One of the paradoxes of the contemporary world is the continuing and, in many places, growing strength of nationalist ideology at a time when the weaknesses and limitations of the nation-state are becoming increasingly apparent. Many observers agree that the basic conditions for achieving human dignity—for meeting human needs and assuring human rights—must be established on a worldwide basis, through cooperative transnational efforts. To this end, nation-states must be prepared to yield a degree of their national sovereignty, to expand their range of empathy, and to think in terms of global rather than entirely national interests. In short, the realization of human dignity in the contemporary world requires changes in the nationalist assumptions that have dominated the international system and curtailments of nationalistic demands and aspirations. Yet, throughout the world, people continue to look to the nation-state as the primary provider of human dignity. The populations of established nation-states expect the state to ensure that their needs will be met and their rights protected. At the same time, the idea of the nation-state is repeatedly infused with new energy and vitality as movements of national liberation seek to establish independent states to assure dignity for oppressed populations.

The central role of the nation-state as provider of dignity is rooted in nationalist ideology. Nationalist ideology in turn draws heavily on patriotism as the source of the population's trust in and support for the state. After some initial definitions, I shall examine the characteristics and assumptions of nationalist ideology and then turn to some of the social-psychological
The ideology of nationalism and patriotism involves the establishment of a nation-state and the political unit in which national, patriotic sentiments and affiliations are directed toward the establishment of a nation-state. Whatever its specific form, nationalism is an ideology that produces identification and attachment to a collective identity. The nation-state, the political unit in which national and patriotic sentiments are directed, is the nation-state that individuals, groups, and nations identify with and to which they are loyal. The nation-state is defined as a political entity that is territorially bounded and that is characterized by a shared historical, cultural, and political identity. The nation-state is the political entity that is the object of national and patriotic sentiments. The nation-state is the political entity that is the object of national and patriotic sentiments. The nation-state is the political entity that is the object of national and patriotic sentiments. The nation-state is the political entity that is the object of national and patriotic sentiments. The nation-state is the political entity that is the object of national and patriotic sentiments. The nation-state is the political entity that is the object of national and patriotic sentiments. The nation-state is the political entity that is the object of national and patriotic sentiments.
The CONCEPT OF NATION

Since the early 19th century, the nation has been seen as a group of people who share a common culture and history, often united by a common language and religion. This concept of the nation has been central to political and social thought, and has been used to justify the formation of new states and the expansion of existing ones.

The nationhood of a group is often defined by the presence of certain characteristics, such as a shared culture, language, religion, and history. These characteristics are often used to distinguish a nation from other groups, and to justify the use of force to maintain or expand the boundaries of the nation.

The nation is often seen as a collective entity, with its own rights and interests, and the nation-state is often defined as the political unit that represents the nation. The nation-state is often viewed as a necessary institution for the protection of the nation's interests, and as a means of maintaining order and stability.

However, the concept of the nation and the nation-state is often criticized for its reliance on exclusionary criteria, and for its tendency to reinforce divisions and inequalities. The nation is often seen as a source of conflict and division, and as a means of justifying violence and oppression.

In recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the need to move beyond the nation-state, and to develop new forms of political organization that are more inclusive and equitable. This has led to a rethinking of the concept of the nation, and to a search for new ways of defining and organizing groups and communities.

The nation is often seen as a fluid and dynamic concept, and as a means of creating a sense of belonging and identity. It is often used to justify the pursuit of power and influence, and to maintain the status quo.

In conclusion, the nation is a complex and multifaceted concept, and its definition and meaning vary widely across time and place. It is often used to justify the pursuit of power and influence, and to maintain the status quo. However, it is also a source of conflict and division, and a means of justifying violence and oppression. The nation is often seen as a fluid and dynamic concept, and as a means of creating a sense of belonging and identity.
these ideas with the others of his group, and like the others is loyal to them, he belongs to their nation; otherwise he does not belong to it, even though he may be of the same race as his fellows, speak the same language, and live in the same territory. . . . Individuals belonging to a certain nation are aware that they belong to it and, furthermore, this awareness is an essential part of nationality itself. (P. 136)

The consciousness of being a nation gives rise to the ideology we call patriotism. That is, patriotism is a set of attitudes and beliefs centering around attachment and loyalty to people and land, held by members of a group who have developed a sense of national consciousness. When patriotism is transformed into nationalism, this sense of national consciousness is drawn upon as a source of legitimacy and loyalty to the nation-state (for the movement demanding such a state).

The link between the sense of national consciousness and the ideology of patriotism brings to mind Fishman's (1968) useful idea that an ethnic group becomes a nation when it begins to ideologize its customs and way of life. That is, it goes beyond the conception of "this is the way we do things" to a conception of "there is something unique, special, and valuable about our way of doing things." It is ideologizing of this sort that makes it possible to develop allegiance to and invest one's identity in a collectivity that goes beyond—in both space and time—one's primary-group, face-to-face contacts.

Historically, such a process of ideologizing ethnic characteristics is likely to have occurred whenever there were energetic individuals and groups who had an interest in creating loyalty to a wider group—in order, for example, to establish a new religion, or to expand their economic activities, or to broaden the base of their political power. Who was to be included in this wider group depended, in each case, on the particular interests of the nation builders and on the opportunities available to them. Thus, the boundaries of the newly formed nations and the elements of communality that characterized them tended to be somewhat arbitrary. At the same time, they could not be completely arbitrary, because there had to be some common cultural characteristics as the starting point for the work of ideologizing. Serbs and Croats provide a good example, so prominent in the current news, of the element of arbitrariness in the drawing of national boundaries. These two groups share a common language and common culture that, in principle, could well have served to define them as a single nation. Yet, differences in religion and historical experience have been magnified to define them as separate nations, confronting each other in a bitter conflict of long standing.

I am proposing, then, that consciousness as a nation and patriotism vividly develop within a group of people as a result of deliberate efforts to ideologize common cultural characteristics and experiences and to mobilize people around them. This process is designed to create wider loyalties—loyalties that extend to people who are not part of one's immediate community but are defined as part of the larger nation. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that defining a group as a nation represents a marking-off process—a process by which some are included and others excluded.

Thus, the development of national consciousness has the effect of both broadening group loyalties and narrowing them, of both uniting people and dividing them. When national consciousness and patriotic sentiments become focused on a nation-state, these contradictory tendencies become accentuated by the drawing of political boundaries, which serve to both unite and divide. This contradiction, then, becomes another central part of the dialectic that characterizes nationalist ideology.

PERSONAL ACQUISITION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Insofar as a group of people have come to see themselves as constituting a unique, identifiable entity, with a claim to continuity over time, to unity across geographical distance, and to the right to various forms of collective self-expression, we can say that they have acquired a sense of national identity. National identity is the group's definition of itself as a group—in its conception of its enduring characteristics and basic values; its strengths and weaknesses; its hopes and fears; its reputation and conditions of existence; its institutions and traditions; and its past history, current purposes, and future prospects. National identity is carried by the individual members of the group, but it is not cotemporaneous with the sum of the conceptions of individual group members. For one thing, it has an independent existence in the form of accumulated historical products, including written documents, oral traditions, institutional arrangements, and symbolic artifacts. For another, different segments of the group differ widely in their degree of active involvement in the nation and emotional commitment to it. Various leadership elements and particularly active and committed subgroups are far more instrumental in defining the national identity than the rank-and-file members.

Clearly, national identity—as a collective phenomenon—is complex and differentiated. It varies over time and circumstances. Its strength and nature depend on the kind of mobilization processes that occur within the group and on the particular leadership elements most responsible for that mobilization. I assume that national identity always represents a combination of historical realities and deliberate mobilization. Mobilization cannot take place without the existence of significant elements of common culture and historical experience on which the leadership can draw in mobilizing support for political action within the group. What aspects of identity will
The adoption of elements of national identity involves a combination of effective, personal, and collective elements. The integration of these elements into the individual's self-concept is achieved through the process of identification. Identification can occur at various levels: individual, group, and societal. The process of identification involves the assimilation of shared values, beliefs, and behaviors, which are then internalized and become part of the individual's self-concept. This process is facilitated by the individual's ability to recognize and understand the values, beliefs, and behaviors associated with the group or society to which they belong.

The second level of identification involves the integration of collective elements into the individual's self-concept. This level of identification is characterized by the individual's willingness to adopt and incorporate the values, beliefs, and behaviors associated with the collective unit, such as a social group or community. The process of collective identification is facilitated by the individual's recognition of the importance of the collective unit and the desire to maintain a positive relationship with it. The adoption of collective elements involves the individual's ability to understand and internalize the values, beliefs, and behaviors associated with the collective unit.

The third level of identification involves the integration of societal elements into the individual's self-concept. This level of identification is characterized by the individual's willingness to adopt and incorporate the values, beliefs, and behaviors associated with the larger society. The process of societal identification is facilitated by the individual's recognition of the importance of society as a whole and the desire to maintain a positive relationship with it. The adoption of societal elements involves the individual's ability to understand and internalize the values, beliefs, and behaviors associated with society as a whole.
The two sources of attachment jointly determine the strength of people's patriotism, or their loyalty and commitment to the group. This commitment may express itself in different ways, however, depending on the basis of people's integration in the group and the nature of their orientation to it. The columns of Table 8.1 distinguish three types of orientations (or bases of integration): rule orientation, role orientation, and value orientation.

We can speak of role orientation when people's relationship to the group is based primarily on their acceptance of the group rules. They recognize the group's authority to set rules and their obligation to adhere to them. In return, they expect to be included within the definition of group membership and to have access to their fair share of the resources that are at the disposal of the group. In a national group living within its own national state or within a stable and traditional ethnic community, members' behavior is governed by a widely accepted set of rules and regulations, and adherence to these rules often has a direct bearing on individuals' acceptance by the group and access to resources on which they depend. For members of a national group living outside of a state of their own or of a tightly knit ethnic community, rule orientation refers to a relationship to the group based on adherence to those minimal rules that would assure their continuing acceptance within the definition of a member of the national community. Typically, this means retention of one's national identity on those occasions at which group survival becomes an issue. For individuals who are primarily role oriented, relationship to the national group represents what I have called elsewhere (Kelman, 1977a) a conferred or nominal identity element in their personal identities.

We can speak of role orientation when the person's relationship to the group is based on identification with and active involvement in group roles. In particular, at the affective level, role-oriented individuals are identified with the role of group member. They are emotionally involved in it, regard it as a central part of their self-definition, and derive a sense of status enhancement and self-trace from it. What is significant for them, however, is possession of the role itself rather than the specific contents of that role and its relationship to their broader value system. They tend to accept the role as prescribed—more or less totally and unconditionally—without interpreting it with their other values and beliefs. In short, their commitment to the group can be described as a vicarious element of their personal identity (Kelman, 1977a). In the typical examples of role orientation, sentimental and instrumental features often coincide: Involvement in national community affairs provides an opportunity not only to derive vicarious satisfaction from enacting the group member role but also to participate in other satisfying role relationships.

Value orientation, charted in the third column of Table 8.1, represents a relationship to the group based on a sharing of national values. Here
members have internalized the group's values because they find them congruent with their own value systems. Their commitment to the group thus represents an authentic element of their personal identity (Kelman, 1971a). It should be stressed that value orientation does not preclude responsiveness to issues of group survival, which I suggested as a characteristic of the rule oriented, or active involvement in the role of group member, which I suggested as a characteristic of the rule oriented. If anything, value-oriented members should be more responsive to issues of group survival, because they are not merely concerned with the physical survival of the group but with the values for which it stands. Similarly, they may be more actively involved in the role of group member insofar as they see this role as a way of expressing their personal identity and promoting their personal values. What characterizes their relationship to the group, however, is that it goes beyond adherence to group rules and involvement in group roles and becomes an integral part of an authentic personal identity.

Patriotic commitment based on value orientation is likely to be more stable and more profound than the other types of commitment, but it is also more differentiated and more questioning. A rule-oriented loyalty has little depth and continuity but is likely to be elicited automatically if the proper symbols are brought into play. A rule-oriented loyalty is particularly powerful in that it may represent a total and enthusiastic commitment to the group's cause. A value-oriented loyalty, on the other hand, is conditional; it does not promise support for the nation, right or wrong (cf. Nathanson's discussion of "nationalism" in the present volume). Value-oriented members evaluate the actions they are asked to support on the basis of their own values and of the fundamental group values that they share, and are prepared to criticize and to dissent (Kelman & Hamilton, 1988, chapters 11-12). Such a commitment is less easily mobilized because it does not respond automatically to fear, guilt, and group pressures. But, in the long run, it is most conducive to national identity as a creative force that is both rooted in the historical national experience and responsive to the realities of national life in a changing environment.

MOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

One of the most interesting questions, from a psychological point of view, concerns the motivational forces that make it possible to mobilize national consciousness and to create the broader patriotic loyalties that it entails. To be sure, the mobilization of national consciousness often builds on an experience of deprivation and a sense of grievance within a group, such that the national cause comes to be seen as a more adequate way of meeting the instrumental needs and interests of the group. But the pursuit of personal or subgroup interests can hardly explain the powerful identifications and loyalties that the nation and the homeland generate and the degree to which these maintain and perpetuate themselves. Certainly the self-sacrificing behavior that the national cause to often elicits cannot be entirely understood in terms of rational calculations of costs and benefits.

Self-sacrifice on behalf of the nation and its country is particularly striking when we keep in mind that the nation is an abstract unit: It is not a primary group in whose midst individuals lead their daily lives, but a large group, consisting of numerous people whom they have never met nor expect to meet—a group that fills their personal experience in time and space. I propose that this unit generates such powerful identifications and loyalties because it brings together two central psychological dispositions: the need for self-protection and the need for self-transcendence.

The need for self-protection leads to a strong tendency to identify with those who are extremely close to us, the members of our immediate families whose daily lives and fates are closely interwoven with our own. The family becomes an extension of the self and the protection of family members becomes almost indistinguishable from the protection of the self. This tendency—within the individual and within the species—can probably be traced to the realities of the infant's dependence on its parents and of the interdependence of members of the same living unit. In typically human fashion, family loyalty becomes elaborated in a variety of cultural forms that go far beyond the realities of dependence and interdependence for self-protection.

Whereas the need for self-protection leads to an identification with those closest to the individual, the need for self-transcendence leads to an identification with groups that go far beyond the self in time and space. Such a need is ultimately rooted in human awareness of our own mortality. The search for meaning in the face of knowledge of our impending death disposes us to look at ourselves as part of a larger process that goes beyond ourselves—that existed long before we arrived on the scene and will continue to exist long after we are gone. Loyalty to a self-transcending cause and readiness to sacrifice one's self to such a cause thus give meaning to our existence in the face of our awareness of its finite nature.

The nation, according to this view, has the capacity for engendering such powerful identifications and loyalties because it is a unit of intermediate size—considerably more inclusive than the face-to-face groups of our daily lives, but considerably more exclusive than the whole of humanity. As such, it is a sufficiently small and parochial unit to draw on the primordial attachments rooted in the need for self-protection, but it is a sufficiently large and a transcendent unit to justify the quest for self-transcendence. Identification with the nation represents the transformation of primordial attachments into commitment to an abstract, transcendent entity.
attachment to the homeland similarly reflects the needs of both self-protection and self-transcendence. On the one hand, loyal to a source of being, providing food, shelter, and the emotional space required for the individual to develop a sense of identity. On the other hand, as an extension of personal identity, it serves as a source of power and worth, a source to which the individual can appeal in time of need. The emotional need for attachment to a homeland is evident from the fact that the same individuals, in modern times, are just as likely to develop an emotional need for attachment to a homeland in the course of childhood socialization, rationally, that the attachment to a homeland is a source of continuity and meaning in the individual's life. The need to develop an emotional need for attachment to a homeland is not just a matter of personal identity, but a matter of social identity as well. At the same time, the need to belong and to be a part of a group that is socially and emotionally important, is a source of personal identity. The need to belong and to be a part of a group that is socially and emotionally important, is a source of personal identity.
National consciousness may decline in a group over time; new historical developments may then lead to efforts to reawaken this consciousness—to reinvigorate the group around a national cause that may have been dormant for some time. Thus, the mobilization of national consciousness often represents a dual process of creating as well as discovering (or rediscovering) a sense of national identity.

**THE POLITICAL EXPRESSION OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS**

In the modern world, national consciousness finds its clearest and most powerful political expression in the nation-state. People look to the nation-state to represent their national identity and protect their rights and interests. In return, they are prepared to extend allegiance to the state, insofar as they see it as corresponding to the nation. Thus, national consciousness and the patriotism it engenders are potentially important resources for political leaders.

Where it exists, national consciousness—with all the psychological and social forces that sustain it—can be a powerful source of unity and political legitimacy for the state (though not without its dysfunctional side effects).

Where it does not exist, political leaders attempt to create a national consciousness with boundaries corresponding to the boundaries of the political system. In some established states this has been accomplished, with a new sense of nationhood developing despite initial ethnic and cultural differences. In many new states, however, and in many old ones as well, such a sense of national consciousness has yet to be achieved. What we find, in such situations, are efforts at nation building. Through the development of new symbols that encompass the entire population, and of new institutions that meet the needs and interests of that population, political leaders attempt to create, out of ethically distinct groups and out of un-integrated individuals and localities, a single nation that corresponds to the political state. If such efforts succeed, the attachment and loyalty to that new and larger nation—the patriotic sentiments directed toward it—can then be utilized.

Despite its shortcomings (especially from the point of view of ethnic minorities), the nation-state typically provides enough sentimental or instrumental satisfactions to enough people to hold their allegiance. The ability of the state to mobilize allegiance is aided by the fact that sentimental and instrumental satisfactions tend to generate and reinforce each other, as mentioned above. They can also partially substitute for one another. Thus, on the one hand, the assertion of the state as representative of national identity can compensate for failures to meet the population's needs and interests. On the other hand, the perception of the state as meeting the population's needs and interests can compensate for a lacking sense of national identity, and can in fact help to create such an identity. (Kelman, 1969, p. 285)

The near monopoly of the nation-state on the supply of instrumental and sentimental satisfactions is reinforced by the structure of the international system. Since the international system is organized around the nation-state as the predominant unit, the provision of important goods and services and the protection of important rights are channeled through the nation-state. For example, development aid—whether provided by individual states or by international organizations—goes to recognized nation-states. States can make trade arrangements, enter into military alliances, and sign a variety of agreements. Moreover, states—and only states—can confer the status and rights of citizenship upon individuals. In addition to assigning symbolic value as a source of personal pride and status enhancement, citizenship provides individuals with the right to travel and with protection when they are away from home. The significance of this protection is painfully apparent to stateless persons or groups, who are deprived of it and often find themselves at the mercy of others.

The structure of the international system and the central role of the nation-state within it help to account for the continuing strength of nationalism ideology. It is both understandable and in many ways rational for groups that feel oppressed or threatened to try to achieve independence or to maintain an independent nation-state as the focal point of their struggle, within such a state as their vehicle for achieving dignity and security. Despite the fact that the nation-state rarely corresponds to the ideal model postulated by nationalist ideology, it contrasts favorably with the experience of foreign domination and colonial status, which by its nature denigrates a people's identity and neglects its needs and interests. An independent state provides opportunities, at least to certain elites, to gain control over their lives, to increase their economic and political power, to give expression to their cultural values and traditions. To the masses, it provides greater assurance that their needs will be sympathetically considered, and a greater feeling that they are respected, autonomous human beings. To be sure, the hopes for a better life in an independent state are often frustrated; foreign oppression may merely be replaced with domestic oppression and, for some minorities, membership in a nation-state may be tantamount to internal colonization. Nevertheless, we should not minimize the potential contribution of an independent nation-state to an oppressed people's dignity, even if it is only by enabling them to gain, through identification with the state, a vicarious sense of efficacy and importance.
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

To illustrate some of the implications of my conceptual analysis, let me turn briefly to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has been widely acknowledged to be one of the most intractable international conflicts of our time. The conflict is rooted in the historical and geopolitical realities of the region, and it has been characterized by recurrent outbreaks of violence and efforts to achieve a lasting peace. The conflict is not only about territory and resources, but also about identity, history, and the struggle for self-determination. The parties involved, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, have competing claims to the same land, and both have aspirations for statehood. The conflict has been complicated by the involvement of various other actors, including the United States, the European Union, and the international community. The current situation is marked by stalemate, with no clear path to a resolution in sight. The conflict is a testament to the complexity of international relations and the challenges of conflict resolution.
Chapter 4/Social-Psychological Dimensions

184 PART III/ THE FUNCTIONS OF PATRIOTISM

conditions that give rise to a national movement, and if these conditions are not met the movement is unlikely to succeed. However, for outsiders to insist that a group lacks the formal characteristics or the historical justifications for nationhood—i.e., that it is not a nation—is an exercise in futility. It is equally futile to downplay the authenticity of a nationalism movement by claiming that it is merely the handiwork of an aggressive elite that does not represent the population. All nationalist movements are in fact parts of creation, in which an enterprising elite—in the pursuit of its own ideology and interests—takes the leadership in mobilizing national sentiment. Such an elite cannot succeed, however, unless there are national sentiments to be mobilized. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians have all too clearly demonstrated the existence and authenticity of such national sentiments.

The resistance on each side to recognizing the nationhood of the other is rooted in the view that their respective national identities are inherently incompatible and that the fulfillment of one can be achieved only at the expense of the other. This view is a direct consequence of the fact that the two movements focus on the same land. For Palestinians, acknowledging Jewish nationhood implies acceptance of the right of Jews to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Many Palestinians have seen this as tantamount to qualifying or abandoning their own claim to Palestine and thus destroying the nation of state of their national movement. For Israelis, acknowledging Palestinian nationhood implies acceptance of the right of Palestinians to establish an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza. Many Israelis have feared that such a state—particularly one that would carry the name "Palestine"—might suggest support of the Palestinians' claim to the whole of Palestine and thus cast doubt on the legitimacy of Israel.

Each side has beenconvinced, then, that acceptance of the other's nationhood would undermine the moral basis of its own claims—i.e., that its own claims would become more ambiguous, less self-evident, and more subject to debate if recognized, even implicitly, that there may also be some moral basis to the claims of the other side. Such ambiguities are particularly threatening because the stakes for each side are extremely high. The two sides are not merely concerned about having a good case so that they can win debating postures. Rather, both are deeply afraid about their continuing national existence. Recognition of these genuine fears on both sides is essential to any understanding of this conflict.

Due to a combination of historical trauma and current realities, each group has perceived itself as particularly vulnerable and felt that its survival as a national group was in the balance. The anxiety about national survival has been magnified by anxieties about personal survival, since the destruction of the nation has been seen in the context of wholesale massacres. Each side has tended to heighten the fears of the other, often failing to understand the basis of these fears and considering them groundless and hence inauthentic. When such fears have been voiced by leaders on the other side they have been viewed as propaganda ploys, and when voiced by common citizens as products of the leaders' propaganda. These fears, however, though they may often be used for propaganda purposes, are very real—not only to the masses, but to the leaders as well. Both sides fear (with some historical justification) that the other is bent on destroying their national identity and their national existence—and, if necessary, is prepared to annihilate them physically in the process.

As long as fulfillment of the other's national identity is perceived by each side as equivalent to the destruction of its own identity, neither will be prepared to accept the other's national identity and its right to a state expressing it. To do so, in each side's view, would be to participate in a process that directly imperils its own national existence. Thus, neither side could be expected to make a move to recognize the other unless and until it is developed a sense of assurance that its own existence was secure. The great challenge—and a fundamental requirement—for resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been to create the psychological conditions that would provide such assurance to each party and thus make mutual acceptance possible.

The 1967 war exacerbated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in that it led to Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and to the adoption of armed struggle as the central strategy of the Palestinian national movement. At the same time, however, the Palestinianization of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which began with the war of 1967 and became intensified with the onset of the intifada, the Palestinian uprising, in late 1987, created the conditions for resolution of the conflict. Paradoxically, it was only with the revival of Palestinian nationalism after 1967 that the compromise solution of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, alongside of Israel, emerged as a viable option (Kelman, 1988).

Prior to 1967, this option was psychologically unavailable. Palestinians tended to approach the conflict from the perspective of either their Arab Identity (which required recapturing all of the Arab territory on which Israel was established) or their local identity (which called for return of Palestinian refugees to the specific towns or villages—within Israel—from which they had come). It is only as Palestinians began to adopt a Palestinian national perspective that a West Bank/Gaza state became a psychological option. Such a state would achieve a meaningful goal for a national movement and represent a reasonable end to the national struggle. It would allow Palestinians to exercise their right to national self-determination, to establish national sovereignty, and to obtain a territorial base for expressing their national selfhood.

For Israelis, the growth of Palestinian nationalism—and especially its culmination in the intifada—also made the creation of a Palestinian state
on the West Bank and Gaza a more attractive option, provided Israeli securi-
ty concerns would be adequately met. It has become clear to an increasing
number of Israelis that incorporating large numbers of reluctant
Palestinian nationalists into Israel would destroy the Jewish and/or the democratic
character of their state and that neither Palestinian autonomy nor the Jordan-
ian option will satisfy Palestinian national aspirations. The intifada in partic-
ular persuaded Israelis that the Palestinians were indeed a nation, prepared
to organize and sacrifice to achieve their national aspirations.

The evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict thus suggests that, at
least in some respects and at some historical junctures, nationalism may
actually be part of the solution, rather than part of the problem. Still, the
solution did not come quickly or easily. Despite the growing awareness on
both sides that it was in their long-term interests to end the conflict with a
historic compromise, they were reluctant to move to the negotiation table.
This reluctance can be traced to the existential fears and the internal divi-
sions on both sides. Movement toward negotiation required many years of
debate within each society and dialogue between them, in the context of
major historical changes and a series of dramatic events, including the Sadat
initiative in 1977, the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the onset of the
intifada, and the PLO peace initiative culminating in the acceptance of a
two-state solution at the 1988 meeting of the Palestinian National Council.

The changes in the strategic situation due to the end of the Cold War,
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War of 1991 finally created
the conditions for initiating negotiations between Israel and the Palestin-
ians as well as the Arab states. The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, however,
lacked momentum until the Israeli government accepted the PLO as its
negotiating partner and the two parties exchanged letters of mutual recog-
nition, which calculated to begin on September 13, 1991. In the signing of a Decla-
ration of Principles for Negotiating interim and final agreements. The
negotiations that are still ahead will be long and difficult, but the mutual
recognition of Israel and the PLO represents a fundamental breakthrough in
this conflict. By acknowledging each other’s nationhood, which the
two parties had systematically refused to do in the past, they have provided a
basis for the mutual reassurance required for successful negotiations.

CONCLUSION

The clash of Israeli and Palestinian nationalism is just one of many exam-

THE FUNCTIONS OF PATRIOTISM

186

Chapter 8: Social-Psychological Dimensions

187

tles of the strength of nationalist ideology in the contemporary global sys-
tem and of its role in international conflict. It is paradoxical that the spread
of nationalism and its renewed vigor throughout the world come at a time
when two dysfunctional aspects of the nation-state are increasingly being
recognized. These are related, respectively, to the growing interdependence
between nation-states and the upsurge of ethnic divisions within nation-states.

Our global interdependence for the achievement of international peace,

social justice, and individual freedom has made it increasingly evident that
the nation-state is no longer capable of solving some of the functions it was designed to serve. Foremost among
these is the function of military security, which no state—no matter
how powerful—can fulfill on a unilateral basis today. New and power
states, in particular, cannot entirely rely on their own resources to carry
out the functions of economic development and of meeting the health
and welfare needs of their populations. Higher education, scientific
research, and technological development are among those functions that
will increasingly have to be organized on a transnational basis. (Kel-
man, 1968, p. 664)

Thus the ideology of the nation-state, by insisting that the task of meeting
the needs and interests of the population must be entrusted to the unit that
reflects their national identity, becomes dysfunctional by erecting barriers
to alternative patterns—supranational or transnational in scope—of organiz-
ing for those functions that individual states cannot handle effectively.

The second dysfunctional aspect of the nation-state also derives from the
underlying assumption of nationalist ideology that only a system reflect-
ing the population’s ethnic character can properly look out for its needs
and interests. . . . If there are strong ethnic and cultural divisions within a
state, then this ideology may interfere with the government’s ability to
organize the society effectively” (Kelman, 1968, p. 664). Such ethnic divi-
sions and the associated feelings of discontent are not only hampering the
development of national unity in new states, but are creating serious unrest
in older, well-established states and have even, in some cases, caused them
to break up. These conditions point to the importance of supranational
arrangements to satisfy some of the sentimental and instrumental concerns
of population segments within nation-states. At the same time, they rein-
force the importance of transnational arrangements, in view of the cross-
cutting links that exist between subnational groups (such as ethnic mini-
states) and groups in other countries with which they share elements of iden-
tity and interest.

These dysfunctional aspects of the nation-state—quite apart from any
ideological commitment to the concept of a global society—underline the
critical importance of transnational efforts to the achievement of human
dignity. This consideration, taken together with the positive functions of
patriotism and the potentially liberating role of nationalism, makes the en-
tension and protection of human dignity a dialectical process, characterized
by an inherent contradiction (Kelman, 1977a). On the one hand, dignity
implies the right of each group to express its national identity, to control its own fate, to resist domination and oppression, and to protect the interests of its members. In the context of the current international system, the exercise of these rights often takes the form of establishing an independent nation-state or a highly autonomous unit within a larger state. On the other hand, extension and protection of human dignity require the development of a global society, in which many important functions—including the basic function of protecting the population against threats to their survival in the form of war, starvation, and repression—are provided on a cooperative transnational basis. In view of the increasing interdependence of nation-states, this implies a diminution of national sovereignty and of the paranoia that the nation-state currently enjoys. We are thus faced with the contradiction that nationalism represents both a vehicle for and a barrier to the enhancement of human dignity.

There is no easy formula for resolving this contradiction. For example, the argument that nationalism is a progressive force in national liberation movements and former colonies but a reactionary force in established states is specious on at least two grounds. First, it ignores the fact that creation of a new nation-state has a potentially liberating effect precisely because of the powerful role of nation-states within the international system, which is preserved and modeled by the established states. Second, it draws an unrealistically sharp line between new and established states, forgetting that new states quickly become established in the sense of developing vested interests and patterns of internal discrimination or external aggression; and that established states, under the prevailing conditions of interpenetration, may well find their autonomy threatened. Thus, the dialectical character of nationalism cannot be glossed over by the application of a double standard. Even the nationalism of oppressed peoples is profoundly problematic: Their right to the expression of their national identity and determination of their own fate cannot justify the perpetuation of the nationalistic model of nation-states unrestrained in their exercise of national sovereignty and their pursuit of national interests. This model, in any part of the world, is inconsistent with the requirements of human survival. In short, the realization of human dignity depends on a balance between fulfillment and containment of nationalist aspirations.

REFERENCES

——— (1987). The political psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: How can we overcome the barriers to a negotiated solution? Political Psychology 8:547-63.