REPRESENTATION AND THE FALL*

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This article makes the case that the early modern debate over political representation was deeply intertwined with a theological debate over the Fall. The “resemblance” theory of representation adopted by English Parliamentarians was first formulated by Calvinists to make the case that Adam represented humanity, despite the fact that humanity had never authorized him to act in their name. The Royalist rejoinder, which treated authorization as a necessary and sufficient condition of representation, began life instead as a Pelagian response to Calvinist orthodoxy. This theological dispute provides a crucial context for the interventions of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.

I

John Locke opens his essay on The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695) with a striking claim. Since it is “obvious,” he writes, that the Christian “Doctrine of Redemption, and consequently of the Gospel, is founded upon the Supposition of Adam’s Fall,” it follows that, in order to understand “what we are restored to by Jesus Christ, we must first consider what the Scripture shows we lost by Adam.”

The orthodox answer to this question had been supplied by Augustine’s doctrine of original sin, according to which all of humanity fell with Adam; our spirit is depraved as a result, and we are incapable of meriting election by obeying the law. Rather, we depend utterly on God’s grace, which comes irresistibly to those he has predestined for salvation by means of faith in the Atonement. “This and nothing else,” Augustine canonically argued, “is the predestination of the saints, namely, the foreknowledge and the preparation of God’s favors, by which those

* I am deeply grateful to Benjamin Friedman, Sarah Mortimer, Michael Rosen, Quentin Skinner, Richard Tuck, and three anonymous readers for Modern Intellectual History for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay. I also had the opportunity to present my argument to audiences at Cambridge and Princeton Universities, as well as at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. I am indebted to all those who attended my talks for their comments and encouragement.

who are delivered are most certainly delivered.” If we ask “why God delivers this person rather than that one,” the response is simply, “How incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways.” But Locke makes clear that he cannot accept this Augustinian doctrine. It is, he insists, “little consistent with the Justice or Goodness of the Great and Infinite God” to suppose that “all Adam’s Posterity” could have been “doomed to Eternal Infinite Punishment for the transgression of Adam, whom Millions had never heard of, and no one had authorized to transact for him, or be his Representative.”

Locke thus grounds his momentous rejection of the doctrine of original sin in a claim about the theory of representation. A representative, on this account, is one who is “authorized” by some group of people to “transact” in their name. To ask whether Adam legitimately represented the human race when he fell is therefore simply to ask whether humanity ever authorized Adam to act as their agent. And because the answer to this question is unambiguously negative, Locke concludes that Adam acted solely in his own right and, consequently, that his sin cannot have been attributed by a just God to anyone else—let alone to the entire human race. Locke’s terminology in this passage clearly reflects an encounter with the well-known discussion of “Persons, Authors, and things Personated” in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651). A “Representer, or Representative,” Hobbes tells us, is a person whose “words or actions” are “Owned by those whom they represent.”

In such a case, “the Person is the Actor; and he that owneth the

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3 Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, in St. Augustine: Four Anti-Pelagian Writings, 238 (quoting Romans 11:33).

4 Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, 5. An insightful discussion of this passage appears in Ian Harris, The Mind of John Locke: A Study of Political Theory in Its Intellectual Setting (Cambridge, 1994), 233–40. As will become clear, I offer a very different account of how Locke’s intervention should be understood in its theological and political context. In particular, I am unpersuaded that Locke meant this argument to answer Filmer, who in fact never claimed that Adam represented humanity. Locke meant, rather, to answer a range of Calvinist parliamentarian writers. On Locke’s view of the Fall more generally see Peter Shouls, Reasoned Freedom: John Locke and the Enlightenment (Ithaca, 1992), 194–6, 202–3; and John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility (Cambridge, 1994), 397–8, 414–18. For an unpersuasive attempt to align Locke with a less heterodox position on the Fall see W. M. Spellman, “The Latitudinarian Perspective on Original Sin,” Revue internationale de philosophie 42/165 (1988), 215–28. See in particular Spellman’s claim (at 221) that Locke’s views were quite close to those of Richard Burthogge. The latter, in fact, straightforwardly endorsed the Augustinian view that Locke rejected—viz. that “mankind is an Extended Adam.” Richard Burthogge, Tagathon, or, divine goodness Explicated and Vindicated from the Exceptions of the Atheist (London, 1672), 69.

words and actions, is the AUTHORE,” as a result of which the representative may be said to act “by Authority.” If we take this theory seriously, we will conclude that “when the Actor maketh a Covenant by Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if he had made it himself; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same.” But the converse holds equally well: if the Actor has not been authorized to transact in the name of another person, he acts only for himself. “For no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.”

We have recently been reminded of the highly polemical character of Hobbes’s intervention. The political and military contest between king and Parliament in the 1640s had turned substantially on a debate about the proper understanding of representation. Parliamentarian writers argued that a legitimate representative must be a good representation, or image, of those represented. Representation, on this view, is a matter of degree: A is more representative of B the more he resembles, or constitutes a good image of, B. Accordingly, this view insisted that an assembly reflecting the complex composition of the “body of the people” could be said to represent them better than a single monarch—and that such an assembly might represent the entire body of the people even if many citizens did not elect members to it. The theory thus conveniently established two vital propositions: that the king could not compete with Parliament for the title of “representative of the people,” and that the House of Commons could be the representative of the whole people, despite the fact that nine-tenths of the English population did not elect members to Parliament. But if the king was not the representative of the people, it followed that the existence and exercise of his various prerogative powers (particularly the “negative voice”) would place Englishmen in a state of servile dependence upon an arbitrary and alien will—that is, in the condition of slavery.

Royalists countered this Parliamentarian onslaught by deploying a rival theory of representation, according to which it is authorization, not resemblance (or “representativeness”), that is both necessary and sufficient to establish the legitimacy of a representative. If any authorized agent can be said to speak or act in the name of the people just as well as any other, then plainly a king, no less than a popular assembly, is capable of “representing” his people—from

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 246.
8 Ibid.
which it follows that the people can be said to be “sovereign” under the rule of a monarch who wields prerogative powers. Representation, on this account, is not a comparative concept, or a matter of degree. It is either wholly present or wholly absent, depending solely on whether the one claiming to act for another has in fact been authorized by that person to do so. Hobbes’s discussion of “personation” in chapter 16 of *Leviathan* plainly aimed to systematize and develop this Royalist line of argument.

I wish to suggest that this debate over political representation in the 1640s was deeply intertwined with a theological debate over the Fall. The “signification” or “resemblance” theory of representation adopted by Parliamentarians began life as Calvinist apologetics. It was first formulated to make the case that Adam could justly be regarded as the representative of humanity, despite the fact that humanity had never authorized him to act in their name. He had been appointed by God to act as trustee for the human race, and had then covenanted with God on humanity’s behalf. God’s appointment of Adam to this office was, in turn, just and equitable, because Adam and his descendants shared an image and nature. Adam was thus an adequate “representation” of his descendants, each of whom was “in” him “virtually” or “interpretively.” He was the “sign” and humanity was the “signified.” In virtue of their shared image, Adam and humanity likewise possessed shared interests, from which it followed that the former could be expected to act in accordance with the (eventual) will of the latter. The Royalist rejoinder began life instead as a Pelagian response to this Calvinist orthodoxy. Arminian and Laudian theologians developed the authorization theory to explain why Adam could not have represented his descendants, despite their shared image, and, accordingly, why a just God could not have held humanity at large responsible for Adam’s sin. At stake in this confrontation were central articles of Christian faith—the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the doctrine of grace—along with the millennial hope of a theodicy.

Indeed, as we shall see, it is not merely that the theological debate over theodicy and original sin gave rise to a set of concepts and arguments that would later be deployed by other theorists in the political context. Rather, the theological and political debates about representation were, to a remarkable degree, two fronts in a single war. The Parliamentarian writers who formulated the “imaging” theory of representation were themselves Calvinists dedicated to the defense of Augustinian orthodoxy against Pelagianism and “Popery,” whereas the Royalist polemicists who defended the “authorization” theory were overwhelmingly Laudian and Arminian opponents of Calvinism. When Locke insisted in 1695 that Adam could not have represented the human race, he was aligning himself self-consciously with a Pelagian/Royalist tradition of thought that placed consent and “authorization” at the center of both the civic and religious enterprises.
II

The earliest Christian accounts of the Fall make no use of the concept of representation, for the simple reason that they accept the organic, familial notion of personality that is found in the Hebrew Bible itself. Abraham, on this view, just is his family; they are essentially the same person, from which it follows that his descendants can be rewarded for his virtues and punished for his vices. It is this collective concept of personality that underlies the famous claim in the Decalogue that God “visits the iniquities of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generations” (Exodus 20:5), and likewise explains why Adam’s offspring might be said to have fallen with him. If we assume that Adam and his descendants are the same person, we need not grapple with the question of why the sins of one person (Adam) are visited upon a set of wholly distinct persons (his descendants) who never sinned. When the Epistles assure us that “all sinned” in Adam (Romans 5:12), they are not speaking metaphorically. Adam, on this account, simply was humanity.

This familial, collective understanding of personality was already a subject of controversy in the later biblical books. It is, for example, clearly the target of Ezekiel’s celebrated insistence that each individual should only suffer for his own personal sins: “What do you people mean by quoting this proverb about the land of Israel: ‘The parents eat sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge’? As surely as I live, declares the Sovereign Lord, you will no longer quote this proverb in Israel . . . The one who sins is the one who will die” (Ezekiel 18:1–4). But the collective understanding remained powerfully present among the church fathers. When Augustine turns to the subject of the Fall in The City of God, his intellectual allegiances are straightforwardly on display:

For God, who is the author of nature, and certainly not of vices, created man righteous. Man, however, depraved by his own will, and justly condemned, produced depraved and condemned children. For we all were in that one man, since we all were that one man who fell into sin through the woman who was made from him before they sinned. The particular form in which we were to live as individuals had not yet been created and distributed to us; but the seminal nature from which we were to be propagated already existed. And, when this was vitiated by sin and bound by the chain of death, and justly condemned, man could not be born of man in any other condition. Thus, from the evil use of free will there arose the whole series of calamities, by which the human race is led by a succession of miseries from its depraved origin, as from a corrupt root [radix corrupta],

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10 The best account of this biblical conception appears in Jon Levenson, Resurrection and the Redemption of Israel: The Ultimate Victory of the God of Life (New Haven, 2006).
11 But see Ezekiel 22:17–31 for a very different view.
even to the ruin of the second death, which has no end, and from which those who are redeemed by the grace of God are exempt.\textsuperscript{12}

For Augustine, the Pauline claim that we all sinned in Adam must be understood to mean that “we all were that one man.” Our subsequent individuation—“the particular form in which we were to live as individuals” that was eventually “created and distributed to us”—was an incidental development that did not vitiate our organic unity in Adam.

This collective understanding of human personality remained central to orthodox accounts of the Fall until well into the sixteenth century. Indeed, Calvin himself endorsed it unreservedly (although this is a subject on which there has been a good deal of scholarly confusion\textsuperscript{13}). “The whole human race,” he writes in the \textit{Institutes}, “was lost in the person of Adam.”\textsuperscript{14} “We must, therefore, hold it for certain, that Adam was not merely a progenitor of human nature, but, as it were, a root, and that, accordingly, by his corruption, the whole human race was deservedly vitiated.”\textsuperscript{15} Here again, Adam was our “root” (\textit{radix}) and we were therefore “radically” present in him when he fell. But for Calvin’s disciples, both continental and English, this collective understanding of personality began to seem untenable. Adam and humanity, they increasingly felt obliged to concede, were not the same person. Rather, what now had to be explained was why we could have fallen with Adam \textit{despite} our undeniable separateness.\textsuperscript{16} And it was the concept of representation that gave them their explanation. God, they claimed, had appointed Adam the representative of the human race and entered into a covenant (\textit{foedus}) with him, according to which humanity would be rewarded


\textsuperscript{15} Calvin, \textit{Institutio}, 148 (2:16): “ita certe habendum est, fuisset Adamum humanae naturae non progenitorem modo, sed quasi radicum, atque ideo in illius corruptione merito vitiatum fuisse hominum genus.”

\textsuperscript{16} For the role of Ambrosius Catharinus in originating this shift see the valuable discussion in Weir, \textit{The Origins of the Federal Theology}, 12–15. Other important progenitors of the argument were Zacharias Ursinus, Franciscus Junius, and Johannes Cocceius. See also Charles J. Butler, “Religious Liberty and Covenant Theology” (unpublished PhD thesis, Temple University, 1979), 19–20.
with immortality if they remained obedient to his law and punished with death and damnation if they proved rebellious.\textsuperscript{17}

As William Perkins canonically put the argument in the *Golden Chaine* (1600), “all his posteritie sinned” in Adam because “Adam was not then a priuate man, but represented all mankind.”\textsuperscript{18}

Sinnes are either personall, or generall. Personall are such, as are peculiar to one or some fewe persons and make them alone guiltie. Generall, that is common to all men: and such is Adams fall. It is a sinne not onely of the person of one man, but of the whole nature of man. And Adam must be considered not as a priuate man, but as a roote or head bearing in it all mankind; or as a publike person representing all his posteritie, and therefore when he sinned, all his posteritie sinned with him; as in a Parliament whatsoeuer is done by the burgesse of the shiere, is done by euery person in the shiere . . . And here lies the difference betweene Adams fall and the sinnes of men, as Cains murder, which makes not the posteritie of Cain guiltie, because he was neuer appointed by God to be the roote of his posteritie, as Adam was: and therefore his sinne is personall, whereas Adams is not. Yet this which I say, must not be vnderstood of all the sinnes of Adam, but onely of the first.\textsuperscript{19}

Perkins thus invoked the concept of representation to address what struck him as a dangerously powerful objection to the doctrine of original sin. If the familial, collective account of personality and responsibility is to be accepted, then surely we must be just as responsible for the sins of Cain, and all of our other ancestors, as we are for the sins of Adam. But that looks absurd—we don’t ordinarily hold people accountable for the crimes of their grandfathers. Perkins’s answer is straightforward: we are accountable for Adam’s sin, and not Cain’s, because only the former was a “public person” designated by God to represent us. Adam therefore spoke and acted for us in the same way that “in a Parliament whatsoeuer is done by the burgesse of the shiere, is done by euery person in the shiere.”

Perkins’s argument in this respect was immediately taken up by a range of Calvinist divines. “We must know,” announced Thomas Tuke in 1609,

that Adam was no priuate person, but represented all mankinde. And therefore we stood and fell with him. For hee was the root and we are his branches: he was the spring, and we the streams: he was as the head, and wee are as the members. As the King, his Nobles, Knights and Burgesses doe represent the whole realme in the Parliament: euen so did Adam represent the person of his whole posteritie.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} See, classically, Heinrich Heppe, *Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus im sechzehnten Jahrhundert* (Gotha, 1857); and Gottlob Schrenk, *Gottesreich und Bund im älteren Protestantismus, vornehmlich Johannes Cocceius* (Gütersloh, 1923).

\textsuperscript{18} William Perkins, *A golden Chaine: or, The Description of Theologie* (Cambridge, 1600), 16.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 254.

John Yates offered both the organic argument and the representation argument in *Gods Arraignement of Hypocrites* (1615). On the one hand, “he was our father, & we his heires; he was the root of all mankind, and we were in his loynes: the manner is by imputation of the transgression, and so consequently of blame, guilt, and punishment.”21 But, anxious to reassure those who might be skeptical of this claim about collective personality, he adds that Adam “counenant with God for vs, as well as for himself.”22 Paul Baynes, Perkins’s Puritan successor as minister in the Church of St Andrew the Great in Cambridge, likewise insisted in 1618 that “a publique person standing for him and his, doth agree to Adam, as a thing appropriated to him.”23 In this regard, Adam was crucially a “Type of Christ,” who was likewise a “public person” representing humanity on the cross: “as the Subjects of England, Scotland, Ireland, are in our King vnited, and all made one body politicke, so it is with the members of Christ in heauen and earth.”24

Pierre du Moulin offered precisely the same argument from analogy in *The Anatomy of Arminianisme* (1620):

The punishments which all men suffer in the name of Adam, doe argue that the sinne of Adam is imputed to vs: This the Apostle teacheth, Rom. 5.12. Death passed on all men, by one man, in whom all men sinned, or because all men sinned in him: For the sinne of Adam was not onely personall, neither did hee sinne as a singular person, but as carrying all mankinde in the stocke and originall; no otherwise then Christ satisfying for vs on the crosse, hath not suffred as a priuate person, but as sustaining and representing the whole Church in the head.25

And like Perkins before him, du Moulin makes use of the notion of representation to address the reductio that we are legally and morally accountable for the sins of all of our progenitors:

I say that that place in *Ezechiel* [18:1–4, where Ezekiel declares that “the one who sins is the one who will die”] makes nothing to the present matter: for hee speaketh of the sinnes of the fathers, whose sinnes are personall, and who in sinning doe not sustaine the persons of their children . . . the sinnes of my Grand-father and great-Grandfather were personall

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22 Ibid., 331–2.
24 Ibid., 235. For Christ as a representative see Schaede, *Stellvertretung*. Schaede mentions the representative role of Adam only in passing (see esp. 229).
25 Pierre du Moulin, *The Anatomy of Arminianisme*, English trans. (London, 1620), 58. All emphasis in quotations is original, unless otherwise noted.
sinnes; neither did they in their sinning sustaine the persons of their posterity, which cannot be said of Adam.²⁶

“Surely,” du Moulin continues, “I think that it cannot be said that Ezechias or Iosias, who were the posterity of Dauid, did in Dauid murther Vrias.” Indeed, “Adam while hee liued committed many sinnes, yet I thinke that onely that first sinne of Adam was imputed to his posterity, because onely by this sinne he violated that couenant which was made with him, as with the author of mankind.”²⁷

As this tradition of thought gathered pace, its expositors grew increasingly eager to characterize the office of a representative more systematically and to distinguish it from other, apparently similar, juridical roles. Thus Thomas Goodwin, writing in Christ Set Forth (1642), offers a meticulous, highly technical, definition of a “common person”:

A Common person with, or for another hee goes for, is one who represents, personates, and acts the part of another, by the allowance and warrant of the Law: so as what he doth, (as such a common person, and in the name of the other) that other whom he personates, is by the Law reckoned to doe: and in like manner, what is done to him, (as being in the others stead and roome) is reckoned as done to the other. Thus by our Law, an Attorney appears for another, & money received by him, is reckoned as received by him whom it is due unto . . . So Embassadours for Princes represent their Masters: what is done to them, is reckoned as done to the Prince; and what they do according to their Commission, is all one as if the Prince, whose Person they represent, had done it himselfe.²⁸

But Goodwin was equally keen to prevent a particular kind of misunderstanding. A “common person,” or representative, is to be sharply distinguished from a mere “surety”—a point of some importance in this theological discourse, where Christ was routinely said to have acted as a surety for mankind.²⁹ “A Surety,” Goodwin explains,

undertakes to pay a debt for another, or the like; but a Common person serves to perform any common act, which by the Law is reckoned, and virtually imputed to the other, and is to stand as the others act, & is as valid, as if he had done it: So as the good and benefit which is the consequent of such an act, shall accrue to him whom he personated, and for whom he stood as a Common person.³⁰

²⁶ Ibid., 60. For a contrasting attempt to explain the Ezekiel passage see Grotius, A Defence of the Catholick Faith concerning the Satisfaction of Christ, trans. W. H. (London, 1692), 92.
²⁷ Du Moulin, Anatomy of Arminianisme, 60.
²⁸ Thomas Goodwin, Christ Set Forth In his Death, Resurrection, Ascension, Sitting at Gods right hand, Intercession As Cause of Justification (London, 1642), 46.
²⁹ See, for example, Edward Reynolds, Three Treatises (London, 1631), 401. The chief scriptural authority for this claim is found in Hebrews 7:22.
³⁰ Goodwin, Christ set Forth, 46.
It is therefore crucial to understand that “Adam was not a Surety for all Man-kind, he undertook not for them, in the sense fore-mentioned; but he was a Common person representing all Man-kind; So as what he should do, was to be accounted as if they had done it.” Adam was “herein a lively type of our Lord Christ,” who was likewise a “common publique person,” rather than a mere surety. The Larger Catechism of the Westminster Assembly codified this set of assertions in 1648, declaring that “the covenant being made with Adam as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him in that first transgression.”

But Calvinist theorists confronted a challenge at this stage of the argument. God, they agreed, had appointed Adam as a representative of the human race and had then entered into a covenant with humanity through him. But why exactly was it just for God to do this? What was it about Adam that gave him a justifiable claim to represent his progeny in the sweeping fashion presupposed by the first covenant? A small number of divines were prepared simply to accept God’s appointment of Adam as an arbitrary exercise of sovereign power. For Anthony Burgess, “Adam’s will may be said to be our will two ways.” First, “by way of delegation, as if we had chosen him to be our common parent, and had translated our wills over to him, as amongst men, it is usual in arbitrations, and then they are said to will, that which their Arbitrator hath done, though it may be they dislike it.” But, clearly, “in this sense, Adam’s will is not our will, for we had no actual being or existence in him.” Fortunately, however, there is another option: “Adam’s will may be said to be ours interpretatively, God appointing him to be the universal principle of mankind; what he did is interpreted, as if we had done it, and the equity of making Adam’s will ours, ariseth from the instituting will and Covenant of God, that would have it so.” Burgess adds later that “neither was it requisite that God should expect Adam’s consent, or ours to this agreement, seeing God is the absolute Sovereign and Lord of all”—or “supream Lord over all Mankind.” Thomas Brooks agreed, writing in A Golden Key to Open Hidden Treasures (1675), “And so was Adam a common person, and

31 Ibid., 46.
33 Westminster Larger Catechism (1648), Quaes. 22.
35 Ibid., 39.
36 Ibid., 430 (“and herein did consult for our good, better then if he had taken any other way is more to be insisted on”).
37 Ibid., 393.
that by an act of God’s Sovereignty; appointing him, in making a covenant with him so to be, and he did represent all Man-kind.”

But most Calvinists were unwilling to leave matters here. They were not voluntarists, after all, and so did not believe that God’s will was itself the measure of just and unjust. Rather, they accepted that God, being perfect, would unerringly conform his conduct to an objectively valid natural law. His designation of Adam as representative of humanity therefore must have been just and legitimate. Some explained the justice of the divine appointment by stressing its “equity.” God, on this account, would have credited the human race with Adam’s obedience, had the latter resisted temptation, so it was only fair that He should have attributed Adam’s fall to his descendants as well. As in any partnership, partners should stand ready to bear the losses if they hope to share in the gains. As John Polhill put the case,

if one Man may put his Will into another Man’s Will in a Comprimise, why may not God (who is more Lord of our Wills than our selves) put all our Wills into Adam’s by a Covenant? and here God did it with abundant Equity, because our Wills were put into Adam’s as well for the obtaining blessedness upon his Obedience, as for the incurring punishment upon his Disobedience.

Burgess canvassed this view as well, explaining that

God when he made Adam thus the common trustee for mankind, did herein consult our good; It was for mans advantage that all this was done for him, he intended original righteousness, immortality and happiness should descend from him to his posterity, upon his perseverance, so that no more evil is now inflicted upon Adam’s off-spring then good was designed and provided for him, if he had continued in obedience.

Fair enough, one might reply, but the mere fact that the terms of a partnership are equitable does not suffice to show that persons may be designated partners without their consent. The question remains: why was God acting in accordance with the principles of justice when he designated Adam our partner in this fashion? As a first step toward an answer, a number of theorists began to emphasize that Adam and humanity shared a set of interests. Adam could, for this reason, be

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supposed to act as his descendants would have chosen to act. Gabriel Towerson, for example, insisted that the law “must be supposed to have been given to Adam, as that too not only in his private, but publick capacity, and as he may be thought to have been the representative of all Mankind.”42 “By the publick capacity of Adam,” Towerson goes on to explain,

I mean such a one, whereby as he was design’d to be the Father of all Mankind, so God made him a kind of Trustee for it; In order thereunto both giving him what he did for their benefit, as well as his own, and obliging him for their sakes, as well as his own, to see to the preservation of it, and act agreeably to it. Which if he did, his Posterity as well as himself should have the benefit thereof.43

Since it was in Adam’s own interest to act as a good steward and “trustee” of humanity’s patrimony, it was just and proper for God to assign him that office.

But here again, the argument seemed to need something more. The laws of trusteeship, after all, were well known, and they plainly did not allow the crimes of trustees to be attributed to beneficiaries.44 Adam was not merely a trustee, but a representative whose actions were to count as the actions of his progeny. Why was it legitimate for him to have been assigned this office? To answer this further question, Calvinist divines turned to a discourse of representation that they had inherited chiefly from the Protestant theology of the sacraments and from biblical typology. To “represent” something, in this discourse, was to make an image or “representation” of that thing. As George Lawson put the crucial point, “something in relation to another thing, whereof it is an Image or likenesse . . . is represented by it. For the form of an image, or likenesse as such is to represent some other thing.”45 The Eucharist, rightly understood, functions “by Representation, because it’s a Sign and Figure of [Christ’s] Body . . . The reason of this expression, is the similitude and agreement between the sign and the thing signified.”46 Christ, he adds in an important turn of phrase, is therefore “here Virtually, and Really present” by representation.47

Perkins had likewise written fifty years earlier that “figures” represent in just the same way that words “signifie,” and he had offered precisely the same example: in “the Lords Supper, as in every sacrament, there is a relation or analogie between the outward signes and the things signified. The action of the minister giving the bread and wine to the hands of particular communicants, representeth Gods

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42 Gabriel Towerson, *Of the Sacraments in General* (London, 1686), 56.
43 Ibid., 56–7.
44 See, for example, Daniel Lee, *Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought* (Oxford, 2016), 133–6.
46 Ibid., 239.
47 Ibid., 246.
action in giving Christ with his benefits to the same particular communicants.”

Or as he put the same argument in the form of a catechism, “Q. What is a Sacrament? A. A signe to represent, a seale to confirme, an instrument to conuey Christ and all his benefits to them that doe beleue in him. Q. Why must a Sacrament represent the mercies of God before our eies? A. Because we are dull to conceiue and to remember them.”

Whatever is said about the representative character of the sacraments can, on this account, likewise be said about biblical “types” more broadly—each of which “was a figure and a shadow in foreshewing some representment of those things which should have a future existence under the new covenant.” Thus Lancelot Andrewes (writing in his most Calvinist register) could insist that “King David . . . is in Scriptures, not persona Regis onely, the person of a King but persona Regum, a person representing all Kings to come after him; such specially, as with David, serve and worship GOD in truth. We doe safely therefore, what is said to him, applie to them all, since he is the type of them all.”

A type represents its antitype by virtue of resemblance or “signification.” In precisely this sense, Edward Reynolds argued that “as Christ was the substantiall and universall Mediator betweene God and Man: So Moses was to that people a representative, typicall, or national Mediator.” Note that the word “representative” in this context appears as a synonym for “typical.” John Owen employed the term identically when he wrote that

Christ was like to Moses, as he was a Prophet, and like to Aaron, as he was a Priest, and like to David, as he was a King. That is, he was represented and typified, by all these, & had that likenesse to them, which the Antitype (as the thing typified is usually, but improperly called) hath to the Type.

But if representation is understood in this fashion, the notion of “authorization” simply drops out. If, in Perkins’s words, “the name of the thing signified is giuen to the signe, as vpon a stage he is called a king that represents the king,” then the question of whether Adam represented humanity cannot possibly turn on whether he was authorized by humanity to act in that role. After

48 Perkins, A golden Chaine, 801, 962.
49 Ibid., 1040.
51 Lancelot Andrewes, XCVI: Sermons by the Right Honorable and Reverend Father in God, Lancelot Andrewes (London, 1629), 816.
52 Reynolds, Three Treatises, 380.
54 Perkins, A golden Chaine, 965.
all, the actor upon the stage who “represents the king” has not been authorized by the king to speak and act in his name. He represents the king by “signification” and resemblance. To adjudicate the question whether Adam represented humanity in this sense, we must therefore ask whether he adequately “signified” or resembled humanity—whether he and his descendants shared an image, such that he could “appear” in their stead and “act their part.” Was Adam, in other words, an acceptable “representation” of his descendants?

Calvinists had no doubt that he was, and they could turn for support to the established Christian discourse of the Incarnation. Christ, in this tradition of thought, had taken on human form—the image of humanity—precisely so that he could “bear the person” of humanity as Adam had, thus undoing the consequences of the Fall for the elect. As Calvin himself had written, “our lord came forth a true man, adopted the person of Adam, and undertook in his stead to obey the Father.” Calvinists had no doubt that he was, and they could turn for support to the established Christian discourse of the Incarnation. Christ, in this tradition of thought, had taken on human form—the image of humanity—precisely so that he could “bear the person” of humanity as Adam had, thus undoing the consequences of the Fall for the elect. As Calvin himself had written, “our lord came forth a true man, adopted the person of Adam, and undertook in his stead to obey the Father.”

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Or as Patrick Gillespie put the claim, Christ “act[ed] our part, not in a scenick, but in a real manner; he came upon the stage to represent our person, and in our nature and Law-place he really acted our part.” He could only “act our part” because he was able to “represent” our person, precisely as Adam had. “In whatsoever state and condition Christ was,” Gillespie explains, “in that state and condition he doth sustain our persons, and is surrogate in our place and condition . . . when he was in a state of humiliation here, upon the earth, in that low condition, he did sustain the persons, and bear and represent the state and condition of his poor broken people.” Likewise, after the crucifixion,

in his exaltation, Christ doth sustain the persons, and represent the condition of the Elect, unto the which they are advanced by the Covenant through him: and therefore the Scripture holds him forth in his resurrection and ascension, &c. as representing the state of the Elect: He is in heaven this day, saith the Scripture, for us, sustaining our state, and glorified condition, till we come there.

His passion was therefore an “instance and parallel of Adams sustaining the condition of all men, and therein being a type of Christ.”

Thomas Goodwin unpacked the comparison in even greater detail. “In their two several conditions, qualifications, and states,” both Adam and Christ

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57 Ibid., 397.
58 Ibid., 397–8.
59 Ibid., 398.
were *Common persons*. That is, look what state or condition the one or the other was made in, is by a just Law to be put upon those whom they represented. So the Apostle reasons from it, ver. 48. *[As] is the earthly man, (namely, the first man, Adam) *[such] are the earthly: namely, to be earthly men as well as he; because he who was a Common person representing them, was in his condition but an earthly man: And oppositely, by the same Law, it follows, *[As] is the heavenly man, (namely, the second man, Christ) *[such] are and must be the heavenly; who pertaine to him, because he also is a Common person, ordained to personate them: and Adam, who came after him, was therein but his Type.\(^{50}\)

Humanity was “virtually, and representatively” in both men, with the result that “as in Adam we were all virtually condemned, *(In Adam all dye)*,” and yet, “we are not actually in our owne persons condemned, till we are borne of him; nor doe we personally dye, untill we lay downe our flesh: Even so is it in the matter of our Justification; it was done virtually in Christ, and afterwards when we beleve, is actually passed in and upon our selves.”\(^{61}\)

Calvinist divines were at great pains to insist that Christ could not have represented humanity had he not taken on their image, just as Adam could not have represented his descendants had he not shared theirs. As Lawson explained in his *Theo-Politica* (1659),

> If we enquire of the manner, how Righteousness and Life is derived from Christ being One, unto so many, we shall find that this cannot be, except Christ be a general Head of Mankind, and one person with them, as Adam was. And this He could not be, as He was the Word properly; but as the Word, made Flesh: for if He will sanctifie them, he must take Flesh and Bloud with the Sanctified, and so be Man. Yet He may be Man, and not a general Person, so as to be one with them: and we do not read of any, but onely two, who were general Heads, and, in some respect, virtually all Mankind, the first and second Adam. Such Christ, was not but by the Will of God, and His own voluntary Consent. The Will of God appoints Him to be the Head of Mankind, and their Surety and Hostage, and so accounted Him; and He did willingly submit, and took upon Him the Person of others. And the principal cause of this Representation, whereby He is one Person with us, is the Will of God, who, as Lord, made Him such; and, as Law-giver, and Judge, did so account Him.\(^{62}\)

Sharing the image of man was therefore a necessary condition of Christ’s acting as a representative, “general Person.” It was not, of course, a sufficient condition: not everyone who shares A’s image is A’s representative. Only those “image-sharers” who are duly appointed or designated to speak and act in A’s name, and who voluntarily accept the office, may be said to bear his “Person” (note, however,

\(^{50}\) Goodwin, *Christ Set Forth*, 58.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 72, 78.

that A’s consent is not necessary for this arrangement). But one cannot be a “representation” of A if one does not share his image.

Indeed, some Calvinists went so far as to argue that Adam and Christ were “representations” of humanity in an extraordinary sense. John Owen, for example, emphasized in his *Vindiciae Evangelicae* that the manner in which both Adam and Christ possessed “a likenessee of nature to all men” is to be understood in relation to the biblical claim that “Adam begat a Sonne in his own likenesse, Gen. 5. 1.”63 Glossing this verse, Owen writes that “an Image is either an *Essentiaall* Image, or Accidentall. A Representation of a thing in the same substance with it, as a Sonne is the Image of his Father, or a Representation in some resemblance like that of a Picture.”64 A picture merely “resembles” its subject—that which it represents—while a son is the “representation” of his father “in the same substance.” The two share an “essential” image, rather than merely “accidental” features. Adam and Christ, on Owen’s account, were able to represent humanity in this deepest of senses; they were “representations in the same substance.”

This, then, was the Calvinist explanation of the Fall. Humanity fell with Adam because the latter was a “public” or “common” person who represented them, and Adam represented them because he was an adequate “representation” or “signification” of his descendants. He and they shared an “essential” image, as a result of which posterity was “virtually” or “interpretively” present in Adam. These polemicists deployed precisely the same language and arguments to explain their support for the Parliamentarian cause in the 1640s and 1650s. Henry Parker, a committed Calvinist who insisted that man was “depraved by the Fall of Adam”65 and straightforwardly endorsed the “similitude” account of representation in his 1641 attack on the Catholic veneration of relics and icons,66 declared in his political pamphlets that “the Parliament is indeed nothing else, but the very people it self artificially congregated, or reduced by an orderly election, and representation, into such a Senate, or proportionable body.” “Tis true, in my understanding,” he grants, “the Parliament differs many wayes from the rude bulk of the universality,”67 but the former is “so equally, and geometrically proportionable, and all the States doe so orderly contribute their due parts therein,” that “in power, in honour, in majestie, in commission, it ought not at all to be divided, or accounted different as to any legal purpose.”68

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63 Owen, *Vindiciae Evangelicae*, 302.
64 Ibid., 337.
66 See, for example, Henry Parker, *The Altar Dispute* (London, 1641), 70, 75.
on this view, is “virtually the whole kingdom it selfe.”69 Indeed, the similitude between people and Parliament is not merely accidental, but “essential”: “in the truth,” Parker observes, “the vwhole Kingdom is not so properly the Author as the essence it selfe of Parliaments.”70 “For the Parliament being the representative of the people becomes thereby their living soul, including the will and desires of all the people, as comprehending them all.”71

It is important to recognize that Parker and his allies did not claim that a single person can never “represent” or “signify” a multitude. Such a conclusion would obviously have had the effect of undermining the entire Calvinist project, since it entails that only an assembly, and not Adam alone, could have represented humanity in falling. Parker argues instead that a “proportionable” assembly will always be a better representation of the people than a single man—so good, in fact, that it will infallibly act as the natural body of the people would have acted—and that, given a choice between the two, one should therefore always choose the former.72 When no such choice is available, a single person can indeed adequately represent the people. In the early ages of the earth, Parker explains,

...till some way was invented to regulate the motions of the peoples moliminous body, I think arbitrary rule was most safe for the world. But now since most Countries have found out an Art and peaceable Order for Publique Assemblies, whereby the people may assume its owne power to do itselfe right without disturbance to it selfe, or injury to Princes, he is very unjust that will oppose this Art and order.73

That is, “we cannot imagine that publique consent should be any where more vigorous or more orderly than it is in Parliament,” but when no orderly, “proportionable” assembly is on offer, a single person will do.

Parker can thus hold that “the King does not represent the people, but onely in such and such cases: viz. in pleas of a common nature betwixt Subject and Subject. Wherein he can have no particular ends; and at such or such times, viz. when there is not a more full and neer representation by the Parliament.”74 The King, in other words, can count as a “representation” of the people when “a more full or neer” one is unavailable. By the same reasoning, since there was clearly “not a more full and neer representation” of humanity available in the first days of Creation, a just God could have appointed Adam, who “signified” us, to bear

69 Ibid., 29.
70 Ibid., 5.
74 Parker, *Ius Populi*, 18–19.
our person. Once designated in this manner, Adam (like the House of Commons) became our representative, despite the fact that we ourselves never chose him for the role—for, as the Parliamentarian John Herle helpfully explained, “designation to a trust in anothers stead,” just as much as “the deputation of a man by way of election,” makes “him to represent that other.”

III

Royalists of the 1640s answered this Parliamentarian challenge by rejecting the “virtual,” signification theory of representation in favor of a pure authorization account. Anyone authorized by the people to speak and act in their name must count as their representative, whatever the authorized party may look like—and no amount of “similitude” or resemblance in any way enhances the claim of an agent to represent a given author. Thus the fact (if it is one) that the House of Commons constitutes a better image of the people than the king becomes completely irrelevant. Both king and Commons were authorized by the people, and both therefore count as representatives. The popular authorization in question could not have come in either case by way of election, since, as Royalists delighted in pointing out, nine-tenths of the Englishmen “represented” in Parliament did not possess the franchise. And, of course, no one ever voted for the king. Rather, the people gave their tacit consent to the overall institutional scheme of which both king and Parliament were a part.

Thus, when Sir John Spelman sought to refute Parker’s claim that Parliament alone was “virtually” the whole kingdom in 1643, he offered as evidence the language of a statute of Henry VIII:

> the truth is, the King, Lords and Commons in conjunction are *virtually* the whole *Kingdome*, for that all the people did at first submit themselves to their determination. 25 H. 8. 21. *your royall Majestie and your Lords and Commons representing the whole Realme, in this your most high Court of Parliament, have power, &c.* So that in the King principally, but yet in conjunction with the Lords and Commons, is the vertue and power of the whole Kingdome contained.

For Spelman, the king as well as the Lords and Common represented the people for the simple reason that “all the people did at first submit themselves to their determination.” Henry Ferne likewise mocked Parker’s insistence “that the two Houses upon the absence and refusall of the other part, are virtually the whole”:

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77 Ibid., 26.
“This tearm *virtually* doth often stand him instead, for under that he can enlarge the power of the Houses to the extent of his fancie.” In fact, Ferne agrees with Spelman, the king is every bit as much the representative of the people, since “we are sure it is declared 25 H. 8.21. *Your Royall Majesty, and Your Lords and Commons represent the whole Realm.*” Dudley Digges was, if anything, even more emphatic on this point. The Commons claim the “virtue of Representation,” but “is not this cleerly the Kings case, who is entrusted certainly as highly as they?” To be sure, the Commons “represent the people to some purposes,” but so too does the king. Both have been “entrusted” in precisely the same sense.

At the very same moment, Royalist divines were also applying this set of arguments to the case of church councils. A representative, Henry Hammond announced, “hath its authority” from the agent it represents. That is all there is to it. Yet “low church” councils dared to claim “infallibility” on the grounds that they constituted a perfect image of the church universal. They fancied themselves “the *Compendium* and quintessence of the Church, and the body representative thereof,” as Parliament was of the “whole Kingdome,” and therefore claimed “that the *Councell is the Church in substance*.” In truth, Hammond explains, the council is a “representation onely” and “nothing is the Church in substance, but the Church in its full extent, of which . . . the Church is onely the *quintessence*, which sure is not the same in *substance* with that whose *quintessence* it is, but onely the *representation of it*.”

Every Body Collective that represents, receives power, & priviledges from the Body which is represented, els a Representation might have force without the thing it represents; which cannot be. So there is no Power in the Councell, no Assistance to it, but what is in, and to the Church. But yet then it may be Questioned, whether the Representing Body hath all the Power, Strength, and Priviledge, which the Represented hath? And suppose it hath all the Legall Power, yet it hath not all the Naturall, either of strength, or wisdome, that the whole hath. Now because the Representative hath power from the Whole, and the Maine Body, can meet no other way; therefore the Acts, Lawes, and Decrees of the Representative, be it Ecclesiasticall, or Civill, are Binding in their Strength. But they are not so certaine,

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79 Ferne, *Conscience Satisfied*, 22.
80 Dudley Diggs, *An Answer to a Printed Book, Intituled, Observations upon His Majesties Late Answeres and Expresses* (1642), 37.
81 Ibid., 113.
82 Henry Hammond, *A View of Some Exceptions which have been made by a Romanist to the Ld Viscount Falkland’s Discourse Of the Infallibility of the Church of Rome* (1650), 13.
83 Ibid., 72.
and free from Errour, as is that Wisdome which resides in the Whole. For in Assemblies meerely Civill, or Ecclesiasticall, all the able and sufficient men cannot be in the Body that Represents. And it is as possible, so many able, and sufficient men (for some particular businesse) may be left out, as that they which are in, may misse, or mis apply that Reason, and Ground, upon which the Determination is principally to rest. Here, for want of a cleare view of this ground, the Representative Body erres; whereas the Represented, by vertue of those Members which saw and knew the ground, may hold the Principle inviolated.  

If, as Laud argues, representation is simply a mechanism whereby some agent authorizes some other agent (individual or collective) to act in his name, then all of the complex metaphysics of image-sharing and consubstantiality must be rejected out of hand. A representative body is no more the “virtual whole” than a single, authorized magistrate is.

It is, I want to suggest, no accident that the Royalist writers and divines who deployed these arguments were all Arminian anti-Calvinists who rejected the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. Beginning in the early seventeenth century, Continental opponents of Calvinism had developed the authorization argument in order to deny that Adam could have represented the human race when he fell. Thus the Remonstrant Simon Episcopius reasoned in his Institutiones Theologicae (left unfinished at his death in 1643) that “it is impossible that the actual and personal sin of Adam could have been originally ours,” on the grounds that another’s sin cannot be attributed to an agent “unless he contributes authority [imperium], or counsel, or consent, either tacit or express, or at the very least . . . knowledge of the crime or sin. And none of these could have any place in that sin.” As Josuè de la Place (Placeus) likewise insisted in his well-known De imputatione primi peccati Adami, it cannot be said that Adam represented his posterity “by a legal pact” (foedus legalis). “Did he sin in our place? . . . Did we ever accept this by any act of our mind and will?”

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85 William Laud, A Relation of the Conference . . . with Mr. Fisher the Jesuite (1639), 229. 
88 Placeus, De imputatione primi peccati Adami (Saumur, 1665; first published 1655), 41. Translations from Placeus are my own. 
89 Ibid., 59–60.
context, Samuel Hoard reached the same conclusion in *Gods love to Mankind, Manifested, by Disproving his Absolute Decree* (1633): our guilt for Adam’s sin must be rejected out of hand on the grounds that “Adams sinne is the sinne of mans nature onely and no mans personall transgression, but Adams: it was neyther committed nor consented to, by any of his posterity in their own persons.”90 Such an “absolute decree is repugnant to Gods Iustice.”91

This argument became hegemonic in Arminian circles in the 1640s and 1650s. “Why,” Henry Hammond asked in 1645, “should God inflict that punishment upon all mankinde, for (or upon occasion of) the sinne of that one man? though he used his talent so very ill, others of his posterity might have used it better, and why should they all be so prejudged, upon one mans miscarriage?”92 Such a decree could not have been an expression of “distributive justice,” because humanity never authorized Adam to act in their name. Jeremy Taylor likewise reasoned in 1656 that “condemnation cannot pass upon a man for any sin but his own: therefore it did not pass upon man for Adam’s sin; because Adam’s sin, was Adam’s, not our own.”93 Calvinists may ground their doctrine of original sin in a “Covenant made between Almighty God and Adam, as relating to his posterity,” but Taylor finds

in Scripture no mention made of any such Covenant as is dreamt of about the matter of original sin: only the Covenant of works God did make with all men till Christ came; but he did never exact it after Adam; but for a Covenant that God should make with Adam, that if he stood, all his posterity should be I know not what; and if he fell, they should be in a damnable condition, of this (I say) there is *nec vola nec vestigium* in holy Scripture, that ever I could meet with.94

He then makes the central claim,

If there had been any such covenant, it had been but equity that to all the persons interested it should have been communicated, and caution given to all who were to suffer, and abilities given to them to prevent the evil: for else it is not a Covenant with them, but a decree concerning them; and it is impossible that there should be a covenant made between two, when one of the parties knowes nothing of it.95

91 Ibid., 69.
94 Ibid., 105–6.
In other words, only “he that is author or the perswader, the minister or the helper, the approver or the follower, may derive the sins of others to himself, but then it is not their sins only, but our own too.” Humanity was not the “author” of Adam’s sin, because Adam had never been authorized by humanity to covenant on its behalf.

What, then, of the Calvinist claim that our wills were in Adam “by interpretation” because he shared our image? On this point, Taylor is scathing:

Now if so, I ask, Whether before that sin of Adam were our wills free, or not free? For if we had any will at all, it must be free, or not free. If we had none at all, how could it be involv’d in his? Now if our wills were free, why are they without our act, and whether we will or no, involv’d in the will of another? If they were not free, how could we be guilty? If they were free, then they could also dissent. If they were not free, then they could not consent; and so either they never had, or else before Adams fall they lost their liberty. But if it be inquired seriously, I cannot imagine what can be answered. Could we prevent the sin of Adam? could we hinder it? were we ever ask’d? Could we, if we had been ask’d after we were born a moneth, have given our negative? Or could we do more before we were born then after? were we, or could we be tied to prevent that sin? Did not God know that we could not in that case dissent?

“Why then,” Taylor wonders in conclusion,

shall our consent be taken in by interpretation, when our dissent could not be really acted; But if at that time we could not dissent really, could we have dissented from Adams sin by interpretation? If not, then we could dissent no way, and then it was inevitably decreed that we should be ruin’d: for neither really, nor by interpretation could we have dissented. But if we could by interpretation have dissented, it were certainly more agreeable to Gods goodnesse, to have interpreted for us in the better sense, rather then in the worse.

This theological debate provided a crucial context for Hobbes’s celebrated intervention in Leviathan. Hobbes was closely associated with the circle of Arminian Oxford divines who met regularly to discuss theology at Viscount Falkland’s house at Great Tew in the 1630s, among them William Chillingworth,

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96 Ibid., 109.
98 Ibid., 382.
George Morely, Gilbert Sheldon, and Hammond himself.\footnote{90} He was also quite familiar with the writings of Perkins, Tuke, du Moulin, and other federal theologians.\footnote{91} It is therefore difficult to believe that, when he asserts in chapter 16 that a representative is merely an “actor” who has been authorized by another agent to “bear his person,” Hobbes is unaware that he is endorsing and systematically developing a position that is not only Royalist, but also deeply Arminian/Pelagian. And, indeed, important passages in this much-studied chapter take on a new resonance once they are seen as volleys in the battle over representation and the Fall. Thus Hobbes’s claim that “no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave” amounts to a straightforward rejection of the central claim of Calvinist covenant theology—namely that Adam could have entered into a covenant with God on humanity’s behalf.\footnote{92} Hobbes likewise had an unambiguous answer for those who argued that Adam might have represented us as a “trustee” in virtue of sharing our image. It is true, he grants, that those who are not capable of acting in their own right may be “represented by Fiction,” and “Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason, may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators.”\footnote{93} But such non-agents “can be no Authors (during that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they shall recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable.”\footnote{94} Even if Adam had been our trustee before we existed, we would not have counted as “authors” of his actions unless and until we endorsed them after we had developed our own agential powers. And, in any event, Hobbes tells us that non-agents of this kind “cannot be Personated, before there be some state of Civill Government”—that is, until “the Actors may have Authority to procure


\footnote{91} Numerous works by Perkins, Tuke, and du Moulin appear in the manuscript library catalogue that Hobbes prepared for his patron, the Earl of Devonshire, in the 1630s—among them Tuke’s \emph{High-Way to Heaven} (Hobbes MSS (Chatsworth) MS E.1.A, no. 439). Hobbes likewise mentions Perkins by name as one of the “Doctors of the Church” whom (along with Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon) “I never sleighted, but alwayes very much reverenced, and admired.” See Thomas Hobbes, \emph{Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance Cleary Stated and Debated} (London, 1656), 212.

\footnote{92} Hobbes, \emph{Leviathan}, 2: 246.


\footnote{94} Hobbes, \emph{Leviathan}, 2: 247.
their maintenance, given them by those that are Owners, or Governours of those things.”^{105} And Hobbes is clear that no such state existed when Adam fell.

In consequence, Hobbes nowhere refers to Adam as a representative of the human race, and, given his numerous and extensive discussions of the Fall, the silence would have been deafening to his contemporaries (he likewise systematically avoided using the language of representation in his lengthy discussions of the sacraments^{106}). In chapter 35, for example, Hobbes writes that God

reigned over Adam, and gave him commandment to abstaine from the tree of cognizance of Good and Evill; which when he obeyed not, but tasting thereof, took upon him to be as God, judging between Good and Evill, not by his Creator’s commandment, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of the estate of Eternall life, wherein God had at first created him: And afterwards God punished his posterity, for their vices.{^107}

Adam is punished personally for his transgression, and his posterity are punished for their own “vices”—not for their ancestor’s. Likewise, we read in chapter 38 that

it seemeth to me, (with submission nevertheless both in this, and in all questions, whereof the determination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the interpretation of the Bible authorized by the Common-wealth, whose Subject I am), that Adam, if he had not sinned, had had an Eternall life on Earth: and that Mortality entred upon himself, and his posterity, by his first Sin.{^108}

Two points are worth stressing about this comment. First, Hobbes makes clear that he understands the depths of the controversy into which he is wading; hence his insistence that, his own view notwithstanding, he is prepared to accept the interpretation of his sovereign. Second, his argument here is radically Arminian, indeed almost Socinian. Adam, on this account, would have lived forever in Eden, had he not sinned, “for there was the Tree of life; whereof he was so long allowed to eat.”^{109} Once denied access to the tree, his existing mortal nature entailed that he would die, as would his posterity. Humanity was not depraved in spirit as a

105 Ibid., 2: 246.
106 The most important discussions appear in chaps. 36 and 41 of Leviathan.
107 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3: 634.
109 Ibid., 3: 698.
punishment for the sin of Adam. Indeed, the Fall wrought no change in human nature at all.

Hobbes was equally emphatic that Christ himself could not, properly speaking, be regarded as a representative of mankind at the time of the crucifixion. To be sure, “Jesus Christ hath satisfied for the sins of all that beleeve in him; and therefore recovered to all beleevers, that ETERNALL LIFE, which was lost by the sin of Adam,” but, as Hobbes took pains to establish in chapter 16 (quoting Thomas Goodwin almost verbatim), there is a central difference between an “Author” who is represented by an “actor” and one “that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time.” “These Authors conditionall,” Hobbes explains, “are generally called SURETYES, in Latine Fidejussores, and Sponsores; and particularly for Debt, Prædes; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.” A “surety” who appears before a judge to settle a “debt” on another’s behalf is not a “representative”—and, as we have seen, Christ was understood to be the archetypal surety. Indeed, the Latin term sponsor was invariably used to translate the crucial passage in the Septuagint in which Christ is described as “the surety [ἐγγυός] of a better covenant” (Hebrews 7:22), and Reformed theologians of the seventeenth century added, more specifically, that Christ had entered into a fideiussio on behalf of humanity—that is, a conditional suretyship, in which the debtor remains liable for his debt until the designated sponsor pays the creditor. Hobbes’s use of this vocabulary is quite deliberate.

Thus, while Jesus was a surety, he was not the “public person” of Calvinist theology, any more than Adam had been. “The King of any Countrey,” Hobbes clarifies, “is the Publique Person, or Representative of all his own Subjects,” and in the ancient “Kingdom of God” by covenant, this public person was

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110 Compare Hobbes’s comment in his reply to Bramhall: “nor is there here any punishment [after the Fall], but onely a reducing of Adam and Eve to their original mortality, where death was no punishment but a gift of God.” Thomas Hobbes, The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance (London, 1656), 78.
111 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3: 700.
112 Ibid., 2: 252.
113 Ibid., 2: 252.
114 See Willem J. van Asselt, “Expromissio or Fideiussio? A Seventeenth-Century Theological Debate between Voetians and Cocceians about the Nature of Christ’s Suretyship in Salvation History,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 14 (2003), 37–57. The alternative to a fideiussio, in Roman law, is an expromissio, in which the debtor is immediately absolved of his debt, even before the sponsor has paid the creditor. Late seventeenth-century Dutch attempts to cast Christ as an expromissor led to predictable difficulties surrounding the efficacy and centrality of the cross.
“God the King of Israel,” not his son.  

115 “It is manifest,” for Hobbes, “that our Saviour (as man) was not King of those that he Redeemed, before hee suffered death; that is, during that time hee conversed bodily on the Earth.” 

116 The incarnate Christ was never authorized by covenant to represent the faithful, from which it follows that he was not their representative at the time he mounted the cross. “The Kingdome of Christ is not to begin till the generall Resurrection,” at which point he will become sovereign representative “peculiarly of his own Elect, by vertue of the pact they make with him in their Baptisme.” 

117 During his ministry, Christ was only the representative of “God the Father,” who had authorized him to bear his person “during his abode on earth,” in precisely the same sense that “Moses, and the High Priests, were Gods Representative in the Old Testament” and “the Holy Ghost, that is to say, the Apostles, and their successors . . . have Represented him ever since.” 

118 In this sense—and only in this sense, as Hobbes notoriously argued—“God, who has been Represented (that is, Personated) thrice, may properly enough be said to be three Persons; though neither the word Person, nor Trinity be ascribed to him in the Bible.” 

119 Hobbes thus offered the most sophisticated and influential defense of the Arminian/anti-Calvinist theory of representation to appear in the seventeenth century, but he plainly did not do so because he wished to vindicate a set of Pelagian views about theodicy and the undiminished metaphysical freedom of human beings. On the contrary, he famously advocated a wholly deterministic picture of human agency that appalled his more Pelagian interlocutors. The solution to this apparent riddle is to point out that Hobbes, unlike virtually any of his interlocutors, was a voluntarist. The Calvinists and anti-Calvinists we have been discussing all agreed that God’s actions must be judged with reference to a transcendent, objective principle of justice. If he is to punish us, it must be that we have sinned, because it is contrary to justice to punish someone who is not guilty of a transgression. The problem with the doctrine of original sin, from this point of view, is that it holds that God punished us for the sins of another person—and that as a consequence of this first sin, we are now unable to avoid committing sins of our own (for which we will then be punished). The Calvinist solution was to insist that Adam was our representative, and that our depravity

115 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3: 646. 
116 Ibid., 3: 762. 
117 Ibid, 3: 762, 768. 
118 Ibid., 3: 776. 
119 Ibid., 3: 776. Compare Johann Crel, The Expiation of a Sinner in a Commentary upon the Epistle to the Hebrews (London, 1646), 3: “Christ is the character or image of Gods person; for God did as it were imprint his person upon Christ, that Christ might be his substitute upon earth to personate, represent and resemble the person of God.”
was thus itself a just punishment for our own sin; the anti-Calvinist rejoinder was to assert that Adam was not our representative, and therefore that God, being just, could never have depraved our spirit as punishment for the Fall.

Hobbes, in contrast, holds that God’s will is itself the only measure of just and unjust, and that, accordingly,

though it be said, *That death entered into the world by sinne*, (by which is meant, that if *Adam* had never sinned, he had never dyed, that is, never suffered any separation of his soul from his body,) it follows not thence, that God could not justly have Afflicted him, though he had not sinned, as well as he afflicteth other living creatures, that cannot sinne.\(^{120}\)

If God is perfectly within his rights to afflict us at will, even when no sin has been committed, there is simply no theological reason to insist that Adam was our representative (God could, without injustice, have decided to afflict us even if he had not been). As Hobbes puts the point in his response to Bishop Bramhall, “the power of God alone is sufficient Justification of any act he does . . . That which he does is made just by his doing it.”\(^{121}\) Hobbes could therefore safely embrace the Arminian/Pelagian theory of representation for political purposes without fearing that any of his religious views would come undone as a result.

It is for this reason wholly unsurprising to find vocabulary that looks quite Hobbesian in a great many Arminian and Socinian texts of the late seventeenth century.\(^{122}\) Thomas Pierce, writing in *Divine Purity Defended* (1659), demanded of the Calvinist/Augustinian “party,” “Is it not at least as just a thing, to decree the misery of the farthest greatest part of mankind for those personal Impieties which they do wilfully commit, as for the meer sin of Adam, which was committed by Adam before his posterity had a Being, much less a Will, and a Personality?”\(^{123}\)

Those who are not “persons” cannot have their person “born” or “sustained” by another, and so cannot be represented. Locke’s friend Philipp van Limborch used similar language when he sought to answer the Calvinist claim that “Adam was the Representative of all Mankind [*repraesentavit totum genus humanum*], which was then in his Loins.” “No man,” for Limborch, “can by any Action represent the Person of another, unless impower’d by him so to do: For in this case only

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\(^{121}\) Hobbes, *Liberty and Necessity*, 87. Indeed, Bramhall relied strongly on the argument that God’s punishment of mankind was just because “He made the Covenant of works with mankind in Adam, and therefore he punisheth not man contrary to his own Covenant, but for the transgression of his duty.” Ibid., 101, Hobbes quoting Bramhall.


whatsoever Offence the one commits, may be imputed to the other: but Adam was not impower’d with any such Authority by his Posterity.”

Stephen Nye likewise may have been alluding to Hobbes in his *A brief History of the Unitarians, called also Socinians* (1687) when he insisted that Christ had been God’s representative, not man’s: “Christ may well be named *Immanuel*, taking it for *God with us*; as God was most plentifully with his People, by sending the Lord Christ to be his Ambassador and Representative, and our Redeemer. Several of the most learned *Trinitarians* acknowledg, that no more than this was intended by this Name.”

Gilbert Burnet, writing in 1700, presented himself as an unapologetic opponent of Hobbesian voluntarism:

in Moral Matters, in God’s foederal dealings with us, it seems unreasonable and contrary to the Nature of God, to believe that there may be a Mystery contrary to the clearest Notions of Justice and Goodness; such as the condemning Mankind for the Sin of one Man, in which the rest had no share; and as contrary to our Ideas of God . . . Justice and Goodness being as inseparable from his Nature, as Truth and Fidelity can be supposed to be.

But in rejecting “the supposed Covenant with *Adam* as the Representative Head of Mankind,” Burnet was nonetheless endorsing an account of representation identical to Hobbes’s own.

IV

Let us end as we began, with Locke’s claim at the outset of *The Reasonableness of Christianity* that, if we believe in a just God, we cannot suppose that “all *Adam’s Posterity*” could have been “doomed to Eternal Infinite Punishment for the transgression of *Adam*, whom Millions had never heard of, and no one had authorized to transact for him, or be his Representative.” I hope it is now clear that, in making this argument, Locke was associating himself with a long-standing Royalist and Arminian/Pelagian tradition of thought, according to which a representative is simply one who has been authorized by an actor to “bear his person”—not a “similitude” or image of the represented party. But Locke, whose *Two Treatises of Government* had appeared barely four years earlier, was

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125 Stephen Nye, *A brief History of the Unitarians, called also Socinians in four letters* (London, 1687), 56.


127 Ibid., 115.

also a committed defender of the Whig, Parliamentarian cause, which remained ideologically invested in the discourse of “virtual representation” throughout the long eighteenth century.\(^{129}\) His challenge, therefore, was to marry two positions that had grown up in comprehensive opposition to each other: (1) the notion that an assembly chosen by a small number of voters represents the people to a far greater degree than a single monarch ever could, and (2) the claim that Adam could not have represented the human race by virtue of sharing their image. The more Locke spoke the Pelagian language of representation, the more he threatened to undermine his own defense of parliaments; and the more he invested in the ideological defense of parliaments, the less stable his anti-Calvinism became.

This fact may well explain the notoriously muddled set of arguments about representation that we find in the *Second Treatise*. On the one hand, Locke straightforwardly agreed with his Parliamentarian predecessors that “there can be but one Supream Power, which is the Legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate,” and he further affirmed their view that this power ought to be placed “in collective Bodies of Men, call them Senate, Parliament, or what you please”—and that only under such circumstances could “every single person” regard himself as “subject, equally with other the meanest Men, to those Laws, which he himself, as part of the Legislative had established.”\(^{130}\) Locke thus made it clear that subjects must be governed by laws promulgated by an assembly in order to count as self-governing, and he likewise tended to reserve the term “representative” for the members of such an assembly.\(^{131}\)

But at the same time, Locke states emphatically in chapter 10 that the people may “put the power of making Laws into the hands of a few select men . . . or else into the hands of one Man, and then it is a *Monarchy*” if they choose, and, a fortiori, “the Community may make compounded and mixed forms of Government, as they think good.”\(^{132}\) These “mixed” forms may, in turn, legitimately assign the monarch a negative voice, along with the other sweeping prerogatives outlined in chapter 14 (“Of Prerogative”). Whatever the description of the instituted legislative power, the subject “authorizes the Society, or which is all one, the Legislative thereof to make laws for him as the publick good of the Society shall require.”\(^{133}\) Or again,

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\(^{130}\) John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett, rev. edn (Cambridge, 1967), 384, 347–8, 431. Locke in fact stated that men could not “think themselves in Civil Society, till the Legislature was placed in collective Bodies of Men.” Ibid., 347. This passage is in obvious tension with Locke’s remarks in chap. 10 (see ibid., 372).

\(^{131}\) See, for example, ibid., 343, 388.

\(^{132}\) Ibid., 372.

\(^{133}\) Ibid., 343.
the *Constitution of the Legislative* is the first and fundamental Act of Society, whereby provision is made for the *Continuation of their Union*, under the Direction of Persons, and Bonds of Laws, made by persons authorized thereunto, by the Consent and Appointment of the People, without which no one Man, or number of Men, amongst them, can have Authority of making Laws, that shall be binding to the rest.¹³⁴

Here we recognizably find ourselves back in the conceptual world of the Royalist/Pelagian tradition, where authorization is a necessary and sufficient condition of representation. In such a world, “one man” or a “number of Men” can represent the people equally well.

The scholarly temptation has always been to try to find some way of reconciling these apparently contradictory claims, but that exercise has, I think, prevented us from appreciating the significance of the muddle itself. Locke, who had already in the *First Treatise* expressed his contempt for the view that Adam was the “Representative” of “all mankind” when he fell,¹³⁵ could not wholeheartedly embrace the Parliamentarian language of resemblance and “signification” without imperiling his assault on the doctrine of original sin. He was driven, instead, to engage with a Royalist discourse that placed the concept of authorization at the very center of the human experience, in both politics and theology. What mattered, in this discourse, was not what people would have agreed to—or what others just like them may have agreed to—but, fundamentally and exclusively, what people themselves had *in fact* agreed to. We call the resulting tradition of thought “liberalism.”

¹³⁴ Ibid., 425–6.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 191.