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V.O. Key
Political science focused on “today”
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• In explaining this, American politics research tends to focus on contemporary factors
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- In explaining this, American politics research tends to focus on contemporary factors
- Many papers pointing to contemporary characteristics
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  ▶ Individual’s income, education, gender, race
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• Others to contemporary context:
In explaining this, American politics research tends to focus on contemporary factors.

Many papers pointing to contemporary characteristics:

- Individual’s income, education, gender, race

Others to contemporary context:

- Black-white interactions, % African American, economic conditions
But what about Black Belt’s history?
But what about Black Belt’s history?

- 250 years of chattel slavery
But what about Black Belt’s history?

• 250 years of chattel slavery
• At its peak around 1860, 1 in 4 Southern families held slaves
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• 250 years of chattel slavery
• At its peak around 1860, 1 in 4 Southern families held slaves
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But what about Black Belt’s history?

• 250 years of chattel slavery
• At its peak around 1860, 1 in 4 Southern families held slaves
• 4 million people enslaved, 32% of Southern population
• Racial oppression continued after Civil War → black codes, lynchings, Jim Crow
Persistent effects of institutions

Coercive labor institutions such as slavery can have economic/cultural effects long after disappearing.

- Dell (2010) → Colonial labor coercion in Peru/Bolivia → higher levels of economic distress today.
- Acemoglu, García-Jimeno and Robinson (2012) → 17th century Colombian gold mine slavery → higher levels of poverty today.
- Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) → African groups w/ closer ties to slave trade → higher levels of mistrust today.

More recently:
- Increasing political science literature finding evidence of path dependence in political attitudes: Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov (2017); Charnysh (2015).
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- Increasing political science literature finding evidence of path dependence in political attitudes: Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov (2017); Charnysh (2015)
Taken together, leads to key question
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Can slavery and its aftermath in part explain contemporary political attitudes in Southern “Black Belts”? 
As we show, answer is yes
As we show, answer is yes

Key results:
As we show, answer is yes

Key results:

1. Areas of U.S. South with more slaves in 1860 → whites more conservative today (especially on race)
As we show, answer is yes

Key results:

1. Areas of U.S. South w/ more slaves in 1860 → whites more conservative today (especially on race)

2. Differences not due to contemporary factors such as demographics or inequality
As we show, answer is yes

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1. Areas of U.S. South w/ more slaves in 1860 → whites more conservative today (especially on race)
2. Differences not due to contemporary factors such as demographics or inequality
3. Differences not entirely due to antebellum attitudes or migration → which will show suggests a postbellum pattern
4. Suggests a strong historical persistence of attitudes
1. Historical data and main results showing how slavery in 1860 predicts whites’ attitudes today
2. Possible alternative explanations and mechanisms
3. Postbellum political/economic incentives and behavioral path dependence
4. Conclusion (quick!)
1. Data
Key explanatory variable

- Share of population enslaved in a county in 1860
- Data come from 1860 U.S. Census
- Need to account for shifting county boundaries (aerial interpolation)
- Restrict our analysis to ex-Confederate States plus Kentucky and Missouri:
  - Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia
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Key explanatory variable
Key explanatory variable

- 0-20%
- 21-40%
- 41-60%
- 61-80%
- 81-100%
Key outcome variables

- Survey data
  - Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES)
  - Restrict to self-identified whites in Southern states
  - 39,000 respondents across 1,251 Southern counties (90% coverage)
  - Aggregate up to county level, use WLS (weighted by within-county sample sizes)
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Key outcome variables

1. Partisanship (self-identification with Democratic Party)
2. Affirmative action (support or oppose)
3. Racial resentment questions, averaged: (5 point scale)
   - Disagreement with statement: "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class"
4. Historical vote-share
5. Other measures in book (thermometer scores, economic & social indicators, non-race related outcomes (no effect))
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Slavery predicts attitudes today
Slavery predicts attitudes today

Percentage of Whites that are Democrat, Today

Percentage Slave, 1860
Slavery predicts attitudes today
Slavery predicts attitudes today

Percent of Whites that support Affirm. Action

Percentage Slave, 1860
Slavery predicts attitudes today

Percent of Whites that support Affirm. Action

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Percentage Slave, 1860

Percent of Whites that support Affirm. Action
Slavery predicts attitudes today

Racial Resentment

Percentage Slave, 1860
Slavery predicts attitudes today

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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

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Racial Resentment
Control for 1860s factors

- Geographic: state fixed effects, latitude, longitude, county acreage size, navigable water/railway access, ruggedness
- Demographic: county pop, % mixed race/free black (or % Methodist)
- Economic: % small farms, log total farm value, share of land that was developed, inequality of farm holdings
Control for 1860s factors

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Baseline results

Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect on Proportion Democrat

-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4

20%-pt ↑ Slavery 1860
2.2%-pt ↓ Democrat

4.5%-pt GOP swing today
Baseline results

Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

20%-pt ↑ Slavery 1860
2.2%-pt ↓ Democrat today
4.5%-pt GOP swing today
Results robust to various checks

- Dropping urban counties
- Using only counties neighboring one another
- Looking at counties on North-Sound boundary (to test that local prevalence, not legal status of slavery, doing the work)

North-South Analysis

- Instrumenting slavery w/ cotton suitability (will show you)
Results robust to various checks

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• Instrumenting slavery w/ cotton suitability (will show you)
Instrumental variables

• Unmeasured confounding between location of slavery and attitudes today always possible

• Alternative: use ecological measures of cotton suitability (U.N. FAO) as instrument for slavery

• 2SLS models only include geographic controls and state fixed effects
Instrumental variables

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Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

Effect on Proportion Democrat

IV results
IV results

Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 2: Instrumental variables
**IV results**

Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 2: Instrumental variables

Effect of Proportion Slave
Exclusion restriction?

Cotton Suitability ➤ Slavery ➤ Attitudes, today

• How do we know the exclusion restriction holds? (Obviously good reasons to think not)
• Can do a falsification test: no legal slavery, the only effect of cotton will be the direct effect
• Exclusion clearly violated if evidence of cotton-attitudes relationship outside South
  Map
  ▶ States with variation: AZ, CA, NV, NM, UT, CO, OK, KS, NE, IA, IL, IN, OH, PA, NJ
Exclusion restriction?

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Map

States with variation: AZ, CA, NV, NM, UT, CO, OK, KS, NE, IA, IL, IN, OH, PA, NJ
Falsification test

Reduced Form in the South

Effect on Proportion Democrat

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Falsification test

Reduced Form in the South

Effect of Cotton Suitability

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Falsification test

Reduced Form in the South

Effect of Cotton Suitability

Reduced Form in the North

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Falsification test

Reduced Form in the South

Effect on Proportion Democrat

Effect of Cotton Suitability

Reduced Form in the North

Effect of Cotton Suitability

Effect on Proportion Democrat
2. Potential mechanisms
What explains this link?

Discuss many in the book...

- Antebellum attitudes
- Racial threat
- Sorting
- Black-White Inequality
- Civil War destruction
- Rural-urban differences
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Discuss many in the book...

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Antebellum attitudes?

• Political differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas preceded 1860?

▶ Did racism cause slaveholding or did slaveholding cause racism?

▶ Racially hostile attitudes preceded plantation economy, this passed down?

• Historical literature points to broad antebellum racism.

• Genovese (1975) on white small farm owners (non-slaveholders):

“n it was, therefore, natural, as a matter of inclination and social conscience, to be ready to ride patrol, to help discipline the slaves, and to take part in the political and police aspects of the slave regime—in short, to think and act like slaveholders even before becoming one.”

• For our purposes:

Effect of slavery on historical Presidential vote shares suggests post-bellum pattern
Antebellum attitudes?

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- For our purposes: Effect of slavery on historical Presidential vote shares → suggests post-bellum pattern
Antebellum attitudes?

- All states but KY have enacted poll taxes.
- Voting Rights Act.

Year:
- Civil War Begins
- Reconstruction Ends
- Voting Rights Act

Effect of Slavery on % Democrat:
- Percentage change from 1850 to 2000.
Antebellum attitudes?

- **Civil War Begins**: 1861
- **Civil War Ends**: 1865
- **Reconstruction Ends**: 1877
- **All states but KY have enacted poll taxes**: 1900
- **Voting Rights Act**: 1965

The graph shows the effect of slavery on the percentage of Democrats, with key events marked along the timeline.
Antebellum attitudes?

Effect of Slavery on % Democrat

-10
0
10
20
30

Civil War Begins
Reconstruction Ends

1850 1900 1950 2000
Year

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Wallace 1968
Thurmond 1948

Voting Rights Act

Effect of Slavery on % Democrat

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- Thurmond 1948
- Wallace 1968
- Obama 2008
- Wallaces
Contemporary racial threat?

- Extensive literature in political science on "racial threat".
- Higher % minority today → contemporary threat to dominant group → more hostility against minority group.

% Slave 1860

Attitudes Today % Black Today

- If true, demographic persistence, not persistence of political attitudes.
- Slavery 1860 correlated w/ % African American today, so estimate controlled direct effect of slavery via sequential g-estimation, "fixing" % African American today (including in regression: same results).

Methodology explained in Acharya Blackwell & Sen 2016 APSR.
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Contemporary racial threat?

Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 2: Controlled Direct Effect (Fixing Proportion Black, 2000)
Contemporary racial threat?

Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 2: Controlled Direct Effect (Fixing Proportion Black, 2000)

Effect of Proportion Slave
Contemporary racial threat?

• No evidence effect operates via contemporary racial threat.
• If anything: No relationship between current-day black % and political attitudes, once control for slavery.
• Strong implication: Slavery/history major omitted variable for studies of voting/public opinion, racial threat in South.
Contemporary racial threat?

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If anything: No relationship between current-day black % and political attitudes, once control for slavery.

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3. Path Dependence in Attitudes
Slavery and its collapse as causal force

• Slavery and its collapse were critical junctures.
• After slavery, Southern whites faced massive changes to political, economic landscape.
• Emancipation huge shock.
• In theory and practice, blacks free to vote, take labor elsewhere.
• Posed severe problems for cotton economy, which relied heavily on cheap labor (Ransom and Sutch).
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Whites replaced slavery w/other institutions

Specifically, political and economic responses involving violence/suppression

- Political: violence, poll taxes, literacy tests to disenfranchise
- Economic: vagrancy laws, peonage/convict leasing, paternalism

Aim: Keep black wages low, suppress mobility, increase labor output

(Mechanization Results)

Mix of norms and institutions:
- Laws nominally race blind, but lawmakers were explicitly racist in their intentions
Whites replaced slavery w/other institutions

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  - More support for early 20th century Southern state constitutions that created Jim Crow
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  - Blacks less likely to own farms, lower farm values in 1925
  - Black-white wage inequality in 1940 (though not an explanation for contemporary attitudes)
  - More Voting Rights Act violations/lower black voter turnout (separate paper)
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Why persistence?

- Differential black belt political and economic institutions largely erased by CRA, VRA, and mechanization.

Why do we still these relationships today? → Behavioral path dependence.

- Two mechanisms:
  1. Institutional: Schools, businesses, etc.
  2. Intergenerational: Parents to children.

  Ex) Jennifer Ritterhouse, Growing Up Jim Crow (2006): “Children who learned to treat blacks as inferiors at an interpersonal level were unlikely, as adults, to question laws and institutions that discriminated against blacks at a societal, structural level. Rather, they became all the more receptive to racist imagery and other cultural narratives that assured them that blacks were unworthy of whites’ civility because they were themselves uncivilized: dirty, uneducated, immoral, bestial, less than human.”

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Violence as intergenerational socialization

• Violence was a prominent form of intergenerational socialization.
• Children were often present or even active participants.


In celebration of his arrival into town, the mayor granted the town's children a holiday from school and they joined their families in waving handkerchiefs at [the man] as he was paraded through town on a carnival float drawn by four white horses. [During the lynching] the crowd, including the white schoolchildren, shouted their approval.

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• This lasted well into 20th century (Warning: Graphic content ahead...)
Violence as intergenerational socialization
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Lynching of Ruben Stacy, 1935 in Ft Lauderdale
Violence as intergenerational socialization

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Violence as intergenerational socialization

Lynching of Ruben Stacy, 1935 in Ft Lauderdale

→ Girls in picture would be in their 80s today
4. Concluding Remarks
To sum

• Local presence of slavery in 1860 explains some variation in political attitudes within South today
• Effects not simply due to antebellum attitudes, geographic sorting, contemporary factors (racial threat)
• Slavery appears to have direct effect on attitudes today thanks to political and economic incentives its collapse created and by way of institutions and culture
• More broadly, political attitudes can persist over time & we have offered a theory that helps explain this
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Thanks!

For more information:

- Maya → http://scholar.harvard.edu/msen
- Avi → http://stanford.edu/~avidit/
- Matt → http://mattblackwell.org
Implication of economic incentive argument

Suppose postbellum demand for cheap labor drives anti-black attitudes and intergeneration transfer involves some decay → areas with lower labor demands should see smaller effects

Partial mechanization of cotton begins in 1920s-30s, leads to lower labor requirements (Alston and Ferrie, 1993)

In places that mechanized earlier → should see smaller effects

Exactly what we see empirically
Implication of economic incentive argument

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Mechanization weakens slavery’s impact

Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 2: Controlled Direct Effect (Fixing Proportion Black, 2000)

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 3: Interaction with growth in tractors per acre, 1930-1940

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Mechanization weakens slavery’s impact

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Effect on Proportion Democrat
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Model 3: Interaction with growth in tractors per acre, 1930-1940
Effect of Proportion Slave, later mechanization

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Effect of Proportion Slave

-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Mechanization weakens slavery’s impact

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Interaction significant
Cotton Suitability

Least Suitable

Most Suitable
Geographic sorting?

- Possible people moving around over 20th century causes patterns
  - (1) Racially liberal whites leave former slave areas
  - (2) Racially conservative whites move to former slave areas
- Evidence on these points difficult to come by
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Evidence from 1940 Census

1940 U.S. Census recorded county of residence in 1935 and 1940
Can exploit this to see how white patterns of migration differed
between high-slave and low-slave areas

Design from Hornbeck (working paper):
▶ Regress census traits on migrant status interacted with proportion
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1935-1940 Migration Patterns

Out-migration

- Monthly Rent
- Wages
- Weeks Worked
- Living in birthstate
- Nativity
- Female
- Age
- Education

Out-migrants vs. Non-migrants

- High Prop Slave
- Low Prop Slave
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Low Prop Slave
1935-1940 Migration Patterns

In-migration vs. In-migrants vs. Non-migrants

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- Low Prop Slave

- Monthly Rent
- Wages
- Weeks Worked
- Living in birthstate
- Nativity
- Female
- Age
- Education

In-migrants vs. Non-migrants

-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Evidence from 1940 Census

- Migrants very different from non-migrants
- But: Migration patterns roughly similar across the slavery distribution
- Some additional evidence from 1995-2000 from 2000 Census
  - Most migration from (a) low-slave to low-slave areas, (b) high-slave to high-slave areas
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- Sorting hard to dismiss, but if anything causing classical measurement error
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(1) Slavery → Electoral Challenges
## Slavery → Electoral Challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral Challenges per 100k Residents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>3.152***</td>
<td>3.158***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.512)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
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<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model</td>
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<td>OLS</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>772</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.128</td>
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*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
(2) Slavery $\rightarrow$ Lower Black Voter Turnout
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>-2.901***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.121)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>521</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>518.353</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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(3) Slavery $\rightarrow$ Higher Racial Polarization
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<table>
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<th>Democratic Identification</th>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.396)</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
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<td>AIC</td>
<td>4,962.651</td>
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*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
## Baseline specification

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>$-0.187^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.159^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.137^{**}$</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.024)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>748</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.188</td>
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* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$
Baseline specification (individual level)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prop Democrat</th>
<th>Affirm. Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>logistic</td>
<td>OLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>−0.698**</td>
<td>−0.672**</td>
<td>−0.627**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>19.583</td>
<td>18.586</td>
<td>25.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15.941)</td>
<td>(16.043)</td>
<td>(16.871)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster-Robust SEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>23,714</td>
<td>22,686</td>
<td>23,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01
# Results on Slaveholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prop Democrat</th>
<th>Affirm. Action</th>
<th>Racial Resentment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>-0.163*</td>
<td>-0.175**</td>
<td>0.749**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Slave, 1830</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Slaveholder, 1860</td>
<td>0.991†</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>-3.596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.591)</td>
<td>(0.509)</td>
<td>(2.586)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: † p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01. All models are WLS with within-county sample size as weights. Proportion slaveholder is the total slaveholders in a county divided by the total county population.
## Instrumental variable results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prop Slave (1)</th>
<th>Prop Democrat (2)</th>
<th>Affirm. Action (3)</th>
<th>Racial Resentment (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Suitability</td>
<td>0.381**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.198**</td>
<td>−0.168**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latitude/Longitude</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1, 206</td>
<td>1, 206</td>
<td>1, 206</td>
<td>1, 016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>2SLS 1st Stage</td>
<td>2SLS 2nd Stage</td>
<td>2SLS 2nd Stage</td>
<td>2SLS 2nd Stage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01

Column (1) is 1st stage relationship, Columns (2)-(4) 2nd stage
Does exclusion restriction hold?

- Cotton suitability could affect political beliefs via other mechanisms
- Falsification test (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011): Exclusion violated if evidence of cotton-attitudes relationship in areas w/ no legal slavery
- \( \rightarrow \) Examine if effect of IV on attitudes \textit{outside South}
Falsification test

Reduced Form in the South

Effect on Proportion Democrat

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Falsification test

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Reduced Form in the South
Effect of Cotton Suitability
Reduced Form in the North

Effect on Proportion Democrat
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Falsification test

Reduced Form in the South

Effect of Cotton Suitability

Reduced Form in the North

Effect of Cotton Suitability

Effect on Proportion Democrat
North-South counterfactual analysis

- Is fact that slavery legal driving effect? Or is localized high/low prevalence driving effect?
- Test to compare:
  - Northern counties (slavery illegal by 1860)
  - Southern counties w/ very low % enslaved
North-South counterfactual analysis
North-South counterfactual analysis

Campbell County, KY

Prop Slave = 0.006
North-South counterfactual analysis

Campbell County, KY
Prop Slave = 0.006

Adams County, OH
No Legal Slavery
North-South counterfactual analysis

if different, then legality of institution driving the difference

Adams County, OH
No Legal Slavery

Campbell County, KY
Prop Slave = 0.006
North-South counterfactual analysis

- Match Southern counties w/ few slaves (< 3% of the pop) to Northern counties w/ no slaves on
  - geography (latitude/longitude/area)
  - farm value per capita, and
  - total county population

- Use coarsened exact matching w/ default cut-points

- 181 matched counties left

- Regress each outcome measure on North-South dummy
North-South counterfactual analysis

Model 1: Baseline Results
Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 2: Instrumental variables
Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 3: North-South Matching

Effect on Affirmative Action Support

-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
North-South counterfactual analysis

Model 1: Baseline Results
- Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 2: Instrumental variables
- Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 3: North-South Matching
- South-North Difference

Effect on Affirmative Action Support
Other political attitudes

Prop. Democrat

Affirm. Action

Racial Resentment

Effect of Slavery

-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6

Raw Within States + 1860 Controls IV Raw Within States + 1860 Controls IV Raw Within States + 1860 Controls IV
Other political attitudes

- Jobs vs. Environment
- Gay Marriage Ban
- Pro-choice
Test of racial threat

- Sequential g-estimation procedure (Vansteelandt, 2009):
  1. Regress attitudes on % black today, % slave 1860, and any confounders for % black today

\[
Y_c = \alpha_s + \beta_1 PB_{c,2000} + \beta_2 PS_{c,1860} + X_c \beta_3 + \varepsilon_c
\]

2. Adjust outcome by subtracting estimated effect of % black

\[
\tilde{Y}_c = Y_c - \hat{\beta}_1 PB_{c,2000}
\]

3. Regress adjusted outcome on % slave without any post-treatment variables

\[
\tilde{Y}_c = \alpha_s + \gamma_1 PS_{c,1860} + X_{c,1860} \gamma_2 + \nu_c
\]

- Under no omitted variables at each stage (and homogeneous effects), \( \gamma_2 \) is controlled direct effect of slavery.
### Racial threat results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, Direct Effect</td>
<td>$-0.175^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.159^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.143^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.129^{**}$</td>
<td>0.571^{**}</td>
<td>0.541^{**}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Black, 2000</td>
<td>$0.167^{**}$</td>
<td>$0.054$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.241</td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

State Fixed Effects: ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

1860 Covariates: ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

- **p < .05; *** p < .01

Columns (1), (3), and (5) include % black 2000 as an additional control to the baseline specification. Columns (2), (4), and (6) use sequential g-estimation of Vansteelandt (2009).
## Antebellum attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prop Democrat</th>
<th>Affirm. Action</th>
<th>Racial Resentment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prop. Slave, 1860</strong></td>
<td>-0.198 †</td>
<td>-0.186**</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prop. Slave, 1850</strong></td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.452)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prop Slave 1840</strong></td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>-0.985*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prop Slaveholder, 1860</strong></td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>-4.253 †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.576)</td>
<td>(0.495)</td>
<td>(2.545)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>566</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R^2</strong></td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01
### Effect of slavery on African Americans (Columns 1, 3, and 5) and children of immigrants (Columns 2, 4, 6) in South

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prop Democrat Logistic</th>
<th>Affirm. Action Logistic</th>
<th>Racial Resentment OLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>0.619 ± 0.396</td>
<td>-0.714 ± 0.533</td>
<td>-0.630 ± 0.462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster-Robust SEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>2nd Gen. Immigrants</td>
<td>Blacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5,030</td>
<td>1,886</td>
<td>5,025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05
Urban-Rural/Civil War Destruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prop Democrat</th>
<th>Affirm. Action</th>
<th>Racial Resentment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>$-0.196^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.165^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.157^{**}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War Destruction</td>
<td>$-0.005$</td>
<td>$-0.005$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Counties Only</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^† p < .1; ^* p < .05; ^{**} p < .01$

Effect of slavery after eliminating large urban centers (Columns 1, 3, 5) and controlling for Civil War destruction (Columns 2, 4, 6), which are % decrease in farm value in county between 1860 and 1870
### Postbellum patterns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lynchings</th>
<th>Prop Democrat</th>
<th>Affirm. Action</th>
<th>Racial Resentment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>16.618**</td>
<td>-0.235**</td>
<td>-0.213**</td>
<td>0.829**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.537)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors Change, 1930-1940</td>
<td>-0.483†</td>
<td>-0.616†</td>
<td>2.198†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(1.264)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors, 1930</td>
<td>-0.197</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.777)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Slave × Tractors Change</td>
<td>2.303*</td>
<td>2.179**</td>
<td>-9.094*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.942)</td>
<td>(0.809)</td>
<td>(4.229)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>WLS-county area</th>
<th>WLS-sample size</th>
<th>WLS-sample size</th>
<th>WLS-sample size</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01

Black lynchings per 100,000 blacks 1882–1930, number of tractors per 100,000 acres of land in 1940. Column 1 is WLS w/ log of total county area as weights.


