Nationalism is widely regarded as a powerful force in the world today. In Europe, where it has been discredited as a result of the Second World War, it seems to be reemerging. In the Communist world, it has led to separate and often conflicting policies in different countries, thus helping to break down the myth of a monolithic world Communist. In the United States, it is at least partly responsible for the international posture of the current administration. In the Middle East, clashing nationalisms are seen as the cause of continuing tension. Nationalism has spread throughout the newly emerging states of Asia and Africa and, according to Whittaker and Jordan (1965), "it has become the greatest single force at work in Latin America" (p. 1).

Nationalism is seen as a major cause of wars and threats of war in our century, and as a barrier to the full development of international institutions and of an integrated world system. In some cases, we speak of nationalism as a threat to the internal cohesion of the nation-state—for example, Serb or Croatian nationalism in Yugoslavia, or French-Canadian separatism in Canada, or even black nationalism in the United States. In other cases—notably when we are thinking of emerging states in Africa and Asia—we see it as a binding force contributing to economic development and political stability. Thus, the secession of Biafra from Nigeria is regarded as an act of the tribalism threatening Nigerian nationalism.
These examples point to one of the many sources of ambiguity and difficulty in the concept of nationalism, at least as it is often employed. We are being entirely arbitrary when we speak of the Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia as nations and of the Ibo and Hausa in Nigeria as tribes. The phenomena are broadly similar in both cases, despite, of course, their many unique features. In both cases, we have regions within an official nation-state whose populations—see themselves as culturally distinct and as having competing interests. These conditions cause them to demand a political structure that is, to a greater or lesser degree, separate or autonomous from the larger system and thus presumably more reflective of their identities and interests.

One cannot, in such a case, speak of nationalism as a force, with clearly definable universal goals. Rather, we must specify whose nationalism we are speaking of—what is the nation whose interest it is to be served. The population unit that is defined as the nation in a given case is, to a large extent, arbitrary. It is, therefore, confusing to speak of what is happening in Nigeria as a conflict between tribes and nationalism. It would seem more reasonable to describe it as a conflict between Nigerian nationalism and Ibo nationalism—between those who see their interests best served by maintaining Nigeria, with all its vastness and tribal diversity, as a single nation-state, and those who see their interests best served by establishing a nation-state in a smaller, culturally more (though by no means entirely) homogeneous region.

There is another sense in which it is misleading to speak of nationalism as a force, with the implication that this carries some special explanatory value. Nationalism, whatever it occurs, draws on certain universal psychological dispositions, and on a set of norms established in the contemporary international system, in order to promote a particular set of goals shared by an identifiable population or segment of such a population. What is common to all cases of nationalism is the attempt to promote these goals by maintaining or establishing a nation-state as an effective political unit. The nature of the goals involved, however, may vary widely from country to country, from period to period, and from group to group within a given country. Nationalism may be mobilized, for example, in the service of economic development, or of military expansion, or of internal democratization; and in each of these cases a different segment of the population is likely to provide the impetus and the leadership for that effort.

Thus, it is more useful to conceive of nationalism not as a force in its own right, but as a vehicle for achieving certain other goals. These goals are usually of special importance to a particular elite within a society, but they must, at some level, correspond to goals widely shared by the population at large, whose support must be mobilized. To cite Whittaker and Jordan (1966) again, "...nationalism is a tool, and the things we need to know about it are, who uses it, and why, how, and with what results." (p. 7)

Only by distinguishing different types of nationalism can we do justice, for example, to "a phenomenon common to most Latin American countries, namely, the existence of several different and competing versions of nationalism in the same country at the same time." (p. 6)

Generic Features of Nationalism

Before we proceed to examine different types of nationalism, each with its own particular goals and functions, we must identify the generic features that they all share. We can capture these common elements best, I believe, if we conceive of nationalism as the ideology of the modern nation-state or of movements directed toward the establishment of a new nation-state. Nationalism, whatever its form, is an ideology that provides a justification for the existence or establishment of a nation-state defining a particular population, and that prescribes the relationship of the individual to that state. There are at least three elements that all different forms of modern nationalism seem to have in common.

(1) The ultimate justification for maintaining, strengthening, or establishing a political system with jurisdiction over a particular population—that is, an internationally recognized nation-state—is that this system is most naturally and effectively representative of that population. It is this feature, as we shall see later, that provides legitimacy and cohesion to the modern nation-state. In principle, the nation-state—as its name implies—is representative of the population by virtue of the fact that its political boundaries also constitute national boundaries. In other words, the political entity corresponds with an
ethnic, cultural, and historical entity with which at least large portions of the population identify. There is the same presumption that such correspondence also ensures the best protection of the interests of the population. In practice, of course, this correspondence does not exist, in that a state may comprise a variety of distinct ethnic and cultural groups, sometimes with a long history of intergroup conflict. Belgium, Yugoslavia, Canada, and Nigeria are some of the many examples of multicultural and multilingual states. Thus, there is an inherent circularity in the defining characteristic of the nation-state: The state is justified by virtue of the fact that it represents a nation, but often a population is considered or becomes a nation by virtue of the fact that it is part of the same state. Despite these ambiguities—and I shall return to them later—the principle that the political system must in some fashion be representative of the population under its control is central to all forms of nationalism.

(2) The nation-state, according to nationalism, is the political unit in which paramount authority is vested. It is placed at the pinnacle of power and control to override both smaller and larger political units.

(3) Establishing and/or maintaining the independence, integrity, and the effective functioning of the nation-state is an essential task to which all members of the system (by it an established state or a nationalist movement) are expected to contribute.

These three elements are universal characteristics of nationalist ideology because they are central to the establishment and the effective operation of a national political system in the modern world. They provide the basic set of assumptions that govern the relationship of a nation-state to other states in the international system, and the relationship of the political leadership to the individual citizen. This set of assumptions is thus built into the system's institutional structures and its constitution, and transmitted to the population through its basic documents and elite communications.

In addition to these common elements, which correspond to the genetic functions of all nation-states, any given type of nationalism has unique features, corresponding to the particular functions that a nation-state or a nationalist movement must perform at any given historical juncture. These elements too are built into institutional arrangements and communicated by political leaders. They determine the special form that nationalist ideology will take, depending—in an established state—on its level of development, its international position, its power and success in the international arena, and its internal political structure; and—in a nationalist movement—on the nature of the changes that it is attempting to produce, on the segments of the population from which it draws its leadership, and on the groups to which it is directing its major appeal.

So far I have spoken of nationalist ideology at the system level as a property of the state or the movement. This system ideology is communicated to individual members in the course of socialization and through the life and experience of its constituent parts of the belief system. The way in which the ideology is interpreted and incorporated into the belief systems of individuals and subgroups within the population may vary widely. Depending on their demographic and personality characteristics and on their positions within the social and political structure, individuals may vary in the components of the ideology that they emphasize or de-emphasize, the intensity of their commitment to the nation-state, their definition of the citizen role and the expectations that go with it, and the way in which they enact this role.

While there may be such variations, it is essential to the effective functioning of the nation-state that the basic tracts of its ideology be widely accepted within the population. This does not necessarily mean a well-articulated, highly structured acceptance of the ideology at the cognitive level. It does mean, however, that the average citizen is prepared to accede and conform to the expectations of the citizen role and to comply with the demands that the state makes upon him, even when he or she regards it as personally sacrificial.

Legitimacy of the National System

In essence, acceptance of the system's ideology implies that the individual regards the authority of the state and hence its specific demands (within some broadly defined range) as legitimate. In times of national crisis the state demands sacrifices from individual citizens that they would not ordinarily make if they were acting purely in terms of their
patterns of personal involvement in the national system. The system cannot, in the long run, depend on coercion for enforcing such demands. To be sure, given the state’s control of the sphere sanctioning power, it can rely on coercion to obtain the compliance of relatively small segments of the population, or even of large segments of the population for relatively short periods of time. But the fear of punishment is not a dependable method of eliciting the sustained support of wide segments of the population, which is necessary to meet a national crisis or to mobilize a nation’s energies. There are various psychological and organizational mechanisms through which the role of national patriotism at critical times—such as the use of national symbols to heighten emotional arousal and the co-optation of various groups and institutions within the society into the service of the state. The underlying condition, however, for the effective functioning of the state is the perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

We refer to a system as legitimate when it is perceived as having the right to exercise authority in a given domain and within specified limits. Thus, when the administration of a legitimate political system makes certain demands, citizens accept them, whether or not they like them—unless, these demands are seen as arbitrary and outside of the limits of the leader’s legitimate authority. Legitimacy always implies that there is an external reference point—such as a constitution—to which both political leadership and the citizenry are subject, and which makes it possible to determine whether or not a given demand is legitimate. But, in the normal course of events, the demand of a legitimate authority is obeyed. An individual citizen may or may not be convinced of the value of the action he is asked to take; he may or may not be enthusiastic about carrying it out; and he may, in fact, be very unhappy about it. If it is within the limits of legitimacy, however, he willingly meets the demand without feeling coerced, and considers it his duty to do so.

Psychologically, once the demand is seen as legitimate, the individual finds himself in a nonchoice situation. His preferences are irrelevant; the legitimate demand takes on the character of an external reality which defines the dimensions of the situation and the required response. Reactions in a situation of legitimate influence are not so much governed by instrumental processes as they are by perceptual ones. The focus is not on what the individual wants to do, given available alternatives, but on what is required of him. Perhaps another way of putting it is that legitimacy of an act is tantamount to its right—within certain limits and by duly constituted leadership—to define reality for its members.

Legitimacy is indeed a property of the system, but it cannot be defined in terms of objective characteristics of the system itself. While it is determined by the nature and the environment of the system, legitimacy has no meaning apart from the individual who perceives it and the groups who share the norms that define it. It is thus a genuinely social-psychological concept in that it represents the interaction between properties of the social systems and properties of individual actors.

The question, “What makes a system legitimate?” is equivalent, at the ethical-psychological level, to the question, “What ties individual members to the system?” The acceptance of the system’s legitimacy implies that the individual is in some fashion personally involved in the system—that he feels a sense of loyalty to it and is integrated into its operations. The specific nature of the involvement may differ for different individuals, different subgroups, and different countries, at different times. It should be possible to distinguish different patterns of involvement in the national system, each of which is conducive to its perceived legitimacy, corresponding to different types of national ideology, each of which fosters the integrity of the nation-state.

A Model of Personal Involvement in the National System

A new and still evolving framework for distinguishing different patterns of personal involvement with the
national system is summarized in Table 1. The model is intended to yield hypotheses about the specific antecedents and consequences of different patterns it distinguishes, although at this stage it is possible only to suggest the general form that these hypotheses will take.4

As can be seen in Table 1, the model distinguishes six patterns of personal involvement in the national system in terms of two qualitative dimensions. The rows represent two sources of attachment or loyalty to the system—sentimental attachment or instrumental attachment. The columns represent three means of integration of the individual into the system—ideological, role-participant, or normative integration. In other words, the rows distinguish essentially, two types of motives of the individual that lead him to clutch the system. The columns, on the other hand, distinguish three components of the system via which members may be bound into it. Let me proceed to examine each of these "dimensions" in turn.

An individual's attachment to the national state—or to any other group—may be noted either in sentimental or instrumental considerations. An individual is sentimentally attached when he sees the system as representing him—as being, in some central way, a reflection and extension of himself. For the sentimentally attached, the system is legitimate and deserving of his loyalty because it is the embodiment of a group in which his personal identity is anchored. Sentimental attachment may be channels in three different ways, depending on the manner in which the individual is integrated into the system (as shown in the three columns of Table 1):

(1) Commitment to cultural values. The individual may be committed to the values basic to the national culture. He may value the special qualities of his people, as they have evolved historically and are culturally defined (that is, he attaches importance and personal meaning to "the kind of people we are"). He may value the characteristic way of life of the nation; its cultural products—such as its language, its literature, or its art; its national and often its religious traditions; and the goals for which the nation has stood in its historical development. Thus, he is attached to the system because it represents the people whose values are his own values, and whose national identity is part of his personal identity. He will support the political system because—and whenever—he sees the preservation of the system as crucial to the preservation of these cultural values.

(2) Commitment to the role of national. The individual may be identified with the role of the
national in the sense that it enters importantly into his self-definition and that it constitutes a genuine emotional commitment for him. He is attached to the system because his role as system member provides him with a satisfying and important part of his personal identity. He will support the system and carry out—usually with enthusiasm—the requirements of the role of national; whenever that role becomes salient. The salience of the role depends on situational factors—most notably on the presence of certain national symbols (such as the national flag or the singing of the national anthem). The role is also brought into existence by authoritative announcements that a serious threat to the nation exists (which is, typically, combined with the display of national symbols); or by travel in foreign countries, where others cast the person into the role of national. For some individuals—the adherents of super-patriotic movements—the role is always salient; they surround themselves with national symbols and perceive a permanent set of external and internal threat to the integrity of the nation. For most individuals who identify with the role of national, however, this role is usually latent, but engages their full emotional commitment whenever the situation brings it into salience.

A person’s commitment to the national role may be linked to the cultural values for which the national symbols stand, in which case his sentimental attachment would be channeled both through ideology and role participation (column a in the table). Identification with the role, however, may also be quite independent of the underlying values of the nation and in fact, likely to be more intense under those circumstances. Often this identification is based, in large part, on emotional conditioning—started in childhood and reinforced throughout life—of patriotic responses to national symbols. The concrete content of the values symbolized is quite irrelevant in such cases. For an individual who has a commitment to the national role without a true commitment to the cultural values, the nation is important not because it reflects his personal identity, but because he defines his personal identity to a significant degree from identification with the nation.

Commitment to the sacredness of the state. The individual may be committed to the state as an end in itself. The state has become, for him, a sacred object in its own right, by virtue of the fact that it is the embodiment of the people. He will legislatively meet all the demands that are made upon him, so long as it is clear that these reflect the wishes of those responsible for maintaining and operating the nation. To do otherwise would be to undermine the authority of the state which, in his view, must be preserved at all costs.

A person may be committed to the sacredness of the state because he shares the cultural values and identity of the people of whom the state embodies and/or because he identifies with the role of national. Commitment to the sacredness of the state, however, may be quite independent of these other commitments. In fact, this type of commitment is purest and most intense when the individual has lost touch with the underlying values of the national culture and even with the sense of excitement and self-assurance that accompanies performance of the national role. He supports the system not out of ideological conviction, nor out of emotional engagement, but out of unquestioning obedience to the demands of the state. His personal satisfaction derives primarily from the knowledge that he has been a loyal servant to the sacred state and from the recognition of his acts of obedience by the authorities in charge of the state-apparatus.

Let us turn now to the second row of Table 1, which refers to an individual’s attachment to the nation-state on the basis of instrumental considerations. An individual is instrumentally attached when he uses the system as an effective vehicle for achieving his own ends and the ends of other system members. For the instrumentally attached, the system is legitimate and deserving of his loyalty because it provides the organization for a smoothly running society in which individuals can participate to their mutual benefit and have some assurance that their needs and interests will be met. Instrumental attachment, again, may be channeled in three different ways depending on the manner in which the individual is integrated into the system:

1. Commitment to social institutions. The individual may be committed to the ideology that underlies the particular social and economic institutions through which the society is organized. Typically, he will value these institutional arrangements because
he regards them as maximally perceptive of the needs and interests of the society\'s entire population. This decentralized socialism of Yugoslavia, the African socialism of Tanzania, the welfare economy of the Scandinavian countries, and the New Deal and its successors of the United States are among the many examples of such ideologies to which important segments of their respective populations have been committed. (Such commitments, of course, are also central to many modern nationalist movements and revolutionary states, where the goal is fundamental change in social and economic institutions.) An individual integrated in this manner is attached to the national system because he believes that the way it organizes society is just and effective in maximizing general welfare. He will support the political system because—and whenever—he sees the preservation of the system as crucial to the preservation of its valued social institutions.

(2) Commitment to social roles. The individual may be committed to a variety of social roles, whose continued and successful enactment depends on the materially effective functioning of the larger national system. In a large bureaucratic society, such as the United States, in which there is a high degree of functional interdependence and centralization of power in various areas of life, many of the major institutions of the society are directly dependent on the nation-state, federal government, and a variety of government regulations concerning taxes, tariffs, transportation, and other matters; educational institutions depend on government research grants, building grants, and financial support for students; municipal agencies depend on federal government programs in housing, urban planning, and assistance to schools.

Individuals who hold positions within such institutions are, thus, directly hooked into the national system via their roles in subsystems that are bound up with the national system. They are attached to the national system because they see it as a useful means toward the performance of their occupational roles, their community roles, and roles in various other subsystems. They will support the system and help to maintain its integrity because—and to the extent that—they have vested interests in its continued and adequate functioning; and their support is often mobilized in a context that brings their other social roles (i.e., their subsystem roles) into salience. Those with especially responsible positions in their respective institutions—such as top business executives, educational administrators, or community leaders—are particularly likely to feel a stake in the national system and are usually among the first to be mobilized in its support.

A person\'s commitment to the system on the basis of his engagement in subsystem roles may be linked to an ideological commitment to the system\'s institutions. In such a case, the person would, in essence, be instrumentally attached to the system because he perceives it as an effective means for meeting the needs and interests of the population in general and of himself in particular. It can be reasonably assumed that a person who is ideologically committed to the institutions of the society will also be a well-integrated participant in roles within those institutions. On the other hand, commitment to social roles mediated by the system may very well be independent of ideological commitment. In fact, individuals who are most intensely caught up in their subsystem roles and personally committed to them are less likely to be also committed at the ideological level. Such a pattern may be particularly common in a society that does not provide meaningful roles for large segments of its population. Those who benefit from such roles are likely to have a strong investment in maintaining its institutions, since they meet their own needs; yet they are unlikely to value those institutions in the context of a broader commitment to the public interest.

(3) Commitment to law and order. The individual may be committed to law and order as an end in itself. He assumes that, if society is to run smoothly and equitably, certain rules must be followed by its members and that violation of these rules is a threat to the integrity of the society. He is attached to the national system because it is the agent of orderly and consistent procedures. He will readily meet all the demands of the system, so long as it is clear that these are normatively required and that they conform to the principle of equity—that is, that they are not merely arbitrary demands imposed on a discriminatory fashion, but obligations to which every citizen is potentially bound. They are particularly likely to conform to demands whenever negative sanctions...
are subjected to noncompliance. This is notbecause
their behavior is entirely or even largely determined
by fear of punishment. If that were so, we could not
speak of them as in any way integrated into the system
and loyal to it; we would be dealing with response
to coercion rather than legitimate power. Rather, it
is because the existence of negative sanctions is a clear
indicator that the behavior demanded is indeed
required by law, or at least by general consensus,
and that disobedience is therefore not an option.

A person may be committed to law and order, as
prescribed by the state, because he is ideologically
committed to the society's institutions and for because
he is involved in institutional roles, and, for those
reasons, has an interest in protecting the system's
procedures. Commitment to law and order may,
however, be relatively independent of these other
commitments. In fact, individuals who are most
clearly committed on this issue tend to have little
ideological conviction about the society's institutions
and to participate in institutional roles only at low
levels of responsibility. Their commitment is more
passive and disengaged and largely oriented to-
ward keeping the fabric of ordinary life undisturbed.

Sentimental and Instrumental
Attachments and the Source of
Political Legitimacy

Whether a person's attachment to the national
system is largely sentimental or largely instrumental
or some fairly balanced combination of the two de-

pends on his personal and social characteristics—
such as his place in society, his education, his
residence, his religious and ethnic identifications,
his personal history, his personality dispositions.
One can also examine, however, characteristics of the
system that make one or the other of these two types
of attachment more probable in a given society, and
at a given point in time. Thus, for example, the
source of loyalty that predominates in a system may
depend on its stage of development. One is reminded,
in this connection, of Durkheim's (1947) distinction
between the mechatanical solidarity of more traditional
societies and the organic solidarity of more industri-

al societies, a distinction to which our semi-
timental-instrumental dichotomy is closely related.
The predominant source of loyalty may also depend
on the kinds of appeals that the national leadership
makes at a given time; those in turn depend on the
major system functions that the leaders attempt to
perform, and on the dispositions available within the
population on which they can draw for popular
support.

Consideration of system characteristics brings
us back to the question with which I started this
discussion of patterns of personal involvement in the
national system: What makes a system legitimate in
the eyes of the population? We can distinguish
between two aspects of legitimacy for the national
system, which correspond directly to the distinction
between sentimental and instrumental attachment at
the level of the individual. A modern nation-state's
legitimacy depends on the extent to which the popula-
tion perceives the regime as (1) reflecting its ethnic
and cultural identity, and (b) meeting its needs and
interests.

Ultimately, the political system is a way of meet-
ing the needs and interests of the population, and
unless it accomplishes this, at least to a moderate
degree, it cannot maintain its legitimacy in the long
run. However, the legitimacy of the system can be
sustained, even if it is not adequately organized or
lacks the necessary resources to meet the needs and
interests of the entire population, if it is seen as
reflective of the cultural identity of the people and
thus—by definition—as most capable of representing
their interests. Under such circumstances, the hard-
ships experienced by the population will be balanced
on external sources, and citizens will continue to
place their trust in their national leadership and be
prepared to make whatever sacrifices are necessary.

Cultural and ethnic identity as the major source
of legitimacy is particularly important in a situation
in which different segments of the population have
conflicting interests and the state is set up to meet
the interests of some groups more fully than those of
others. By appealing to the common national identity
of the people, the leadership may be able to elicit
their loyalty despite internal divisions and inequities.
Thus, the perception of the system as representing
the national identity of the people can compensate
temporarily and sometimes for extended periods—
for the system's failures in meeting public interests
and needs, and gives it a continuity it might other-
wise lack.

It is not surprising that the correspondence
between state and nation is a central component of
the ideology of the modern nation-state. The impetus for establishing a new state typically has come—both in earlier periods and today—from certain elites within the population whose interests and needs are best served by a redefining of political boundaries. Even when these elites are committed to a democratic ideology, which calls for institutions that permit broad participation in social life and promote the welfare of the entire population, they need time before they can come close to achieving such goals. Thus, they are in a position in which they have to mobilize the support of the masses of the population even though, at least in the short run, they have few concrete benefits to offer them. Indeed, as they are able to appeal to the national identity of the population, they can overcome this difficulty and attain a broad-based support that will at least see them through the initial stages of political development.

The ideal model of the modern nation-state, therefore, is one that governs a population sharing a common ethnic and cultural identity—in other words, a population that is a nation and presumably was a nation even before the state was established. Such a state derives its legitimacy from the principle that it represents an already existing nation, which provides historical and existential justification for organizing the present-day political unit on that basis.

This ideal model, of course, as I have already pointed out, is only rarely and approximately achieved in actuality. Political boundaries do not usually follow prevailing cultural and ethnic divisions. Yet, the concept of a state corresponding to a nation remains a central feature of modern nationalistic ideology. It becomes necessary, therefore, to grapple with the very difficult concept of "nation." I am referring here not to nation in the political sense in which it is often used today, i.e., the population of an internationally recognized nation-state, but to nation in the sense of an ethnic-cultural unit—a concept that predates by far the rise of the modern nation-state.

The definition of nation in this sense has occupied many historians and political scientists for many years, and I shall not attempt to enter into this intricate discussion. Following Karl Deutsch's (1953) formulation, I shall simply describe a nation as a community of individuals who—in the absence of personal acquaintance—have little difficulty in finding a common basis for communication. Thus, the boundaries of a nation represent the line at which a qualitative change in the use of communication takes place; that is, communication is always easier among individuals within these boundaries than it is across boundaries. Such a community cannot arise unless its members share certain important aspects of culture—a common language, a common history, a common tradition, a common way of life, a common religion, or a common sense of destiny—although the specific aspects of culture held in common may vary from nation to nation. No one aspect is crucial to the definition of a nation; thus, for example, a group may constitute a nation even if its members do not share the same language, as long as they share other important values and experiences that provide a ready-made basis for communication among them.

I would assume, furthermore, that nationalism implies a consciousness among members of a collectivity of the special bonds that tie them to one another. I find very useful, in this connection, T. V. L. John's (1949) suggestion that an ethnic group becomes a nation when it begins to idealize its customs and way of life. That is, it goes beyond the conception of "this is the way we do things" to a conception of "there is something unique, special, and valuable about our way of doing things." It is idealizing of this sort that makes it possible to develop allegiance to and invest one's identity in a collectivity that goes beyond—in both space and time—one's primary group, face-to-face contacts.

Historically, such a process of idealizing ethnic characteristics is likely to have occurred whenever there were energetic individuals who had an interest in creating loyalty to a wider group—in order, for example, to establish a new religion, or to expand their economic activities, or to broaden the base of their political power. Who was to be included in this wider group depended, in each case, on the particular interests of the nation-builders and on the opportunities available to them. Thus, the boundaries of the newly formed nations and the elements of community that characterized them tended to be somewhat arbitrary (though not completely so, because there had to be some common cultural characteristics as the starting point for the work of idealizing).

Once a group has developed a sense of nationality, strong psychological and social forces can be
ment to sustain and perpetuate it. At the psychosocial level, I would offer the hypothesis that attachment to the nation gains much of its strength from the fact that it represents the coming together of two important and in some sense contradictory needs: the need to protect those—such as members of one’s immediate family—who are close to the self and extensions of the self, and the need to transcend the self through identification with distinct groups and causes. The nation is close enough to draw on the first of these needs, yet distant enough to satisfy the second.

At the social level, attachment to the nation gains much of its strength from its linkage to sacred objects. Love for the nation is typically taught in the home and closely linked to love for one’s family. It is no coincidence that family symbolism is borrowed for such terms as fatherland and mother tongue. In many cases, moreover, the nation is closely linked to religious symbols, and love for the nation is taught in parochial schools as part of the child’s religious duty. With the nation so intimately tied up with God and mother, it is not surprising that support of the nation is seen as a sacred duty and failure to provide such support can be a source of profound guilt.

It is this national consciousness, then, with all the psychological and social forces that sustain it, which the modern nation-state needs to utilize as a major source of its political legitimacy. Where it does exist, it can indeed be a very powerful binding force (though not without its dysfunctional side effects). Where it does not exist, political leaders attempt to create a national consciousness with boundaries corresponding to the boundaries of the political system. In many established states this has been accomplished, with a new sense of nationhood developing despite initial ethnic and cultural differences. In many new states, however, and in many old ones as well, such a sense of national consciousness has yet to be achieved. The population may be divided into groups that differ widely in ethnic and cultural characteristics and often have a history of intense conflict with one another, or the mass of the population may be tied only to local communities and not at all integrated into the national system. What we find, in such situations, are efforts at nation-building—at creating, out of ethnically distinct groups and out of uninterested individuals and localities, a single nation that corresponds to the political state.3

These nation-building efforts involve a type of nationalist movement in which the primary push is from state to nation. That is, a state already exists, but if it is to become an effective and legitimate nation-state, a nation has to be built around it. This type of nationalist movement can be distinguished from the usual independence or separatist movement, in which the primary push is from nation to state. That is, a group, with an already existing national consciousness (and, I should add, a set of special interests) demands a political state that will correspond to the nation. Most nationalist movements involve some combination of these two elements, though with different degrees of emphasis.

The push from state to nation may violate the ideal model of the modern nation-state, which presumably is based on an already existing sense of national identity, but it is not at all inconsistent with historical precedents. Whether such a push will succeed, it seems to me, depends on the extent to which the state contains a well-functioning society, with members who are interdependent and whose needs and interests are adequately met. It is the existence of such a society which has, historically, provided the conditions for utilizing diverse cultural elements into a national community.

In sum, the two sources of legitimacy that I have been discussing can reinforce each other in both directions. On the one hand—if I have already pointed out—the perception of the state as representative of national unity can compensate for failures to meet the population’s needs and interests. On the other hand, the perception of the state as meeting the population’s needs and interests can compensate for a lacking sense of national identity, and can in fact help to create such an identity.

Turning back to Table 1, the close interaction between the two sources of legitimacy leads me to a final point about the distinction between sentimental and instrumental attachment. The two types of attachment are by no means mutually exclusive. Both 3Such nation-building efforts are, in principle, not so different from the efforts at transforming an ethnic group into a nation that I mentioned above. In both cases, there is a push toward establishing new boundaries for national identity—in the present case, boundaries that correspond to an already existing, institutionally recognized political state.
are likely to be present within a system, and are in fact important to the effective functioning of the system. Similarly, any given individual may well be attached to the system in both of these ways, though probably with different degrees of emphasis on each one.

There are also possible patterns of involvement in the system that combine these two components in unique fashion. For example, an African society may force an approach to modernization that draws on traditional African values, thus combining instrumental and sentimental features into a single ideological commitment. Or, at the level of role participation, various subsystem roles may include, as one of their expectations, the requirement to support the nation-state in times of crisis and to take the lead in mobilizing others to that end. Thus, various social roles may, in effect, be co-opted into the service of the national role. Or, finally, at the normative level, a commitment to law and order may be sentimentalized so that the prosecution of certain bureaucratic procedures becomes a sacred end in its own right. In short, sentimental and instrumental attachments may compensate for one another, or reinforce one another, or combine with one another in novel ways.

Integration of Individuals into the National System

Let me turn now, and much more briefly, to the distinction between the three columns of Table 1. I have already touched on most of the relevant points in exploiting the six individual cells of the table, and shall now merely try to bring them together in summary fashion.

The columns of Table 1 identify three components of the national system through which an individual may be integrated into it—its values, its roles, and its norms. These components are by no means mutually exclusive, and, in fact, a well-integrated system member will be involved in the system at all of these levels. They may, however, as I have already pointed out, be relatively independent of one another, and for some individuals a particular one of these means of integration may predominate. At the very least, the three means of integration are likely to have different weights for different individuals.

These three paths of integration can be linked to three proxemics of social influence—internalization, identification, and compliance—that I have distinguished in my earlier work on attitude change (Kelman, 1958, 1961). We would speak of internalization when an individual accepts influence from another individual or a group—that is, changes his behavior or attitude in the direction induced by the other—because he sees the new behavior as congruent with his own value system. We would speak of identification when an individual accepts influence from another in order to maintain a satisfying role relationship to the other, in which his own self-definition is anchored. In other words, he accepts the induced behavior because he sees it as required by a role that has personal significance for him. Finally, we would speak of compliance when an individual accepts influence from another in order to attain specific rewards or avoid specific punishments controlled by the other, or to attain the other’s approval or avoid his disapproval.

The three proxemics of influence are relevant to the present analysis in two senses. They can help us define the way in which a particular type of integration is initially established, and the way in which an individual integrated by each of these means is likely to react to a specific system demand. Linking the three types of integration to my work on social influence and has the advantage of suggesting a series of hypotheses about their antecedents and consequences, derived from the earlier work. With this in mind, then, let me briefly review the meaning of each of the three columns.

(3) Ideological Integration. An individual who is ideologically integrated is bound to the system by virtue of the fact that he subscribes to some of the basic values on which the system is established. These may be the cultural values defining the national identity, or the social values reflected in the institutions by which the society is organized, or both. The ideologically integrated member has internalized these values and incorporated them into a personal value framework. When he is faced with demands for behavior in support of the national system he is likely to respond positively, because support of the system is generally congruent with his own values.

The extent to which he meets specific demands, however, depends on the extent to which he sees these
demands as consistent with the underlying values of the system to which he's committed.

(2) Role-participant integration. An individual who is integrally related to the system by virtue of the fact that he is personally engaged in roles within the system—roles that enter significantly into his self-definition. He may be emotionally caught up in the role of national as such, with its associated symbols, and derive a sense of self-transcendence and compensatory identity from it; or he may be functionally caught up in various social roles that are central to his identity and whose effective performance depends on the national system. His integration into the system is based on identification, in the sense that he has a stake in maintaining the system-related roles and the self-definition anchored in them. When he is faced with demands to support the system he is likely to respond positively, because such support is generally required by the system role to which he is committed. The extent to which he meets specific demands depends, however, on the extent to which the relevant role has been brought into salience by situational factors.

(3) Normative integration. An individual who is normatively integrated is bound to the system by virtue of the fact that he accepts the system's right to set the behavior of its members within a prescribed domain. Here we are dealing, one might say, with legitimacy in its pure form, in which the question of personal values and roles has become irrelevant. Acceptance of the system's right to unquestioning obedience may be based on a commitment to the state as a sacred object in its own right, or on a commitment to the necessity of law and order as a guarantor of equitable procedures. The normatively integrated member regards compliance with the law as a highly proper and valued orientation. When he is faced with demands to support the system he is likely to comply without question, since he regards it as his obligation to do so. The extent to which he meets specific demands, however, depends on the extent to which these are authoritative presented as the wishes of the leadership or the requirements of law. One important indicator of the authoritative ness of a particular demand is the existence of positive or negative sanctions to control proper performance.

The manner of an individual's integration into the system—just like the source of his attachment to the system—depends on his personal and social characteristics. Similarly, the prevalence of one or another type of integration or of some combination of them in a given society depends on such factors as stage of development and the particular requirements that it must meet at a given point in time. Thus, for example, one might distinguish between three system functions in relation to its population: (a) consolidation of the population, which is crucial during periods of nation-building or, in established nation-states, during periods of serious internal division; (b) mobilization of the population, which is crucial during periods of national crisis or periods of major social and political change; and (c) assuring the conformity of the population, which is crucial to the smooth operation of the system during periods of relative quiet. As indicated in Table 1, I am suggesting that system leaders promote and primarily draw on ideological integration to consolidate the population, role-participant integration to mobilize the population, and normative integration to achieve conformity on a day-to-day basis.

Conclusion
I have presented a six-celled scheme that classifies patterns of personal involvement in the national system on the basis of the source of an individual's attachment to the system and his manner of integration into it. Such a scheme is built on the assumption that individuals and groups within a population can be distinguished in terms of the patterns that they are most likely to adopt; that political systems can be distinguished in terms of the patterns that are most likely to emerge within them;

* In my original model for the study of social influence, which is meant to deal with choice behavior (in contrast to the normative character of demands from legitimate authorities), sanctions are only a motivating force for compliance. That is, the person complies in order to obtain a particular reward or avoid a particular punishment. In the context of legitimate demands, sanctions still play an important part in controlling compliance, but primarily as indicators that the demands are really authoritative and meant to be obeyed, rather than as motivators for the choice that would be personally most rewarding.
and that stages of development and system functions can be identified that are most likely to bring different patterns to the fore. The potential value of such a scheme, of course, is that it can yield hypotheses about the determinants of different patterns of involvement and about their consequences.

With respect to the rows of Table 1, for example, one hypothesis on which we already have evidence from our United States study (DeLamater, Katz, and Kelman) is that individuals characterized by geographical stability are more prone to be sentimentally attached, while those characterized by geographical mobility tend to be instrumentally attached. On the consequent side, we are now planning an experimental study to test the hypothesis that sentimentally attached individuals are more likely to conceive an intergroup conflict in competitive, zero-sum terms, while instrumentally attached individuals are more likely to see the possibilities for cooperation and a moderate-sum orientation. We further hypothesize that increasing the intensity of attachment will have opposite effects, depending on the type of attachment involved.

With respect to the columns of Table 1, various hypotheses are suggested by the distinction between the three processes of influence corresponding to them. On the coercive side, for example, one might hypothesize that the higher an individual's socio-economic status, education, and political power, the more likely he is to be ideologically integrated; the lower he is on these dimensions, the more likely he is to be normatively integrated. On the consequent side, one might hypothesize that the normatively integrated are most likely to obey specific demands, while the ideologically integrated are most likely to give long-run support to the system.

Various other hypotheses about the antecedents and consequences of types of attachment and integration have been mentioned throughout this paper, although perhaps the most intriguing hypotheses are likely to be those that refer to the interaction between these two dimensions. Derivation of such hypotheses represents the next step in the development of this model.

References