Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological Perspective

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This chapter focuses on reconciliation in the context of and in relation to an emerging or recently completed process of conflict resolution. The cases that particularly inform my analysis are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other protracted conflicts between identity groups—such as those in Bosnia or Northern Ireland—that are characterized by the existence of incomplete, fragile peace agreements (cf. Rothstein, 1999a). I hope, however, that the analysis also has some relevance to reconciliation in postconflict situations—both those of recent origin, such as South Africa or Guatemala, and those of long standing, such as the German-Jewish or the Franco-German relationship in the wake of World War II. Clearly, there are differences in the nature of reconciliation processes as a function of the stage of the conflict and the time that has elapsed since the end of active hostilities, but such differences need to be accounted for in a comprehensive theory of reconciliation.

Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution

The concept of reconciliation has had a place in my writings over the years about the goals of conflict resolution, both in general (for example, Kelman, 1999a) and in the Israeli-Palestinian case in particular (for example, Kelman, 1998a). But I have not treated reconciliation systematically as a distinct analytic category. The central distinction
for my colleagues and myself, following John Burton, has been between sette-
ment and resolution of conflict (see, for example, Burton, 1969, chs. 11, 12). In
contrast to the negotiation of a political settlement, a process of conflict reso-
lution goes beyond a realist view of national interests. It explores the causes
of the conflict, particularly causes in the form of unmet or threatened needs
for identity; security, recognition, autonomy, and justice. It seeks solutions re-
sponsive to the needs of both sides through active engagement in joint problem
solving. Hence, agreements achieved through a process of genuine conflict
resolution—unlike compromises achieved through a bargaining process bro-
kered or imposed by third parties—are likely to engender the two parties’ long-
term commitment to the outcome and to transform their relationship. We have
argued that an agreement emerging from such a process of conflict resolution
and the new relationship it promotes are conducive to stable peace, mutually
enhancing cooperation, and ultimate reconciliation.

Thus, reconciliation, in this view, is a consequence of successful conflict
resolution. It comes at the end of the process, with time: the test of a good
agreement, and of the process that generates it, is its conduciveness to ultimate
reconciliation. This does not mean (and has never meant, in my view) that
reconciliation comes into play only after an agreement has been reached. Rec-
conciliation is, after all, a process as well as an outcome; as such, it should ideally
be set into motion from the beginning of a peace process and as an integral
part of it. In this spirit, I have described the exchange of the letters of mutual
recognition between the PLO and the state of Israel—which I have always
regarded as the most important feature of the Oslo accord (see Kelman,
1997a)—as “a product of a rudimentary process of reconciliation” (Kelman,
1998a: 37). In the same spirit, the problem-solving workshops between polit-
ically influential Israelis and Palestinians that my colleagues and I have
organized for some years (see Kelman, 1992; Roubana and Kelman, 1994)
represent tentative steps toward reconciliation, insofar as participants are en-
couraged to listen to and to try to appreciate each other’s narrative and to
engage in a process of “negotiating identity” (Kelman, 2001).

During the Netanyahu period I went further, arguing that the pragmatic,
step-by-step approach of the Oslo process was no longer feasible, because of
the breakdown of trust and partnership between the two sides, and that a new
process was needed in which reconciliation would move to the fore. I would
make that point even more strongly today, in the second year of the second
Intifada. I am not proposing that reconciliation is a precondition for negotia-
tion or that it must precede a peace agreement. But significant steps toward
reconciliation—in the form of mutual acceptance of the other’s nationhood
and humanity—are necessary in order to resume negotiations and move them
forward. "The process and outcome of negotiations must be consistent with the requirements for ultimate reconciliation" (Kelman, 1998a: 37). In my view, this requires negotiations committed to the search for a principled peace, anchored in a historic compromise.

Although reconciliation has been central to my thinking in these different ways, I tended to conceive of it not so much as a separate process but as a component and logical outcome of conflict resolution as my colleagues and I have conceptualized and practiced it. However, along with many analysts and practitioners of conflict resolution, my thinking has been influenced by a variety of recent events that have brought the issue of reconciliation into focus: the truth and reconciliation commissions in South Africa and in Latin America; the signing of incomplete peace agreements, which have failed to lead to a new relationship and a stable peace between the antagonists; the efforts of external powers to intervene in internal conflicts, which may have succeeded in reducing the immediate violence but lacked a strategy to enable the warring communities to live together; and the new wave of attention to the unfinished business of World War II, both in the form of restitution for Holocaust victims and in the form of psychological efforts to promote healing, best exemplified by the work of Bar-On (1993b, 2000) and others to bring together children of Nazi victims and Nazi perpetrators. The cumulative effect of these experiences has been to encourage me, along with my colleagues, to view reconciliation as a distinct process, qualitatively different from conflict resolution—even conflict resolution within a needs-oriented, interactive problem-solving framework. Reconciliation is obviously continuous with and linked to conflict resolution and it certainly is not an alternative to it. But whereas conflict resolution refers to the process of achieving a mutually satisfactory and hence durable agreement between the two societies, reconciliation refers to the process whereby the societies learn to live together in the postconflict environment.

Combining the customary differentiation between conflict settlement and resolution, and the more recent differentiation between conflict resolution and reconciliation, suggests a conceptual model based on three qualitatively distinct processes of peacemaking: conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation. In adopting such a model, I am following in the footsteps of my colleague, Nadim Rouhana (in press), although my formulation of the process of reconciliation, in particular, differs from his in some important respects. As an analytic approach I find the three-way distinction very appealing, for reasons that will become clearer in the next section.
Three Processes of Peacemaking

Although settlement, resolution, and reconciliation represent three approaches to peacemaking, they should not be viewed as three different ways of achieving the same goal. Instead, they are ways of achieving different—though often overlapping—goals, all broadly linked to changing the relationship between groups, communities, societies, or states from one of hostility to one of peaceful coexistence. The specific goals and emphases of the three processes may be congruent and mutually supportive, but they may also be contradictory to one another.

I have already suggested that reconciliation is continuous with and linked to conflict resolution. In a sense, it can be argued that reconciliation, at least in its full form, presupposes conflict resolution: a long-term, cooperative relationship, based on mutual acceptance and respect, is not likely to take hold without a peace agreement that addresses the fundamental needs and sense of justice of both sides. Similarly, it can be argued that conflict resolution presupposes conflict settlement, at least in the sense that a political agreement negotiated by the legitimate leaderships of the conflicting parties and endorsed by relevant outside powers and international organizations must be in place if the two societies are to consider their conflict to have ended in a fair and mutually satisfactory way. The three processes may thus be related in a sequential way, with settlement as the first step, which may or may not be followed by resolution, which in turn may or may not be followed by reconciliation. However, there is no reason to assume that the three processes necessarily follow such a sequence. Steps in the direction or in the spirit of settlement, resolution, or reconciliation may occur quite independently, in any order and in any combination.

In short, possible relationships between the three processes need to be explored, conceptually and empirically, rather than assumed—or dismissed. The main purpose of the present exercise is to see whether we can gain some analytical leverage by thinking of settlement, resolution, and reconciliation as qualitatively different (though not necessarily always empirically separate) processes and identifying the distinct antecedents and consequences of each.

My special perspective on the distinction among conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation derives from the proposition that they broadly correspond to the three processes of social influence—compliance, identification, and internalization—that I distinguished in my earlier work (Kelman, 1958, 1961; Kelman and Hamilton, 1989). Very briefly, compliance refers to acceptance of influence from another in order to achieve a favorable
reaction from the other, to gain a reward or approval from the other, or to avoid punishment or disapproval. Identification refers to acceptance of influence from another in order to maintain a desired relationship to the other and the self-definition anchored in that relationship; identification may involve taking on the role of the other or a role reciprocal to that of the other. Internalization refers to acceptance of influence from another in order to maintain the congruence of one's own value system; internalization may involve adopting new behavior because it is consistent with one's beliefs or consonant with one's identity.

I arrived at this three-way distinction early in my work on attitude and behavior change in individuals, out of an abiding interest in the quality of the changes induced by social influence: the depth of change, the durability of change, the independence of change from the external source from which it was originally derived, and the integration of the new elements into preexisting structures such as the person's belief system, value system, or personal identity. Each of the three processes is characterized by a distinct set of antecedent conditions. For example, the source of the power of the influencing agent to induce change varies for the three processes. In the case of compliance, it is the agent's means of control, that is, control over rewards and punishments, which constitute material or psychological resources that are consequential to the person. In the case of identification, it is the agent's attractiveness, that is, desirability as a partner in a continuing relationship. In the case of internalization, it is the agent's credibility, that is, expertise and trustworthiness as a conveyer of value-relevant information (Kelman, 1958).

At the output end, each of the three processes is characterized by a distinct set of consequent conditions. Most important here are the conditions under which the new opinion or behavior is likely to manifest itself. The manifestation of compliance-induced behavior depends on surveillance by the influencing agent. Identification-based behavior is not contingent on surveillance, but it does depend on the continuing salience of the person's relationship to the influencing agent. That is, it is likely to manifest itself only when the person acts within the role defined by that relationship. Finally, internalized behavior becomes independent of the original source and is likely to manifest itself whenever it is relevant to the issue at hand, regardless of the surveillance or salience of the influencing agent.

I have extended this model to analysis of the relationship of individuals to the state or other social systems (Kelman, 1969), and to the nation or other collective entities (Kelman, 1958b). In this connection, we have distinguished between three types of political orientation—rule-, role-, and value-orientation (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989)—that are coordinated with the three processes
of influence. The rule, role, and value distinction has also been useful in analyzing people's relationship to legitimate authority and their emotional reactions to their own deviations from social norms. I have also distinguished between rule-oriented, role-oriented, and value-oriented movements of social protest. In an entirely different context, in my writing on the ethics of social research, I drew on my three-processes model to distinguish among three types of ethical concerns that our research may arouse: concerns about the impact of the research on the interests of the individuals and communities who are the subjects of our investigations, on the quality of the relationship between investigators and research participants, and on broader societal values.

I mention these various extensions of the original model because they suggest the possibility, or at least the hope, that it might also have some relevance to the analysis of conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation as three distinct processes of peacemaking. My original model of social influence emerged out of research on persuasive communication, but it has broadened to capture the interaction of individuals or groups with each other and with larger social systems in a variety of social contexts, and their integration within these social systems. In essence, my trichotomy distinguishes three foci for these interactions. The first centers on individual and group interests, whose coordination is governed by a system of enforceable rules, with which individuals are expected to comply. The second centers on the relationships between individuals or groups, which are managed through a system of shared roles, with which individuals identify. The third centers on personal and group identities, expressing a value system that individuals internalize.

As indicated, my original three-process model grew out of an interest in the quality of changes induced by social influence—their depth, durability, independence, and integration. My approach to conflict resolution has involved a very similar problematic: I have always been interested in the conditions under which negotiations to end a conflict will produce a high-quality agreement—an agreement that will be deeper, more durable, more sustainable, and more fully integrated into the political cultures or societal belief systems (cf. Bar-Tal and Bennink, this volume) of the conflicting societies than the settlements that are so often hammered together under the pressure of external powers. I have always assumed, therefore, that it should be possible to forge a link between my work on conflict resolution and the three processes of influence. Now, I feel, I have found that link. This is, of course, esthetically pleasing, but the important question is whether it is analytically useful. Does that link give us handles for distinguishing between qualitatively different ways of making peace, with distinct antecedent and consequent conditions? Specifically, for present purposes, does the proposed correspondence of reconciliation to in-
ternalization suggest a useful way of defining and conceptualizing reconciliation?

Let me make clear that I am not proposing an exact correspondence because we are dealing with different levels of analysis. In my original model of social influence, the unit of analysis is the individual—albeit the individual embedded in a social system. In a model of peacemaking, the unit of analysis is a pair of actors—the relationship between two parties, whether two individuals or two collectivities. My purpose here is to explore whether conceptualizing peacemaking processes in terms of the broader trichotomy suggested by the three processes of compliance, identification, and internalization is useful in suggesting relevant hypotheses about the determinants and outcomes of different approaches to peacemaking.

In this spirit, I propose that it may be useful to conceive of conflict settlement as operating primarily at the level of interests, conflict resolution at the level of relationships, and reconciliation at the level of identity. It is interesting that this distinction may have been anticipated by the late James Laue, when he suggested that Roger Fisher’s approach focused on interests, Burton’s on needs, and mine on values. At the time, I had some question about this formulation because my approach to conflict resolution has always been—and indeed continues to be—needs-based, in the Burton tradition. But Laue may well have detected in my work an incipient interest in moving beyond conflict resolution to reconciliation, where societal values have to be addressed.

Conflict Settlement and Resolution

Let me turn first to conflict settlement and resolution in terms of the distinction I have proposed. Conflict settlement can be described as a process yielding an agreement that meets the interests of both parties to the extent that their respective power positions enable them to prevail. In other words, the terms of their agreement are heavily determined by the power they can bring to bear in the negotiations. Third parties—outside powers or international organizations—often play a role in brokering or even imposing an agreement, using their own power by way of threats or inducements. The agreement may be supported by the publics on the two sides because they are tired of war and have found the status quo of continuing hostility and uncertainty increasingly intolerable. Such support for the agreement does not rest in any particular change in public attitudes toward the adversary. The settlement process is not designed to change the quality of the relationship between the societies. As is the case with compliance as a form of social influence, the stability of a political
settlement ultimately depends on surveillance—by the parties themselves, in keeping with their deterrent capacities, by outside powers, and by international organizations.

Conflict settlement is not a negligible achievement in a violent and destructive relationship with escalatory potential. In fact, conflict resolution can often build on political settlements, insofar as these involve a negotiating process in which each side pursues its interests and in which they are able to reach agreement on many outstanding issues through distributive bargaining in which power as well as international norms play a role. But conflict resolution, particularly if we think of it within an interactive problem-solving framework, goes beyond conflict settlement in many of the ways to which I already alluded at the beginning of this paper:

- It refers to an agreement that is arrived at interactively, rather than imposed or sponsored by outside powers, and to which the parties therefore have a higher level of commitment.
- It addresses the parties' basic needs and fears and therefore has a greater capacity to sustain itself over time.
- It builds a degree of working trust between the parties—a pragmatic trust in the other's interest in achieving and maintaining peace—and therefore is not entirely dependent on surveillance as the guarantor of the agreement.
- It establishes a new relationship between the parties, best described as a partnership, in which the parties are responsive to each other's needs and constraints and are committed to reciprocity.
- It generates public support for the agreement and encourages the development of new images of the other.

In all of these ways, conflict resolution moves beyond the interest-based settlement of the conflict and its dependence on the balance of power. It represents a strategic change in the relationship between the parties, expressed in terms of a pragmatic partnership, in which each side is persuaded that stable peace and cooperation are both in its own best interest and in the interest of the other. This is the kind of partnership that began to emerge, especially at the leadership level, in the early post-Oslo environment (cf. Lustick, 1997).

But there are limits to this change in the relationship, which make it vulnerable to changes in interests, circumstances, and leadership. Conflict resolution as a process of peacemaking—like identification as a process of social influence—involves the development of a new relationship, with an associated set of new attitudes alongside or perhaps on top of the old attitudes. The new attitudes are not necessarily integrated with one's preexisting value structure
and belief system—with one’s worldview. This means that the old attitudes—including attitudes of fundamental distrust and negation of the other—remain intact even as new attitudes, associated with the new relationship, take shape. The coexistence of new attitudes toward the other as a potential partner in peace with old attitudes toward the other as a mortal enemy creates instability in the new relationship, particularly in the context of an existential identity conflict. Changing circumstances may trigger the old attitudes in their full force.

Reconciliation

The third process, reconciliation, presupposes conflict resolution of the type that I have described: the development of working trust, the transformation of the relationship toward a partnership based on reciprocity and mutual responsiveness, and an agreement that addresses both parties’ basic needs. But it goes beyond conflict resolution in representing a change in each party’s identity.

The primary feature of the identity change constituting reconciliation is the removal of the negation of the other as a central component of one’s own identity. My main empirical reference point here is the Israeli-Palestinian case, in which mutual denial of the other’s identity has been a central feature of the conflict over the decades (cf. Kelman, 1978, 1999b). The mutual negation of the other’s identity is perhaps not as central in other cases of conflict and reconciliation—such as those of Chile, Guatemala, or South Africa, or the German-Jewish, the Franco-German, or even the Egyptian-Israeli case—yet in each case the negation of the other is somehow embedded in the identity of each of the conflicting parties and must be addressed in the reconciliation process.

Changing one’s collective identity by removing the negation of the other from it implies a degree of acceptance of the other’s identity—at least in the sense of acknowledging the legitimacy of the other’s narrative without necessarily fully agreeing with that narrative. The change in each party’s identity may go further by moving toward the development of a common, transcendent identity—not in lieu of, but alongside of each group’s particularistic identity. Development of a transcendent identity becomes possible with reconciliation and, in turn, reinforces reconciliation, but is not a necessary condition or consequence of reconciliation. What is essential to reconciliation, in my view, is that each party revise its own identity just enough to accommodate the identity of the other. As the parties overcome the negative interdependence of their
identities, they can build on the positive interdependence of their identities that often characterizes parties living in close proximity to each other (Kelman, 1999b).

Reconciliation goes beyond conflict resolution in that it moves past the level of pragmatic partnership—which is the hallmark of identification and is essential to peacemaking—and enables the parties to internalize the new relationship, integrating it into their own identities. New attitudes toward the other can thus develop, not just alongside of the old attitudes but in place of them. In contrast to the attitude-change process that characterizes identification, internalized attitudes are not just taken over in full measure but are reworked. As the new attitudes become integrated into the group’s own identity, they gradually replace the old attitudes. Working trust can gradually turn into personal trust. This does not foreclose the possibility that old fears and suspicions will reemerge, but the relationship is less vulnerable to situational changes.

Viewing reconciliation as identity change linked to the process of internalization has important implications for the nature of the identity change that it involves. Internalization represents a readiness to change an attitude because the new attitude—though induced by influence from an external source—is more consistent with the person’s own, preexisting value system. Thus, the change in a particular attitude actually strengthens the preexisting structure in which it is embedded by responding to a potential challenge to that structure: one might say that we change in order to remain the same. By the same token, the change in each party’s identity—the revision in its narrative—that I am defining as reconciliation implies a strengthening, rather than a weakening, of each party’s core identity. I would argue that a revision in the group’s identity and the associated narrative is possible only if the core of the identity remains intact. In fact, changes in more peripheral elements of identity are often seen as necessary in order to preserve the core of the identity—just as changes in specific attitudes may be seen as necessary in order to maintain the consistency and integrity of a person’s value framework. This was the basis, for example, on which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians were (and I believe continue to be) prepared to revise the territorial dimension of their national identity in order to maintain the essence of that identity (Kelman, 2001).

This analysis points to a major dilemma of reconciliation. Reconciliation requires parties to change an element of their identity—the negation of the other—which is far from trivial for parties engaged in an existential identity conflict, while at the same time preserving, even strengthening, the core of their identity. This is more easily achieved in situations in which one of the parties has already rejected part of its identity—as was the case for many Ger-
mans in post-Nazi Germany and many whites in post-apartheid South Africa—although even in these situations resistances are bound to arise. It is particularly difficult, however, in conflicts in which each side insists on the justice of its cause and sees itself as having been wronged by the other. The dilemma is that the amount and kind of identity change that A requires from B in order to be ready for reconciliation may be perceived by B as undermining the core of its identity. A good example here would be the demand to acknowledge collective guilt to which even post-Nazi Germany was reluctant to accede (Auerbach, this volume).

It is important to emphasize here that, in conflicts such as that between Palestinians and Israelis, negation of the other is a central element of each party's own identity, which it cannot give up easily. Given the nature of the conflict, each party finds it necessary to deny the other's authenticity as a people, the other's links to the land, and the other's national rights, especially its right to national self-determination through the establishment of an independent state in the land both claim, because the other's claims to peoplehood and to rights in the land are seen as competitive with each party's own claims and rights. Moreover, negation of the other is also important to each party in a violent conflict as a protection against negative elements in its own identity (cf. Kelman, 1999b). In so far as the other can be demonized and dehumanized, it becomes easier for each party to minimize guilt feelings for acts of violence and oppression against the other and to avoid seeing itself in the role of victimizer, rather than only the role of victim.

Thus, in protracted identity conflicts, negation of the other is not a peripheral, marginal element of each party's identity that can be easily discarded. My argument is merely that, from an "objective" point of view, negating the other's identity is not a necessary condition for preserving, and indeed enhancing the core of one's own identity. However, for conflicting parties to arrive at a point where they can be free to relegate negation of the other to the periphery of their own identities and eventually discard it requires the hard work of reconciliation. What is central to that work is the growing assurance that the other is not a threat to one's own identity. In that process of assurance, the conditions for reconciliation play a vital role.

Parties in a conflict in which both sides perceive themselves as victims are helped to deal with the dilemma of abandoning some elements of identity without threatening the core of their identity by the reciprocal nature of reconciliation. Changes on the part of one group make changes on the other's part more attainable. But this view suggests that the process of reconciliation requires a certain amount of "negotiation" of identity, including negotiation of the conditions for reconciliation, which turn on such issues as truth, justice,
and responsibility. I contend that reconciliation—especially in cases in which neither party is prepared to adopt the role of perpetrator—cannot be achieved on the basis of purely objective criteria of truth, justice, or responsibility, anchored in historical scholarship or international law, but requires some degree of mutual accommodation in the course of negotiating the conditions for reconciliation. I briefly discuss these conditions in the concluding section.

Conditions for Reconciliation

I want to identify five conditions that can help groups in conflict arrive at the difficult point of revising their identity so as to accommodate to the identity of the other. One might also think of these as indicators of reconciliation, or steps in a process of reconciliation. They are both indicators of movement toward reconciliation and conditions for further movement in that direction.

Mutual Acknowledgment of the Other's Nationhood and Humanity

Such acknowledgment is, of course, implicit in my very definition of reconciliation. Insofar as reconciliation means removing the negation and exclusion of the other from one's own identity, it requires the accumulation of steps that indicate acceptance of the other as an authentic nation and inclusion of the other in one's own moral community. Such steps include political recognition and acknowledgment of the other's legitimacy, the authenticity of their links to the land, and their national rights, including the right to national self-determination. Equally important are steps toward the humanization of the other, including respect for their dignity, concern for their welfare, and attachment of value to the other's lives and security.

Development of a Common Moral Basis for Peace

To create the conditions for reconciliation, it is necessary to move beyond a peace anchored entirely in pragmatic considerations—essential as these are—to a peace based on moral considerations. This condition is relatively easy to meet when the moral basis is widely accepted and shared from the beginning of the peacemaking effort, as in the rejection of Nazism or the rejection of apartheid. It is much more difficult to achieve in a conflict in which the common moral basis is not a given, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the conflicts in Sri Lanka or Northern Ireland. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, I have emphasized, in this connection, the need for commitment to a principled
peace, which finds its moral basis in a historic compromise—a compromise that is presented to the publics as not just the best that can be achieved under the circumstances, but as the foundation for a peace that is right because it is consistent with the principles of fairness and justice for both sides (Kelman, 1998a). The definition of justice, in this and other such cases, will to some extent have to be negotiated between the parties, recognizing that there is some inevitable tension between justice and reconciliation. Such negotiations must experiment with different kinds of justice that an agreement might try to achieve, such as

- Substantive justice, achieved through an agreement that meets the fundamental needs of both sides
- Future justice, achieved through the establishment of just institutions, arrangements, and relationships
- Procedural justice, achieved through a fair and reciprocal process of negotiating the agreement
- Emotional justice, achieved through the sense that the negotiations have seriously sought and to a significant degree shaped a just outcome

Confrontation with History

Confronting history and coming to terms with the truth is an essential component of any reconciliation effort. The reexamination of historical narratives and the reevaluation of national myths—on both sides of a conflict—are valuable contributions to such an effort. Here again, however, I maintain that it is unrealistic to aim for the establishment of a single, objective truth and that one has to accept the need to negotiate the historical truth to a certain degree. I want to avoid the simple relativistic stance that each side has its own truth and that their conflicting narratives are therefore equally valid. But we have to recognize that the different narratives of different groups reflect different historical experiences—occasioned by the same set of facts and figures—and that, therefore, their experienced truths can in fact not be identical. Reconciliation, in my view, does not require writing a joint consensual history, but it does require admitting the other's truth into one's own narrative.

Acknowledgment of Responsibility

Reconciliation also requires acceptance, by each side, of responsibility for the wrong it has done to the other and for the course of the conflict. Responsibility
must be expressed symbolically in acknowledgment of one's actions and their
effect on the other and appropriate apologies and concretely in appropriate
steps of compensation, reparation, and restitution. The German distinction
between Auslöschung and Versöhnung (as pointed out in Feldman, 1999) is very
helpful in reminding us that the practical/material dimension and the philo-
sophical/emotional dimension (or instrumental and moral dimensions) are
both key elements of reconciliation. It is not surprising that I again take the
view that the acknowledgment of responsibility cannot be based entirely on an
objective set of legal or moral norms, but requires a process of negotiation in
which different types of responsibility are identified and agreed upon.

Establishment of Patterns and Institutional Mechanisms
of Cooperation

Cooperation on functional issues cannot in itself lead to reconciliation in the
absence of a mutually satisfactory political agreement. It can, however, help
increase openness to the search for political solutions and it can play an im-
portant role in peacebuilding in the wake of a political solution. To contribute
to reconciliation, the patterns and mechanisms of cooperation must them-
selves meet certain critical conditions: they must be genuinely useful to both
parties in meeting societal needs and achieving societal goals, they must be
based on the principles of equality and reciprocity, and they must undercut
rather than reinforce old patterns of dependency of one party on the other. An
important variety of cooperative institutional mechanisms consists of institu-
tions and arrangements focusing on conflict resolution through joint problem
solving in order to deal constructively, on a continuing basis, with the conflicts
that will inevitably arise in the relations between the two societies.

In sum, all of these conditions are designed to facilitate changes in the
collective identities of the conflicting parties, with particular emphasis on re-
moving the negation of the other as a key element of each group's own identity.