Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East

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On présente ici un programme de recherche-action conçu à la résolution des problèmes d’interaction, ainsi que son application au conflit israélo-palestinien. Dans cet article sont résumées les présuppositions socio-psychologiques sous-tendant cette approche : (1) le moment où, dans le processus d’interaction sociale des conflits internationaux, l’individu devient l’objet d’analyse pertinente ; (2) la dimension intergroupe du conflit international et sa résolution ; (3) le conflit en tant que processus pourri d’une dynamique croissante auto-renforcement ; (4) l’importance du trait d’union à un large éventail de processus d’influence dans les relations internationales conflictuelles ; et (5) le conflit comme phénomène dynamique marqué par l’existence et la possibilité du changement. Dans la description de la méthode d’intervention, on met l’accent sur les ateliers de résolution de problèmes qui accomplissent des Israéliens et des Palestiniens pacifiquement influents. Puis on analyse les développements récents, la contribution des ateliers à la perée de septembre 1993 dans les négociations israélo-palestiniennes et enfin les contributions potentielles de ce travail à l’élaboration de la paix.

An action research programme devoted to the development of interactive problem solving—an unofficial third party approach to resolution of

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At several points in this paper, I draw on my chapter in the Ben-Yehuda and Tabachnick volume on Mediation in international relations (Kelman, 1992).
Inocational and intercommunal conflicts—and its application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are described. The article summarizes the social-psychological assumptions underlying the approach, referring to (1) the point in the societal and intersocial process of international conflict in which the individual is the appropriate unit of analysis; (2) the intersocietal character of international conflict and its resolution; (3) conflict as an interactive process with an escalating, self-perpetuating dynamic; (4) the need to use a wide range of influence processes in international conflict relationships; and (5) conflict as a dynamic phenomenon, marked by the occurrence and possibility of change. Next, the intervention methodology is described, focusing on the problem-solving workshops with politically influential Israelis and Palestinians that the author and his colleagues have been organizing. Recent developments in the work are then presented, including a continuing workshop that met from 1996–98, and a current joint working group on the final-status political issues in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The article concludes with an analysis of the contributions that these and other unofficial efforts have made to the breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations of September 1993, and of the potential contributions of this work to the peace-building that must accompany and follow the peacemaking process.

INTRODUCTION

For more than 25 years, my colleagues and I have been developing and applying an unofficial, academically based, third-party approach to the analysis and resolution of international and ethnic conflicts, which I have come to call interactive problem solving. The approach is derived from the seminal work of John Burton (see Burton, 1969, 1979, 1984; Kelman, 1972). It is anchored in social-psychological principles and follows a scholar-practitioner model. Our practice is informed by theoretical analyses and empirical studies of international conflict, social influence, and group interaction. The experience gained in practice, in turn, contributes to theory building and to the evaluation and refinement of our intervention model. The work thus represents an integration and continuing interaction between practice, research, and theory building.

The fullest—in a sense, the paradigmatic—application of the approach is represented by problem-solving workshops, which bring together politically influential members of conflicting parties in a private, confidential setting for direct, nonconfrontational communication. Workshops are designed to enable the parties to explore each other's perspective and, through a joint process of creative problem solving, to generate new ideas for mutually satisfactory solutions to their conflict. The ultimate goal is to transfer the insights and ideas gained from these interactions into the political debate and decision-making processes in the two communities. (See Kelman, 1979, 1986, 1990, 1992; Kelman & Cohen, 1986; Rousana & Kelman, 1994. For a review of other work within this general framework, see Ronald Fisher, 1988.)

Problem-solving workshops are not negotiating sessions and they are not intended to simulate and certainly not to substitute for official negotiations.
Their unofficial, non-binding character clearly distinguishes them from formal negotiations, which can only be carried out by officials authorised to conclude binding agreements. At the same time, such workshops and similar mechanisms for interactive problem solving are closely linked to negotiations and play an important complementary role at all stages of the negotiation process: in the prenegotiation phase, they can help to create a political atmosphere conducive to movement to the table; in the active negotiation phase, they can help in overcoming obstacles to productive negotiations and in framing issues that are not yet on the table; and in the postnegotiation phase, they can contribute to implementation of the negotiated agreement and to long-term peacebuilding. It is precisely the non-binding character of workshops that is the source of their unique contribution to the larger negotiation process: they provide the participants with opportunities for sharing perspectives, exploring options, and joint thinking that are not readily available at the official negotiating table (Kelman, 1996).

AN ACTION RESEARCH PROGRAMME ON THE ISRAELI–PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

From the beginning, I have been interested in applying the interactive problem-solving approach to the Middle East. Our first effort in this direction was a pilot workshop on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict organised in 1971 (see Cohen, Kelman, Miller, & Smith, 1977). Since 1974, my colleagues and I have been intensively engaged in an action research programme on the resolution of international and intercommunal conflicts, with special emphasis on the Arab–Israeli conflict—and particularly the Israeli–Palestinian component of it.

A major part of the programme has involved the development of our intervention methodology and of the theoretical, social psychological base of interactive problem solving, and the training of a new generation of scholar-practitioners in this emerging field. This approach is applicable to a wide variety of conflicts; indeed, its relevance is becoming increasingly evident with the proliferation of ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Personally, I have continued some involvement in the Cyprus conflict and have remained in touch with several other protracted identity conflicts around the world through the work of my students and associates and through exchange and occasional collaboration within the growing network of practitioners in this field. Still, both because of my special interest in the Arab–Israeli conflict, and because this work—at least in my particular style of practice—calls for almost complete immersion in the region and its problems and for a sustained effort over a number of years, I have concentrated on the Middle East. Our work there is based, of course, on the
application of general principles to this specific setting, and it must be informed by a comparative perspective. However, close familiarity with the region and a long-term commitment to it contribute significantly to our credibility and effectiveness.

The remainder of this paper (1) highlights some of the assumptions, derived from a social-psychological framework, that we bring to our intervention efforts; (2) provides a brief description of our intervention methodology, as applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and (3) suggests how our work can contribute—and indeed has contributed—to the search for a peaceful resolution of that conflict. With respect to the last point, I do not propose that interactive problem solving—or any other form of unofficial diplomacy—can substitute for official diplomacy, or that it can operate independently from the constellation of historical forces and national interests that are themselves shaped by domestic and international political processes. I am convinced, however, that the very partial contribution that this approach can make to conflict resolution is potentially significant and that it should be thought of systematically as an integral part of a larger diplomatic process rather than as a side-show to the real work of diplomacy.

In the current context of an active but uncertain Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the greatest strength of this approach is its potential contribution to transforming the relationship between the conflicting parties. Our work is based on the proposition that in conflicts like that between Palestinians and Israelis—conflicts about national identity and national existence between two peoples that are destined to live together in the same small space—conflict resolution must aim towards the ultimate establishment of a new cooperative and mutually enhancing relationship, and must involve a process that paves the way to such a relationship. Although perhaps an idealistic aspiration, it is actually the most realistic approach to resolving such a conflict. Nothing less will work in the long run; and, even in the short run, only a process embodying the principle of reciprocity that is at the centre of a new relationship is likely to succeed.

SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS

The practice of interactive problem solving is informed by a set of assumptions about the nature of international or intercommunal conflict and conflict resolution, derived from a social-psychological analysis. These assumptions enter into the formulation of the structure, the process, and the content of problem-solving workshops. I shall mention five general assumptions that are central to our approach.

(1) Although war and peace—and international relations as a whole—are societal and intersocietal processes, which cannot be reduced to the level of
individual behaviour, there are many aspects of international conflict and conflict resolution for which the individual represents the most appropriate unit of analysis. Most important, the satisfaction of the needs of both parties—the needs of human individuals as articulated through their core identity groups—is the ultimate criterion for a mutually satisfactory resolution of their conflict (Burton, 1990; Kelman, 1990). Unfulfilled needs, especially for identity and security, and existential fears—fears based on threats to national existence—typically drive the conflict and create barriers to its resolution. By pushing behind the parties’ incompatible positions and exploring the identity and security concerns that underlie them, it often becomes possible to develop mutually satisfactory solutions, as conflicts about identity, security, and other psychological needs are not inherently zero-sum.

Both in our theoretical work and in our practice, we need to determine the relevant points of entry for psychological analysis—those points in the theoretical model or in the diplomatic process at which the cognitions, emotions, and intentions of individuals and the interactions between individuals can play a specific role in determining outcomes. Thus, we can identify certain processes central to conflict resolution—such as empathy, insight, creative problem solving, and learning—that of necessity take place at the level of individuals and interaction between individuals. Problem-solving workshops provide a setting in which these processes can occur. Changes at the level of individuals—in the form of new insights and ideas—resulting from the micro-process of the workshop can then be fed back into the political debate and the decision making in the two communities, thus becoming vehicles for change at the macro-level.

(2) International conflict must be viewed as not merely an intergovernmental or interstate phenomenon, but also as an inter-societal phenomenon. To so far as the conflict is between two societies, it becomes important to examine what happens within each society. In particular, this view alerts us to the role of internal divisions within each society in international conflicts—i.e. the crucial relationship between in-group and inter-group conflict. Internal divisions create serious constraints as decision makers in the pursuit of peaceful solutions, yet they also provide opportunities and levers for change: they challenge the moralistic image of the enemy that parties in conflict tend to hold and enable them to deal with each other in a more differentiated way. Conflict resolution efforts that are sensitive to the role of intra- and inter-societal processes require analysis of the dynamics of public opinion on both sides and of the requirements for consensus building within and coalition forming across the conflicting societies (Kelman, 1993).
An important implication of the intersocietal view of conflict is that negotiations and third-party efforts should ideally be directed not merely to a settlement of the conflict in the form of a brokered political agreement, but to its resolution. Conflict resolution in this deeper and more lasting sense implies arrangements and accommodations that emerge out of the interaction between representatives of the parties themselves, that address the basic needs of both parties, and to which the parties are committed. Only this kind of solution is capable of transforming the relationship between parties locked into a protracted conflict that engages their collective identities and existential concerns. There is no presumption, of course, that conflicts can ever be totally or permanently resolved; what I mean by conflict resolution is a gradual process conducive to structural and attitudinal change, to reconciliation, to the development of a new relationship cognizant of the interdependence of the two societies and open to cooperative functional arrangements between them. The real test of conflict resolution in deep-rooted conflicts is how much the process by which agreements are constructed and the nature of the resultant agreements contribute to transformation of the relationship between the parties.

The conception of international conflict as an intersocietal phenomenon also suggests a broader view of diplomacy as a complex mix of official and unofficial processes. The peaceful termination or management of conflict requires binding agreements that can only be achieved at the official level. Unofficial, non-committal interactions, however, can play a constructive complementary role by exploring ways of overcoming obstacles to conflict resolution and helping to create a political environment conducive to negotiations and other diplomatic initiatives (Saunders, 1988).

(3) Conflict is an interactive process with an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic. The needs and fears of parties involved in an intense conflict relationship impose perceptual and cognitive constraints on their processing of new information. A major effect of these constraints is that the parties systematically underestimate the occurrence and possibility of change and therefore avoid negotiations, even in the face of changing interests that would make negotiations desirable for both. Images of the enemy are particularly resistant to disconfirming information. The combination of demonic enemy images and virtuous self-images on both sides leads to the formation of mirror images, which contribute to the escalatory dynamic of conflict interaction and to resistance to change in a conflict relationship (Brudeman, 1961: White, 1965). Moreover, interaction between conflicting parties is governed by a set of "conflict norms" that encourage each party to adopt a militant, uncompromising, threatening posture, which reinforces the enemy's hostile image and creates self-fulfilling prophecies. The conflict dynamics tend to estrange the parties in their own perspectives.
on history and justice; dehumanization of the enemy makes it even more difficult to acknowledge and access the perspective of the other.

Conflict resolution efforts require promotion of a different kind of interaction, capable of reversing the escalatory and self-perpetuating dynamics of conflict: an interaction conducive to sharing of perspectives, differentiation of the enemy image, and insight into the processes that contribute to escalation. At the micro-level—in problem-solving workshops or similar fora—such interaction can contribute to the development of a de-escalatory language, of ideas for mutually reassuring gestures and actions, of commitment to reciprocity, and of proposals for win-win solutions. At the macro-level, such products can translate into a new discourse among conflicting parties, characterized by a shift in emphasis from power politics to mutual responsiveness, reciprocity in process and solutions, and invitation to a new relationship.

(4) Conflict resolution requires a wider range of influence processes than those typically employed in international conflict relationships. It is necessary to move beyond influence strategies based on threats, and to expand and refine strategies based on promises and positive incentives. Conflict resolution efforts, by searching for solutions that satisfy the needs of both parties, create opportunities for mutual influence by way of responsiveness to each other’s needs. They can demonstrate the possibility of influencing the other through one’s own actions. A key element in this process is mutual reassurance. In existential conflicts, in particular, parties can encourage each other to negotiate seriously by reducing both sides’ fears—not just, as more traditional strategic analysis often suggest, by increasing their pain. At the macro-level, this broader conception of influence processes calls for a shift in emphasis from deterrence and compliance to mutual reassurance. The use of influence processes based on responsiveness to the other’s needs and fears and search for ways of benefitting the other can do more than affect specific behaviours of the other. It can contribute to a creative redefinition of the conflict, to joint discovery of win-win solutions, and to transformation of the relationship between the parties.

(5) The present, expanded conception of influence processes that can be brought to bear in a conflict relationship is based on the further assumption that international conflict is a dynamic phenomenon, marked by the occurrence and possibility of change. Conflict resolution efforts are geared, therefore, to discovering possibilities for change, identifying conditions for change, and overcoming resistances to change. Such an approach favours an attitude of strategic (or possibilistic) optimism (Keimhan, 1978, 1979)—not because of an unrealistic denial of malignant trends, but as a part of a deliberate strategy to promote change by actively searching for and accentuating whatever realistic possibilities for peaceful resolution of the conflict might be on the horizon.
PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOPS

The assumptions summarised in the preceding section are reflected in our intervention methodology. In describing this methodology, I will focus on problem-solving workshops which, as I have indicated, represent the fullest—though not the sole—expression of interactive problem solving (see Kelman, 1979, 1986, 1992).

Problem-solving workshops are intensive meetings between politically involved and often politically influential but unofficial representatives of conflicting parties—for example, Israelis and Palestinians, or Greek and Turkish Cypriots—drawn from the mainstream of their respective communities. Thus, in our Israeli-Palestinian work, participants have included parliamentarians, leading figures in political parties or movements, former military officers or government officials, journalists or editors specialising in the Middle East, and academic scholars who are major analysts of the conflict for their societies and some of whom have served in advisory, official, or diplomatic positions. The number of participants has varied; our workshops generally include three to six members of each party, as well as a third party of two to eight members. The third party consists of a panel of social scientists knowledgeable about international conflict, group process, and the Middle East region. The third party’s skills and knowledge in these areas and its academic status serve as the basis of its credibility. The credibility as well as the effectiveness of the third party are also enhanced by ethnic balance of the panel. In the last few years, for example, I have worked closely with Naim Roubana, whose Palestinian-Arab background provides a helpful balance to my own Jewish background. The third party in our model does not offer solutions, but enacts a strictly facilitative role.

Recruitment of participants is one of the most important tasks of the third party. The effectiveness of our recruitment process depends on intimate familiarity with the two communities and their political elites, on the establishment of links to various networks within these communities, and on the maintenance of the parties’ trust in our evenhandedness, integrity, and knowledge of the region. Depending on the occasion and the political level of the participants, we may discuss our plans for a workshop with relevant elements of the political leadership on both sides, in order to keep them informed, gain their support, and solicit their advice on participants and agenda. For many potential workshop participants, approval and at times encouragement from the political leadership is a necessary condition for their agreement to take part. Recruitment, however, is generally done on an individual basis and participants are invited to come as individuals rather than as formal representatives. Invites, of course, may consult with their leadership or with each other before agreeing to come. Whenever possible, we start the recruitment process with one key person on each side; we then...
consult with that person and with each successive invitee in selecting the rest of the team. At times, the composition of a team may be negotiated within the particular community (or subcommunity) that we approach, but the final invitation is always issued by the third party to each individual participant. An essential part of the recruitment process is a personal discussion with each participant of the purposes, procedures, and ground rules of the workshop before obtaining his or her final commitment to the enterprise. Participants' motives for accepting our invitation have varied, depending in particular on the nature of their political involvement and on the stage of the conflict. In earlier years, when there were virtually no fora for Israelis and Palestinians to meet as equals and discuss political issues, many participants saw workshops as opportunities to learn about the other side's thinking, to inform the other side about their own thinking, and to see if they could find any common ground. More recently, with increasing Israeli–Palestinian contacts and, particularly, with the onset of negotiations, motives for participation are often more specific. Participants want to know about the political divisions and the state of public opinion on the other side, about the reasons behind some of the other's actions or failures to act, and about the prospects for movement. They want to inform the other side about their own thinking and reactions to events, about their own political divisions and public opinion, and about their priorities, limits, and frustrations. They want to present some of their own ideas and proposals and test the other side's reactions. They want to explore possibilities for resolving difficult issues in mutually satisfactory ways. Workshop participants over the years have been motivated by an interest in finding a negotiated solution to the conflict, or at least in testing—in a safe environment—whether the possibility for such a solution exists at all. They have also been interested in demonstrating to the other side and to the third party that they are committed to the quest for peace.

A typical workshop consists of a pre-workshop session of four to five hours for each of the parties and joint meetings for two-and-a-half days. The workshops take place in an academic setting; most of our workshops have been carried out under the auspices of the Harvard Center for International Affairs. The university has the advantage of providing an unoffical, non-binding context, with its own set of norms to support a type of interaction that departs from the norms that generally govern interactions between conflicting parties.

The discussions are completely private and confidential. There is no audience, no publicity, and no record, and one of the central ground rules specifies that statements made in the course of a workshop cannot be cited with attribution outside of the workshop setting. These and other features of the workshop are designed to enable and encourage workshop participants to engage in a type of communication that is usually not available to parties.
involved in an intense conflict relationship. The third party creates an atmosphere, establishes norms, and makes occasional interventions, all conducive to free and open discussion, in which the parties address each other, rather than third parties or their own constituencies, and in which they listen to each other in order to understand their differing perspectives. They are encouraged to deal with the conflict analytically rather than polemically—to explore the ways in which their interaction helps to exacerbate and perpetuate the conflict, rather than to assign blame to the other side while justifying their own. This analytic discussion helps the parties penetrate each other's perspective and understand each other's concerns, needs, fears, priorities, and constraints.

Once both sets of concerns are on the table and have been understood and acknowledged, the parties are encouraged to engage in a process of joint problem solving. They are asked to work together in developing new ideas for resolving the conflict in ways that would satisfy the fundamental needs and allay the existential fears of both parties. They are then asked to explore the political and psychological constraints that stand in the way of such integrative, win-win solutions and that, in fact, have prevented the parties from moving to (or staying at) the negotiating table, or from negotiating productively. Again, they are asked to engage in a process of joint problem solving, designed to generate ideas for “getting from here to there.” A central feature of this process is the identification of steps of mutual reassurance—in the form of acknowledgments, symbolic gestures, or confidence-building measures—that would help reduce the parties’ fear of entering into negotiations whose outcome is uncertain and risky. Problem-solving workshops also contribute to mutual reassurance by helping the parties develop—again, through collaborative effort—a nonthreatening, de-escalatory language, and a shared vision of a desirable future.

Workshops have a dual purpose. First, they are designed to produce changes in the workshop participants themselves—changes in the form of more differentiated images of the enemy (see Kelman, 1987), greater insight into the dynamics of the conflict, and new ideas for resolving the conflict and for overcoming the barriers to a negotiated solution. These changes at the level of individual participants are not ends in themselves, but vehicles for promoting change at the policy level. Thus, a second purpose of workshops is to maximize the likelihood that the new insights, ideas, and proposals developed in the course of the workshop are fed back into the political debate and the decision-making process within each community. One of the central tasks of the third party is to structure the workshop in such a way that new insights and ideas are likely to be generated and to be transferred effectively to the policy process.

The composition of the workshop is crucial in this context; great care must be taken to select participants who, on the one hand, have the interest and
capacity to engage in the kind of learning process that workshops provide and, on the other hand, have the positions and credibility within their own communities that enable them to influence the thinking of political leaders, political constituencies, or the general public. As noted earlier, the third party’s role—though essential to the success of problem-solving workshops—is strictly a facilitative role. The critical work of generating ideas and infusing them into the political process must be done by the participants themselves. A basic assumption of our approach is that solutions emerging out of the interaction between the conflicting parties are most likely to be responsive to their needs and to engender their commitment.

Although workshops are governed by the principle that ideas for conflict resolution must emerge out of the interaction between the parties, the facilitative role of the third party is essential—at least at certain stages in the conflict—to making that interaction possible and fruitful. The third party provides the context in which representatives of parties engaged in an intense conflict are able to come together. It selects, briefs, and convenes the participants. It serves as a repository of trust for both parties, enabling them to proceed with the assurance that their confidentiality will be respected and their interests protected even though—by definition—they cannot trust each other. It establishes and enforces the norms and ground rules that facilitate analytic discussion and a problem-solving orientation. It proposes a broad agenda that encourages the parties to move from explication of each other’s concerns and constraints to the generation of ideas for win-win solutions and for implementing such solutions.

Furthermore, although the third party tries to stay in the background as much as possible once it has set the stage, it is prepared to intervene in order to help keep the discussion moving in a productive, constructive direction. Thus, if the discussion goes too far astray, becomes repetitive, or systematically avoids the issues, the third party—usually with the help of some of the participants—will try to bring it back to the broad agenda. At times, we also make substantive interventions in the form of suggestions for potentially useful conceptual handles or observations about the content and process of the interaction. Content observations are designed to summarise, interpret, integrate, clarify, or sharpen what is being said in the group. Process observations, which suggest how interactions between the parties “here and now” may reflect the dynamics of the conflict between their communities, are among the unique features of problem-solving workshops. They generally focus on incidents in which one party’s words or actions clearly have a strong emotional impact on the other—leading to expressions of anger and dismay, of relief and reassurance, of understanding and acceptance, or of reciprocation. The third party can use such incidents, which are part of the participants’ shared immediate experience, as a
springboard for exploring some of the issues and concerns that define the conflict between their societies. Through such exploration, each side can gain some insight into the preoccupations of the other, and the way these are affected by its own actions. Process observations must be introduced sparingly and make special demands on the third party's skill and sense of timing. It is particularly important that such interventions be pitched at the intergroup, rather than the interpersonal level. Analysis of "here and now" interactions is not concerned with the personal characteristics of the participants or with their personal relations to each other, but only with what these interactions can tell us about the relationship between their national groups.

Workshops, unlike official negotiations, are not binding. But it is precisely this non-binding character that is the source of their potential contributions—that makes it possible for new understandings and new ideas to emerge out of the interaction between the parties. Although workshops are clearly separate from negotiations, they are intended to contribute to the negotiation process. The nature of their potential contribution depends on the status of the negotiations—on whether, for example, the parties are engaged in a prenegotiation phase, in early negotiations, in advanced negotiations, or in an implementation phase. Whatever phase the negotiations are in, however, maximizing the political impact is a central consideration in defining the purpose of a particular workshop, in shaping its agenda, in steering the discussion, and in the selection of workshop participants.

Most of our work on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—that is all of our workshops before the autumn of 1991—took place during the prenegotiation phase. The primary function of this work was to help create a political environment conducive to negotiations: a set of conditions that would enable the parties to overcome the obstacles to negotiation and to move to the table. Participants in the workshops that we have conducted over the years, as well as many analysts of the Arab-Israeli conflict, seem to agree that our programme has indeed contributed, in a small but significant way, to paving the way to the negotiating table. Workshops have enabled the parties to penetrate each other's perspective, and thus gain insight into the other's concerns, priorities, and concerns. They have contributed, within each community, to a more differentiated image of the other side, to a greater awareness of changes that have been taking place, to the discovery of potential negotiating partners, and thus to the sense that there is someone to talk to on the other side and something to talk about. More concretely, they have contributed to the development of cadres of individuals with experience in productive communication with the other side and the conviction that such communication can be fruitful. Thus, representatives in the various Israeli-Palestinian negotiating sessions that have been
conducted since the autumn of 1991. They have included a considerable number of individuals who took part in our workshops and other Israeli-Palestinian unofficial meetings over the years. In particular, many members of a continuing workshop (to be described later), which met periodically between 1991 and 1993 (see Rouhana & Kelman, 1994), have been actively involved in the official peace process as negotiators or advisors. "Alumni" of our workshops have been in the Israeli cabinet, Knesset, and foreign ministry, and in leading positions in various official Palestinian agencies. Workshops have also contributed to creating a political environment conducive to negotiations through the development of a de-escalatory language, based on sensitivity to words that frighten or humiliate and words that reassure the other party. Anecdotal evidence for this effect is provided by the changes in the tone of the political discourse among Palestinians and Israelis in recent years—changes that can at least in part be traced to participation in workshops and similar experiences. Moreover, workshops have helped in the identification of mutually reassuring actions and symbolic gestures, often in the form of acknowledgments of the other's humanity, national identity, ties to the land, history of victimisation, sense of injustice, genuine fears, and conciliatory moves. They have contributed to the development of shared visions of a desirable future, which help reduce the parties' fear of negotiations as a step into an unknown, dangerous realm. They have generated ideas about the shape of a solution to the conflict that meets the basic needs of both parties, as well as ideas about how to get from here to there—about a framework and set of principles for getting negotiations started. Perhaps the greatest value of these workshops is that, for the short run, they helped to keep alive a sense of possibility—a belief that a negotiated solution remains within the parties' reach—and, for the long run, they helped to begin the process of transforming the relationship between former enemies.

RECENT ACTIVITIES AND THEIR POLITICAL CONTEXT

Since 1990, our programme has moved in two important new directions. First, as already indicated, we initiated our first continuing workshop in the autumn of 1991 (Rouhana & Kelman, 1994). Second, with the start of official negotiations in the autumn of 1991, and the subsequent signing of the Oslo agreement in September 1993, we have adopted the structure and functions of our work to the new requirements of the evolving negotiation phase.

Until the autumn of 1990, the workshops and related opportunities for interaction that we organised were all self-contained, one-time events. To be sure, there was continuity in our earlier efforts. A number of individuals participated in two or more of our workshops. "Alumni" of the workshops
also continued to be involved in a variety of other efforts at Israeli-
Palestinian communication and collaboration, in which they drew on their
earlier interactions. Moreover, our workshops had a cumulative effect in
helping to create a political environment conducive to negotiations. Because
of logistical and financial constraints, however, and also because of a certain
lack of political readiness, we had not attempted before 1990 to organize a
workshop in which the same group of participants would meet regularly over
an extended period of time.

There are several unique contributions that a continuing workshop can
make to the larger political process. It represents a sustained effort to
address concrete issues, enabling the participants to push the process of
conflict analysis and interactive problem solving further and to apply it more
systematically than they can do in one-time workshops. The longer time
period and the continuing nature of the enterprise make it possible to go
beyond the sharing of perspectives to the joint production of creative ideas.
Moreover, the periodic reworking of a continuing workshop allows for an
iterative and cumulative process, based on feedback and correction. The
participants have an opportunity to take the ideas developed in the course of
a workshop back to their own communities, to gather reactions, and to
return to the next meeting with proposals for strengthening, expanding, or
modifying the original ideas. It is also possible for participants, within or
across parties, to meet or otherwise communicate with each other between
workshop sessions in order to work out some of the ideas more fully and
bring the results of their efforts back to the next session. Finally, a continuing
workshop provides better opportunities to address the question of how to
disseminate ideas and proposals developed at the workshop most effectively
and appropriately.

We succeeded in convening such a continuing workshop in the autumn of
1989 when a group of high-level, politically influential Israelis and
Palestinians agreed to take part in a series of three meetings over the course
of the year of 1990–91. The participants in these meetings were all
individuals with broad experience and high credibility in their respective
communities, close to the centre of the political mainstream, and occupying
positions—in political organizations, academic institutions, think tanks, or
the media—that enabled them to have a major impact on the framing of the
issue and the perception of available options by decision makers, political

*The continuing workshop was initiated and organized in partnership with Nadim Roushida
of the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and we co-chairs the programme throughout its
three-year duration. We were joined on the third-party panel of facilitators by Harold Sanders
of the Kettering Foundation and C.R. Mitchell of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and
Resolution at George Mason University. We are very grateful to them, as well as to the
members of our third-party staff, which included Cynthia Chatway, Rose Kelman, Susan
Kooper, Kate Roushida, and William Weilberg.
elites, and the general public. The first session of this continuing workshop took place in November 1990, in the midst of the Gulf crisis, when the level of mutual distrust was at its height. The second session took place in June 1991, after the Gulf war, when a great deal of repair work on the Israeli-Palestinian relationship had to be undertaken. By the time of our third session, in Bellagio, Italy, in August 1991, the participants were ready to engage in a constructive effort of joint thinking and to begin to formulate mutually acceptable approaches to some of the more difficult issues. At the end of this meeting the group committed itself to continuing the workshop.

Shortly after our August meeting, however, the political situation changed dramatically with the initiation of Arab-Israeli peace talks. Four of the six Palestinian participants in the continuing workshop were appointed to the official negotiating teams. We thus had both to reassess the functions of the continuing workshop in the context of ongoing official negotiations, and to consider how the overlap in participants between the official process and our unofficial process affected our future work. After exploration of these questions in a series of bilateral consultations (in May 1992) with Israeli and Palestinian participants, a fourth meeting of the continuing workshop was held in Leuven, Belgium, in July 1992. By that time, the political situation had changed further as a result of the Labour Party's victory in the Israeli elections. With the formation of a new government, the Israeli participants in the continuing workshop became increasingly influential in the policy within their own society. Thus, for participants on both sides there was the sense that they were speaking to counterparts who were consequential and well-informed about the current situation. The political relevance of the continuing workshop was clearly enhanced by these developments, as Israeli and Palestinians who had interacted with each other productively over a series of unofficial meetings were not actively engaged in the negotiating process.

But this convergence and overlap between the official and unofficial processes also created some new dilemmas. It became almost inevitable that some ambiguities and role conflicts would arise if official negotiators also met with representatives of the other side separately, in an unofficial context—despite the fact that these unofficial meetings began well before the official negotiations and were clearly independent of the official process. We were not able to resolve these issues at the Leuven meeting. On the one hand, the participants found the discussions in Leuven extremely useful; it was clear that they greatly valued the continuing workshop and were eager to continue the group and to utilize the working trust and the effective working relationship that they had developed over the preceding two years. At the same time, they realized that it might be necessary to reconstitute the group in view of the involvement of so many of its members in the official negotiations, in order to safeguard the integrity of both the official and the
unofficial process. In the end, it was decided to maintain the group, while continuing to explore the questions of whether and how the group should be reconstituted, and how to promote a productive interplay between the official and unofficial processes—one that could make maximal use of the excellent working relationship that the two sides had developed within the continuing workshop.

There was general consensus in our deliberations before, during, and after the Leaven meeting about the new functions of the continuing workshop. We agreed that there was a continuing need for an unofficial forum, but that its functions would have to be redefined with the onset of official negotiations. We wanted to be very clear that our process is separate from and independent of the official negotiations, and also that it is not designed to serve as a forum for back-channel negotiations. Workshop participants—whatever their official positions—do not come instructed, nor are they expected to make commitments on behalf of their leaderships. However, although our process is completely independent of the official process, it is designed to contribute directly to the success of that process by exploring obstacles to the negotiations and ways of overcoming them; by helping to formulate shared principles on which the negotiations can proceed; by addressing long-term issues that are implicitly on the agenda and will eventually have to be addressed explicitly; and by beginning the process of peacemaking and transformation of the relationship between the parties that must accompany and follow the process of peacemaking. The composition of our continuing workshop enabled us to link our work to the official process in both directions: the participants were well informed about developments in the negotiations themselves, as well as in the decision-making circles and the general public in their own societies; and they were in a position to feedback what they learned in the course of a workshop into the negotiations, as well as into the decision-making process and public opinion in their respective communities.

With these functions and special advantages in mind, we convened—after extended consultation—a fifth meeting of the continuing workshop in Salzburg, Austria, in August 1993. Several members of the continuing workshop were unable to attend this meeting, either because they found it in conflict with their official roles, or because of competing obligations. We therefore invited other participants to replace them, which made for a significant change in the group's composition: a large minority of the participants in the Salzburg meeting were new to the group and had to be integrated into it. A good part of the discussion was devoted to some of the issues relating to the interim arrangements on which the negotiating teams in Washington had been unable to reach agreement. The participants found these discussions, as always, useful and instructive, but there was some sentiment that in future meetings it would be best to focus more
systematically on specific issues, with advance preparation and with a commitment to working on a concrete written product. The events that unfolded within days of the ending of the Salzburg meeting reinforced this sentiment.

The first rumour of a major breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations reached us on the last day of the Salzburg meeting. On 22 September 1993—nine days after the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian accord—we arranged a consultation in Jerusalem with seven members of the continuing workshop who were within commuting distance of the city. At this meeting, and in subsequent consultations, there was general consensus that our work needed to continue and that we had a special contribution to make in this new phase of the peace process. However, it was clear that the latest developments had created a new political situation, in which our efforts—though no less significant than our earlier work—would require a change in their structure and functions. Our own work—like the peace process itself—now had to enter a new phase.

Accordingly, in the late autumn of 1993, we decided that the time had come to close the continuing workshop in the form that it had taken over the preceding three years, but to hold a new project directly and immediately on the experience and achievements of that effort. The new project takes the form of a joint working group on Israeli-Palestinian relations, with an initial emphasis on systematic exploration of the difficult political issues that are expected to be on the table when negotiations of a final agreement are scheduled to begin. The working group, consisting of politically active and highly influential Israelis and Palestinians, held its first meeting in May 1994. The new project has drawn, and will continue to draw, extensively on the members of the continuing workshop—to provide advice, access to the official process, and the nucleus of the new working group itself. However, there are important differences—in structure, format, and participants—between the working group and the earlier continuing workshop. Much of the work of the new project is done in smaller groups, meeting more frequently and for longer periods of time than in the past. The focus is more specific and the work more product-oriented. Moreover, we have been recruiting new participants with the particular expertise and experience required by the issues to which the working group addresses itself. We hope that this new phase of our work will contribute significantly to

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negotiation of the final Israeli-Palestinian agreement as well as to the further refinement of third-party mechanisms for creating unofficial inputs into ongoing official negotiations. At the present stage, there are three types of considerations that an unofficial working group like ours can make to the peace process.

At the level of the most immediate concerns, the group can address the difficult issues that have arisen and will inevitably continue to arise in implementation of the interim agreement. Unless these issues are resolved, the entire process may collapse or be sidetracked for a long time. As in our past activities, the purpose of such discussions is to explore the state of public opinion on each side, the obstacles that have arisen, and ways of providing mutual reassurance (in the form of symbolic gestures, reciprocal acknowledgments, or confidence-building measures) that will improve the political atmosphere for implementing interim agreements and keeping the process on track. The kind of relationship that is established on the ground during the interim phase has an important bearing on whether the interim agreement will be successfully implemented and what will be the quality of the final agreement that will emerge from the interim stage.

At an intermediate level, the group can focus on the major political issues that will be on the table for the final-status negotiations. The issues to be addressed by such discussions include the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees and the right of return, the future of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the final borders of the Palestinian politi, the nature of Palestinian self-determination, and the future relationship among the states in the region. The purpose is not to produce blueprints of draft agreements, but to develop a range of options, general approaches to each issue, and ideas for reframing the issue so that it becomes more amenable to negotiation. This is the kind of process that cannot readily take place, even under the best of circumstances, in the official context, where participants come instructed, must check back with decision makers, and are charged with producing agreements to which the parties are officially committed. unofficial interlocutors can engage in a joint exploratory process, which can provide the needed inputs into the official negotiations. In particular, in our framework these issues can be discussed and formulated in a way that avoids the shortcomings of power bargaining and mechanical compromise by taking account of the needs and constraints of both parties and of the requirements for building a new, long-term relationship between them.

At the level of long-range concerns, the group can focus on the requirements for developing a new relationship between the two communities during and beyond the interim period, exploring the role of the media, of education, of economic ties, and of institutional links in contributing to the peacemaking process that must accompany and follow successful peacemaking. An unofficial joint forum for exploring issues in the
relationship between the two communities, such as our new working group, is in itself an institutional mechanism that can help build a civil society across the political borders. In other words, the working group can serve, not only as a means for promoting a new relationship between the parties, but also as a manifestation and model of that new relationship.

We have placed the main emphasis of our Israeli-Palestinian working group, at least initially, at the intermediate level. Advance consideration of the difficult political issues that will have to be tackled in the negotiations for the final agreement is essential if these negotiations are to be productive. This kind of consideration, however, is not taking place at the official level, where the focus is almost entirely on immediate concerns. Indeed, consideration of these issues was deferred to the next stage of the negotiations precisely because of their difficulty, and even when that stage is reached, they cannot be adequately addressed within the bargaining framework of official negotiations. Systematic exploration of these specific issues and preparation of joint concept papers—papers that can be submitted to decision makers and official negotiators as relevant background for their deliberations, and disseminated more widely to help identify and frame the issues for the general public—are the most relevant and unique contributions that we can make at this stage of the process. The unofficial context makes it possible for knowledgeable and credible Israelis and Palestinians to engage in a process of joint thinking and exploration, which can help to frame the issues in a way that is conducive to productive negotiations and to agreements that can form the basis of a mutually beneficial relationship.

Although the initial emphasis of the working group is at the intermediate level, we do not entirely ignore the more immediate as well as the more long-range issues. In fact, the framing of the issues for the final-status negotiations on which we are now concentrating has considerable relevance for the interim phase as well, as for the long-term relationship between the two societies. Thus, for example, implementation of the interim agreement requires some provisional decisions regarding Jerusalem and the Israeli settlements. The sensitivity of these issues can easily create obstacles to implementation of the interim agreement; by the same token, any progress that our working group will make in framing and developing an approach to the issues of Jerusalem and the settlements may prove useful in overcoming obstacles at the interim stage. Similarly, as we work on specific issues to be addressed in the final-status negotiations, we begin to develop a broader framework for the future relationship between the two states. The formula for sharing Jerusalem, for example, may serve as a prototype for the way the country will ultimately be shared by the two peoples and the two states; discussions of the approach to the problems of Palestinian refugees or Israeli settlers may serve as a starting-point for exploring the long-term question of
the status of ethnic minorities in the two states after the conclusion of a final peace agreement.

THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF UNOFFICIAL EFFORTS

The Israeli-Palestinian agreement of September 1993 represents a fundamental breakthrough in the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict. The crucial element of this breakthrough is the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, expressed in the exchange of letters between the late Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat and in the opening of formal negotiations between the two sides. Israel's recognition of the PLO constitutes acceptance of Palestinian nationhood and signals—to Palestinians, to Israelis, and to the rest of the world—that the most likely eventual outcome of the negotiations, after a peaceful transition period, will be a Palestinian state (perhaps in confederation with Jordan). PLO recognition of Israel constitutes a formal acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the State of Israel within its pre-1967 borders, and opens the door to the recognition of Israel by the Arab states and acceptance of its rightful place in the region.

The significance of this act of mutual recognition becomes apparent in the light of the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was marked by mutual denial of the other's nationhood and systematic efforts by each side to delegitimize the other. The conflict had been perceived by the two parties as a zero-sum conflict around national identity and national existence, in that each saw acknowledgment of the other's national rights and even the other's existence as a nation to be antagonistic to its own national rights and existence. The September 1993 agreement thus represented a conceptual breakthrough. To be sure, the process that it set into motion is not irreversible: any political process is potentially subject to change. But the fact that what has been unthinkable for the entire history of this conflict has now not only been thought, but spoken and acted on at the highest level of each community and in the international arena, has created a new historical reality that cannot be undone. Moreover, the political costs of reversing the process that has been set into motion with the peace agreement would be extremely high for the leaderships on both sides. There is no doubt that Rabin and Arafat made a strategic decision to bring an end to the conflict through a historic compromise and each staked his political future and standing in history on the achievement of this goal. In doing so, they responded to a widespread—though far from unanimous—sense within each community that continuation of the conflict does not serve its fundamental needs and long-term interests.
Our workshops and related activities over the past two decades made a modest, but not insignificant contribution to the recent breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Kelman, 1995). They did so through the development of cadre prepared to carry out productive negotiations; the sharing of information and the formulation of new ideas that provided important substantive input into the negotiations; and the fostering of a political atmosphere that made the parties open to a new relationship. The continuing workshop of 1990-93 greatly enhanced these contributions and strengthened the political relevance of our work, both because it represented a sustained effort of joint Israeli-Palestinian exploration of key issues, and because of the high level of the participants in terms of their political influence and their intellectual power. With the onset of the negotiations, we found ourselves at an important new turning point. Unofficial communication, far from being irrelevant under the new circumstances, became a potentially important vehicle for helping to create the momentum that was still lacking in the negotiation process and to develop ideas to sustain the process and improve its outcome. The participants in the continuing workshop, given their role in the negotiations and their increasing political influence in their respective communities, were particularly well situated to make such contributions.

Despite the historic breakthrough of September 1993, there is a continuing need for the potential contributions of unofficial diplomacy. The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are by no means complete and enormous obstacles have yet to be overcome. Implementation of the interim agreement and conclusion of a final agreement will inevitably be a long and arduous process and there is no assurance that it will succeed within the five-year period stipulated in the peace accord. The difficulties are exacerbated by sharp divisions within each society. Ideological opponents of the peace process who want to hold out for sole possession of the entire land—although they represent only a minority on each side—are strengthened by the existential fears and profound distrust of the other side that pervade both communities. Under these circumstances, the peace process is particularly threatened by acts of violence—such as the Hebron massacre of Palestinians in February 1994 and the retaliatory killings of Israelis that came in its wake—which heighten the public's sense of vulnerability and its dread that the leadership has embarked on an uncertain and dangerous course. For both sides, such acts of violence deepen the sense of doubt and disillusionment created by the difficulties in implementing the interim agreements; for Palestinians, they reinforce the feeling that the peace process is not producing the hoped-for changes in their daily existence; for Israelis they help to erode the belief that the process can succeed in transforming the status quo into a state of peaceful coexistence.
Delays and difficulties in negotiating details of the agreement and in implementing it are inevitable in a conflict with such a long history of bitterness and distrust. Indeed, they arise from the very nature of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) for negotiating interim and final agreements that was signed in Washington on 3 September 1993. The DOP was a compromise document, designed to give Palestinians the hope and expectation that in the end they would have an independent state, and to give Israelis the assurance that they were not committing themselves irrevocably to a dangerous set of arrangements. These two requirements contain some inherent contradictions, because interim arrangements must be seen by Palestinians as first steps towards the anticipated future state, and by Israelis as gradual, limited steps that leave the future open to further negotiation. Thus, provisions intended to offer reassurance to one side may create disappointment and anxiety for the other. It was precisely in order to straddle these contradictory requirements that the DOP postponed discussion of some of the most contentious political issues—including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, and borders—to the permanent-status negotiations, scheduled to begin in the third year of the five-year interim period. For the interim process itself, these contradictions have created ambiguities and delays in implementation. Moreover, they have led the leadership on both sides to make statements and use rhetoric that are designed to reassure their own public, but in doing so arouse suspicion and fear on the other side.

Thus, a great deal of effort and skill are still required—at the level of diplomacy, political decision-making, and public education—if the major breakthrough of September 1993 is to fulfill itself through implementation of a viable interim agreement, passage of a peaceful transition period, conclusion of a mutually satisfactory final agreement, and establishment of a new relationship between the two nations. Successful transaction of these tasks calls for a systematic process of mutual reassurance responsive to both sides' existential fears, and creative reframing of the final-status issues so that they become amenable to negotiation. Unofficial efforts, such as those that my colleagues and I are engaged in, can make useful contributions at this stage, particularly by facilitating a joint Israeli-Palestinian forum for addressing the obstacles and constraints that impede implementation of the interim agreement and negotiation of the final agreement, for developing principles and options for resolving the difficult political issues left to the negotiations over the final agreement, and for exploring the requirements for building a new relationship between the two communities.

In conclusion, let me return to my conceptual analysis to summarize the two ways in which interactive problem solving can potentially make such contributions to peacemaking in the Middle East and elsewhere:
First, it provides a micro-process that can generate new insights into the conflicts and new ideas for advancing negotiation and for shaping mutually satisfactory solutions; and that can influence these insights and ideas into the political debate and the decision-making processes in the two communities. The special value of these ideas is that they emerge from a process of interactive problem solving—of joint thinking—by politically influential mainstream members of the parties themselves.

Second, interactive problem solving contributes to the development of new approaches to conceptualising and conducting the macro-process of conflict resolution and international relations in general. The central features to this reconceptualisation are (1) a view of conflict resolution as an attempt to change the relationships between the conflicting parties, which, in turn, implies the principle of reciprocity in the process and product of conflict resolution; (2) a new kind of political discourse in international relations—one that involves a shift in emphasis from power politics to joint problem solving; and (3) a new view of the influence processes employed in international relations—one that involves a shift in emphasis from deference and coercion to mutual reassurance.

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REFERENCES


