not take the experiment more than once. Subjects were aware of these checks. For first-movers, there was a single proctor for the implementation, who made sure first-movers did the experiment only once. For second-movers, the logistics were a bit more involved. In order to be paid, all subjects needed to go to a secretary's office. The secretary was unaware of the experimental design. They would have to provide their university ID card and the experiment's randomly generated five-digit ID number. The secretary would add the subject's name to a list. (Note that this list was obtained and stored separately from the experimental results, so we could not link the responses to individuals.) The secretary would then verify that there was indeed a sealed envelope with that ID number, and would hand the envelope to the subject.

Subjects were endowed with 100 MXN.

Contribution decisions. First-movers chose their contribution decisions simultaneously.

Implementation decision. When making their contribution decisions, first-movers knew that only one contingency would be implemented. After making their contribution decisions, they were told that the contingency to be implemented would be drawn from an urn with three balls. They had to choose the composition of the balls in the urn. They could choose an urn with two balls that would lead the influence contingency to be implemented and one that would lead the no-influence contingency to be implemented, or an urn with two balls that would lead the no-

influence contingency to be implemented and one that would lead the influence contingency to be implemented.

Second-movers. Second-movers were assigned into two treatments: they saw what their first-movers contributed either before or after making their own contribution decision. They did not answer any questions before or after making their contribution decisions.

C Robustness

C.1 Using Expectations Instead of Social Expectations

	Mean	S.D.	Max	Min	Count
Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.58	0.27	1.00	0	390
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	0.38	0.24	1.00	0	390
Expectations in Influence Contingency Contributed Extra	0.56	0.20	1.00	.20	86
Expectations in Influence Contingency Did Not Contribute Extra	0.58	0.30	1	0	304
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency Contributed Extra	0.32	0.19	0.80	0	86
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency Did Not Contribute Extra	0.40	0.25	1	0	304
Contr. Satisfies Expectations Contributed Same	0.71	0.46	1	0	273

‘Expectations in Influence Contingency’ is the first-mover’s belief of what other first-movers contributed on average in the influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). ‘Expectations in No-Influence Contingency’ is defined analogously. The rest of the variables, except for the last one, limit the sample to those who contributed extra or to those who did not contribute extra. ‘Contribution Satisfies Expectations | Contributed Same’ is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover’s contribution is weakly higher than her expectations in the influence contingency (that is, how much she believes first-movers contribute in the influence contingency).

Table 9: Summary Statistics of Beliefs Relevant to Expectations Concerns, Using Expectations Instead of Social Expectations

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution
Influence Contingency	1.039 (2.159)	1.367 (2.104)	1.608 (2.087)
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	0.228** (0.0660)	0.205** (0.0649)	0.170* (0.0714)
Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.0999** (0.0300)	0.103** (0.0377)	0.131* (0.0533)
Slope of Response	-1.457** (0.393)	-1.632** (0.382)	0.198 (0.722)
Counterfactual Contribution	0.822** (0.0550)	0.843** (0.0494)	0.895** (0.0430)
Influence Contingency \times Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	-0.0230 (0.0553)	-0.0153 (0.0524)	-0.0316 (0.0542)
Influence Contingency \times Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.185** (0.0585)	0.167** (0.0570)	0.172** (0.0551)
Influence Contingency \times Slope of Response	0.674* (0.272)	0.673* (0.272)	0.663* (0.270)
Influence Contingency \times Counterfactual Contribution	-0.195** (0.0529)	-0.187** (0.0509)	-0.184** (0.0495)
Dep Variable Mean	58.31	58.34	58.34
Observations	778	776	776
Clusters	389	386	386
R^2	0.710	0.730	0.751
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the γ coefficient vector of model $Contribution_{i,c} = \beta InfluenceC_{i,c} + \delta \mathbf{X}_i + \gamma InfluenceC_{i,c} \times \mathbf{X}_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$. An observation is a subject-contingency (i, c) , and standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The dependent variable is the contribution out of ten dollars. 'Influence Contingency' is an indicator variable for the influence contingency. 'Expectation in Influence Contingency' is the first-mover's guess of the average contribution in the influence contingency. 'Expectation in No-Influence Contingency' is the first-mover's guess of the average contribution in the no-influence contingency. The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 10: Expectations Yield Similar Empirical Results Than Social Expectations Regarding Contributions

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Seeks	Seeks	Seeks
	Primacy	Primacy	Primacy
Contribution Satisfies Expectations	0.0849 (0.0696)	0.0647 (0.0737)	0.0590 (0.0753)
Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.00351** (0.00133)	0.00303 (0.00158)	0.000328 (0.00193)
Expectations in No Influence Contingency	0.000543 (0.00150)	0.000358 (0.00167)	-0.000192 (0.00172)
Dep Variable Mean	0.612	0.612	0.612
Observations	273	273	273
R^2	0.072	0.132	0.182
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the coefficient β of the model $Y_i = \beta X_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$, restricted to first-movers who contributed the same amount in both contingencies, and with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover seeks primacy (that is, implements the influence contingency). The independent variable is 'Contribution Satisfies Expectations', an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover's contribution is weakly higher than her expectations in the influence contingency (that is, how much she believes first-movers contribute in the influence contingency). The regressions include controls for expectations in the influence and no-influence contingencies. The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Satisfying Expectations Does Not Predict Seeking Primacy Among Those Who Contributed the Same Amount in Both Contingencies

C.2 US Sample: Ordering Effects

Table 12 shows the balance table for a range of values depending on which contingency first-movers were faced with first. There are only two variables which are significantly different: whether the first-mover thinks Save the Children fulfills its objectives, and whether the first-mover reportedly talks about her own values. Since we are considering 22 variables, the significance of these variables is consistent with random noise.

	No-Influence C.		Influence C.		Mean Diff t
	First		First		
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	
Age	30.88	(14.27)	30.84	(12.08)	0.01
Gender (Female=1)	0.57	(0.50)	0.61	(0.49)	-0.41
Finished College	0.67	(0.47)	0.82	(0.39)	-1.61
Student	0.57	(0.50)	0.45	(0.50)	1.12
Economics Major	0.16	(0.37)	0.18	(0.39)	-0.23
Past Experiments	11.65	(16.86)	7.36	(6.44)	1.65
Knows Save The Children's Objective (10-point scale)	5.98	(2.67)	5.64	(2.71)	0.61
Thinks Save the Children Fulfills Objective (10-point scale)	5.61	(2.06)	4.32	(2.33)	2.82*
Has Taught A Course	0.45	(0.50)	0.50	(0.51)	-0.49
Is Oldest Sibling	0.92	(1.10)	0.61	(0.97)	1.42
Has Children	0.10	(0.31)	0.07	(0.25)	0.58
Has Been Team Captain	0.63	(0.49)	0.66	(0.48)	-0.26
Has Subordinates	0.24	(0.43)	0.25	(0.44)	-0.06
Risk Tolerance (10-point scale)	5.92	(2.36)	5.89	(2.07)	0.07
Enjoys Control Over Others	0.22	(0.42)	0.32	(0.47)	-1.01
Thinks Others Motivated By Personal Gain	0.33	(0.47)	0.27	(0.45)	0.56
Talks About Own Values	0.29	(0.46)	0.52	(0.51)	-2.36
Doesn't Trust Others	0.22	(0.42)	0.14	(0.35)	1.10
Hesitant About Taking Initiative In A Group	0.10	(0.31)	0.11	(0.32)	-0.18
Predicts Behavior Accurately	0.22	(0.42)	0.30	(0.46)	-0.77
Looks Out For Group Welfare	0.59	(0.50)	0.70	(0.46)	-1.13
Inspires Enthusiasm For Projects	0.47	(0.50)	0.55	(0.50)	-0.73

Table 12: Balance Table According To Sequencing of Contingencies

Table 13 shows ordering effects on contributions (column 1), social expectations (columns 2 and 3), and implementation decisions (column 4). The regressions do not include controls because they come after the randomization of the order. The interaction term in the first column shows that first-movers contributed significantly more in the influence contingency when their first contribution was made in that contingency. This seems to be driven by a few first-movers in the first group who contributed much more in the influence contingency. Whatever the order, first-movers contribute more in the influence contingency, although insignificantly so when the no-influence contingency comes first. The second and third column shows that making a contribution in the in-

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Contribution	S.E. in Infl. C.	S.E. in No-Infl. C.	Implement. Decision
First Contribution is in Influence Contingency	0.533 (0.733)	0.846 (0.476)	-0.242 (0.477)	0.210 (0.118)
Influence Contingency	0.122 (0.0908)			
Influence Contingency × First Contribution is in Influence Contingency	0.764* (0.334)			
Contributed Extra				-0.165 (0.175)
Contributed Extra × First Contribution is in Influence Contingency				-0.294 (0.225)
Dep Variable Mean	2.984	3.309	3.255	0.441
Observations	186	93	93	93
Clusters	93	—	—	—
R^2	0.024	0.034	0.003	0.101
Controls	No	No	No	No

The first column reports the γ coefficient vector of model $Contribution_{i,c} = \beta Influence_{i,c} + \delta X_i + \gamma Influence_{i,c} \times X_i + \phi W_i + \varepsilon_i$. An observation is a first-mover-contingency in the first column, and standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the first-mover level. The dependent variable is the first-mover's contribution in the first column. In the second to fourth columns, the table reports the coefficient β of the model $Y_i = \beta AltruistCondition_i + \phi W_i + \varepsilon_i$. An observation is a first-mover in these columns, and standard errors are robust. The dependent variable are social expectations in the influence contingency in the second column, social expectations in the no-influence contingency in the third column, and whether the first-mover made the influence contingency more likely to be implemented in the last column (an indicator variable equal to one if she made the influence contingency more likely to be implemented). 'First Contribution is in Influence Contingency' is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover's first contribution was in the influence contingency. 'Influence Contingency' is an indicator function equal to one if the contingency is the influence contingency. 'Contributing Extra' is an indicator equal to one if the first-mover contributed more in the influence contingency.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 13: Ordering Effects on Contribution and Implementation Decisions

fluence contingency first marginally increases social expectations in the influence contingency, and does not affect social expectations in the no-influence contingency. The last column shows that the implementation decision was not significantly affected by the order for those who led relative to the rest. In results not shown, the impact of ordering is also insignificant on overall implementation rates.

D Tables Limited To Mexico and US Samples

D.1 Tables From Main Text

<i>Panel A. Contribution Decisions</i>					
Influence-Contingency Contribution	0.32	0.37	1.00	0	93
No-Influence-Contingency Contribution	0.27	0.35	1.00	0	93
Contributed Extra	0.22	0.41	1	0	93
Contributed Same	0.73	0.45	1	0	93
Contributed Less	0.05	0.23	1	0	93
Absolute Difference In Contributions Contributed Extra	0.26	0.24	1.00	0.10	20
Absolute Difference In Contributions Contributed Less	0.12	0.04	0.1	0.2	5
<i>Panel B. Implementation Decisions</i>					
Percent Implementing Influence Contingency Contributed Extra	0.20	0.41	1	0	20
Percent Implementing Influence Contingency Contributed Less	1.00	0.00	1	1	5
Percent Implementing Influence Contingency Contributed Same	0.47	0.50	1	0	68
Percent Implementing Influence Contingency Contributed Same, Below or Equal the Median	0.29	0.46	1	0	35
Percent Implementing Influence Contingency Contributed Same, Above the Median	0.67	0.48	1	0	33

“Influence-Contingency Contribution” is the percent of her endowment the first-mover contributed in the influence contingency. “No-Influence-Contingency Contribution” is the percent of her endowment the first-mover contributed in the no-influence contingency. “Contributing Extra” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the first-mover contributed more in the influence contingency than in the no-influence contingency. “Contributed Same” and “Contributed Less” are defined analogously. “Absolute Difference in Contributions | Contributed Extra” is the absolute difference in contributions (as a percent of her endowment) in the influence and no-influence contingencies among those who contributed more in the influence contingency. “Absolute Difference in Contributions | Contributed Less” is defined analogously. “Percent Implementing Influence Contingency | Contributed Extra” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the first-mover made the the influence contingency more likely to be implemented, among those who contributed more in the influence contingency than in the no-influence contingency. “Percent Implementing Influence Contingency | Contributed Less”, and “Percent Implementing Influence Contingency | Contributed Same” are defined analogously.

Table 14: US Sample: Summary of Outcome Variables

	Mean	S.D.	Max	Min	Count
<i>Panel A. Contribution Decisions</i>					
Influence-Contingency Contribution	0.69	0.32	1.00	0	301
No-Influence-Contingency Contribution	0.65	0.34	1.00	0	301
Contributed Extra	0.23	0.42	1	0	302
Contributed Same	0.69	0.47	1	0	302
Contributed Less	0.09	0.28	1	0	302
Absolute Difference In Contributions Contributed Extra	0.26	0.19	1.00	0.01	68
Absolute Difference In Contributions Contributed Less	0.21	0.14	0.65	0.04	26
<i>Panel B. Implementation Decisions</i>					
Percent Implementing Influence Contingency Contributed Extra	0.48	0.50	1	0	68
Percent Implementing Influence Contingency Contributed Less	0.53	0.51	1	0	26
Percent Implementing Influence Contingency Contributed Same	0.66	0.48	1	0	205
Percent Implementing Influence Contingency Contributed Same, Below or Equal the Median	0.60	0.49	1	0	102
Percent Implementing Influence Contingency Contributed Same, Above the Median	0.72	0.45	1	0	103

“Influence-Contingency Contribution” is the percent of her endowment the first-mover contributed in the influence contingency. “No-Influence-Contingency Contribution” is the percent of her endowment the first-mover contributed in the no-influence contingency. “Contributing Extra” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the first-mover contributed more in the influence contingency than in the no-influence contingency. “Contributed Same” and “Contributed Less” are defined analogously. “Absolute Difference in Contributions | Contributed Extra” is the absolute difference in contributions (as a percent of her endowment) in the influence and no-influence contingencies among those who contributed more in the influence contingency. “Absolute Difference in Contributions | Contributed Less” is defined analogously. “Percent Implementing Influence Contingency | Contributed Extra” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the first-mover made the the influence contingency more likely to be implemented, among those who contributed more in the influence contingency than in the no-influence contingency. “Percent Implementing Influence Contingency | Contributed Less”, and “Percent Implementing Influence Contingency | Contributed Same” are defined analogously.

Table 15: Mexico Sample: Summary of Outcome Variables

	Mean	S.D.	Max	Min	Count
<i>Panel A. Beliefs Relevant to Altruistic Concerns</i>					
Slope of Response	0.04	0.07	0.12	-0.4	93
Strictly Positive Response	0.66	0.48	1	0	93
Zero Response	0.26	0.44	1	0	93
Strictly Negative Response	0.01	0.03	1	0	93
Condition for Altruists to Take Back Contributing Extra	0.43	0.50	1	0	93
Seeking Primacy Increases Contributions Contributed Same	0.13	0.34	1	0	93
<i>Panel B. Beliefs Relevant to Expectations Concerns</i>					
Social Expectations of Influence Contingency	0.33	0.23	1.00	0	93
Social Expectations of No-Influence Contingency	0.33	0.23	1.00	0	93
Social Expectations of Influence Contingency Contributed Extra	0.42	0.23	0.90	0	20
Social Expectations of Influence Contingency Did Not Contribute Extra	0.31	0.23	1.00	0	73
Social Expectations of No-Influence Contingency Contributed Extra	0.36	0.23	1.00	0	20
Social Expectations of No-Influence Contingency Did Not Contribute Extra	0.32	0.23	1.00	0	73
Contribution Satisfies Social Expectations Contributed Same	0.49	0.50	1	0	68

“Slope of Response” is the slope coefficient of a regression of what the first-mover expects the second-mover contributes (as a percentage of her endowment) for each decile of the first-mover’s contribution in the influence contingency. “Strictly Positive Response” is an indicator variable equal to one if Slope of Response is strictly positive. “Zero Response” and “Strictly Negative Response” are defined analogously. “Conditions for Altruists to Take Back Contributing Extra” is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover believes that the second-mover contributes more in the no-influence contingency than he would in the influence contingency if the first-mover contributed the same amount as she did in the no-influence contingency. “Seeking Primacy Increases Contributions | Contributed Same” is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover believes the second-mover will contribute strictly less in the no-influence contingency than in the influence contingency (given what she contributed), and is limited to first-movers who contributed the same amount in both contingencies. “Social Expectations of Influence Contingency” measures the first-mover’s beliefs over others’ beliefs regarding the average contribution (as a percentage of the endowment) by first-movers in the influence contingency. “Social Expectations of No-Influence Contingency” is defined analogously. “Social Expectations of Influence Contingency | Contributed Extra” limits the sample to first-movers who contributed more in the influence contingency. “Contribution Satisfies Social Expectations | Contributed Same” is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover’s contribution is weakly higher than her social expectations in the influence contingency (that is, how much she believes others believe first-movers contribute in the influence contingency), and is limited to first-movers who contributed the same amount in both contingencies. The rest of the variables are defined analogously.

Table 16: US Sample: Summary Statistics of Beliefs Relevant to Altruistic Concerns and Expectations Concerns

	Mean	S.D.	Max	Min	Count
<i>Panel A. Beliefs Relevant to Altruistic Concerns</i>					
Slope of Response	0.06	0.05	0.11	-0.10	297
Strictly Positive Response	0.88	0.33	1	0	297
Zero Response	0.03	0.18	1	0	297
Strictly Negative Response	0.09	0.28	1	0	297
Condition for Altruists to Take Back Contributing Extra	0.26	0.44	1	0	297
Seeking Primacy Increases Contributions Contributed Same	0.42	0.49	1	0	297
<i>Panel B. Beliefs Relevant to Social Expectations Concerns</i>					
Social Expectations of Influence Contingency	0.66	0.24	1.00	0.01	296
Social Expectations of No-Influence Contingency	0.38	0.24	1.00	0	296
Social Expectations of Influence Contingency Contributed Extra	0.62	0.18	1.00	0.25	65
Social Expectations of Influence Contingency Did Not Contribute Extra	0.67	0.26	1.00	0.01	231
Social Expectations of Influence Contingency Contributed Extra	0.35	0.20	1.00	0	65
Social Expectations of No-Influence Contingency Did Not Contribute Extra	0.39	0.25	1.00	0	231
Contribution Satisfies Social Expectations Contributed Same	0.72	0.45	1	0	205

“Slope of Response” is the slope coefficient of a regression of what the first-mover expects the second-mover contributes (as a percentage of her endowment) for each decile of the first-mover’s contribution in the influence contingency. “Strictly Positive Response” is an indicator variable equal to one if Slope of Response is strictly positive. “Zero Response” and “Strictly Negative Response” are defined analogously. “Conditions for Altruists to Take Back Contributing Extra” is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover believes that the second-mover contributes more in the no-influence contingency than he would in the influence contingency if the first-mover contributed the same amount as she did in the no-influence contingency. “Seeking Primacy Increases Contributions | Contributed Same” is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover believes the second-mover will contribute strictly less in the no-influence contingency than in the influence contingency (given what she contributed), and is limited to first-movers who contributed the same amount in both contingencies. “Social Expectations of Influence Contingency” measures the first-mover’s beliefs over others’ beliefs regarding the average contribution (as a percentage of the endowment) by first-movers in the influence contingency. “Social Expectations of No-Influence Contingency” is defined analogously. “Social Expectations of Influence Contingency | Contributed Extra” limits the sample to first-movers who contributed more in the influence contingency. “Contribution Satisfies Social Expectations | Contributed Same” is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover’s contribution is weakly higher than her social expectations in the influence contingency (that is, how much she believes others believe first-movers contribute in the influence contingency), and is limited to first-movers who contributed the same amount in both contingencies. The rest of the variables are defined analogously.

Table 17: Mexico Sample: Summary Statistics of Beliefs Relevant to Altruistic Concerns and Expectations Concerns

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution
Influence Contingency	-1.916 (1.948)	-1.916 (2.076)	-1.916 (2.154)
Social Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	0.130 (0.163)	0.134 (0.183)	0.186 (0.175)
Social Expectations in Influence Contingency	-0.000701 (0.145)	-0.159 (0.153)	-0.184 (0.184)
Slope of Response	0.685 (0.693)	0.434 (0.555)	4.267 (4.413)
Counterfactual Contribution	0.805** (0.0947)	0.918** (0.0833)	0.939** (0.119)
Influence Contingency \times Social Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	-0.0735 (0.130)	-0.0735 (0.139)	-0.0735 (0.144)
Influence Contingency \times Social Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.346* (0.142)	0.346* (0.151)	0.346* (0.157)
Influence Contingency \times Slope of Response	0.697 (0.539)	0.697 (0.575)	0.697 (0.596)
Influence Contingency \times Counterfactual	-0.153 (0.0803)	-0.153 (0.0856)	-0.153 (0.0888)
Dep Variable Mean	29.84	29.84	29.84
Observations	186	186	186
Clusters	93	93	93
R^2	0.616	0.748	0.794
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the γ coefficient vector of model $Contribution_{i,c} = \beta InfluenceC_{i,c} + \delta X_i + \gamma InfluenceC_{i,c} \times X_i + \phi W_i + \varepsilon_i$. An observation is a subject-contingency (i, c), and standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The dependent variable is the first-mover's contribution as a percentage of the endowment. "Influence Contingency" is an indicator variable for the influence contingency. "Social Expectation in Influence Contingency" is the first-mover's guess of what others guessed was the average contribution in the influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). "Social Expectation in No-Influence Contingency" is the first-mover's guess of what others guessed was the average contribution in the no-influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). "Slope of Response" is the slope coefficient of a regression of what the first-mover expects the second-mover contributes (as a percentage of her endowment) for each decile of the first-mover's contribution in the influence contingency. "Counterfactual Contribution" is the percentage of the endowment the first-mover believes the second-mover would contribute in the influence contingency had the first-mover contributed the amount she contributed in the no-influence contingency. The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 18: US Sample: The Role of Beliefs on the Decision to Contribute Extra

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution
Influence Contingency	1.529 (2.613)	1.471 (2.669)	1.471 (2.693)
Social Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	0.0567 (0.0514)	0.0747 (0.0495)	0.0539 (0.0475)
Social Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.0453 (0.0634)	0.0409 (0.0624)	0.0560 (0.0587)
Slope of Response	-2.461** (0.383)	-2.491** (0.376)	0 (.)
Counterfactual Contribution	0.956** (0.0544)	0.963** (0.0533)	1.010** (0.0530)
Influence Contingency \times Social Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	-0.0279 (0.0409)	-0.0284 (0.0417)	-0.0284 (0.0421)
Influence Contingency \times Social Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.164** (0.0447)	0.164** (0.0455)	0.164** (0.0459)
Influence Contingency \times Slope of Response	0.761** (0.283)	0.765** (0.288)	0.765** (0.291)
Influence Contingency \times Counterfactual Contribution	-0.196** (0.0503)	-0.195** (0.0513)	-0.195** (0.0517)
Dep Variable Mean	67.25	67.33	67.33
Observations	592	590	590
Clusters	296	295	295
R^2	0.681	0.704	0.732
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the γ coefficient vector of model $Contribution_{i,c} = \beta Influence_{i,c} + \delta X_i + \gamma Influence_{i,c} \times X_i + \phi W_i + \varepsilon_i$. An observation is a subject-contingency (i, c), and standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The dependent variable is the first-mover's contribution as a percentage of the endowment. "Influence Contingency" is an indicator variable for the influence contingency. "Social Expectation in Influence Contingency" is the first-mover's guess of what others guessed was the average contribution in the influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). "Social Expectation in No-Influence Contingency" is the first-mover's guess of what others guessed was the average contribution in the no-influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). "Slope of Response" is the slope coefficient of a regression of what the first-mover expects the second-mover contributes (as a percentage of her endowment) for each decile of the first-mover's contribution in the influence contingency. "Counterfactual Contribution" is the percentage of the endowment the first-mover believes the second-mover would contribute in the influence contingency had the first-mover contributed the amount she contributed in the no-influence contingency. The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 19: Mexico Sample: The Role of Beliefs on the Decision to Contribute Extra

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Takes Back Contributing Extra	Takes Back Contributing Extra	Takes Back Contributing Extra
Condition for Altruists to Take Back Contributing Extra	0.0722 (0.0808)	0.0654 (0.0886)	-0.00426 (0.119)
Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.00388 (0.00428)	0.00360 (0.00472)	0.00512 (0.00596)
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	-0.000997 (0.00334)	-0.000684 (0.00365)	-0.00490 (0.00294)
Social Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.00303 (0.00450)	0.00404 (0.00515)	0.00490 (0.00569)
Social Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	-0.00564 (0.00365)	-0.00689 (0.00370)	-0.00506 (0.00331)
Dep Variable Mean	0.172	0.172	0.172
Observations	93	93	93
R^2	0.073	0.272	0.424
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the coefficient β of the model $Y_i = \beta X_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$, with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover takes back contributing extra. The independent variable, "Condition for Altruists to Take Back Contributing Extra", is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover believes that the second-mover contributes more in the no-influence contingency than he would in the influence contingency if the first-mover contributed the same amount as she did in the no-influence contingency. 'Social Expectations in Influence Contingency' is the first-mover's belief of others' belief of what other first-movers contributed on average in the influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). 'Social Expectations in No-Influence Contingency' is defined analogously. 'Expectations in Influence Contingency' is the first-mover's belief of what other first-movers contributed on average in the influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). 'Expectations in No-Influence Contingency' is defined analogously. The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the first-mover's endowment.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 20: USA Sample: The Role of Beliefs on the Decision to Take Back Leading

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Takes Back Contributing Extra	Takes Back Contributing Extra	Takes Back Contributing Extra
Condition for Altruists to Take Back Contributing Extra	0.0921 (0.0484)	0.0765 (0.0481)	0.111 (0.0639)
Expectations in Influence Contingency	-0.000389 (0.00101)	-0.000432 (0.00110)	0.000600 (0.00128)
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	-0.00314** (0.00103)	-0.00327** (0.00107)	-0.00230* (0.000990)
Social Expectations in Influence Contingency	-0.000449 (0.000851)	-0.000264 (0.000848)	-0.000289 (0.000960)
Social Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	0.00118 (0.00101)	0.00154 (0.000986)	0.00180* (0.000873)
Dep Variable Mean	0.115	0.112	0.112
Observations	296	295	295
R^2	0.071	0.133	0.181
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the coefficient β of the model $Y_i = \beta X_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$, with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover takes back contributing extra. The independent variable, "Condition for Altruists to Take Back Contributing Extra", is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover believes that the second-mover contributes more in the no-influence contingency than he would in the influence contingency if the first-mover contributed the same amount as she did in the no-influence contingency. 'Social Expectations in Influence Contingency' is the first-mover's belief of others' belief of what other first-movers contributed on average in the influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). 'Social Expectations in No-Influence Contingency' is defined analogously. 'Expectations in Influence Contingency' is the first-mover's belief of what other first-movers contributed on average in the influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). 'Expectations in No-Influence Contingency' is defined analogously. The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the first-mover's endowment.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 21: Mexico Sample: The Role of Beliefs on the Decision to Take Back Leading

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Seeks	Seeks	Seeks	Seeks	Seeks	Seeks
	Primacy	Primacy	Primacy	Primacy	Primacy	Primacy
Seeking Primacy Increases Contributions	0.159 (0.122)	0.120 (0.150)	0.139 (0.214)			
Contribution Satisfies Social Expectations				0.245* (0.114)	0.217 (0.134)	0.161 (0.175)
Social Expectations of Influence Contingency				0.149** (0.00292)	0.187** (0.00649)	0.162 (0.00853)
Social Expectations of No-Influence Contingency				-0.0962** (0.00362)	-0.157** (0.00575)	-0.191** (0.00615)
Dep Variable Mean	0.471	0.471	0.471	0.471	0.471	0.471
Observations	68	68	68	68	68	68
R^2	0.025	0.385	0.473	0.223	0.524	0.595
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

The table reports the coefficient β of the model $Y_i = \beta X_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$, restricted to first-movers who contributed the same amount in both contingencies, and with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover seeks primacy (that is, implements the influence contingency). The independent variable for the first three columns is “Seeking Primacy Increases Contributions”, an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover believes the second-mover will contribute strictly less in the no-influence contingency than in the influence contingency (given what she contributed). The independent variable in the last three columns is “Contribution Satisfies Social Expectations”, an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover’s contribution is weakly higher than her social expectations in the influence contingency (that is, how much she believes others believe first-movers contribute in the influence contingency). The regressions in the last three columns include controls for social expectations in the influence and no-influence contingencies. The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover’s beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 22: USA Sample: The Role of Beliefs on the Decision to Seek Primacy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Seeking Primacy	Seeks Primacy	Seeks Primacy	Seeks Primacy	Seeks Primacy	Seeks Primacy
Seeking Primacy Increases Contributions	0.213** (0.0863)	0.181 (0.0920)	0.111 (0.103)			
Contribution Satisfies Social Expectations				0.0516 (0.0784)	0.00979 (0.0852)	-0.0233 (0.0898)
Social Expectations in Influence Contingency				0.00250 (0.00145)	0.00251 (0.00149)	0.000457 (0.00178)
Social Expectations in No-Influence Contingency				0.000489 (0.00128)	0.000157 (0.00148)	-0.000573 (0.00159)
Dep Variable Mean	0.659	0.659	0.659	0.659	0.659	0.659
Observations	205	205	205	205	205	205
R^2	0.032	0.092	0.161	0.027	0.089	0.156
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

The table reports the coefficient β of the model $Y_i = \beta X_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$, restricted to first-movers who contributed the same amount in both contingencies, and with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover seeks primacy (that is, implements the influence contingency). The independent variable for the first three columns is “Seeking Primacy Increases Contributions”, an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover believes the second-mover will contribute strictly less in the no-influence contingency than in the influence contingency (given what she contributed). The independent variable in the last three columns is “Contribution Satisfies Social Expectations”, an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover’s contribution is weakly higher than her social expectations in the influence contingency (that is, how much she believes others believe first-movers contribute in the influence contingency). The regressions in the last three columns include controls for social expectations in the influence and no-influence contingencies. The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover’s beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 23: Mexico Sample: The Role of Beliefs on the Decision to Seek Primacy

D.2 Tables From Online Appendix A

Contribution in Influence Contingency	Contribution in No-Influence Contingency										Total
	0	10	20	30	40	50	70	80	90	100	
0	35	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	36
10	3	7	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
20	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
30	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
40	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	4
50	1	0	1	0	2	4	0	0	0	0	8
60	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
70	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	3
80	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	6
90	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
100	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	9	12
Total	41	8	11	5	3	6	5	3	1	10	93

Table 24: US Sample: Joint Frequency of Contributions in the Influence and No-Influence Contingencies

Contribution in Influence Contingency	Contribution in Non-Leadership Cont.														Total
	0	1	5	10	15	20	25	30	33	35	38	40	45	50	
0	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
5	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
10	0	0	0	7	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
20	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
25	1	0	0	1	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	2	8
33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
35	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
40	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	4	0	1	10
45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
50	1	1	0	0	0	4	0	2	0	0	0	4	0	32	44
52	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
60	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	6
65	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
70	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	5
75	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
80	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	4
85	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
99	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
100	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	5
Total	16	1	4	9	2	12	7	15	1	1	1	11	2	50	132

Table 25: Mexico Sample: Joint Frequency of Contributions in the Influence and No-Influence Contingencies, First Half

Contribution in Influence Contingency	Contribution in No-Influence Contingency														Total
	51	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	88	90	95	98	99	100	
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
40	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
45	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
50	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	9
51	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
55	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
60	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
65	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
70	0	0	1	0	6	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	9
75	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5
80	0	0	3	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	12
85	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
88	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
90	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	5
94	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
99	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
100	0	0	1	0	1	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	104	112
Total	1	4	8	1	12	6	13	4	1	7	2	1	2	107	169

Table 26: Mexico Sample: Joint Frequency of Contributions in the Influence and No-Influence Contingencies, Second Half

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Seeks	Seeks	Seeks
	Primacy	Primacy	Primacy
Contribution in Influence Contingency	0.00534** (0.00131)	0.00436* (0.00179)	0.00492 (0.00313)
Dep Variable Mean	0.471	0.471	0.471
Observations	68	68	68
R^2	0.153	0.436	0.499
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the coefficient β of the model $Y_i = \beta X_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$, with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover seeks primacy (that is, implements the influence contingency). The independent variable, 'Contribution in Influence Contingency', is the amount contributed by the first-mover in the influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 27: US Sample: The Relationship Between Contribution in the Influence Contingency and the Decision to Seek Primacy

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Seeks	Seeks	Seeks
	Primacy	Primacy	Primacy
Contribution in Influence Contingency	0.00182 (0.000987)	0.00134 (0.00109)	0.000377 (0.00129)
Dep Variable Mean	0.659	0.659	0.659
Observations	205	205	205
R^2	0.017	0.079	0.155
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the coefficient β of the model $Y_i = \beta X_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$, with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover seeks primacy (that is, implements the influence contingency). The independent variable, 'Contribution in Influence Contingency', is the amount contributed by the first-mover in the influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 28: Mexico Sample: The Relationship Between Contribution in the Influence Contingency and the Decision to Seek Primacy

D.3 Tables From Online Appendix C.1

	Mean	S.D.	Max	Min	Count
Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.31	0.2	1.00	0	93
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	0.28	0.24	1.00	0	93
Expectations in Influence Contingency Contributed Extra	0.41	0.20	0.90	0.2	20
Expectations in Influence Contingency Did Not Contribute Extra	0.28	0.23	1.00	0	73
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency Contributed Extra	0.30	0.24	0.80	0	20
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency Did Contribute Extra	0.28	0.24	1.00	0	73
Contr. Satisfies Expectation Contributed Same	0.19	0.40	1	0	60

'Expectations in Influence Contingency' is the first-mover's belief of what other first-movers contributed on average in the influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). 'Expectations in No-Influence Contingency' is defined analogously. The rest of the variables, except for the last one, limit the sample to those who contributed extra or to those who did not contribute extra. 'Contribution Satisfies Expectations | Contributed Same' is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover's contribution is weakly higher than her expectations in the influence contingency (that is, how much she believes first-movers contribute in the influence contingency).

Table 29: US Sample: Summary Statistics of Beliefs Relevant to Expectations Concerns, Using Expectations Instead of Social Expectations

	Mean	S.D.	Max	Min	Count
Expectations in Leadership Contingency	0.66	0.23	1.00	0	297
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	0.41	0.23	1.00	0	297
Expectations in Influence Contingency Contributed Extra	0.61	0.18	1.00	0.25	66
Expectations in Influence Contingency Did Not Contribute Extra	0.68	0.24	1.00	0.01	231
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency Contributed Extra	0.33	0.17	0.80	0	66
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency Did Not Contribute Extra	0.44	0.24	1.00	0	231
Contr. Satisfies Expectations Contributed Same	0.73	0.44	1	0	205

'Expectations in Influence Contingency' is the first-mover's belief of what other first-movers contributed on average in the influence contingency (as a percentage of the endowment). 'Expectations in No-Influence Contingency' is defined analogously. The rest of the variables, except for the last one, limit the sample to those who contributed extra or to those who did not contribute extra. 'Contribution Satisfies Expectations | Contributed Same' is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover's contribution is weakly higher than her expectations in the influence contingency (that is, how much she believes first-movers contribute in the influence contingency).

Table 30: Mexico Sample: Summary Statistics of Beliefs Relevant to Expectations Concerns, Using Expectations Instead of Social Expectations

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution
Influence Contingency	3.009 (3.998)	2.624 (2.817)	1.385 (2.779)
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	0.708* (0.322)	0.466 (0.283)	0.845* (0.327)
Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.172 (0.152)	0.0950 (0.138)	0.314* (0.156)
Slope of Response	0.802 (0.588)	0.539 (0.548)	7.551 (3.930)
Counterfactual Contribution	0.602** (0.132)	0.741** (0.114)	0.852** (0.135)
Influence Contingency × Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	-0.124 (0.203)	-0.0742 (0.206)	0.00649 (0.171)
Influence Contingency × Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.158 (0.177)	0.134 (0.172)	0.125 (0.164)
Influence Contingency × Slope of Response	0.691 (0.572)	0.669 (0.612)	0.639 (0.628)
Influence Contingency × Counterfactual Contribution	-0.0497 (0.117)	-0.0638 (0.0992)	-0.0986 (0.0978)
Dep Variable Mean	29.84	29.84	29.84
Observations	186	186	186
Clusters	93	93	93
R^2	0.658	0.764	0.810
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the γ coefficient vector of model $Contribution_{i,c} = \beta InfluenceC_{i,c} + \delta \mathbf{X}_i + \gamma InfluenceC_{i,c} \times \mathbf{X}_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$. An observation is a subject-contingency (i, c) , and standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The dependent variable is the contribution out of ten dollars. 'Influence Contingency' is an indicator variable for the influence contingency. 'Expectation in Influence Contingency' is the first-mover's guess of the average contribution in the influence contingency. 'Expectation in No-Influence Contingency' is the first-mover's guess of the average contribution in the no-influence contingency. The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 31: US Sample: The Role of Beliefs on the Decision to Contribute Extra, Using Expectations Instead of Social Expectations

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution
Influence Contingency	4.845 (3.295)	4.234 (3.319)	3.297 (3.219)
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	0.0580 (0.0673)	0.0668 (0.0664)	0.0734 (0.0715)
Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.225** (0.0786)	0.211** (0.0774)	0.242** (0.0736)
Slope of Response	-2.315** (0.387)	-2.351** (0.389)	0 (.)
Counterfactual Contribution	0.850** (0.0643)	0.865** (0.0636)	0.947** (0.0579)
Influence Contingency × Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	-0.00505 (0.0502)	0.00775 (0.0468)	0.00647 (0.0465)
Influence Contingency × Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.0662 (0.0600)	0.0725 (0.0597)	0.0970 (0.0539)
Influence Contingency × Slope of Response	0.681* (0.292)	0.703* (0.298)	0.727* (0.299)
Influence Contingency × Counterfactual Contribution	-0.151** (0.0523)	-0.159** (0.0529)	-0.171** (0.0507)
Observations	592	590	590
Clusters	296	295	295
Dep Variable Mean	67.25	67.33	67.33
R^2	0.694	0.715	0.742
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the γ coefficient vector of model $Contribution_{i,c} = \beta InfluenceC_{i,c} + \delta \mathbf{X}_i + \gamma InfluenceC_{i,c} \times \mathbf{X}_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$. An observation is a subject-contingency (i, c), and standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. The dependent variable is the contribution out of ten dollars. 'Influence Contingency' is an indicator variable for the influence contingency. 'Expectation in Influence Contingency' is the first-mover's guess of the average contribution in the influence contingency. 'Expectation in No-Influence Contingency' is the first-mover's guess of the average contribution in the no-influence contingency. The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 32: Mexico Sample: The Role of Beliefs on the Decision to Contribute Extra, Using Expectations Instead of Social Expectations

	(1) Seeks Primacy	(2) Seeks Primacy	(3) Seeks Primacy
Contribution Satisfies Expectations	0.325* (0.129)	0.418* (0.166)	0.461* (0.189)
Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.0104** (0.00323)	0.00739 (0.00515)	0.00259 (0.00748)
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	-0.00515 (0.00324)	-0.00727 (0.00532)	-0.0121 (0.00672)
Dep Variable Mean	0.471	0.471	0.471
Observations	68	68	68
R^2	0.198	0.478	0.572
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the coefficient β of the model $Y_i = \beta X_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$, restricted to first-movers who contributed the same amount in both contingencies, and with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover seeks primacy (that is, implements the influence contingency). The independent variable is 'Contribution Satisfies Expectations', an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover's contribution is weakly higher than her expectations in the influence contingency (that is, how much she believes first-movers contribute in the influence contingency). The regressions include controls for expectations in the influence and no-influence contingencies. The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 33: US Sample: The Role of Beliefs on the Decision to Seek Primacy, Using Expectations Instead of Social Expectations

	(1) Seeks Primacy	(2) Seeks Primacy	(3) Seeks Primacy
Contribution Satisfies Expectations	0.0175 (0.0830)	-0.0154 (0.0892)	-0.0221 (0.0909)
Expectations in Influence Contingency	0.00200 (0.00181)	0.00185 (0.00187)	-0.000756 (0.00212)
Expectations in No-Influence Contingency	0.00133 (0.00166)	0.00111 (0.00191)	0.0000153 (0.00191)
Dep Variable Mean	0.659	0.659	0.659
Observations	205	205	205
R^2	0.025	0.086	0.156
Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for Beliefs	No	No	Yes

The table reports the coefficient β of the model $Y_i = \beta X_i + \phi \mathbf{W}_i + \varepsilon_i$, restricted to first-movers who contributed the same amount in both contingencies, and with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover seeks primacy (that is, implements the influence contingency). The independent variable is 'Contribution Satisfies Expectations', an indicator variable equal to one if the first-mover's contribution is weakly higher than her expectations in the influence contingency (that is, how much she believes first-movers contribute in the influence contingency). The regressions include controls for expectations in the influence and no-influence contingencies. The Controls for Socio-Demographics and Personality are age, gender, education, student status, economics major, number of past experiments, knowledge of the objective of Save the Children, a battery of questions about how they would behave in different leadership scenarios, risk aversion and a battery of questions about leadership personalities. The Controls for Beliefs are the first-mover's beliefs of what second-movers contribute (as a percentage of the endowment) in the no-influence contingency, and in the influence contingency for every decile of the endowment first-mover can contribute.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 34: Mexico Sample: The Role of Beliefs on the Decision to Seek Primacy, Using Expectations Instead of Social Expectations

E US Sample: First-Mover’s Public Instructions and Screenshots

In this section we present the instructions as they were presented to the first-movers.


E.1 First-Movers’ Public Instructions

In this section we present the instructions that were read out loud publicly to first-movers once they were seated in front of their computers, but before the first instruction screen.

Public Instructions: The key you were given has a number on it. Before we begin, please take a moment to type the number into the computer.

You are taking part in an experimental session. You may have noticed that there were two sign up times for this session. That is because today’s session will take place in two rooms, with the participants in each room beginning at different times. Please do not talk or try to communicate with other participants during the session.

You are given 10 dollars. You will be asked to make three different decisions of how to divide these 10 dollars. The three decisions will be described one after another in three boxes:



After you make your decisions, a lottery will select one of the boxes, giving equal chances to each box. We will divide your ten dollars the way you decided in the box that was selected, and we will do everything else described by the box. It is worth stressing that each decision you make has an equal chance of being selected by lottery, and if it is selected the other decisions become irrelevant for how we divide your ten dollars. Therefore, you will get the most out of each decision by making it as if it were the only one you were making with your ten dollars.

In each decision you will be asked to divide the ten dollars between yourself and the East Africa Food Crisis Relief Fund of Save the Children. Millions of people, many of them children, are at

risk in drought-stricken East Africa. Save the Children is a charitable organization providing food, water, education, child care and more for children and families affected by the food crisis. Please note that this study does not use deception, which means we are obligated to give the money you decide to Save the Children. Save the Children will only be contacted by this study to give them the amount of money you decide. The money will be given anonymously and without an explanation of where it came from.

Please pay attention to the instructions. It is normal and encouraged to read the instructions more than once, as they contain several important details. The difference between the decisions will be timing of when another participant will be told what you chose. If you have any questions, please push the assistance button in front of you.

You will not use your name at any point during the session. You have been given a key and assigned a cubicle by chance. With the key you have been given you will be able to open a locker and collect your payment privately at the end of the session.

The rest of the instructions you will read privately on your computer screen.

The people in Room A will begin once you have all finished making your decisions.

E.2 First-Movers' Screenshots

In this appendix we include first-movers' screenshots. Some screenshots have randomly filled in answers so we could show how the answers affect future screens.




Figure 5: Input of Key Number




Figure 6: Screen in Which Public Instructions Was Read Out Loud




Figure 7: First-Movers' Introductory Screen Instructions

Please answer the following questions about the two scenarios:

1) Order the three steps below in the Cannot-Consider scenario by putting a 1 next to the step that goes first, a 2 next to the one that goes second and a 3 next to the one that goes third.

Mr 2 makes his choice.

Mr 2 is told what you chose.

You make your choice.

2) Order the three steps below in the Can-Consider scenario by putting a 1 next to the step that goes first, a 2 next to the one that goes second and a 3 next to the one that goes third.

Mr 2 makes his choice.

Mr 2 is told what you chose.

You make your choice.

3) Which scenario below is the only one that allows Mr 2 to consider the choice you made before making his own choice?

Cannot-Consider

Can-Consider

Figure 8: First-Movers' Questionnaire for Introductory Instructions (Answers Randomly Filled In)

Here is the answer to the question about your choice in the first scenario:

1) Order the three steps below in the Cannot-Consider scenario by putting a 1 next to the step that goes first, a 2 next to the one that goes second and a 3 next to the one that goes third.

You answered **INCORRECTLY** what the first step is. The first step is for you to make your choice.

You answered **INCORRECTLY** what the second step is. The second step is for Mr 2 to make his choice.

You answered **INCORRECTLY** what the third step is. The third step is for Mr 2 to be told what you chose.

2) Order the three steps below in the Can-Consider scenario by putting a 1 next to the step that goes first, a 2 next to the one that goes second and a 3 next to the one that goes third.

You **CORRECTLY** answered what the first step. The first step is for you to make your choice.

You **CORRECTLY** answered what the second step is. The second step is for Mr 2 to be told what you chose.

You **CORRECTLY** answered what the third step is. The third step is for Mr 2 to make his choice.

3) Which scenario below is the only one that allows Mr 2 to consider the choice you made before making his own choice?

You answered **INCORRECTLY**. The answer is the Can-Consider scenario. This is the only scenario where Mr 2 sees what you decided before making his own decision.


In the next screen the instructions will be repeated for any final clarifications. You will be asked to make your decision.

Figure 9: First-Movers' Questionnaire Answers for Introductory Instructions for First-Movers

For your decisions, you will make choices of how to divide ten dollars between yourself and Save the Children in two different scenarios. We will describe the scenarios here. In both scenarios, you and someone else will make a choice about how much money to give to Save the Children. We will refer to this other person as 'Mr 2'.


You will make your choice before Mr 2 makes his. Mr 2 knows someone makes a choice before he does, and will be told what you chose. The difference between the scenarios is when Mr 2 is told what you chose. In one scenario, Mr 2 makes his own choice first and only then is told what you chose. In this scenario, Mr 2 *can not* consider what you chose before making his own choice. We will call this the 'Cannot-Consider' scenario. In the other scenario Mr 2 is told what you chose first, and then makes his own choice. This second scenario gives Mr 2 an opportunity to consider what you chose before making his own choice. We will call this the 'Can-Consider' scenario. The following describes the scenarios in more detail:

•'Cannot-Consider' scenario: You make a choice of how much money to give to Save the Children. Mr 2 makes his own choice of how much money to give to Save the Children. Once no one has further choices to make, Mr 2 will be told what you chose. The following shows the sequence of events:



When Mr 2 makes his choice, he would not be told any information about what others chose.

•'Can-Consider' scenario: As in the Cannot-Consider scenario, first you make a choice of how much money to give to Save the Children. The order of events is different from that point on. Before making a choice, Mr 2 is told what you chose. Only then will Mr 2 make his own choice. The following shows the sequence of events:



When Mr 2 makes his choice, what you chose would be the only information he would be told about what others chose.

Notice that step 3 in the timeline of the Cannot-Consider scenario does not happen until step 4 in the timeline of the Can-Consider scenario.

Figure 10: First-Movers' Introductory First Contribution Screen

Please answer the following questions about your choice in this first scenario:

- 1) Without being told what you give, Mr 2 would choose how much to give to Save the Children out of ten dollars. True False
- 2) Mr 2 was selected by chance out of the people in the session who have not yet made their decisions. True False
- 3) You would be told what Mr 2 gives to Save the Children. True False
- 4) There is a chance that we do not divide your ten dollars according to what you choose here. True False

Figure 11: First-Movers' Questionnaire for First Contribution (Answers Randomly Filled In)




Figure 12: First-Movers' Questionnaire Answers for First Contribution




Figure 13: Decision for First-Movers' First Contribution (Answer Randomly Filled In)




Figure 14: First-Movers' Introductory Second Contribution Screen



Figure 15: First-Movers' Questionnaire for Second Contribution (Answers Randomly Filled In)




Figure 16: First-Movers' Questionnaire Answers for Second Contribution




Figure 17: First-Movers' Second Contribution Decision (Answer Randomly Filled In)




Figure 20: Questionnaire Answers for First-Movers' Implementation Decision

Here is the description of your third decision. In this third decision, we do not present you with a new scenario in which to divide ten dollars. Rather, you are offered only two options: to replicate your choice in the Cannot-Consider scenario or your choice in the Can-Consider scenario. The decision is captured within the third of the three boxes:

First Box	Second Box	Third Box
We follow your choice and Mr 2 makes his choice in the Cannot-Consider scenario	We follow your choice and Mr 2 makes his choice in the Can-Consider scenario	We follow your choice and Mr 2 makes his choice in the Cannot-Consider scenario <i>or</i> We follow your choice and Mr 2 makes his choice in the Can-Consider scenario

As we've mentioned, we will select by lottery only one of the three boxes, and follow its description for how we divide your ten dollars and for Mr 2's scenario. Each of the three boxes has an equal chance of being selected by the lottery. Note that the decision you make now would make the third box either identical to the first or to the second box. That means there will be 2 boxes with the option you choose now and only 1 with the option you didn't choose. It will therefore be twice as likely that the lottery selects the option you choose now.

You must choose whether to replicate your choice in the Cannot-Consider scenario or your choice in the Can-Consider scenario. We recap the details of each scenario and your choices below:

•Replicate your choice in the Cannot-Consider scenario. 3 dollar(s) go to Save the Children and 7 dollar(s) to yourself. Mr 2 makes his own choice of how much money to give to Save the Children. Once no one has further choices to make, Mr 2 will be told what you chose to give to Save the Children. To keep this recap brief, we will not repeat the rest of the details. The following shows the sequence of events:

Session begins	You make your choice	Mr 2 makes his choice	No one has further decisions to make	Mr 2 sees what you gave
1	2	3	4	5

•Replicate your choice in the Can-Consider scenario. 2 dollar(s) would go to Save the Children and 8 dollar(s) to yourself. Before making a choice, Mr 2 is told what you chose to give to Save the Children. Only then will Mr 2 make his own choice. To keep this recap brief, we will not repeat the rest of the details. We will just point out that all the other details are the same in both scenarios. The following shows the sequence of events:

Session begins	You make your choice	Mr 2 sees what you gave	Mr 2 makes his choice	No one has further decisions to make
1	2	3	4	5

It is worth stressing that step 3 in the Cannot-Consider scenario does not happen until step 4 in the Can-Consider scenario.

Please choose one of the two options for how to divide your 10 dollars:

Replicate your choice in the Cannot-Consider scenario.
 Replicate your choice in the Can-Consider scenario.

OK

Figure 21: Decision for First-Movers' Implementation Decision (Answer Randomly Filled In)


You have made decisions with your ten dollars in three boxes. A lottery will select one of the boxes, giving equal chances to each box. We will divide your ten dollars the way you decided in the box that was selected, and we will do everything else described by the box. You will learn about the result of the lottery later in the session.

You will now play a guessing game. You will be asked to guess how much people in the session give to Save the Children under different scenarios. Different people in this session will make choices under some of the scenarios we describe.

You will earn 5 extra dollars if your guess is close enough to what people in the session will actually do on average. In particular, if your guess is at most a dollar off from what people did in each scenario, you will earn 5 extra dollars.


In this first part of the guessing game, you will make guesses about people in the Can-Consider and in the Cannot-Consider scenarios. We recap each of the scenarios. As others were in the same situation you were in for each of those scenarios, in the recap we will refer to the people in the situations you were in as 'Mr 1'.

*"Cannot-Consider" scenario: Mr 1 makes a choice of how much money to give to Save the Children. Mr 2 makes his own choice of how much money to give to Save the Children. Once no one has further choices to make, Mr 2 will be told what Mr 1 chose. The following shows the sequence of events:



When Mr 2 is making choices, he would not be told any information about what others chose.

*"Can-Consider" scenario: As in the Cannot-Consider scenario, first Mr 1 makes a choice of how much money to give to Save the Children. The order of events is different from that point on. Before making a choice, Mr 2 is told what Mr 1 chose. Only then will Mr 2 make his own choice. The following shows the sequence of events:




When Mr 2 is making choices, what Mr 1 chose would be the only information he would be told about what others chose.

Notice that step 3 in the timeline of the Cannot-Consider scenario does not happen until step 4 in the timeline of the Can-Consider scenario.

OK


Figure 22: Introduction To The Guessing Game for First-Movers

First consider the Cannot-Consider scenario. In this scenario, Mr 2 cannot consider what anybody else gave before making his own decision. Here we recap the sequence of events:



Give your best guess as to how much Mr 2 will give to Save the Children:

Now consider the Can-Consider scenario. Here we recap the sequence of events:



You will now give your best guess as to how much Mr 2 will give to Save the Children, for each choice Mr 1 can make.

Give your best guess as to how much Mr 2 will give to Save the Children...

- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 0 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 1 dollar to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 2 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 3 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 4 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 5 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 6 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 7 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 8 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 9 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 10 dollars to Save the Children:


OK

Figure 23: First Part of Guessing Game for First-Movers

You will now play the rest of the guessing game. You will be asked to guess how much people in the session gave to Save the Children under different scenarios. Some of these scenarios may be familiar to you from the decisions you just made, and some others may not. Remember that you will earn 5 extra dollars if your guess is close enough to what people in the session did on average.


You will make a guess about **Mr 1** in the Cannot-Consider scenario and the Can-Consider scenario.

•Cannot-Consider scenario. Mr 1 will make a decision knowing that Mr 2 will not be able to consider the decision before make a decision of his own. Here is the sequence of events:



Give your best guess of how much **Mr 1** gave to Save the Children:

•Can-Consider scenario. Mr 1 will make a decision knowing that Mr 2 WILL be able to consider the decision before make a decision of his own. Here is the sequence of events:



Give your best guess of how much **Mr 1** gave to Save the Children:

Now consider a person in a different scenario. Mr 'ByHimself' does not know what any other person gave to Save the Children, and no one will see his or her decision.

Give your best guess of how much Mr ByHimself gave to Save the Children:

OK


Figure 24: Second Part of Guessing Game for First-Movers

You will now play a *different* guessing game, and possibly earn 5 extra dollars. Like you, others in this session gave their best guess as to what people in different scenarios gave on average. You will now guess, for each of these scenarios, what people in this session guessed on average. So as opposed to the first guessing game, where you were asked to guess what people actually did, now you will guess what people actually *guessed*.


You will earn 5 extra dollars if your guess is close enough to what people in the session will actually do on average. In particular, if your guess is at most a dollar off from what people did in each scenario, you will earn 5 extra dollars.

You will make guesses about the Cannot-Consider and the Can-Consider scenarios. We present the sequence of events for each of the scenarios:

Cannot-Consider scenario: Here we recap the sequence of events:



Can-Consider scenario: Here we recap the sequence of events:



Notice that step 3 in the timeline of the Can-Consider scenario does not happen until step 5 in the timeline of the Cannot-Consider scenario.

OK

Figure 25: Introduction To the Second-Order Guessing Game for First-Movers

First consider the Cannot-Consider scenario. Here we recap the sequence of events:

Give your best guess as to what others guessed much Mr 2 will give to Save the Children:

Now consider the Can-Consider scenario. Here we recap the sequence of events:

You will now give your best guess as to what others guessed Mr 2 would give to Save the Children, for each choice Mr 1 can make.

Give your best guess as to what others guessed Mr 2 would give to Save the Children...


- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 0 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 1 dollar to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 2 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 3 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 4 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 5 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 6 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 7 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 8 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 9 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 10 dollars to Save the Children:

Figure 26: First Part of Second-Order Guessing Game for First-Movers

You will now play the rest of this second guessing game. You will be asked to guess how much *others guessed* people in the session gave to Save the Children under different scenarios. Some of these scenarios may be familiar to you from the decisions you just made, and some others may not. Remember that 5 extra dollars will go to the person in the session whose guess is closest to what people in the session did on average. In case of a tie, we will select one person in the session by lottery from among the winners to receive the prize.


You will make a guess about **Mr 1** in the Cannot-Consider scenario and the Can-Consider scenario.

•Cannot-Consider scenario. Mr 1 will make a decision knowing that Mr 2 will not be able to consider the decision before make a decision of his own. Here we recap the sequence of events:



Give your best guess of how much others guessed **Mr 1** gave to Save the Children:

•Can-Consider scenario. Mr 1 will make a decision knowing that Mr 2 WILL be able to consider the decision before make a decision of his own. Here we recap the sequence of events.



Give your best guess of how much others guessed **Mr 1** gave to Save the Children:

Now consider a person in a different scenario. Mr 'ByHimself' does not know what any other person gave to Save the Children, and no one will see his or her decision.

Give your best guess as to how much others guessed Mr ByHimself gave to Save the Children:

OK

Figure 27: Second Part of Second-Order Guessing Game For First-Movers



Figure 28: First-Movers Guess the Number of Subjects in the Session

Please answer the following questions:

- 1) What is your age?
- 2) What is your sex?
 - Male
 - Female
- 3) What is the highest level of education you have **completed**?
 - Elementary
 - Middle School
 - High School
 - College or above
- 4) At any time in the last 3 months, have you attended school or college?
 - Yes
 - No
- 5) Are you studying or did you study a Bachelor's degree in economics?
 - Yes
 - No
- 6) How many experiments have you participated in in the past?
- 7) On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is 'none at all' and 10 is 'perfectly', how well would you say you know what the objective of Save the Children is?
- 8) On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is 'not at all' and 10 is 'perfectly', how well would you say Save the Children fulfills its objective?

Figure 29: First Part of First-Movers' Socio-Demographic Questions

Please answer the following questions:

9) Have you ever taught a course to a group of people? Yes
 No

10) If you have siblings, are you the oldest? I am the oldest
 I am not the oldest
 I do not have siblings.

11) Do you have children? Yes
 No

12) Have you ever been the captain of a team? Yes
 No

13) If you are employed, are there people where you work who answer directly to you? Yes
 No

14) How willing are you to take risks, in general? Answer on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is 'Not willing at all' and 10 is 'Very willing'.

Figure 30: Second Part of First-Movers' Socio-Demographic Questions

This screen contains a number of statements with which some people agree and others disagree. Please rate how much you personally agree or disagree with these statements-how much they reflect how you feel or think personally. Use the following scale:

- (1) totally disagree
- (2) generally disagree
- (3) somewhat disagree
- (4) somewhat agree
- (5) generally agree
- (6) totally agree

1) I enjoy having control over other people.	<input type="text"/>
2) People are only motivated by personal gain.	<input type="text"/>
3) I talk about my most important values and beliefs.	<input type="text"/>
4) I generally don't trust others.	<input type="text"/>
5) I am hesitant about taking initiative in a group.	<input type="text"/>
6) I am accurate in predicting how people will behave.	<input type="text"/>
7) I look out for the personal welfare of group members.	<input type="text"/>
8) I can inspire enthusiasm for a project.	<input type="text"/>

Figure 31: First-Movers' Personality Questions

Recall that after your decisions, we said we would determine how your ten dollars would be divided. The computer program just ran the lottery, which gave equal chances to each of the boxes below.

First Box	Second Box	Third Box
We follow your choice and Mr 2 makes his choice in the Cannot-Consider scenario	We follow your choice and Mr 2 makes his choice in the Can-Consider scenario	We follow your choice and Mr 2 makes his choice in the Cannot-Consider scenario

Lottery 1 selected the second of the boxes. Therefore, we will follow your choice in the Can-Consider scenario by having 2 dollar(s) go to Save the Children and 8 dollar(s) to yourself. Further, Mr 2 will be told you gave 2 dollar(s) BEFORE he makes his own decision.

OK

Figure 32: First-Movers' Announcement of Randomly Selected Contingency




Figure 33: Announcement To First-Mover of What a Second-Mover Contributed. This Is Not the First-Mover's Own Second-Mover. This Announcement Was Made as Part of the Study of Second-Movers.

F Second-Mover's Public Instructions and Screenshots

In this section we present the instructions as they were presented to the second-movers. Section F.1 provides the instructions that were read out loud to second-movers once they were seated in front of their computers, but before the first instruction screen. Section F.2 presents the screenshots second-movers saw, for all treatments. Details of the second-movers' treatments and an analysis of their behavior can be found in the companion paper Fernández-Duque and Hiscox (2022).

F.1 Second-Mover's Public Instructions

In this section we present the instructions that were read out loud publicly to second-movers once they were seated in front of their computers, but before the first instruction screen.

Public Instructions: The key you were given has a number on it. Before we begin, please take a moment to type the number into the computer.

You are taking part in an experimental session. You may have noticed that there were two sign up times for this session. That is because today's session will take place in two rooms, with the participants in each room beginning at different times. Please do not talk or try to communicate with other participants during the session.

You are given 10 dollars. You will be asked to make a decision of how to divide these 10 dollars. In your decision you will be asked to divide the ten dollars between yourself and the East Africa Food Crisis Relief Fund of Save the Children. Millions of people, many of them children, are at risk in drought-stricken East Africa. Save the Children is a charitable organization providing food, water, education, child care and more for children and families affected by the food crisis. Please note that this study does not use deception, which means we are obligated to give the money you decide to Save the Children. Save the Children will only be contacted by this study to give them the amount of money you decide. The money will be given anonymously and without an explanation of where it came from.

Please pay attention to the instructions. It is normal and encouraged to read the instructions

more than once, as they contain several important details. If you have any questions, please push the assistance button in front of you.

You will not use your name at any point during the session. You have been given a key and assigned a cubicle by chance. With the key you have been given you will be able to open a locker and collect your payment privately at the end of the session.

The rest of the instructions you will read privately on your computer screen.

The people in Room B began before you did. Once they have all finished making their decisions, the program on your computer screen will display a button allowing you to proceed. If this button is already on your screen, you can now proceed to the experiment.

F.2 Second-Movers' Screenshots

In this section we present the screenshots that second-movers saw on their computer screens. All second-movers saw the same screens in the order in which they are presented, except for the screens in Figures 35, 36, and 37. These three screens varied by treatment. Details of these treatments can be found in the companion paper Fernández-Duque and Hiscox (2022).

Before making any decisions, you will play the first part of a guessing game. You will be asked to guess how much people in the session give to Save the Children under different scenarios. People in this session will make decisions under some of the scenarios we describe.

5 extra dollars will go to the person whose guess is closest to what people in the session will actually do on average. In case of a tie, we will choose one person in the session by chance from among the winners to receive the payment.

For this first part of the guessing game, you will only make a guess about one person in one scenario. This scenario has two people, Mr 1 and Mr 2, although you will only make a guess about Mr 1. Consider the situation in which Mr 1 makes his decision:

Mr 1 decides how to divide his ten dollars. Mr 2 is told what Mr 1 decided. Mr 2 then makes a decision of his own. Note that Mr 1 makes his decision knowing that Mr 2 has time to consider Mr 1's decision before making a decision of his own. Mr 1 himself has no information about what others decided.

The following shows the sequence of events.



The names were picked to help you easily know when the person makes a decision. Their names, Mr 1 and Mr 2, indicate whether the person is the **1st** or the **2nd** to make a decision in the scenario.

Give your best guess of how much Mr 1 gave to Save the Children:

OK

Figure 34: Second-Movers' Introductory Slide, Prediction of First-Mover




Figure 35: Second-Movers' Contribution Screen for Isolated Contributors

You will now choose how much of the ten dollars you would give to Save the Children, and the rest you would keep for yourself. You will be in the position of Mr 2 in the guessing game.

We mentioned that other people in this session have already made their decision. We will call one of these persons 'Mr 1'. Mr 1 was selected by chance from among the other people in this session.

Mr 1 made a decision knowing that you would first see the decision, and then make a decision of your own. Note that Mr 1 has no information about what others decided. When Mr 1 made his decision, he gave y dollar(s) to Save the Children. Mr 1 has no more decisions to make.

No one in this session will know what you decided.

Please enter the amount of dollars between 0 and 10 you would like to give to **Save the Children**:

Figure 36: Second-Movers' Contribution Screen For Second-Movers with No Audience

You will now choose how much of the ten dollars you would give to Save the Children, and the rest you would keep for yourself. You will be in the position of Mr 2 in the guessing game. We mentioned that other people in this session have already made their decision. We will call one of these persons 'Mr 1'. Mr 1 was selected by chance from among the other people in this session.

Mr 1 made a decision knowing that you would first see the decision, and then make a decision of your own. Note that Mr 1 has no information about what others decided. When Mr 1 made his decision, he gave x dollar(s) to Save the Children. Recall that Mr 1 was selected by chance from among the other people in this session. Mr 1 has no more decisions to make.

There are three people in Room A that were asked to guess how much you will give to Save the Children after seeing that Mr 1 gave x dollars. They will be told what you decided at the very end of the session, and have no more decisions to make. They will not know who you are.

Please enter the amount of dollars between 0 and 10 you would like to give to **Save the Children**:

OK


Figure 37: Second-Movers' Contribution Screen For Second-Movers With An Audience

You will now play the rest of the guessing game. You will be asked to guess how much people in the session gave to Save the Children under different scenarios. Some of these scenarios may be familiar to you from the decisions you just made, and some others may not. Remember that 5 extra dollars will go to the person in the session whose guess is closest to what people in the session did on average. In case of a tie, we will select one person in the session by lottery from among the winners to receive the prize.

In this second part of the guessing game, you will make guesses about people in two scenarios. In both scenarios, two people will make a choice about how much money to give to Save the Children. We will refer to these people as 'Mr 1' and 'Mr 2'.


Mr 1 makes a choice before Mr 2 makes his. Mr 2 knows someone makes a choice before he does, and is told what Mr 1 chose. The difference between the scenarios is *when* Mr 2 is told what Mr 1 chose. In one scenario Mr 2 is told what Mr 1 chose first, and then makes his own choice. This scenario gives Mr 2 an opportunity to consider what you chose before making his own choice. We will call this the 'Can-Consider' scenario. In the other scenario, Mr 2 makes his own choice first and only then is told what you chose. In this second scenario, Mr 2 *can not* consider what you chose before making his own choice. We will call this the 'Cannot-Consider' scenario. The following describes the scenarios in more detail:

*'Can-Consider' scenario: This is the scenario you are familiar with. Mr 1 makes a choice of how much money to give to Save the Children. Mr 2 is told what Mr 1 chose. Mr 2 then makes his own choice. The following shows the sequence of events:



When Mr 2 is making choices, what Mr 1 chose would be the only information he would be told about what others chose.

*'Cannot-Consider' scenario: As in the Can-Consider scenario, first Mr 1 makes a choice of how much money to give to Save the Children. The order of events is different from that point on. Before being told what Mr 1 chose, Mr 2 makes his own choice. Only after no one has further choices to make, Mr 2 will be told what Mr 1 chose. Mr 2 would then do other tasks such as playing a guessing game for money and answering a survey. The following shows the sequence of events:



When Mr 2 is making choices, he would not be told any information about what others chose.

Notice that step 3 in the timeline of the Can-Consider scenario does not happen until step 5 in the timeline of the Cannot-Consider scenario. Before we continue, we will ask you some questions about what you just read to make sure the instructions are clear.

OK

Figure 38: Second-Movers' Screen Explaining Rest of Guessing Game

Please answer the following questions about the two scenarios:

1) Order the three steps below in the Can-Consider scenario by putting a 1 next to the step that goes first, a 2 next to the one that goes second and a 3 next to the one that goes third.

Mr 2 makes his choice.

Mr 2 is told what you chose.

You make your choice.

2) Order the three steps below in the Cannot-Consider scenario by putting a 1 next to the step that goes first, a 2 next to the one that goes second and a 3 next to the one that goes third.

Mr 2 makes his choice.

Mr 2 is told what you chose.

You make your choice.

3) Which scenario below is the only one that allows Mr 2 to consider the choice you made before making his own choice?

Cannot-Consider

Can-Consider

Figure 39: Second-Movers' Questionnaire of Screen Explaining Rest of Guessing Game





Figure 40: Second-Movers' Answers To Questionnaire of Screen Explaining Rest of Guessing Game

First consider the Can-Consider scenario. Here we recap the sequence of events:




You will now give your best guess as to how much Mr 2 will give to Save the Children, for each choice Mr 1 can make.

Give your best guess as to how much Mr 2 will give to Save the Children...

- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 0 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 1 dollar to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 2 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 3 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 4 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 5 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 6 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 7 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 8 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 9 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 10 dollars to Save the Children:

Now consider the Cannot-Consider scenario. In this scenario, Mr 2 cannot consider what anybody else gave before making his own decision. Here we recap the sequence of events:



Give your best guess as to how much Mr 2 will give to Save the Children:


OK

Figure 41: Second-Movers' First Input Screen for Guessing Game

You will now play the rest of the guessing game. You will be asked to guess how much people in the session gave to Save the Children under different scenarios. Some of these scenarios may be familiar to you from the decisions you just made, and some others may not. Remember that 5 extra dollars will go to the person in the session whose guess is closest to what people in the session did on average. In case of a tie, we will select one person in the session by lottery from among the winners to receive the prize.

You will make a guess about **Mr 1** in the Cannot-Consider scenario.

•Cannot-Consider scenario. Mr 1 will make a decision knowing that Mr 2 will NOT be able to consider the decision before make a decision of his own. Here is the sequence of events:



Give your best guess of how much **Mr 1** gave to Save the Children:

Now consider a person in a different scenario. Mr 'ByHimself' does not know what any other person gave to Save the Children, and no one will see his or her decision.

Give your best guess of how much Mr ByHimself gave to Save the Children:

OK


Figure 42: Second-Movers' Second Input Screen for Guessing Game

You will now play a *different* guessing game, and possibly earn 5 *extra* dollars. Like you, others in this session gave their best guess as to what people in different scenarios gave on average. You will now guess, for each of these scenarios, what people in this session guessed on average. So as opposed to the first guessing game, where you were asked to guess what people actually did, now you will guess what people actually *guessed*.


5 extra dollars will go to the person whose guess is closest to what people in the session actually guessed on average. In case of a tie, we will select one person in the session by lottery from among the winners to receive the payment.

You will make guesses about the Can-Consider and the Cannot-Consider scenarios. We present the sequence of events for each of the scenarios:

•“Can-Consider” scenario. Here we recap the sequence of events:



•“Cannot-Consider” scenario. Here we recap the sequence of events:



Notice that step 3 in the timeline of the Can-Consider scenario does not happen until step 5 in the timeline of the Cannot-Consider scenario.

OK

Figure 43: Second-Movers’ Screen Explaining Second-Order Guessing Game

First consider the Can-Consider scenario. Here we recap the sequence of events:

You will now give your best guess as to what others guessed Mr 2 would give to Save the Children, for each choice Mr 1 can make.

Give your best guess as to what others guessed Mr 2 would give to Save the Children...

- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 0 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 1 dollar to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 2 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 3 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 4 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 5 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 6 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 7 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 8 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 9 dollars to Save the Children:
- ... if he sees Mr 1 gave 10 dollars to Save the Children:

Now consider the Cannot-Consider scenario. Here we recap the sequence of events:


Give your best guess as to what others guessed much Mr 2 will give to Save the Children:

Figure 44: Second-Movers' First Input Screen for Second-Order Guessing Game

You will now play the rest of this second guessing game. You will be asked to guess *how much others guessed* people in the session gave to Save the Children under different scenarios. Some of these scenarios may be familiar to you from the decisions you just made, and some others may not. Remember that 5 extra dollars will go to the person in the session whose guess is closest to what people in the session did on average. In case of a tie, we will select one person in the session by lottery from among the winners to receive the prize.


You will make a guess about **Mr 1** in the Can-Consider scenario and the Cannot-Consider scenario.

•Can-Consider scenario. Mr 1 will make a decision knowing that Mr 2 will be able to consider the decision before make a decision of his own. Here we recap the sequence of events:



Give your best guess of how much others guessed **Mr 1** gave to Save the Children:

•Cannot-Consider scenario. Mr 1 will make a decision knowing that Mr 2 will NOT be able to consider the decision before make a decision of his own. Here we recap the sequence of events.



Give your best guess of how much others guessed **Mr 1** gave to Save the Children:

Now consider a person in a different scenario. Mr 'ByHimself' does not know what any other person gave to Save the Children, and no one will see his or her decision.

Give your best guess as to how much others guessed Mr ByHimself gave to Save the Children:

OK

Figure 45: Second-Movers' Second Input Screen for Second-Order Guessing Game

Please answer the following questions:

- 1) What is your age?
- 2) What is your sex?
 - Male
 - Female
- 3) What is the highest level of education you have **completed**?
 - Elementary
 - Middle School
 - High School
 - College or above
- 4) At any time in the last 3 months, have you attended school or college?
 - Yes
 - No
- 5) Are you studying or did you study a Bachelor's degree in economics?
 - Yes
 - No
- 6) How many experiments have you participated in in the past?
- 7) On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is 'none at all' and 10 is 'perfectly', how well would you say you know what the objective of Save the Children is?
- 8) On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is 'not at all' and 10 is 'perfectly', how well would you say Save the Children fulfills its objective?

Figure 46: Second-Movers' First Socio-Demographic Characteristics Screen

Please answer the following questions:

9) Have you ever taught a course to a group of people? Yes
 No

10) If you have siblings, are you the oldest? I am the oldest
 I am not the oldest
 I do not have siblings.

11) Do you have children? Yes
 No

12) Have you ever been the captain of a team? Yes
 No

13) If you are employed, are there people where you work who answer directly to you? Yes
 No

14) How willing are you to take risks, in general? Answer on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is 'Not willing at all' and 10 is 'Very willing'.

Figure 47: Second-Movers' Second Socio-Demographic Characteristics Screen

This screen contains a number of statements with which some people agree and others disagree. Please rate how much you personally agree or disagree with these statements-how much they reflect how you feel or think personally. Use the following scale:

(1) totally disagree
(2) generally disagree
(3) somewhat disagree
(4) somewhat agree
(5) generally agree
(6) totally agree

1) I enjoy having control over other people.	<input type="text"/>
2) People are only motivated by personal gain.	<input type="text"/>
3) I talk about my most important values and beliefs.	<input type="text"/>
4) I generally don't trust others.	<input type="text"/>
5) I am hesitant about taking initiative in a group.	<input type="text"/>
6) I am accurate in predicting how people will behave.	<input type="text"/>
7) I look out for the personal welfare of group members.	<input type="text"/>
8) I can inspire enthusiasm for a project.	<input type="text"/>

Figure 48: Second-Movers' Personality Screen




Figure 49: Second-Movers' Guess Number of Subjects Screen

G Mexico Sample: First-Mover's Instructions

In this survey you are assigned ID number XXXXX. Write it down somewhere, as we will use it for your payment.

Next Block of Text

In this experiment we will pair you with another person. Each person has a different role. The name of the role we will assign you is “Person 1”. You are Person 1. The name of the role of the person you are paired with is “Person 2”.

For taking part in this survey, you and Person 2 are eligible to receive a 100 peso payment or instead, ask that the payment or portion of payment be donated to the East Africa Division of Save the Children.

Save the Children works in East Africa to fight child malnutrition, provide drinkable water and advise governments about childhood development. To abbreviate, instead of saying “Save the Children’s East Africa Division”, we will simply say “Save the Children”


You (Person 1) will take two decisions about how to divide those 100 pesos between you and Save the Children. Whatever amount you don’t give to Save the Children will be yours.

Person 2 will also receive 100 pesos and will decide how to divide them with Save the Children.

There are two decision sequences

Both decisions you take about how to divide your 100 pesos correspond to the two sequences about the decisions between you and Person 2.

You (Person 1) are the first person to take the decision in both sequences. The sequences of decisions you and Person 2 take will differ in when Person 2 sees your decision. The sequences are illustrated below.



In the first sequence, you divide your 100 pesos and Person 2 sees your decision *before* they take their decision.

In the second sequence, you divide your 100 pesos and Person 2 sees your decision *after* they take their decision.

Only one sequence is implemented

Only one sequence of decisions will be implemented, and we will divide the 100 pesos like Person 1 (you) and Person 2 decide in the sequence selected decisions.

Illustrative example

Let's illustrate with an example. Suppose you gave X pesos to Save the Children in the sequence where Person 2 sees your decision *before* taking their own decision.

Suppose too that you gave Z pesos to Save the Children in the sequence in which Person 2 sees your decision *after* they take their own decision. (Note that X might be different or equal to Z.) Then, we will use a raffle to decide which of the two decision sequences will be implemented:

- Sequence where Person 2 sees *before* deciding: Person 1 (you) gives X pesos to Save the Children. Person 2 sees that you gave X pesos to Save the Children. Person 2 divides their 100 pesos with Save the Children.
- Sequence where Person 2 sees *after* deciding: Person 1 (you) gives Z pesos to Save the Children. Person 2 divides their 100 pesos with Save the Children.

We will use a raffle to decide which sequence will be implemented

We will use a virtual raffle to choose which sequence of decisions will be implemented in your case. Again, each sequence of decisions is chosen with a certain probability, and if a sequence of decisions is chosen, the other sequence becomes irrelevant.

The session will not use deception

Please, note that we will follow the standard of these types of studies: no part of the instructions is deceitful or misleading. In particular, Save the Children will really receive the money you and Person 2 decided in the chosen sequence.

The donation is anonymous

Save the Children will only be reached by this study to give them the amount of money you decide. The money you give will be donated anonymously and without any explanation of where it came from.

Your only interaction with Person 2 is that they will see your decision

Even if Person 2 sees what you decided, they will not know who you are. You will not know what decision Person 2 takes. Person 2 will be selected randomly between the individuals that are part of a second phase of the experiment, that will possibly be online.

We will give you the money you choose for yourself keeping your anonymity

Once you and Person 2 take your decisions, we will give you the money you chose for yourself. This procedure will be anonymous. We will ask you to go to an office that is close (for example, in your university if you are a student) to pick up your money in a sealed envelope, and you will identify yourself through the ID number we assigned you randomly in the beginning of the experiment. The person who is in charge of the office will not know the details of the experiment.

In the next screen we will ask you some questions.

Next Block of Text

To ease your comprehension, please answer the following questions about the instructions:

1. Sometimes you will take the role of Person 2 in the experiment
 - a. True
 - b. False

2. Order the next three steps in the sequence in which Person 2 sees *before* deciding. Write 1 besides the step that goes first, write 2 next to the second step, and 3 next to the step that goes third.
 - a. Person 2 takes their decision
 - b. Person 2 is told what Person 1 decided (what you decided)
 - c. Person 1 (you) takes their decision
3. Order the next three steps in the sequence in which Person 2 sees *after* deciding. Write 1 besides the step that goes first, white a 2 next to the second step, and 3 next to the step that goes third.
 - a. Person 2 takes their decision
 - b. Person 2 is told what Person 1 decided (what you decided)
 - c. Person 1 (you) takes their decision
4. The sequence of decisions in which Person 2 sees *before* deciding, Person 2 will be able to take their own decision taking into account what you decided before taking their own decision
 - a. True
 - b. False
5. In the sequence in which Person 2 sees *after* deciding, Person 2 will be able to take into consideration what you decided before taking their own decision
 - a. True
 - b. False
6. Person 2 will know your identity
 - a. True
 - b. False
7. Save the Children will know your identity
 - a. True
 - b. False
8. Person 2 will be randomly selected between those who are part of the next phase of the experiment
 - a. True
 - b. False
9. We will inform you what your assigned Person 2 gave to Save the Children
 - a. True
 - b. False
10. For any of the decision sequences, there is a possibility that sequence will not be implemented
 - a. True
 - b. False
11. If we implement one of the sequences, then we will not implement the other decision sequence
 - a. True
 - b. False

The Next Block of Text Provides the Right Answers to the Questions, Along With an Explanation of the Right Answer (The Explanation Does Not Depend on the Answer Given). We Provide An Example, For Randomly Selected Answers.

We will show the questions again. Now we will include your answer, if the answer was right or wrong, and an explanation of the right answer.

1. You will sometimes take the role of Person 2 in this experiment
You answered True. This is WRONG. You will always take the role of Person 1 in this experiment
2. Order the next three steps in the sequence in which Person 2 sees *before* deciding. Write 1 besides the step that goes first, white a 2 next to the second step, and 3 next to the step that goes third.

Person 2 takes their decision

You answered 1. This is WRONG. Person 2 taking their decision is step number 3 in the sequence in which Person 2 sees *before* deciding.

Person 2 is told what Person 1 decided (what you decided)

You answered 2. This is RIGHT. Revealing what Person 1 decided is step number 2 in the sequence in which Person 2 sees *before* deciding.

Person 1 decides (you)

You answered 3. This is WRONG. Person 1 taking their decision is step number 1 in the sequence in which Person 2 sees *before* deciding.

3. Order the next three steps in the sequence in which Person 2 sees *after* deciding. Write 1 besides the step that goes first, white a 2 next to the second step, and 3 next to the step that goes third.

Person 2 takes their decision.

You answered 2. This is RIGHT. Person 2 taking their decision is step number 2 in the sequence in hich Person 2 sees *after* deciding.

Person 2 is told what Person 1 decided (what you decided)

You answered 3. This is RIGHT. Revealing what Person 1 decided to Person 2 is step number 3 in the sequence in which Person 2 sees *after* deciding.

Person 1 decides (you)

You answered 1. This is RIGHT. Person 1 taking their decision is step number 1 in the sequence in which Person 2 sees *after* deciding.

4. In the sequence where Person 2 sees *before* deciding, Person 2 will be able to take into consideration what you decided before taking their own decision

You answered True. This is RIGHT. Person 2 sees what Person 1 decided (you) before taking their own decision

5. In the sequence where Person 2 sees *after* deciding, Person 2 will be able to take into consideration what you decided before taking their own decision

You answered True. This is WRONG. Person 2 sees what Person 1 decided (you) before taking their own decision

6. Person 2 will know your identity

You answered False. This is RIGHT. Your only interaction with Person 2 is that they will see how you divided your 100 pesos and depending on the sequence they will see it before or after they took their own decision.

7. Save the Children will know your identity

You answered False. This is RIGHT. Save the Children will only receive an anonymous donation with the amount given by the individuals playing Person 1 and Person 2.

8. Person 2 will be selected randomly between those who are part of the next phase of the experiment

You answered False. This is WRONG. Person 2 will be selected randomly in the next phase of the experiment

9. We will inform you what Person 2 gave Save the Children

You answered False. This is RIGHT. You will not know how much Person 2 donated to Save the Children

10. For any of both the decision sequences, there is a possibility that sequence is not going to be implemented

You answered True. This is RIGHT. We will use a raffle to choose only one of the sequences to implement.

11. If we implement one of the decision sequences, then we would not implement the other decision sequence

You answered True. This is RIGHT. When we choose one sequence to implement, the other one becomes irrelevant.

Next question block

To clear up any questions, here are the instructions we just asked you questions about. At the end of the screen, you can answer how to divide your 100 pesos in each sequence.

In this experiment we will pair you with another person. Each person has a different role. The name of the role we will assign you is “Person 1”. You are Person 1. The name of the role of the person you are paired with is “Person 2”.

For taking part in this survey, you and Person 2 are eligible to receive a 100 peso payment or instead, ask that the payment or portion of payment be donated to Save the Children.

Save the Children works in East Africa to fight child malnutrition, provide drinkable water and advise governments about childhood development. To abbreviate, instead of saying “Save the Children’s East Africa Division”, we will simply say “Save the Children”


You (Person 1) will take two decisions about how to divide those 100 pesos between you and Save the Children. Whatever amount you don’t give to Save the Children will be yours.

Person 2 will also receive 100 pesos and will decide how to divide them with Save the Children.

There are two decision sequences

Both decisions you take about how to divide your 100 pesos correspond to the two sequences about the decisions between you and Person 2.

You (Person 1) are the first person to take the decision in both sequences. The sequences of decisions you and Person 2 take will differ in when Person 2 sees your decision. The sequences are illustrated below.



In the first sequence, you divide your 100 pesos and Person 2 sees your decision *before* they take their decision.

In the second sequence, you divide your 100 pesos and Person 2 sees your decision *after* they take their decision.

Only one sequence is implemented

Only one sequence of decisions will be implemented, and we will divide the 100 pesos like Person 1 (you) and Person 2 decide in the sequence selected decisions.

Illustrative example

Let's illustrate with an example. Suppose you gave X pesos to Save the Children in the sequence where Person 2 sees your decision *before* taking their own decision.

Suppose too that you gave Z pesos to Save the Children in the sequence in which Person 2 sees your decision *after* they takes their own decision. (Note that X might be different or equal to Z.) Then, we will use a raffle to decide which of the two decision sequences will be implemented:

- Sequence where Person 2 sees *before* deciding: Person 1 (you) gives X pesos to Save the Children. Person 2 sees that you gave X pesos to Save the Children. Person 2 divides their 100 pesos with Save the Children.
- Sequence where Person 2 sees *after* deciding: Person 1 (you) gives Z pesos to Save the Children. Person 2 divides their 100 pesos with Save the Children.

We will use a raffle to decide which sequence will be implemented

We will use a virtual raffle to choose which sequence of decisions will be implemented in your case. Again, each sequence of decisions is chosen with a certain probability, and if a sequence of decisions is chosen, the other sequence becomes irrelevant.

The session will not use deception

Please, note that that we will follow the standard of this type of study: no part of the instructions is deceitful or misleading. In particular, Save the Children will really receive the money you and Person 2 decided in the chosen sequence.

The donation is anonymous

Save the Children will only be reached by this study to give them the amount of money you decide. The money you give will be donated anonymously and without any explanation of where it came from.

Your only interaction with Person 2 is that they will see your decision


Even if Person 2 sees what you decided, they will not know who you are. You will not know what decision Person 2 takes. Person 2 will be selected randomly between the individuals that are part of a second phase of the experiment, that will possibly be online.

We will give you the money you choose for yourself keeping your anonymity

Once you and Person 2 take your decisions, we will give you the money you chose for yourself. This procedure will be anonymous. We will ask you to go to an office that is close (for example, in your university if you are a student) to pick up your money in a sealed envelope, and you will identify yourself through the ID number we assigned you randomly in the beginning of the experiment. The person who is in charge of the office will not know the details of the experiment.

Now you will take the decision of how much to give Save the Children in each sequence of decisions.

For your reference we will include once again the graph with the decision sequences.



Decide how much to give of your 100 pesos to Save the Children in the sequence in which Person 2 sees how much you gave *before* taking their own decision. Remember you keep what you don't give Save the Children.

Next Block of Text

As we previously said, we will just implement one sequence. This sequence is to be selected through a raffle (randomly).

The urn

The urn has two balls. To decide which sequence is to be implemented, we will select a ball randomly from the urn. There two kinds of balls in the urn:

- The first type of ball corresponds to the decision sequence in which Person 2 sees your decision *before* taking their own decision. We will call this ball "Person 2 sees *before* deciding".

- The second type of ball corresponds to the decision sequence in which Person 2 sees your decision *after* taking their own decision. We will call this ball “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”.

Continuing with the example

We will take the previous example to illustrate.

Remember in the example you gave X pesos to Save the Children in the decision sequence where Person 2 sees you decision *before* taking their own decision. You gave Z pesos to Save the Children in the sequence in which Person 2 sees your decision *after* taking their own decision.

We take a ball out of the urn.

- If the ball is the type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding”, then we will implement the following sequence: Person 1 (you) gives X pesos to Save the Children. Person 2 sees that you gave X pesos to Save the Children. Person 2 divides their 100 pesos with Save the Children.
- If the ball is the type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”, then we will implement the following sequence: Person 1 (you) gives Z pesos to Save the Children. Person 2 divides their 100 pesos with Save the Children and can't change their decision. Person 2 sees that you gave Z pesos to Save the Children

You decide what type of balls there are in the urn

You will decide how many balls of each type there are in the urn.


This is, you will decide if the urn has:

- Two balls of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding” and a ball of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”. In this case, it is twice as likely that we draw a ball of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding” over a ball of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”.

Or if the urn has:

- Two balls of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding” and a ball of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding”. In this case, it is twice as likely that we draw ball of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding” over a ball of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding”.

We illustrate below the decisions you will take.



As a reminder:

In the sequence “Person 2 does see before deciding”, you gave XX pesos to Save the Children.

In the sequence “Person 2 does not see before deciding”, you gave XX pesos to Save the Children.

In the next screen we will ask you some comprehension questions.

Next Block of Text

To help your comprehension, please answer the next questions about the instructions:

1. How many balls does the urn have?
2. How many types of balls there are in the urn?
3. In the urn we will use to decide which sequence to implement, it is possible that there is just one type of ball
 - a. True
 - b. False
4. If you choose the urn with two balls of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding” and a ball of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”, then it is twice as likely that the next sequence is implemented:
 - Person 1 (you) divides your 100 pesos
 - Person 2 sees what you decided
 - Person 2 divides their 100 pesos
 - No one takes further decisions
 - a. True
 - b. False
5. If you choose the urn with two balls of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding” and a ball of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding”, then it is twice as likely that the next sequence is implemented:
 - Person 1 (you) divides your 100 pesos
 - Person 2 divides their 100 pesos
 - No one must take more decisions
 - Person 2 sees what you decided

- a) True
- b) False

The Next Block of Text Provides the Right Answers to the Questions, Along With an Explanation of the Right Answer (The Explanation Does Not Depend on the Answer Given). We Provide An Example, For Randomly Selected Answers.

We will rewrite the questions. Now we will include your answer, if the answer is right or wrong, and an explanation of the right answer.

1. How many balls does the urn have?

You answered 3. Your answer is CORRECT. The urn has 3 balls.

2. How many types of balls there are in the urn?

Your answer was 2. Your answer is RIGHT. The urn has 2 types of balls. The ball of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding” and the ball of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”.

3. In the urn we will use to decide which sequence to implement, it is possible that there is just one type of ball

You answered False. Your answer was RIGHT. In the urn we will use, there will be two types of ball, two of one type and one of the other type.

4. If you choose the urn with two balls of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding” and a ball of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”. In this case, it is twice as likely that the next sequence is implemented:

- Person 1 (you) divide your 100 pesos
- Person 2 sees what you decided
- Person 2 divides their 100 pesos

- No one must take more decisions

You answered False. Your answer was WRONG. The sequence that is described is the decision sequence “Person 2 sees *before* deciding”, and it would be twice as likely to be implemented as the sequence “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”.

5. If you choose the urn with two balls of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding” and a ball of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding”, it is twice as likely that the next sequence is implemented:

- Person 1 (you) divide your 100 pesos
- Person 2 divides their 100 pesos
- No one must take more decisions
- Person 2 sees what you decided

You answered True. Your answer was RIGHT. The sequence that is described is the decision sequence “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”, and it would be twice as likely to be implemented as the sequence “Person 2 sees *before* deciding”.

Next Block of Text

To clear up any questions, here there are the instructions about which we just asked questions. At the end of the screen, you can choose the urn you prefer.

As we previously said, we will just implement one sequence. This sequence is to be selected through a raffle (randomly).

The urn

The urn has two balls. To decide which sequence is to be implemented, we will select a ball randomly from the urn. There two kinds of balls in the urn:

- The first type of ball corresponds to the decision sequence in which Person 2 sees your decision *before* taking their own decision. We will call this ball “Person 2 sees *before* deciding”.
- The second type of ball corresponds to the decision sequence in which Person 2 sees your decision *after* taking their own decision. We will call this ball “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”.

Continuing with the example

We will take the previous example to illustrate.

Remember in the example you gave X pesos to Save the Children in the decision sequence where Person 2 sees you decision *before* taking their own decision. You gave Z pesos to Save the Children in the sequence in which Person 2 sees your decision *after* taking their own decision.

We take a ball out of the urn.

- If the ball is the type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding”, then we will implement the following sequence: Person 1 (you) gives X pesos to Save the Children. Person 2 sees that you gave X pesos to Save the Children. Person 2 divides their 100 pesos with Save the Children.
- If the ball is the type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”, then we will implement the following sequence: Person 1 (you) gives Z pesos to Save the Children. Person 2 divides their 100 pesos with Save the Children and can’t change their decision. Person 2 sees that you gave Z pesos to Save the Children

You decide what type of balls there are in the urn

You will decide how many balls of each type there are in the urn.


This is, you will decide if the urn has:

- Two balls of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding” and a ball of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”. In this case, it is twice as likely that we draw a ball of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding” over a ball of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”.

Or if the urn has:

- Two balls of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding” and a ball of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding”. In this case, it is twice as likely that we draw ball of type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding” over a ball of type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding”.

We illustrate below the decisions you will take.



As a reminder:

In the sequence “Person 2 does see before deciding”, you gave XX pesos to Save the Children.

In the sequence “Person 2 does not see before deciding”, you gave XX pesos to Save the Children.

Choose the urn you prefer.

1. The urn with two balls type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding” and one ball type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding”
2. The urn with two balls type “Person 2 sees *after* deciding” and one ball type “Person 2 sees *before* deciding”

Next Block fo Text

You already took two decisions about how to divide your 100 pesos with Save the Children. At the end of the session, we will pull out randomly a ball out of the urn that you chose to see which sequence to implement.

We are going to play a guessing game before. You will guess the decision made by the individuals playing the role of Person 2 when they are in different circumstances.

If what you guess is 10 pesos from the average of what individuals in the positions of Person 1 and Person 2 decided, you will get 50 extra pesos. To be precise, we will get the average of the decisions of the people playing role of Person 1 and Person 2 in each circumstance. Then, we will take, for each circumstance, the difference between the average and what you guessed. If this difference is not greater than 10 pesos (on average), you will get the 50 pesos. This payment will come at the end of the experiment, once we have observed all decisions from all trials.

Suppose that Person 2 must take a decision *before* seeing what Person 1 decided. ¿How many pesos do you think Person 2 gives to Save the Children (on average) if...

- ... Person 1 gave between 0 and 9 pesos to Save the Children?
- ... Person 1 gave between 10 and 19 pesos to Save the Children?
- ... Person 1 gave between 20 and 29 pesos to Save the Children?
- ... Person 1 gave between 30 and 39 pesos to Save the Children?
- ... Person 1 gave between 40 and 49 pesos to Save the Children?
- ... Person 1 gave between 50 and 59 pesos to Save the Children?
- ... Person 1 gave between 60 and 69 pesos to Save the Children?
- ... Person 1 gave between 70 and 79 pesos to Save the Children?

- ... Person 1 gave between 80 and 89 pesos to Save the Children?
- ... Person 1 gave between 90 and 100 pesos to Save the Children?

Next Block of Text

How much do you think the individuals playing the role of Person 1 on average gave to Save the Children when...

- ...they knew that Person 2 would see their decision *before* they made their own decision?
- ...they knew that Person 2 would see their decision *after* they made their own decision?

Next Block of Text

Other Persons 1 in the experiment will answer the same questions you just finished.

We will now ask the same questions we asked about those playing the role of Person 1, but we will no longer want you to guess what they *did*. Now we want you to *guess what others guessed* (on average) in the guessing-game.

To ease your comprehension, please answer the next questions regarding the instructions:

1. In this guessing game, ¿what will you guess?
 - a. What Person 1 chose to do in different circumstances
 - b. What others guessed about what Person 1 chose in different circumstances

Next Block of Text

To clear up any questions, here there are the instructions about which we just asked questions.

We will also present to you the question we made about the guessing game. Now we will include your answer, if the answer was right or wrong, and an explanation of the right answer.

At the end of the screen, you can already play the guessing game.

Other Persons 1 in the experiment will answer the same questions you just finished.

We will now ask the same questions we asked about those playing the role of Person 1, but we will no longer want you to guess what they *did*. Now we want you to *guess what others guessed* (on average) in the guessing-game.

1. In this guessing-game, ¿what will you guess?

You answered, “What Person 1 chose in different circumstances”. This is WRONG. You will guess what others guessed about what Person 1 chose in different circumstances.

Now is your turn to guess.

Think about what others guessed in the guessing games. ¿How much do you think others guessed Person 1 would choose when...

... persons 1 knew that Person 2 would see their decision *before* they took their own decision?

... Person 1 knew that Person 2 would see their decision *after* they took their own decision?

Next Block of Text

Please answer the following questions:

- 1) What is your age?
- 2) What is your sex?
- 3) What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- 4) At any time in the last 3 months, have you attended school or college?
- 5) Are you studying or did you study a Bachelor's Degree in Economics?
- 6) How many experiments have you participated in in the past?
- 7) On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is 'none at all' and 10 is 'perfectly', how well would you say you know what the objective of Save the Children is?
- 8) On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is 'not at all' and 10 is 'perfectly', how well would you say Save the Children fulfills its objective?

Next Block of Text

Please answer the following questions:

- 9) Have you ever taught a course to a group of people?
- 10) If you have siblings, are you the oldest?
- 11) Do you have children?
- 12) Have you ever been the captain of a team?
- 13) If you are employed, are there people where you work who answer directly to you?
- 14) How willing are you to take risks, in general? Answer on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is 'Not willing at all' and 10 is 'Very willing'.

Next Block of Text

This screen contains a number of statements with which some people agree and others disagree. Please rate how much you personally agree or disagree with these statements---how much they reflect how you feel or think personally. Use the following scale:

- (1) totally disagree
- (2) generally disagree
- (3) somewhat disagree
- (4) somewhat agree
- (5) generally agree
- (6) totally agree

- 1) I enjoy having control over other people.
- 2) People are only motivated by personal gain.
- 3) I talk about my most important values and beliefs.
- 4) I generally don't trust others.
- 5) I am hesitant about taking initiative in a group.
- 6) I am accurate in predicting how people will behave.
- 7) I look out for the personal welfare of group members.
- 8) I can inspire enthusiasm for a project.

Next Block of Text

You have reached the end of the experiment. Please take a minute to fill out a couple of questions about your experience in the session.

We will ask you a couple of question about the decisions you made with your 100 pesos. You made three decisions regarding those 100 pesos, one of which was randomly chosen to be implemented.

What was going through your mind when you made the decision of how to divide the money that Person 2 would see before making their decision?

What was going through your mind when you made the decision of how to divide the money that Person 2 would see after makign their decision?

What was going through your mind when you were asked to choose between the urns?

This question is about the first part of the guessing game. What was going through your mind when you were guessing how much Person 2 would give for different values Person 1 would give?

This question is about the second part of the guessing game. What was going through your mind when you were asked to guess what others guessed in the first guessing game? How were your answers different from the first guessing game?

Could you describe what you think the experiment was trying to test?

Did you find anything strange or unusual about the experiment?

Were any of the tasks or questions confusing?

Thank you!

H Mexico Sample: Second-Mover's Instructions

FOLLOWERS

In this survey you are assigned ID number XXXXX. Write it down somewhere, as we will use it for your payment.

You cannot fill the survey if you have already participated in this experiment.

We will only pay subjects who have not participated in the experiment. To pay you, we will verify your name with your school ID, and compare it to a list of names of people that we have registered as having participated in the study, or as having received a payment. This protocol maintains your anonymity in the survey, given that the list of names only has names, and is independent of the data we are compiling in this list. In effect, at no point in this survey will we ask you your name or other identifying information.

To know where to pay you, please indicate which university you work or study in in:

ITAM

CIDE

Tec de Monterrey campus Santa Fe

Next Screen

For taking part in this survey, you are eligible to receive a 100 peso payment or instead, ask that the payment or portion of payment be donated to the East Africa Division of Save the Children.

Save the Children works in East Africa to fight child malnutrition, provide drinkable water and advise governments about childhood development. To abbreviate, instead of saying "Save the Children's East Africa Division", we will simply say "Save the Children"

Please note that this study does not use deception, which means we really will give the money you decide to Save the Children.

Save the Children will only be contacted by this study to give them the amount of money you decide. The money will be given anonymously and without an explanation of where it came from.

Once you have made your decision, we will give you the money you kept. This procedure will be anonymous.

We will ask you to go to an office that is close by (for example, in your college) to pick up the money in a sealed envelope, and you will identify yourself with your ID code we randomly assigned at the beginning

of the experiment. (Recall your ID is XXXX.) The person in charge of the office will not know the details of the experiment.

Next Screen (for those in the No-Influence Contingency)

You will now choose how much of the 100 pesos you would give to Save the Children, and the rest you would keep for yourself.

Other people in this session have already made a decision.

Please enter the amount of pesos between 0 and 100 you would like to give to Save the Children

Next Screen (for those in the Influence Contingency)

We mentioned that other people in this session have already made their decision. We will call one of these persons 'Person 1'. Person 1 was selected by chance from among the other people in this session.

Person 1 made a decision knowing that you would first see the decision, and then make a decision of your own. Note that Person 1 has no information about what others decided. When Person 1 made their decision, they gave X pesos to Save the Children. Person 1 has no more decisions to make.

Please enter the amount of pesos between 0 and 100 you would like to give to Save the Children:

References

Fernández-Duque, Mauricio and Michael Hiscox, “Audience effects on anonymous pro-social followership,” *Economics Letters*, 2022, 212, 110268.

Fischbacher, Urs, “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments,” *Experimental economics*, 2007, 10 (2), 171–178.