

PATRIOTISM

IN THE LIVES OF
INDIVIDUALS
AND NATIONS

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CHAPTER EIGHT

**Nationalism, Patriotism, and National Identity:
Social-Psychological Dimensions**

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One of the paradoxes of the contemporary world is the continuing and, in many places, growing strength of nationalist ideology at a time when the weaknesses and limitations of the nation-state are becoming increasingly apparent. Many observers agree that the basic conditions for achieving human dignity—for meeting human needs and assuring human rights—must be established on a worldwide basis, through cooperative transnational efforts. To this end, nation-states must be prepared to yield a degree of their national sovereignty, to expand their range of empathy, and to think in terms of global rather than entirely national interests. In short, the realization of human dignity in the contemporary world requires changes in the nationalistic assumptions that have dominated the international system and curtailments of nationalistic demands and aspirations. Yet, throughout the world, people continue to look to the nation-state as the primary provider of human dignity. The populations of established nation-states expect the state to ensure that their needs will be met and their rights protected. At the same time, the idea of the nation-state is repeatedly infused with new energy and vitality as movements of national liberation seek to establish independent states to assure dignity for oppressed populations.

The central role of the nation-state as provider of dignity is rooted in nationalist ideology. Nationalist ideology in turn draws heavily on patriotism as the source of the population's trust in and support for the state. After some initial definitions, I shall examine the characteristics and assumptions of nationalist ideology and then turn to some of the social-psychological

forces—deriving largely from attachment to an identification with people and land—that account for its strength and endurance.

DEFINITIONS OF NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM

Following Hans Kohn (1968) and many other writers, nationalism can be conceived as the ideology of the modern nation-state or of any movement directed toward the establishment of a new nation-state. Whatever its specific form, nationalism is an ideology that provides a justification for the existence or creation of a state defining a particular population, and that prescribes the relationship of the individual to that state. According to nationalist ideology, the nation-state is the political unit in which paramount authority or sovereignty is vested. It is placed at the pinnacle of power and entitled to overrule both smaller and larger political units. Nationalist ideology also entitles the nation-state (or the nationalist movement) to the support of its members in establishing and maintaining the state's independence, integrity, and effective functioning.

Patriotism is an ideology—or a set of attitudes and beliefs—that refers to individuals' attachment and loyalty to their nation and country. Nation and country in this ideological system are integrally connected with one another. The country represents not merely a geographic location, but the *patria*, the homeland—the homeland of one's people. Country and nation are not necessarily coterminous: Some members of the nation may live outside of the country, and some inhabitants of the country may be part of a different nation. Still, the concept of patriotism refers to the conjunction between country and nation—to loyalty to one's people and its land.

Patriotism is not necessarily directed toward a nation-state. It is a psychological orientation that predates the advent of the nation-state and is thus much older and more general than modern nationalism. Moreover, patriotism may be directed toward a unit that is part of a nation-state (as in the case of the Basques in Spain or the Scots in the United Kingdom), or that spans several nation-states (as in the case of the Kurds or the Somalis), or that is claimed by another people for its nation-state (as in the case of the Palestinians). In the modern era, patriotic sentiments that do not have an existing nation-state as their object often become translated into demands for an independent state corresponding to the territory that the patriots regard as their homeland. In other words, the centrality of the nation-state in the global system creates a dynamic tendency to transform patriotism into separatism, irredentism, or other expressions of nationalism. This transformation, however, is not inevitable; it is most likely to occur when members of an ethnic or national group come to see the establishment of a state of their own as the proper response to a sense of grievance and oppression, or to a historical opportunity, or both.

While patriotism is not always linked to a nation-state or to the quest for a separate state corresponding to the national group, the reverse relationship probably holds true universally. That is, existing nation-states and movements directed toward establishment of such a state characteristically rely on patriotism as a major source of legitimacy, of popular support, and of member loyalty. The leaders of nation-states or nationalist movements utilize patriotic sentiments that exist within the population, or try to create such sentiments to the extent that they do not already exist, to instill nationalist ideology in the population. In effect, nationalism—the ideology of the modern nation-state—appropriates people's attachment and loyalty to the country as a basis for their attachment and loyalty to the state.

To clarify the relationship between nationalism and patriotism, it is useful to elaborate somewhat on the ideological basis of the modern nation-state.

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE NATION-STATE

The ultimate justification for establishing, maintaining, and strengthening a nation-state—that is, a political system with internationally recognized jurisdiction over a particular population—is that this system is most naturally and effectively representative of that population. It is this feature that provides legitimacy and cohesiveness to the modern nation-state. In principle, the nation-state—as its name implies—is representative of the population by virtue of the fact that its political boundaries also constitute national boundaries. The presumed correspondence of the political entity to an ethnic, cultural, and historical entity, with which at least large portions of the population identify—i.e., to which their patriotic sentiments are directed—leads to the further presumption that the nation-state assures the best protection of the needs and interests of the population.

Thus, the nation-state is perceived as a source of personal dignity in two respects: Insofar as it represents the ethnic and cultural identity of the population, it provides individuals a sense of participation and control over their own fate. Through identification with an independent state, individuals affirm and express their personal identity and experience an enhanced sense of self-respect and self-transcendence. At the same time, insofar as individuals are included within the boundaries of the political system and are secure in their citizen status, they can rely on the nation-state to meet their basic needs and protect their interests.

The reality of the nation-state rarely lives up to the ideal model envisioned by nationalist ideology. The very composition of most states violates, to a greater or lesser degree, the assumption that the political entity corresponds to a national (i.e., ethnic-cultural) entity. Many nation-states comprise a variety of distinct ethnic and cultural groups. Some of these

groups—usually ethnic minorities—may come to feel that their group identity is not adequately reflected by the system. Along with this deprivation in identity, these population groups often experience exclusion and discrimination, so that their needs and interests are inadequately met. Ethnic, linguistic, or religious divisions within nation-states may erupt in conflicts ranging from demands for cultural autonomy, through separatist movements and language riots, to civil warfare and secession. Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Spain, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, the former Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia are just a few of many examples of states in which ethnic and cultural divisions have led to recent conflicts with varying degrees of violence. Such conflicts provide vivid reminders of the extent to which nation-states—both old and new—deviate from the model specified by nationalist ideology.

Thus, there is an inherent circularity in the defining characteristic of the nation-state: The state derives its legitimacy and claim to citizens' loyalty from the fact that it represents a nation, but often a population is considered or becomes a nation only by virtue of the fact that it is part of the same state. All nationalist movements are marked by this duality: They aim both to build a state around the existence or idea of a nation and to build a nation around the existence or idea of a state. The correspondence between state and nation is never a given; it must, at least in part, be achieved. The leaders of a new state or a nationalist movement see nation building as a major part of their task, even when they are dealing with a homogeneous population. And when the population is ethnically diverse, the task of nation building seems never to be completed—even in well-established nation-states, as recent events have demonstrated.

THE CONCEPT OF NATION

Since the correspondence between state and nation is so central to nationalist ideology, it is necessary to take a look at the concept of nation. I am not referring here to *nation* in the political sense of the population of an internationally recognized nation-state (or as shorthand for nation-state, as in "United Nations"), but to *nation* in the sense of an ethnic-cultural unit that has a meaning apart from the shape of political boundaries. One might substitute the term nationality or people for the term nation as I am using it here. Nations in this sense, of course, have existed long before the emergence of the modern nation-state.

An almost ubiquitous characteristic of groups that we define as nations is their residence in a common territory that they consider their homeland, or else their shared memory of such a territory—of an ancestral homeland that they may have lost but not forgotten—and their shared hope to be

reunited in a common territory. The centrality of territory in the concept of nation is reflected in the conjunction between land and people that is the focus of patriotic sentiments, as mentioned above. But inhabiting the same territory—or sharing the memory of or aspiration to such a territory—is not a sufficient condition for defining a group as a nation. Group members must also share certain other cultural elements.

We generally think of a nation as a group of people who—whether or not they live in the same land—share a common language, a common history, a common tradition, a common religion, a common way of life, a common sense of destiny, and a common set of memories and aspirations. Not all of these common elements need to be present before we define a group as a nation, nor is there any single objective criterion that is essential to the definition. But there must be enough communality to provide a ready basis for communication. We can follow Karl Deutsch's (1953) operational criterion here in describing a nation as a community of individuals who—in the absence of personal acquaintance—find little difficulty in establishing common ground for communication. Thus, the boundaries of a nation represent the line at which a qualitative change in the ease of communication occurs; that is, communication is smoother and more comfortable among individuals within than across these boundaries.

Such a community cannot develop unless its members share certain important aspects of culture, but the specific aspects held in common may vary from nation to nation. No one aspect is crucial to the definition of a nation; there are a variety of elements that are functionally equivalent as bases for communication. For example, a group may constitute a nation even if its members do not share the same language or religion, as long as they share other important values and experiences that provide a ready-made basis for communication among them. Language and religion are important unifying elements for a nation, but surely the Swiss can be described as a nation despite their linguistic divisions and the Germans despite their religious differences.

The mere existence of common cultural elements among members of a collectivity is not enough to define them as a nation. They must also have the *consciousness* that these common elements represent special bonds that tie them to one another—in short, the consciousness of being a nation. Floyd Allport made this point in *Institutional Behavior* (1933) when he wrote that there is one fact on which the various definitions of "nation" are in agreement:

... namely, that the main criteria of nationality are psychological. There are certain traditions, historical perspectives, and principles possessed in common by the members of every national group which are both the evidence and the substance of their nationality. If an individual shares

these ideas with the others of his group, and like the others is loyal to them, he belongs to their nation; otherwise he does not belong to it, even though he may be of the same race as his fellows, speak the same language, and live in the same territory. . . . Individuals belonging to a certain nation are aware that they belong to it and, furthermore, this awareness is an essential part of nationality itself. (P. 138)

The consciousness of being a nation gives rise to the ideology we call patriotism. That is, patriotism is a set of attitudes and beliefs centering around attachment and loyalty to people and land, held by members of a group who have developed a sense of national consciousness. When patriotism is transformed into nationalism, this sense of national consciousness is drawn upon as a source of legitimacy of and loyalty to the nation-state (or the movement demanding such a state).

The link between the sense of national consciousness and the ideology of patriotism brings to mind Fishman's (1968) useful idea that an ethnic group becomes a nation when it begins to *ideologize* its customs and way of life. That is, it goes beyond the conception of "this is the way we do things" to a conception of "there is something unique, special, and valuable about our way of doing things." It is ideologizing of this sort that makes it possible to develop allegiance to and invest one's identity in a collectivity that goes beyond—in both space and time—one's primary-group, face-to-face contacts.

Historically, such a process of ideologizing ethnic characteristics is likely to have occurred whenever there were energetic individuals and groups who had an interest in creating loyalty to a wider group—in order, for example, to establish a new religion, or to expand their economic activities, or to broaden the base of their political power. Who was to be included in this wider group depended, in each case, on the particular interests of the nation builders and on the opportunities available to them. Thus, the boundaries of the newly formed nations and the elements of communality that characterized them tended to be somewhat arbitrary. At the same time, they could not be completely arbitrary, because there had to be some common cultural characteristics as the starting point for the work of ideologizing. Serbs and Croats provide a good example, so prominent in the current news, of the element of arbitrariness in the drawing of national boundaries. These two groups share a common language and common culture that, in principle, could well have served to define them as a single nation. Yet, differences in religion and historical experience have been magnified to define them as separate nations, confronting each other in a bitter conflict of long standing.

I am proposing, then, that consciousness as a nation and patriotism typically develop within a group of people as a result of deliberate efforts

to ideologize common cultural characteristics and experiences and to mobilize people around them. This process is designed to create wider loyalties—loyalties that extend to people who are not part of one's immediate community but are defined as part of the larger nation. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that defining a group as a nation represents a marking-off process—a process by which some are included and others excluded. Thus, the development of national consciousness has the effect of both broadening group loyalties and narrowing them, of both uniting people and dividing them. When national consciousness and patriotic sentiments become focused on a nation-state, these contradictory tendencies become accentuated by the drawing of political boundaries, which serve to both unite and divide. This contradiction, then, becomes another central part of the dialectic that characterizes nationalist ideology.

PERSONAL ACQUISITION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Insofar as a group of people have come to see themselves as constituting a unique, identifiable entity, with a claim to continuity over time, to unity across geographical distance, and to the right to various forms of collective self-expression, we can say that they have acquired a sense of national identity. National identity is the group's definition of itself as a group—its conception of its enduring characteristics and basic values; its strengths and weaknesses; its hopes and fears; its reputation and conditions of existence; its institutions and traditions; and its past history, current purposes, and future prospects. National identity is carried by the individual members of the group, but it is not coterminous with the sum of the conceptions of individual group members. For one thing, it has an independent existence in the form of accumulated historical products, including written documents, oral traditions, institutional arrangements, and symbolic artifacts. For another, different segments of the group differ widely in their degree of active involvement in the nation and emotional commitment to it: Various leadership elements and particularly active and committed subgroups are far more instrumental in defining the national identity than the rank-and-file members.

Clearly, national identity—as a collective phenomenon—is complex and differentiated. It varies over time and circumstances. Its strength and nature depend on the kind of mobilization processes that occur within the group and on the particular leadership elements most responsible for that mobilization. I assume that national identity always represents a combination of historical realities and deliberate mobilization. Mobilization cannot take place without the existence of significant elements of common culture and historical experience on which the leadership can draw in mobilizing support for political action within the group. What aspects of identity will

become central, however, is determined by the characteristics of the leadership that dominates the mobilization and by the historical context that shapes this leadership's interests and opportunities.

Recognizing its complexity and fluidity, one can think of national identity as a collective product—in the form of a system of beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations—that is transmitted to group members in the course of their socialization and mobilized through a variety of communications over the course of their lives. It is reflected in the consciousness of individuals to different degrees and in different ways, depending on the nature of the socialization and mobilization experiences to which they are exposed and the way in which they handle these. National identity and its component elements become incorporated in an individual's personal identity through various processes of social influence. A social-influence analysis of the incorporation of national identity in an individual's personal identity can address itself to two issues (corresponding to the two elements of group identity distinguished by Simon Herman, 1977): (1) the adoption of the specific elements of the national identity, i.e., of the beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations that make up the national identity as a collective product; and (2) the development of an orientation to the nation itself.

In asking how national identity is incorporated in the personal identity of individuals we are, in large part, asking how individuals accept the specific elements that make up the national identity. To what extent do they adopt the normatively prescribed beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations of the group?

Adoption of these elements may affect people's personal identity by determining an important component of that identity: their self-definition as members of the nation. They may come to share, to varying degrees, such collective aspects of the national identity as images of the nation itself and of other groups in its environment, conceptions of national history and goals, attitudes toward national traditions and symbols, and memories of national experiences and achievements. These collective identity elements, insofar as they are adopted by individuals as their own, become important parts of these individuals' definition of who and what they personally are.

Adoption of the specific elements of national identity may also affect individuals' personal self-definition more generally by contributing to their worldview. A national identity typically contains within it beliefs and values pertaining to the meaning of human existence, the nature of social institutions, the conduct of human relationships, and the definition of the ideal personality. These are rooted in the group's historical experiences, and reflected and elaborated in its documents, traditions, and institutional forms. Such beliefs and values, insofar as they are adopted by individuals as their own, influence the way these individuals view the world and their own place in it and the way they conceive their relationship to the environment.

The adoption of elements of national identity involves a combination of knowledge, affect, and action. If national identity is to become an integral part of an authentic personal identity, individuals must acquire some substantive knowledge of the historical and cultural context of its beliefs and values; they must see these beliefs and values as personally meaningful to them; and they must somehow translate them into concrete practice in their daily lives.

The second issue in the incorporation of national identity in the personal identity of individuals concerns the development of their orientation to the nation itself. How central and significant a part does membership in this particular group play in their personal identity? To what extent is their definition of who and what they are linked to that group? How salient is this group membership in their daily lives, how intense is their involvement with it, how strong their commitment and loyalty to it, how solid their sense of belongingness in it?

The person's orientation to the nation can be explored not only in quantitative, but also in qualitative terms. That is, we can ask not only about the strength of involvement in the nation, but also about the nature of that involvement. Table 8.1 summarizes a distinction between six different patterns of personal involvement in a national group, derived from my earlier analysis of patterns of involvement in the political system (Kelman, 1969; see also Kelman and Hamilton, 1989).

The rows of the table identify two sources of attachment to the group, that is, two motivational bases for extending loyalty to the group: sentimental attachment and instrumental attachment. These two types of attachment correspond to Simon Herman's (1977) distinction between alignment with a group on the basis of a feeling of *similarity* or on the basis of a feeling of *interdependence*—though his focus is on intermember perceptions and mine on perception of the group.

Sentimental attachment refers to people's attachment to a group based on perception of that group as representative of their personal identity—as somehow reflecting, extending, or confirming their identity. Insofar as it represents them, as persons and as parts of a collectivity, they extend loyalty to it. Instrumental attachment refers to people's attachment to a group based on perception of that group as meeting their personal needs and interests and those of the other members of the social category encompassed by the group. Insofar as the group is seen as instrumental to the achievement of their goals, they extend loyalty to it. The two sources of attachment are analytically distinct and need not go together empirically, but they do tend to generate and reinforce one another. That is, instrumental attachment to a group also tends to strengthen the perception of that group as representative of one's identity, and sentimental attachment also encourages members to look to that group for the fulfillment of their needs and interests.

The two sources of attachment jointly determine the strength of people's patriotism, of their loyalty and commitment to the group. This commitment may express itself in different ways, however, depending on the basis of people's integration in the group and the nature of their orientation to it. The columns of table 8.1 distinguish three types of orientation (or bases of integration): rule orientation, role orientation, and value orientation.

We can speak of rule orientation when people's relationship to the group is based primarily on their acceptance of the group rules. They recognize the group's authority to set rules and their obligation to adhere to them. In return, they expect to be included within the definition of group membership and to have access to their fair share of the resources that are at the disposal of the group. In a national group living within its own nation-state or within a stable and traditional ethnic community, members' behavior is governed by a widely accepted set of rules and regulations, and adherence to these rules often has a direct bearing on individuals' acceptance by the group and access to resources on which they depend. For members of a national group living outside of a state of their own or of a tightly knit ethnic community, rule orientation refers to a relationship to the group based on adherence to those minimal rules that would assure their continuing acceptance within the definition of a member of the national community. Typically, this means assertion of one's national identity on those occasions at which group survival becomes an issue. For individuals who are primarily rule oriented, relationship to the national group represents what I have called elsewhere (Kelman, 1977a) a conferred or nominal identity element in their personal identities.

We can speak of role orientation when the person's relationship to the group is based on identification with and active involvement in group roles. In particular, at the sentimental level, role-oriented individuals are identified with the role of group member: They are emotionally involved in it, regard it as a central part of their self-definition, and derive a sense of status enhancement and self-transcendence from it. What is significant for them, however, is possession of the role itself rather than the specific content of that role and its relationship to their broader value system. They tend to accept the role as prescribed — more or less totally and uncritically — without integrating it with their other values and beliefs. In short, their commitment to the group can be described as a vicarious element of their personal identity (Kelman, 1977a). In the typical examples of role orientation, sentimental and instrumental features often coincide: Involvement in national community affairs provides an opportunity not only to derive vicarious satisfaction from enacting the group member role but also to participate in other satisfying role relationships.

Value orientation, charted in the third column of table 8.1, represents a relationship to the group based on a sharing of national values. Here

Table 8.1
Patterns of personal involvement in a national or ethnic group

Types of orientation to the group		Sources of attachment to the group		
Value Orientation (Internalization of group values)	Commitment to the group's traditions and defining values	Commitment to the group's institutional arrangements and operating values	Sentimental (Perception of the group as representative of personal identity)	
Role Orientation (Identification with group roles)	Emotional involvement in role of group member	Entanglement in social roles mediated by the group		Instrumental (Perception of the group as meeting personal needs and interests)
Rule Orientation (Compliance with group rules)	Acceptance of the group's authority to define membership	Acceptance of rules and regulations governing member interaction		

members have internalized the group's values because they find them congruent with their own value systems. Their commitment to the group thus represents an authentic element of their personal identity (Kelman, 1977a). It should be stressed that value orientation does not preclude responsiveness to issues of group survival, which I suggested as a characteristic of the rule oriented, or active involvement in the role of group member, which I suggested as a characteristic of the role oriented. If anything, value-oriented members should be more responsive to issues of group survival, because they are not merely concerned with the physical survival of the group but with the values for which it stands. Similarly, they may be more actively involved in the role of group member insofar as they see this role as a way of expressing their personal identity and promoting their personal values. What characterizes their relationship to the group, however, is that it goes beyond adherence to group rules and involvement in group roles and becomes an integral part of an authentic personal identity.

Patriotic commitment based on value orientation is likely to be more stable and more profound than the other types of commitment, but it is also more differentiated and more questioning. A rule-oriented loyalty has little depth and continuity but is likely to be elicited automatically if the proper symbols are brought into play. A role-oriented loyalty is particularly powerful in that it may represent a total and enthusiastic commitment to the group's cause. A value-oriented loyalty, on the other hand, is conditional; it does not promise support for the nation, right or wrong (cf. Nathanson's discussion of "moderate nationalism" in the present volume). Value-oriented members evaluate the actions they are asked to support on the basis of their own values and of the fundamental group values that they share, and are prepared to criticize and to dissent (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989, chapters 11-12). Such a commitment is less easily mobilized because it does not respond automatically to fear, guilt, and group pressures. But, in the long run, it is most conducive to national identity as a creative force that is both rooted in the historical national experience and responsive to the realities of national life in a changing environment.

MOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

One of the most interesting questions, from a psychological point of view, concerns the motivational forces that make it possible to mobilize national consciousness and to create the broader patriotic loyalties that it entails. To be sure, the mobilization of national consciousness often builds on an experience of deprivation and a sense of grievance within a group, such that the national cause comes to be seen as a more adequate way of meeting the insurmountable needs and interests of the group. But the pursuit of personal

or subgroup interests can hardly explain the powerful identifications and loyalties that the nation and the homeland generate and the degree to which these maintain and perpetuate themselves. Certainly the self-sacrificial behavior that the national cause so often elicits cannot be entirely understood in terms of rational calculations of costs and benefits.

Self-sacrifice on behalf of the nation and its country is particularly striking when we keep in mind that the nation is an abstract unit: It is not a primary group in whose midst individuals lead their daily lives, but a large group, consisting of numerous people whom they have never met nor expect to meet—a group that far exceeds their personal experience in time and space. I propose that this unit generates such powerful identifications and loyalties because it brings together two central psychological dispositions: the need for self-protection and the need for self-transcendence.

The need for self-protection leads to a strong tendency to identify with those who are extremely close to us, the members of our immediate families whose daily lives and fates are closely interwoven with our own. The family becomes an extension of the self and the protection of family members becomes almost indistinguishable from protection of the self. This tendency—within the individual and within the species—can probably be traced to the realities of the infant's dependence on its parents and of the interdependence of members of the same living unit. In typically human fashion, family loyalty becomes elaborated in a variety of cultural forms that go far beyond the realities of dependence and interdependence for self-protection.

Whereas the need for self-protection leads to an identification with those closest to the individual, the need for self-transcendence leads to an identification with groups that go far beyond the self in time and space. Such a need is ultimately rooted in human awareness of our own mortality. The search for meaning in the face of knowledge of our impending death disposes us to look at ourselves as part of a larger process that goes beyond ourselves—that existed long before we arrived on the scene and will continue to exist long after we are gone. Loyalty to a self-transcending cause and readiness to sacrifice one's self to such a cause thus give meaning to our existence in the face of our awareness of its finite nature.

The nation, according to this view, has the capacity for engendering such powerful identifications and loyalties because it is a unit of intermediate size—considerably more inclusive than the face-to-face groups of our daily lives, but considerably more exclusive than the whole of humanity. As such, it is a sufficiently small and parochial unit to draw on the primordial attachments rooted in the need for self-protection, but it is a sufficiently large and extensive unit to satisfy the quest for self-transcendence. Identification with the nation represents the transformation of primordial attachments into commitment to an abstract, transcendent entity.

Attachment to the homeland similarly reflects the needs for both self-protection and self-transcendence. On the one hand, land is a source of basic security, providing food, shelter, and the personal space required for the maintenance of a sense of self. These protective functions of land are implied in the concepts of territoriality and the territorial instinct that have such an important place in the writings of ethologists and other biologically oriented students of behavior. On the other hand, land is an instrument for self-transcendence. It serves as a source and symbol of power and wealth. Most important, it provides stability and continuity over time: It is the concrete national heritage that is passed on from generation to generation and exists in perpetuity.

The extent to which attachment to nation and country draws on familial attachments is evident from the use of such terms as fatherland (*patria*) and mother tongue, which can be found in many languages and cultures. In the course of childhood socialization, loyalty to the nation is often developed as an extension of loyalty to the family. To serve and defend the country comes to be seen as a way of demonstrating love for one's parents and protecting family and home. Similarly, loyalties to the local community and to the church are enlisted in the national cause. Thus, patriotism becomes the equivalent of expressing one's devotion and doing one's duty to family, community, and church.

At the same time that loyalty to nation and country expresses these primordial attachments, it extends far beyond the immediate boundaries of time and space. It represents identification with a population that is spread out over a wide geographical area—often, in fact, dispersed across the world—and to which a person feels a sense of belonging and closeness quite apart from any experience or expectation of personal contact. Moreover, this object of identification extends backward and forward in time: Most national causes have their histories and myths about the origins of the group, often in the distant past, and their ideological commitments to the group's survival and to the fulfillment of its destiny in the unending future.

There are, then, powerful psychological and social processes, linked to the needs for self-protection and self-transcendence, that generate loyalty to the nation—or, to be more precise, to a unit of intermediate size such as the nation. One might then define the nation—without being entirely circular—as that unit around which these important elements of self-identity have been successfully mobilized for a particular group of people.

The mobilization of national consciousness, as has already been pointed out, is often associated with the promise that, by rallying around the national cause, people will find more adequate ways of meeting their needs and interests. Insofar as people believe that the national movement can indeed speak to their instrumental concerns, they are more likely to identify with the nation and develop a sense of loyalty to it. The relationship,

however, is likely to work in the other direction as well. Insofar as a group of people have developed a sense of national consciousness and have invested their identity in the nation, they are more inclined to look to that unit for the satisfaction of their material needs. A group that represents their identity can be trusted more readily and completely to look out for their welfare and advance their interests.

Again, this trust can be seen as an extension of familial attachments, rooted in the need for self-protection and the awareness of interdependence within the immediate living unit. At the same time, a larger unit like the nation also offers opportunities for self-transcendence at the instrumental level. It provides individuals with a larger arena in which to develop themselves, to advance economically, to express themselves artistically or scientifically, or to pursue various other professions or occupations. A new national entity represents, in other words, a larger market, a larger audience, a larger constituency, and a larger support system, particularly for rising elites whose opportunities for self-development and self-utilization are limited within existing structures.

In sum, I have proposed that the coming together of the needs for self-protection and self-transcendence creates powerful identifications with the nation and loyalties to it. Since the nation speaks simultaneously to these two basic needs, individuals are prepared to invest their identity in it and likely to develop what I have called sentimental attachments to it. At the same time—and again through the mediation of these two needs—people come to see the nation as the best way to meet their more material interests and are thus likely to develop instrumental attachments to it. Loyalty to the nation thus represents a blending of self-protection with self-transcendence, as well as a blending of sentimental or identity concerns with instrumental ones. These mixed inputs are reflected in the themes that dominate both patriotic and nationalist rhetoric: the themes of security and group survival, of power and expansion, of national self-expression and self-fulfillment. More generally, they create the special combination of selflessness and self-interest in the relationship of the individual to the nation, which is another feature of the dialectic that characterizes these ideologies.

My argument has focused on the process of mobilizing an ethnic group and turning it into a nation by ideologizing its unique ethnic characteristics. We must keep in mind that this process takes place over time and works with concrete, substantive contents. It involves far more than just declaring an ethnic group a nation. It is fair to say that in the process of mobilization an ethnic group in fact *becomes* a nation. It develops and refines political forms, societal arrangements, economic relations, cultural products, a language, a religious tradition. These are real changes that help to build the sense of community, the group consciousness, and the shared history that make for a nation. Over a long span of time, the process is cyclical in nature.

National consciousness may decline in a group over time; new historical developments may then lead to efforts to reawaken this consciousness—to remobilize the group around a national cause that may have been dormant for some time. Thus, the mobilization of national consciousness often represents a dual process of creating as well as discovering (or rediscovering) a sense of national identity.

THE POLITICAL EXPRESSION OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

In the modern world, national consciousness finds its clearest and most powerful political expression in the nation-state. People look to the nation-state to represent their national identity and protect their rights and interests. In return, they are prepared to extend allegiance to the state, insofar as they see it as corresponding to the nation. Thus, national consciousness and the patriotism it engenders are potentially important resources for political leaders.

Where it exists, national consciousness—with all the psychological and social forces that sustain it—can be a powerful source of unity and political legitimacy for the state (though not without its dysfunctional side effects). Where it does not exist, political leaders attempt to create a national consciousness with boundaries corresponding to the boundaries of the political system. In some established states this has been accomplished, with a new sense of nationhood developing despite initial ethnic and cultural differences. In many new states, however, and in many old ones as well, such a sense of national consciousness has yet to be achieved. What we find, in such situations, are efforts at nation building. Through the development of new symbols that encompass the entire population, and of new institutions that meet the needs and interests of that population, political leaders attempt to create, out of ethnically distinct groups and out of unintegrated individuals and localities, a single nation that corresponds to the political state. If such efforts succeed, the attachment and loyalty to that new and larger nation—the patriotic sentiments directed toward it—can then be utilized by the state as a source of legitimacy, of citizens' support for its policies, and of citizens' willingness to make sacrifices in pursuit of these policies.

Despite its shortcomings (especially from the point of view of ethnic minorities), the nation-state typically provides enough sentimental or instrumental satisfactions to enough people to hold their allegiance. The ability of the state to mobilize allegiance is aided by the fact that sentimental and instrumental satisfactions tend to generate and reinforce each other, as mentioned above. They can also partially substitute for one another. Thus, on the one hand, the perception of the state as representative of national identity

can compensate for failures to meet the population's needs and interests. On the other hand, the perception of the state as meeting the population's needs and interests can compensate for a lacking sense of national identity, and can in fact help to create such an identity. (Kelman, 1969, p. 285)

The near monopoly of the nation-state on the supply of instrumental and sentimental satisfactions is reinforced by the structure of the international system. Since the international system is organized around the nation-state as the predominant unit, the provision of important goods and services and the protection of important rights are channeled through the nation-state. For example, development aid—whether provided by individual states or by international organizations—goes to recognized nation-states. States can make trade arrangements, enter into military alliances, and sign a variety of agreements. Moreover, states—and only states—can confer the status and rights of citizenship upon individuals. In addition to its symbolic value as a source of personal pride and status enhancement, citizenship provides individuals with the right to travel and with protection when they are away from home. The significance of this protection is painfully apparent to stateless persons or groups, who are deprived of it and often find themselves at the mercy of others.

The structure of the international system and the central role of the nation-state within it help to account for the continuing strength of nationalist ideology. It is both understandable and in many ways rational for groups that feel oppressed or threatened to take the establishment or maintenance of an independent nation-state as the focus of their struggle, perceiving such a state as their vehicle for achieving dignity and security. Despite the fact that the nation-state rarely corresponds to the ideal model postulated by nationalist ideology, it contrasts favorably with the experience of foreign domination and colonial status, which by its nature denigrates a people's identity and neglects its needs and interests. An independent state provides opportunities, at least to certain elites, to gain control over their lives, to increase their economic and political power, to give expression to their cultural values and traditions. To the masses, it provides greater assurance that their needs will be sympathetically considered, and a greater feeling that they are respected, autonomous human beings. To be sure, the hopes for a better life in an independent state are often frustrated; foreign oppression may merely be replaced with domestic oppression and, for some minorities, membership in a nation-state may be tantamount to internal colonization. Nevertheless, we should not minimize the potential contribution of an independent nation-state to an oppressed people's dignity, even if it is only by enabling them to gain, through identification with the state, a vicarious sense of efficacy and importance.

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

To illustrate some of the implications of my conceptual analysis, let me turn to a brief consideration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which can best be understood as a conflict between two national movements, each struggling for its right to national identity and to national existence. Both movements evolved, at different times and in different ways, from patriotic sentiments—from attachments to land and people (cf. Hertzberg, 1975; Muslih, 1988). They have been transformed, however, into explicitly *nationalist* movements, each seeking to express the national identity of its people in an independent state, and each claiming the same land for the establishment of that state.

What is especially pronounced, if not totally unique, about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that it has been marked by a principled non-recognition of the other at a very basic level. Until recently—in fact until the signing on September 13, 1993, of the peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—neither side had fully recognized the other's national identity and its right to exist. Indeed, the very peoplehood of the other had been at issue across the decades. Historically, the core element of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been mutual denial of the adversary's national identity (cf. Kelman, 1978, 1992). In political terms, the denial of the other's identity has translated into systematic efforts to delegitimize the other (cf. Bar-Tal, 1989; Kelman, 1987).

On the Palestinian side, the PLO—the only recognized representative of Palestinian nationhood—for many years denied the legitimacy of Israel as a fundamental tenet of its ideology. But the rejection of Israel went beyond the state; it encompassed the very concept of a Jewish nation. Thus, for example, the Palestinian National Covenant explicitly stated that "Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nation. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own." To Israelis—and indeed to most Jews around the world—the definition of Jews as a purely religious group constitutes a denial of an obvious reality, rooted in their personal experience and their national consciousness. They can see it only as a blatant effort to undermine the legitimacy of Israel as a state designed to give expression to Jewish national identity.

Since the very idea of Jewish nationhood was denied by many Palestinians (and indeed throughout the Arab world), there was no conception that Jewish nationalism might be the driving force behind Zionism, behind the creation of Israel, and behind the identification of world Jewry with Israel. Various conceptions of Zionism and Israel that have been offered—such as those describing Zionism as a form of racism or Israel as a settler state or outpost of Western imperialism—failed to recognize Zionism as a national movement and Israel as the political expression of that movement.

Similarly, Israeli recognition of Palestinian nationhood has been reluctant and half-hearted. By the end of the 1970s, the existence of a Palestinian people was widely acknowledged in Israel, but there continued to be efforts to deny the Palestinians' claim to national distinctiveness and to define them, instead, as an ethnic minority or as part of the larger Arab nation. Historical arguments and observations about the ethnic character of Palestinians have been used by some to support the idea of Jordan as the appropriate vehicle to give expression to Palestinian national identity. Whatever their logical validity may be, such arguments ignore some of the central dimensions of Palestinian nationalism. Most Palestinians want an independent state as an affirmation of their separate national identity—as explicit recognition that they are a *nation* rather than merely the Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza or a collection of refugees. An independent state—even one with limited sovereignty, which most Palestinians have been ready to accept for some time—is of special significance to them because it contrasts with their bitter experience of decades of Israeli occupation, refugee status, and second-class treatment in most of the Arab world.

Furthermore, it is essential to Palestinians that their state be centered on Palestinian soil, because it is the loss of that homeland that is the main-spring of their national movement. The establishment of a state on Palestinian soil would address itself to the sense of injustice that pervades the Palestinian experience. It would represent at least a partial acknowledgment that an injustice has been done and is being rectified by the creation of an independent state. Finally, the central role assigned to the PLO by so many Palestinians in their view of national recognition derives from the fact that the PLO is the only organized and acknowledged body that has symbolized, expressed, and promoted Palestinian nationhood and independence. This does not mean that all Palestinians are enthusiastic about the PLO leadership at any given time. However, they see no alternative to the PLO as the carrier of Palestinian national independence.

In sum, for both sides, psychological resistance to the idea that the adversary is a *bona fide* nation has been a powerful element in the conflict. Only slowly and reluctantly have the parties begun to reconsider the prevailing view of "the other's nationalism as in some sense unnatural, historically unjustified, and a fiction (or perhaps a fraud) promulgated by a fanatical minority" (Kelman, 1978, p. 169).

I have argued that a realistic policy must proceed from an awareness by each side that it is dealing with an adversary that has all the characteristics of a nation, expressing itself through a national movement with its own dynamic and its own political forms. A group becomes a nation once its members perceive themselves as such and are ready to define their identities, to pursue their interests, and to engage in costly and self-sacrificial actions around that perception. There are, of course, certain objective

conditions that give rise to a national movement, and if these conditions are not met the movement is unlikely to succeed. However, for outsiders to insist that a group lacks the formal characteristics or the historical justifications for nationhood — i.e., that it *ought* not be a nation — is an exercise in futility. It is equally futile to downplay the authenticity of a nationalist movement by claiming that it is merely the handiwork of an aggressive elite that does not represent the population. All nationalist movements are in part acts of creation, in which an enterprising elite — in the pursuit of its own ideology and interests — takes the leadership in mobilizing national sentiments. Such an elite cannot succeed, however, unless there are national sentiments to be mobilized. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians have amply demonstrated the existence and authenticity of such national sentiments.

The resistance on each side to recognizing the nationhood of the other is rooted in the view that their respective national identities are inherently incompatible and that the fulfillment of one can be achieved only at the expense of the other. This view is a direct consequence of the fact that the two movements focus on the same land. For Palestinians, acknowledging Jewish nationhood implies acceptance of the right of Jews to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Many Palestinians have seen this as tantamount to qualifying or abandoning their own claim to Palestine and thus destroying the *raison d'être* of their national movement. For Israelis, acknowledging Palestinian nationhood implies acceptance of the right of Palestinians to establish an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza. Many Israelis have feared that such a state — particularly one that would carry the name “Palestine” — might suggest support of the Palestinians’ claim to the whole of Palestine and thus cast doubt on the legitimacy of Israel.

Each side has been concerned, then, that acceptance of the other’s nationhood would undermine the moral basis of its own claims — i.e., that its own claims would become more ambiguous, less self-evident, and more subject to debate if it recognized, even implicitly, that there may also be some moral basis to the claims of the other side. Such ambiguities are particularly threatening because the stakes for each side are extremely high. The two sides are not merely concerned about having a good case so that they can win debates or improve their bargaining postures. Rather, both are deeply afraid about their continuing national existence. Recognition of these genuine fears on both sides is essential to any understanding of this conflict.

Due to a combination of historical traumata and current realities, each group has perceived itself as particularly vulnerable and felt that its survival as a national group was in the balance. The anxiety about national survival has been magnified by anxieties about personal survival, since the destruction of the nation has been seen in the context of wholesale massacres. Each side has tended to belittle the fears of the other, often failing to understand the basis of these fears and considering them groundless and

hence inauthentic. When such fears have been voiced by leaders on the other side they have been viewed as propaganda ploys, and when voiced by common citizens as products of the leaders’ propaganda. These fears, however, though they may often be used for propaganda purposes, are very real — not only to the masses, but to the leaders as well. Both sides fear (with some historical justification) that the other is bent on destroying their national identity and their national existence — and, if necessary, is prepared to annihilate them physically in the process.

As long as fulfillment of the other’s national identity is perceived by each side as equivalent to the destruction of its own identity, neither will be prepared to accept the other’s national identity and its right to a state expressing it. To do so, in each side’s view, would be to participate in a process that directly imperils its own national existence. Thus, neither side could be expected to make a move to recognize the other unless and until it developed a sense of assurance that its own existence was secure. The great challenge — and a fundamental requirement — for resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been to create the psychological conditions that would provide such assurance to each party and thus make mutual acceptance possible.

The 1967 war exacerbated the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in that it led to Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and to the adoption of armed struggle as the central strategy of the Palestinian national movement. At the same time, however, the Palestinianization of the Arab–Israeli conflict, which began with the war of 1967 and became intensified with the onset of the *intifada*, the Palestinian uprising, in late 1987, created the conditions for resolution of the conflict. Paradoxically, it was only with the revival of Palestinian nationalism after 1967 that the compromise solution of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, alongside of Israel, emerged as a viable option (Kelman, 1988).

Prior to 1967, this option was psychologically unavailable. Palestinians tended to approach the conflict from the perspective of either their Arab identity (which required recapturing all of the Arab territory on which Israel was established) or their local identity (which called for return of Palestinian refugees to the specific towns or villages — within Israel — from which they had come). It is only as Palestinians began to adopt a *Palestinian national* perspective that a West Bank/Gaza state became a psychological option. Such a state would achieve a meaningful goal for a national movement and represent a reasonable end to the national struggle. It would allow Palestinians to exercise their right to national self-determination, to establish national sovereignty, and to obtain a territorial base for expressing their nationhood.

For Israelis, the growth of Palestinian nationalism — and especially its culmination in the *intifada* — also made the creation of a Palestinian state

on the West Bank and Gaza a more attractive option, provided Israeli security concerns would be adequately met. It has become clear to an increasing number of Israelis that incorporating large numbers of reluctant Palestinians into Israel would destroy the Jewish and/or the democratic character of their state and that neither Palestinian autonomy nor the Jordanian Option will satisfy Palestinian national strivings. The *intifada* in particular persuaded Israelis that the Palestinians were indeed a nation, prepared to organize and sacrifice to achieve their national aspirations.

The evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict thus suggests that, at least in some respects and at some historical junctures, nationalism may actually be part of the solution as well as part of the problem. Still, the solution did not come quickly or easily. Despite the growing awareness on both sides that it was in their long-term interest to end the conflict with a historic compromise, they were reluctant to move to the negotiation table. This reluctance can be traced to the existential fears and the internal divisions on both sides. Movement toward negotiation required many years of debate within each society and dialogue between them, in the context of major historical changes and a series of dramatic events, including the Sadat initiative in 1977, the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the onset of the *intifada*, and the PLO peace initiative culminating in the acceptance of a two-state solution at the 1988 meeting of the Palestine National Council.

The changes in the strategic situation due to the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War of 1991 finally created the conditions for initiating negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians as well as the Arab states. The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, however, lacked momentum until the Israeli government accepted the PLO as its negotiating partner and the two parties exchanged letters of mutual recognition, which culminated on September 13, 1993, in the signing of a Declaration of Principles for negotiating interim and final agreements. The negotiations that are still ahead will be long and difficult, but the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO represents a fundamental breakthrough in this conflict. By acknowledging each other's nationhood, which the two parties had systematically refused to do in the past, they have provided a basis for the mutual reassurance required for successful negotiations.

CONCLUSION

The clash of Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms is just one of many examples of the strength of nationalist ideology in the contemporary global system and of its role in international conflict. It is paradoxical that the spread of nationalism and its renewed vigor throughout the world come at a time when two dysfunctional aspects of the nation-state are increasingly being

recognized. These are related, respectively, to the growing interdependence between nation-states and the upsurge of ethnic divisions within nation-states. Our global interdependence for the achievement of international peace, social justice, and individual freedom has made it

increasingly evident that the nation state is no longer capable of serving some of the functions it was designed to serve. Foremost among these is the function of military security, which no state—no matter how powerful—can fulfill on a unilateral basis today. Newer and poorer states, in particular, cannot entirely rely on their own resources to carry out the functions of economic development and of meeting the health and welfare needs of their populations. Higher education, scientific research, and technological development are among those functions that will increasingly have to be organized on a transnational basis. (Kelman, 1968, p. 661)

Thus the ideology of the nation-state, by insisting that the task of meeting the needs and interests of the population must be entrusted to the unit that reflects their national identity, becomes dysfunctional by erecting barriers to alternative patterns—supranational or transnational in scope—of organizing for those functions that individual states cannot handle effectively.

The second dysfunctional aspect of the nation-state also derives from the underlying assumption of nationalist ideology "that only a system reflecting the population's ethnic character can properly look out for its needs and interests. . . . If there are strong ethnic and cultural divisions within a state, then this ideology may interfere with the government's ability to organize the society effectively" (Kelman, 1968, p. 664). Such ethnic divisions and the associated feelings of discontent are not only hampering the development of national unity in new states, but are creating serious unrest in older, well-established states and have even, in some cases, caused them to break up. These conditions point to the importance of subnational arrangements to satisfy some of the sentimental and instrumental concerns of population segments within nation-states. At the same time, they reinforce the importance of transnational arrangements, in view of the cross-cutting links that exist between subnational groups (such as ethnic minorities) and groups in other countries with which they share elements of identity and interest.

These dysfunctional aspects of the nation-state—quite apart from any ideological commitment to the concept of a global society—underline the critical importance of transnational efforts to the achievement of human dignity. This consideration, taken together with the positive functions of patriotism and the potentially liberating role of nationalism, makes the extension and protection of human dignity a dialectical process, characterized by an inherent contradiction (Kelman, 1977b). On the one hand, dignity

implies the right of each group to express its national identity, to control its own fate, to resist domination and oppression, and to protect the interests of its members. In the context of the current international system, the exercise of these rights often takes the form of establishing an independent nation-state or at least a highly autonomous unit within a larger state. On the other hand, extension and protection of human dignity require the development of a global society, in which many important functions—including the basic function of protecting the population against threats to their survival in the form of war, starvation, and repression—are provided on a cooperative transnational basis. In view of the increasing interdependence of nation-states, this implies a diminution of national sovereignty and of the paramountcy that the nation-state currently enjoys. We are thus faced with the contradiction that nationalism represents both a vehicle for and a barrier to the enhancement of human dignity.

There is no easy formula for resolving this contradiction. For example, the argument that nationalism is a progressive force in national liberation movements and former colonies but a reactionary force in established states is specious on at least two grounds. First, it ignores the fact that creation of a new nation-state has a potentially liberating effect precisely because of the powerful role of nation-states within the international system, which is preserved and modeled by the established states. Second, it draws an unrealistically sharp line between new and established states, forgetting that new states quickly become established in the sense of developing vested interests and patterns of internal discrimination or external aggression; and that established states, under the prevailing conditions of interpenetration, may well find their autonomy threatened. Thus, the dialectical character of nationalism cannot be glossed over by the application of a double standard. Even the nationalism of oppressed peoples is profoundly problematic: Their right to the expression of their national identity and determination of their own fate cannot justify the perpetuation of the nationalist model of nation-states unrestrained in their exercise of national sovereignty and their pursuit of national interests. This model, in any part of the world, is inconsistent with the requirements of human survival. In short, the realization of human dignity depends on a balance between fulfillment and containment of nationalist aspirations.

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