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Message from the Chair of the Council for European Studies

I am thrilled to announce that Professor Richard Deeg of Temple University has become the exciting new editor of *Perspectives on Europe* (formerly the *European Studies Forum*). Deeg has written widely on Germany and the European political economy, received his doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and has had several extended stays as a postdoctoral fellow and visiting scholar at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany. He has published a book, *Finance Capitalism Unveiled: Banks and the German Political Economy* (University of Michigan, 1999), and numerous journal articles in such venues as *World Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Governance, Journal of European Public Policy, Socio-Economic Review*, and *West European Politics*. Many thanks to Richard for taking on this important position!

In addition, I am delighted to report that the Council for European Studies is stepping into the environmental age: *Perspectives on Europe* is becoming an online journal and I hope that your enjoyment remains virtually the same.

Thanks to all of you who have submitted proposals for the forthcoming conference of the Council for European Studies, to be held in Montreal, April 15-17, 2010! It is testimony to our members' commitment and enthusiasm that we received a record number of paper and panel proposals during economic times that are far from prosperous. The program committee, led by Sophie Meunier and Philip Nord of Princeton University, has done an outstanding job putting together a dynamic program, and plans to send letters of acceptance in the near future. Montreal is certain to be stimulating and fun: We extend a warm welcome to all of you and hope that you can join us.

Finally, I wish all of you a happy, safe, and peaceful holiday season.

With warm regards,

CATHIE JO MARTIN
Chair of the Council for European Studies


Editor’s Note

Welcome to the inaugural issue of Perspectives on Europe. With the move from print to electronic publication, we decided to rename the European Studies Forum in recognition of this change and the new opportunities that come with electronic publishing. We hope, for instance, that electronic publishing will facilitate the use of essays in Perspectives on Europe for classroom use, or that embedded links to authors’ Web pages will facilitate familiarization with ongoing research in various disciplines and foster new scholarly connections. We hope that you will take advantage of these new opportunities, and we certainly welcome suggestions for improvement of the new Perspectives on Europe.

This first issue of Perspectives begins with a mini-forum comprised of three essays on the sociology and politics of health care and health outcomes in Europe. The first essay, by Lucy Barnes, Peter Hall, and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, takes a new approach to explaining the widely observed ‘health gradient’ – the fact that people of higher socioeconomic status tend to be healthier than those of lower status. These authors suggest that the level of stress faced by individuals is a key influence on their health, and this level of stress is determined by the structural distribution of income and workplace autonomy in a given society, as well as the structure of social relations. In societies that distribute resources such as income, autonomy and social status more unequally, the health gradient will be steeper. The second essay, by Jason Beckfield and Sigrun Olafsdottir, also addresses this health gradient issue. These authors argue that political institutions shape the distribution of power – in the broad Weberian sense – among individuals in society. An individual’s power to choose a neighborhood, occupation, or lifestyle, for instance, is connected to his or her health. These authors thus seek to identify the institutional differences that explain cross-national variation in the health gradient. In the third essay on health, Julia Lynch examines a different kind of health inequality in Europe, namely, territorial inequalities. Lynch documents substantial inequalities across regions – within and between states – in Europe by examining data on mortality rates (which reflect a host of underlying differences in key health conditions). Since much health care in Europe is delivered increasingly through regionally-organized systems, these inequalities call for greater political attention and analysis.

The other three essays in this issue cover a wide range of fascinating topics. Christian Joppke counters the ‘postnational membership’ thesis, which holds that the growth of an international human rights regime lessens the importance of national membership or citizenship for the protection of individual rights. Joppke examines recent events in the UK and US in support of his view that postnational membership is vulnerable to decisions by states to ignore the rights associated with this; thus there is still no substitute for true citizenship. Katya Kalandadze and Mitchell Orenstein examine the electoral or “color” revolutions in East-Central Europe, such as Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” in 2004 that brought Viktor Yushchenko to power. Examining a larger number of color revolutions, the authors find that relatively few are successful in leading to a change in governing elites and, even when they are successful, do not necessarily lead to marked improvement in democratic processes. These outcomes lead the authors to conclude that democratic reformers need to look beyond elections as the path to true democracy. Finally, Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher examine the growing role of Europe in global economic governance. The authors see the economic crisis of 2008-09 as marking the end of the “post-Cold War period,” characterized by US unipolar dominance. Looking closely at the Group of Twenty (G-20), they make clear the heavy representation of Europe in the body that has quickly become the center of global economic coordination. Nonetheless, they caution that Europe’s influence over the G-20 will likely wane in coming years, as Europe frequently cannot act cohesively and rising states, such as India and China, gain influence.

We hope that you enjoy all of these excellent contributions, and we look forward to bringing you more in coming issues.

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"Wealthier is healthier." This characteristically pithy observation by Lant Pritchett and Lawrence H. Summers (1993) summarizes one of the most firmly-established findings about population health. Health is closely related to social class. This “health gradient” shows up in all the developed democracies. On a wide variety of measures, people of higher socioeconomic status tend to be healthier than those on the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder.

The health gradient has long been of interest to social epidemiologists, but it contains puzzles that deserve the attention of many social scientists. We have been living through a neo-liberal era of rising inequality in many nations, and few social inequalities are more pernicious than those affecting health. What generates health inequalities? How can they be mitigated? These questions should concern all of us, and, they raise general issues – bearing on the constitution of societies and the sources of inequality – of longstanding interest to social scientists. The object of this essay is to introduce some of the puzzles generated by the health gradient that deserve the attention of scholars studying the developed democracies of Europe.

The first of these puzzles is naturally intriguing for comparativists. Although the health gradient can be found in every European society, its shape varies dramatically across them. As figure 1 indicates, there are three relevant types of variation. In countries such as Ireland, the overall shape of the gradient is flatter than it is in other countries, such as Germany, where the health of the working class is considerably worse relative to the health of the upper and middle classes. In general, these gradients are fan-shaped, which is to say, they flatten out at some point where the differences in health corresponding to class position become less stark. However, the threshold at which relatively poor health outcomes give way to better health can lie at higher or lower class positions, as it does, for instance, in France and the Netherlands. At stake here is the relative health of the middle classes compared to the businessmen and professionals in the social ranks above them. Finally, the overall height of the curve can vary across countries. Although the distribution of health across classes is roughly similar in Ireland and the Netherlands, for instance, respondents at most class positions in Ireland report better health than those in the Netherlands. How is variation along these three dimensions to be explained?

Of course, there are measurement issues here. Figure 1 is drawn from the 1990 wave of the World Values Survey. The horizontal axis reports class position as coded in that survey and the vertical axis indicates the percentage of respondents reporting they are in good or very good health. Self-reported health is a good indicator of health. In some studies, self-reported health has proved superior even to reports from a respondent’s physician, but it is not perfect. The Irish may not be healthier than the Dutch, but simply less inclined to admit they are in poor health. A real need exists for better cross-national data about these matters.
Figure 1. The shape of the health gradient in European countries (Source: World Values Survey 1990; authors’ calculations)
The resolution to puzzles about the shape of the gradient will depend, however, on finding answers to an even more fundamental puzzle: How is this health gradient generated in the first place? Why do people in lower class positions tend to suffer from worse health than those in higher class positions? Social epidemiology is dominated by studies that give two kinds of answers to that question, but the inquiry should go beyond the perspectives embodied in each.

The quotation at the beginning of this article reflects the classic approach often taken to this question. Many scholars argue that inequalities of health are rooted in inequalities of wealth or income. There is surely some truth in such explanations, but precisely why this relationship should always hold is not so clear. People with low incomes and few assets will have more difficulty securing clean housing, nutritious meals, a pollution-free environment, and the time for relaxation that contribute to good health. In the developed democracies, however, except for those in abject poverty, most people in the lower half of the social pyramid have access to the basic requisites of material life. While undoubtedly important, such materialist explanations do not seem entirely adequate for explaining the variation found along the health gradient. Ultimately, they explain too little.

In recent years, a second approach to this puzzle has emerged from social epidemiology. Its most prominent exponents, such as Michael Marmot (2004) and Richard Wilkinson (2005), seek a psychosocial explanation for the gradient, emphasizing the impact social status might have on health. They are inspired by the famous Whitehall studies that examine the health of people at different ranks in the British civil service. Those studies reveal that, even when a wide range of factors normally associated with health are controlled, those in the lower ranks of the civil service have poorer health than those at higher ranks. People of lower status may suffer feelings of relative deprivation and status-induced anxiety that a growing body of science links to physiological processes in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical systems associated with illness and mortality. Such arguments dovetail nicely with the intriguing finding that non-human primates with low status in their tribes also suffer from afflictions linked to these physiological systems.

From the perspective of comparative social science, however, the psychosocial approach explains too much. If inequalities in health are a function of status orders that are a feature of every society, how are we to explain cross-national variations in the shape of the health gradient? One way to do so would be to seek systematic differences in the shape of this status order across societies. In order to do so, however, we would need to see this status order as something other than a natural component of all societies. We would have to understand how and why the status order varies across societies, which entails moving beyond psychosocial approaches toward structural conceptions of the social order. This move is precisely what a recently-published book, to which we have contributed, does. Successful Societies: How Institutions and Culture Affect Health (Hall and Lamont 2009) is a pioneering effort by a diverse group of social scientists to broaden conceptions of the social determinants of population health. Our formulations are inspired by their essays, and we are currently attempting to test some of the book’s main propositions against cross-national data.

Our starting point is a model, outlined in the Successful Societies book, suggesting that a person’s health is likely to be affected, over the long term, by regular experiences of stress and the emotional reactions of anxiety, anger and frustration that accompany them. Research indicates that such experiences take a toll on the physiological systems regulating health. Thus, the wear and tear of daily life can have long-term effects on a person’s health. Our premise is that how much wear and tear each person experiences is, in turn, a function of the balance between the magnitude of the life challenges he or she faces and that person’s capabilities for coping with them. What are the factors that condition these challenges and capabilities? Our intuition is that some are rooted in the social and economic structures of a society. If so, a better understanding of those structures may contribute to explanations for national variation in the health gradient.

Based on the work done in the Successful Societies project, we think that every society embodies a specific structure of economic relations and an analogous structure of social relations. The structure of economic relations distributes income and autonomy at work (as well as other goods). In countries where those goods are more evenly distributed, health inequalities should be lower, because income and workplace autonomy enhance the capabilities that feed into a person’s health.

The structure of social relations in a nation is constituted by its status hierarchy, the networks of social connections linking people, and what Gérard Bouchard has described as its collective imaginary, constituted by symbolic representations specifying who belongs to the community, the members’ rights and obligations to each other, and the community’s collective purposes. From their position in this structure of social relations, people draw social resources that enhance their capabilities for coping with life challenges. Membership in social networks supplies logistical and emotional support. A higher rank in the status hierarchy makes securing the cooperation of others easier. The collective imaginary provides a sense of belonging. Like the structure of economic relations, however, the structure of social relations distributes such resources unevenly across a nation’s population. Where that distribution is more unequal, we expect to see higher inequalities in health.

Although we have expressed these points synoptically, they provide an alternative to materialist and psychosocial explanations for the existence of the health gradient and for cross-national variation in the shape of that gradient. From this perspective, many inequalities in health are rooted in structural features of economic and social relations that distribute economic and social resources unevenly, thereby affecting the

[T]he structure of a country’s social relations is as important as its structure of economic relations to inequalities of health.
balance between life challenges and capabilities present for people at different social positions, with consequences for the amount of wear and tear they experience in daily life. In this view, the structure of a country’s social relations is as important as its structure of economic relations to inequalities of health.

Is this approach plausible? In order to assess it, we have estimated the impact on health of the various types of economic and social resources available to a person by virtue of his or her position within the structures of economic and social relations. Table 1 reports the results for pooled national samples drawn from fourteen developed democracies, where the dependent variable is self-reported health. Based on first differences, table 1 indicates the percentage change in the likelihood of reporting poor health when the social or economic resources available to an average person change as indicated.

Some results from this estimation are striking. Resources rooted in the structure of economic relations, such as income or workplace autonomy, matter to a person’s health. However, access to social resources, of the sort reflected in family ties, social connections and feelings of national belonging, has an even stronger effect on health. Material factors alone cannot explain health inequalities.

Our control variables – age, gender and sense of self-mastery, an indicator for the features of personality that condition capabilities – have effects one might expect. However, level of education is not statistically significant, which is a puzzling finding, given the many policymakers who believe that educating the populace more fully is one of the most promising ways to improve health outcomes. Of course, these results should be treated as purely exploratory. Full assessment of such propositions will require much more empirical research.

However, these findings are tantalizing. They suggest that a person’s health depends on access to social as well as economic resources. And, in the developed democracies, as table 2 indicates, social as well as economic resources are distributed unevenly across social classes. We conclude that the roots of the health gradient lie, not only in the structure of economic relations, but in the structure of social relations as well.

In a brief essay, we cannot resolve the other puzzle noted here, namely, how to explain variations in the shape of the health gradient across nations. Yet our results have intriguing implications for this puzzle. Many scholars explain national differences in health inequality by reference to variations in the distribution of income, and our results offer some support for that view. However, our results suggest that the structure of a nation’s economy may affect health in other ways, notably by virtue of how it conditions the distribution of job autonomy.

Moreover, variations in the shape of national health

| Table 1. The effect on health of changes in economic and social resources (first differences) |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Percentage shift in the likelihood of poor health associated with the following changes: | |
| **Level of education** | 0 % |
| Left school at 21 vs. 18 | |
| **Connections to family** | 6 % |
| Move from important to unimportant | |
| **Connections to social networks** | 11 % |
| Respondent now reports feeling lonely | |
| **Autonomy at work** | -3 % |
| Move from 25th to 75th percentile in autonomy | |
| **Gender** | 2 % |
| Male to female | |
| **Income** | -3 % |
| From 25th to 75th percentile | |
| **Self-Mastery** | -3 % |
| From 25th to 75th percentile | |
| **National belonging** | 3 % |
| From high to low feeling of belonging | |

gradients may be rooted, as well, in cross-national variation in the structure of social relations. For any country, for instance, we should ask: How dense is the network of social connections at the bottom of the social ladder compared with those at the top? Where members of the lower social classes suffer from especially low levels of social connectedness or unusually low levels of social status, inequalities in health may be especially high. National variations in social structure could be as important to health inequality as national differences in the structure of economic relations.

To know whether such propositions hold more generally, however, will require cross-national comparisons of social structure – a topic somewhat neglected by contemporary social science. There is much that should attract scholars of Europe to the study of inequalities in health. Population health is not just about health care systems. By turning their attention to these questions, social scientists can secure new vistas on many kinds of issues that will broaden overall perspectives in their fields.

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### References

Decades of research by social scientists, epidemiologists, and public health scholars have established a robust association between social status and health outcomes. Regardless of whether status is measured by money, education, or occupation, research shows that those who have higher status are healthier. Indeed, sparked by Richard Wilkinson's 1992 article in the British Medical Journal, a now-large literature aims to establish that social inequality itself – the very existence and extent of hierarchy in society – is harmful to the health of not only poor people, but rich people, too, and is thus deleterious for the health of whole populations (Wilkinson 1992, 1996; cf. Beckfield 2004). Simultaneously, theoretical and empirical work by Bruce Link and Jo Phelan argues for socioeconomic status (SES) as a fundamental cause of health and illness that operates through multiple mechanisms to produce the robust health gradient that separates the unhealthy lower classes from the healthy upper classes (Link and Phelan 1995).

While productive debates are ongoing over the association between inequality and health at the societal level, and over the causal relationship between SES and health (Elo 2009; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009), we argue that these literatures serve as a point of departure for a new comparative sociology of health disparities. We welcome the opportunity provided by this essay to report on a comparative framework that we are developing to understand the relationship between inequalities and health, and to illustrate the framework with results from our analyses. Along the way, we hope to answer the question: Why should Europeanists care about health disparities?

Institutions, Power, and Inequality

A beginning to the answer is that the institutional diversity of Europe offers a rich opportunity to understand how institutions – the rules of the game encoded as reproducible practices and laws – have consequences for health and illness (Beckfield and Krieger 2009; Olafsdottir and Beckfield, forthcoming). Just as political institutions (for example, the set of social citizenship rights that define the welfare state) shape economic inequality, they also are likely to shape health inequalities. This is because our health goes beyond our genetics and individual behavior: Our health is also closely related to power, in a Weberian sense. Health is about the power, for instance, to live in a neighborhood of one’s choice, to take part in political life, to train for and enter an occupation, to opt for a healthy lifestyle, and to claim and access health care. These powers are related to the stratified structure of societies, since power in one domain of social life may or may not map to power in other domains. For instance, it matters for health both that income, education, and
citizenship rights may confer different sorts of power, and that low rank on these dimensions might have different implications for health than high rank (that is, the impact of rank should be multi-dimensional and non-linear).

In identifying the sources and arrangements of power that confer health and illness, we turn to the polity, or form of government. In identifying the polity as a source of health disparities, our conceptual framework includes not just the state, but also subnational and supranational forms of government, such as cities like Munich, regions like Bavaria, and formations like the European Union. The key quality of a polity that relates it to health disparities is its rule-making and rule-enforcing capacity – the point is that the polity confers power that stratifies health. In other words, polities distribute more than economic resources; they also mark status distinctions and create rights to forms of social relations, thereby conferring power in systematic ways.

In specifying how polities distribute power, we draw on the comparative political economy of the welfare state. For instance, the welfare-regimes approach of Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990) is one specification of how national institutional arrangements cluster into broad types. At issue is how welfare states stratify. Liberal regimes offer limited, means-tested benefits to citizens and do little to allow citizens to maintain a socially acceptable standard of living without reliance on the labor market; corporatist regimes are more generous in the quantity of provision, but distribute benefits in a way that reinforces status distinctions; and social-democratic regimes distribute benefits on the basis of universal entitlements. While comparative research on health disparities is not yet well developed, one study showed that generous family policies may have a positive impact on the health of parents in Iceland, while lack of such policies may negatively impact the health of parents in the United States (Olafsdottir 2007).

While the comparative political economy of the welfare state is fundamental for placing health disparities in a macro-sociological context, a range of other political institutions outside of the welfare state also shape health disparities. For this reason, we identify “political institutions,” rather than just the welfare state per se, as important for health. For instance, the extension of voting rights in a socially-patterned way should affect the development, expression, and impact of public opinion toward social policy (Brooks and Manza 2007; Uggen and Manza 2002). Evidence also exists from the United States that policies of mass imprisonment, which disproportionately affect African-Americans, have contributed to inequality in infant mortality rates (Wildeman 2009). In Europe, ongoing reconfigurations of welfare states that are partially in response to European integration may contribute to growing health inequalities, or changing patterns in health inequalities, as pension and unemployment benefits are rolled back (Beckfield 2009). This fact suggests that regional polities like the European Union may form part of the macro-sociological context for health disparities.

More broadly, thinking about health disparities in comparative context can contribute to the development of political-sociological theory relating social inequalities to political institutions (Fischer et al. 1996; Nelson and Bridges 1999; Orloff 1993; Western 2006). The general point is that political institutions have distributional consequences: The rules of the game lock some inequalities in place, and unsettle others. Such thinking is central, for instance, to much research in the field of social stratification, but such research still tends to focus on social status, or on inequalities in economic resources such as income and wealth. We think one way of broadening such research and opening conversations among the fields of social stratification, political sociology, and medical sociology is to take a comparative approach to the stratification of health. The empirical work presented below is a small start on this agenda, using one of the key debates in comparative studies on health inequalities as a point of departure: the relationship between income inequality and health.

Empirics of Comparative Health Disparities

To date, research on health disparities and comparative research on political institutions have tended to move without dialogue, leaving a host of unanswered questions. Indeed, we think substantial room exists for comparative inquiry on the broad question of how political institutions matter for health disparities (Beckfield and Krieger 2009; Olafsdottir and Beckfield, forthcoming). As it stands, studies in this nascent literature have tested a relatively narrow range of hypotheses, in a relatively narrow range of places and times. Our aim is to broaden this literature, by drawing on cross-national survey datasets, as well as datasets on macro-level indicators often used in comparative studies.

In the remainder of this essay, we draw on research presentations from the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association (Beckfield and Olafsdottir 2008) and the American Public Health Association (Beckfield and Olafsdottir 2009) to report some early results from our ongoing empirical work. Here, we use data from the World Values Survey (WVS, 1995) to estimate measures of health disparities in thirty-eight societies around the world, including Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine. We also use data from the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002-2006), which is limited to Europe, but has the advantage of including measures for self-assessed health, as well as a well-established scale on depression.

The first step is to estimate comparable measures of education- and income-based health inequalities. We take a regression-based approach, and estimate health inequalities using ordinal logistic regressions of self-rated health on relative measures of educational attainment and income (controlling for age, sex, and marital status). Self-rated health is a valid and reliable indicator that has proven useful for comparative research on health (Eikemo et al. 2008; Idler and Benyamini 1997; Mackenbach et al. 2008). We construct relative indicators of educational attainment and income by coding respondents as relatively advantaged on these dimensions if they fall in the top quartile of the national distribution, and relatively...
disadvantaged if they fall in the bottom quartile. This step allows for an investigation of multi-dimensional health inequalities: education-based inequalities can differ from income-based inequalities, and the effect of low social rank can differ from the effect of high social rank. Ordinal logistic regression facilitates cross-national comparison because it relaxes the assumptions of equal spacing of response categories, homoscedasticity, normality, and linearity of functional form (Winship and Mare 1984). So, for instance, if Germans on average perceive a greater “distance” between “good” and “fair” health than do Swedes, this does not bias our estimates of health inequalities. In examining the association between political institutions and the stratification of health, we use multi-level and single-level models that incorporate macro-level characteristics of societies, such as income inequality and welfare regimes.

Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that there is substantial variability in health disparities among the thirty-eight WVS countries. The countries are grouped by level of economic development, with rich countries at the top of the figure and poor countries at the bottom. The results shown in figure 1 illustrate that relative poverty harms health even in poor countries. Indeed, low income is associated with significantly worse self-reported health in nearly every country (thirty-four out of thirty-eight countries). Yet substantial variation exists in the magnitude of the association. The effects of relative poverty appear to be sensitive to varying social conditions that do not merely reflect economic development. Figure 2 displays the health advantage of (relative) high income. What again stands out is the substantial variation among these thirty-eight countries in the extent to which high relative income translates into better self-reported health. The health advantage of high income appears to be largest in middle-income countries, both in terms of the number of countries where the relationship is significant and the strength of the effects. Interestingly, the association between relative affluence and better health is less consistent across nations than the relationship between relative poverty and bad health.

Our inquiry into the institutional factors that help to account for the large cross-national variation in health disparities is in the early stages, but we can report some findings. While national economic development is not associated with our indicators of health disparities, the level of income inequality and the over-
time change in income inequality are associated with health disparities, such that the advantage of relative high income and the disadvantage of low income are greater where income inequality has increased the most (Beckfield and Olafsdottir 2008). Evidence also exists that welfare states matter for health, but in some surprising ways. For instance, results from multi-level models show that conservative welfare regimes are less protective of individual health than liberal regimes, and that social democratic welfare regimes are more protective of mental health, but not physical health (Olafsdottir and Beckfield 2008).

New Puzzles

We have offered more questions than answers in this essay, but we think the puzzles are important for a range of practical and theoretical reasons. On the practical side, with increased attention of policymakers to health disparities, investigating the institutional factors that stratify health is critical. On the theoretical side, developing new accounts of how political institutions intersect with social inequalities in a way that builds on insights from the fields of political sociology, social stratification, and medical sociology is imperative.

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References


The Political Geography of Mortality in Europe

by Julia Lynch

Mortality Matters

In the past decade, scholars and politicians have devoted increasing attention to health inequalities in Europe. The overwhelming majority of research and policy activity in Europe has targeted the “social gradient” in health: the tendency for individuals of higher income, education, and/or social class to be in better health than those of lower socioeconomic status. While some scholars examine neighborhoods or small geographic areas as a source of contextual effects on health or as a proxy for unmeasured socioeconomic attributes, differences in the level of population health or health care across the subnational political units of national states – territorial inequalities – have received very little attention in either public health or political science. In an era when European health care systems are growing more regionalized, and when rising health care costs strain cross-regional revenue-sharing institutions, territorial inequalities in health and health care seem very likely to be both substantively important and politically salient.

In this essay, I present some new data on the geographic distribution of mortality in European countries, and suggest some of the ways that these territorial inequalities in mortality may affect political debates about health care and fiscal policy in Europe. The essay draws on my work for a book project under way on The Politics of Territorial Health Inequalities in Europe.

What do demographers and epidemiologists know about the territorial distribution of mortality in European countries? In fact, they know quite a lot. For example, they know that the Swedish-speaking regions in western Finland have lower death rates than the Finnish-speaking East (Sipilä and Martikainen 2009); that deaths from cancer in Italy are concentrated in the richer industrialized North, rather than the poorer South (Facchini et al. 1985); that life expectancy in the former East Germany was markedly lower than in West Germany after reunification, but it has since begun to catch up (Razum et al. 2008); and that mortality is not evenly distributed across the national territory in any country in Europe (Eurostat 2009). In fact, the spatial distribution of mortality in Europe has been studied quite extensively (for useful reviews of this literature, see Shaw et al. 2000 and Macintyre et al. 2002).

Yet there is much that we do not know about the territorial distribution of mortality that we must learn if we are to understand the politics of health policy in Europe. One of the most basic questions to which we do not, for the most part, know the answer is: Which countries have the largest territorial inequalities in mortality? Evidence exists of territorial disparities in mortality within many countries in Europe, but these disparities are rarely compared across countries.

National political and policy discussions about territorial inequalities are not a good guide to the actual incidence of inequalities, because they do not always accurately reflect the magnitude of...
the problem compared to other countries. For example, when we weight for the size of the populations affected, the much-studied health and mortality disparities between Swedish-speakers and Finnish-speakers in Finland are minimal compared to the less highly publicized, but considerably larger, differences between West and East in Germany. Similarly, a decade of French hand-wringing has resulted in a research and policy infrastructure devoted to addressing regional disparities in health and health care that is unparalleled elsewhere in Europe – and yet, as I show below, France has remarkably little regional variation in mortality. As a political scientist, I am particularly interested in when and why a mismatch occurs between the measurable territorial distribution of health and mortality, on the one hand, and the political responses to that distribution, on the other.

Measuring the Territorial Distribution of Mortality

Comparing the size of territorial inequalities across countries requires decisions about aggregation and measurement, none of which can be discussed at any length here. A few words of definition are in order, however. First, the inequality measures that I present here are based on aggregation of mortality statistics at two subnational levels: the health region and the territory. Health regions (which may be health districts, regions, cantons, provinces, Länder, subnational “communities,” and the like) are where the policy rubber hits the road: where decisions are made about how to allocate regional health policy budgets, or how aggressively to implement national standards. In most European countries, health regions correspond to the NUTS 2 level (see ISARE 2009). Health regions are nested within territories demarcated by historically rooted, politically salient geographic cleavages (for example, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland versus England in the United Kingdom, North versus South in Italy, West versus East in Germany). Such divisions do not exist in every country, of course, and where they do exist, they are of variable strength and provenance, with potentially important consequences for the nature of political discourse about territorial health inequalities.

I examine mortality from the top killers affecting age groups across the life-course (infant mortality; external causes [for example, accidents, homicides]; cancers of the airway; and circulatory and respiratory diseases) (Niederlander 2006). I also examine “premature” mortality – that is, deaths from all causes in the population under age 65 – and deaths from chronic, but largely treatable, diseases (asthma and diabetes), since mortality from these causes may be a more sensitive indicator than most of gaps in the health care system. Standardized mortality rates (SMRs) are constructed by calculating the number of deaths per 100,000 residents of a region that would occur if the age- and sex- structure of the region were the same as that of the European population as a whole. Data are from 2001-2003, pooled to smooth year-to-year variation.

Inequality across Health Regions

To measure the total amount of variation in mortality across health regions in a country, I construct what I call a Weighted Absolute Dispersion Index (WADI). This index sums the absolute value of the difference between the regional and national mortality rate over all regions, weighting each difference by the health region’s share of the national population. The quantity is then expressed as a percent of the national mortality rate. The WADIs for different countries and causes of death can be compared to assess whether territorial inequalities in a particular country are objectively “big” or “small.”

The inequality in mortality across health regions varies systematically across countries. We can not yet say for certain what it is about some countries that produces more or less territorial inequality – but produce it they do. Figure 1 shows the mean value for each country of the WADIs over the seven causes of death that I examined.1

In Western Europe, the United Kingdom and Italy have the most territorial variation in mortality across a range of causes of death, by a fairly wide margin. Belgium, Germany, and Spain have larger than average territorial inequalities as well. France has, on average, slightly less territorial variation in mortality from these causes, while Finland (which is missing regional data for infant mortality), shows a strikingly lower average level of variation. The Netherlands, Sweden and Norway have generally low territorial dispersion as well. In Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have generally high levels of territorial variation in mortality, while Hungary and Poland have more moderate territorial inequalities.

Territorial dispersion for individual causes of death (not shown here) varies, of course, from this overall pattern. Sweden, for example, has among the smallest territorial inequalities of

In an era when European health care systems are growing more regionalized, and when rising health care costs strain cross-
regional revenue-sharing institutions, territorial inequalities in health and health care seem very likely to be both substantively important and politically salient.
regional dispersion in mortality is likely not the only force driving the politics of territorial health inequalities in Europe. In fact, some portion of the total dispersion in mortality may be quite irrelevant for politics. This outcome is particularly likely when the health region does not correspond to a territorial unit that is of any particular political relevance. For example, the differences in provincial mortality rates within Flanders in Belgium are likely to be far less politically salient than the difference between the Flemish and Walloon areas – in part, because health care is still largely driven from the center in Belgium, and, in part, because there is not a salient infra-Flemish politics of territory. We need, then, another unit of aggregation above the level of the health region that can capture politically salient territorial divisions.

**Territorial Inequalities in Mortality**

Subnational territorial politics in the different countries of Europe have their roots in varying divisions – the historical amalgamation or annexation of historically distinct polities, ethno-linguistic variation, or divergence of economic or productive structures. Territorial cleavages also vary in their contemporary political salience. In some countries (for example, Belgium, Italy, and the United Kingdom), a dominant territorial fault line is present whose political salience is maintained by regional parties and autonomist movements. In other countries (for example, Spain and Finland) multiple territorial cleavages exist, or the territorial cleavage itself may be crosscut by other, more salient political divisions (for example, Germany). In still other countries (for example, France), territorial cleavages were never strong, or, for the most part, have lost their power to drive politics. Table 1 shows cause-specific mortality rates aggregated to the level of the territory, indicating cause of death and the percent difference in mortality between a politically “unfavored” territory and a “favored” one for each country.

The largest territorial inequalities for most causes of death are in Great Britain, where Scotland’s high death rates drive mortality rates 50 to 120 percent higher than in England. Territorial inequalities in Spain, Germany, France and Finland are generally much smaller (on the order of 10 to 30 percent greater mortality in the politically less-favored region), where they exist at all. In Belgium, mortality gaps are small for some causes of death (infant mortality and cancer), but quite large in other categories (premature mortality and, especially, deaths from chronic disease). Similarly, in Italy, very large inequalities between the North and South are evident for infant mortality and deaths from chronic disease, but the gaps in all-cause mortality and premature mortality are insignificant. Adding to the confusion, lung cancer deaths and deaths from external causes show a reverse political gradient in Italy, with lower death rates in the politically “unfavored” territories.

What are the likely effects, in terms of the politics and policy, of differences in mortality between politically favored and politically unfavored territories? If we begin by presuming that the size of territorial inequalities in mortality drives political attention to the problem, we might hypothesize that where territorial inequalities are small, attention to the problem of health disparities is likely to focus on other, non-territorial sources of inequality – for example, individual behavior, or
Table 1. Territorial differences in standardized mortality rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>All cause</th>
<th>% diff</th>
<th>Premature</th>
<th>% diff</th>
<th>Infant</th>
<th>% diff</th>
<th>External</th>
<th>% diff</th>
<th>Cancer</th>
<th>% diff</th>
<th>CircResp</th>
<th>% diff</th>
<th>Chronic</th>
<th>% diff</th>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Flanders</td>
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<td></td>
<td>204.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>50.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallonia</td>
<td>785.5</td>
<td>17 %</td>
<td>271.1</td>
<td>33 %</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-1 %</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>34 %</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>650.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>204.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East</td>
<td>706.6</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>228.9</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-7 %</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>30 %</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>-2 %</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>18 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>580.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>178.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rest of Spain</td>
<td>598.3</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>187.1</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>26 %</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>38.0</td>
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<td>28.1</td>
<td>70.3</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finnish</td>
<td>703.0</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>237.3</td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>-1 %</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>-15 %</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>594.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>222.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center-North</td>
<td>669.5</td>
<td>13 %</td>
<td>206.3</td>
<td>-7 %</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-2 %</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>-4 %</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>-2 %</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>666.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>199.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>83.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scotland and Wales</td>
<td>1009.5</td>
<td>51 %</td>
<td>330.2</td>
<td>65 %</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>122 %</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>72 %</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>18 %</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>558.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>162.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>40.7</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South</td>
<td>597.7</td>
<td>7 %</td>
<td>171.5</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>52 %</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>-15 %</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>-10 %</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>84 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
social determinants measured at the individual level. To this basic assumption, we might add the proviso that the magnitude of territorial inequalities interacts with the degree of prior politicization of the territorial cleavage to determine the level of attention to territorial sources of health inequalities.

If these assumptions are correct, then small or inconsistent differences in mortality rates between rather weakly politicized territorial cleavages, as in Finland, France or Germany, should, all other things being equal, yield weak attention to the territorial health inequalities. Even moderately sized inequalities over strongly politicized territorial cleavages, as in Spain, may, on the other hand, generate robust debates over territorial inequalities. Finally, those countries with very large territorial inequalities and/or very contentious territorial cleavages (for example, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Italy) should see the most intense attention to territorial health inequalities among academics, policymakers, and politicians.

My research in progress shows, however, that patterns of political discourse surrounding health inequalities rarely correspond to the size of territorial inequalities as presented here, or even to the amount of territorial inequality that is “left over” after considering the contribution of socioeconomic factors like income, education, or labor market conditions. Discovering, interpreting, and explaining the root causes of political-territorial disparities is both a job for further research, and the central, contested task of political and health policy actors.

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Notes

1. The WADI for each cause of death is adjusted for the total number of deaths at the national level in that category, so the mean is an indicator of the typical amount of dispersion in mortality across these seven causes of death. However, some of these causes of death are responsible for far more deaths than others.

References


The Vulnerability of Non-Citizens

BY CHRISTIAN JOPPKE

In her gloomy tractate on the lot of stateless people and of national minorities in early twentieth century Europe, Hannah Arendt argued that the “rights of man” were nil if not encoded as citizen rights by nation-states. Those people deprived of their state were “rightless, the scum of the earth” (Arendt 1951, 267). In turn, as the experience of the newly founded state of Israel demonstrated, the “restoration of human rights” could happen only by means of the “restoration…of national rights” (ibid, 299). As Arendt bitterly concedes, Edmund Burke, veteran critic of the French Revolution and its high-minded Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, was correct that the “rights of an Englishman” counted infinitely more than the “abstraction” of human rights (ibid.). If membership in a nation-state is the source of rights, how can there be a “right to have rights” (ibid., 296), “a right to belong to some kind of organized community” (ibid.), that is, a right to citizenship? As Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1919) pointed out in his acidic analysis of rights, a “right” presupposes a “duty” on others, whose enforcement requires a state that is exactly found wanting in Arendt’s scenario. The “right to have rights” is vitiated by circularity. However, what other conclusion can be drawn from Europe’s dark century?

One has to keep in mind the Arendtian equation of human rights with citizen rights to realize the enormous provocation that is inherent in the contemporary claim that “postnational membership” (Soysal 1994) has come to trump national citizenship, and that states matter less in view of an international human rights regime. Certainly, a slice of truth exists in this claim, which is revealed when scrutinizing the rights component of citizen rights. Consider, for example, Cass Sunstein’s useful definition of rights. He defines rights pragmatically as “legally enforceable instruments for the protection of their claimants” (Sunstein 1995, 739). When probing deeper into the content of this protection, Sunstein finds that rights pertain to “important human interests” (ibid.,736). If this is the case, citizen rights notionally blend with human rights. Qua reference to “important human interests,” citizenship as rights is inflicted with the virus of universalism that eventually bursts the shell of nationality and asks for the equal consideration of all human beings. The universalistic core of citizenship inevitably pushes toward something akin to “postnational membership” (Soysal 1994), or, even more provocatively, “alien citizenship” (Bosniak 2006).

Historically, the trigger for unleashing this dynamic was the mid-twentieth century’s delegitimization of race as marker of social differentiation, which previously had meant the exact denial of shared humanity. While the distinction between citizens and aliens remains valid under international and domestic law, the threshold for attributing lesser rights to aliens, at least outside the narrow nexus of immigration laws, has massively increased, because disadvantaging aliens is now tainted by the smell of racial discrimination. In the famous 1971 decision, Graham v. Richardson, which restored state-level welfare rights for legal immigrants, the United States
Supreme Court likened immigrants to a “discrete and insular” minority, discriminations against which on the basis of “alienage” were “inherently suspect,” much “like those based on nationality or race.” Precisely because political rights continued to be the privilege of citizens, whereby aliens were potentially subjected to the whims of xenophobic citizens in the political arena, there was even a heightened need for aliens’ protection in the legal arena. Supreme Court Justice Blackmun articulated this spirit in a post-Graham decision: “The very powerlessness of a discrete minority, then, is itself the factor that overcomes the usual presumption that even improvident decisions affecting minorities will eventually be rectified by the democratic process. If anything, the fact that aliens constitutionally may be — and generally are — formally and completely barred from participating in the process of self-government makes particularly profound the need for searching judicial review of classifications grounded in alienage” (quoted in Katyal 2007, 1373). This is the inherently legal-versus-political dynamic that has marked the evolution of alien rights in America and Europe after World War II (see Joppke 2001).

However, what the diagnosis of postnational membership ignores is the role, if not revenge, of the state. As Randall Hansen put it sarcastically, postnationalists have reduced the function of states to that of “policy waiters following the orders of universal persons” (Hansen 2009, 4). Instead, these universal persons are still “aliens” on the state’s radar. Ultimately subject to the state’s immigration powers, aliens never quite reach the position of comfort allotted to them by postnationalists. Certain rights are always precluded to postnational members, most notably political rights, absolute protection from expulsion, and rights of diplomatic protection. The latter may never be relevant to most people, but when needed, say, in the “human rights horror that is Guantánamo Bay” (ibid.), postnational membership is not enough to escape death or unjust punishment, because only formal citizenship status entitles one to diplomatic protection. Even the rights that indisputably belong to postnational members, civil and social rights, have proved to be vulnerable and subject to reversal in recent times.

Indeed, a distinct mark of the post-2001 period and the US-led “War on Terror” is a “growing vulnerability of non-citizens” (Goldston 2006). The US responded to the unprecedented attack by nineteen Arab non-citizens on September 11, 2001, with resuscitating the Schmittian notion that the citizen bind is the quintessential political bind, in which “friends” are sharply distinguished from “enemies.” Aliens now were potential enemies, as in the gruesome notion of “unlawful enemy combatants,” beyond the pale of the rule of law, and subject to indefinite detention, summary deportation, heightened surveillance, and blanket registration. The “law for enemies” dispensed on aliens differs from ordinary criminal law because it does not intend to rehabilitate, to reform, or even to punish; instead, its purpose is to “banish” danger (Eckert 2008, 20).

If the post-2001 obsession with security is often looked at as sacrificing liberty for security, this is at best a half-truth. Because, as David Cole (2002, 955) described the US response, “in practice we have selectively sacrificed non-citizens’ liberties while retaining basic protections for citizens.” The opening shot was former US President George Bush’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, which established military commissions to try suspected international terrorists, and in which the military acts as prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner in one, without appeal to a civilian court. Crucially, only aliens, not citizens were subjected to this regime. The reason was not legal constraints but political expediency or plain nationalism. Nationalistic, at least, is former US Vice President Dick Cheney’s defense of singling out aliens: “Somebody who comes into the United States of America illegally, who conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of innocent Americans — men, women, and children — is not a lawful combatant… They don’t deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen” (quoted ibid., 959f).

Upon President Bush’s Military Order, followed the passing of the USA Patriot Act, which makes non-citizens deportable for merely associational activity, excludable for pure speech, and detainable on the Attorney General’s opinion that the suspected person was engaged in “terrorist activity,” without a hearing and without a finding that the person posed a danger or a risk to abscond. Association with an organization designated as terrorist was so widely conceived that “an alien who sent a toy train set to a day-care center run by a designated organization would be deportable as a terrorist, even if she could show that the train set was used only by three-year-olds” (Cole 2002, 967). And “terrorist activity” was so laxly defined that “a permanent resident alien who brandished a kitchen knife in a domestic dispute with her abusive husband” would qualify (ibid., 971).

The dubious novelty in the American response to terror is the denial of elementary civil rights to aliens, showing no mercy even to their previously most protected subset, legal permanent residents (Soysal’s “postnational members”). Cole made an important distinction in this respect between rights that stem from a contract, which are better conceived of as privileges, and rights proper that inhere in an inviolable integrity of the person. Political freedom, due process, and equal protection under the law, which are undercut by the revival of America’s late eighteenth century concept of enemy alien, are “best understood not as special privileges stemming from a specific social contract, but from what it means to be a person with free and equal dignity”; they are “human rights, not privileges of citizenship” (Cole 2002, 957). Accordingly, the denial of “equal justice under law” to enemy aliens is of a different order from no longer “handing out a ‘goody’” (Katyal 2007, 1375), which is the gist of excluding immigrants from welfare benefits. By the same token, the enormity of this move consists of undercutting the generality of the law, which had hitherto been a staple of the rule.
of law as such, and surely is no innovation of the postnational age. Supreme Court Justice Jackson had stated some sixty years ago that laws of general applicability were the best protection against tyranny: “[T]here is no more effective practical guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law, which officials would impose upon a minority, must be imposed generally” (quoted in Katyal 2007, 1370). The dethroning of postnational members (worse, all aliens’ deprivation of elementary civic rights) thus bears risks for the citizenry at large.

These risks became evident in Britain, where an indictment of similarly selective anti-terrorism laws by the country’s highest court caused the government to respond, not by lifting the incriminated emergency provisions, but, on the contrary, by extending them from aliens to citizens. Section 23 of Britain’s Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, hastily passed a few months after the September 2001 attacks on the US, allowed indefinite detention, without an indictment, of suspected international terrorists who cannot be deported. All that was required was that the Home Secretary “reasonably believes” (without grounding in objective fact) that a person is a terrorist who poses a risk to national security. As in the US anti-terror laws, this heavy-handed measure first applied only to non-citizens, in this case using the less protective framework of immigration law. A government report defended this limitation with respect to “the damage” that the extension to citizens of such “draconian powers” could inflict on “community cohesion” (Home Office 2004, 9). In less circumscribed words, aliens were victimized on the altar of appeasing Britain’s Muslim population.

To achieve its goal, the government had to derogate from Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR), which protects the “right to liberty and security” (and prohibits indefinite detention), and to invoke article 15 of ECHR, which allows derogation for the sake of a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation.” However, more than repudiating an unloved European import, the power to detain people indefinitely without charge or trial, which was stipulated by Section 23 of the anti-terrorism act, called into question “the very existence of an ancient liberty of which this country has until now been proud: freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention.” In fact, much as the US government had done in its War on Terror, its British deputy lifted ancient habeas corpus rights, and selectively for aliens, as also was done in the US.

Concretely, the operation of Section 23 of the anti-terrorism act meant that by late 2004, when the House of Lords condemned the measure, twelve detainees had been held for three years under prison-like conditions as suspected terrorists, without any criminal charge brought against them, and possibly forever, because the non-refoulement norm of international refugee law prevented their deportation. In a widely noted decision of December 16, 2004, the House of Lords declared Section 23 of the 2001 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act in violation of Articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR, which prohibit compromising the right to liberty and discriminating on the grounds of national origins, respectively. Importantly, the Law Lords bemoaned that Section 23 selectively targeted aliens, while leaving out from its ambit suspected terrorists who are citizens and who might pose an equal security threat. This inequity was not deemed “proportionate” to the intended purpose of providing domestic protection from terrorist threat, as about half of all terrorism suspects at that time were believed to be British nationals. And, in exempting suspected citizen terrorists from its reach, Section 23 unduly discriminated against suspected non-citizen terrorists for no other reason than their nationality. Citing US Supreme Court Justice Jackson’s famous plea that the law should be “equal in operation,” Lord Bingham affirmed that the habeas corpus protection, which in Section 23 was selectively lifted for non-citizens, did not allow such rationing: “Every person within the jurisdiction enjoys the equal protection of our laws. There is no distinction between British nationals and others. He who is subject to English law is entitled to its protection.”

However, despite the incorporation of the ECHR into domestic law, British courts still do not have the powers to strike down an act of parliament. So the House of Lord’s condemnation of the British government’s singling out of aliens in its anti-terrorism measures was merely an opinion, without direct effect. Home Secretary Charles Clarke promptly refused to bow to the Law Lords’ judgment, vowing that the detainees who had taken the government to court would remain in prison. In fact, the government responded to the discrimination charge by simply extending the emergency provisions of the anti-terrorism laws from aliens to citizens, in terms of the Prevention of Terrorism Act of March 11, 2005. As one observer sarcastically characterized this outcome, “it puts an end to a double judicial system: rule of law for citizens and pure violence for foreigners. The suppression of habeas corpus is extended to the whole population” (Paye 2005, 4). Even if counteracted by vigilant courts, as was done in different measures in the US and Britain alike, the attack on aliens’ civil liberty rights after 2001 still proves the inherent vulnerability of alien rights.

Even if counteracted by vigilant courts, as was done in different measures in the US and Britain alike, the attack on aliens’ civil liberty rights after 2001 still proves the inherent vulnerability of alien rights. Almost thirty years ago, long before postnational membership was on the map, legal scholar John Hart Ely (1980, 83) had identified the root cause of aliens’ vulnerability in their exclusion from the political process, so that their representation was at best “virtual” or entrusted to independent judiciaries. Ely’s analysis remains as true as ever, especially as international terror has moved the world a step back to the situation described by Hannah Arendt more than half a century ago, when aliens indeed were “rightless, the scum of the earth” (1951, 267).

CHRISTIAN JOPPKE is a professor of politics at the American University of Paris. This article draws on a theme from his most recent book, Citizenship and Immigration (Cambridge: Polity, 2010). His current research focus is on the accommodation of Islam in Western societies.
Notes


2. This notion was codified in the 2006 Military Commissions Act, which subjects aliens suspected as terrorists to special military courts.

3. Struck down by the Supreme Court in June 2006 also for its capricious limitation to aliens, the Military Order (MA) was resurrected by Congress in terms of the 2006 Military Commissions Act, which upheld MA's citizen/alien distinction (see Katyal 2007, 1366f).

4. By contrast, President Bush failed in Congress to pass Patriot II, which would have extended the Patriot Act’s anti-terrorism provisions from aliens to citizens (see Paye 2005).


6. A and Others v. Secretary of State, at par. 33.

7. A and Others v. Secretary of State, at par. 48.


9. It should be mentioned here that the outcome in the US has been the opposite: in its 12 June 2008 decision, Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court restored habeas corpus rights for alien terror suspects detained in Guantánamo Bay, and declared unconstitutional the 2006 Military Commissions Act on which the stripping of habeas corpus for “alien unlawful enemy combatants” had been based.

References


Electoral Revolutions: Hopes and Disappointments*

BY KATYA KALANDADZE AND MITCHELL A. ORENSTEIN

Color revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan raised enormous expectations for countries that lagged behind the third wave of democratization in East-Central Europe and throughout the world. In these countries, the post-communist era was dominated by semi-authoritarian regimes masquerading as democracies. The sight of thousands of people demanding clean elections revived faith in “people power” and reminded analysts of the revolutions of 1989 in Central Europe.

Many observers saw these protests as second-stage revolutions that would bring democratization to countries that failed to capitalize on the original democratic breakthroughs of 1989–1991. How successful were these electoral revolutions? Is the quality and pace of democratization in these countries comparable to that of the first stage of post-communist revolutions in East-Central Europe? How many electoral revolutions have had an undisputedly positive effect on regime standing?

To answer these questions, we studied all cases of electoral revolution in hybrid and authoritarian regimes worldwide since 1991. We found that even successful electoral revolutions show little democratic progress in their wakes. This failure happens, we argue, because electoral revolutions are more often symptoms of the problems of hybrid and authoritarian regimes, rather than solutions to their ills. Fraudulent elections are only one of many deficiencies in pseudo-democracies. Addressing electoral shortcomings and changing top leadership does not transform many features underpinning hybrid and authoritarian regimes, such as corruption, clientelism, underdeveloped political parties, and lack of transparent decision making. Just as elections do not automatically produce democracy (the so-called electoral fallacy), neither does improving the quality of elections.

Whereas successful electoral revolutions are mostly found in post-communist European and Eurasian societies, other countries, particularly in Africa, experience similar dynamics. We restricted our study to the period after 1991, given that the end of the Cold War coincided with the victory of the liberal paradigm and a massive spurt of worldwide democratization, resulting in the formation of a large number of political regimes that held elections that were less than free and fair. These regimes found it beneficial to provide a democratic façade, offering political openings to the opposition in the form of elections. Thus, elections began to play an important role in many systems of government, and people came to view fair elections as their right. This view enabled electoral protests in hybrid regimes, such as Georgia and Ukraine, as well as in closed authoritarian systems, such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Ethiopia.

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Eleven countries — African, post-communist Eurasian, and Latin American — have seen major electoral protests since 1991: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Peru, Serbia, Togo, and Ukraine. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Serbia experienced more than one outbreak of electoral protests. In total, we examined seventeen cases of electoral revolutions. We do not include in the sample borderline cases or disputed elections in democratic countries, given that our primary interest is the effect of electoral revolutions on hybrid and authoritarian regimes.

We adopted Michael McFaul’s definition (2006) of electoral revolution, which emphasizes four features: First, a fraudulent election serves as a catalyst for electoral protests; second, the opposition resorts to extra-constitutional means, including mass protests, to defend the democratic cause; third, owing to disputed electoral results, both the incumbents and the oppositional candidates declare their authority; and, fourth, both sides avoid any significant use of violence — with the exception of failed electoral revolutions that are usually repressed by violent means.

What makes electoral revolutions unique is the presence of mass protests in favor of adherence to a key feature of democracy: free and fair elections that give the opposition the opportunity to win. The fact that the people come into the streets to defend their democratic rights gives electoral revolutions a sense of legitimacy, internally and internationally, that many other mass protests lack.

We based our case selections and observations on an analysis of the scholarly literature on regime dynamics in these countries, as well as on changes in Freedom House scores over time — specifically, scores on the seven-point scale based on Freedom House’s Freedom in the World (FW) series for general assessments of regime dynamics. We relied on another set of Freedom House publications, Nations in Transit (NT), for a closer look at all cases of successful electoral revolutions, except Madagascar, which is excluded from the NT study.

Outcomes of Electoral Revolutions

Electoral revolutions can be divided into three categories: failed/repressed cases, successful cases without democratization, and successful cases with democratization (or some democratization). Freedom House scores provide a useful visual tool that helps to analyze the outcomes of electoral revolutions. By differentiating between repressed and successful revolutions, we can see whether subsequent rankings demonstrated democratic improvement.

Failed or Repressed Electoral Revolutions

Failed cases are electoral revolutions successfully subdued by the incumbent regime. The examples include electoral protests in Serbia (1996–1997), Armenia (1996, 2003), Azerbaijan (2000, 2003, 2005), Peru (2000), Belarus (2001, 2004, 2006), Ethiopia (2005), and Togo (2005). These unsuccessful electoral revolutions all followed a similar scenario: A fraudulent election served as a catalyst for electoral protests. The opposition contested the official electoral results and demanded their re-examination or nullification. The demonstrations typically attracted hundreds of protesters, although sometimes thousands. In most cases, incumbents used violent means to disperse protesters and to safeguard their hold on power. We find that countries’ unsuccessful electoral revolutions demonstrate no discernible impact on subsequent regimes’ dynamics.

Successful Electoral Revolutions

Successful electoral revolutions are cases in which the demonstrations achieved their original objectives or more — namely, the rerunning of the election, the nullification of the election results, and/or the resignation of the incumbent — and in which the subsequent change in leadership, from an undemocratic incumbent to new democratic forces, occurred as a direct result of the electoral protests. The surprising finding from this research is that some successful electoral revolutions fail to progress toward democracy.

We find that three of five successful electoral revolutions in our sample (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Madagascar) had no clear democratizing effect, as measured by scholarly analysis and lack of improvement in democracy scores. Moreover, regarding the two cases where successful electoral revolutions led to some democratization (Serbia and Ukraine), analysts have noted weak and slow improvements compared to the first-stage post-communist revolutions.

Successful Electoral Revolutions without Democratic Improvement

Georgia’s Rose Revolution was sparked by a fraudulent parliamentary election in November 2003, held under the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze subsequently resigned under pressure from the opposition and protesters. In January 2004, opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president, with more than 96 percent of the vote.

The Rose Revolution highlighted some of the central problems of the Georgian hybrid regime: routinely rigged elections, abuses of power, and lack of political transparency and efficient governance in the regions. The new leadership has since increased the fairness of the elections, returned the unruly region of Ajara to central control, decentralized the government, and taken action against corruption.

Unfortunately, the challenges since 2003 are deeper than the provision for fair elections and more orderly decision-making practices. Georgia suffers from an underdeveloped culture of political competition and a lack of transparency in governmental business. After the Rose Revolution, the political arena remained uncontested, with no viable opposition to Saakashvili, which allowed for his semi-authoritarian behavior; since the fall of 2007, the political arena has been chaotic, with the murky Irakli Otkuashvili scandal, and a more active, but visibly disoriented, opposition.

Neither does it bode well for democracy that Georgia retains a super-presidentialist regime: A powerful executive dominates a weak parliament. Other major problems include the territorial
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the government’s persistent manipulation of the media and the judiciary, and the absent rule of law.

Saakashvili was elected on a populist platform, and although he certainly had a state-building agenda, he had no clear democratizing program. Furthermore, his democratic credentials came under critique after he used violence to disperse protesters in November 2007, imposing a state of emergency and closing down the television station of the opposition.

Western pressure, which facilitated democratization in East-Central Europe and the Baltic countries (Vachudova 2005), was not as consistent in Georgia, and it failed to prevent the persisting illiberal tendencies of the regime. The European Union (EU), suffering from its enlargement fatigue, gave Georgia few signs of encouragement. Overall, Georgia registered democratic improvements after the Rose Revolution, particularly in the areas of electoral and civil society freedom (Freedom House 2007a, Freedom House 2006b), but, because of democratic deficiencies and setbacks, the NT ranking for Georgia declined after the electoral revolution and stagnated thereafter (Freedom House 2007b).

Similarly, Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution broke out as a response to a fraudulent parliamentary election in February – March 2005. Faced with protests, President Askar Akayev fled the country. The protesters were mobilized by their dislike of Akayev, rather than their support for a popular figure, such as Saakashvili in Georgia or Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine (Freedom House 2006b). The new president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, was not the revolution’s leader, but rather, a compromise chosen from the political elite.

The more sporadic and bottom-up nature of the Kyrgyz protests distinguishes them from other successful electoral revolutions. The presence of a vibrant civil society — a crucial asset for the electoral protests — has taken on dark undertones after the Tulip Revolution: The authorities have not been able to prevent unsanctioned demonstrations and outbursts of public violence, whereas a heightened sense of power contestation has resulted in a number of high-profile assassinations. Kyrgyzstan’s geographic position is not advantageous for the development of strong ties with the West, which could foster a consistent democratizing influence on the country. The country’s scores from both FU and NT remained mostly unchanged after the Tulip Revolution, keeping Kyrgyzstan in the ranks of “soft” autocracies.

Madagascar also failed to register significant democratic progress after its electoral revolution. Madagascar presents little interest for the major world powers because of its disadvantageous position and weak ties to the West (Levitsky and Way 2005). The country has few chances of joining organizations known to facilitate democratic progress, such as the EU or NATO.

**Successful Electoral Revolutions with Democratic Improvement**

The third category of cases includes countries such as Serbia and Ukraine that have demonstrated some regime democratization after their electoral revolutions. However, in these countries, democratic progress has been slow and reforms have been insignificant during the last two to three years, such that we can talk of evident democratic stagnation.

The Bulldozer Revolution of 2000 in Serbia was provoked by Slobodan Milosevic’s refusal to acknowledge the opposition’s victory in the first round of the presidential election. After a decade of extreme fragmentation, Serbia’s democratic opposition united around one candidate, Vojislav Kostunica. When a million people marched on Belgrade in his support, Milosevic resigned.

The new leadership made elections free and fair, relieved pressure on the media, and implemented fiscal and tax reforms, as well as anti-corruption legislation (Freedom House 2002b, Freedom House 2006b). The Union of Serbia and Montenegro dissolved peacefully in 2006, and the same year Serbia enacted a new democratic constitution (Freedom House 2007b).

Unfortunately, the two most pressing problems for Serbia remained unsolved: the status of Kosovo and the continuous elite power struggles. The balance of political forces at the onset of regime transition was favorable for democratic reforms. However, continual disagreements between President Kostunica and Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic — and later between the new president, Boris Tadic, and his prime minister, Kostunica — repeatedly undermined the credibility of the democratic parties. By the time Kosovo declared its independence in February 2008, it had become clear that Serbia’s democratic forces could not agree on a common agenda of democratization: The stance on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the status of Kosovo, and Serbia’s pro-Western/EU orientation versus its relations with Russia remained contentious issues. The broad democratic coalition collapsed, and the country remained deeply split, even after the victory of Tadic’s pro-European forces in the snap election of May 2008.

External actors played an important role in Serbia’s democratic progress. Serbia benefits from a history of stronger contacts with the West and weaker ties to Russia, as compared to many post-communist countries. Among our cases, Serbia has the highest chances of joining the EU in the near future, and it has experienced an unprecedented Western interference: NATO bombings, the UN protectorate over Kosovo, extraditions of indicted war criminals, and financial pressure. For instance, the Djindjic government felt forced to extradite Milosevic to the ICTY because the outcome of the EU donors’ conference for Serbia that ultimately brought $1.3 billion depended on this decision. The EU and other external pressure remain offset, however, by Serbia’s domestic problems.

In Ukraine, electoral fraud during the presidential election of 2004 provoked the Orange Revolution. The authorities were forced to accept a rerun of the second round of the election, which brought victory to the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko.
The best achievements of the Orange Revolution have been the free and fair electoral process and the atmosphere of greater openness and freedom in society. The policymaking process under President Yushchenko also has become significantly more democratic, transparent, and lawful. Marked improvements came with regard to the independence of the media and the civil sector, as well as some improvements in the fight against corruption (Freedom House 2006b). The most fundamental institutional change was the constitutional reform of December 2004, which increased the parliament’s power and weakened the president’s position (Freedom House 2007b).

Continuous power struggle is the most negative inheritance of the Orange Revolution. On one hand, the country conducts free and fair elections; power changes hands; and the general situation with political rights and liberties has improved significantly. On the other, the rule of law is still absent; the party system is underdeveloped; democracy remains superficial; and political elites are corrupt and self-absorbed, concerned primarily with their hold on power.

Yushchenko appeared inactive and disorganized in the first one hundred days of his presidency. The number of law initiatives submitted to parliament by the executive branch during this period was the lowest since independence. Furthermore, the relationship between Yushchenko and his former “orange” ally, Yulia Tymoshenko, was extremely conflictual during her two tenures as prime minister.

Tymoshenko accused Yushchenko of blocking her reform initiatives, and she suggested amending the constitution in favor of a parliamentary model, knowing well that her party consistently beats the president’s party in the polls. Continual political crises are a direct result of the fact that major political actors in Ukraine failed to negotiate a stable power-sharing agreement before or after the Orange Revolution. In terms of international impact, Ukraine is a moderate leverage and linkage country (Levitsky and Way 2005). Although the West hailed the Orange Revolution, it has not shown consistent interest in Ukraine since then; the country has received little encouragement from the EU and NATO. Meanwhile, a significant portion of the population believes that Ukraine should remain closely allied with Russia, and it strongly opposes the prospect of NATO membership.

Results of Electoral Revolutions

Most electoral revolutions after the Cold War have not been successful: The protesters have not achieved their goals of annulling or reviewing the fraudulent electoral results. Electoral revolutions that have been successful did not result in as much democratization as optimists were expecting. Even regimes that have improved through electoral revolutions have made modest progress. Ukraine has been gripped by continual political crises. Serbia, the most encouraging case overall, has suffered from a slow pace of reforms and from unresolved issues of territorial integrity, which present hurdles to democratic consolidation. Democratization has been slow (or absent) in these countries because deeper structural problems remained that the electoral revolutions were not equipped to solve.

Fraudulent elections were only the tips of icebergs in these countries. Other problems included underdeveloped cultures of political competition and party politics, power conflicts beyond the electoral circle, corruption, and lack of the rule of law — to name a few. All of these countries remain poor or relatively poor, and two (Georgia and Serbia) have ongoing territorial disputes. Second, electoral revolutions have relatively narrow aims, mostly targeting fraudulent elections and a number of visible deficits of political rights and civil liberties. As a result, leaders of these revolutions often have no actual programs of democratic reforms upon assuming power and are not prepared to deal with many deep-seated obstacles to democratization.

Finally, many of these countries have lacked the sustained external pressure to democratize, as experienced by some of the more successful cases of democratization, particularly in the post-communist countries. International influences have greatly assisted democratization in East-Central European countries, most visibly in the later democratized countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania. Among the cases of successful electoral revolutions, however, only Serbia has experienced consistent external pressure to democratize and has a real chance of EU integration.

By and large, electoral revolutions have not fulfilled the hopes of their supporters; they are more symptoms than solutions to the ills of hybrid regimes. A more effective strategy for democratization would not focus single-mindedly on elections, but also address some of the deeper underlying issues preventing democratic progress. Electoral revolutions are powerful moments of mass protest and civic participation, but their lack of effectiveness requires rethinking this strategy of democratization.

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References


The era of American unipolarity is waning. This fading coincides with a shift in the basic character of international organization and global governance, most notably including the rise of the Group of Twenty (G-20) Heads of States or Governments, Finance Ministers, and Central Bank Governors as the new main global forum for coordination and consultation on economics and finance (and soon, presumably, on many other issues as well). We find ourselves in the twilight of the post-Cold War period and at the dawn of a new era of global politics. Through its participation in forums like the G-20, Europe exports the intricate results of its institutional evolution since the end of World War II into the new realm of international organization for this new era. Europe thereby blends its own institutional history with the formation of new global governance structures, making it part of the very architecture of global governance that is emerging before us.

Europe's presence at the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh in September 2009, as well as those that preceded it, signify two different and longer-term historical developments. The first is Europe's seemingly expanding involvement in world politics through an idiosyncratic set of foreign relations that reflect its institutional evolution – the result of some half century of European integration across a variety of policy areas. With frequently overlapping or shared patterns of competences, and a blend of intergovernmental and supranational forms of governance, various European Union (EU) organs such as the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the European Council may speak for the EU, either individually or jointly. In addition to and parallel to the consolidation of EU foreign policy, however, in major policy domains EU member states' individual governments continue to pursue separate foreign policies. These policies might be coordinated with one another or with the EU, but not necessarily. The various European states and the Union might pursue different interests and advocate different positions.

The second historical result of longer-term development that is becoming more apparent is the end of the post-Cold War era and the beginning of a new and quite different phase in international politics and history. Perhaps future historians will date the "post-Cold War period" from 1991 to 2009, which began with the implosion of the Soviet Union and Russia's re-emergence. The 2008-09 financial meltdown and economic crisis mark its twilight. The crisis rapidly spread to nearly the entire world economy, but hit the economies of the West most profoundly, particularly the United States.

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Crisis and disruptions often bring certain realities into sharper focus, or illuminate underlying trends that otherwise would have remained ambiguous or hidden. The meltdown that nearly brought the international financial world to collapse has served to illuminate something longer-term and much more profound than the immediate economic outcomes themselves: on the one hand, the changing distribution of power and influence in international affairs away from the US and the West, a process that has increasingly unfolded over the twenty-first century’s first decade; and, on the other hand, the ways in which states and other international actors are beginning to respond to these changes. The financial and economic crisis significantly contributed to and perhaps will decisively symbolize these epochal shifts. The crisis certainly advanced the recalibration and reconstruction of major aspects of international organization and global governance in the early new century. Already, almost as a matter of course, the implications of and policy responses to the financial crisis, among other major issues, were first addressed at the G-20.

The institutional rise of the G-20, which seems to have already fully replaced the Western-dominated Group of Seven (G-7) and Group of Eight (G-8), reflects and very likely will help to shape and define this new era. The G-20 also signifies the deeply changed, but also still shifting and emerging distribution of influence and authority in world politics. This novel forum (and form) of global governance includes representatives not only of established and emerging major powers, but also creations like the EU (in addition to the main European nation-states that are G-20 members independent of the EU), as well as a number of important global and regional international organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

G-20: The Latest and Most Significant Addition to Global Governance

As major features of the post-Cold War order are fading or transforming – such as the unipolar distribution of power, defined by American preponderance in the economic, political, and military realms; the eclipse of the G-8; and the ongoing transformation even of the IMF – the G-20 is emerging as the single most important institutional addition to international organization and global governance in decades. Almost instantly, the G-20 has become the premier international body in which heads of government, finance ministers, and various other policymakers discuss global governance issues in economics and finance, and beyond. Apparently, the early assumption was that matters of stabilizing the world economy and outlining the worldwide post-crisis financial architecture would principally be discussed at that forum (and not at the G-8 or elsewhere).

The G-20 draws its legitimacy by reflecting and embodying the new global economic and political realities better than any other policy-producing body of global governance in the evolving post-post-Cold War world: the shift of power away from the US, and the shift of authority and influence away from the West as a whole and toward other regions of the world – principally South and East Asia. G-20 members represent about 90 percent of the world economy, about 80 percent of world trade (including intra-EU trade), and some two-thirds of the world’s population.1 The G-20 is much more representative of global economic and political realities than were its predecessors, the various other Groups. The G-20 is much less Western in its composition compared to the G-7 or G-8 – North American or Western European states have accounted for six of the eight seats at the G-8 (Russia and Japan being the two exceptions).

Its official title, “Group of Twenty,” is somewhat of a misnomer and does not really correspond to the number of representatives around the table. In fact, many more members – formal and informal – participate in G-20 summit meetings. The original composition featured nineteen states – Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the US – and the EU, which is represented at summit meetings by the rotating European Council president (if not already represented by a European nation-state) and the ECB. In the original numbering of the G-20, thus, the EU was included along with the nineteen states, making twenty. The president of the European Commission, the main executive body of the EU, also regularly takes part in summit meetings. Spain and the Netherlands have acquired de facto membership, participating in all three heads of government G-20 summits so far, yet without being included in the official count.

Given its apparent general acceptance and workability, the G-20 is unlikely to restrict itself to economic and financial matters in the future. Institutions, as we know from theory and history, tend to have a way of developing new kinds of authorities that expand to new jurisdictions.2 Indeed, the G-20 already addresses environmental matters and issues of climate change. Not least, the latter comes with obvious security implications and seems gently to lead the G-20 into security affairs. Thus, a plausible outcome is that policymakers will gradually expand the G-20’s purview beyond its present mandate and take on matters that at least overlap with questions of international security or involve significant security components. The degree and ways in which this task expansion might happen could be a key issue of twenty-first century international organization and governance. For example, would the G-20 as a collectivity ever impose coercive economic or political measures, such as the imposition of sanctions or embargoes? Will the G-20 move into areas of security and defense narrowly? Such questions inevitably include matters of the future relationship between the G-20 and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). These questions are more likely to surface if the UNSC fails to address the concerns of the emerging economies and rising states.

Nation-States and Union at the G-20

With its patterns of overlapping and shared authorities, blend of intergovernmental and supranational competences, and mix of national and Union-level arrangements, John Ruggie once characterized the European Union as a postmodern polity – a
political unit that offered new forms and understandings of sovereignty and governance. The Pittsburgh and other G-20 summits to date illustrate that the EU is not simply the sum of its parts, but exists with its own preferences, interests, and scope of action. Moreover, no one official represents the EU as a whole, and it is not even clear whether the EU always will or will be able to speak with a single voice. Rather, the various EU organs, such as the Commission, the Council, and the ECB, which are highly independent from one another, send their own executives. Thus, the EU exists and increasingly operates in world politics as a fragmented and simultaneously incomplete actor, possessing actorhood in some realms some of the time, while in other policy domains, leaving competences and political authority largely or entirely in the hands of the national governments of its member states.

In turn, some of Europe’s nation-state governments – such as France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, as well as the Netherlands and Spain – while constitutive units of the EU, at the G-20 they operate side-by-side, yet independently of the EU’s supranational or intergovernmental organs. These member states neither speak for nor represent Europe as a whole, and will not necessarily share each other’s views or positions or those of the various EU organs. Still, amazingly enough – although certainly without automatism – from this diversity of actors and interests, Europeans so far have generally been able to reach agreement on many major substantive issues before the G-20 summits. Common positions provide them not simply with a stronger stance from which to bargain, but also with a seriousness of purpose that comes when twenty-seven separate member states, plus the EU itself, can work together on major global issues.

As European integration evolved over the course of the past six decades, Europe developed its peculiar institutional, administrative, and political character. The Europeans now have begun to export some of these idiosyncratic institutional structures and intricate policymaking procedures, not least through the instantly pivotal G-20. Thus, Europeans replicate the divided nature of sovereignty and political authority from within EU-Europe at the table of the new G-20, and make the results of their own institutional history part of the emerging and entirely new twenty-first century global governance. One commentator even went so far as to describe the G-20 as Europe’s “Trojan horse,” presuming that Europe possesses a comparative advantage in the diplomatic jockeying and bargaining in such types of forums. Issuing jargon-filled communiqués, the same observer holds, and setting up obscure working groups would be deeply familiar to any Brussels bureaucrat.

Not only does the G-20 embody institutional arrangements seemingly recognizable and intuitive to the Europeans, but it also vastly over-represents Europe in its proceedings, since it includes six EU member states, the president of the European Commission, the president of the Council, and the head of the ECB. In addition – although the person represents neither his or her home country nor any branch of the EU at the G-20 – the head of the IMF (currently Dominique Strauss-Kahn) has traditionally been a European; Frenchman Pascal Lamy currently heads the World Trade Organization and Italian Mario Draghi heads the Financial Stability Board. Contrast this with a single Chinese, Russian, Indian, and Brazilian representative at the G-20 table. Also, as if both foreshadowing and symbolizing the US’s decline in world standing, only two officials at the G-20 are American: the US representative (the US President if it is a heads of government summit, or the Treasury Secretary) and the head of the World Bank, a position to date traditionally filled by an American. In terms of overall representation, no doubt, Europe is punching way above its weight.

Indeed, the Europeans did score victories at the Pittsburgh summit, for example by pushing through a call for more global regulation of compensation practices within the financial sector, including greater control of bonuses. After weeks of internal negotiations the accord was supported by all twenty-seven EU member states, led principally by France and Germany, who sought to exert greater pressure on the Obama administration regarding the matter. The Europeans also were instrumental in getting energy security and climate change into the final communiqué.

However, Europe most likely will see its influence diminish in the G-20 world. Power is shifting away from the West as a whole, and away from Europe, perhaps just as swiftly as from the US. The two Pittsburgh summit decisions regarding the IMF – to discontinue the automatic appointment of a European as IMF director, and to alter the voting rights in such a way as to favor emerging economies by five percentage points – only illustrate the epochal shift. The shift in voting power is the largest since the IMF’s inception, and is likely to increase China’s voting share to overtake those of the UK and France (who strongly resisted the change). In addition, whether the rest of the world will indefinitely tolerate Europe’s vast G-20 over-representation is questionable: if the Europeans speak with one voice, the others might ask why there are so many of them around the table; if they do not, they will be admonished for failing to come to an agreement before attending the summit.

Moreover, as the transition from G-8 to G-20 dilutes Europe’s collective influence, neither the EU nor any European member state is a member of the other important institutional novelty of global governance in the twenty-first century: the “G-2,” that is, the bilateral consultations and coordination between Washington and Beijing. For example, even though Europe has long pushed for stronger measures for environmental protection, the existence of a climate bill at the upcoming United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December will largely depend on whether Washington and Beijing can come to some kind of consensus.

Despite its numerical over-representation in the G-20, Europe, at best, might emerge as one of several major players on the world stage. If Europe is to have a voice on global economic,
financial, and regulatory issues, it will increasingly have to be a single voice. Collectively, Europe possesses what each member state lacks individually: weight. The extent to which Europe can act coherently in forums such as the G-20 and beyond will determine whether or not the Old Continent will be able to play a significant role in twenty-first century world politics, alongside the US, China, India, and perhaps Brazil, Russia, and Japan.

To date, however, Europe does not act as a single, unified polity across the full spectrum of policy issues. For the time being, the fragmentary and fragmented nature of the EU may actually help rather than impede it as it works to achieve its goals. Rather than creating a powerful bloc on a par with the US and China, instantaneous efforts toward further centralization at the Union level might simply tend to lead to paralysis or inaction within Europe, or to greater bouts of anti-Brussels sentiment in some EU member countries. The fragmentary nature of the EU provides it with a significant degree of flexibility. Finding the right balance between Ruggie’s “postmodern polity,” with its peculiar allocations of political authority across policy areas, and the ability externally to act coherently and dependably will be both the challenge and the opportunity for the EU.

In addition, Europe’s increasing entry into global world politics poses new operational and procedural questions. Will the pooling, sharing, or coordinating of sovereignty between EU member states and Brussels institutions work externally at forums such as the G-20, as it does in many policy arenas of intra-European policy- and decision-making? Who takes the lead, for example, in drawing up financial reform or many other challenges ahead with Washington, Beijing and others: London, Paris, Berlin, Brussels or the fully autonomous, supranational ECB from Frankfurt – or (varying?) coalitions among them?

More fundamentally, Europe’s institutional evolution is not complete. The Lisbon Treaty will soon come into force. This most recent accord among the EU member states will introduce various institutional adjustments and much-needed procedural reform. However, issues of the further course of European integration, Europe’s future institutional shape, and its goals and purposes will surface in the course of the decades ahead. The answers (or non-answers) that Europeans give to these questions will help to shape twenty-first century world politics.

The “Europeanization” of Global Governance?

For almost half a millennium, from the early sixteenth century to the end of World War II, Europe dominated international politics. The Cold War, for most Europeans, meant a period of relative political absence in the world. During those decades, Europe mostly became an arena and an object of the competition between the superpowers to its east and west, the Soviet Union and the US. At the early twenty-first century, the Europeans are increasingly re-entering world politics. However, they seem to do so in new and different ways. Traditional European nation-states are now joined by the EU, a political entity that has no parallel in the history of international affairs. The EU is not a state, and might never be one, at least not for a long time to come, but it displays several state-like features; and, by and large, the G-20 seems to treat it as such. The EU’s institutions and organs, at forums like the G-20, increasingly take on the role of state entities.

However, by entering global affairs through forums such as the G-20, Europe also exports the intermediary results of its institutional evolution over the past six decades since European integration began to take on momentum soon after World War II. Thus, the Europeans make their peculiar and intricate institutional organization – with its complex, overlapping, or fragmentated authority structures, mix of intergovernmental and supranational competences at the Union level, and blend of EU- and nation-state representation – part of a new and still evolving international organization and global governance for a new era in world politics.

Beyond the goals and purposes that Europeans define for themselves, the further course of Europe’s institutional evolution – both at the level of the EU and in its relationship with the nation-states that constitute it – will strongly influence the possible future roles that Europe may wish or be able to play in world politics. As political conditions and as policy projects, both factors will be decisive for Europe, one way or another, to find its voice and place in the world.

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Notes

1. These figures are from the official G-20 Web site. See http://www.g20.org/about_faq.aspx.
2. See, for example, March and Olsen (2006).
7. For a comprehensive discussion of the factors and forces either promoting or obstructing the emergence of Europe as a cohesive international actor in the areas of foreign policy, security, and defense, see Krotz (2009).
8. For a debate on the desirability and the political stakes involved in sharing, pooling, or otherwise delegating state sovereignty in Europe and in world politics more broadly, see Rabkin (2000) and Moravcsik (2000).
References


