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The Place of Ethnic Identity in the Development of Personal Identity: A Challenge for the Jewish Family

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This article presents a general approach to the development of personal identity, exploring the ways in which various group identities may be incorporated into the emerging personal identity of an individual. It is hoped that this general scheme will have some implications for the question of how Jewish identity can be built into the personal identity of Jewish children, and what role Jewish education might play in this process.

The approach is based on a conceptual model developed for the analysis of social influence and extended to the analysis of personal involvement in social systems. This model is not specifically addressed to identity formation, but it has some relevance to the development of identity both at the level of the individual and at that of the group—that is, both to personal and to national or ethnic identity. The purpose of this article is to explore the implications of this model for identity formation at these two levels, with special reference to Jewish identity.

What is Personal Identity?

Personal identity refers to the enduring aspects of a person's definition of her- or himself, the conception of who one is and what one is over time and across situations. It is what individuals bring to the many situations and social interactions in which they become involved as they go through the life cycle and, at any given period of time, as they enact their various social roles. This is not to say that personal identity—even once a person has reached adulthood—is an entirely stable, consistent, and unchanging property. Though the degree of stability and consistency of one's identity varies widely among individuals, it is never a fixed entity, but rather a constantly evolving self-definition. As people's life situations change and as they accumulate new experiences, their identity becomes modified in various ways. Certain aspects may be strengthened, diluted, revised, or abandoned. In some instances there may be radical alterations in personal identity. More typically, however, personal identity is a cumulative product built up over a person's lifetime experiences.
The conception of identity as a product of experiences underscores one of the central assumptions of the present model: personal identity is, to a large extent, a result of the various social influences to which individuals are exposed as they grow up and as they continue to function in society. This view, however, does not imply that personal identity is merely the reflection of social influences and thus ephemeral. Rather, it assumes that aspects of identity derived through social influence are centered around a personal core. The combination and integration of diverse elements around this core are unique for each individual and thus assure an individualized product, even though many of its components are socially shared. Accordingly, any approach that pits the self against society (whether by viewing personal identity as a reflection of the "true self" apart from social roles or as a "thing like" a reflection of social roles) is based on a false dichotomy. Personal identity, by its very nature, is an intersection of personal and social forces.

The personal core around which identity takes shape varies with the individual's in-culture characteristics. Research based on observations of infants from the day of birth suggests that there are apparently innate individual differences in motivational orientation. Infants differ, for example, in their degree of activity or passivity and in the extent to which they seek or avoid stimulation. There also seem to be innate differences in a variety of capacities, such as those involved in intellectual and physical functioning, in the processing of information, and in the acquisition of various skills. These innate characteristics can be seen as the beginnings of what the individual is. They have an important effect on individuals' orientation to the environment—or what they need and expect from it—as well as on their ways of coping with the environment—on their ability to meet its demands and exploit the opportunities it offers. Children's subsequent experiences, as they cope with the environment, relate to their families, and interact with others, help to determine what they become, given their innate orientations and capacities.

Children's cultural and ethnic heritage—the groups into which they are born and in which they are raised—are part of the personal core of their identity. Insofar as these groups membership in itself is part of children's experience, providing the context of their daily lives. For example, children may grow up in a Jewish neighborhood, live in a home in which Jewish religious rituals are regularly or occasionally observed, go to synagogues frequently or for special holidays, be taught Hebrew or at least the prayers, hear discussions about Israel and Jewish affairs in various parts of the world around the dinner table, know that their parents belong to Jewish organizations or at least contribute to Jewish causes, and so on. Alternatively, ethnicity may be quite peripheral, serving primarily as a basis for children's self-identification and for symbolic and intergroup association. Many Waters has written about the prevalence of such a relationship to their ethnic identity among white Americans in the United States, particularly individuals growing up in families with Jewish ethnic heritages that have lived in the country for more than three generations and have moved away from ethnic neighborhoods. Waters argues persuasively that ethnic identities—in contrast to African Americans and members of other racially defined ethnic groups—exercise many options as to which, if any, ethnic group to identify with and how to affiliate themselves to that group. Waters' data are based primarily on ethnic white Catholics; the lifeli-
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A key point is that American Jews exercise fewer options in how they define themselves, because of the convergence of ethnicity and religion in the Jewish case. However, these American and other diaspora Jews who grow up in homes in which association with the Jewish heritage is largely symbolic and intermittent will generally experience few structural constraints in opting out of their Jewish identification entirely.

When, and to the extent that, children's cultural and ethnic heritage plays an integral role in their life experiences, their ethnic group membership becomes an inherent part of the personal core of their identity. At the very least, the fact of their affiliation with a particular group is communicated to children in the course of their socialization, and also has a bearing on the way in which they are perceived and treated by others. Usually, membership in ethnic groups is reflected in the values, traditions, assumptions, and expectations that are conveyed to children by their families and others in their environment. Although ethnicity is ultimately a social construction, it is formed by each individual out of real-life experiences. There are wide differences, as noted, in the saliency of a particular group membership in children's early experiences. But in some sense, at least, people's ethnic and cultural heritage enters into who and what they are, just as their biological heritage does. This is not to say that individuals must accept their group memberships passively and unalterably, any more than they must accept their biological constraints in a fatalistic way. What is assumed, however, is that the individuals must somehow make their cultural as well as their biological heritage into account if they are to develop a firm personal identity.

The personal core, as indicated, is the starting point around which an individual's identity develops. As people participate in a variety of social interactions—first within the family and increasingly within other contexts, including those formed by their important membership groups—they are exposed to different influences. One of these influences is how beliefs, attitudes, values, and expectations that, when added to their personal core, make up their emerging identities. These socially derived elements of identity are modified to varying degrees as they are related to the person's core identity and to each other.

It should also be noted, in keeping with the assumption that identity represents an intersection of personal and social forces, that identity includes not only people's conceptions of who and what they are in their own eyes, but also who and what they are in the eyes of others. Thus, important components of their identity refer to the way others see them and to what others expect of them (which, of course, do not necessarily correspond to the others' actual perceptions and expectations). In other words, identity includes definitions of self not only as a personal agent, but also as a social stimulus and as a congeries of social roles.

Dimensions of Personal Identity

Three interrelated dimensions of personal identity can be distinguished: stability, integration, and authenticity.

Stability refers to the degree to which the person's identity maintains itself over time and across situations. To some extent, stability is built into the very definition of
the concept of identity: If there is no stability—if a person’s view of self or himself changes from day to day and from situation to situation—one cannot properly speak of identity at all. The degree of stability of identity, however, can vary considerably from individual to individual. It may also vary from time to time within the same individual, since even a relatively stable identity may be undermined by traumatic or disconfirming experiences. The less stable their personal identity—either in general or as a result of destabilizing experiences—the less capable individuals are of managing the various situations in which they find themselves by bringing an enduring self-definition to them. Instead, their definition of themselves fluctuates as a function of the temporarv and situational forces to which they are exposed. Stability does not mean that the person’s identity is rigidly fixed and uninfluenced by new experiences. A stable identity does not preclude openness to change; indeed, stability is conducive to a process of constant development of personal identity as the individual goes through life and responds to new experiences. But stability does imply a high degree of continuity even while change takes place. When there is change, it is not in the form of abandoning one identity and replacing it by another, but in the form of building on the existing identity, altering new elements to old ones, and readjusting different elements in the light of new inputs.

Integration refers to the extent to which the different elements of a person’s identity are in communication with each other. A person’s identity—particularly in complex and pluralistic modern societies—is the result of many different and often contradictory inputs. People differ in the degree to which these various inputs are related to one another and form a coherent, integrated whole. An integrated identity is not necessarily one that is fully consistent. It is often impossible to harmonize some of the contradictory elements of one’s identity without losing the richness of their richness and variety. Integration does not preclude the existence and recognition of a degree of constructive tension between different elements of identity. Integration does imply that these contradictory elements are not compartmentalized, but remain in communication with each other. Thus, the awareness and acceptance of certain inconsistencies become part of personal identity. Moreover, as there is communication between the different elements, they retain their ability to influence each other so that action flowing from one part of a person’s identity will not take place in total disregard of the demands of another part.

Authenticity refers to the extent to which a person’s identity takes into account what he or the “really” is and has become. An identity is authentic to the extent to which its different elements draw on and flow from the person’s temperamental orientation, experiences, ethnic and cultural background—in short, the person’s biological and cultural heritage, which form the personal core of identity—and to the extent to which they reflect the person’s life experiences, and the various roles and activities in which he or she has been involved. As already indicated, the biological and cultural factors used not be passively accepted. Authenticity does not imply a simplistic view that you are what you are and can do nothing about it. There is nothing inauthentic about an active effort to overcome certain biological or social limitations, as even to reject parts of one’s experience as unimportant with one’s evolving identity. What would make an identity inauthentic would be a denial or repression of these unwanted elements—a failure to put them into account even though they may have been rejected and in
recognize the part that they have played in shaping the personal identity. Furthermore, an identity is inauthentic to the extent to which its different elements are "borrowed"—that is, represent a wholesale adoption of the roles and expectations of others, and so the extent to which they are selected to accommodate others and gain their approval. An authentic identity does not preclude attention to the expectations and approval of others, but it implies an active effort to relate socially derived elements of identity to one's personal orientations and experiences, to adapt them accordingly, and to integrate them with one's emerging personal identity.

The concepts of stability, integrity, and authenticity are descriptive, in the sense that they are dimensions on which an identity can be located and assessed. Although it may not be easy to do so, it is certainly possible to develop empirical measures of these identity dimensions. At the same time, however, these concepts are normative, in the sense that they represent what I regard as desirable qualities of personal identity. That is, my view of a mature and effective personal identity is stable, without being rigidly unchanging, integrated without being simplistically consistent, and authentic without being oblivious to social demands and expectations.

A Model of Social Influence

We can now turn to a description of the model of social influence, which will then be applied to an analysis of identity formation. Specifically, we will want to see what this model suggests about the ways in which socially derived elements of identity may be acquired.

Social influence is defined as change in a person's behavior as a result of induction by others, whether another person or a group. Induction refers to an action by the other (the "influencing agent") that—through any one of a variety of means, such as suggestion, persuasion, modeling, coercion, or providing information—leads to a new direction for the person and makes a new behavioral possibility available to him or her. The term behavior is used very broadly to include attitudes, opinions, beliefs, values, and action preferences. The model is concerned with the motor aspects of behavior, but with its evaluative components.

The starting point of this model is a distinction between three processes of social influence: compliance, identification, and internalization. The basic assumption of the model is that each of these three processes is determined by a qualitatively distinct set of antecedent conditions and that each, in turn, yields a qualitatively different type of change.

Compliance can be said to occur when people accept influence from a person or from a group because they hope to achieve a favorable reaction from the other. They may be interested in attaining certain specific rewards or in avoiding certain specific punishments that the influencing agent controls. For example, an individual may make a special effort to express only "correct" opinions in order to gain admission to a particular group, or in order to avoid being dismissed from a job. Or people may be concerned with gaining approval or avoiding disapproval from the influencing agent in a more general way. For example, some individuals may try to say what is expected and what will please others in all (or in certain types of) situations, out of
a disproportionately small number of favorable reactions of a direct and immediate kind. In any event, when people comply, they do what the agent wants them to do—or what they think the agent wants them to do—because they see this as a way of achieving a desired response from that agent. They do not adopt the induced behavior—for example, a particular opinion response—because they believe in its content, but because it is instrumental in the production of a satisfying social effect. What individuals keep, essentially, is not the expected thing in special situations, regardless of what their private beliefs may be. Opinions adopted through compliance tend to be expressed only when the person’s behavior is observable by the influencing agent.

Identification can be said to occur when an individual adopts behavior derived from another person or a group because this behavior is associated with a satisfying self-defining relationship to this person or group. A self-defining relationship is a role relationship that forms a part of the person’s self-image. Accepting influence through identification, then, is a way of establishing or maintaining the desired relationship to the other, and the self-definition that is acquired in this relationship.

The relationship that an individual tries to establish or maintain through identification may take different forms. It may take the form of classical identification, that is, of a relationship in which individuals take over all or part of the role of the influencing agent, and its effect define their own roles in terms of the role of the other. They attempt to be like or actually be the other person. By saying what the other does, doing what the other does, believing what the other believes, they maintain this relationship and the satisfying self-definition that it provides them. An influencing agent who is likely to be an attractive object for such a relationship is one who occupies a role desired by these individuals—who possesses those characteristics that they identify themselves with, such as success in a situation in which they feel helpless, direction in a situation in which they are disoriented, or “group belongingness,” in a situation in which they feel isolated.

The behavior of persons undergoing internalizing or severe interpenetration provides an.concrete example of this type of identification. By adopting the attitudes and beliefs of the interrogator—including his evaluation of death—they attempt to regain their identity, which has been subjected to massive threats. But this kind of identification does not occur only in such severe crisis situations. It can also be observed, for example, in the context of socialization of children, where the taking over of parental attitudes and actions is a normal (and probably essential) part of personality development. The more or less conscious efforts involved when individuals learn to play a desired occupational role and instate an appropriate role model would also exemplify this process. Here, of course, the individuals are much more selective in the attitudes and actions they take over from the other person. What is at stake is not their basic sense of identity or the stability of their self-concept, but rather their more limited “professional identity.”

The self-defining relationship that an individual tries to establish or maintain through identification may also take the form of a reciprocally role relationship—that is, of a relationship in which the roles of the two parties are defined with reference to one another. An individual may be involved in a reciprocal relationship with another specific individual, or in a friendship relationship between two people. Or a person may enact a social role that is defined with reference to another (reciprocally) role, as
in the relationship between patient and doctor. A reciprocal role relationship can be maintained only if the participants have mutually shared expectations of one another's behavior. Thus, if people find a particular relationship satisfying, they will tend to behave in such a way as to meet the expectations of the other. In other words, they will tend to behave in line with the requirements of this particular relationship. This should be true regardless of whether the observer is watching or not; quite apart from the reactions of the other, it is important to people's own self-concept to meet the expectations of their friendship roles, or, example, of those of their occupational roles.

Thus, the acceptance of influence through identification should take place where people see the induced behavior as relevant to and required by a reciprocal role relationship in which they are participants. Acceptance of influence based on a reciprocal role relationship is similar to that involved in classical identification in that it is a way of establishing or maintaining a satisfying self-defining relationship to another.

The nature of the relationship differs, of course. In one case it is a relationship of identity; in the other, one of reciprocity. In the case of reciprocal role relationships, the individual is not identifying with the other in the sense of taking over the other's identity, but in the sense of empathically reacting in terms of the other's expectations, feelings, or needs.

Identification may also serve to maintain people's relationship to a group in which their self-definition is anchored. Such a relationship may have elements of classical identification as well as of reciprocal roles to maintain their self-definition as group members. People have to model their behavior along particular lines and have to meet the expectations of their fellow members. An example of identification with a group is provided by the member of a revolutionary movement who derives strength and a sense of identity from his or her self-definition as part of the vanguard of the revolution and as an agent of historical destiny. A similar process, but at a lower degree of intensity, is probably involved in many of the conventions that people acquire as part of their socialization into a particular group.

Identification is similar to compliance in that the individual does not adopt the induced behavior because its content is intrinsically satisfying. Identification differs from compliance, however, in that the individual actually believes in the opinions and actions adopted. The behavior is accepted both publicly and privately, and its manifestation does not depend on observability by the influencing agent. It does depend, however, on the role that the individual takes at any given moment in time. Only when the appropriate role is activated—only when the individual is acting within the relationship upon which the identification is based—will the induced opinions be expressed or actions be performed. In the case of identification, people are not primarily concerned with pleasing or accommodating the other (as in compliance), but they are concerned with meeting the other's expectations for their own role performance. Thus, opinions adopted through identification do remain tied to the external source and dependent on social support. They are not integrated with the individual's value system, but rather tend to be isolated from the rest of one's values—to remain encapsulated.

Finally, internalization can be said to occur when people accept influence because the induced behavior is congruent with their value system. The content of the induced behavior is intrinsically rewarding; it is adopted because people find it useful for
the solution of a problem, or because it is congenial to their own orientations, or because it is demanded by their own beliefs—in short, because they perceive it as immediately conducive to the maximization of their values. The characteristics of a modifying agent play an important role in internalization, but the crucial dimension here is credibility, that is, the agent's behavior, not its content.

The most obvious examples of internalization are those that involve the evaluation and acceptance of induced behavior on rational grounds. People may adopt the recommendations of an expert, for example, because they find them relevant to their own problems and consistent with their own values. Typically, when internalization is involved, they will not accept these recommendations in toto, but modify them to some degree so that they will fit their unique situation. In a somewhat different scenario, visitors to a foreign country may be challenged by the different patterns of behavior to which they are exposed, and they may decide to adopt them again, selectively and in modified form because they find them more in keeping with their own values than the patterns in their home country. There is no implication, of course, that adopting the recommendations of an expert or the customs of a foreign country always involves internalization. One would speak of internalization only if the acceptance of influence was based on an assessment of the induced behavior against the person's own values.

Internalization, however, does not necessarily involve the adoption of induced behavior on rational grounds, even though the description of the process has decidedly rationalist overtones. Thus one might characterize as internalization the adoption of beliefs because of their congruence with a value system that is based on parochial premises. For example, authoritarian individuals who adopt certain racist attitudes fit into their parochial, traditional view of the world may be engaging in internalization, as long as it is the content of these attitudes and their congruence with the individual's value system that motivates their adoption. Furthermore, congruence with a person's value system does not necessarily imply logical consistency. Behavior would be congruent in, on one another way, if it fit into the person's value system, it is seen as belonging there and be demanded by it.

It follows from this conception that behavior adopted through internalization is in some way—certainly of otherwise—integrated with the individual's existing values. It becomes part of a personal system, as distinguished from a system of social role expectations. Such behavior gradually becomes independent of the external source. Its manifestation depends neither on observability by the influencing agent nor on the activation of the relevant role, but on the extent to which the underlying values have been made relevant by the values under consideration. This does not mean that people will invariably express internalized opinions, regardless of the social situation. In any specific situation, one has to choose among competing values in the face of a variety of situational requirements. It does mean, however, that these opinions will at least enter into competition with other alternatives whenever the context is deemed relevant to the situation at hand.

It should be stressed that the three processes are not mutually exclusive. While they have been defined as ideal types, they do not generally occur in pure form in real-life situations. The examples that have been given represent, at best, situations in which a particular process predominates and determines the central features of the interaction.
Each of these three processes is characterized by a distinct set of antecedent conditions and a distinct set of consequents. These are summarized in Table 1. Briefly, on the antecedent side, it is proposed that three qualitative aspects of the influence situation determine which process is likely to result: (1) the basis for the importance of the induction—that is, the nature of the predominant motivational orientation that is activated in the influence situation; (2) the source of power of the influencing agent—that is, the particular characteristics that enable the influencing agent to affect the person’s goal achievement; and (3) the manner of achieving potency of the induced response—that is, the particular induction techniques that are used (deliberately or otherwise) to make the desired behavior stand out in preference to other alternatives. Thus, compliance is likely to result if the individual’s primary concern in the influence situation is with the social cost or benefit of his or her behavior; if the influencing agent’s power is based largely on the agent’s “means control” (the ability to supply or withhold material or psychological resources on which the person’s goal achievement depends); and if the induction techniques are designed to focus the individual’s choice behavior. Identification is likely to result if the individual is primarily concerned, in this situation, with the social anchorage of his or her behavior; if the influencing agent’s power is based largely on attractiveness (that is, the possession of qualities that make a continued relationship to the agent particularly desirable); and if the induction techniques serve to delineate the requirements of a role relationship in which the person’s self-definition isanchored (for example, if they spell out the expectations of a relevant reference group). Internalization is likely to result if the in-

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individual's primary concern in the influence situation is with the value congruence of her or his behavior; if the influencing agent's power is based largely on the agent's credibility (that is, expertise and worthwhileness), and if the induction techniques are designed to emphasize the person's "mechanism of influence"—the person's conception of the process aimed at maximizing her or his values.

On the consequent side, the framework proposes that the changes produced by each of the three processes tend to be of a different nature. The crucial difference in nature of change between the three processes is in the conditions under which the newly acquired behavior is likely to manifest itself. Behavior accepted through compliance will tend to manifest itself only under conditions of surveillance by the influencing agent, that is, only when the person's behavior is observable (directly and indirectly) by the agent. The manifestation of identification-based behavior does not depend on observability by the influencing agent but does depend on the subject of the person's relationship to the agent. That is, the behavior is likely to manifest itself only in situations that are in some way associated with the individual or group from whom the behavior was originally adopted. Thus, whether or not the behavior is manifested will depend on the role that the individual takes at any given moment in time. While surveillance is irrelevant, identification-based behavior is designed to meet the individual's expectations for the person's own role performance. The behavior, therefore, remains tied to the external source and dependent upon social support. It is not integrated with the individual's value system, but rather seems to remain encapsulated. In contrast, behavior accepted through internalization depends neither on surveillance nor on reliance of the influencing agent but tends to manifest itself whenever the values on which it is based are relevant to the issue at hand. Behavior adopted through internalization is in some way, rational or otherwise, integrated with the individual's existing values. It becomes part of a personal system, distinguished from a system of social role expectations. It becomes independent of the original source and, because of the resulting interplay with other parts of the person's value system, tends to be more idiosyncratic, more flexible, and more complex. This does not imply constant inconsistency, nor does it mean that the behavior will occur every time it is relevant to the situation. Internalized beliefs will, however, at least come into play whenever their content is relevant and will contribute to the final behavioral outcome, along with competing value considerations and situational demands.

Social Influences on Identity Formation

Each of the three processes of social influence may contribute to the acquisition of elements of personal identity. Internalization can be said to yield authentic elements of identity, identification to yield vicarious elements, and compliance to yield conform elements. Thus, at the risk of some overgeneralization, we can distinguish between authentic identity, which is largely based on internalization; vicarious identity, which is largely based on identification; and conform identity, which is largely based on compliance.

In terms of the dimensions of identity described earlier, it is proposed that a stable, integrated, and authentic identity is likely to emerge to the extent to which people in
...elements of their self-definition. Internalization, by definition, involves the acceptance of social influence because its induced behavior is congruent with the person's own value system. In adopting the new behavior, people make it their own. They go through a more or less active process of relating it to their values and orientations. This often means some modification in the induced behavior to fit into the preexisting structure, as well as some modification in that structure to accommodate the new element. The product of this process is relatively stable, so that it is less vulnerable to variations in social context, it is integrated into the individual's value system, and it bears the individual's personal stamp. Thus, the conditions favorable to the internalization of socially derived elements of self-definition are, in effect, the conditions conducive to a stable, integrated, and authentic identity. Indeed, one can define an authentic identity as one composed in large part of internalized elements.

The process of identification also contributes to identity formation, but in a way that is not as conclusive—at least in and of itself—to the emergence of a stable, integrated, and authentic identity. In identification, people take over, in more or less full-blown form, aspects of another's identity—for example, the identity of the parent or of the generalized group member—as a way of establishing, filling out, or sharing up their own identity. One can speak here of vicarious elements of identity because, in taking over the other's role, the individual may try to become the other and thus to acquire vicariously the desired characteristics of the other. Vicarious identity—particularly when based on identification with a group—often has a compensatory character through identification with the group, individuals can gain a sense of power and status that, as individuals, they lack. Vicarious elements of identity are not adapted to people's own capacities and orientations, nor are they integrated into their personal value systems. They are thus lower in authenticity than internalized elements, even though they may represent a high level of personal commitment and emotional involvement. Though they may be highly durable (as long as the relationship from which they derive persists), they are relatively low in stability, since their manifestation depends on the extent to which the situational context brings the relevant role into salience. In sum, insofar as influence conditions favor the adoption of socially derived elements of self-definition through identification—and therefore the development of an identity dominated by vicarious elements—the resultant identity is likely to be relatively low in stability, integration, and authenticity.6

The relationship of the process of compliance to identity formation is less obvious. Compliance refers to the acceptance of induced behavior as a way of producing a desired social effect. Compliance-based behavior is situation-bound and depends on observability by the influencing agent or by those the agent represents. This does not mean, however, that it lacks internalization implications. People acquire, through compliance, certain patterns of self-presentation (applicable to a particular set of situations) that will gain the approval of those with whom they interact, or at least conform to the others' expectations sufficiently to permit the interaction to proceed smoothly. Insofar as these self-presentations become part of people's self-definitions—that is, insofar as they define themselves in terms of the characteristics favored by others and the categories imposed by others—one can speak of elements of identity based on compliance. For example, a person may define her or himself as...
someone whom others see as generous or as hard-nosed or as a loyal law, and may bring to various interaction situations a concern with maintaining this public image. One can speak here of conferred elements of identity because they are aspects of self-definition that depend entirely on the reactions of others—on how others regard and treat the individual.

A special case of conferred identity, relating to self-definition in terms of a particular group membership, may be called normative identity; people may define themselves as members of a group to which they belong by birth or by virtue of subsequent experiences, but have only a minimal degree of identification with their membership role or internalization of group norms and values. Normative identity, then, provides elements of self-definition based almost entirely on the way others categorize the person. Normative and other conferred elements of identity are situation-bound in that their manifestation depends very heavily on the particular others with whom the person interacts. They are thus relatively low in stability, as well as in integration and authenticity. Compared to secusus elements, they are less authentic in that their acceptance is at a more superficial, less emotionally involving level; by the same token, however, their authenticity may be less pervasive in that it is usually tied to a specific set of situations. Insofar as a person's identity is dominated by conferred elements, it can perhaps be seen as the ultimate in inauthenticity, since self-definition in this case is almost entirely subject to the demands of the situation and the vicissitudes of the moment.

The discussion of different types of identity and identity elements in relation to the three processes of influence has been marked by a normative flavor. The very choice of terms to describe the three types of identity reflects the normative orientation: calling internalization-based elements of identity "authentic," while referring to the others as "vacuous" and "conferrable"—which smack of insubstantiality—clearly wags a finger at what is deemed desirable and what is undesirable. This does indeed reflect my normative orientation toward authentic identity, but it probably conveys a more negative view of compliance and identification than I actually hold. To restore the balance, I must point out that the contributions of the three processes of influence to identity formation are not as sharply separate and divergent as the discussion may have implied. Identity formation is never simply a matter of either internalization or identification or compliance. Instead, there are several important ways in which the three processes may be related to one another and interact with each other in the development of personal identity.

No identity—regardless of its degree of authenticity—is composed entirely of conferred elements. Identity is always a mixture of elements derived from each of the three processes. As already indicated, identity includes definitions of the self not only as a personal agent, but also as a social stimulus and as a domain of social roles—that is, conceptions of how others see us and what they expect of us. Almost inevitably, some of these will have been adopted—and will remain—at the level of compliance and identification, respectively. In other words, even individuals with an authentic well-developed identity will partly define themselves in terms of aspects of self-presentation that have habitually brought them the approval of others, as well as in terms of aspects of role performance that conform to the expectations of others. The real issue is how dominant and pervasive these elements are in a person's identity.
The Place of Shared Identity in the Development of Personal Identity

ility. An identity that is predominantly made up of elements that are "marketable" or "borrowed," without a coherent, autonomous self-definition built up around a personal core, can be viewed as a flawed identity. But the presence of some conformed and vicarious elements, alongside an autonomous sense of self—particularly if these elements are not sharply at variance with that sense of self—can be seen as a perfectly "healthy" and probably inevitable feature of identity formation.

2. In a child's acquisition of certain elements of identity, the three processes may represent successive stages of development. Children may first adopt an aspect of self-definition through compliance, having found that a particular mode of self-presentation brings forth parental approval. They may then move to identification, initially for instrumental reasons. By taking the parent's role in their absence, they can predict more accurately what behavior is likely to meet with parental approval or disapproval. Taking the parental role may turn out to be satisfying in its own right, by giving children a vicarious sense of power and efficacy, and they may then—as part of the process of identification with the parental role—adopt the parent's definition of them as their own. Having done so, they may find that this aspect of self-definition is intrinsically desirable and congenial with their evolving personal identity, and they may then internalize it. In such cases, then, compliance and identification may provide the conditions for internalization and thus facilitate that process.

There is no assumption, however, that the succession of the three processes is in any sense automatic. Aspects of self-definition acquired through compliance or identification (or internalization) depend on the extent to which the conditions for identification (or internalization) are present subsequent to compliance. Similarly, whether identification leads to internalization depends on the extent to which the conditions for internalization are present subsequent to identification. The presence of these subsequent conditions, in turn, depends on the conditions under which compliance or identification was initially induced—that is, on the particular character of the initial compliance or identification. Some illustrations may help to clarify this point.

In some cases, the development of authentic identity by bringing potentially authentic elements of the child's self into salience and enabling them to become part of her or his behavioral repertoire may provide the occasion for discovering and building authentic elements of the self. Clearly, whether or not compliance is likely to have such consequences depends on the precise conditions under which it takes place—on the extent to which it actually serves to encourage the child in expressing her or his talents and inclinations. Thus, compliance is more likely to lead to subsequent internalization if it is based on reward and approval than if it is based on punishment and disapproval. Similarly, compliance is more likely to lead to subsequent internalization if it is based on reward and approval focus on self-expressive and exploratory behavior rather than conforming and obedient behavior. In short, compliance may well facilitate the development of authentic identity, provided the conditions under which compliance occurs are favorable to subsequent internalization.

Identification may contribute to the development of authentic identity by helping
children to acquire the tools and develop the commitment for performing social roles that may become integrated into their emerging identity. Though they may originally take over the role through identification and perform it according to the assumptions and expectations of others, they may in the process gain mastery over the role and bring it into increasing communication with other aspects of the self. Thus, identification may provide the occasion for exploring and developing an arena for authentic self-expression. Whether or not identification is likely to have such consequences depends, again, on the precise conditions under which it takes place—on the extent to which it actually serves to encourage children in gaining mastery over the roles they have taken over and adapting them to their own ends. Accordingly, the likelihood that identification will lead to subsequent internalization depends on the aspects of the parental role that the child takes over. Internalization is more probable if children identify with the parent as an efficacious agent, capable of controlling the environment, than if they identify with the parent as an regressor capable of exerting punitive power. Similarly, identification is more likely to lead to subsequent internalization if role expectations focus on active, individualized performance of the role rather than on stereotyped repetition of prescribed behavior. In short, identification, like compliance, can facilitate the development of authentic identity, given the proper conditions.

3. Even in adulthood, compliance and identification may contribute to an authentic self-definition. Though performance in a role—expressing, for example, one's professional or ethnic identity—may be well integrated with the person's value system, it may still require periodic reinforcement in the form of social approval (for having demonstrated to others that one is, for example, a good scholar or a good Jew), as well as self-approval (for having demonstrated to oneself that one has adequately met the expectations of the role and that one can continue to see oneself as a good scholar or as a good Jew). It is not unusual for an important aspect of personal identity to include conformed and vicarious elements along with authentic ones. Such coexistence of different elements does not undermine the authenticity of the identity, as long as the authentic elements clearly predominate and the conformed and vicarious elements are clearly linked to them and point in the same direction. The achievement of such conformed and vicarious elements may help to strengthen the authentic elements and to facilitate their expression.

The Acquisition of Group Identity

One can speak of a group identity (focusing here primarily on an ethnic or national identity) as the group's definition of itself—its conception of its enduring, characteristic, and basic values, its strengths and weaknesses, its hopes and fears, its reputation and conditions of existence, its institutions and traditions, its purposes, current purposes, and future prospects. Underlying all of these components of the group identity is the extent to which the group has an identity at all, the extent to which its members see themselves as constituting a unique, identifiable entity, with a claim to continuity over time, to unity across geographical distance, and to the recognized right to various forms of collective self-expression. Group identity is carried by the
individual members of the group, but it is not coterminous with the sum of the conceptions of individual group members. For one thing, it has an independent existence in the form of accumulated historical processes, including written documents, oral traditions, institutional arrangements, and symbolic artifacts. For another, different segments of the group differ widely in their degree of active involvement and emotional commitment to the group; various leadership elements, and particularly active and committed subgroups are far more instrumental in defining the group identity than the rank-and-file members.

Clearly, group identity—as a collective phenomenon—is complex and differentiated. It varies over time and circumstances, its strength and nature depend on the kind of mobilization processes that occur within the group, and on the particular leadership elements most responsible for that mobilization. Group identity typically represents a combination of historical realities and deliberate mobilization. To a certain degree, the fostering of group identity is an arbitrary matter, determined by the interests and opportunities of those leaders who are mobilizing support for political action within the group. It cannot be entirely arbitrary, however, in that there must be some elements of common culture and historical experience around which this mobilization can take place. What aspects of identity will become central depends on the particular leadership that is responsible for mobilization and the historical context within which it operates.

Recognizing its complexity and fluidity, one can think of group identity as a collective product—i.e., the form of a system of beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations—that is transmitted to group members in the course of their socialization and mobilized through a variety of communications over the course of their lives. It is reflected in the consciousness of individual group members to different degrees and in different ways, depending on the nature of the socialization and mobilization experiences to which they have been exposed and the way in which they have handled these.

In terms of the conceptual model used in the present article, group identity and its various components represent external inputs that become incorporated in an individual's (person's) identity through various processes of social influence. In the context of identity formation in the child, one can think of group identity and its components as behavioral possibilities induced by important socializing agents, including parents, teachers, and peers. The question is: To what extent and in what way does the child adopt these induced behaviors as elements of personal identity? More specifically, from the normative perspective taken here, the important question would be: What are the conditions most conducive to the internalization of these elements—that is, to their inclusion as authentic parts of a stable and integrated personal identity?

A social-influence analysis of the acquisition of group identity as a component of personal identity can address itself to two issues: (1) the adoption of the specific elements of the group identity, that is, the beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations that make up the group identity as a collective product, and (2) the development of an orientation to the group itself. These two issues correspond closely (in reverse order) to the criteria of Jewish identity distinguished by Susan Hermann: the relationship to the Jewish group and the adoption of the norms of the group and other contents of the group identity.
Adoption of the Elements of Group Identity

In asking how a group identity is incorporated into the personal identity of an individual, we are no large part, asking how the individual accepts the specific elements that make up the group identity. To what extent does one adopt the normatively prescribed beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations of the group? Adoption of these elements may enter into personal identity in two ways.

First, the ethnic or national group to which individuals belong is inevitably part of their definition of who and what they personally are. The particular elements of the group identity that they adopt determine and provide the content of their self-definition as members of that group. They may come to share, to varying degrees, such collective aspects of the group identity as images of the group itself and of other groups in its environment, conceptions of the group's history and goals, attitudes toward group traditions and symbols, and memories of group experiences and achievements. Insofar as a person adopts these collective identity elements as his own, they become important parts of that person's self-identity.

Second, the elements of group identity that individuals adopt may determine their personal self-definition more generally by contributing to their worldview. A group identity, such as Jewish identity, contains within it beliefs and values pertaining to the meaning of human existence, the nature of social institutions, the conduct of human relationships, the definition of the ideal personality. These are tested in the group's historical experiences, reflected and elaborated in its documents, traditions, and institutional forms. Insofar as group members adopt the group's beliefs and values as their own, they influence the way in which these individuals view the world and their place in it and the way in which they conceive their relationship to their environment.

The adoption of elements of group identity involves a combination of knowledge, affect, and action. If group identity is to become an integral part of an authentic personal identity, individuals must acquire some substantive knowledge of the historical and cultural core of the group's beliefs and values; they must set these beliefs and values as personally meaningful to them; and they must somehow translate them into concrete practices in their daily lives. For example, the Holocaust, which is so central an element of contemporary Jewish experience that any authentic Jewish identity must somehow come to grips with it in developing a consciousness of the Holocaust among Jewish children, one would want to foster knowledge of the historical events and reflection upon them, an emotional grasp of the meaning of their own membership in a community of Holocaust survivors; and an exploration of the kinds of individual and collective actions that the Holocaust suggests to them as Jews and as members of other groups.

In keeping with the conceptual and normative approach of this article, it is proposed that the optimal integration of knowledge, affect, and action is most likely to result if elements of group identity are accepted at the level of internalization. Compliance may lead to situational practice, lacking in personal involvement and conviction; or to a nominal acceptance of group identity, devoid of substantive content and subject to mobilization only in response to threats to group survival. Identification may lead to a high effective involvement in group identity as a source of self-en-
hencement, but one in which the elements of group identity are compartmentalized and held reflexively and unreflectively, and in which action is mobilized primarily by pride or guilt. Internalization, by contrast, should lead to an acceptance of group-identity elements based on evaluation of them in terms of the individual's general values and orientations; group-identity elements would then be reflected in both his judgments, feelings, and actions as well as they become integral parts of personal identity. The conditions conducive to adoption of group-identity elements at the level of internalization can be stated in general terms by reference to the earlier discussion of the antecedents of internalization (as summarized in Table 1), as well as the discussion of the conditions under which compliance and identification are likely to lead to subsequent internalization. The challenge, of course, is to translate these general propositions into concrete approaches to Jewish education that would create the conditions for internalization of Jewish beliefs and values and avoid the conditions under which learnings are likely to become fixed at the level of compliance or identification.

In exploring the possibilities of an educational model conducive to internalization, it would be well to keep in mind a perhaps controversial implication of the present analysis. Emphasis has been placed on the incorporation of elements of group identity into a stable, integrated, and authentic personal identity. It is quite conceivable that the requirements for promoting the integration and authenticity of personal identity may come into conflict with the requirements for maintaining the unity and stability of Jewish group identity, at least in its traditional, historical sense. Internalization implies an active process of shaping socially derived elements into a product suited to the person's own value system. The person evaluates induced behaviors in terms of a prevailing, evolving structure, adopts them selectively, and modifies them as she or he integrates them with the rest of her or his values and orientations. Thus, internalization of Jewish-identity elements implies that the person approaches Jewish identity in a flexible, selective way; that Jewish-identity elements enter into communication and competition with other-identity elements, including those derived from the various other roles the person occupies and the various other groups to which the person belongs; and that the resultant product may represent a personal transformation of the group identity, giving varied and new meanings to old beliefs and values, in keeping with the unique personal identity in which the Jewish elements are concretized.

This view has definite implications for the conception of Jewish identity that is offered to children in the course of Jewish education. It suggests a view of Jewish identity that is differentiated rather than monolithic, making it possible for the individual to "disregard" its various elements and evaluate them separately (though recognizing their historical roots). Further, it suggests a view of Jewish identity that is variable rather than fixed in meaning, making it possible for the individual to redefine some of its elements in keeping with the realities of her or his own existence (though recognizing their historical roots).

Thus, for example, the relationship between religious and national elements, which are clearly intertwined in Jewish identity as it has historically developed. In a stable, traditional Jewish community, the unity of these two elements tended to present relatively few problems. "Judaism as a religion and the Jewish group were
consequences," in Peter Medding's words. In communities operating under halakhic rules,
the ethical components of Judaism were subsumed within and subservient to the religious components. Jewish identity was constructed in a community of belief based upon a system of shared prescriptive values. This conventionalistic system which conceives of the individual's whole environment as a detailed pattern of prescribed actions and social roles.

Group membership, consequently, was clearly defined. In the less stable, more pluralistic environment in which most Jewish children now grow up, these two elements have become relatively independent of each other, and "group values, beliefs, rituals and roles have all become matters of individual choice and personal definition." Under these circumstances, the relative weights of the two components and the nature of the relationship between them may have to differ for different individuals if Jewish identity is to be successfully integrated into their emerging personal identities. To insist on an unchanging relationship between the two elements may constrain individuals with an either-or choice, which may lead some to reject their Jewish identity entirely and others to adopt elements of Jewish identity at a compliance or identification level.

An educational model aiming toward internalization would explore the historical relationship between the religious and national elements, but encourage each individual to evaluate them independently. Moreover, it would define the religious elements more broadly so that they would not be intrinsically tied to a particular set of practices and beliefs. Such a broader definition would enable some individuals to extract from the Jewish religious worldview certain ethical values, assumptions about the nature of humankind, or teachings about human relations and social justice, which they could integrate with values derived from other sources, even if they chose to reject the specific religious idiom in which these have been traditionally expressed.

In short, the educational model proposed here would aim at individualizing Jewish identity rather than to maximize it. Such a model may not be acceptable to those who are committed to the unity and integrity of Jewish identity in its traditional form. There is good reason to argue, however, that in the complex, pluralistic, rapidly changing world in which we now live, the model presented here is more conducive to the incorporation of Jewish identity into an authentic, integrated personal identity. By opening up the communications between Jewish values and other values, it may transform some of the Jewish values, but in so doing retain their vitality. The alternative may be a Jewish identity that is offered in maximal form but accepted in minimal form—striped of content, playing an insignificant role in the person's daily life or existential choices, and activated only when there is an opportunity for status enhancement or as a threat to group survival. These are very old issues, but perhaps the framework presented here may provide some new handles for dealing with them.

Development of Orientation to the Group

The second issue in the incorporation of group identity into the personal identity of individuals concerns the development of their orientation to the group itself. How central and significant a part does their membership in this particular group play in
their personal identity). To what extent is their definition of who and what they are linked to that group? How salient is this group membership in their daily lives, how intense is their involvement with it, how strong their commitment and loyalty to it, how solid their sense of belongingness in it?

The person's orientation to the group can be explored not only in quantitative, but also in qualitative terms. That is, one can ask not only about the strength of the person's involvement in the group but also about the nature of that involvement. Here the model of social influence presented above may again be of some relevance. The model has been extended to an analysis of patterns of personal involvement in the political system, which can also be applied to the analysis of involvement in a national or ethnic group.

Table 2 summarizes six different patterns of personal involvement in a group, corresponding to the six patterns distinguished in the earlier work on political ideology. The rows of the table identify two sources of attachment to the group—two motivational bases for extending loyalty to the group: sentimental attachment and instrumental attachment. These two sources of attachment correspond to Simon Flexner's distinction between alignment with a group on the basis of a feeling of 'simularity' or a feeling of interdependence, though his focus is on intermember perceptions rather than on perception of the group.11

Sentimental attachment refers to people's attachment to a group based on a perception of that group as representative of their personal identity—as somehow reflecting, extending, or confirming their identity. Insofar as it represents them, as individuals and as parts of a community, they extend loyalty to it. Instrumental attachment refers to people's attachment to a group based on a perception of that group as meeting their personal needs and interests and those of the other members of the social category encompassed by the group. Insofar as the group is seen as instrumental to the achievement of their goals, they extend loyalty to it. For person purposes, the first row of the table—which refers to the relationship of the group to personal identity—is most germane. The two sources of attachment, however, are clearly related to one

Table 2. Patterns of Personal Involvement in a National or Ethnic Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of orientation to the group</th>
<th>Role orientation (compliance with group rules)</th>
<th>Role orientation (identification with group rules)</th>
<th>Value orientation (commitment of group values)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sources of attachment to the group</td>
<td>Acceptance of the group's authority in defining membership</td>
<td>Acceptance of the group's values</td>
<td>Commitment to the group's values and standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentimental perception of the group as representing personal identity</td>
<td>Acceptance of the group's authority in defining membership</td>
<td>Acceptance of the group's values</td>
<td>Commitment to the group's values and standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental perception of the group as meeting personal needs and interests</td>
<td>Acceptance of the group's rules and regulations</td>
<td>Commitment to the group's instrumental values</td>
<td>Commitment to the group's instrumental values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

another. Though they are analytically distinct, and need not go together empirically, they do tend to generate and reinforce one another. That is, instrumental attachment to a group also tends to strengthen the perception of that group as representative of one’s identity, and sentimentional attachment also encourages beholders to look up to that group for the fulfillment of their needs and interests.

The two sources of attachment jointly determine the strength of the person’s loyalty and commitment to the group. This commitment may express itself in different ways, however, depending on the basis of people’s integration in the group and the nature of their orientation to it. The columns of Table 2 distinguish three types of orientations (or bases of integration): rule orientation, role orientation, and value orientation—which correspond to the processes of compliance, identification, and internalization, respectively.

One can speak of role orientation when people’s relationship to the group is based primarily on their acceptance of the group rules. They recognize the group’s authority to define rules and their obligation to adhere to them. In return, they expect to be included within the definition of group membership and to have access to their fair share of the resources that are at the disposal of the group. This type of orientation can be visualized quite readily in the context of a stable, traditional Jewish community as represented, for example, by the Eastern European shofet. In such a setting, daily behavior was governed by a widely accepted set of rules and regulations, and adherence to these rules often had direct bearing on people’s acceptance by the group and access to resources on which they depended. In the context of the present-day American Jewish community, role orientation in daily life is probably relevant only to relatively small segments of the population. This orientation, however, does have wider implications when it refers to the basic rules by which continued membership in the group is defined. One can speak of role orientation in this context when an individual’s relationship to the group is based on adherence to those minimal rules that would assure their continuing acceptance within the definition of members of the Jewish community. Typically, this involves assertion of their Jewish identity on those occasions when group survival becomes an issue—though such events as financial and moral support for Israel, particularly at times of crisis, or through opposition to intermarriage, in terms of the earlier discussion of types of identity, for individuals who are primarily role-oriented, relationship to the group represents a conferred or nominal identity element in their personal identities.

One can speak of role orientation when the person’s relationship to the group is based on identification with and active involvement in group roles. In particular, at the emotional level, role-oriented individuals are identified with the role of group member: they are emotionally involved in the group, regard it as a central part of their self-definition, and derive a sense of status enhancement and self-transcendence from it. What is significant for them, however, is possession of the role itself rather than the specific content of that role and its relationship to their broader value system. They tend to accept the role as prescribed—more or less literally and factically—without integrating it with their other values and beliefs. In short, their commitment to the group can be described as a vicarious element of their personal identity. This pattern might be exemplified by many Jews who are closely identified with Israel or actively involved in Jewish community affairs, but who express these commitments in rel-
natively conventional and ineffective fashion. It should be noted that in these examples of role orientation, sentimental and instrumental features typically coincide.

Involvement in Zionist or Jewish community affairs provides an opportunity not only to derive vicarious satisfaction from enacting the group member role, but also to participate in other satisfying role relationships.

Value orientations, charted in the third column of Table 2, represents a relationship to the group based on a sharing of the group's values. Here members have internalized the group's values because they find them congruent with their own value system. Their commitment to the group that represents an authentic element of their personal identity. It should be stressed that value orientations do not preclude responsiveness to issues of group survival (mentioned above as a feature of role orientation) or active involvement in the role of group member (mentioned above as a feature of role orientation). If anything, value-oriented members should be more responsive to issues of group survival, because they are concerned not merely with the physical survival of the group, but with the values for which it stands. Similarly, they may be more actively involved in the role of group member, even as they see this role as a way of expressing their personal identity and promoting their personal values. What characterizes their relationship to the group, however, is that it goes beyond adherence to group rules and involvement in group roles and becomes an integral part of an authentic personal identity.

Within the present framework, the question for Jewish education is: How can one create the conditions conducive to the development of a value-oriented commitment to Jewish identity and avoid the conditions conducive to the development of commitments that remain fixed at the level of role orientation or role orientation?

Clearly, responsiveness to threats against Jewish survival and emotional involvement in one's Jewish role are essential ingredients of a Jewish education, but there is a need to go beyond these if commitment to the group is to become part of an authentic personal identity in which Jewish values are integrated in a multiply determined and personally coherent value structure.

Again, a potentially controversial implication of this view should be noted. A commitment based on internalization and value orientation is likely to be more stable and more profound, but it is also more differentiated and more questioning. A role-oriented loyalty has little depth and continuity, but it is likely to be elicited automatically if the proper symbols are brought into play. A role-oriented loyalty is particularly powerful in that it may represent a total and enthusiastic commitment to the group's cause. A value-oriented loyalty, in contrast, is conditional: it does not promote support for the group, right or wrong. Value-oriented members evaluate the activity they are asked to support on the basis of their own values and of the fundamental group values that they share, and are prepared to criticize and dissent.

The implications of these distinctions are readily apparent if we think of commitment to the state of Israel. An authentic Jewish identity in our time typically includes, for Diaspora Jews no less than for Israelis, a commitment to the vision and the enterprise represented by Israel. But my model of Jewish education would encourage a commitment characterized by reflective, rather than reflexive, support for government policies and practices. To be sure, such a commitment is less easily activated because it does not respond automatically to fear, guilt, and group pressures. But in the long
run, it is most conducive to a creative interaction between Israel and the diaspora in evolving a new Jewish identity that is rooted in both the experiences of Jewish history and the realities of Jewish existence.

Conclusion

The analytic thesis of this article reflects a pluralistic view of Jewish identity for both Israeli and diaspora Jews. Pluralism, within both the state of Israel and the Jewish people, is seen as a necessary condition for the maintenance of democratic institutions, for the vitality of Jewish culture and religion, and for Jewish survival in our contemporary and ever-changing world. An authentic Jewish identity for the coming century must take account of the close link between religion and ethnicity in the development of Jewish peoplehood, of the historical experiences of the Jewish people, including the Holocaust and the establishment of the state of Israel—the two monsoon events of the twentieth century for the Jewish people, and the crucial role of Israel in contemporary Jewish life. Within these limits, however, an authentic Jewish identity can take many different forms.

If we want to encourage internalization of Jewish identity in the coming generations of Jewish children, we must allow them to choose and adapt the different elements of that identity in ways that are congruent and integrated with their evolving personal values and with their other identities—in other words, in ways that are personally authentic for them. In this spirit, the definition of an authentic Jewish group identity must allow for different ways of expressing and combining the religious and ethnic components of Jewish identity. It must accommodate different degrees and forms of Jewish religious belief and practice, including thoroughgoing secularism. Similarly, it must leave room—among both Israeli and diaspora Jews—for different views of Jewish nationalism, Zionism, and the state of Israel. Ideological positions that relegate diaspora Jews, non-Zionist Jews or non-Orthodox Jews to a status of Israel or incomplete Jews, or that seek to limit the pluralism of Israel or the Jewish people, are detrimental to the creative integration of Jewish identity into an authentic personal identity.

A pluralistic view of Jewish identity takes cognizance of the ambiguities inherent in this group identity as it has evolved over the centuries. Jewish identity is similar in this respect to other group identities, each of which is marked by its own particular act of ambiguities. In the Jewish case, a major source of ambiguity is the confrontation of the historical link between religion and peoplehood with the current diversity of religious commitments among self-identified Jews. Another source of ambiguity is the success of the Zionist enterprise in establishing a state for the Jewish people in its ancestral homeland, which must of necessity face two realities: that there is also another people living in that state and that land, which must be afforded the legal, material, and psychological conditions for full citizenship; and that there is a majority of Jews living outside of Israel, which must be afforded the conditions for developing a vital and creative Jewish life in the diaspora communities. To incorporate Jewish identity in an authentic personal identity, Jews in Israel and the diaspora, at all stages of personal development, must be aware of these ambiguities, accept their reality, and
smuggle with their implications. To this end, we need to focus thinking and debate on how to build a conception of Jewish particularism, of Jewish identity, that is alive to these ambiguities. Jewish education, in turn, needs to sensitize children to these ambiguities; encourage and equip them to question ideological assumptions anchored in religious and political doctrines, and enable them to choose a definition of Jewish identity that is both historically and personally authentic.

Notes

This article is a revised version of a working paper that was originally prepared for the American Jewish Committee's Colloquium on Jewish Education and Jewish Identity, and presented at a Colloquium Conference in November 1974. I am grateful to Peter Minkler for encouraging me to make this paper available to a wider audience after all these years, to Jennifer Rodkin for her very helpful feedback on the original paper and guidance on the contemporary literature; and to the late Simon Hochschild, who greatly stimulated my thinking about the issues discussed here. I dedicate this article to the memory of Simon Hochschild, who was my friend and colleague for many years.


identity, which refers to shared similarities with members of certain social categories. In the
present usage, personal identity includes elements derived from and shared with various
groups, which— to varying degrees and in varying ways—to be explained below—are inte-
grated with the personal core of the identity.
5. Group identification is examined extensively by Kurt Lewin. See his ARMING SOCIAL
CONFLICT (New York: 1948) and FIELDS THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (New York: 1955).
6. It is interesting that Turner et al.'s description of the variability and context dependence
of social identity (see their "Self and Collective: Cognition and Social Coping"") is very rein-
forcement of the process of identification and the functioning of what is here called a vicarious
identity. The authors argue quite persuasively that the variability in self-identification across
stimuli is not a sign of superficial, inauthentic change. This may be correct relative to inco-
herence-based confounded identity (see below), but according to the present argument—it
should not be more relative to internalization-based authentic identity.
7. This differs from the case of identification where people may be concerned with gen-
erally being perceived as having a good time—but this, with meeting the expectations of the
role and role identification are culturally anchored in — not just with the way others see them.
The one may, of course, shade into the other.
8. Note that because of the term "group identity" here differs from its use in the social psy-
chological literature based on social identity theory (see n. 4 for relevant references), by this
literature, group (or collective) identity refers to a property of individuals in an aspect of the self-
congest that reflects the person's relationship to a group or social category. Here, group iden-
tity refers to a collective phenomenon—a property of the group.
9. See Steven N. Heine, JEWISH IDENTITY, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, N.J. and Oxford:
1989), esp. ch. 3.
10. Peter A. Middelhoek, "Political Zionism, the State of Israel and Jewish Identity." Paper
11. Ibid., 3.
12. See Keenan, "Paucity of Personal Investment in the National System," and Keenan
and Hamilton, Origins of Obedience.
13. Heine, Jewish Identity, 43 ff.