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Undergraduate and previous Graduate studies:

MS in Economics, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2010.

BA in Economics at the Getulio Vargas Foundation, Brazil, highest honors, 2007.

Graduate studies:

Harvard University, 2011 – Present

PhD candidate in Political Economy and Government

Thesis title: “Essays in Development Economics”

Expected completion date: June 2016

References:

Professor Sendhil Mullainathan

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Professor Nathan Nunn

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Professor Edward Glaeser

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Teaching and Research Fields:

Fields: Development Economics, Political Economy, Behavioral Economics

Teaching Experience:

Spring, 2015 Advanced Microeconomic Analysis, Harvard Kennedy School, teaching fellow for Professor Estelle Cantillon

Spring, 2009 Graduate Microeconomics, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, teaching fellow for Professor Rodrigo Soares

Research Experience and Other Employment:

Jun – Aug/14 World Bank, Consultant for the Urban Anchor, Washington, DC

Oct/13 – now MGov, Founder (www.mgovinternational.com)

Jan/13 – now World Bank, Consultant for Rural Development projects, Brazil

Mar/10 – Jun/11 World Bank, Research Analyst, Brasília, Brazil

Awards and fellowships:

2015-16 Christopher and Silvana Pascucci Graduate Student Dissertation Fellowship Fund, Harvard University

2015-16 Dissertation Completion fellowship, Harvard University

2015 Omidyar research grant (US\$100,000), Fundação Lemann

2015 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation research grant (US\$150,000), Yale Savings and Payments Research Fund at Innovations for Poverty Action

2015 Bradley Foundation award

2014 Top-10 Brazilian innovator under 35 and Social Innovator of the year, MIT Technology Review

2014 Person of the year fellowship, Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce

2013-14 Lab for Economic Applications and Policy research grant (US\$10,000), Harvard University

2013-14 John H. Coatsworth fellowship, Harvard University

Peer-reviewed Publications:

LICHAND, Guilherme, and Rodrigo SOARES (2014) “Access to Justice and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Brazil’s Special Civil Tribunals”. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 57(2), May 2014.

Non-peer-reviewed Publications:

LICHAND, Guilherme (2010) “Decomposing the Effects of CCTs on Entrepreneurship”. *World Bank’s Impact Evaluation Series*, No. 46.

Research Papers:

“Is Corruption Good For Your Health? ([Job Market Paper](#), with Marcos Lopes, CEPESP/FGV, and Marcelo Medeiros, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro)

ABSTRACT: While corruption crackdowns have been shown to effectively reduce missing government expenditures, their effects on public service delivery have not been credibly documented. This matters because, if corruption generates incentives for bureaucrats to deliver those services, then deterring it might actually hurt downstream outcomes. This paper exploits variation from an anti-corruption program in Brazil, designed by the federal government to enforce guidelines on earmarked transfers to municipalities, to study this question. Combining random audits with a differences-in-differences strategy, we find that the anti-corruption program greatly reduced occurrences of over-invoicing and off-the-record payments, and of procurement manipulation within health transfers. However, health indicators, such as hospital beds and immunization coverage, became worse as a result. Evidence from audited amounts suggests that lower corruption came at a high cost: after the program, public spending fell by so much that corruption per dollar spent actually increased. These findings are consistent with those responsible for procurement dramatically reducing purchases after the program, either because they no longer can capture rents, or because they are afraid of being punished for procurement mistakes.

“Cognitive Droughts” (with Anandi Mani, University of Warwick)

ABSTRACT: This paper tests whether worrying about rainfall risk impairs farmers’ decision-making, through worse cognition. Behavioral theories predict that worries could impose a psychological tax on farmers, reducing the quality of their decisions and, in turn, leading to material consequences at all times and across all states of nature – even when negative rainfall shocks do not materialize down the line. Using a novel technology to run lab experiments in the field, we combine survey experiments and recent rainfall shocks to estimate the effects of worrying about rainfall risk on farmers’ cognition. We find that worries about rainfall increase farmers’ cognitive load and their susceptibility to a variety of behavioral biases. In theory, insurance could mitigate those effects by alleviating the material consequences of rainfall risk. To test this hypothesis, we randomly assign offers of an index insurance product, and find that it does not affect farmers’ worries about rainfall, cognitive load, or susceptibility to biases. These results suggest that farmers’ anxiety might be relatively difficult to alleviate.

Research in Progress:

“Forecasting Rainfall: Are Farmers Bayesian? Evidence from Northeast Brazil” (with Anandi Mani, University of Warwick)

ABSTRACT: While higher insurance take-up remains a challenge in the developing world, more accurate rainfall forecasts could play the same role (Rosenzweig and Udry, 2014). In practice, there are multiple sources of rainfall forecasts, with wide variation in accuracy, and it is unclear how farmers weigh in different sources to form expectations. This paper randomly assigns

information about the local accuracy of alternative sources of rainfall forecasts and documents how doing so affects farmers' perceived reliability of each source, and their expectations about rainfall throughout the rainy season. We track farmers' expectations weekly over SMS, and incentivize correct forecasts for truthful reporting. Results are forthcoming.

“The Psychological Effects of Poverty on Parenting” (with Nina Cunha, Stanford University)

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates whether poverty affects parenting, through cognitive function. While there is evidence that low-cost interventions can significantly improve parenting, trickling-down to better student behavior and outcomes at school, such interventions have much weaker effects among the most disadvantaged families. One hypothesis for why that might be is that poverty impedes cognitive function (Mani et al, 2013), capturing poor parents' attention, memory and impulse control. We test this hypothesis by running lab experiments to measure parents' executive functions. This psychological theory also predicts that poverty should enhance focus, by making poor parents relatively better at tasks framed in monetary terms. To test this hypothesis, we design a low-cost intervention aimed at improving parental engagement, delivering weekly text messages (SMS) to support best parenting practices in Brazil over 8 months of the school year. We develop two versions of this intervention – one that frames the consequences of good parenting in monetary terms, and one that does not – and randomly assign parents to either version of the treatment or to a control group. We then test the focus enhancement mechanism, by comparing parents in the *monetary framing* treatment to those in the *neutral framing* one, and to those in the control group. Results are forthcoming.

“What Is It About Communicating With Parents?” (with Eric Bettinger and Nina Cunha, Stanford University, and Ricardo Madeira, University of São Paulo)

ABSTRACT: While there is increasing evidence that enhancing the communication between schools and parents significantly improves students' performance, less is known about what mechanisms drive those effects. Is it because communication primarily alleviates the moral hazard problem between parents and children, by providing parents with information about attendance and grades? Or is it because education is jointly produced by schools and parents, but the latter are poorly informed about key events such as school meetings and activities? Is it because communication changes parents' beliefs about the returns to education, increasing parental investment? Or is it because parents have limited attention, and communication makes parenting “top of mind”? We randomly assign communication interventions at the school and student levels, within a sample of Brazilian public schools, in order to estimate the impacts of each of those mechanisms on parental engagement and students' outcomes. Our design also allows investigating how different mechanisms interact. Results are forthcoming.