

# **The Political Dynamics of Occupational Coalitions and the Electoral Prospects of Mainstream versus Radical Parties**

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## **Abstract**

This paper documents long-term changes in the political attitudes of occupational groups in eight western democracies from 1990 to 2018 and assesses how and why the viability of the electoral coalitions that can be formed among them changes over these decades. We place seven occupational groups within a two-dimensional electoral space and use spatial analysis to assess the viability of coalitions associated with the center-left, center-right, radical-right and radical-left. We find that the viability of these coalitions is affected both by shifts in the relative salience of economic and cultural issues and by significant changes over time in citizens' economic and cultural attitudes. The viability of traditional center-left and most center-right coalitions declines over this period, while the viability of radical right and left coalitions rises. However, a cosmopolitan coalition potentially available to center-left or Green parties becomes an increasingly viable contender for power.

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Recent decades have seen profound shifts in western electoral systems. On the one hand, mainstream political parties of the center-left and center-right, which long dominated these polities, are having difficulty holding onto their electoral support. Among the western European democracies in this analysis, the share of the legislative vote secured by parties of the center-left and center-right fell from about 86 percent in 1980 to 62 percent in 2018. On the other hand, support has been rising for challenger parties of the radical right and left whose share of the vote more than doubled from about 9 percent in 1980 to 24 percent in 2018.<sup>1</sup> Why have the electoral coalitions of mainstream center-left and right become more fragile, while those assembled by challenger parties are gaining traction?

Many factors contribute to these developments, including shifts in the composition of the electorate, disillusionment with economic performance, and reactions against immigration or globalization (Mudde 2007; Kitschelt and Rehm 2019; Hopkin and Blyth 2019; Colantone and Stanig 2019; Dancygier 2010;). We do not aim at a comprehensive explanation. Instead, with a view to shedding light on the matter, we approach the problem as one of coalition formation, asking how the viability of the coalitions underpinning mainstream parties and their challengers has been changing over time and why some electoral coalitions are becoming more viable than others.

Our focus is on the coalitions formed among occupational groups. Comparative political economists have long been interested in the relationship between people's positions within the occupational structure and their political behavior. The relevant studies initially focused on conflict between social classes (cf. Goldthorpe et al. 1968; Przeworski and Sprague 1986) but, as the sharp socioeconomic divisions separating social classes eroded, attention has turned to the associations between political attitudes and a more diverse array of occupational groups. A large literature shows that occupational position still influences political attitudes and voting behavior (Evans 1999; Knutsen 2008; Oesch 2013; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014; Hausermann and Kriesi 2015). Accordingly, there is growing interest in the types of political coalitions that can be formed among occupational groups (Beramendi et al. 2015; Iversen and Soskice 2015).

Our starting point is the pioneering analysis of Oesch and Rennwald (2018) who show that radical right parties are locked in a contest with center-left parties for working-class votes and in competition with center-right parties for the votes of small employers. We are interested in two issues they raise but do not entirely answer, namely, what gives some parties advantages over

others and how have those advantages changed over time? To gain leverage on those issues, we go beyond studies of the contemporary period to consider how the potential for coalition formation in the western democracies has changed over a long period of time extending across three decades. This long timespan allows us to secure substantial variation on the potential determinants of coalitional advantage and to reveal how those advantages have changed across three decades widely seen as consequential for electoral politics.

We identify the economic and cultural attitudes of a diverse set of occupational groups in eight western democracies and locate them within a two-dimensional electoral space at three points in time over a thirty-year period (1990, 2006 and 2018). Using spatial analysis, we compare the viability of the occupational coalitions assembled by center-left, center-right, radical-right and radical-left parties in each of these periods under scenarios that vary the relative salience of economic and cultural issues; and we consider how the viability of those coalitions has changed over time. To preview some of the findings, our results confirm the intuition of Oesch and Rennwald (2018) that the viability of radical right coalitions increases with the salience of cultural issues, while the viability of coalitions on the political left increases with the salience of economic issues. However, we also find significant movements of occupational groups within the electoral space, including an increasing fragmentation in that space between 2006 and 2018 which has made coalition formation more difficult for all parties, but especially for mainstream parties, as a result of growing divisions on cultural issues. Although the prospects for radical parties improved significantly between 1990 and 2006, in the contemporary period, we find considerable potential in a coalition among service-sector workers that Green or center-left parties may be able to exploit.

## **Theoretical perspectives**

### *The focus on occupations*

For the purpose of establishing the viability of political coalitions formed among occupational groups, we take the political attitudes of people in those groups as important factors in their choice of which political party to support. Of course, this is a simplification. Parties can also appeal to voters on other grounds, such as the party's competence to govern, its economic record or valence issues (cf. Green and Jennings 2017; Healy and Malhotra 2013); and political attitudes may be shaped not only by occupation but by other commonalities of experience linked, for instance, to

age, residence or ethnicity. For those reasons, we are not attempting to predict the outcomes of specific elections.

However, there are grounds for thinking that people in similar occupations share similar views on the types of economic and cultural issues examined here, and there is substantial evidence that people in different occupations tend to support different parties. By and large, people in less remunerative or more routine occupations favor more redistribution and state intervention than people in higher-paid occupations with more marketable skills (Rydgren 2013). It has also been shown that people with less autonomy or interpersonal interaction at work are more likely to hold traditional cultural attitudes than people in jobs offering more autonomy and social interaction (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014; Oesch 2013). In our data, we find the differences in political attitudes among occupational groups that these accounts predict.

Given how important jobs and income are to well-being in advanced industrial societies, it would be surprising if occupation were not a significant factor conditioning political attitudes and decisions; and there is substantial evidence that occupation is closely related to people's choices about which political party to support. A canvass of recent studies examining the types of occupational categories used here reveals significant associations of substantial magnitude between people's occupations and the parties they support, even when conditioning on many other determinants of the vote (eg. Bornschier and Kriesi 2013; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Gidron and Hall 2019). Accordingly, we believe that occupation is a reasonable basis for thinking about the terms on which political coalitions can be formed.

### *Assessing the viability of coalitions*

Based on their political attitudes, we place occupational groups within an electoral space that is now widely seen as two-dimensional in which a traditional left-right axis reflecting people's views on economic issues is cross-cut by another axis reflecting their views on cultural issues (Kitschelt 1990; Kriesi et al 2008). We are interested in establishing the electoral viability of some occupational coalitions in comparison to others, where viability refers to the likelihood that the occupational groups composing the coalition can agree on a common set of positions on economic and cultural issues. For that purpose, we employ spatial analysis where a coalition's viability is a function of two factors. The first is the distance in the electoral space that must be spanned by the groups composing it (Adams et al. 2005). The smaller that distance, the more agreement among

coalition partners on the issues, and therefore the more feasible the coalition. However, in a two-dimensional electoral space, the second factor affecting the viability of a coalition is the relative salience of economic versus cultural issues to voting decisions. One occupational group can be proximate to a second on economic issues but closer to a third on cultural issues. Whether a coalition with the second or third group will be more viable depends on the weights the groups assign to economic vs. cultural issues in their political decisions, namely on the relative salience of economic or cultural issues to their voting.

### *Shifts in salience and their implications for coalitions*

Our baseline expectations for the positions of occupational groups in this two-dimensional electoral space are set by a small but important literature examining similar occupational categories, whose findings we reassess (Oesch 2013; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Oesch and Rennwald 2018). This literature indicates that low-skilled workers in manual labor and services are generally located to the left on the economic axis, professionals and skilled service workers around the center, while managers and small businessmen sit toward its right. The literature also posits a substantial divide on cultural issues between people in service sector occupations, whose workplace experiences are said to incline them toward cosmopolitan views, and people in manual or managerial occupations who are likely to hold more traditional cultural views (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014).<sup>2</sup> On this basis, Oesch and Rennwald (2018:14) contend that salience is a key determinant of how mainstream parties fare vis-à-vis the radical right because “depending on whether economic or cultural issues are more salient, production and service workers either choose the left or the radical right”; and small businessmen are expected to choose between the center-right or radical right based on the relative salience of economic versus cultural issues.

These contentions are congruent with the types of appeals made by contemporary parties. Radical right parties typically depend heavily on cultural appeals to traditional values, including opposition to immigration, support for law and order and sometimes respect for traditional gender roles, while center-left, center-right and radical left parties often depend on their economic platforms for electoral appeal (Mudde 2007; Bornschier 2010; Stubager 2010; Rovny and Polk 2019). Accordingly, we expect the electoral coalition of the radical right to be more viable when cultural issues are more salient and the coalitions of mainstream parties, and especially parties of the political left, to be more viable when economic issues are more salient.

This perspective carries implications for how the relative viability of coalitions may have shifted over the three decades from 1990 to 2018, because there are good reasons for expecting the relative salience of cultural issues to have risen over these years. This was a period when cultural issues associated with the promotion of gender equality, racial equality, and human rights became increasingly prominent in public discourse and public policy. Governments strengthened laws against gender discrimination, liberalized restrictions on abortion, legalized same-sex marriage, and put increasing emphasis on tolerance for diversity in school curricula (Bromley 2009; Banting and Kymlicka 2013). Some argue that the growing prominence of cosmopolitan values in elite discourse also generated a backlash among people with traditional values, thereby rendering cultural issues even more salient to politics (Norris and Inglehart 2019). The economic policies of mainstream parties also converged toward the right in this period (Hopkin 2020). Therefore, in order to offer distinctive platforms, mainstream parties had an incentive to put more emphasis on cultural issues. And, finding it harder to choose between those parties on economic issues, citizens are likely to have attached more weight to cultural issues in their voting decisions. Therefore, as cultural issues became more salient, we expect the viability of radical right vis-à-vis mainstream coalitions to have increased. However, the global economic recession of 2008 should have raised the salience of economic issues again, reducing the viability of radical right coalitions after 2008, if intervening events did not keep cultural issues high on the agenda.

#### *Movements in the electoral space and their implications for coalitions*

Since a coalition's viability is determined, not only by salience, but by the proximity of voters to each other in the electoral space, shifts in the positions of occupational groups vis-à-vis one another should also affect the relative viability of mainstream and radical coalitions; and several sets of socioeconomic developments between 1990 and 2018 are likely to have produced consequential shifts in the positions of some occupational groups.

Some of these concern cultural issues. The gap on cultural issues between people in service sector occupations and people in manual occupations is likely to have grown over these years for several reasons. Dramatic increases in college enrollments over this period increased the proportion of service sector workers with tertiary education (Kitschelt and Rehm 2019). Since a college education tends to confer cosmopolitan values, the average outlook of service sector groups should have become substantially more cosmopolitan in this period compared to other

groups with less education. If so, center-left coalitions, which join high-skill service sector workers to manual workers, as well as center-right coalitions, which join service-sector workers to small businessmen, would become more difficult to assemble. However, the viability of an alternative coalition uniting service sector workers might increase.

Economic developments during these decades may also have shifted the positions of occupational groups on economic issues. These years brought extensive liberalization in labor markets and social policy, increasing income inequality, and the growth of dual labor markets, alongside skill-biased technological change and the off-shoring of jobs, which threatened the employment prospects of many routine workers (Centeno and Cohen 2012; Palier and Thelen 2010; Goos et al. 2009; Rommel and Walter 2018). Prevailing accounts in comparative political economy suggest at least three ways in which these developments might have shifted the positions of occupational groups vis-à-vis one another on economic issues.

Because manual workers and low-skill service workers suffered the most from increasing job insecurity and downward pressure on wages, we can expect them to have reacted by moving to the left on economic issues, especially during the heyday of labor market liberalization in the 1990s. Such a shift to the left would make radical left coalitions that seek to unite those groups more feasible. At the same time, center-left coalitions, joining manual workers to skilled service sector and professional workers, might have become less viable, as the higher-skill groups who are less vulnerable to these labor market developments hesitated to move so far to the left in electoral terms.

But there are several reasons for thinking that the economic views of skilled service workers and professionals would also shift to the left over these years. As Kitschelt and Rehm (2019) observe, the proportion of professional and service sector employees with relatively low levels of income increased in this period; and that might have inclined more of them toward the economic left – especially since there is some evidence that their job security also declined (Geishecker 2008; Schwander 2020). Other analysts expect a similar outcome based on an alternative logic that emphasizes how social policy has changed. Over these years, governments began to put increasing resources into the types of ‘social investments’ that benefit skilled service sector workers and professionals. As a result, support among these groups for activist government and the welfare state may have grown (Geering and Häusermann 2013; Gingrich and Häusermann

2015; Garritzmann et al. 2018). Thermostatic theories of politics, positing that the views of voters move against the direction of policy (Soroka and Wlezien 2010), also predict a similar result. As the governments of the 1990s implemented neoliberal policies, all occupational groups might have reacted by shifting to the left on economic issues during that decade. If the economic views of professionals and skilled service workers did shift to the left, in terms of economic issues at least, the basis for center-left coalitions might have remained intact.

Finally, an important literature on ‘insider/outsider’ politics argues that the expansion of dual labor markets has created new divisions inside the working class between ‘insiders’ who continue to enjoy relatively secure and well-paid employment and the ‘outsiders’ relegated to precarious and poorly-paid positions in secondary labor markets (Rueda 2005; cf. Iversen and Soskice 2015). This perspective predicts that we should see a growing gap between the low-skill manual and service sector workers who are typically outsiders and the skilled manual workers who are often insiders, as the former become more supportive of redistribution and active labor-market intervention than skilled manual workers. If it were to materialize, this kind of division would render radical left coalitions that seek to unite the working class less feasible.

### **Empirical approach**

Before considering the evidence on these issues, we outline our empirical approach. Since we want to consider how the viability of electoral coalitions is affected by movements in the attitudes of occupational groups about economic and cultural issues over a long period of time, we seek cross-national data from which comparable measures of citizens’ attitudes on those issues can be constructed spanning the longest possible time period. The most comprehensive data we have been able to find with these features is in the World Values Surveys (WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS) with which we can compare citizens’ attitudes in 1990 (WVS wave 2 with about 13,000 respondents), 2006 (WVS wave 5 with about 19,000 respondents) and 2018 (EVS wave 5 with about 16,000 respondents) in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United States.<sup>3</sup> We use demographic weights to secure representative samples of each national population.



### *Defining occupational groups*

Based on self-reported occupation, we assign respondents to occupational groups designed to conform to the influential categories of Oesch (2006) which capture features of the workplace situation said to condition people's views on economic and cultural issues. Limitations in the WVS data mean that we can only approximate those categories, but we do so by grouping people into seven occupational groups according to the tasks associated with their employment: managers, professional workers, small employers, skilled service workers, low-skill service workers, skilled manual workers, and low-skill manual workers (details in Appendix C).

### *Assessing attitudes*

Using these surveys, we measure citizens' views about economic issues with questions about their attitudes to income inequality, private vs. state ownership of business, the responsibility of the government to provide for all, whether the unemployed should be forced to take a job, and whether competition is good or harmful. We assess their views about cultural issues with questions about whether homosexuality and abortion are justifiable, how respondents feel about having immigrants, Muslims and people of a different race as neighbors, whether men have more of a right to work than women, and whether respect for authority is good or bad. Using these questions, we construct indices for views on economic and cultural issues by estimating a confirmatory model for multidimensional item response parameters, based on Samejima's (1969) multidimensional ordinal response model because the data are ordinal (Chalmers 2012). Given our premise that these questions tap two distinct factors, we constrain most of the variables to load onto one dimension. Our economic index reflects attitudes to redistribution and governmental activism, which we describe as left vs right, while the cultural index reflects a set of values we describe as cosmopolitan vs. traditional (details in Appendix A and B). Enhancing our confidence in the results, the cross-national and over-time patterns observed with our measures correspond broadly to those found by Caughey et al. (2019). In all analyses, we report the positions of citizens in the two-dimensional issue space that these indices yield using a metric based on standard deviations from the mean on the relevant dimension in the 1990 sample.

### *Identifying feasible coalitions*

Because we are interested in assessing the viability of coalitions underpinning mainstream center-left and center-right parties and their challengers on the radical left and right, we focus on the typical coalitions such parties have tried to assemble. Although the composition of those coalitions varies to some extent across countries and time, our specifications follow the findings of recent studies of partisan support (Oesch 2008; Geering and Häusermann 2013; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Gingrich 2017). For the purposes of this analysis, we specify that each coalition must include three occupational groups. Rarely can a party secure a dominant position in the legislature with votes from fewer groups; but some parties may command support from more. All the coalitions considered here encompass at least 35 percent of the electorate, the minimum share of the vote needed to dominate a coalition government in this era (see Armingeon et al. 2019), and in most cases they represent 40 to 50 percent of the electorate.

The coalition we term *center-left* is composed of professionals, skilled service workers and skilled manual workers. This reflects the fact that social democratic parties have traditionally tried to assemble coalitions extending across these middle-class groups into the working class, and notably to skilled manual workers among whom unionization encourages support for redistribution (Knutsen 2009; Gingrich and Häusermann 2015; Mossiman and Pontusson 2017). However, we also consider an alternative *cosmopolitan coalition* that joins professionals and skilled service workers to another working-class group, low-skill service sector workers, on the premise that shared cultural outlooks among people working in the service sector may make it a more viable coalition for center left parties or Green parties when the salience of cultural issues is high.

The *center-right* coalition we consider is composed of professionals, skilled service sector workers and small employers. This reflects the fact that center-right coalitions are unlikely to gain enough votes to dominate the legislature unless they secure substantial support from these two middle class groups as well as small employers. An alternative formulation would include managers as a key constituency for the center right, but small employers are even more likely than managers to support the center right (Oesch 2008); and Oesch and Rennwald (2018) identify small employers as the key swing group between the center-right and radical right.

We define the *radical right* coalition as one assembling support from skilled manual workers, low-skill manual workers and small employers in line with studies indicating that these

are the occupational groups most likely to support contemporary radical right parties (Bornschiefer and Kriesi 2010; Oesch and Rennwald 2018; Gidron and Hall 2019). We define a *radical left* coalition as one aimed primarily at uniting the working class composed of low-skilled and skilled manual workers with low-skilled service sector employees, in order to speak to the issue of whether a common program appealing to the working class remains viable in the segmented occupational structure of the contemporary period.

Of course, this exercise is to some extent stylized. Most parties would like to secure electoral support from more than three occupational groups and in some measure they usually do. In some cases, our analysis accommodates that because occupational groups with intermediate views fall within the electoral space circumscribed by the three coalition partners on which we concentrate. Parties can also attract supporters from specific occupational groups without securing majorities of them. Radical left parties, for instance, typically receive some votes from professionals, a point we sidestep in favor of assessing the potential in a traditional ‘working class’ coalition (Ramiro 2016).<sup>4</sup> And the relevant coalitions could sometimes be specified differently – the center-left might appeal, for instance, to low-skilled rather than skilled manual workers. However, our choices generally reflect the coalitions most likely to be propitious for the relevant party; and in robustness tests we consider coalitions with a different composition that are the most feasible alternatives. Overall, the analysis should be read as one assessing the potential for assembling a set of coalitions seen as ideal types rather than one considering the coalition any one party assembles.

#### *Assessing the viability of coalitions*

To assess the relative viability of coalitions, we adopt a standard spatial analysis based on the ideal points of occupational groups measured in terms of the average position taken by their members (McDonald and Budge 2005). We assume that parties offer a common program to the electorate. Of course, this is a simplifying assumption: parties sometimes emphasize specific appeals when communicating with specific groups of voters, hoping to assemble coalitions on a logrolling basis. But our assumption accords with studies pointing to the nationalization of party politics; and it is realistic in an era when parties publish national manifestos and rely heavily on national media coverage (Caramani 2009; Hopkin 2018).

In this context, the more similar the attitudes of each occupational group are to those of the other groups in the potential coalition, the easier it will be for a party to assemble support from these groups. Therefore, our measure for the viability of a coalition is the maximum distance in the electoral space that must be spanned if the coalition is to be assembled, i.e. the distance between the occupational groups in each coalition that are most distant from one another. In the terms of spatial voting models, the smaller that distance, the closer the position of the party will be to the ideal points of all members of the coalition.

In order to account for the relative salience of economic and cultural issues, we consider three scenarios: one when economic issues dominate electoral competition, another when cultural issues dominate, and a third when voters accord economic and cultural issues roughly equal weight. We construe salience as a general feature of electoral competition at a given point in time, namely, what Meyer and Wagner (2018) term ‘systemic salience’. Therefore, when electoral competition turns primarily on economic or cultural issues, the relative viability of coalitions will depend on the distance that each coalition spans on the axis reflecting the type of issue dominant at that time. However, our results remain informative if salience is seen as a feature of coalitions rather than of electoral competition, such that a specific coalition depends primarily on cultural or economic issues for its appeal. In such cases, the electoral viability of a coalition will depend on the maximum distance that coalition spans along the axis most salient to its supporters.<sup>5</sup>

Because economic and cultural issues can both be salient to an election, we also construct an indicator for the viability of coalitions when voters’ decisions are based equally on economic and cultural issues.<sup>6</sup> For that purpose, we use the triangle formed when the positions of the three occupational groups in each coalition are joined in this two-dimensional space. The smaller this triangle the more feasible it should be to form a coalition among the groups; and to assess the size of each triangle we calculate its centroid, namely the point at which lines joining each vertex with the midpoint of the opposite side intersect, and sum the distances between the centroid and the vertices. The smaller this sum, the closer the three groups at the points of the triangle are to each other in the electoral space, and the more feasible it is to form a coalition among them. We label this sum the ‘size of the triangle.’

## **Empirical results**

Turning to our empirical results, we begin with observations based on the positions of occupational groups from all eight countries and then assess those against country-specific observations. Drawing on the full cross-national sample, Figure 1 locates the average positions of occupational groups in this two-dimensional electoral space in 1990, 2006 and 2018. The positions of the groups within this Figure generally conform to the findings of previous studies. In all three periods, managers and small employers anchor the right side of the economic axis, while low-skilled manual workers are on its left. Professionals and skilled service sector workers have the most cosmopolitan cultural views and low-skilled manual workers traditional views. Despite some movements that are consequential for coalition formation, these features of the distribution remain quite stable over these three decades.

### *The importance of issue salience*

Based on the position of occupational groups in the full cross-national sample, Table 1 lists the relevant coalitions, their share of the workforce and our measures for the viability of each coalition under scenarios that vary the salience of economic and cultural issues. When economic (cultural) issues dominate electoral competition, the relevant measure for the viability of a coalition is the distance separating the groups in it that are the farthest apart from one another on the economic (cultural) axis (columns 4 and 5). When economic and cultural issues are equally salient to electoral competition, the relevant measure is the size of the triangle joining the groups in each coalition within the electoral space (column 6).

It is apparent that salience matters to the success of coalitions. When economic issues dominate electoral competition (column 4), the coalitions of the political left emerge as the most viable, although the advantage shifts over time between the center-left, radical left, and cosmopolitan coalitions. Comparison of columns 4 and 5 indicate that the center-right also benefits from the salience of economic issues; and the radical right always assembles the least viable coalition when economic issues dominate electoral competition. However, when cultural issues dominate electoral competition (column 5), the viability of mainstream coalitions deteriorates, and the radical right does well, assembling the most viable coalitions in 2006 and 2018 and coming close in 1990.

These findings are important because the electoral salience of cultural issues rose over these decades. For fourteen western democracies, Figure 2 displays the proportions of party manifestos devoted to cultural and economic issues since 1950, widely considered a good indicator for the salience of different types of issues to electoral competition (details in Appendix D). Although economic issues always received considerable attention, the proportion of space devoted to cultural issues increased steadily after 1980. By 2006, economic and cultural issues have close to equal salience to electoral competition; and Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) find that by 2009 the votes for most parties in Europe were more closely associated with voters' positions on cultural issues than on economic issues (see also Lachat 2008). The relative salience of economic issues rises again after the 2008 financial crisis, but by 2018 the two types of issues are equally salient again.

### *Movements in the electoral space*

As Figure 1 indicates, the movements of occupational groups in the electoral space over these decades also conform to some of the conjectures we have drawn from the literatures on comparative political economy and electoral behavior. Between 1990 and 2006, all occupational groups moved significantly left on economic issues, as thermostatic theories of electoral behavior suggest they would in response to neoliberal policies which reached a high point in that era (Armingeon et al. 2019). As economic policies became more interventionist in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, most groups move toward the center again, while managers and small employers revert to their previous positions on the right. Professionals and skilled service workers are among those who move left on economic issues between 1990 and 2006, and they remain well to the left of their positions in 1990, potentially improving the prospects for center-left coalitions.

However, after some convergence between 1990 and 2006, the electoral space fragments on cultural issues. The standard deviation for the views of occupational groups on such issues moves from 0.17 in 1990 to 0.12 in 2006 to 0.28 in 2018 (Figure A1). A significant gap opens up between service sector workers and managers versus manual workers and small employers, driving a wedge through center-left coalitions hoping to unite professionals or skilled service workers and manual workers; and center-right coalitions attempting to unite skilled service workers or professionals with small employers become more difficult. The center-left becomes more dependent on the formation of a cosmopolitan coalition among service sector workers, while the

center-right is now more likely to be able to form a coalition with managers than with small employers (for details see Table A2 in appendix).

The evidence for insider/outsider divisions is mixed. In 1990, there is a substantial difference in the economic views of the skilled manual workers who are ‘insiders’ and the low-skilled manual or service workers who are ‘outsiders.’ However, at the height of liberalization in Europe, the economic views of the three groups converge to the left, only to move apart again after 2006, as the views of skilled manual workers shift much farther to the right than those of low-skilled workers.

### *The shifting character of electoral competition*

Because economic and cultural issues have both been salient to electoral competition since 1990, the most realistic indicator for the relative viability of coalitions is the sum of the distances from the centroids for each coalition reported in column 6 of Table 1. They suggest that the political left was in a relatively strong position in 1990: at that point, the two most viable coalitions were the cosmopolitan coalition that the left can sometimes assemble and the traditional center-left coalition. By 2006, however, an especially pronounced shift of manual workers to the economic left impaired the viability of the traditional center-left coalition, although it increased the feasibility of a radical left coalition (see Figure 1 and the data in Figure A1). Meanwhile, radical right and center-right coalitions were rendered more viable by a general convergence on cultural issues and a shift to the left on economic issues by small employers, who may have been adversely affected by more intense competition in those years (cf. Berger 1981).

However, it should be noted that the real world of party competition contains few analogues to the radical left coalition portrayed here, because a party representing it would have to be quite far left on economic issues and traditionalist on cultural issues, whereas most radical left parties take relatively cosmopolitan cultural positions in line with the views of the professionals who also support them (Ramiro 2016; Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos 2020). As construed here, the radical left coalition is included in this analysis primarily in order to assess the prospects of a notional ‘working class’ coalition. In the absence of a party representing it, electoral competition in 2006 appears to be evenly balanced between parties assembling radical right, center-right and cosmopolitan coalitions.

By 2018, further fragmentation of the electoral space has made coalition formation more difficult for all parties. Mainstream coalitions on the political left continue to benefit if economic issues are more salient, while the radical right benefits from the salience of cultural issues. However, when both types of issues are equally salient, the standard coalitions of the center-left and center-right do not fare well. The most viable coalition becomes a cosmopolitan coalition among service sector workers, which Green and center-left parties might be able to mobilize, and its main real-world rival is a radical right coalition. These findings are consistent with arguments that the character of partisan politics in the western democracies is changing. Those arguments suggest that the prospects for traditional center-left and center-right parties are declining and electoral competition is beginning to center around a new ‘integration cleavage’ pitting Green or center-left parties representing people in skilled service sector occupations against radical right parties speaking for manual workers and small employers (Kriesi et al. 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2018; cf. Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2019).

To assess the robustness of this analysis, we also compare the viability of these five types of coalitions when we allow the occupational groups composing them to vary subject to criteria that preserve the basic nature of the coalition. These criteria are that: the center-right coalition must include managers or small employers, the center-left has to include professionals or skilled service workers and skilled manual workers or low-skill manual workers, and the radical right coalition must include small employers and skilled manual workers or low-skill manual workers. The specifications for the radical left and cosmopolitan coalitions do not change. We then calculate the distance from the centroids (as in column 6 of Table 1) for all possible coalitions in the electoral space and identify the coalitions subject to these criteria that most minimize this distance. The results are in Table A1 of the appendix. Not surprisingly, based on the magnitude of the centroids, the electoral contests become tighter, but the relative viability of the various coalitions does not change much. The main differences are that the center-right becomes more competitive in 2018 and the radical right somewhat more competitive in 1990.

### *National variations*

As a further check, we also assess the findings from this cross-national analysis against the results for individual nations, since it is within nations that elections are conducted. Table 2 provides the country-specific data, and Figure A1 charts movements in the positions of occupational groups by



country. Within countries, the overall relationship of occupational groups to one another broadly mirrors the distributions reported in the cross-national analysis; and in most countries we see parallel movements over time. Although they start from different positions, the occupational groups of all countries move in cosmopolitan directions on cultural issues. In most countries, occupational groups also move left on economic issues between 1990 and 2006 and then back toward the center between 2006 and 2018. The exceptions are Britain, where occupational groups converge toward the center in that first period, as Grasso et al. (2019) might expect, and Sweden, where many groups move farther right in the second period. The presence of parallel movements in multiple countries suggests that, over the long-term at least, the views of western electorates may be influenced by common sets of developments.

Because national variations in occupational structure, socioeconomic trajectories, electoral rules and partisan competition can influence the positions of occupational groups, we expect to see some national differences. In keeping with the observation of Evans and Tilley (2012) that the platforms of political parties influence the views of citizens, the electoral space is consistently more fragmented in nations such as France and the Netherlands, where parties express a wide range of positions, than in Britain and the United States where majoritarian rules limit the range of party platforms. Similarly, political culture can condition national positions. In Italy and the U.S., where organized religion remains a potent political force, most groups retain more traditional cultural views; and cultural views in the two Nordic countries are highly cosmopolitan (Inglehart 1997). The economic views of Europeans also move farther to the left than those of citizens in the two Anglo-American democracies.

However, the country cases confirm the importance of issue salience to the viability of coalitions. Table 3 reports the most viable coalitions in the 23 country waves under scenarios in which economic issues, cultural issues or both sets of issues dominate electoral competition. If economic issues dominate, the coalitions associated with mainstream parties emerge as the most viable in 16 of these cases and the radical right in only one. However, when cultural issues dominate, a radical right coalition becomes the most viable in 12 cases (plus two US cases where the radical right virtually ties alternative coalitions).

These results also bear out the historic truism that parties of the left benefit when economic issues dominate electoral competition, while the political right relies on cultural issues for

advantage (Ziblatt 2017). When economic issues dominate, the political left assembles the most viable coalition in 20 national cases, whether in the form of cosmopolitan, radical-left or center-left coalitions. When cultural issues dominate, the most viable coalitions in 15 cases are those of the political right, and notably the radical-right. In short, the country cases confirm that issue salience is closely associated with the outcomes of electoral competition between mainstream parties and the radical right, and between the political left and right.

In the scenario most realistic for the contemporary period when economic and cultural issues are both salient to electoral competition, the country cases confirm that traditional center-left and center-right coalitions tend to do badly, while radical coalitions do relatively well, as does a cosmopolitan coalition built on service sector workers. The feasibility of this cosmopolitan coalition rests on similarities in the cultural views of service sector workers and the movement of professionals and skilled service sector workers to the economic left. This coalition seems to be the principal bulwark against the radical right; and it may signal rising prospects for Green parties. Some may also see in it the ‘aspirational voters’ that Iversen and Soskice (2019) expect to underpin policies for the knowledge economy.

With some national variations, general shifts in the positions of occupational groups vis-à-vis one another that we find in the cross-national data are also visible within countries (see Figure A1). By 2018, a significant gap on cultural issues has appeared between professionals or skilled service sector workers and manual workers in all countries. In most, professionals and skilled service workers also move to the left on economic issues. The exceptions are Italy where they do not, and Britain and Sweden where skilled service workers do not. Divisions on economic issues between skilled and low-skill manual workers increase over the period only in Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden.

## **Conclusion**

We have compared the economic and cultural views of people in seven occupational groups at three points in time over three decades marked by substantial socioeconomic change. Using spatial analysis, we evaluate the viability of five types of coalitions that can be formed among these groups, under three scenarios that vary the salience of economic and cultural issues. We find that the relative salience of these issues has a significant impact on the viability of coalitions. When economic issues are more salient, the types of coalitions formed by mainstream parties, and

especially parties of the political left, are more viable, while increases in the salience of cultural issues improve the viability of coalitions formed by the radical right, and to a lesser extent the center-right. We document an increase in the electoral salience of cultural issues over these years and find that it corresponds to increases in the viability of radical right coalitions.

In the eight western democracies examined here, we also find significant changes over time in the positions of occupational groups in the electoral space. In the context of economic liberalization during the 1990s, the economic views of all groups shift significantly to the left. Although the cultural views of all groups become more cosmopolitan over these decades, by 2018, a significant gap on cultural issues has opened up between the middle-class members of standard center-left and center-right coalitions and their longstanding coalition partners among manual workers or small employers. That gap renders mainstream coalitions less viable, despite a movement by professionals and skilled service workers to the left on economic issues. We do not attempt a full explanation of these movements but find they correspond to some prominent theories about the political effects of socioeconomic change. In the more fragmented electoral space of 2018, a cosmopolitan coalition built on service sector workers, which may be available to Green or center left parties, emerges as the most viable.

A number of caveats must accompany the analysis. Occupational groups are not the only social groups among which coalitions can be formed (cf. Liberini et al. 2020). However, we think they deserve attention given the extent to which people's jobs condition their economic and cultural attitudes (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). Parties can also make appeals that are not group-oriented but based on economic performance, valence issues, or competence to govern (cf. Green and Jennings 2017); and it may be possible to form occupational coalitions on the basis of issues more specific than those tapped by our measures for economic and cultural views. A recent literature suggests, for instance, that different occupational groups support different types of social policies (cf. Green-Pedersen and Jensen 2019; Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2019; Häusermann et al. 2019). That is an important issue deserving of more investigation. However, it is not yet clear that preferences over types of social policies are substantially more significant for voting decisions than the broad economic and cultural attitudes on which we concentrate, especially since party manifestos continue to highlight the types of issues tapped by our measures (cf. Garritzmann et al. 2018). Our ability to compare the coalitions assembled by the center-left and center-right is also

limited by the fact that the occupational categories available in our data do not allow us to distinguish high-skilled workers in technical occupations, who may be more attracted to the center right, from those in service occupations who may be more sympathetic to the center left (cf. Oesch 2013; Wren and Rehm 2013).

This analysis suggests several avenues for further research. Although we believe that the national nature of electoral campaigns makes it reasonable to treat the salience of economic and cultural issues as general features of an electoral context, some occupational groups may give more weight to economic or cultural issues in their voting decisions (Lachat 2008; Lefkofridi et al. 2014). Turnout can also vary by occupational groups. Since these factors could affect the viability of coalitions, they deserve further investigation. Of course, electoral rules also influence the process of coalition formation: in majoritarian systems parties must assemble larger electoral coalitions in order to secure office, while, under proportional representation, parties representing narrower slices of the electorate can secure office via post-electoral coalitions. We accommodate this, if imperfectly, by focusing on coalitions with enough support from multiple occupational groups to dominate a legislature, whether assembled among the electorate or via post-electoral coalition formation. But post-electoral coalition formation may not turn to the same extent on the preferences of the occupational groups represented in them (cf. Laver 1998).

By charting the movement of occupational groups in the electoral space over a long period of time across multiple countries, however, we contribute to contemporary understandings of the dilemmas facing mainstream political parties and the prospects of their radical challengers. We show that these depend, not only on the relative salience of cultural issues, but also on the movements of occupational groups on economic issues. In these respects, we hope to advance an important body of research that is integrating studies in comparative political economy with the study of electoral politics.

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
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
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
Figure 1: The relative salience of economic and cultural issues in party platforms



Note: Calculated from CMP data. For the construction of the categories, see Appendix D.

**FIGURE 2: The location of occupational groups in the electoral space in 1990, 2006 and 2018**





*Note:* M: managers; P: professionals; SS: skilled service workers; LS: low-skilled service workers; SE: small employers; SM: skilled manual workers; LM: low-skilled manual workers. *Source:* authors' calculations from WVS/EVS.

**TABLE 1: Coalition potential in 1990, 2006 and 2018 for all countries**

Coalition	Composition	Workforce Share	Max Distance Economic Axis	Max Distance Cultural Axis	Triangle Size
<b>1990</b>					
Center-left	P + SS + SM	51%	<u>10</u>	29	38
Center-right	P + SS + SE	38%	14	43	57
Cosmopolitan	P + SS + LS	47%	13	<u>11</u>	<b>18</b>
Radical left	LM +LS + SM	59%	14	28	39
Radical Right	SM + LM + SE	50%	35	14	44
<b>2006</b>					
Center-left	P + SS + SM	52%	17	31	45
Center-right	P + SS + SE	38%	13	22	33
Cosmopolitan	P + SS + LS	49%	18	18	30
Radical Left	LM +LS + SM	58%	<u>1</u>	14	<b>18</b>
Radical right	SM + LM + SE	47%	21	<u>10</u>	30
<b>2018</b>					
Center-left	P + SS + SM	58%	11	60	69
Center-right	P + SS + SE	53%	35	54	73
Cosmopolitan	P+ SS + LS	76%	<u>9</u>	33	<b>38</b>
Radical Left	LM +LS + SM	43%	17	41	52
Radical right	SM + LM + SE	41%	41	<u>20</u>	53

*Note:* All distances in units multiplied by 100. Workforce share is based on the proportion of workers in each occupation in the weighted WVS/EVS sample.<sup>7</sup> The most viable coalitions in **bold** or boxes.

TABLE 2: Coalition potential in 1990, 2006 and 2018 by country

Coalition	1990				2006					2018				
	Share	Max Distance		Triangle Size	Share	Max Distance		Triangle Size	Change	Share	Max Distance		Triangle Size	Change
		Econ	Cultural			Econ	Cultural				Econ	Cultural		
<b>BRITAIN</b>	%				%					%				
Center-left	43	21	27	38	53	<u>7</u>	32	37	- 1	46	42	46	78	+ 41
Center-right	37	28	24	45	54	15	33	37	- 8	46	51	42	80	+ 43
Cosmopolitan	47	<u>6</u>	15	<b>20</b>	57	<u>7</u>	17	<b>24</b>	+ 4	53	<b>18</b>	27	<b>44</b>	+ 20
Radical left	49	17	18	30	47	9	19	26	- 4	44	40	31	66	+ 40
Radical Right	39	46	<u>9</u>	62	31	23	<u>3</u>	26	- 36	37	49	<b>16</b>	63	+ 37
<b>FRANCE</b>														
Center-left	56	19	48	64	58	12	53	66	+ 2	50	16	64	73	+ 7
Center-right	47	25	64	83	54	23	59	78	- 5	44	16	90	98	+ 20
Cosmopolitan	52	29	28	49	56	15	32	39	- 10	51	14	42	56	+ 17
Radical Left	51	<b>10</b>	36	<b>44</b>	41	<b>11</b>	23	<b>33</b>	- 11	48	<u>9</u>	35	<b>39</b>	+ 6
Radical right	46	35	<b>16</b>	49	39	37	<u>6</u>	43	- 6	41	31	<b>26</b>	50	+ 7

**GERMANY**

Center-left	59	13	32	40	56	23	37	51	+ 11	56	19	42	49	- 2
Center-right	39	<u>9</u>	53	59	47	<u>9</u>	<u>20</u>	<b>25</b>	- 34	44	29	28	50	+ 25
Cosmopolitan	47	14	<u>18</u>	<b>28</b>	53	12	<u>20</u>	31	+ 3	56	<u>5</u>	<u>22</u>	<b>24</b>	- 7
Radical Left	56	16	37	46	48	15	22	32	- 14	52	13	33	42	+ 10
Radical right	48	34	21	49	42	25	27	45	- 4	43	37	27	49	+ 4

**ITALY**

Center-left	44	17	25	38	48	29	23	45	+ 7	51	<u>5</u>	55	58	+ 13
Center-right	48	<u>14</u>	34	47	50	20	28	42	- 5	52	48	48	84	+ 42
Cosmopolitan	34	32	11	39	44	32	<u>9</u>	39	0	51	<u>5</u>	<u>29</u>	<b>36</b>	- 3
Radical Left	48	16	18	<b>32</b>	46	<u>3</u>	24	<b>26</b>	- 6	51	6	58	61	+ 35
Radical right	62	27	<u>9</u>	<b>32</b>	52	23	11	33	+ 1	52	59	40	90	+ 57

**SWEDEN\***

Center-left	51	21	20	38	56	40	17	51	+ 13	57	35	56	88	+ 37
Center-right	53	21	29	48	60	<u>9</u>	<u>3</u>	<b>13</b>	- 35	50	67	<u>12</u>	73	+ 60
Cosmopolitan	57	21	<u>2</u>	*	59	32	7	38		60	29	15	<b>41</b>	+ 3
Radical Left	53	<u>11</u>	12	*	35	<u>9</u>	26	33		44	<u>27</u>	41	62	+ 29
Radical right	39	27	15	<b>33</b>	36	32	21	49	+ 16	34	59	44	87	+ 38

## NETHERLANDS

Center-left	55	<u>10</u>	36	43	58	<u>11</u>	41	44	+ 1	49	15	49	63	+ 19
Center-right	42	30	71	91	59	17	36	41	- 50	49	33	33	58	+ 17
Cosmopolitan	49	25	<u>15</u>	<b>37</b>	61	32	17	46	+ 9	53	<u>8</u>	24	<b>30</b>	- 16
Radical Left	39	16	51	61	34	37	40	67	+ 6	44	31	24	48	- 19
Radical right	39	38	36	67	32	17	<u>5</u>	<b>20</b>	- 47	40	49	<u>16</u>	60	+ 40

## NORWAY

Center-left	59	22	39	57	63	<u>16</u>	35	49	- 8	52	32	61	89	+ 40
Center-right	38	30	38	60	49	19	40	53	- 7	50	28	58	84	+ 31
Cosmopolitan	31	22	19	37	44	39	17	50	+ 13	74	26	33	52	+ 2
Radical Left	56	<u>17</u>	20	<b>33</b>	45	28	26	45	+ 12	41	35	47	66	+ 21
Radical right	63	36	<u>5</u>	38	50	19	<u>9</u>	<b>25</b>	- 13	17	<u>11</u>	<u>21</u>	<b>29</b>	+ 4

## UNITED STATES

Center-left	60	13	28	33	60	19	25	37	+ 4					
Center-right	44	16	31	41	44	<u>3</u>	20	<b>22</b>	- 19					
Cosmopolitan	44	<u>8</u>	<u>12</u>	<b>18</b>	49	5	21	25	+ 7					
Radical Left	50	11	31	34	20	21	<u>18</u>	35	+ 1					
Radical right	50	31	13	42	37	16	19	32	- 10					




*Note:* \*Because of data limitations, figures for Sweden in 1990 use 'service workers' for LS or SS workers. Most viable coalitions in **bold** or boxes. 'Change' indicates change in the size of the triangles since the prior period. 'Share' is share of the workforce in the coalition – for European countries from EU Labour Force Statistics via Peugny (2018) and INSEE (2018); and from the WVS/EVS samples for the US and for Norway in 2018.<sup>8</sup>

**Table 3: Winning coalition in all country cases by the relative salience of economic and cultural issues**


Coalition	Most salient issue		
	Economic	Cultural	Both
Center left	5	0	0
Center right	5	3	3
Cosmopolitan	7	8	10
Radical left	8	1	6
Radical right	1	12	5

*Note:* Totals may not sum to 23 because of ties in some cases.


**Figure A1: The location of occupational groups in the electoral space in 1990, 2006 and 2018**




	%	Econ	Values
M	3	0.35	-0.46
P	12	0.22	-0.21
SS	18	0.19	-0.24
LS	18	0.09	-0.32
SM	22	0.12	-0.50
LM	15	-0.02	-0.60
SE	8	0.33	-0.64
SD		0.13	0.17




	%	Econ	Values
M	4	0.01	-0.08
P	14	-0.12	0.13
SS	15	-0.04	0.18
LS	20	-0.22	0.0
SM	22	-0.21	-0.13
LM	16	-0.22	-0.14
SE	9	0.01	-0.04
SD		0.13	0.12




	%	Econ	Values
M	6	0.33	0.64
P	16	-0.05	0.75
SS	26	0.01	0.59
LS	30	-0.08	0.42
SM	10	0.06	0.15
LM	09	-0.11	0.01
SE	4	0.30	0.21
SD		0.18	0.28




	%	Econ	Values
M	2	0.60	-0.63
P	13	0.22	-0.25
SS	23	0.03	-0.12
LS	16	-0.08	-0.40
SM	20	0.03	-0.60
LM	15	-0.08	-0.76
SE	11	0.28	-0.76
SD		0.24	0.25




	%	Econ	Values
M	7	0.36	-0.50
P	18	-0.31	0.18
SS	28	-0.22	0.29
LS	10	-0.37	-0.04
SM	12	-0.34	-0.25
LM	19	-0.44	-0.27
SE	8	-0.08	-0.31
SD		0.27	0.28




	%	Econ	Values
M	6	0.43	0.60
P	15	-0.13	0.89
SS	22	-0.04	0.55
LS	33	-0.19	0.47
SM	12	-0.20	0.26
LM	8	-0.27	0.12
SE	4	0.04	0.00
SD		0.24	0.31




	%	Econ	Values
M	6	0.48	-0.51
P	12	0.30	-0.19
SS	21	0.35	-0.38
LS	14	0.21	-0.29
SM	26	0.21	-0.51
LM	16	0.06	-0.67
SE	6	0.40	-0.72
SD		0.14	0.19




	%	Econ	Values
M	5	0.14	-0.17
P	18	-0.20	0.12
SS	22	-0.11	-0.08
LS	13	-0.23	-0.06
SM	16	-0.34	-0.24
LM	19	-0.39	-0.29
SE	7	-0.13	-0.02
SD		0.17	0.14




	%	Econ	Values
M	5	0.25	0.54
P	16	0.00	0.59
SS	33	0.01	0.49
LS	23	-0.04	0.38
SM	12	0.05	0.18
LM	6	-0.08	0.05
SE	4	0.29	0.31
SD		0.14	0.20




	%	Econ	Values
M	14	0.13	-0.58
P	17	-0.03	-0.33
SS	12	-0.08	-0.45
LS	18	-0.09	-0.49
SM	14	-0.24	-0.60
LM	17	-0.26	-0.66
SE	8	0.20	-0.57
SD		0.17	0.11




	%	Econ	Values
M	11	0.11	-0.30
P	26	-0.08	0.03
SS	21	-0.01	-0.13
LS	10	-0.08	-0.14
SM	8	-0.08	-0.30
LM	16	-0.17	-0.33
SE	7	0.07	-0.30
SD		0.09	0.13




	%	Econ	Values
M	9	0.31	0.47
P	16	-0.08	0.59
SS	19	0.10	0.59
LS	33	-0.03	0.32
SM	11	0.34	0.14
LM	10	-0.07	0.01
SE	3	0.42	0.17
SD		0.21	0.22




	%	Econ	Values
M	3	0.29	-0.59
P	9	0.13	-0.38
SS	13	-0.02	-0.32
LS	12	-0.20	-0.43
SM	22	-0.04	-0.57
LM	14	-0.18	-0.61
SE	26	0.09	-0.67
SD		0.17	0.13




	%	Econ	Values
M	4	0.22	-0.72
P	14	-0.14	-0.50
SS	18	0.06	-0.58
LS	12	-0.26	-0.59
SM	16	-0.24	-0.73
LM	18	-0.25	-0.83
SE	18	-0.02	-0.78
SD		0.18	0.12




	%	Econ	Values
M	3	0.32	0.04
P	12	0.12	0.33
SS	15	0.10	0.09
LS	34	0.05	0.04
SM	17	0.04	-0.22
LM	11	-0.02	-0.54
SE	8	0.57	-0.14
SD		0.21	0.28









	%	Econ	Values
M	5	0.36	-0.37
P	13	0.10	-0.06
SS	14	0.33	-0.12
LS	4	0.16	-0.25
SM	20	0.22	-0.45
LM	32	0.05	-0.40
SE	11	0.41	-0.44
SD		0.14	0.16




	%	Econ	Values
M	6	0.04	0.35
P	25	-0.24	0.57
SS	15	-0.08	0.46
LS	4	-0.46	0.39
SM	18	-0.24	0.22
LM	23	-0.18	0.13
SE	9	-0.05	0.17
SD		0.17	0.16




	%	Econ	Values
M	10	0.38	1.09
P	25	-0.06	1.09
SS	21	0.20	1.18
LS	28	-0.02	0.85
SM	8	0.26	0.56
LM	5	0.33	0.38
SE	4	0.22	0.59
SD		0.17	0.31





	%	Econ	Values
M	5	0.51	-0.51
P	24	0.39	-0.40
SS	13	0.34	-0.52
LS	7	0.30	-0.51
SM	23	0.25	-0.68
LM	20	0.19	-0.82
SE	7	0.50	-0.71
SD		0.12	0.15



	%	Econ	Values
M	14	0.21	-0.33
P	29	0.14	-0.20
SS	8	0.16	-0.12
LS	12	0.19	-0.33
SM	23	-0.03	-0.37
LM	7	0.13	-0.51
SE	7	0.13	-0.32
SD		0.08	0.13



	%	Econ	Values
M	14	0.12	-0.30
P	29	0.13	-0.18
SS	8	0.07	-0.13
LS	12	0.13	-0.33
SM	23	-0.12	-0.33
LM	7	0.14	-0.48
SE	7	0.33	-0.17
SD		0.13	0.12

*Note:* Note: M: managers; P: professionals; SS: skilled service workers; LS: low-skilled service workers; SE: small employers; SM: skilled manual workers; LM: low-skilled manual workers.

*Sources:* authors' calculations from WVS/EVS. National proportions of workforce for 1990 from EU-LFS via Peugny 2018 data for 1993 and for 2006 from Peugny data for 2011. Proportions for 2018, U.S. and whole sample from WVS samples.

## Acknowledgements

For help with the calculations, we are grateful to Art Goldhammer and for comments to Rosemary CR Taylor.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Calculated from Hix et al. 2020. Averaged across countries based on the latest election compared to the last election before 1980 (without Italy for the radical left)

<sup>2</sup> We describe cultural attitudes as traditional v cosmopolitan, although other terms such as authoritarian v libertarian or particularistic v universal are sometimes employed for the same purpose.

<sup>3</sup> We consider the U.S. only in the first two periods because there is no comparable data for it in 2018.

<sup>4</sup> As we construe it, the center-left coalition provides evidence for the viability of coalitions joining skilled service-sector workers to manual workers.

<sup>5</sup> For discussion of whether voters for different parties weight these types of issues differently, see Häusermann and Kriesi 2015.

<sup>6</sup> The weight given to economic or cultural issues in voting decisions could also vary across occupational groups, and we would like to be able to take that into account; but the absence of relevant data prompts us to consider scenarios in which a common weighting of economic and cultural issues is assigned to all groups.

<sup>7</sup> Because the groups forming the radical right coalition are underrepresented in the EVS sample, the size reported for that coalition in 2018 is an average from the national labor force figures in Table 2 and the 2018 estimates do not include the U.S.

<sup>8</sup> Figures from Peugny (2018) for 1993 used for 1990 and for 2013 used for 2006. Figures from INSEE (2018) for 2015 used for 2018.