

CHAPTER 4

NEGOTIATING A
HISTORIC COMPROMISE

NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN THE
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS

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As expected, the United States–sponsored Annapolis conference between Israeli and Palestinian leaders in November 2007, attended by representatives of some 50 countries, including 16 Arab states, did not produce a dramatic breakthrough. The joint statement, in which President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert committed themselves to actively negotiate a two-state agreement, was quite general and vague and fell short of offering a statement of basic principles, which would address the key final-status issues—notably borders, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees—that a viable two-state agreement would have to resolve.

The conference did, however, present the best opportunity since the failure of the Camp David summit for a return to the serious negotiation of a final agreement on a two-state solution. Several factors pointed in this direction in the immediate aftermath of the conference. At Annapolis, Abbas and Olmert clearly committed themselves to such negotiations in a highly visible international forum. As a result, Abbas' political standing in his own community received an important boost. Olmert's post-Annapolis statements gave indications that he understood both the importance and the implications of a two-state solution from Israel's perspective and was prepared to educate his public in that direction. The Bush administration, especially in the person of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, was more actively engaged in promoting negotiations and preparing to monitor their outcome than ever before. And the participation of many Arab states, including Syria, in the Annapolis conference provided Abbas with important Arab support and provided Olmert the added incentive of improving Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors.

The fragility of these developments soon became apparent in the weeks after Annapolis. Olmert's forthcoming statements were overshadowed by the violence in Gaza and the expansion of settlements in the Jerusalem area. Abbas' standing in the Palestinian community was compromised by his inability to achieve significant changes on the ground or to help ameliorate Gaza's humanitarian crisis. U.S. attention to the peace process tended to be intermittent. Nevertheless, the challenge to those of us committed to reviving Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to maximize whatever opportunities present themselves in the current atmosphere of escalating violence and diminishing hope.

I saw such an opportunity in a statement by Haim Ramon, a vice prime minister of Israel (cited in the *New York Times*, February 12, 2008). In remarks that probably reflected the views of his Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, he said that Israel hoped to reach agreement with its Palestinian negotiating partners by the end of 2008 on a "declaration of principles" for peace, but not on a detailed peace treaty. Some observers viewed these remarks as another indication of the failure of the Annapolis conference, which envisaged a peace agreement by the end of the year.

In my view, however, the idea of a declaration of principles should be built upon rather than dismissed.

Depending on its precise nature, such a declaration could represent a dramatic breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To achieve this, it would have to go beyond a vague, general commitment to a two-state solution and state the fundamental principles on which such a solution must be based if it is to be perceived as fair and just by the two populations and offer them a positive vision of their future relationship. Without going into all the details, the statement would have to address the key final-status issues—notably borders, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees—that a viable two-state agreement would have to resolve. In essence, the statement would frame the envisaged final agreement as one of principled peace based on a historic compromise that meets the fundamental needs of both peoples, validates their national identities, and declares an end to the conflict and the occupation in a manner consistent with the requirements of fairness and attainable justice. I believe that such a statement, issued jointly by the two leaderships, could have a profound impact on public opinion in the two societies and mobilize the two publics' enthusiastic support for peace negotiations.

In the following paragraphs, I will describe the anomalous state of Israeli and Palestinian public opinion vis-à-vis peace negotiations, spell out the components of a joint statement of principles that could energize the publics in support of negotiations, summarize my reasons for expecting this effect, and finally comment on some of the conditions that might encourage the political leaderships to produce a visionary statement of principles along the lines I am proposing.

PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD NEGOTIATING A TWO-STATE SOLUTION

To gain some perspective on contemporary public opinion on the two sides, it is important to remember how much has changed in the past 40 years. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, indeed, a very long-standing and intractable conflict, and there is good reason to feel discouraged by

the obstacles to a peaceful resolution that arise whenever there seems to be a sign of progress. However, it is important to remember that, in the 1970s, the idea of negotiations between the Israeli government and the PLO toward the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Israeli-occupied territories was hardly on the horizon. Even within the Israeli peace movement, only a minority endorsed this idea. A 1978 article in *Foreign Affairs* in which Walid Khalidi, a leading Palestinian intellectual, embraced this formula was entitled “Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State” (Khalidi, 1978).

Today, the two-state solution is widely accepted among Israelis and Palestinians and around the world. Even elements of the Israeli right are now resigned to the establishment of a Palestinian state, although their conception of the nature of that state is not acceptable to Palestinians. The formula for a historic compromise in the form of a two-state solution began to take shape after the 1967 war and the resulting Palestinianization (or re-Palestinianization) of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Kelman, 1988). It took another quarter century, which brought major changes in the global and regional environment (including the end of the Cold War, the aftermath of the first Gulf War, the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, and the first intifada), to persuade Israeli and Palestinian leaders of the necessity of negotiating a compromise (Kelman, 1997). The growing number of unofficial interactions over the course of these years helped to persuade them of the possibility of doing so (Kelman, 1995, 2005). These developments culminated in the Oslo accords of 1993, which has been seen as

a major breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite its inherent flaws and despite the failure of the Camp David talks in the summer of 2000, the onset of the second *intifada* later that year, and the breakdown in the ‘Oslo process’ in 2001. (Kelman, 2005, pp. 41–42)

The major breakthrough of the Oslo accords was the mutual recognition between the PLO and the state of Israel, in effect acknowledging each other’s political legitimacy, which still stands despite the breakdown of the Oslo process itself.

I have written elsewhere (Kelman, 2007a) about the Oslo process’ ups and downs, which ultimately led to its collapse with the failure of the Camp David summit and the onset of the second intifada in 2000. Negotiations continued for several months after Camp David but ended completely after an apparently productive last round in Taba, Egypt, in January 2001. Despite the total breakdown of negotiations in 2001, the general shape of a two-state solution—with provisions on the key issues of borders, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees—that could be acceptable to the moderate elements in the Israeli and Palestinian communities and that would likely emerge if serious final-status negotiations were resumed is by now widely known. The negotiations in Taba came very close to such an agreement. Similarly, the Clinton points of December 2000 (Clinton, 2000), the People’s Voice Initiative of 2002 (Ayalon-Nusseibeh Statement of Principles, 2003), and the very ambitious Geneva Accord of 2003 (Geneva Accord, 2004) all envisaged a solution more or less along these lines.

Public opinion polls have consistently shown that majorities on both sides support a two-state solution loosely based on these parameters. Moreover, majorities in a joint poll conducted in late 2004 endorsed mutual recognition of the national identities of the two states after an agreement is reached: 70% of Israeli and 63% of Palestinian respondents accepted the concept of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people (Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll, 2005). And yet, the publics have not fully embraced such initiatives as the Geneva Accord, especially its formulas for resolving the issues of Palestinian refugees and sovereignty in Jerusalem. The main reason for the publics’ ambivalence has been the profound mutual distrust that has marked the relationship between the two communities since the failure of the Camp David summit and the onset of the second intifada. The prevailing narrative on each side has held that, while “we” have demonstrated our readiness to make the necessary compromises for peace, “they” have refused to do so. Opinion data bear out this conclusion. Shamir and Shikaki (2005), who posed the same questions to Israeli and Palestinian samples, found that both sides—in mirror-image

fashion—underestimated the extent of support for a two-state solution on the other side. The publics have been unwilling to support the painful concessions on such emotional and existential issues as the right of return and Jerusalem that were called for by the Geneva Accord and other initiatives, at a time when they have no confidence that the other side will reciprocate and follow through on its commitments.

The widely held belief on each side that there is no credible negotiating partner on the other side explains the anomalous findings of the opinion polls. Even as majorities on both sides have continued to endorse a two-state solution and some of the compromises it requires, majorities (with fluctuating percentages) have also supported anti-Israeli violence, including suicide bombings on the Palestinian side and violent and at times indiscriminate reprisals on the Israeli side. The view on each side seems to be that, because the other is not responding to “our” peaceful overtures, “they” leave us no choice but to use violence, “the only language they understand.” Public ambivalence also expresses itself at the electoral level. Palestinians gave Mahmoud Abbas a landslide victory in the presidential election, giving him a mandate to pursue negotiations, but then empowered Hamas in the legislative elections. Israelis supported Sharon and Olmert’s policy of unilateral disengagement from the occupied territories, but Olmert then seemed uncertain of sufficient public support as he moved toward the negotiating table. Importantly, support for violent tactics or hard-line leaders has not necessarily coincided with opposition to peace negotiations or a two-state solution.

In sum, we find ourselves in a situation in which majorities of both publics embrace a two-state solution and yet are not ready to give whole-hearted support to negotiations because of profound distrust in the ultimate intentions of the other side. I propose that, to energize public opinion toward final-status negotiations at this point, it is necessary to go beyond the pragmatic approach exemplified by the Oslo agreements, the Geneva Accord, or the People’s Voice Initiative. Pragmatism was essential to the considerable progress that has been made and continues to be essential to shaping the terms of a final agreement. But it is insufficient to the task of overcoming the current level of mutual distrust. It is unrealistic to expect

the publics to accept painful concessions—especially on such existential issues as the right of return and Jerusalem—on the grounds that there is no other option at a time when they are not persuaded that the other side can be trusted to live up to its commitments. To overcome the mutual distrust, the publics must be assured that it is possible to negotiate a solution that is fair, safe, and conducive to a better future.

To this end, the leaderships will have to adopt a visionary approach, transcending the balance of power and the calculus of bargaining concessions. They will have to come to recognize that, in a profound conflict over national identity and national existence, only an integrative, win-win strategy can provide a solution—that each can achieve the needed acknowledgments, commitments, and concessions from the other only by offering such acknowledgments, commitments, and concessions to the other.

This brings me back to the potential contribution of a joint statement of principles with which I began my remarks. As indicated, the statement I am advocating would complement and frame the pragmatic terms of a negotiated agreement by a joint vision of a principled peace, based on a historic compromise that meets the fundamental needs of both peoples, validates their national identities, and allows them to declare an end to the conflict consistent with the requirements of attainable justice. If such a framework is constructed through a joint Israeli-Palestinian process, it can reassure the two publics that the agreement is not jeopardizing their national existence and promises mutual benefits that far outweigh the risks it entails.

COMPONENTS OF A JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

The joint statement of principles, as I see it, would contain four main components:

1. Mutual recognition of the other’s national identity and attachment to the land, and commitment to a historic compromise that allows each people to express this identity in its own state within the land they both claim;

2. Spelling out what the logic of a historic compromise implies for the key final-status issues;
3. Highlighting the meaning of a historic compromise in terms of the nature of the peace that it brings; and
4. Offering a positive vision of a common future for the two peoples in the shared land.

To concretize what I have in mind, I composed a hypothetical draft of an Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement of Principles that Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert might present to their publics as the framework for final-status negotiations, a draft that was actually published as an op-ed article in the *Boston Globe* (Kelman, 2008). I did this with some misgivings, because I feel very strongly that any such statement must be produced by the parties themselves in order to reflect their concerns and engender their commitments. I offered this hypothetical draft only as a way of stimulating thought about reviving a meaningful Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the aftermath of the Annapolis conference. The text of this hypothetical draft may be found in the appendix. Let me discuss its four components, which I consider the essential elements of a framework for a principled peace.

First, the statement must be based on mutual recognition of the other's national identity and acknowledgment of both peoples' historic roots in the land and authentic links to it. Ideally, from my point of view, it would start with the proposition that the land—the entire land—belongs to both peoples. If the framers are not prepared to endorse such a strong departure from ideological positions, they could negotiate a softer formulation, for example, that the land is claimed—with some legitimacy—by both peoples and that both are deeply attached to it.

The statement would then proceed to acknowledge that the pursuit of the two peoples' national aspirations on the basis of their conflicting claims has led to decades of violent, destructive conflict, and it would express regret for the suffering that each people has caused the other in the course of this struggle. It would assert that neither people can prevail by military means at an acceptable cost and that continuation of the

present course may well lead to mutual destruction. Therefore, instead of pursuing a military solution to the conflict, the parties need to resolve it with a historic compromise, whereby the two peoples agree to share the land to which both are so deeply attached in a way that allows each to exercise its right to national self-determination, fulfill its national aspirations, and express its national identity in a state of its own within the shared land, in peaceful coexistence with the other's neighboring state.

Second, while details of the final agreement that reflects this historic compromise remain to be negotiated, the statement would affirm certain basic principles, dictated by the logic of the historic compromise. These principles must be followed in resolving the core issues—issues that engage each people's national narrative—in order to enable each people to maintain its national existence and express its national identity in its own state. In particular, the statement might address the issues of borders, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees along the following lines:

1. The borders between the two states would be drawn in a way that conforms with international legitimacy (as expressed in relevant UN resolutions) and establishes a Palestinian state (consisting of the West Bank and Gaza) that meets the criteria of independence, viability, governability, and contiguity within the West Bank. To this end, the borders would follow the 1967 armistice lines with minor, mutually agreed-upon adjustments, based on an exchange of West Bank territories that contain most of the Israeli settlers for Israeli territories of equal size and value, and with a secure link between the West Bank and Gaza.
2. In recognition of the central importance of Jerusalem to the national identities of both peoples, the city would be shared by the two states and contain the capital of each. The city's Jewish neighborhoods would be under Israeli sovereignty and its Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty, with joint administration of arrangements for security, freedom of movement, and municipal services for the entire city and for governance of the Old City. A plan of shared or joint sovereignty would be negotiated for the holy

sites, allowing each side control over its own sites and assuring free access to them from both parts of the city.

3. To insure the independence, viability, governability, and contiguity of the Palestinian state, Israeli settlements with extraterritorial rights and status (including separate roads and protection by Israeli troops) would be removed from the West Bank. The right of individual settlers to stay in place as Palestinian citizens or as resident aliens, subject to Palestinian law, would be negotiated.
4. Israel would recognize that the refugee problem and the right of return are central to the Palestinian national identity and national narrative and acknowledge its share of responsibility for the plight of the refugees. Concretely, the refugee problem would be addressed in all its dimensions, with comprehensive plans for financial compensation, regularization of the status of refugees in host countries, and resettlement when needed or desired. Refugees would be granted citizenship in and the right of return to the Palestinian state. Only a limited number, however, would return to Israel proper, in order to allow Israel to maintain its character as a Jewish-majority state.

Third, the statement would highlight the meaning of the historic compromise in terms of the nature of the peace that the final negotiated agreement is designed to put in place, that is, a principled peace, characterized by the following conditions:

1. Mutual recognition of the national identity of the other people and of each people's right to express this identity in an independent state within the shared land;
2. A sense that the agreement is not merely a product of the balance of power but is consistent with the principle of attainable justice and with international law and the international consensus;
3. An end to the occupation and to the conflict;
4. Integration of both states in the region and the international community.

Finally, the joint statement of principles that I am proposing for framing a negotiated agreement would offer a positive vision of a common future for the two peoples in the land to which both are attached and which they have agreed to share and of the future of the shared land itself: a vision that contemplates a secure and prosperous existence for each society, mutually beneficial cooperation between the two societies in various spheres (e.g., economic relations, public health, environmental protection, telecommunications, cultural and educational programs, tourism), regional development, and stable peace with ultimate reconciliation. Positive expectations for the future would begin to compensate the two populations for the losses inevitably entailed by a historic compromise. In this vision of a common future, the extent and speed of institutionalization of cooperative activities and the possibility that they may culminate in an economic union or even a confederation, conceivably including Jordan as a third partner, would be left to future developments and would depend on how the relationship evolves over time (Ma'oz, Khatib, et al., 2000).

A bold statement of a positive vision of a common future might call for a united country with divided sovereignty (Kelman, 2007b). This concept differentiates between state and country and allows both Israelis and Palestinians to maintain their attachment to the land as a whole, while claiming "ownership"—in the form of independent statehood—over only their part of the land. To lend reality to this concept, the vision requires a range of cooperative activities that treat the shared land as a unit and are designed to benefit each state and its population as well as the country as a whole. It would also require free movement across state borders so that citizens of the Palestinian state could visit Jaffa (and appreciate or even write poems about it), and Israeli Jews could come to worship at Abraham's tomb in Hebron. Such cross-border attachments would not be threatening to the other side in a context in which both sides acknowledge that each is attached to the entire land but relinquishes claims to ownership of the part of the land that constitutes the state of the other people. A vision of a united country with divided sovereignty might enable the two communities to build toward a new,

transcendent identity alongside their separate national identities, such that sharing the land would not be seen as equivalent to losing the land. This vision might be described as a one-country/two-state solution.

ANTICIPATED IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION

I have proposed that a joint statement of principles along the lines I have outlined can cut through the ambivalence of public opinion and mobilize wholehearted support for negotiations toward a two-state solution. Let me now summarize the reasons why I believe this to be the case, to which I have alluded in the course of my argument.

Let us keep in mind that opinion polls have consistently shown public readiness for a solution based on two states for two peoples. The publics are ambivalent about negotiations to this end because they are not convinced that there is a credible negotiating partner on the other side. The most important contribution of a joint statement of principles would be to reassure each public about the intentions of the other side and to reestablish trust in the availability of a negotiating partner. The fact that credible leaders on the other side have explicitly acknowledged your identity and tied achievement of their own national rights to achievement of your national rights provide the best reassurance that you are not jeopardizing your national existence by signing a peace agreement.

The mutual recognition of the other's national identity is not only reassuring to each people but also provides important affirmation of each national self-image. The conflict has been marked over the decades by systematic denial of each other's national identity and national rights—indeed, national existence. To at last have your identity recognized and the legitimacy of your claims acknowledged—to be told by the adversary that you have authentic roots in the land, that you belong in it and that it belongs to you—is an immensely liberating experience for each group. It is the long-sought confirmation by the other of what you have always known and the other has heretofore refused to acknowledge.

Moreover, the concept of a principled peace based on a historic compromise speaks to the two peoples' sense of justice. It promises them that

the injustices done to them are finally being addressed and—to the extent possible—rectified. Beyond that, it also enables them to feel that they are being fair and just in their dealings with their erstwhile adversary.

The historic compromise embraced by the proposed statement of principles also provides a rationale for the painful concessions that each side is asked to make. These concessions can be seen not just as losses that have to be sustained because they are the best that can be achieved in a bargaining process governed by the balance of power; instead, they can be seen as necessary elements of a historic compromise, in which both sides make concessions in order to achieve a solution that conforms to the principles of fairness and attainable justice and meets the basic needs and interests of both.

A key component of the proposed framework is the positive vision of a common future for the two peoples in the shared land. As indicated earlier, such a vision would begin to compensate the two populations for the inevitable costs that an agreement would entail. An agreement committed to the future welfare and security of both societies and to peace and reconciliation between them is capable of generating enthusiasm and energizing the two publics, both of which are exhausted by the unending conflict. A visionary approach has the potential of eliciting wholehearted public support in a way that strictly pragmatic formulations of the terms of a compromise agreement have been unable to do.

The acknowledgment that each people is attached to the entire land even though it claims only part of that land for its independent state (whether or not it goes so far as to call for a united country with divided sovereignty) may well strike a responsive chord in both publics. It makes it easier for people to accept the compromises entailed by an agreement by conveying the message that they are not losing the land by agreeing to share it.

CREATING FAVORABLE CONDITIONS

What are some of the conditions that might encourage political leaders to produce a statement of principles along the lines I have proposed?

To help create a supportive environment for constructing a joint statement of principles—and, by the same token, for negotiating a final peace agreement—it is necessary to introduce early and significant changes in the conditions on the ground, designed to improve the security, economic well-being, quality of life, and personal dignity of the two populations. The most urgent steps in this regard are (a) a cessation of violence and strengthening of security arrangements, including commitment and adherence to a ceasefire in the West Bank and Gaza; and (b) a cessation of all settlement activity, including expansion of existing settlements and land confiscation. Other issues that need to be addressed include releasing prisoners, facilitating the movement of people and goods, meeting the basic needs of the West Bank and Gaza population, and eliminating hateful language in education and the media. Whenever action on these immediate issues requires negotiations, these should be conducted without conditions and with the participation of whichever persons or agencies are relevant to the resolution of a particular issue. Visible improvements in the conditions on the ground are important in their own right; they would also enhance the atmosphere for developing the principled framework of a final agreement and for negotiating this agreement by increasing each public's trust in the seriousness of the other side's intentions, belief in the value of negotiations, and hope for a better future.

In addition to addressing such immediate intersocietal issues as the framing and conduct of final-status negotiations, it is necessary to pursue intrasocietal efforts to strengthen public support for the process and outcomes of the negotiations. It is important to provide openings in these efforts that will bring representatives of all major political tendencies within each society into the process, directly or indirectly. In so doing, it is particularly important to remember that Hamas remains a key actor, not only in Gaza, but in the West Bank as well. Negotiations that appear to serve the interests of Fatah at the expense of Hamas, or of the West Bank at the expense of Gaza, would lose legitimacy in the eyes of many Palestinians. Furthermore, it is important to engage in an active campaign of public education to acquaint the two publics with the values and

implications—the benefits as well as the necessary costs—of the historic compromise that is being negotiated.

I want to stress that I am not proposing that such efforts to create a supportive environment for constructing a joint statement of principles must precede work on the statement of principles. I believe that both strategies must be pursued simultaneously (Kelman, 2007b). Nor, for that matter, does the statement of principles need to be drafted before the onset of final-status negotiations. The statement of principles should, of course, be guiding the negotiations. But its other, equally important function is to frame the negotiated agreement in its presentation to the public.

Finally, let me then turn back to the statement of principles itself and comment on some of the conditions that might promote the construction of such a document. Its construction would be greatly facilitated by visionary leadership on one or both sides, as exemplified by Nelson Mandela or Anwar Sadat. Such leadership has not yet emerged on either side, but it may be waiting in the wings, ready to emerge when the need for it becomes clear. Outside powers, like the United States, could help in this regard by stressing the need for a visionary approach at this historical juncture. They could also contribute by encouraging the parties to think seriously about a statement of basic principles and identifying the issues that it must address, keeping in mind that, in the end, the document must be crafted by the parties themselves in order to reflect their concerns and engender their commitment. Remarks such as those by Haim Ramon about a declaration of principles, with which I began, can be used as a point of departure for endorsing the concept, while also stressing what form such a declaration must take if it is to energize the publics and revitalize the peace process.

Until visionary leadership emerges in the two societies, the primary initiative for constructing and disseminating a framework for a principled peace based on a historic compromise rests with civil society in the two communities. Civil society has already prepared the ground for such a project. There has been a wide variety of Israeli-Palestinian people-to-people projects, particularly in the last 20 years, promoting

communication, cooperation, and reconciliation between the two communities. More directly relevant are the Geneva Initiative (Geneva Accord, 2004) and the People's Voice Initiative (Ayalon-Nusseibeh Statement of Principles, 2003) mentioned earlier: Both are very ambitious civil-society enterprises that have—each in its own way—developed specific ideas for the terms of a final agreement, disseminated them widely, and actively sought public support for them in the two societies.

The need now is for civil-society efforts that build on these two important initiatives by constructing and disseminating a framework for the agreement, whose terms these initiatives have spelled out—in other words, by framing the agreement as a principled peace based on a historic compromise, which, I have argued, would reassure the publics and mobilize their wholehearted support. A track-two approach like interactive problem solving—which my colleagues and I have applied in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for more than three decades now (Kelman, 2005)—can contribute to such efforts by providing a joint process of “negotiating identity.” In this process, each side can acknowledge and accommodate the other's identity—at least to the extent of eliminating negation of the other and the claim of exclusivity from its own identity—in a context in which the core of its own identity and its associated narrative are affirmed by the other (Kelman, 2001). Ideas that emerge from such an interactive process can then be injected into the political debate and the political culture of each society.

CONCLUSION

A joint statement of principles along the lines proposed here would reassure the two publics about the intentions of the other side and help to reestablish trust in the availability of a negotiating partner. By advocating a principled peace that acknowledges each side's national identity and national narrative, that conforms to the dictates of attainable justice, that provides a rationale for the concessions each side is expected to make, and that offers a positive vision of the future for the two peoples in the land they share, it has the potential for energizing the two publics

and eliciting their full support for the negotiated agreement on a two-state solution. What I am proposing represents a step toward reconciliation. We usually think of reconciliation as a process that occurs after a political agreement has been signed. But, at least in this case, some significant movement toward reconciliation is necessary in order to enable the parties to reach a political agreement. This is indeed a visionary strategy, but it may well be the most realistic option available to the two leaderships.

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APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

1. The parties agree that the land that has been in dispute between the Jewish and the Palestinian peoples—the land that includes the state of Israel and the occupied territories (the West Bank and Gaza)—belongs to both peoples: both have historic roots in it, both are deeply attached to it, and both claim it as their national homeland. We are convinced that there is no military solution to the conflict resulting from these competing claims.

The attempt to impose a solution by violence has caused pain and suffering to both peoples for generations, which we deeply regret. The continuing conflict threatens to destroy the future of both peoples and of the land itself. We are therefore committed to ending the conflict by negotiating a principled peace, based on a historic compromise in the form of a two-state solution. We agree to share the land in a way that allows each people to exercise its right to national self-determination, to express its national identity, and to fulfill its national aspirations in its own independent, viable state within the shared land.

2. The details of a peace agreement that concretizes this historic compromise have to be negotiated, but we are committed to certain basic principles, dictated by the logic of the historic compromise, that must be followed in resolving the key issues in the negotiations. Specifically:
 - a. The borders between the two states will follow the 1967 armistice lines, with minor, mutually agreed-upon adjustments,

based on an exchange of West Bank territories that contain most of the Israeli settlers for Israeli territories of equal size and value, and with a secure link between the West Bank and Gaza. These borders are necessary in order to enable the Palestinian state to meet the criteria of true independence, viability, governability, and contiguity within the West Bank. Palestinians can accept the fairness of these borders because they conform with international legitimacy, as expressed in appropriate UN resolutions.

- b. Jerusalem will be shared by the two states and contain the national capital of each state, in recognition of the central importance of the city to the national identities of both peoples. Jerusalem's Jewish neighborhoods will be under Israeli sovereignty and its Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty, with jointly administered arrangements for security, freedom of movement, and municipal services for the entire city and for governance of the Old City. A plan of shared or joint sovereignty will be negotiated for the holy sites, allowing each side control over its own sites and assuring free access to them from both parts of the city.
- c. Israeli settlements with extraterritorial rights and status (including separate roads and protection by Israeli troops) will be removed from the Palestinian state in order to insure the state's independence, viability, governability, and contiguity. The right of individual settlers to stay in place as Palestinian citizens or as resident aliens, subject to Palestinian law, will be negotiated.
- d. In negotiating solutions to the problem of Palestinian refugees, Israel recognizes that the refugee problem and the right of return are central to the Palestinian national identity and national narrative, and acknowledges its share of responsibility for the plight of the refugees. Concretely, the refugee problem will be addressed in all its dimensions, with comprehensive plans for financial compensation, regularization

of the status of refugees in host countries, and resettlement when needed or desired. Refugees will be granted citizenship in and the right of return to the Palestinian state. Only a limited number, however, will return to Israel proper, in order to allow Israel to maintain its character as a Jewish-majority state.

3. The final negotiated agreement, based on a historic compromise as reflected in the above principles, is designed to yield a principled peace, characterized by the following conditions:
 - a. mutual recognition of the national identity of the other people and of each people's right to express this identity in an independent state within the shared land;
 - b. a sense that the agreement is not merely a product of the balance of power but is consistent with the principles of attainable justice and with international law and the international consensus;
 - c. an end to the occupation and to the conflict; and
 - d. integration of both states in the region and the international community.
4. As we commit ourselves to negotiating a final agreement based on the concept of a historic compromise and meeting the conditions of a principled peace, we are enabled to develop and to communicate to our publics a positive vision of a common future for the two peoples in the land they are agreeing to share. Our vision contemplates:
 - a. a secure and prosperous existence for each society;
 - b. mutually beneficial cooperation between the two states and societies in various fields, including economic relations, public health, environmental protection, telecommunications, cultural and educational programs, and tourism;
 - c. regional development; and
 - d. stable peace with ultimate reconciliation.

Our positive vision extends not only to the future of the two peoples in their independent states within the land they are agreeing to share but to the future of the shared land itself: a land to which both peoples are attached, even though each agrees to claim only part of it for its independent state. In this spirit, our vision of a common future includes freedom of movement across state borders, as well as a range of cooperative activities that treat the shared land as a unit and are designed to benefit it in its entirety.