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Journal of Peace Psychology


PIONEERS IN U.S. PEACE PSYCHOLOGY:
Herbert C. Kelman

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Pioneers in Peace Psychology: Reflections on the Series

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The Pioneers in Peace Psychology series has explored the lives, contributions, and perspectives of eight early pioneers in peace psychology: Dorothy Carlo, Morton Deutsch, Herbert Kelman, Doris Miller, Milton Schwebel, Brewster Smith, Ethel Tobach, and Ralph White. Reflection on the interviews conducted with these pioneers between 1992 and 2010 revealed consistent themes. These included the importance of early experience, family influences, and positive role models; the value of multidisciplinary approaches; the importance of linking theory and practice; the need for critical reflection on issues of gender and other forms of diversity; the importance of working at multiple levels for peace; and the value of flexible thinking, persistence, and humor. The early pioneers have laid the foundation for future efforts in peace psychology, and they have provided inspiration for rising generations of peace psychologists through their outstanding contributions.
This special issue devoted to the life and work of Herbert C. Kelman is the final piece in a series on Pioneers in Peace Psychology that has covered eight early luminaries or pioneers whose lives and work have guided our field. This series was predicated on the idea that, although peace psychology is a very young field, it has quite a rich history. No small part of this history has been lived and defined by the pioneers whose remarkable contributions have given us a strong foundation for work in peace psychology. In a very real sense, we walk in the footsteps of giants who have gone before us and to whom we owe our enduring gratitude. Throughout our work on this series, we have assumed that many readers will take an interest in the words and perspectives of these pioneers and in learning about how their work and lives grew out of and addressed the central problems of their times.

To end with a focus on Herbert Kelman is appropriate because the multilayered, intractable conflicts in the Middle East have been enormous obstacles to peace for over 60 years. They continue today to present forms of structural and episodic violence that damage the lives of millions of people, and have profound global implications. Kelman’s work has made highly significant contributions to building peace in one of the most complex and difficult of all the facets of conflict in the Middle East—the Israeli–Palestinian conflict that is the hub of the wider conflicts. Kelman’s sophisticated yet highly practical use of social–psychological approaches to building positive relationships between groups in conflict gives us hope for addressing the identity conflicts that too often have invited pessimism and reliance solely on militaristic approaches.

In concluding this series, we thought it would be useful to briefly review its origins and _modus operandi_ and to ask, “What have we learned?,” from these significant figures in our field.

**BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SERIES**

The series originated in a discussion between Mike Wesells and Milt Schwebel, who was a pioneer himself and the editor of the _Peace Psychology Bulletin_, a forerunner of the journal _Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology_. In a 1992 letter to Milt, Mike spoke of his “sadness and sense of loss” over the deaths of eminent psychologists who had courageously spoken out on behalf of peace and who themselves were repositories of important life experiences many people could learn from. Milt expressed keen interest in the project, and his support would subsequently take on greater importance since he became the founding editor of _Peace and Conflict_ and oversaw its first six years of publication.

Subsequently, Mike asked Ralph White at the 1992 American Psychological Association (APA) convention whether he would be willing to participate in the first of a planned series of interviews for which there were four main goals: (a) to identify ways in which pioneering psychologists have made a positive difference on issues of peace and conflict resolution; (b) to explore the connections between personal and professional dimensions of work in peace psychology; (c) to collect oral historical material on the history of peace psychology; and (d) to hear the voices of pioneering peace psychologists as they reflect broadly on their careers, the world situation, and the prospects for peace. Ralph expressed interest, and Mike conducted the first interview with him in December 1992. Excited by the richness of this interview (not to mention the warm hospitality extended by Ralph and his wife, Betty), Mike became committed to continuing the series. It was clear, however, that the task was too big for one person and that the project would be enriched by taking a diverse, multifaceted team approach. Fortunately, a solution emerged during informal discussions between Mike, Susan McKay, and Micheál Roe in August, 1993, when Randolph-Macon College hosted the Third International Symposium on the Contributions of Psychology to Peace. This biennial symposium continues to the present and is organized by the Committee for the Psychological Study of Peace, which, until 2009, had worked under the auspices of the International Union of Psychological Science. Out of these discussions and subsequent correspondence emerged the team of Micheál, Susie, and Mike.

During Christmas break of 1993, Micheál and Mike traveled from their respective coasts to Wyoming, where our spirits were buoyed by Susie’s hospitality and Micheál’s sharing with us the wonders of Irish whiskey (Bushmills, as Micheál recalls). This meeting was pivotal in identifying people to be interviewed for the series and planning the work. Susie and Mike agreed to conduct the interviews because Micheál was on sabatical in Northern Ireland for much of 1994. He, in turn, took on the laborious, yet crucial, task of overseeing the transcription and first editing of the tapes. All three team members agreed to play key roles in the writing associated with the project, with each member taking the lead in regard to particular pioneers. Initially, we envisioned the development of a book on pioneers of peace psychology, and we drew up a prospectus that included interviews of a wide range of people who had done ground-breaking work in the field. However, we quickly realized that external funding was needed to support such an extensive work, and no funding sources responded to our inquiries. As a result, we scaled back our plans and decided to conduct a smaller number of interviews and to “penny-pinching” by doing the interviews on the margins of APA conventions or in connection with travel undertaken for other purposes.
Over the next 2 years, Mike and Susie, working either together or alone, conducted over 10 interviews. We eventually decided to include in the published series only those interviews with first-wave pioneers whose work extended over many decades. In selecting these, we also strove for gender balance. One interview—that of Herb Kelman—extended much longer, and, in fact, is still ongoing today. Hopefully, it will become an oral history of his life and work that will eventually be available to the public.

The story of how the pioneers series became published is of interest because it indicates the importance of perseverance. In 1994, we harbored hope that a journal of peace psychology, which was then being conceptualized by the Publications Committee of the Division of Peace Psychology, would be a welcoming venue for pieces on the pioneers. These hopes were reinforced through discussions with Milt Schwebel, who was eager to publish the series during his editorship. Yet, the lives of Micheal, Susie, and Mike were pulled into numerous other directions, with the result that it took longer than expected to begin publication. Dick Wagner, the second and current editor of *Peace and Conflict*, expressed strong interest in the pioneers work, and publication of the series began in 2003. Since then, this journal has published material on eight early pioneers (in alphabetical order: Dorothy Ciarlo, Morton Deutsch, Herbert Kelman, Doris Miller, Milton Schwebel, Brewster Smith, Ethel Tobach, and Ralph White), including narrative material from interviews, together with a mixture of substantive and testimonial commentaries that honor the life and work of the respective pioneers. It is an understatement to say that we are grateful to Milt and Dick for their leadership in helping this series move forward.

**REFLECTIONS**

During this project, a variety of significant themes and lessons emerged either in the words of the pioneers; their approaches, or, in some cases, the work of the organizing team. These “lessons learned” are the product of a very small “N,” yet they are, nevertheless, instructive.

**Early Experience**

Most pioneers indicated that their orientation toward peace had roots in their early life experiences and childhood sensitivities to social injustice. Pioneers named particular role models who had inspired them at an early age to action and showed how it was possible to work for peace. Families were important sources of role models, as having activist mothers, fathers, or siblings facilitated involvement in activism. Later in their lives, their marital partners supported their activism in significant ways. The implication is that as peace psychologists, we should not underestimate the importance of being positive role models in regard to activism and sensitivity to social injustice. At a moment in history when militarism, fear, hatred, and xenophobia are powerful influences on young people, it is more important than ever to create peace-oriented role models, beginning with ourselves and in our own families.

**Multidisciplinary Approach**

All the pioneers spoke of the importance of integrating psychological knowledge and analysis with the knowledge and analytic lenses of other disciplines such as political science, sociology, and history. They pointed out that, although psychological knowledge is very useful, real-world problems of peace and social justice are inherently multidimensional and cannot be solved through psychological approaches alone. Overall, their message to younger psychologists was to “get out of the box” of psychology and develop holistic approaches that are suited to the problems at hand.

**Theory–Practice Linkage**

Numerous pioneers, particularly Morton Deutsch, spoke of the importance of developing strong theory as a means of guiding and strengthening one’s action in building peace and social justice. Several pioneers identified the development of empirically validated theories of peace psychology as among the greatest challenges for the field. Furthermore, all the pioneers exhibited a systematic approach guided by a coherent conceptual framework, if not by a formal theory. This systematic linkage of thought and action was visible in the reflective stance that these pioneers took. The lesson for subsequent generations of peace psychologists is to harness the propensity for action with habits of reflection and conceptual analysis, thereby creating a more systematic, empirically based psychology of peace.

**Gender**

An important question we wrestled with as a team was, “Where are the female pioneers?” since the early lists of potential pioneers to interview were predominantly men. Our sense was that female pioneers in peace psychology were often less visible and did highly valued work, but without extensive publication and recognition. (The clear exception was Ethel Tobach, who has a prodigious and distinguished publication record to go with her lifelong activism.) Because access to academia was unusual for female psychologists
who were steered into the career path of becoming clinicians, we discussed how the excessive reliance on the standard of publication record was itself a manifestation of patriarchy within our own discipline and thinking. As a result, we decided to take a more forward-looking and affirmative stance including female pioneers of great talent and accomplishment who had worked in grounded ways that had traditionally been out of the limelight. An important lesson is that the gender discrimination that is so prevalent worldwide can find its way into work for peace. To work for peace in an effective manner requires ongoing critical reflection on issues of gender and other forms of diversity, and this critical reflection must include personal, as well as systems, foci.

Diverse Levels and Orientations

The pioneers conducted their work for peace at many different levels, ranging from the local community to international contexts. For example, Doris Miller focused much of her peace work on initiatives in support of labor unions and workers' rights. In addition, for many years, she was a key figure in Psychologists for Social Responsibility (PsySR), which also engaged in international activism, advocacy, and peacebuilding. Similarly, Dorothy Ciarlo focused her more recent activism working in the Rocky Flats community with people who had been affected by the nuclear waste disposal regime, and during the 1980s and 1990s contributed significantly to the building of national organizations such as PsySR and the then APA Division of Peace Psychology. Other pioneers, such as Ralph White and Herbert Kelman, concentrated their energies on the international arena, although each contributed to peace issues in the United States as well. Still others, such as Brewster Smith and Ethel Tobach, exerted significant energy nationally by working to make the APA more socially responsible. A key lesson is that the task of building peace requires work at many different levels. It is remarkable how most pioneers found a way to work at multiple levels simultaneously, as befits the systematic nature of peacebuilding.

The pioneers exhibited considerable diversity in their backgrounds and their orientations as psychologists who work for peace—in essence, they used different theoretical, analytical, and methodological lenses. They may be summarized as follows:

Dorothy Ciarlo: Clinical psychology.
Morton Deutsch: Social psychology and clinical psychology.
Herbert Kelman: Social psychology, clinical psychology, and international relations.
Doris Miller: Clinical psychology and labor-management relations.

Milton Schwebel: Developmental psychology, clinical psychology, and educational psychology.
Brewer Smith: Social psychology and psychological ethics.
Ethel Tobach: Biological psychology and feminist psychology.
Ralph White: Social psychology, history, and political science.

Clearly, no single disciplinary lens or orientation unlocks all the insights that peace psychology has to offer. In fact, the collective contribution by the pioneers seems to embody the Gestalt principle that "The whole is greater than the sum of its parts," for it is through the diversity of approaches and the synergy between them that peace psychology achieves its full potential. Whether psychologists identify themselves primarily as clinical psychologists, social psychologists, or as psychologists in some other sub-area, they all stand to make highly significant contributions to peace.

Flexible Thinking

At a time when discussions of international relations and peace are increasingly saturated with dogmatic pronouncements and simplistic dichotomies, it is refreshing to see the flexible thinking of these early peace pioneers. For example, one might have expected that pioneers of peace psychology would overwhelmingly be committed pacifists, but most showed little or no affinity for pacifism of an absolutist form. Instead, we observed that pioneers such as Morton Deutsch, Milton Schwebel, and Brewster Smith served in the U.S. armed forces during World War II, citing the need to resist Hitler's deadly, racist policies. Long-time opponent of covert operations, Ralph White nonetheless served in the Central Intelligence Agency collecting accurate information on international rivals, meaningfully combining that information, and then applying it effectively to further international relations. Without exception, all the pioneers showed a powerful commitment to peacebuilding and the avoidance of militarism and overreliance on force and other coercive tactics in handling conflict. We can learn from the way in which pioneers avoid carrying the world into black and white and maintain a critical stance that is antithetical to dogmatism.

Persistence

All of the peace pioneers have shown remarkable capacity to persevere in their efforts to build peace, even when the odds seemed stacked against them. Ralph White was an activist for over seven decades of his professional life, and continued to be active nearly to his death at the ripe age of 100. Like
Ralph, many of the pioneers, now in their 80s or 90s, continue to be highly active public advocates for peace. The pioneers’ persistence in working for peace is grounded in their passion for building a humane world and living in a manner that promotes positive values and social justice. Perhaps the lesson that it takes perseverance to achieve great things seems obvious, yet it offers a poignant reminder of the importance of holding one’s course even when one’s frustrations and despair arise over the direction of world events.

Humor

It is probably no coincidence that the pioneers demonstrated as high a capacity for humor as for perseverance. In fact, our interviews with the pioneers were much fun and were illuminated by their wit and laughter. The pioneers know how to make effective use of humor. For example, Brewster Smith used humor to win the support of the APA Council of Representatives in forming the Division of Peace Psychology. Responding to concerns that the APA had too many divisions, Brewster quipped that adding a Division of Peace Psychology would not even be a jnd—that is, a “just noticeable difference”—which, at the time, was a well-known term from psychophysics. This touch of wit dissipated tensions and set the stage for a positive vote that led to the establishment of the Division.

CONCLUSION

Kurt Lewin is famous for his insight that there is nothing so practical as a good theory. To this gem might be added another saying: There is nothing so motivating as a good role model. In peace psychology, it has been and is our good fortune to have elders who are strong role models and guiding lights—early pioneers—who have forged the way through decades of work that is as inspiring as it is illuminating. To them, we owe our concerted gratitude.

However, the tasks of pioneering have only begun. Although we now have footsteps to follow and can discern the general lay of the land, much remains to be discovered and understood. The question before us now is who will rise to the occasion and make the depth of commitment and contribution that these extraordinary individuals have made? Encouragingly, many second-generation peace psychologists have now made distinguished contributions to peace psychology and promise to continue doing so. Even if only some of them can attain the remarkable level and longevity of accomplishment of the early pioneers, all of us can make our contribution to peace and social justice by learning from and acting on their powerful examples.

REFERENCES FOR THE SERIES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER


BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

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As peace psychologists, we should not underestimate the importance of being positive role models in regard to activism and sensitivity to social injustice. At a moment in history when militarism, fear, hatred, and xenophobia are powerful influences on young people, it is more important than ever to create peace-oriented role models, beginning with ourselves and in our own families.


Herbert C. Kelman: A Tribute

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Five quite special features characterize Herbert Kelman and his work in social psychology: (a) his research is uniquely multilevel and contextualized; (b) there is a consistent moral dimension in all of his work and actions; (c) Kelman elicits trust from all sides; (d) he goes his own way independent of research fashions; and (e) he bravely bears the heat in the social policy kitchen. This article illustrates each of these enviable characteristics and demonstrates why Herbert Kelman richly deserves this recognition.

On a brisk Winter day in 1957 in Washington, DC, I was introduced to Herb Kelman by none other than my mentor, Gordon Allport. Appropriately enough, the three of us were attending a small session on social science perspectives on peace presented for congressional staffers and arranged by the American Friends Service Committee. Allport explained that we should become acquainted because we were both to begin the next Fall as new faculty members in the Department of Social Relations at Harvard University. Thus, we began our long friendship, for Herb is my oldest and closest friend in the discipline.

At the close of the briefing, Herb kindly offered to drive me to Pennsylvania Station where I was to catch a train to visit my parents in Richmond, Virginia. This gave us a chance to have an extended conversation. We immediately bonded; our values and interests were surprisingly close. We seemed to agree on everything; indeed, over the past half century, we have found it nearly impossible to find a subject about which we could have even a friendly disagreement. What makes our similar worldviews so unlikely is that we could not have had more different backgrounds. In sharp contrast

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to Herb's Vienna beginnings, his escape as a child from Nazi-ruled Austria via Antwerp to America, and his training in Jewish studies, I had grown up in then-provincial Richmond in an immigrant Scottish Protestant family. Five months in South Africa with Allport provided my only worldly exposure.

However, Herb and I did have several important things in common. Both of us were highly identified social psychologists, trained at Ivy League universities, and interested in all the social sciences. Most important of all, we were both deeply concerned about intergroup prejudice and discrimination. He knew both phenomena up close from anti-Semitism in Europe and from his extensive work in American race relations with the Congress on Racial Equality; and I knew them up close from the racial oppression that surrounded me in the Virginia of the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, the one article we wrote together appeared in *Commentary* and was entitled, "How to Understand Prejudice" (Kelman & Pettigrew, 1959).

This amiable phenomenon has happened to me on other occasions—as with my closest European friend, Ulrich Wagner, the chair of social psychology at Philipps University in Marburg, Germany. He, too, has a background completely different from mine. This suggests that there are strong selection factors operating as to who decides to become a social psychologist, as well as some common socializing processes we all go through becoming social psychologists.

**DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF KELMAN AND HIS WORK**

Five quite special features characterize both Herb and his influential work: (a) multilevel contextualized research, (b) a consistent moral dimension, (c) eliciting trust, (d) going his own way, and (e) bearing the heat in the social policy kitchen. I admire him for each of these characteristics.

**Multilevel Contextualized Research**

In the 17 years we overlapped at Harvard, Herb and I often had long discussions about his incisive views of social psychology. His perspective led directly to my notion of contextual social psychology (Pettigrew, 1991), which I believe is one of the principal features that distinguishes his influential work. He ingeniously manages to place his individual and group processes in a broader contextual perspective. This ability is crucial for his famous action research program on the Arab–Israeli conflict. Kelman's interactive problem-solving, third-party approach to resolving international and ethnic conflicts requires a judicious linking of the meso-situational and macro-societal levels of analysis. This requires not only careful contextualization, but a multilevel analysis as well.

When stated in this manner, this requirement may not sound as rare and difficult as it actually is. However, consider the several fallacies that often occur in such work. Other social science disciplines are prone to committing the ecological fallacy—incorrectly drawing conclusions about individuals from macrolevel data alone. This mistake is often seen in statements made about individual voters solely from aggregate voting results. It is a fallacy because macro-units are too broad to determine individual data, and individuals have unique properties that cannot be inferred from macro-data.

By contrast, psychologists too often commit the compositional fallacy. Here we have the exact opposite confusion of levels. This fallacy involves drawing conclusions at the macrolevel of analysis from individual and situational data alone. This is a fallacy because institutions and societies are *social systems* and, as such, are more than the sum of their individual parts. Macro-units, too, have unique properties of their own that the macro-social sciences specialize in studying.

The single process fallacy is a special case of the compositional fallacy that often undercuts well-intentioned psychological interventions. This fallacy occurs when we become too enthusiastic about a single psychological process. We then apply it to a structural issue with a single-minded exclusion of other important and relevant psychological processes. Institutional processes are complex, and they invariably involve multiple psychological processes. Not only must we consider different, even conflicting, psychological phenomena, but we must also determine how they interact in a particular institutional context.

Herb's work for peace necessarily links the micro-personality and meso-situation levels of analysis typical of social psychology with the macrolevel of analysis typical of other social sciences; and he carefully avoids the single process fallacy by drawing on an array of processes ranging from small-group to political science research. Such efforts at multiple levels are not easy; but, his ability to weave them seamlessly into his work is a major factor, in my judgment, for the unique effectiveness of his approach.

To appreciate fully Herb's ability to work at the macro-societal level, one need only read his frequent short pieces that have appeared over the past decade in *The Boston Globe* (Kelman, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2007, 2008). Here he laid out the basic terms of a just peace settlement before they became widely understood. Having carefully listened to his Arab and Israeli conferees over the years, he envisioned a feasible middle ground that could potentially be acceptable to both sides.

First, Herb noted that the terms of his outlined proposal are anchored in United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, were implicit in the Oslo Agreement, and almost led to a mutually satisfactory settlement at Taba, Egypt in January 2002. He stressed that the right of both peoples to exist as
recognized nations is a cornerstone of any settlement (Kelman, 1987, 2001, 2002). It is encouraging that earlier surveys, before attitudes on both sides recently hardened, repeatedly showed that a majority of both Israelis and Palestinians would accept this condition if it were part of a wider peace agreement (Svirsky, 2002). Even today, majorities on both sides favor a two-state solution, but each believes the other side rejects peace and cannot be trusted.

To overcome this state of mutual distrust, Kelman (2008) worked tirelessly to reframe the issue as a historic compromise with a positive vision of a desirable future for both peoples. To achieve this, the compromises required by such a settlement must be made clear at the onset. The “... Israeli dreams of settling Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and Palestinian dreams of returning in large numbers to the homes they lost in 1948,” Kelman (2002, p. A15) bluntly wrote, “cannot be realized.” This fact is widely understood by both sides, but Herb went further in emphasizing how the agreement must recognize the special concerns of both sides. Here is a draft statement he advanced:

In negotiating solutions to the problem of Palestinian refugees, Israel recognizes that the refugee problem and the right of return are central to the Palestinian national identity and national narrative, and acknowledges its share of responsibility for the plight of these refugees. Concretely, the refugee problem will be addressed in all its dimensions, with comprehensive plans for financial compensation, regularization of the status of refugees in host countries, and resettlement when needed or desired. Refugees will be granted citizenship in and the right of return to the Palestinian state. Only a limited number, however, will return to Israel proper, in order to allow Israel to maintain its character as a Jewish-majority state. (Kelman, 2008, p. K9)

There must also be recognition by the Arab states of Israel's right to exist in peace in perpetuity as a Jewish-majority state. In 2002, Arab nations adopted Crown Prince Abdullah's proposal that accepts this critical condition. Kelman added a final proviso: Israel must assure full democratic rights to its Arab minority; rights that they seldom enjoy at present (Lustick, 2001).

In return, Israel must recognize the establishment of a separate Palestinian state and its right to exist in peace in perpetuity. The new state must have contiguous territory that follow the 1967 armistice lines encompassing each of its new parts and safe passage between them—in particular, a secure link between the West Bank and Gaza. Such a solution sharply differs from the divided areas offered by Israel in 2000. This means that Israel must abandon many of its more distant settlements in the West Bank. Precedents for this action exist. Sinai settlements were given up long ago as part of the peace agreement with Egypt, and Gaza settlements were abandoned more recently. The impact of this provision would be reduced if, upon mutual agreement, the Palestinians exchanged small border areas with concentrated settlements for Israeli land of similar size and value. Moreover, older surveys show that about 60% of the Israeli public was then willing to evacuate “all” or “most of” the settlements unilaterally (Svirsky, 2002).

Second, the issue of Jerusalem must be resolved. Kelman (2001) believed the city should be designated as a shared city and the capital of both states. Others suggested having the holy sites declared an international zone governed by the United Nations. In any event, the sharing of Jerusalem will be necessary with guaranteed access for all religions.

A Consistent Moral Dimension

There is throughout Herb's life and writing a consistent moral dimension. Like myself, he agrees with Myrdal’s (1944) contention that a value-free social science is impossible to attain. However, this stance also means that scientists should make their values clear to others while striving to eliminate bias in the conduct of their research. This stance invites criticism within the discipline, often coming from those who strongly differ in their politics but, nevertheless, regard their own research as totally unbiased.

Herb's often courageous ends have occurred throughout his life. Let me provide three examples. Early in his years at Harvard, two instructors encouraged their students in a graduate seminar to take drugs. Herb blew the whistle. Others knew of the scandalous practice, but had not dared speak up. Harvard officials were pleased to see the end of the affair, but not pleased that it was reported widely in the press. Later, some social psychology experiments throughout North America began to cross an ethical line in their maltreatment of participants. Again, Herb blew the whistle with a forthright statement on the rights of participants in social research (Kelman, 1967, 1972). Unfortunately, this needed action drew the last ire of some experimentalists in the discipline. The third example is well-known. Herb's book with Lee Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989), drew lessons from the My Lai massacre in Viet Nam concerning personal responsibility for actions ordered by legitimate authorities. This ever-present moral dimension in Herb's work leads directly to the next characteristic: the trust others put in him.

Eliciting Trust

One ingredient of the success of Herb's problem-solving workshops is rarely mentioned: trust by all sides of the seminar facilitator—in this case, Herb...
himself. Here I have the testimony of my son, Mark, now a Middle East specialist at the City University of New York, and fluent in Arabic. He participated as a Harvard undergraduate in one of Kelman's famous graduate seminars on international conflicts. He noted a factor that Herb modestly does not stress. Mark marvelled at the way both Israelis and Palestinians in the seminar respected and trusted him—a key variable in the success of intergroup contact generally (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Unless the facilitator of the intervention is fully trusted by both sides, such successful intergroup interventions are typically not possible.

Kelman Goes His Own Way

Social psychology has exhibited an unfortunate tendency to place a disproportionate share of its limited resources into one or two areas: authoritarianism in the 1950s, cognitive dissonance and attribution theories in the 1960s, and social cognition in the 1970s. Given that social psychology is a relatively small discipline, this unfortunate trend stifles progress. For this reason, I have especially admired those who go their own way and offer new ideas in areas not in fashion. From my own cohort, Herb, as well as Robert Abelson, Donald Campbell, and Robert Zajonc, offer such role models.

Consider Herb's career path. He began with his Yale mentor, Carl Hovland, in the popular study of attitudes, their functions, development, and change. This early work has informed all his later research. However, he soon branched out into applied domains where social psychologists rarely venture—such as psychotherapy, international student exchanges, nationalism, international relations, and personal responsibility. This path directly led to his problem-solving workshops in the resolution of international conflicts. As a child of the Holocaust, Herb has sought to develop peace and reduce conflict with interdisciplinary work that is typically out of the mainstream.

Ability to Bear the Heat in the Policy Kitchen

It is so scalding hot in the policy kitchen that, understandably, most social scientists are content to publish their work in professional journals and avoid direct policy concerns altogether. It takes courage to do what Herb has routinely done—enter the fray, publish in newspapers, work in a policy center, and do whatever he could to generate an equitable peace in the Middle East. Not surprisingly, he has often been the target of severe criticism—all of it unfair in my view. For example, Kelman (1982, 1983) published two reports on lengthy conversations he had in Beirut with Yasser Arafat, then chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The articles and Herb were immediately and viciously assailed. Detractors viewed his interviews as cavorting with the enemy—as if avoiding the opposition could ever bring peace. The critics also sternly rejected Herb's taking Arafat's word seriously. Later, the controversial article (Kelman, 1983) proved prophetic: It held that Arafat "... has the capacity and will to negotiate an agreement with Israel, based on mutual recognition and peaceful coexistence, if afforded necessary incentives and reassurances" (p. 203). The Oslo Agreement, a decade later, proved Herb correct.

It is easy to attack outgroups, but difficult to question your ingroup's positions. Herb has withstood repeated attacks from some other Jews who fail to see how his efforts for peace would benefit Israel far more than their efforts. (It is interesting to note that many Zionists agree and have supported his views and worked with him.) Yet, I have never once heard him complain or even comment on these attacks. I have even personally encountered criticism from these critics for just being a close friend of Herb's. However, this represents yet another reason for our long-term friendship. As a lifelong advocate of racial integration and the end of racial discrimination, I have, at times, encountered similar rebuffs from my ingroup of White Southerners.

A FINAL WORD

Herbert Kelman's many theoretical and research accomplishments are well-known and widely acclaimed. However, he also richly deserves this recognition in Peace and Conflict for the rare combination of characteristics that I have described here about my friend: (a) multilevel contextualized research, (b) a consistent moral dimension, (c) eliciting trust, (d) going his own way, and (e) bearing the heat in the social policy kitchen.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Thomas F. Pettigrew is a research professor of social psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz. A Harvard University PhD, he also taught at the following universities: North Carolina (1956–1957), Harvard (1957–1980), and Amsterdam (1986–1991). He has conducted intergroup research in Europe and South Africa, in addition to North America, and received numerous lifetime achievement awards. His work is reviewed in the following: U. Wagner et al. (2008). Emerging research directions for improving intergroup relations—Building on the legacy of Thomas F. Pettigrew. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
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The present commentary pays tribute to the extraordinary achievement and invaluable contribution of Professor Herbert C. Kelman to the field of applied social-psychological methods for the resolution of conflict. It provides insight into the conceptual core of Kelman’s method interactive problem solving, which has been strongly influenced by the aim to negotiate identity aspects of conflict parties. The commentary explores the method’s practical application to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in the form of dialogue workshops. It displays how former workshop participants have experienced workshop discussions and what they qualify as long-term impacts of the method.

Conflicts are important and indispensable parts of life. Conflicts about scarce resources, political control, ideological dominance, as well as conflicts about social or personal values, are part of everyday life. In conflicts about the distribution of material goods, the problem-solving procedures differ from those applied to conflicts that are rooted in differences of values, convictions, or personal and collective identities. Although often the former

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can be negotiated and dealt with to the satisfaction of both parties, the latter generally present themselves as non-negotiable and intractable, and very often result in physical violence and war.

Herbert Kelman focused his work on trying to find ways to deal with this latter category of deep-rooted conflicts—specifically, the conflicts of identity; and, in particular, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. He realized that in intergroup conflicts—be they national, ethnic, or religious—the core conflicts were often rooted in questions of identity, although the presented problems were of a material kind. As a trained social psychologist, Kelman was aware that the whole realm of “identity”—be it personal or on the group level—was too well-protected from the outside world and too vulnerable to be easily accessible to consciousness and rational analysis. His lifelong efforts have been dedicated to finding methods of dealing with such difficult, deep-rooted conflicts by deconstructing and reconstructing elements of identity.

DEALING WITH IDENTITY

Kelman realizes that present conflicts cannot be understood and dealt with if the intergenerational narratives, the historical grievances, the self-perceptions, as well as the perceptions of the “other” of the conflicting parties are not part of the conscious conflict resolution process. The very complex psychic cluster of identity is formed in early childhood, long before consciousness and language skills are developed. Hidden in very deep layers of the human psyche, this cluster is difficult to grasp, highly sensitive, extremely well-defended against outside intrusion, and, therefore, extremely difficult to include in conflict resolution processes.

Identity formation takes place in the family and begins on Day 1. Growing up in a family means growing up as a member of a group and into a many-layered identity. Every child unconsciously absorbs the values, ideals, symbols, emotional rules, and the self-perceptions of the family (and, thus, the group) with its different ethnic, religious, national, and other components, long before he or she is able to consciously reflect on them. The result of this process is the particular identity of the individual, consisting of a deep sense of belonging, an inner feeling of self, of continuity, and entity. As the British social psychologist, Henry Tajfel (1981), demonstrated, children at the age of six are already full-blown nationalists, and the intricate fusion of “I” and “we” is well-established, as well as the differentiation between “us” and “them,” with very clear, positive connotations for members of one’s own group and equally clear, negative connotations for members of the “other” group. Whereas the family and one’s own group represent each individual’s lifeline, in conflict situations, the “other” correspondingly is quickly perceived as a potential threat to one’s own survival.

To be able to work out conflict resolution processes on the basis of this knowledge, Kelman traveled in various countries of the Middle East and acquired a deep understanding of the perspectives, needs, grievances, and hopes of the different parties to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. He also made himself familiar with the many different camps within both parties, and with the many facets of opinions and wishes within these camps, and then—in his practical work—sought to combine his competence as a scholar with his practical skills as a facilitator.

DEVELOPING THE METHOD

Kelman began to work with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict on the basis of the work of the Australian diplomat, John W. Burton (1915–2010). From practical experiences during and after World War II, Burton had concluded that the usual diplomatic dialogue was ill-suited for a real understanding of the content of, the root of, and the solution to a serious conflict and would not produce satisfactory results. He, therefore, imagined a model of informal diplomacy consisting of controlled communication between carefully selected representatives from the opposing sides, far from the intense emotions and the limelight of either side’s publicity, and facilitated by a completely impartial third party. The model was tested the first time in 1966 in the conflict between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Shortly after that still in 1966, the model was applied to the conflict between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, and Herbert Kelman participated in the process.

Since then, Herbert Kelman has continued to develop the basic concept into a new method of scientifically dealing with deep-rooted conflicts (i.e., integrating knowledge applicable to this situation from social psychology, sociology, and international relations). He called the methodological centerpiece the “problem-solving workshop,” and applied it in continuous work to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, beginning after the war of 1967 and making it the primary focus of his work after the war of 1973. As a respected Middle East expert, he was able to motivate and bring together respected Israelis and Palestinians, typically three to six from each side, into his problem-solving workshops on the precondition that they were willing to engage in a dialogue (which, at the time, was not at all easy). Although some workshops were one-time events, others were continuing workshops in which the participants met repeatedly.

The workshops began with a needs analysis, which was designed to enable the parties to know and understand each other’s needs, fears, and concerns, and to penetrate each other’s perspective. In the following phase, the process moved to interactive problem solving by jointly developing ideas
for resolving the conflict—or particular issues within the conflict—in ways that would be responsive to the needs and fears of both parties, as presented in the preceding discussion.

Over time, the focus of the workshops has evolved from overall approaches, to resolving the conflict, to considering solutions to specific problems. After the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords, the consideration of solutions to specific problems entailed working on joint concept articles. Over the past decade, deep mutual distrust has marked the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. In current working groups, therefore, the emphasis is no longer on developing solutions to specific problems, but on the issue of how to frame an agreement so that it would reassure and energize the two publics.

The strict rules of confidentiality and of equal standing for all participants, the obligation to listen to each other, and particularly to listen to the arguments and grievances of the other side never changed throughout Kelman’s workshop discussions. These basic rules, set by the facilitator and mandatory for all participants, were complemented and refined over time. Among the basic rules there was also the requirement for the third party to play a facilitative role and to avoid introducing its own proposals or its own ideas. Its task was to create conditions that allow the parties—through their interactions—to develop their own ideas and to help refine the ideas that emerged by summarizing the discussions, highlighting certain points, or asking for clarifications.

In the workshops, discussions among participants sometimes took an unproductive course, creating the need for the facilitators to redirect the discussion. For example, participants in some workshops would discuss their views of what was “right” and “wrong,” and used legal and historical argument to support their positions. These discussions, which tended to be emotional and contentious, did not result in a common interpretation of the historical or legal “facts” and, therefore, did not result in solutions. Yet, these unproductive discussions could not be avoided, and were not suppressed because the parties had to be aware of what each considers right or wrong. Such discussions had to be steered in a constructive direction (i.e., toward a view of the conflict as a shared problem requiring a joint effort at shaping solutions). Kelman sought to identify (or let the participants discover) shared elements of their identities upon which to build common interests and develop proposals for solutions of real problems that would not threaten the other’s identity.

Even to achieve a common perception of a common problem was difficult. Kelman refined the methodology to require the following:

- First, a description and analysis of the different parts of the problem by the different parties, independently and analytically.
- Second, a free presentation of proposals for solutions of parts of the conflict, including improbable but desirable proposals.
- Third, a freewheeling dialogue trying to induce the other party, through positive motivation (and not through threats or a demonstration of power), to modify its position and agree to a compromise.
- Fourth, linkage between the small-group discussions and results and the real political environment. This was accomplished by reporting back to the authorities and the public and creating, step-by-step, a political environment and a readiness on both sides to accept the compromises reached in the small-group discussions.

Each of these steps in this micro-process is extremely challenging, and it may not be possible to complete all four steps. For example, the participants in the dialogue may not always be able to convince the broader public of the advantages of the compromise found. The exchange of letters between Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Arafat before signing the Oslo Declaration in September 1993 were—in Kelman’s own perception—the best result ever achieved so far through his method among top decision makers. It documents the difficulties, but also the potential, of this process. Yet, at the same time, the ensuing events prove the fact that such carefully reached results can be annihilated any time through indiscretions or any kind of troublemaking, and that the work of years can be lost in a moment. Working with the identity complex in the problem-solving process may not always bring immediate or enduring solutions. However, without including it, there is no way of resolving a truly deep-rooted conflict.

It is a tribute to Herbert Kelman that he developed a methodology capable of reaching and dealing with the deepest layers of such intractable conflicts. The combination of Kelman’s personality and his sophisticated use of insights and tools from various disciplines has led to a decisive change in dealing with deep-rooted conflicts. Being well-aware of the narcissistic vulnerabilities of people in conflicts and the many obstacles to empathy and cross-conflict collaboration, Kelman based his workshops not only on interdisciplinary understandings of conflicts and methods of conflict management, but also on social-psychological approaches to enabling empathy and collaboration on solving very difficult problems. Kelman understood that unless people were treated in a respectful and empathetic way, constructive solutions could not be developed. Thus, he made it a rule to approach all members of his problem-solving workshops without ever threatening them or exploiting their vulnerabilities. His competence, his modest and kind personality, as well as his patience and endurance combined with his broad knowledge of human nature enabled him, in a very
special way, to become an exemplary practitioner of action research, as he likes to call his method.

FIRST-HAND TESTIMONIES OF THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF INTERACTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING

The following excerpts from interviews held with five Palestinians and eight Israelis who have participated in a consecutive series of interactive problem-solving workshops provide an insight into the real-life scenario of the method’s practical application.

The first set of meetings, called a Continuing Workshop, were held between 1990 and 1993. Responding to the developments following the Oslo Accords, the workshop format evolved into the Joint Working Group that set itself the goal to produce joint concept articles on some of the issues that were to be resolved in the final-status negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis.

The interviews were held between 2002 and 2006 with the aim of evaluating the long-term impact of the method. For this purpose, the interviewees were asked how they rated their experience of participating in interactive problem-solving workshops, in general, what they perceived as positive impacts of the method on the conflict resolution process, and what they saw as limitations. More particularly, the interviewees were asked how their perception of themselves, their own constituency, and the other side had changed throughout the workshop discussions. They were also asked to identify concrete moments at which the process of such changes became apparent and to what extent these changes had been transferred to the larger policy-making process.

Positive Impacts of the Workshop Discussions

Most of the interviewees on both sides were impressed with the crucial, additional knowledge they gained about the other party, although they had encountered with members of the other constituency prior to the workshop participation. Many rated the creation of cadres of people engaged in conflict resolution and the development of negotiation skills as positive impacts. An example of such an impact was the creation by one Israeli and one Palestinian participant of an online platform called Bitter Lemons, where representatives of both sides are able to communicate their view of current issues. This online platform continues to operate today.

Israeli views. The Israeli participant who co-founded Bitter Lemons mentioned that the realization of the online platform was the pinnacle of a process instilled on both sides through the workshop participation. On a personal level, the discussions made him realize that it was not necessary to agree with the other side in order to have an open dialogue about conflict issues. Another Israeli participant pointed out that the problem-solving workshops were a pioneer Track Two initiative that created a sort of school for negotiators and for the development of diplomatic skills.

Palestinian views. An interviewee, who had formed part of the official Palestinian negotiating team in Washington, reported that he had benefited greatly in terms of learning how to formulate Palestinian concerns in a way that could be understood by the Israelis. The Palestinian co-founder of Bitter Lemons said he had learned more about each side’s boundaries and the possibilities for constructive change of particular components of the conflict. He gained a better understanding of how contrasting views of different political parties, as well as the divergent demands and requirements of the two sides’ constituencies, shaped the positions that they each defended in the official negotiations. He also recognized to what extent the positions on either side were flexible and where each party set limits or was not amenable to change. He felt that the meetings created confidence and a familiarity with regard to the people and the positions, which was very helpful for their later involvement in the official negotiations.

New Perceptions and Changed Relations

The interviewees found that the most prominent changes had occurred in two areas. One was increased understanding of how the other side viewed the asymmetry of power distribution and security concerns. The other was increased understanding of national narratives, the story of historic descent that forms part of each constituency’s national identity. Many interviewees commented how the discussion about the right of return of Palestinian refugees had triggered tremendous changes in how each side related to their own and to the other’s national narrative.

Power Asymmetries and Security Concerns

Palestinian views. Some interviewees felt that the discussions reflected the political realities of Israel being the dominant party. One participant said he felt that the Israeli dominance dictated the solutions that the group was approaching and that the solutions dictated the arguments. The same participant said he had realized that Palestinians had a stronger stand with regard to their own identity than Israelis, who went through a complicated
process of identity formation. Other Palestinian interviewees accepted
that Israeli security concerns were real and that everyday life security
threats were not minimized by the fact that the Israeli state held nuclear
weapons.

*Israeli views.* One participant stressed he had learned that a perceived
threat was a real threat and how to communicate about one's fears. Another
Israeli participant, who at the time of the interview was a member of the
Knesset, said that she was aware of the difficult conditions that the occu-
pation bore for the Palestinians, and that their point of departure for nego-
tiations was very different. The participant further said she had learned that
Palestinians had different policy-making structures and that the Israeli way
of proceeding was not the only right way.

National Narratives

*Israeli views.* One participant said he had experienced a change in his
own perception with regard to the refugee issue. Initially, he had thought
that Israelis had no reason to apologize for what had happened during
the war of 1948, as they did not start the war, but were attacked by neigh-
boring Arab states. Hearing the Palestinian side of the story made him rea-
ize that Israelis indeed needed to apologize and assume a share of the
responsibility for causing Palestinian refugees. Another participant pointed
to a pivotal moment of the same discussion when the group had reached a
complete standstill. An Israeli participant said to the Palestinians, address-
ing one in particular who had been in an Israeli prison for many years, that
he was aware of what Palestinians had been going through and that his par-
ticipation was very moving and strongly appreciated by all members of the
group. This manifestation of empathy and respect for the suffering of the
other led the group out of the discussion impasse and opened the way for
negotiations.

*Palestinian views.* One interviewee remembered how demanding the
discussion about the right of return had been for her and that her strong
response to some arguments had triggered an Israeli participant to realize,
for the first time, how difficult the issue was for Palestinians. The partici-

pant felt that her own perception of the Israeli side changed a lot as she
began to understand the Israeli narrative and accept it as a given. She felt

that the perception of the Israelis changed when they heard that it was
indispensable for Palestinians to receive an apology for what had hap-
pened in 1948, and that the apology would not require Israeli concession
of more land.

The interviewee also remembered a question asked by an Israeli participant
whether Palestinians could agree to refrain from asking for the return of
their former houses in Jaffa. She answered that, emotionally, they would
cling to that claim but knew, rationally, that they had to give it up. Impor-
tant for her was the acknowledgment of Israelis that Palestinians had paid
an enormous price in order to get to the point of being ready to forgo such
claims. The participant rated that kind of negotiation, which touches on all
the wounds and then looks at how to cure them, as building confidence and
trust in a very strong manner.

Another interviewee said she had gained understanding why Israelis
resisted listening to the Palestinian story, as hearing the Palestinian narra-
tive meant undoing their own stories about descent and origin, which they
had grown up with. She explained that those stories about one's state,
and about who one is, were very hard to change.

Transfer to the Policy-Making Process

*Israeli views.* One participant referred to the wide distribution in Arabic
and Hebrew of the Joint Working Group's article, "The Palestinian Refugee
Problem and the Right of Return" (Alpher, Shikaki et al., 1999). He
explained that the article had also been sent to members of the Knesset
and that Ehud Barak, in one of his first speeches as Prime Minister, said
with regard to the refugee issue that Israel had to show empathy for the
Palestinian suffering and had to recognize that Israel formed part of the
overall problem, although it does not take sole responsibility for what hap-
pened to the Palestinians. The participant was convinced that Barak had
taken the wording from the Working Group's article, although he never
asked him to confirm that. Another participant maintained that the work-
shop meetings were instrumental in bringing about a revolutionary change
in Israeli public opinion leading, first, to a gradual acceptance of the exist-
ence of the Palestinian people and, subsequently, to a realization that it was
necessary to talk to the PLO and that a two-state solution was possible.

*Palestinian views.* One participant mentioned that some Palestinian
participants in Kelman's workshops had subsequently become negotiators
in official talks with the Israelis. Also, some Israeli participants in Kelman's
workshops had become advisors to the official Israeli delegations of the
formal peace talks. This was an example of effective transfer from Kelman’s workshops to the formal policy-making process.

The Method’s Limitations

Many interviewees preferred the structure of the Continuing Workshop, where the focus was placed on discussions only, to the proceedings of the Joint Working Group that aimed to produce written documents. Generally, Israelis were more satisfied with the published results than the Palestinians, whereas both parties felt that the remaining gaps between the notions of the two constituencies reflected political reality.

Palestinian views. Some Palestinian interviewees saw the method’s limitations in failing to bridge the gap between the different arguments discussed with regard to the refugee problem and ownership of the land, and not reaching an agreement that satisfied both sides. Two participants said that the pressure of producing a written document constrained progress. One of them, a member of the official negotiating team, thought that the method could contribute more to the peace process during the pre-negotiation phase than during official negotiations. The method helped to create readiness for talking to the other side, but that the process of negotiating formal solutions was best left to official politicians.

Israeli views. Some Israeli participants criticized the Joint Working Group for departing from the initial structured workshop format and adopting a less social psychologically oriented, rather intuitive form; others felt that the method’s emphasis on theoretical patterns was fairly strong and favored a more intuitive approach. Some mentioned that the method was preaching to the converted and that, from their point of view, mainstream opinion was not fully represented by participants on either side. One of them held that the method’s ability to reach decision makers was limited.

Achievements of Methodology and Dedication

The interviewees’ vivid memory of details of discussions held some 10 years earlier demonstrates that interactive problem solving had a sustainable impact on workshop participants. The method’s strengths were found to lie in uncovering underlying conflict causes, in generating empathy for the suffering of the other, and in building respect for both parties’ traditions and beliefs. The interviewees rated the method as most successful during the pre-negotiation phase, rather than accompanying official talks, and as most efficient when consisting of structured discussions without having

the set goal of capturing progress in writing. The different opinions with regard to the method’s ability to transfer achieved changes to the policy-making process mirrors the difficulty of tracing how ideas from the workshops diffused and influenced people in the public arena.

The results of the interview: indicate one central impact of the method, which became transparent during the dialogue about the right of return. The discussions gave way to reviewing and systematically negotiating aspects of the two peoples’ national narratives. The testimonies clearly confirm that the workshop discussions led to an increased understanding of the other’s story and to a new way of relating to the other’s narrative. Many participants affirm that the process of negotiating aspects of national narratives and, hence, of elements forming their national identity was very demanding and even painful, yet crucial for the purpose of resolving conflict issues.

All former workshop participants expressed their respect for Herbert Kelman and conveyed their trust in working with him. They appreciated his diligent, professional handling of all aspects of the workshop meetings, and were impressed with his ability to engage influential participants and to manage a balanced an even-handed discussion and third-party role. The interviewees praised his courage in addressing difficult issues and valued his ability to enable complicated discussions with empathy and compassion. Most of all, the former participants were taken by Herbert Kelman’s serious, honest, and complete dedication to the endeavor, and felt that their own engagement in the workshops had contributed to a worthy cause.

Those familiar with the effort have time and again described the achievements reached with interactive problem solving as a true accomplishment. Innovative, interdisciplinary, and realistically rooted in real-life problems as Herbert Kelman’s method and work was and is, it was thanks to his personality that it came to life and gained political importance.

Biographical Notes

Kurt R. Spillmann was a professor of security studies and conflict research at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH) Zurich, and a professor of modern history at the University of Zurich until his retirement in October 2002. He published and edited books and articles in the areas of American history, American foreign and security policy, Swiss security policy, and conflict research. In 1986, he founded the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, of which he was the director until his retirement in October 2002.

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in 2000, and her diploma in mediation from the Swiss Agency of Development in 2004. She has worked as a research assistant in conflict analysis at the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH) in Zurich. She is currently working on a PhD on interactive problem solving at the University of Zurich, for which she conducted research under the auspices of Herbert C. Kelman’s program on international conflict analysis and resolution at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.

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Looking Back at My Work on Conflict Resolution in the Middle East

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This autobiographical article traces the author’s work on the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict back to his childhood experiences in Nazi-ruled Austria. It proceeds to describe his early participation in the American civil rights and antiwar movements; his choice of social psychology as his field of

1This article is based on an address presented at a conference organized by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt on the Establishment of a Missile Free Zone in the Middle East, on February, 26, 2010, in Seville, Spain.

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study because of its potential relevance to issues of peace, justice, and social change; and his role—as a social psychologist—in the beginnings of the peace research movement. It then describes his introduction to John Burton’s work on unofficial diplomacy in the mid-1960s; his development—in collaboration with colleagues and students over the years—of interactive problem solving, an approach derived from Burton’s work and anchored in social-psychological principles; and his application of the approach primarily in the Middle East. The article briefly describes the methods of interactive problem solving and reviews his activities during the various phases of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and efforts to resolve it. The author also offers some reflections on key elements of the third-party role and on personal qualities that have shaped his performance in that role.

During the second half of my life so far—for better than 40 years—an increasingly large portion of my time and effort have been devoted to an action research program, centering on the development, practice, and teaching of a form of unofficial diplomacy that I have come to call interactive problem solving (e.g., see Kelman, 1986). The approach derives from the pioneering work of John Burton (1969, 1979, 1984) and is anchored in social-psychological principles. In the mediation literature, the approach has been described as a form of “informal mediation by the scholar–practitioner” (Kelman, 2002, p. 167). My students and associates over the years have applied the approach to a number of different international and intercommunal conflicts. My own primary—although not exclusive—focus has been on the Arab–Israeli case, with special emphasis on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. My writings have included theoretical papers on the dynamics of that conflict, as well as policy analyses written from a social-psychological, conflict-resolution perspective.

When I am asked to reflect on this work, I find it very tempting to go back to the very beginnings. I have decided to yield to that temptation, particularly because my focus on conflict resolution and reconciliation, with special reference to the Middle East, can be traced back in a nearly continuous line to my earliest years.

**EARLY YEARS**

I was born into a Jewish family in Vienna. I was 11 years old at the time of Austria’s Anschluss to Nazi Germany. After a year under Nazi rule, my immediate family managed to escape to Belgium, where we were given asylum and lived for a year in Antwerp as refugees with the financial support of the Jewish community. In March of 1940, we received the visas to the United States for which my parents had applied two years earlier, and we sailed to New York just a few weeks before the German invasion of Belgium.

Shortly after the Anschluss, while we were still in Vienna, my sister (who is two years older than I am) and I decided to join a Zionist youth group. At earlier times, as I recall, my parents had misgivings about such a move, but I think they realized that membership in a Zionist group would help us maintain our self-esteem and sense of identity at a time when these were brutally assaulted. Indeed, I am fairly certain that my Zionist affiliation significantly contributed to the fact that there was never a moment during those difficult years when I entertained the notion that I—or my people—somehow deserved the treatment that we were subjected to.

Recently, my sister found a diary that she kept during this period in 1938 in which—among other things—she reported on our search for a suitable Zionist youth group. She mentioned discussions that she was having with some older boys who belonged to a right-wing Zionist organization. One day, according to the diary, she came home to report that organization’s solution to the “Arab problem”: Because the Jews have only Palestine, whereas the Arabs have several countries, the Arab population could be relocated elsewhere in the Arab world, leaving Palestine for the Jews. She reported in the diary that this idea was not well-received at home; specifically, she wrote about the reaction of her 11-year-old brother: “Dem Herbert wollte die Lösung der Araberfrage nicht gefallen, ‘denn’ sagte er, ‘wir können doch die Araber nicht zwingen, das Land zu verlassen, in dem sie nun sesshaft sind’” (“Herbert did not find the solution to the Arab question to his liking, ‘because,’ he said, ‘surely, we cannot force the Arabs to leave the land in which they are now settled’”). Note that I was not questioning the right of the Jewish people to establish its homeland in Palestine, but merely pointing out the obvious fact that there were other people living in that land who also had rights. Needless to say, we joined a group with more moderate views.

The Zionist youth movement that I joined in Vienna continued to be a central focus of my life during the year in Antwerp, and for several years after my arrival in New York. During those years, I was also intensively engaged in Jewish studies, including the study of Hebrew language and literature. My first two published articles, at age 18, appearing in student magazines in 1945, were in Hebrew. One of them (Kelman, 1945a) was entitled “In Defense of Nationalism,” and distinguished between some of the positive potentialities of nationalism, such as its contribution to the liberation of oppressed peoples and to the self-esteem and self-confidence of individuals, and its negative manifestations, such as exaggerated national pride, hatred of other peoples, and the extremes of selfishness. That article foreshadowed my later research and writings on nationalism and national
identity, starting in the 1960s, which distinguished between different varieties of nationalism and emphasized its dialectical character. My second Hebrew publication that year (Kelman, 1945b) was entitled "On the Question of Jewish-Arab Cooperation." It discussed the common interests of Jews and Arabs in Palestine and argued that establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine requires cooperation between the two peoples.

In the years prior to the establishment of Israel, I supported the concept of a bi-national state in Palestine, which was advocated by a minority within the Zionist movement, including Martin Buber and some of his colleagues at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, as well as the left wing of the Labor Movement. I should add here that today I do not advocate a bi-national state. I still think it was a good concept, and the history of the land might have been different if it had been supported by the majority of the Zionist movement and by the Palestinian–Arab community. However, today, a one-state formula for the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River—whether in the form of a bi-national state or a unitary (one person–one vote) state—is a prescription for continuing the conflict. I am a staunch supporter of a two-state solution as the only formula for ending the occupation and ending the conflict.

My rather visionary version of a two-state solution is what I have come to call a "one-country/two-state solution" (Kelman, 2009). It is based on the mutual acknowledgment that the land belongs to both peoples—that both have authentic historic roots in it, and both are deeply attached to it. Recognizing that each people's pursuit of its national aspirations on the basis of its exclusive claims has led to decades of violent conflict that may well lead to mutual destruction, the two sides agree to end the conflict with a historic compromise: They agree to share the land to which both peoples are so deeply attached in a way that allows each to exercise its right to self-determination, fulfill its national aspirations, and express its national identity in a state of its own within the shared land, in peaceful coexistence with the neighboring state of the other. The concept of a one-country/two-state solution allows both Israelis and Palestinians to maintain their attachment to the land as a whole while claiming "ownership"—in the form of independent statehood—over only their part of the land. It builds on the two peoples' attachment to the land as a unifying, rather than divisive, force. This vision calls for free movement across the borders, as well as a range of cooperative activities that treat the shared land as a unit, and are designed to benefit each state and its population, as well as the country as a whole. Over time, a one-country/two-state solution might enable the two communities to build a new, transcendent identity alongside their separate identities. Institutionally, this solution may culminate in an economic union or even a confederation—conceivably including Jordan as a third partner—but such options should be left to future developments and depend on how the relationship evolves over time.

FROM SOCIAL ACTIVISM TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND BACK

Let me return to my chronological account, which I left in the mid-1940s. In the immediate postwar years, I became actively involved in the American civil rights and antiwar movements. In 1946, I participated in what I believe was the world's first antinuclear protest as part of a group that picketed the Pentagon in opposition to the atomic bomb test on Bikini Island. On the way back from the Pentagon to the Washington railroad station, we decided to continue holding our placards. Some of us, including myself, were arrested and fined on the charge of "parading without a permit." In 1947, I participated in a nonviolent direct action campaign in protest against racial discrimination at a popular swimming pool in New Jersey. Our technique involved continuing to stand in the ticket line when Black members of the group were refused admission. In keeping with Gandhian discipline, I refused to move when ordered to do so by the police, and was arrested, along with several colleagues, on a charge of "disorderly person." I might add here that the organization that sponsored this project appealed our fines, and we won the appeal.

My activism continued beyond my student days. In the 1950s, I was very active in the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), which pioneered the use of Gandhian methods of nonviolent direct action in the struggle against racial segregation. I was co-founder of a CORE chapter in Baltimore, and actively participated—along with my wife, Rose, whom I met in Baltimore—in a long, but ultimately successful, campaign to end segregation of the luncheon counters in so-called "five and ten cents stores," all of which belonged to national chains. Our methods combined sit-ins, picketing, public education, negotiations with store managers, and bringing the issue to shareholder meetings of the parent companies of these stores. My experience with CORE has had a major impact on my thinking about the nature of social change and helped to shape my approach to conflict resolution and to the relation of the microlevel at which we work to the macrolevel that we hope to influence. My deepest involvement in CORE was in 1951 to 1954, the years I spent in Baltimore, but I continued to be involved throughout the 1950s as an elected field representative of national CORE. As another example of my activism in those years, I might mention that, during the Korean War, I almost went to prison for resisting the military draft; but, in the end, my draft board recognized me as a conscientious objector. During the Vietnam War, I was actively involved...
in the antiwar movement and was a co-organizer of the first teach-in at the University of Michigan and of a conference on Alternative Perspectives on Vietnam in 1965 (Converse, Kelman, & Vandenbergh, 1966).

However, what I particularly want to focus on here is the fusion of my scholarship with my activist concerns. When I began my college studies in 1943, I chose English language and literature as my field of concentration—not because of any specific career plans, but because I believed that whatever I ended up doing in my life would entail writing. In my third year of college, I switched to psychology as my major field because I became convinced that social psychology was a discipline with great relevance to the issues of peace, justice, and social change, with which I was concerned. By the same token, I decided to pursue graduate studies in social psychology, which I began at Yale University in 1947. The fusion of scholarship with social activism was particularly appealing to me and, indeed, has remained so to this day.

Throughout my training and subsequent career, my concerns with peace, justice, and social change affected the topics that I chose to work on, as well as my assessment and critique of the social research enterprise itself. In the course of my graduate training, I became thoroughly socialized as an academic social psychologist. My excursions into new areas of research, and even my critiques of some aspects of the field, have always been from the perspective of a social psychologist identified with the norms and purposes of the enterprise. My earliest research focused on processes of social influence and attitude change—which remains a continuing interest to this day (Kelman, 1953, 1958, 1961). My theoretical and experimental work in these areas during the 1950s and 1960s was well within the mainstream of my discipline, but it clearly reflected my activist interest in peace research (Kelman, 1968).

BEGINNINGS OF PEACE RESEARCH

The one broad area of my early work that most explicitly reflects the concerns that originally brought me into the field and that serves as the most direct bridge between the first and second halves of my life is peace research and the analysis of international conflict. I was deeply involved in the beginnings of the peace research movement in the 1950s. In 1951, my last year in graduate school, Arthur Gladstone—a colleague in the department and, like myself, a conscientious objector to the Korean War—and I published a letter to the American Psychologist (Gladstone & Kelman, 1951), pointing out that pacifist theory rests on a number of psychological assumptions that could be put to empirical test, and proposed that psychologists and other social scientists might fruitfully place such efforts on their research agenda. The responses to this letter identified a community of scholars interested in pursuing a peace research agenda, and together we organized the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War, which—to the best of my knowledge—was the first organization committed to promoting peace research. Over the next few years, the Research Exchange published the Bulletin of the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War, organized discussion groups at academic conventions, as well as symposia (two of which were published: see Kelman, 1954; Kelman, Barth, & Hefner, 1955), and convened two summer workshops to explore theoretical approaches and research ideas in the emerging field of peace research.

In 1954 to 1955, I had the good fortune of being among the first group of Fellows invited to the newly established Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, California. Although I was one of the youngest Fellows at the Center, I convened a group of colleagues to inform them about the Research Exchange and solicit their advice on how to broaden its base and move the enterprise forward. The discussions of this group led to the decision to start a new interdisciplinary journal, which would replace and significantly expand the Bulletin of the Research Exchange. We decided to name the new publication Journal of Conflict Resolution: A Quarterly for Research Related to War and Peace and to base it at the University of Michigan.
The Journal of Conflict Resolution began publication in 1957 as the first journal in the newly emerging field of peace research. With the inauguration of the journal, we ceased publication of the Bulletin of the Research Exchange, and we decided that the other activities of the Research Exchange could be pursued most effectively by merging our small organization with a newly formed Committee on International Relations of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. Meanwhile, at the University of Michigan, the work on planning and editing the Journal of Conflict Resolution created an interdisciplinary community of scholars interested in issues of war and peace. This group became the nucleus for the university’s new Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, which I joined a few years later, when I came to the University of Michigan in 1962, on a joint appointment between the Psychology Department and the Center.

My own research and writing gradually moved to a focus on international relations. In the 1950s and 1960s, some of my thinking and writing was addressed to the question of where social-psychological concepts and methods can contribute to the development of a comprehensive theory of international relations—to identifying the relevant points of entry for social-psychological analysis. A major product of this work was an interdisciplinary volume that I edited, and for which I wrote the opening and closing chapters: International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, which was published in 1965 (Kelman, 1965). That volume, incidentally, was much better known among international relations scholars than among my fellow social psychologists. Over the years, I was repeatedly told by colleagues around the world that they had to read this book for their doctoral examination.

Publication of that book, I believe, significantly contributed to my credibility among international relations scholars who were prepared to accept me as a legitimate member of their guild. Thus, for example (to get ahead of my story), I was elected President of the International Studies Association in 1977; and, in 1976, I was invited to join the Center for International Affairs (now the Weatherhead Center) at Harvard University and its Executive Committee. (For those of you trying to keep track of my movements, let me add that I taught at Harvard between 1957 and 1962; then moved, as I mentioned, to the University of Michigan; and returned to Harvard in 1969 to take up the Cabot Chair of Social Ethics.) The Weatherhead Center has been the all-important base of my conflict resolution work for decades: I have chaired (or co-chaired) its Middle East Seminar since 1976, I founded—together with my students—and directed (between 1993 and 2003) the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution at the Weatherhead Center, and my action research program on conflict resolution in the Middle East has been—and continues to be—based at the Weatherhead Center.

To return to the 1950s and 1960s, my research during those years also increasingly focused on issues in international relations, although it did not directly deal with international conflict. Colleagues and I carried out two extensive studies on the impact of international educational and cultural exchanges (see Bailyn & Kelman, 1962; Kelman & Bailyn, 1962; Kelman, Ezekiel, & Kelman, 1970), and—together with colleagues at the University of Michigan—I pursued a research program on nationalism and the involvement of individuals in the national political system (see DeLamater, Katz, & Kelman, 1969; Katz, Kelman, & Flacks, 1964; Kelman 1969)—which, as I mentioned earlier, was foreshadowed by my 1945 article on nationalism.

Let me also mention here another major line of my research, although it is chronologically out of order in that it was carried out in the second half of my life. In the early 1970s, my then student V. Lee Hamilton and I conducted a U.S. national survey on public reactions to the My Lai massacre in Vietnam and the trial and conviction of Lt. William Calley for that crime. Our focus was on people’s attribution of responsibility for crimes committed under orders from authority. This and subsequent research were reported in our book, Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility, published in 1989 (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). Theoretically, this work draws on my earlier work on social influence, legitimate authority, and personal involvement in the national political system. It also reflects my earlier encounters with genocide, destructive obedience, and resistance to unjust authority.

INITIAL EXPLORATIONS IN UNOFFICIAL DIPLOMACY

These then are some of the experiences and activities that prepared me for the work that has dominated the second half of my life. The defining moment that opened the possibility of this kind of work for me was my first meeting with John Burton in the summer of 1966. Burton, a former senior Australian diplomat, had recently established the Centre for Analysis of Conflict at the University College of London, and begun to experiment with a form of unofficial diplomacy for which he initially used the term controlled communication (Burton, 1969; see also Burton, 1979, 1984). The method involved bringing together high-level representatives of parties in conflict in an academic setting for confidential, unofficial, analytic communication under the guidance of a third-party panel of political and social scientists. I was immediately intrigued by Burton’s model, seeing it as a way of putting into practice the theoretical ideas about social-psychological dimensions of international conflict that I had been thinking and writing about since the early 1950s. I had the sense that this was the kind of direct involvement in the resolution of
international conflicts that I had been searching for. When Burton invited me to join him in London in November 1966 as a member of the third party in an exercise—or a problem-solving workshop, as we would now call it—on the Cyprus conflict, I accepted with enthusiasm.

The Cyprus exercise was only Burton’s second venture in controlled communication. He spent a day, therefore, with members of the third party and other colleagues planning the event and discussing agenda, procedures, and third-party interventions. I came away from the entire experience with some questions, many ideas, and a clear interest in further pursuing this approach. Several months later, in reaction to the Middle East war of June 1967, I began to think about applying the Burton model to the Arab–Israel conflict. Together with John Burton, I explored the possibilities, but—largely because our contacts were limited—nothing came of that effort.

I had a full agenda of other projects, but I continued to think about the method, to discuss it with different colleagues, to stay in touch with the Cyprus conflict, and to explore the idea of Arab–Israeli workshops with colleagues from the region. I also wrote my first article on “The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution” (Kelman, 1972). After reading a draft of that article, Stephen Cohen, a young colleague at Harvard with whom I co-taught a graduate seminar on social–psychological approaches to international relations in 1971, suggested that we organize a pilot workshop in connection with the seminar in which the students would participate as apprentice members of the third party. This workshop in 1971 turned out to be the first in a long series of Israeli–Palestinian workshops that I have conducted over the ensuing years.

Originally, Steve Cohen and I agreed that this pilot workshop should not deal with the Middle East because we considered it inappropriate for two Jews to facilitate an Arab–Israeli workshop. We allowed our class to persuade us, however, to focus on the Middle East, and we decided to organize an Egyptian–Israeli–Palestinian workshop with young scholars from the three communities. To correct for the imbalance in the leadership, we consulted with two scholars with Arab backgrounds, one of whom—the renowned Oxford historian, Albert Hourani, who happened to be a visiting professor at Harvard in 1971—actually participated in the workshop, although he made it clear that he was there as a consultant and not as a facilitator. After a pre-workshop session with Egyptian invitees, they dropped out of the project, giving scheduling problems as their reason; in retrospect, I believe that they had come to the conclusion that this workshop would be a no-win situation for them: They had an agenda with the Israelis because, at the time, President Nasser was searching for ways of reaching an accommodation with Israel, but—in light of Egypt’s position as leader of the pan-Arab movement—they could not pursue that agenda in the presence of the Palestinians. On the Palestinian side, a senior graduate student in Middle East history at Harvard expressed great interest in the project, and told us that he would be able to help recruit other Palestinians if we could persuade a Palestinian intellectual whom he knew—who was working at the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in New York—to join us. I contacted the man, visited him at his home outside New York, and he accepted my invitation. We had 10 problem completing the Palestinian team and recruiting the Israeli participants.

This first workshop (Cohen, Kelman, Miller, & Smith, 1977) laid the groundwork for the development of interactive problem solving—our particular approach to conflict resolution. Although interactive problem solving is firmly anchored in John Burton’s model, we did develop—starting with that first experiment—our own style of running workshops, which is reflected in the ground rules, the agenda, and the third-party interventions that have characterized our work over the years. Both the process and the content of our workshops have been more explicitly informed by social–psychological principles. The 1971 pilot workshop also served as a model for a series of workshops—mostly with Israelis and Palestinians—that I have organized as part of my graduate seminar on International Conflict: Social–Psychological Approaches in which we were able to provide a unique and valuable learning experience for our students without compromising the conditions required for an effective workshop. Three specific lessons I learned from this first experience that have been reinforced by subsequent work are (a) that the third party need not be neutral in the sense of disinterested, but in situations like mine—of a Jew dealing with the Arab–Israel conflict—it is important to work with an ethnically balanced team; (b) that—although recognizing that conflicts are almost always multilateral in a variety of ways—interactive problem solving is most effective in achieving its purpose when there are only two parties around the table; and (c) that one cannot meaningfully deal with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict without bringing Palestinians who are identified with the PLO into the process (just as one cannot do so without Israelis who identify with the Zionist enterprise).

During the 1971 to 1972 academic year, I was on leave in Seattle, where I was busily engaged in a variety of projects unrelated to the Middle East conflict. At the end of that year, I suffered a heart attack (while delivering a Kurt Lewin Memorial Address on the topic of “Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and
MIDDLE EAST INVOLVEMENT

Soon after my recovery, Steve Cohen and I put together a facilitating team that included three Arab-American scholars. I increasingly participated in Middle East-related meetings and conferences. I traveled extensively in the Middle East, sometimes together with other members of the team—but always with my wife, Rose, who became a full partner in this work. My near total immersion in this work, starting in the mid-1970s, would not have been possible if my wife had not been fully committed to it and participated in it at all levels—from making practical arrangements and taking notes at workshops, to making our Middle East work the center of our social life. In the summer of 1975 we traveled for the first time in Arab countries, including Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as the West Bank, talking to PLO officials, political figures, journalists, and scholars. We had similar encounters in Israel. Also that year, we organized a workshop (which met at our house) with senior, politically engaged Israeli and Palestinian academics and our five-member third-party team.

On our first trip to Egypt, we established contact with the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. In 1976, Boutros Boutros-Ghali—who was then a professor at Cairo University and President of the Al-Ahram Center—and I organized a roundtable on "Mutual Perceptions in Arab-Israeli Relations," which took place over a three-day period. The participants included four of the members of our team and many leading Egyptian political and social scientists. What particularly impressed me was the avid interest of the Egyptian participants in learning about Israeli society and their frequent references to the "post-settlement" period—which suggested to me that they were contemplating a settlement with Israel. The proceedings of this meeting were taped, translated into Arabic, and—as I found out about a year later—published in the Egyptian journal of international relations, of which Boutros-Ghali was the editor. After the meeting, our team went on to Israel, where we shared our impressions with Israeli colleagues and officials.

During the meeting in Egypt, I was asked whether I would be interested in an invitation to come to the American University at Cairo for a 5-week appointment as a Distinguished Visiting Professor. I responded with great enthusiasm, but also pointed out that I was Jewish and wondered whether that might be an impediment to such an appointment. I was assured that this was not an issue at all; in retrospect, I think it may actually have been an advantage in that my Egyptian colleagues may have seen me as a bridge to Israel at a time when they were rethinking their relations with Israel. We set the date for my visit in the late Fall of 1977.

In November of 1977, on my way to Cairo to start my visiting appointment, I stopped in Israel to attend a symposium on Arab-Israeli peace in Tel Aviv. A day or two into that symposium, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made the dramatic announcement of his visit to Jerusalem on the coming weekend. It was decided to move the later sessions of the symposium to Jerusalem in anticipation of his arrival there. So, I was in Jerusalem during the truly electrifying days of Sadat's visit there, and a few days later my wife and I went on to Cairo.

As part of my visiting professorship, I was scheduled to give a public lecture. When my hosts learned that I had just come from Jerusalem, they asked me to devote my lecture to that experience. Thus, I ended up speaking on a topic that I could not have anticipated when I packed for my trip: "The Psychological Impact of the Sadat Visit on Israeli Society" (see Kelman, 1973b). Even at this early stage of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process and amidst the euphoria of the Sadat initiative, my analysis emphasized the need to resolve the Palestinian issue if the Egyptian-Israeli peace process was to fulfill itself. My lecture was immediately translated into Arabic and published in its entirety (along with a photo of me in the weekend edition of Al-Ahram (and later reprinted in a commemorative brochure on Sadat's visit to Jerusalem; see Kelman, 1978b). On the strength of my appearance in the pages of Al-Ahram, I received press credentials that allowed me to join the working press at the short-lived Cairo peace conference and the Begin-Sadat Summit in Ismailiya in December 1977.

Shortly after I arrived in Cairo in November, I met with Boutros-Ghali, who had in the meantime been appointed minister of state for foreign affairs (the number-two position in the foreign ministry) and was, in fact, acting foreign minister at the time because the foreign minister had resigned in protest against Sadat's initiative. What became clear to me from this conversation was that our Al-Ahram roundtable the year before was part of the process of rethinking their relations with Israel by Egyptian political and intellectual leaders, which paved the way for Sadat's historic initiative—and, indeed, it was part of Boutros-Ghali's important contribution to that process.

In light of these historic developments, our team planned a conference on the future of the Egyptian-Israeli relationship and the process of reconciliation following a peace agreement. We recruited a group of leading Egyptian and Israeli intellectuals, as well as some scholars who had been
involved in reconciliation programs outside of the region, such as the Franco-German case. We obtained the Rockefeller Foundation's Villa Serbelloni in Bellagio—a perfect setting for such a conference—and were completing final arrangements for the event, scheduled for January 1979. A few weeks before that date, following the Begin–Sadat agreement at Camp David, I was informed that most of the members of the Egyptian team had decided not to take part in the conference unless it included Palestinian participants. I knew that this was impossible to arrange because politically engaged Palestinians saw the Camp David agreement as a separate peace and a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. I could not persuade my Egyptian colleagues that they could make a greater contribution to the Palestinian cause by meeting with the Israelis and raising the Palestinian issue than by staying away. As a result, to our great disappointment, the conference had to be cancelled. We did organize a workshop at Harvard with a few of the participants to discuss where to go next. Some of the members of my team decided to pursue the Egyptian–Israeli process, primarily by way of back-channel diplomacy. My own conclusion was that a full peace and reconciliation between Egypt and Israel ultimately depended on a solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and I, therefore, decided to concentrate my efforts on that issue—which I have done ever since.

PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOPS

It is clear from everything I have said so far that there are many dimensions to the conflict resolution program that I have been involved in, and that it has entailed many kinds of activities. Starting in the 1970s, it has included a great deal of traveling in the region, meetings with political and community leaders and scholars, participation in conferences, as well as teaching, mentoring young scholar–practitioners, and different kinds of writing (to which I shall return shortly). However, the primary and unique tool of interactive problem solving throughout has been the problem-solving workshop. Over the years, I have been involved in organizing and facilitating some 80 problem-solving workshops or related events—mostly, but not entirely, with Israeli and Palestinian participants. Workshops have differed in a variety of ways, depending on the nature and number of participants, the occasion for convening them, the setting, and the specific purposes. A major distinction is between one-time workshops and continuing workshops, the first of which was convened by Nadim Rouhana and myself in 1990 and met until 1993 (Rouhana & Kelman, 1994). In all of their variations, workshops are governed by a set of key principles that are reflected in their ground rules, procedures, and agenda.

A central issue in the theory and practice of interactive problem solving is the dual purpose of the enterprise: to produce change—in the form of new insights into the conflict and new ideas for resolving it—in the particular individuals who are sitting around the workshop table, and to transfer these changes to the political debate and decision-making process in their respective societies. My thinking about this issue goes back to some of my early writings about group processes (e.g., Kelman, 1952), and I addressed it in some detail in my very first article on problem-solving workshops (Kelman, 1972). The dual purpose of interactive problem solving presents its theory and practice with the major challenge of structuring workshops in a way that would maximize both the generation of new insights and ideas and their transfer to the policy process.

What is particularly challenging is that the requirements for maximizing change may be not only different from the requirements for maximizing transfer, but, in fact, contradictory to them. I have described this dilemma as the dialectics of interactive problem solving (Kelman, 1979). In designing workshops, it is necessary to navigate these dialectics—to create the proper balance between an array of contradictory requirements. The best example is provided by the selection of participants. Officials close to the decision-making process are in a good position to apply what they have learned in a workshop, but they are likely to be more constrained in their interactions and therefore less likely to change. We, therefore, look for participants who are not officials, but politically influential—individuals who are more free to engage in the workshop process but, at the same time, occupy positions within their societies that enable them to influence the thinking of decision makers and the general public.

The third party plays a strictly facilitative role in our model. We do not propose solutions, give advice, evaluate the ideas presented, or take an active role in the substantive discussions. Our task is to create the conditions that allow ideas for resolving the conflict to emerge out of the interaction between the parties themselves. Nevertheless, the third party's role is important. We select and brief participants; set and enforce the ground rules; propose the main lines of the agenda; moderate the discussion; make a variety of interventions in the form of observations about the content and the process of the proceedings and occasional theoretical inputs; and serve as a repository of trust for the parties who, by definition, do not trust each other.

There are four aspects of the third-party role that I have found particularly important in my work:

1. Networking is a critical part of the work. The ability to identify and recruit workshop participants and maintain credibility depends heavily on the third party's connections with relevant elements of the elites in the two communities. In my own case, my close association with the
Center for International Affairs at Harvard University was very helpful in the process of building and maintaining our networks. Apart from providing a respectable base, the Center gave me the opportunity, over the years, to get to know and form friendships with Center Fellows and Visiting Scholars from the Middle East. Through them, I was able to make contacts with an ever-widening circle of potential participants in and supporters of our work.

2. Another essential aspect of the work is teambuilding. I first learned about the importance of working with a third-party panel from John Burton. Effective facilitation requires attention and sensitivity to all facets of the interaction—what is being said, how it is said, what reaction it elicits, what is not being said, the mood of the group, and the flow of the communication over the course of a session or a series of sessions. A team of two or more facilitators—particularly if they have experience in working with each other—is better equipped than a single facilitator to capture the dynamics of the interaction and move the process forward. In a team it is also possible to represent the different kinds of expertise—in group process, international relations, and the particular conflict region—that the third party should ideally possess. Furthermore, as I have already mentioned, as a Jew dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, I have always worked with an ethnically balanced team, partnering with Palestinian and other Arab colleagues. Such balance enhances not only the credibility of our team, but also its sensitivity to the experiences and perspectives of both sides in the conflict.

3. In the course of a workshop, much of the third party’s time is spent in respectful listening. I have stressed in my teaching that the contribution of the third party is not necessarily measured by how much it says. By listening, we give the parties the opportunity to express their needs and communicate their perspectives, we demonstrate the importance we attach to the parties’ listening to each other and penetrating each other’s perspective, and we gain a fuller understanding of what is going on in the group and in the larger conflict environment before offering interpretations or making other interventions.

4. The third party can also contribute to the transfer of ideas developed in the course of workshops to the policy debate and the political process. Transfer, of course, primarily is the task of the two parties; the expectation that workshop participants will develop new ideas and be in a position to transfer them to the policy process is central to the underlying logic of interactive problem solving. However, third-party members are also in a unique position to observe and facilitate the intensive interactions between the parties out of which new ideas emerge, and may have access to channels for disseminating these ideas (Chataway, 2002). Transfer is not a necessary function of the third party and, indeed, some practitioners have wondered whether writing and speaking about the substantive issues in a conflict is consistent with the third-party role. In my own case, my writings about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict over the years have drawn extensively on what I have learned from my observations of workshop interactions and my conversations with workshop participants. To my knowledge participants have not had any problem with this aspect of my role—perhaps in part because my analysis tends to take the same evenhanded approach as my practice and, like my practice, is dedicated to the search for a negotiated agreement that addresses both sides’ needs and fears, that is durable because both sides consider it fair and are committed to it, and that provides the institutional and psychological basis for a new—peaceful, cooperative, and mutually enhancing—relationship. I believe that my writings about the conflict and its resolution may actually contribute to my credibility, insofar as they demonstrate my familiarity with the environment and the issues of the conflict.

Problem-solving workshops, it must be stressed, are not negotiating sessions: They are entirely unofficial and non-binding. However, it is precisely their non-binding character that constitutes their special contribution. It allows the participants to interact in an open, exploratory way; to acquire new information and share their differing perspectives; and to gain insight into the other’s—and indeed their own—needs, fears, concerns, priorities, and constraints and into the dynamics of the conflict relationship that leads to exacerbation, escalation, and perpetuation of the conflict (see Kelman, this issue). Although they are not negotiations, workshops can contribute to the negotiation process at all of its stages. At the pre-negotiation stage, they can help create an environment conducive to moving toward the negotiating table. At the para-negotiation stage, they may help create momentum and foster a sense of possibility, as well as identify new options and reframe issues. In periods marked by a breakdown of negotiations, they can help rebuild trust in the availability of a negotiating partner and a sense of possibility and hope. Finally, at the post-negotiation stage, they can contribute to implementation of the negotiated agreements, peace-building, and reconciliation.

ACTIVITIES IN THE PRE-NEGOTIATING PERIOD

Our earliest work, in the 1970s and 1980s, clearly corresponds to the pre-negotiation phase of the conflict. During that phase, the primary purpose of our efforts was to help create a political atmosphere that would encourage the parties to move to the negotiating table. Our workshops and
related activities contributed to the development of a sense of possibility, of new ideas for resolving the conflict, and of relationships among members of the political elites across the conflict lines. Our workshops during those years took a variety of forms, briefly described in the concluding article in this issue (Kelman, this issue).

In 1978, I published my first analysis of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in an article entitled, “Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance” (Kelman, 1978a). This was the first of many articles and book chapters over the years that analyzed the conflict and the requirements for its resolution. These writings conceptualized the conflict as one that is perceived by the parties as a zero-sum conflict around national identity and national existence, and identified the conditions for mutual reassurance, acknowledgment, and recognition. A good part of my writing on this topic—not only in professional publications, but also in magazine articles and newspaper opinion pieces—can be described as a form of policy analysis from a social–psychological/conflict resolution perspective: analysis of recent developments in the conflict, the reasons behind them, and their policy implications.

One article that clearly had an impact on my work during the 1980s was my first report on my conversations with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat (Kelman, 1982b). I first met the Chairman in 1980 in Beirut, through the help of the networking that I mentioned earlier. The meeting started around midnight and lasted about two hours. Only one other person was in the room—a senior PLO official whom I had met on my very first visit to Beirut and whom I later invited to speak at my Middle East Seminar at Harvard in the face of considerable criticism. He introduced me to Arafat and occasionally helped Arafat find the appropriate English word, but the session was mostly a conversation between Arafat and myself. I made it clear that I was not interviewing him; and, in fact, I took no notes (until I returned to my hotel room in the middle of the night)—although I did not promise that his remarks were “off the record,” nor did he ask me to do so. I actually had no intention of writing about the meeting; my purpose in meeting with him was (a) to gain a direct impression of his thinking and (b) to acquaint him with my work in the hope that he would give his approval to Palestinians who asked him or his office about participating in one of our workshops or other activities. (Most of the Palestinians who worked with us wanted to make sure that they would not be seen as presenting themselves as alternatives to the PLO in negotiating with the Israelis.)

I met with Arafat again in Beirut in late 1981, under similar circumstances. I might mention here that I periodically met with him in subsequent years—several times in Tunis, as well as in Algiers, in Amman, in Cambridge, Massachusetts (after the Oslo Accord), and in Ramallah (shortly before his death in 2004). However, our conversations at the first two meetings, in Beirut, were the richest and most substantive. I had the strong sense from these conversations—along with what I knew about Arafat’s actions within the Palestinian movement—that he was open to negotiating a peace agreement with Israel. I based this conclusion not so much on what he said about his positions on the issues, but on how he said it: on his cognitive style and his image of the enemy, as these emerged in the course of our conversations. Having reached this conclusion, I was very concerned during the Lebanon war of the summer of 1982 that the chance for a negotiated peace would be seriously undermined if Arafat were to be killed or if the PLO under his leadership were to be marginalized—both of which seemed highly probable. I published an opinion piece in The New York Times on that theme in July of 1982 (Kelman, 1982a)—without mentioning my conversations with Arafat. In the fall, I published the article in Foreign Policy magazine (Kelman, 1982b) in which I described, in some detail, what I had learned from my conversations with Arafat and why I had come up with the strong hypothesis that he is open to negotiating a peace agreement with Israel. The editor chose the title, “Talk With Arafat,” for this article—a title that conveyed both the fact that the article reports on my conversations with Arafat and my main policy recommendation: test the hypothesis that I am presenting by talking with the man.

The article was heavily criticized in certain quarters in the United States, as well as in Israel—largely, as the editor of Foreign Policy put it to me, because it “gentrified Arafat,” treating him as a statesman who must be taken seriously, rather than as an eccentric who needs a shave and wears a rag on his head. As far as my conflict resolution work was concerned, however, I believe that—if anything—it had a positive impact, enhancing my credibility on both sides. Among Palestinians, my credibility rose because I showed a willingness to go public with an unpopular position in support of the Palestinian cause. Interestingly, I found that the article enhanced my credibility even among some of the anti-Arafat elements of the PLO, based in Damascus. The article also enhanced my credibility among those Israelis who were interested in exploring the possibilities for negotiations—in other words, candidates for problem-solving workshops—because it demonstrated that I was not just another American Jew who was trying to intervene, but that I had significant connections on the Palestinian side.

ACTIVITIES IN THE 1990S

The second period of our work, spanning the years 1990 to 1993, can be described as transition to a para-negotiation effort. The most distinctive
project of those years was our first continuing workshop with a group of high-level, politically influential Israelis and Palestinians, who agreed in the fall of 1990 to meet three times over the course of the coming year (Rouhana & Kelman, 1994). A summary of the group’s activities, again, can be found in the concluding article in this issue (Kelman, this issue). Briefly, the time seemed ripe for such an effort because the atmosphere for negotiations had greatly improved after the 1988 meeting of the Palestinian National Council, which, in effect, endorsed a two-state solution. The developing trust between the two sides, however, was eroded by the Gulf crisis and Gulf War. The first two meetings of the group were largely devoted to rebuilding that trust. By the time of the third meeting, in August 1991, the participants were ready to engage in constructive joint thinking toward resolving some of the difficult issues of the conflict, and they committed themselves to continuing the group.

Shortly after this third meeting, the political landscape changed dramatically with the start of official Arab–Israeli negotiations, first at the Madrid conference in the fall of 1991 and then in Washington, DC. As it happened, four of the six Palestinian members of the continuing workshop were appointed to the official negotiating team. One year later, with the election of a Labor Party government in Israel, several of the Israeli members of the continuing workshop were appointed to high positions in the new administration. Several Palestinian and Israeli members left the group in light of their official appointments, and were replaced by new members. These developments provided an encouraging example of the potential for transfer of workshop learnings to the policy process. However, they also raised the question of the functions of our group at a time when official negotiations were in progress. At the fifth plenary meeting of the group in the summer of 1993, there was some sentiment that the time had come to focus more systematically on specific issues that the official negotiations seemed unable to resolve and perhaps to work on joint written products. The announcement of the Oslo Agreement within days of that meeting reinforced this sentiment. Accordingly, in close consultation with the members of the group, we decided to end the continuing workshop and to develop a new project, building on our earlier experience, but adapting the purposes and procedures to the new political requirements created by the Oslo Agreement.

Our efforts over the years prior to the Oslo Agreement have been credited by some Israeli and Palestinian observers with significant contributions to that achievement. Although I have no systematic evidence, I believe that our work—along with many other efforts—played a modest but not insignificant role, directly or indirectly, in laying the groundwork for the Oslo Agreement. In my own assessment, it has done so by helping to develop cadres experienced in communication with the other side and prepared to carry out productive negotiations; by helping to produce substantive inputs into the political thinking and debate on the two sides, which became the building stones of the Oslo Agreement; and by helping to create a political atmosphere favorable to negotiation and open to a new relationship between the parties (see Kelman, 1995, 2005a, this issue). These are basically contributions to changes in political culture that make the parties more receptive to negotiation, which is, in essence, the operative goal of interactive problem solving (Kelman, 2008).

The Oslo Accord marked the beginning of the third period of our work, corresponding to a phase of the conflict concerned with implementation of a partial, interim agreement and movement to final-status negotiations. The most distinctive project of this period was the Joint Working Group on Israeli–Palestinian Relations, which I co-chaired with Nadim Rouhana and which included Israelis and Palestinians who were highly influential within their respective political communities. The group (with some changes in membership) held a total of 15 plenary meetings, as well as a number of subgroup meetings, between 1994 and 1999. Its explicit purpose was to focus on the difficult issues in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations that the Oslo Accord had deferred to the final-status negotiations, designed to take place after a five-year interim period. Its task was to explore these issues within the context of the desired future relationship between the two societies (i.e., to think of ways of resolving them consistent with the kind of future, long-term relationship that the participants envisioned for their societies). This required going beyond the balance of power and searching for solutions that would address the fundamental needs of both parties and, therefore, be conducive to a lasting peace, a new relationship, and ultimate reconciliation.

For the first time in our work, the Working Group was deliberately designed to create joint products, in the form of concept papers that would eventually be made public. The papers were not intended to be blueprints or draft agreements, but efforts—based on needs analysis and joint thinking—to identify the nature of the problem, to offer a general approach to dealing with it, to explore different options for resolution, and to frame the issues in a way that makes them more amenable to negotiation. The Working Group was one of the relatively few efforts to explore the issues collaboratively and to produce and disseminate jointly written documents. We produced numerous drafts of four documents. Three of these were published (Alpher, Shikaki et al., 1993; Joint Working Group, 1998, 1999), translated into Arabic and Hebrew, and widely disseminated in all three versions. All four papers were available during the discussions of the final-status issues in the year 2000.
CURRENT ACTIVITIES

The current phase of our work began with the failure of the Camp David summit in the summer of 2000 and the onset of the second intifada in the fall of that year. The resulting breakdown of negotiations has been accompanied by clashing narratives in which each side perceives itself as having demonstrated its readiness to make peace, but perceives the other as unwilling to make compromises and responsive only to the language of force. These narratives, in turn, have set in motion an escalatory process in motion. In effect, the lessons that have been learned over the quarter century that led up to Oslo were dramatically unlearned since the failure of Camp David and the onset of the second intifada (cf. Kelman, 2007b). The challenge to our work at this stage is to promote a process of re-learning these lessons—particularly in rebuilding public trust within each society in the availability of a credible negotiating partner and of a mutually acceptable formula for a two-state solution.

The main thrust of my work since the end of 2000—in partnership with Shibley Telhami—has been a new joint working group, focusing on the theme of rebuilding Israeli and Palestinian trust in the availability of a negotiating partner and of a mutually acceptable formula for a two-state solution. We initiated the project in 2001, but due to a variety of difficulties, it did not take off until 2004.

In four meetings between 2004 and 2006, the group explored the question of how an agreement to end the conflict through a historic compromise, in the form of a mutually acceptable two-state solution, could gain widespread public support in the two communities. We concluded that the problem was not so much in the terms of the agreement, but in the way the agreement was framed. Given the profound level of mutual distrust, we saw a need to reframe the terms of a final agreement in a way that reassures the two publics that the agreement is not jeopardizing their national existence and that it offers a vision of a mutually beneficial common future. By 2006, the group was moving toward production of a joint framing paper, but in light of political changes and events on the ground since 2006, it concluded that the time was not ripe for a paper focusing on a final agreement. The participants have made it very clear, however, that they consider Track Two efforts more critical than ever, and that they want to continue meeting with an open agenda—to exchange information and ideas, to discuss new obstacles and possibilities, and to explore the changing political constellations in the two societies.

At a meeting in 2009, the discussion returned to the original issue with which this group started: how to rebuild trust in the availability of a negotiating partner on the other side. Participants spelled out what each public needs to hear from the leadership on the other side in order to be prepared to support negotiations that place their national identity and existence at risk. The discussion generated concrete ideas for eliciting such reassuring statements from the two leaderships. At their most recent meeting, in June 2010, the participants developed ideas for actions on the part of the U.S. administration that might advance negotiations, and asked the third party to convey these ideas to relevant U.S. officials on behalf of the Working Group. Thus, it appears that the group may be gradually finding its way back to the idea of working on a joint product.

PERSONAL QUALITIES

In conclusion, I want to go back to a conference in Dornach, Switzerland, in which I participated in 2004. In the discussions following each presentation at this conference, participants were invited to report their perceptions of the personal qualities that seemed to characterize the speaker's work. In the discussion following my presentation, four such qualities stood out: humor, continuity, persistence, and identity. I shall conclude with brief comments on how these four qualities—reflecting my personal background and style—might enter into my practice (Kelman, 2007a).

With the use of humor, I am able to help workshop participants gain some distance from their problem—to see it, if only for a moment, from an outside perspective. Humor also creates a personal connection between myself and the participants.

The continuity between my work and my life—the way in which my work flows from my life experience, as I tried to show at the beginning of my remarks—adds to my credibility as a third party. I do not claim to be neutral in the sense of being disinterested. It is clear to everyone that I am engaged—that I deeply care about the conflict and the two parties to it—and why I am engaged. As a committed Jew who grew up in the Zionist movement, and as someone who experienced oppression, homelessness, statelessness, and refugee status early in my life, I can readily empathize with both Israelis and Palestinians. My credibility rests not on impartiality, but on multipartiality rooted in my life experiences.

My persistence in the pursuit of resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rests in my view of social change as a cumulative process, built on small, concrete steps—preferably steps that instantiate the new reality that one hopes to create. This view of social change was tested and reinforced in my work in the early days of the U.S. civil rights movement—particularly, my work with CORE in the use of nonviolent, direct-action methods to break down racial segregation, one lunch counter at a time. My perseverance

LOOKING BACK AT MY WORK
is nourished by what I call strategic optimism: a strategy designed to seek out and actively pursue all possible openings to peace, which can help to counteract the pervasive pessimism that dominates deep-rooted conflicts and the negative self-fulfilling prophecies that it engenders. In my many years of work on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, I have taken on a special role as bearer of the sense of possibility.

Finally, my identity also enters into my role as a third party, as I have already suggested in my comment about the continuity between my work and my life. I like to believe that I model the possibility of multiple identities, which is an underlying theme of my work with conflicts between identity groups. It is possible for two groups to develop a transcendent identity that includes both of them, alongside of—not in place of—their separate national identities. It is possible to accommodate the identity of the other in one’s own identity—to counteract the view of group identity in zero-sum terms, which prevails in conflicts between identity groups. However, such elaborations of and adjustments in identity become possible only in a context in which the core of each group’s own national identity is confirmed. This is the essence of what I have described as the process of negotiating identity, which is an integral part of interactive problem solving.

Although it was not brought up in the Dornach discussion, I want to add a fifth quality, which is closely linked to readiness to adopt multiple identities and to accommodate the identity of the other: the quality of empathy. The development of what Ralph White (1984) called “realistic empathy” among conflicting parties is critical to conflict resolution and reconciliation. By the same token, the third party has to be able to model and encourage empathy if the process of joint thinking among dialogue participants is to achieve its potential. The anecdote that I recounted at the beginning of my remarks suggests that the quality of empathy emerged early in my life and probably helped to propel me into the work to which I have devoted so much of that life.

**BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE**

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Interactive Problem Solving: Changing Political Culture in the Pursuit of Conflict Resolution

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Interactive problem solving is an unofficial, third-party approach to the resolution of international and intercommunal conflicts, derived from the work of John Burton and anchored in social-psychological principles. The article presents the approach as a specially constructed microprocess, best exemplified by problem-solving workshops with unofficial representatives of the conflicting parties, designed to produce changes in the macroprocess of conflict resolution through the joint development of new ideas and insights that can be fed into the political cultures of the two societies. The article describes the dual purpose of problem-solving workshops, their relationship to official negotiations, their typical participants, the role of the third party, the ground rules governing workshop interactions, and the broad agenda they are designed to cover. The work of the author and his collaborators on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict over the past four decades is briefly reviewed and its possible contributions to the larger process are suggested. The article concludes with a major challenge to the methods of interactive problem solving in the current phase of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

For nearly 40 years now, my colleagues and I have developed and applied an unofficial, academically based, third-party approach to the resolution of international and intercommunal conflicts, which I have come to call

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1This article is based on a lecture presented at the 2nd International Summer Academy on the Art of Conflict Transformation, Berne, Switzerland, July 17, 2009.

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**INTERACTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING**

The approach is a form of unofficial—or what is now often called “Track Two” —diplomacy. It has also been described as “informal mediation by the scholar–practitioner” (Kelman, 2002) to emphasize the unofficial and facilitative form of the intervention and the academic base of the third party.

My approach to conflict resolution derives from the pioneering work of John Burton (1969, 1979, 1984), who developed a form of unofficial diplomacy for which he initially used the term “controlled communication.” The method involved bringing together high-level representatives of parties in conflict in an academic setting for confidential, unofficial, analytic communication under the guidance of a panel of political and social scientists. I had the good fortune of serving on such a panel for one of Burton’s earliest exercises (or workshops, as we now call them) in the fall of 1966. The meeting dealt with the Cyprus conflict, and was held at the University College of London, where Burton had established the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict.

Starting with that experience (see Kelman, 1972), I became increasingly committed to the development of this approach and to its application in the Middle East and elsewhere, in collaboration with many colleagues and students. The methods of interactive problem solving are applicable to a wide variety of conflicts, and have indeed been applied in a number of protracted conflicts between identity groups around the world, including Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Bosnia, Colombia, and Northern Ireland. My own work, since the early 1970s, has concentrated on the Arab–Israeli conflict and especially on the Israeli-Palestinian component of that conflict (Kelman, 1999).

In our evolving model, both the analysis of international conflict and the workshop methodology are explicitly anchored in social–psychological principles (Kelman, 2007; Kelman & Fisher, 2003). Our workshops are distinctly Track Two efforts in that they target political elites but, as I shall try to show, their fundamental purpose is to contribute to change in the political cultures of the conflicting societies.

**THE MICROPROCESS AND THE MACROPROCESS**

What makes interactive problem solving quintessentially social–psychological in its orientation is its goal of promoting change in individuals—through face-to-face interaction in small groups—as a vehicle for change in larger social systems: in national policy, in political culture, and in the conflict system at large. The core of the work of interactive problem solving is a particular microprocess, best exemplified by problem-solving workshops, to which I shall return shortly. However, this microprocess is intended to produce changes in the macroprocess, in the larger process of conflict resolution, including the official negotiations—in what is now commonly called the peace process (Kelman, 1997). To put it in other terms, our task is to promote private dialogue in the hope of influencing public policy.

The microprocess relates to the macroprocess in two ways. First and foremost, it provides inputs into the macroprocess. The challenge here is to identify the appropriate points of entry: those points in the larger process where contributions from problem-solving workshops and, from a social–psychological analysis, can be particularly useful. Second, the microprocess can serve as a metaphor for what happens—or, at least in my view, ought to happen—at the macrolevel (Kelman, 1996). Let me elaborate somewhat on interactive problem solving as a metaphor for the larger process of conflict resolution before turning to a description of the microprocess of problem-solving workshops.

The three components of the term interactive problem solving—problem, solution, and interactive—suggest what, I propose, happens or ought to happen in the larger process. First, the conflict needs to be treated as a problem that is shared by the parties. Essentially, it is a problem in the relationship between the parties, which has become completely competitive, to the point of mutual destructiveness. Conflict itself is a normal and potentially constructive aspect of relations within and between groups, organizations, and societies, as long as both competitive and cooperative elements are maintained and balanced in the relationship. However, in deep-rooted ethnic conflicts of the kind with which we are concerned, the relationship has come to a point where each party, in pursuit of its own needs and interests, threatens and undermines the needs and interests of the other party and seeks to destroy the other.

Recognizing that the conflict represents a problem in the relationship between the parties, the conflict resolution process needs to search for a solution to the problem. A proper solution is one that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict, which can be located in the unfulfilled or threatened needs of both parties, particularly their needs for security, identity, dignity, participation, autonomy, justice, and recognition. A solution that addresses these needs ultimately leads to a transformation of the destructive relationship between the parties.

Finally, the term interactive refers to the proposition that the task of solving the problem presented by the conflict is best achieved through direct interaction in which the parties are able to share their differing perspectives and learn how to influence each other by way of responsiveness to the other’s needs and concerns. Such responsiveness, based on taking the perspective of the other, is the way in which people normally influence each other in social relationships. In conflict relationships, this process is seriously undermined.
The problem solving required for conflict resolution can occur most effectively in an interactive context in which the ability to exert mutual influence through responsiveness to the other has been restored. A solution arrived at through the direct interaction between the parties is more conducive to a stable, durable peace and a new, cooperative relationship than an imposed solution because it is more likely to address the parties' fundamental needs and to elicit their commitment to the agreement and sense of ownership of it. Moreover, the interactive process of arriving at the solution in itself initiates the new relationship that the solution is designed to foster.

This view of the macroprocess of conflict resolution suggests some of the key components of the process, which must take place somewhere in the larger system. Table 1 lists four such components. The first is identification and analysis of the problem: The parties must identify each side's fundamental needs and fears as seen within each party's own perspective. Moreover, the parties have to become sensitized to the dynamics of conflict—to those interaction processes that are conducive to its escalation and perpetuation.

The second component of the macroprocess of conflict resolution is the joint shaping of ideas for solving the problem that has been identified. This calls for opportunities for the parties to explore options, to reframe issues in ways that make them more amenable to negotiation and conflict resolution, and to generate creative approaches to a win–win solution. Such a process of pre-negotiation, at all stages of conflict resolution, increases the likelihood that formal negotiations themselves will be maximally effective. (The absence of such a pre-negotiation process, incidentally, was a major factor in the failure of the Camp David summit in 2000.) The way the issues are framed has a major impact on the parties' ability to achieve a negotiated agreement and on the quality of that agreement from the point of view of producing a lasting peace.

The third component listed in Table 1 is influencing the other side. The essential requirement here is to shift from the heavy reliance on the use and threat of force, which now characterizes the international system, to the use of positive incentives, including incentives in the form of mutual reassurance and mutual enticement. For parties engaged in an existential conflict, such as that between Israelis and Palestinians, negotiations always loom as dangerous and threatening. The parties are afraid they might be induced to yield too much and to place themselves on a slippery slope, ultimately losing everything, including their national identity and national existence. Therefore, mutual reassurance that it is safe to enter into negotiations and mutual enticement through the promise of attractive gains are key elements of the mutual influence required for conflict resolution. To this end, as I have already suggested, each party has to learn how to influence the other by being responsive to the other's needs and fears. Only influence through responsiveness is conducive to a stable change in the relationship.

The fourth component of the macroprocess of conflict resolution is creating a supportive political environment for negotiations. One of the important features of a supportive environment is the sense of mutual reassurance, which is fostered by sensitivity to each other's concerns and the development of working trust (i.e., the conviction that the other is sincere in its commitment to negotiating a peaceful solution). Another important element of a supportive environment is the sense of possibility—the sense that, although negotiations may be difficult and risky, it is possible to find a mutually satisfactory solution. This sense of possibility contributes to creating self-fulfilling prophecies in a positive direction, to counteract the negative self-fulfilling prophecies that result from the mutual distrust and pervasive pessimism about finding a way out that normally characterize protracted conflicts. A supportive political environment is marked by a shift in the dominant political discourse from power politics to mutual accommodation.

These components of the conflict resolution process, as I have suggested, must occur somewhere in the larger system if conflict resolution is to become possible. They do not have to take place everywhere and at all times. But, somewhere in the system, there have to be efforts to identify and analyze the problem, to engage in joint shaping of ideas for a mutually acceptable solution, to influence the other through mutual reassurance and other positive incentives, and to create a supportive political environment. Problem-solving workshops and related activities in the spirit of interactive problem solving seek to provide special opportunities for these kinds of processes to occur. Let me turn, then, to a description of the microprocess of problem-solving workshops, which bring together members of the political elites of the conflicting societies for direct, face-to-face interaction facilitated by a third party knowledgeable about international conflict, group process, and the conflict region.

**TABLE 1**
Components of the Conflict Resolution Process

| 1. Identification and analysis of the problem |
| 2. Joint shaping of ideas for solution       |
| 3. Influencing the other side               |
| 4. Creating a supportive political environment |
Para-negotiation stage: Helping to create momentum, identify options, and reframe issues

Pre-negotiation stage: Creating an environment conducive to moving the parties toward the negotiating table. Alongside of negotiations, the other's-and indeed their own-needs, fears, concerns, priorities, and way; to speak and listen to each other as a means of acquiring new information and sharing their differing perspectives; and to gain insight into the dynamics of the conflict relationship that leads to setbacks, stalemates, and losses of momentum in this case take the form of new ideas and insights that can be fed into the political debate and the decision-making process within the two societies and, thus, penetrate their political cultures.

Workshops are not negotiating sessions. They are not intended to substitute for negotiations or to bypass them in any way. Negotiations can be carried out only by officials who are authorized to conclude binding agreements; and workshops, by definition, are unofficial and non-binding. It is precisely their non-binding character, however, that represents their unique strength and special contribution to the larger process. They provide an opportunity for the kind of exploratory interaction that is very difficult to achieve in the context of official negotiations. The non-binding character of workshops allows the participants to interact in an open, exploratory way; to speak and listen to each other as a means of acquiring new information and sharing their differing perspectives; and to gain insight into the other's—and indeed their own—needs, fears, concerns, priorities, and constraints and into the dynamics of the conflict relationship that leads to exacerbation, escalation, and perpetuation of the conflict.

Although workshops are not negotiations and not meant to be negotiations, they are directly linked to the negotiations and complementary to them. I view them as an integral part of the larger negotiation process, potentially relevant at all of its stages (see Table 2). At the pre-negotiation stage, they can contribute to creating an environment that is conducive to moving the parties toward the negotiating table. Alongside of negotiations, at the para-negotiation stage, they may be particularly useful in helping the parties deal with the setbacks, stalemates, and losses of momentum that often mark the negotiations of intense, protracted conflicts—as we have observed in the Israeli–Palestinian and many other cases. Thus, they may contribute to creating momentum and reviving the sense of possibility. They can also deal with issues that are not yet on the table, providing an opportunity for the parties to pre-negotiate some of these issues: to identify new options and reframe the issues in ways that make them more amenable to successful negotiation by the time they get to the table. In periods marked by a breakdown of negotiations, such as the current stage in the Israeli–Palestinian case, workshops can contribute to rebuilding trust in the availability of a negotiating partner and a sense of possibility and hope and, thus, help the parties find a way back to the negotiating table. Finally, at the post-negotiation stage, workshops can contribute to resolving the problems of implementation of the negotiated agreements, as well as to the post-conflict process of peace building, reconciliation, and transforming the relationship between the former enemies.

Our Israeli–Palestinian workshops until 1991 were all obviously in the pre-negotiation phase because there were no negotiations in progress. Moreover, until 1990, all of our workshops were one-time, self-contained events, usually consisting of separate pre-workshop sessions (of 4–5 hr) for each party and 2½ days (often over a weekend) of joint meetings. Some of the individual participants in these workshops took part in more than one such event, but the group as a whole met only for this one occasion. It was not until 1990 that we organized our first continuing workshop with a group of influential Israelis and Palestinians who participated in a series of meetings over a 3-year period (Rouhana & Kelman, 1994). We were unable to mount such a continuing workshop before 1990 for political, financial, and logistical reasons. We have since had a Joint Working Group on Israeli–Palestinian Relations, which met between 1994 and 1999 and—for the first time in our work—was explicitly dedicated to producing joint concept papers on issues in the final-status negotiations. We now have another joint Israeli–Palestinian working group that began in 2001, after the failure of the Camp David summit and the onset of the second intifada, with a special focus on rebuilding trust in the availability of a negotiating partner, and that has met periodically since then.

### TABLE 2
Relationship of Interactive Problem Solving to Negotiations

| Pre-negotiation stage: Creating an environment conducive to moving to the table | Para-negotiation stage: Helping to create momentum, identify options, and reframe issues | Breakdown of negotiations: Rebuilding trust in the negotiating partner and sense of possibility and hope | Post-negotiation stage: Contributing to implementation, peace building, and reconciliation |

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING WORKSHOPS

To give some indication of what happens at workshops and the principles that govern them, I describe a typical one-time workshop between Israelis and Palestinians. There are, understandably, important differences between one-time and continuing workshops. There is also considerable variation...
among one-time workshops, with respect to the nature and number of participants, the size of the third party, the occasion for convening the workshop, the specific purposes, the setting, and other considerations. However, despite such variations, there is a set of key principles that apply throughout and can be gleaned from the description of an ideal-type, one-time workshop.

The typical workshop participants are politically involved and, in many cases, politically influential members of their communities. However, with occasional exceptions, they have not been current officials. They have included parliamentarians; leading figures in political parties or movements; former ministers, military officers, diplomats, or government officials; and journalists or editors specializing in the Middle East. Many of the participants have been academics who are important analysts of the conflict for their societies—who not only publish scholarly monographs but also write for the newspapers and appear on radio and television—and some of whom have served in advisory, official, or diplomatic positions and are likely to do so again in the future. We look for participants who are part of the mainstream of their societies and close to the center of the political spectrum, but they have to be interested in exploring the possibilities of a negotiated solution and willing to sit with members of the other society as equals.

The number of participants has varied; our workshops generally include three to six members of each party, as well as a third party of two to four members. On a number of occasions, we have arranged meetings between just two high-level participants—one Israeli and one Palestinian—who preferred to meet in complete privacy rather than in a group setting. The group setting, of course, has great advantages because it reveals some of the internal dynamics—including the intragroup conflicts—within each society, which are important dimensions of intergroup conflict. However, the occasional one-on-one meetings have been valuable in their own way, particularly in view of the stature of their participants.

The modal number of third-party members has been three, but here too there has been variation. I have done a series of workshops in conjunction with my graduate seminar on international conflict in which the members of the class have been able to take part by serving as apprentice members of the third party. In all other respects, these workshops have followed the usual workshop design. Although we have sometimes had a third party of 25 members in these workshops, we have been able to organize them in a way that both preserves the integrity of the process and gives the students the opportunity to gain first-hand experience with the model. It should be noted that only five of the students, on an alternating basis, sit around the table at any one time. The others observe the proceedings from an adjoining room with a one-way mirror—of course, with the full knowledge of the participants. It is understood that, at all times, the students are members of the third party, subject to the discipline of the third party, rather than mere observers.

The academic setting is an important feature of our approach. It has the advantage of providing an unofficial, private, non-binding context, with its own set of norms to support a type of interaction that departs from the norms that generally govern interactions between conflicting parties. Conflict norms require the parties to be militant, unyielding, and dismissive of the other’s claims, interests, fears, and rights. To engage in a different kind of interaction, which enables each party to enter into the other’s perspective and to work with the other, in the search for mutual benefits, requires a countervailing set of norms. The academic setting is not the only setting that can provide such countervailing norms; a religious setting, for example, could do so in its own way. In our work, however, we have found that the university setting is well-suited to performing this function. The norms of this setting both free and require participants to interact in a different way. The fact that the discussions are non-committal—“just academic”—makes it relatively safe to deviate from the conflict norms. The fact that the third party “owns” the setting gives us some authority to prescribe the nature of the interaction.

The third party in our model performs a strictly facilitative role. We do not generally propose solutions, nor do we participate in the substantive discussions. Our task is to create the conditions that allow ideas for resolving the conflict to emerge out of the interaction between the parties themselves. The role of the third party is important. We select and brief the participants, set and enforce the ground rules, and propose the main lines of the agenda. We moderate the discussion and make a variety of interventions: content observations, which often take the form of summarizing, highlighting, asking for clarification, or pointing to similarities and differences between the parties; process observations, which suggest how interactions within the group may reflect the dynamics of the conflict between the two societies; and occasional theoretical observations, which offer concepts that might be useful in clarifying the issues under discussion. Finally, we serve as a repository of trust for the parties who, by definition, do not trust each other: They feel safe to come to the workshop because they trust the third party and rely on it to make sure that confidentiality is maintained and that their interests are protected.

GROUND RULES

The ground rules governing the workshop, which are presented to participants several times—at the point of recruitment, in the pre-workshop
sessions, and at the beginning of the workshop itself—are listed in Table 3. The first ground rule, privacy and confidentiality, is at the heart of the workshop process. It stipulates that whatever is said in the course of a workshop cannot be cited for attribution outside of the workshop setting by any participant, including the third party. To support this ground rule, the typical workshop has no audience, no publicity, and no record. To ensure privacy, we have no observers in our workshops; the only way our students are able to observe the process is by being integrated into the third party and accepting the discipline of the third party. To ensure confidentiality, we do not tape workshop sessions. Tape recordings would provide a potentially rich source of data for discourse analysis and other types of research, but I have followed the principle—based on my definition of action research—that the action requirements must prevail over the research requirements. I have not, therefore, been willing to take any steps in the interest of research that might interfere with the process required by our practice.

Confidentiality and non-attribution are essential for protecting the interests of the participants. In the earlier years of our work, meetings between Israelis and Palestinians were controversial in the two communities. The very fact that they were taking part in such a meeting entailed political and, at times, legal or even physical risks for participants. Now that Israeli–Palestinian meetings have become almost routine, most (although not all) participants are not concerned if their participation becomes known. Privacy and confidentiality—particularly the principle of non-attribution—remain essential, however, for protection of the process. This ground rule makes it possible for the participants to engage in the kind of interaction that problem-solving workshops require. Confidentiality gives them the freedom and safety to think, listen, talk, and play with ideas without having to worry that they will be held accountable outside for what they say in the workshop.

Ground Rules 2 through 4 in Table 3 spell out the nature of the interaction that the workshop process is designed to encourage and that the principle of privacy and confidentiality is designed to protect. We ask participants to focus on each other in the course of the workshop: to listen to each other, with the aim of understanding the other’s perspective; and to address each other, with the aim of making their own perspective understood. Workshops are radically different, in this respect, from debates in which participants listen only for tactical purposes; in which they address the audience, their own constituencies, and third parties, rather than the other party; and in which they often speak for the record. This is why we avoid having an audience or a record and adhere strictly to the principle of confidentiality.

Focusing on each other enables and encourages the parties to engage in an analytic discussion. The purpose of the exchange is not to engage in the usual polemics that characterize conflict interactions. Rather, it is to gain an understanding of each other’s needs, fears, concerns, priorities, and constraints. A second purpose is to develop insight into the dynamics of the conflict, particularly into the ways in which the conflict-driven interactions between the parties tend to exacerbate, escalate, and perpetuate their conflict. An analytic discussion is not intended to exclude the expression of emotions. In a genuine discussion between parties engaged in a bitter conflict, one cannot avoid the occasional expression of anger, distrust, anxiety, disappointment, impatience, or outrage. Indeed, sharing these emotions is an important part of learning about one another’s perspective. Expressions of emotions should, therefore, be used in the course of workshops as raw material for enhancing the participants’ analytic understanding of the concerns of the two sides and the dynamics of the conflict.

Analytic discussion helps the parties move to a problem-solving mode of interaction, in contrast to the adversarial mode that usually characterizes conflict interactions. In line with a “no-fault” principle, the participants are asked to treat the conflict as a shared problem, requiring joint efforts to find a mutually satisfactory solution, rather than try to determine who is right and who is wrong on the basis of historical or legal argumentation. We are not asking participants to abandon their ideas about the justice of their cause, nor are we suggesting that both sides are equally right or equally wrong. We are merely proposing that a problem-solving approach is more likely to be productive than an attempt to allocate blame.

The fifth ground rule, listed in Table 3, states that in a workshop—unlike a negotiating session—there is no expectation to reach an agreement. (Our Joint Working Group on Israeli–Palestinian Relations, which met between 1994 and 1999 and to which I return shortly, was an exception in this respect.) Like any conflict resolution effort, we are interested in finding common ground, but the amount of agreement achieved in the workshop discussion is not a measure of the success of the enterprise. If the participants come away with a better understanding of the other side’s
perspective, of their own priorities, and of the dynamics of the conflict, the workshop will have fulfilled its purpose, even if it does not produce an outline of a peace treaty.

The sixth ground rule states that, within the workshop setting, the two parties are equals. Clearly, there are important asymmetries between them in the real world—asymmetries in power, in moral position, and in reputation. These play important roles in conflict and must be taken into account in the workshop discussions. However, the two parties are equals in the workshop setting in the sense that each party has the same right to serious consideration of its needs, fears, and concerns. Within the rules of the workshop, the Israeli participants cannot dismiss the Palestinian concerns on the grounds that the Palestinians are the weaker party and are, therefore, in a poor bargaining position; nor can the Palestinian participants dismiss the Israeli concerns on the grounds that the Israelis are the oppressors and are, therefore, not entitled to sympathy. Each side has the right to be heard in the workshop and each side’s needs and fears must be given equal attention in the search for a mutually satisfactory solution.

The final ground rule listed in Table 3 concerns the facilitative role of the third party, which I have already discussed. In keeping with this rule, the third party does not take positions on the issues, give advice, or offer its own proposals; nor does it take sides, evaluate the ideas presented, or arbitrate between different interpretations of historical facts and international law. Within its facilitative role, however, it sets the ground rules and monitors adherence to them; it helps to keep discussion moving in constructive directions, tries to stimulate movement, and intervenes as relevant with questions, observations, and even challenges.

WORKSHOP AGENDA

One of the tasks of the third party is to set the agenda for the discussion. In the typical one-time workshop, the agenda is relatively open and unstructured, as far as the substantive issues under discussion are concerned. The way in which these issues are approached, however, and the order of discussion are structured so as to facilitate the kind of discourse that the ground rules seek to encourage. The workshop begins with personal introductions around the table; a review of the purposes, procedures, and ground rules of the gathering; and an opportunity for the participants to ask questions about these. We then typically proceed with a five-part agenda, as outlined in Table 4.

The first discussion session is devoted to an exchange of information between the two sides, which serves primarily to break the ice and to set the tone for the kind of discourse we hope to generate. Each party is asked to talk about the situation on the ground and the current mood in its own community, about the issues in the conflict as seen in that community, about the spectrum of views on the conflict and its resolution, and about its members’ own positions within that spectrum. This exchange provides a shared base of information and sets a precedent for the two sides to deal with each other as mutual resources rather than solely as combatants.

The core agenda of the workshop begins with a needs analysis in which each side is asked to talk about its fundamental needs and fears—those needs that would have to be satisfied and those fears that would have to be allayed if a solution is to be acceptable in its society. Participants are asked to listen attentively and not to debate or argue about what the other side says, although they are invited to ask for elaboration and clarification. The purpose of this phase of the proceedings is to help each side understand the basic concerns of the other side from the other’s perspective. We check the level of understanding by asking each side to summarize the other’s needs, as they have heard them. Each side then has the opportunity to correct or amplify the summary that has been presented by the other side. Once the two sides have come to grasp each other’s perspective and understand each other’s needs as well as seems possible at that point, we move on to the next phase of the agenda: joint thinking about solutions to the conflict.

There is a clear logic to the order of the phases of this agenda. We discourage the participants from proposing solutions until they have identified the problem, which stems from the parties’ unfulfilled and threatened needs. We want the participants to come up with ideas for solution that are anchored in the problem—that address the parties’ felt needs. What we ask the parties to do in Phase 3 of the agenda is to generate—through a process of joint thinking (or interactive problem solving)—ideas for the overall shape of a solution to the conflict, or to particular issues within the conflict, that are responsive to the fundamental needs and fears of both parties, as presented in the preceding phase of the workshop. The participants are given the difficult assignment of thinking of solutions that respond not only to their own side’s needs and fears (as they would in a bargaining situation), but simultaneously
to the needs and fears of both sides. It goes against the grain for parties engaged in a deep-rooted conflict to think of ways in which the adversary, too, can “win”—but that is precisely what joint thinking requires.

Once the parties have achieved some common ground in generating ideas for solutions that would address the fundamental needs and fears of both sides, we turn to a discussion of the political and psychological constraints within their societies that stand in the way of such solutions. Discussion of constraints is an extremely important part of the learning that takes place in workshops because parties involved in an intense conflict find it difficult to understand the constraints of the other, or even to recognize that the other—like themselves—has constraints. However, we try to discourage discussion of constraints until the parties have gone through the phase of joint thinking because a premature focus on constraints is likely to inhibit the creative process of generating new ideas. We try to see whether the particular individuals around the table can come up with new ideas for resolving the conflict. Once they have generated such ideas, we explore the constraints that make it difficult for these new ideas to gain acceptance in their societies.

Finally, to the extent that time permits, we ask the participants to engage in another round of joint thinking, this time about ways of overcoming the constraints against integrative, win-win solutions to the conflict. In this phase of the workshop, participants try to generate ideas for steps that they personally, their organizations, or their governments can take—separately or jointly—to overcome the constraints that have been identified. Such ideas may focus, in particular, on steps of mutual reassurance—in the form of acknowledgments, symbolic gestures, or confidence-building measures—that would make the parties more willing and able to take the risks required for innovative solutions to the conflict.

DUAL PURPOSE OF WORKSHOPS

The ground rules and agendas that I have described are designed to help achieve the dual purpose of workshops (see Table 5), to which I alluded earlier. The first purpose is to produce change in the particular individuals who are sitting around the workshop table—to enable them to gain new insights into the conflict and acquire new ideas for resolving the conflict and overcoming the barriers to a negotiated solution. However, these changes at the level of individual participants are not ends in themselves, but vehicles for promoting change at the policy level. To this end, the second purpose of workshops is to maximize the likelihood that the new insights and ideas developed by workshop participants will be fed back into the political debate and decision-making procedures in their respective societies.

What is interesting, both theoretically and practically, is that these two purposes may be, and often are, contradictory to each other. The requirements for maximizing change in the workshop itself may be contrary to the requirements for maximizing the transfer of that change into the political process. The best example of these dialectics is the selection of participants. To maximize transfer into the political process, we would look for participants who are officials, as close as possible to the decision-making process, and, thus, in a position to apply immediately what they have learned. To maximize change, however, we would look for participants who are not officials, but politically influential. They are, thus, more free to engage in the process but, at the same time, their positions within their societies are such that any new ideas that they develop can have an impact on the thinking of decision makers and the society at large.

Another example of the dialectics of workshops is the degree of cohesiveness that we try to engender in the group of participants. An adequate level of group cohesiveness is important to the effective interaction among the participants. However, if the workshop group becomes too cohesive—if the Israeli and Palestinian participants form too close a coalition across the conflict lines—they may lose credibility and political effectiveness in their own communities (Kelman, 1993). To balance these two contradictory requirements, we recognize that the coalition formed by the two groups of participants must remain an uneasy coalition. By the same token, we aim for the development of working trust—of trust in the participants on the other side based not so much on interpersonal closeness, but on the conviction that they are sincerely committed, out of their own interests, to the search for a peaceful solution.

## TABLE 5

The Dual Purpose of Interactive Problem Solving

| Change in individual workshop participants: Development of new insights and new ideas for conflict resolution |
| Transfer of these changes into the political debate and the decision-making processes in their societies |
situation. I summarize our Israeli-Palestinian work in terms of four general phases, corresponding to different stages of the conflict itself.

Our earliest work, in the 1970s and 1980s, clearly corresponds to the pre-negotiation phase of the conflict. During that phase, the primary purpose of our efforts was to help create a political atmosphere that would encourage the parties to move to the negotiating table. Our workshops and related activities contributed to the development of a sense of possibility, of new ideas for resolving the conflict, and of relationships among members of the political elites across the conflict lines. Our workshops during those years took a variety of forms and included, among others, a workshop with leading Israeli and Palestinian women; several one-on-one events; a series of workshops in the context of my graduate seminar on International Conflict; a “fish-bowl” workshop with a select audience at the meetings of the International Society of Political Psychology; and a workshop in 1985 with five Israeli Knesset members and five leading Palestinians, which took place in the wake of a public symposium and which yielded two adjoining and linked opinion articles in *The New York Times* by an Israeli and a Palestinian member of the group (Sarid & Khalidi, 1984). At the end of this phase, in 1989, we held a public, off-the-record symposium with leading Israeli and Palestinian academic and political figures, including a PLO official; the event was held in public in order to conform to Israeli law at the time governing meetings of Israeli citizens with PLO members. All of the events during this phase were one-time workshops following—with some variations here and there—the ground rules and agenda that I have described.

The second period of our work, which spanned the years 1990 to 1993, can be described as primarily a para-negotiation effort. Although we organized a variety of one-time workshops (including another women’s workshop and the workshops linked to my seminar), the most distinctive project of those years was our first continuing workshop. By 1989, in the wake of the 1988 Palestinian National Council (PNC) session in Algiers, which in effect endorsed a two-state solution, the atmosphere for negotiations had greatly improved—which indeed made it politically possible for Israelis to participate in public meetings with PLO figures. In view of these developments, the time seemed ripe in the fall of 1990 for Nadim Rouhana and myself to convene a continuing workshop with a group of high-level, politically influential Israelis and Palestinians, who initially agreed to meet three times over the course of the coming year (Rouhana & Kelman, 1994). C. R. Mitchell and Harold Saunders joined us in this enterprise as senior members of the third party.

The first two meetings took place in the shadow of the Gulf crisis and the Gulf War, which seriously undermined the trust between the Israelis and Palestinians that had been slowly developing during the late 1980s. Much of the work of the parties at these meetings was devoted to repairing their relationship and to persuading each other that there was still a negotiating partner for them on the other side. By the time of the third meeting, in August 1991, the parties were ready to engage in a constructive effort of joint thinking and to formulate mutually acceptable approaches to some of the difficult issues of the conflict. At the end of this meeting, the participants committed themselves to continuing the workshop.

Shortly after this third meeting, the political situation changed dramatically with the initiation of official Arab-Israeli negotiations, starting with the Madrid conference in the fall of 1991 and continuing in Washington, DC. For the first time, our work moved from the pre-negotiation to the para-negotiation phase, where the focus is on ways of overcoming obstacles and creating momentum for negotiations and on addressing long-term issues that are not yet on the negotiation table.

The new situation forced us to confront a new issue: the overlap between the official and unofficial processes. The PLO was excluded from the official negotiations, and the Palestinian delegation was made up of members of civil society—mostly residents in the occupied territories. As it happened, four of the six Palestinian members of the continuing workshop were appointed to the official negotiating team. A year later, a Labor Party government took over in Israel, and several of the Israeli members of the continuing workshop were appointed to high positions in the new administration. The political relevance of the continuing workshop was enhanced by these developments because a sizable number of participants were now actively engaged in the negotiating process. The overlapping roles, however, also created some ambiguities and role conflicts. Several members left the group in light of their official appointments and were replaced by new members. Much of the time during two plenary sessions of the continuing workshop—in the summers of 1992 and 1993—and in subgroup meetings was spent in discussing the advantages and disadvantages of this overlap, as well as the general question of the functions of our group at a time when official negotiations were in progress.

At the 1993 meeting, there was some sentiment that the time had come to focus more systematically on specific issues that the official negotiations seemed unable to resolve and perhaps to work on joint written products. The announcement of the Oslo Agreement within days of that meeting reinforced this sentiment. Accordingly, in close consultation with the members of the group, we decided to close the continuing workshop and to develop a new project, building on our earlier experience, but adapting the purposes and procedures to the new political requirements.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF WORKSHOPS

Our work up to that point—along with many other Track-Two efforts—played a modest but not insignificant role, directly or indirectly, in laying the groundwork for the Oslo Agreement. In my own assessment, three kinds of contributions can be identified (see Kelman, 1995, 2005):

1. Workshops helped to develop cadres experienced in communication with the other side and prepared to carry out productive negotiations. Many workshop participants over the years were involved in the discussions and negotiations that led up to the Oslo Accord. The extensive involvement of participants in our continuing workshop in the official negotiations in the early 1990s provides a prime example of this contribution.

2. Workshops helped to produce substantive inputs into the political thinking and debate in the two societies. Through the public and private communications of workshop participants—and, to some degree, of members of the third party—ideas on which productive negotiations could be based were injected into the two political cultures and became the building stones of the Oslo Agreement. These ideas, as summarized in Table 6, focused in particular on what was both necessary and possible in negotiating a mutually satisfactory agreement (Kelman, 2005).

3. Our workshops, along with many other efforts, helped to create a political atmosphere favorable to negotiation and open to a new relationship between the parties.

TABLE 6
The Building Stones of the Oslo Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus of the ideas</th>
<th>Negotiation process</th>
<th>Negotiation outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is necessary</td>
<td>Negotiations between legitimate national representatives</td>
<td>Mutual recognition of national identity and rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is possible</td>
<td>Availability of a negotiating partner</td>
<td>The two-state solution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Oslo Accord marked the beginning of the third period of our work, which corresponded to a phase of the conflict focusing on implementation of a partial, interim agreement and movement to final-status negotiations. The most distinctive project of this period was the Joint Working Group on Israeli–Palestinian Relations, which I co-chaired with Nadim Rouhana and which included Israelis and Palestinians who were highly influential within their respective political communities. The group held its first meeting in the spring of 1994 and continued (with some changes in membership) through 1999 for a total of 15 plenary meetings, as well as a number of subgroup meetings. The explicit purpose of the Working Group was to focus on the difficult issues in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations that the Oslo Accord had deferred to the final-status negotiations, designed to take place after a five-year interim period. From the beginning, the idea was to explore these issues within the context of the desired future relationship between the two societies. In other words, we asked the participants to think of ways of resolving these final-status issues that would be consistent with the kind of future, long-term relationship that they envisioned for their societies. This required going beyond the balance of power and searching for solutions that would address the fundamental needs of both parties and, therefore, be conducive to a lasting peace, a new relationship, and ultimate reconciliation.

For the first time in our work, the Working Group was deliberately designed to create joint products, in the form of concept papers that would eventually be made public. The concept papers were not intended to be blueprints or draft agreements: on a given issue, but efforts—based on needs analysis and joint thinking—to identify the nature of the problem, to offer a general approach to dealing with it, to explore different options to resolution, and to frame the issues in a way that makes them more amenable to negotiation. The Working Group was one of the relatively few efforts to explore the issues collaboratively and to produce and disseminate jointly written documents. It operated on the principle of confidentiality and non-attribution up to the point when the members were ready to go public with a joint paper. The understanding that there would eventually be joint products with which the members were publicly identified introduced some constraints that made the Working Group different from our previous work and required modifications in our standard methodology.
The Working Group produced numerous drafts of four documents. Three of these have been published: a set of "General Principles for the Final Israeli–Palestinian Agreement" (Joint Working Group, 1998), a paper on "The Palestinian Refugee Problem and the Right of Return" (Alpher, Shikaki et al., 1998), and a paper on "The Future Israeli–Palestinian Relationship" (Joint Working Group, 1999). These papers were translated into Arabic and Hebrew and widely disseminated in all three versions. The fourth paper, on "Approaches to Resolving the Issue of Jewish Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza," was close to completion, but was overtaken by events. The three published papers (as well as the proposals in the unpublished paper) were available during the discussions of the final-status issues in the year 2000.

CURRENT CHALLENGES

This brings me to the current phase of our work, which began with the failure of the Camp David summit in the summer of 2000 and the onset of the second intifada in the fall of that year. The resulting breakdown of negotiations has been accompanied by clashing narratives in which each side perceives itself as having demonstrated its readiness to make peace, but perceives the other as unwilling to make compromises and responsive only to the language of force. These narratives, in turn, have set an escalatory process in motion. In effect, the lessons that have been learned over the quarter century that led up to Oslo were dramatically unlearned since the failure of Camp David and the onset of the second intifada. The challenge to our work at this stage is to promote a process of relearning these lessons—particularly in rebuilding public trust within each society in the availability of a credible negotiating partner and of a mutually acceptable formula for a two-state solution. This has been the theme of our work in the past few years.

Before describing our current and continuing efforts in this vein, let me briefly mention a special project that our program at Harvard carried out in 2002, together with the Public Conversations Project in Boston and the Austrian Institute of International Politics. We organized an event in Vienna on the role of the media in escalating and de-escalating the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The event consisted of a public (but not-for-attribution) symposium, followed by a private problem-solving workshop. The participants included five Israeli and five Palestinian journalists, representing both print and electronic media. The workshop was not intended to generate a joint product. One outcome of the workshop, it seems—apart from what individual participants learned from the experience—was the opportunity for some professional collaboration across the divide. Thus, for example, an Israeli participant who runs a popular radio talk show invited one of the Palestinian participants to appear on the show.

The main thrust of our work since the end of 2000—in partnership with Shibley Telhami—has been a new joint working group, focusing on the theme of rebuilding Israeli and Palestinian trust in the availability of a negotiating partner and of a mutually acceptable formula for a two-state solution. After a variety of difficulties—including the sudden death of a key member of the core group shortly after its first meeting in the spring of 2001 and the last-minute cancellation of a meeting in Cyprus in the summer of 2003 because of travel restrictions imposed on Palestinian participants in the wake of a suicide bombing—the reconstituted group finally met in June 2004 and has had seven further meetings since that time.

Over the course of three productive sessions in 2004 and 2005, the group explored, in different ways, the question of how an agreement to end the conflict through an historic compromise in the form of a mutually acceptable two-state solution can gain wide public support in the two communities. We concluded that the problem was not so much in the terms of the agreement—which the publics, by and large, seemed ready to accept—but in the way the agreement was framed, given each public’s profound distrust of the other’s ultimate intentions. Under the circumstances, we saw a need to reframe the formula for a final agreement in a way that generates trust and hope—that reassures the two publics that the agreement is not jeopardizing their national existence and that it offers a vision of a mutually beneficial common future. By 2006, the working group was moving toward production of such a framing document: a joint concept paper on how to frame a final peace agreement in a way that would reassure the two publics and elicit their full support.

Since 2006, however, the political landscape has changed significantly, with elections on both sides, the wars of 2006, and the Hamas takeover of Gaza. Members of the group concluded that the time was not ripe for a paper focusing on a final agreement. They have remained very eager, however, to exchange information and ideas, to discuss new obstacles and possibilities, and to explore the implications of the political changes in the two communities. They have made it very clear that they want to continue the group and that they consider Track-Two efforts, if anything, more critical than ever at this juncture. In this spirit, the working group (with some changes in membership) has met four times since 2007, and is planning further meetings. Interestingly, we have returned to our earlier pattern of meeting with an entirely open agenda and without expectation of a concrete product.
There are some indications, however, that the pattern may be changing. At a meeting in 2009, we returned to the question of how to rebuild trust in the availability of a negotiating partner with which this group started its work. The discussions yielded some concrete proposals for statements to be issued by the leadership on each side that might help overcome the profound distrust of the public on the other side. At their most recent meeting, in June 2010, the participants developed some ideas for actions on the part of the U.S. administration that might advance negotiations, and asked the third party to convey these ideas to relevant U.S. officials on behalf of the working group. Thus, there seems to be a renewed interest in the group in working on possible joint products.

CONCLUSION

Turning to the larger picture, what is required, in my view, to break through the profound mutual distrust in the ultimate intentions of the other side and energize public support for peace negotiations is a visionary approach that transcends the balance of power and the calculus of bargaining concessions. Paradoxically, perhaps, this calls for a step toward reconciliation—which is generally viewed as a post-negotiation process—to move negotiations forward. In this spirit, a final agreement would have to be framed as a principled peace, based on a historic compromise that meets the fundamental needs of both peoples, validates their national identities, and declares an end to the conflict and to the occupation consistent with the requirements of fairness and attainable justice.

The framework I propose would start with the recognition that both peoples have historic roots in the land and are deeply attached to it, that each people's pursuit of its national aspirations by military means may well lead to mutual destruction, and that the only solution lies in a historic compromise that allows each people to express its right to national self-determination, fulfill its national aspirations, and express its national identity in a state of its own within the shared land in peaceful coexistence with the neighboring state of the other. The framework would proceed to spell out what the logic of a historic compromise implies for the key final-status issues (including borders, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees) and offer a positive vision of a common future for the two peoples in the land they have agreed to share—and of the future of the shared land itself. A bold statement of this vision might describe it as a one-country/two-state solution.

Such a formulation would be reassuring—and, hence, trust-building—because it would, of necessity, contain an explicit acknowledgment of each other's national identity and aspirations, which would counter the fear that the compromise is just a temporary maneuver by the other in anticipation of resuming the struggle for total victory at a later point. Moreover, such a formulation would provide a logic for the difficult concessions each side will have to make by showing that they are necessary conditions for the historic compromise, not just the result of power bargaining. It would shift the focus from the painfulness of the concessions to the positive prospect of a fair and mutually satisfactory solution on which a vision of a better future for both peoples—and their land—can be built.

The mutual acknowledgment of the national identity of the other and willingness to accommodate it—which I see as the first step toward reconciliation—can take place only in a context in which the identity of one's own group is affirmed. If the framework I envision is constructed through a joint Israeli-Palestinian process, it can reassure the two publics that the agreement is not jeopardizing their national identity and existence and promises mutual benefits that far outweigh the risks it entails.

The framework I propose requires visionary leadership on both sides. Until such leadership emerges, the primary initiative for constructing and disseminating such a framework rests with civil society in the two communities. A Track-Two approach like interactive problem solving can contribute to such efforts by providing a forum for "negotiating" the precise language of a framework to make sure that it serves to reassure each side without threatening the core identity of the other. Problem-solving workshops are well-suited for such a process of "negotiating identity" in which each side can acknowledge and accommodate the other's identity—at least to the extent of eliminating negation of the other and the claim of exclusivity from its own identity—in a context in which the core of its own identity and its associated narrative are affirmed by the other (Kelman, 2001). Ideas that emerge from such an interactive process can then be injected into the political debate and the political culture of each society Contributing to the development of a framework for a peace agreement that respects the national identities of both peoples is perhaps the major challenge to interactive problem solving in the current phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Herbert C. Kelman is Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics, Emeritus, at Harvard University and co-chair of the Middle East Seminar and former Director of the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
His work on interactive problem solving and its application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the early 1970s received the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order in 1997.

REFERENCES


"The problem solving required for conflict resolution can occur most effectively in an interactive context in which the ability to exert mutual influence through responsiveness to the other has been restored. A solution arrived at through the direct interaction between the parties is more conducive to a stable, durable peace and a new, cooperative relationship than an imposed solution because it is more likely to address the parties' fundamental needs and to elicit their commitment to the agreement and sense of ownership of it."


Commentary on Herbert Kelman's Contribution to Interactive Problem Solving

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It is an honor and a challenge to provide a commentary on Herbert Kelman's work on interactive problem solving (IPS), which presents a complex and integrated tapestry of theory, research, and practice devoted to the resolution of violent intergroup conflict, with special attention to the Israeli-Palestinian tragedy. In his tapestry, Herb has created a systematic and comprehensive description of the major components of IPS and its connections to the broader flow of international conflict management. Through four decades of thoughtful analysis and practice, Herb has articulated and elaborated the social-psychological rationale and the social technology of the problem-solving workshop (PSW) as the primary vehicle for IPS. The long-term application of IPS to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict demonstrates the relevance and utility of the method, and will stand as a lasting contribution to the eventual resolution of that costly and tragic interaction.

It is both an honor and a challenge to be asked to provide a commentary on a portion of Herbert Kelman's work, which is closely intertwined with his life and, indeed, his identity as a professional and as a human being. It is an honor because I have long admired Herb as a consummate and quintessential social and peace psychologist who has dedicated his life to the pursuit of knowledge and the development of practice that will lead to the betterment...
of humankind's condition, primarily through the constructive resolution of violent intergroup conflict. It is a challenge to comment on a body of work that is both complex and expansive in scope while at the same time demonstrating considerable specificity and integration. Through his creativity, insight, and persistence, Herb has produced a veritable tapestry of theory, research, and practice that is ambitious in its goals, fascinating in its development, and significant in its import. From processes of social influence, to the social psychology of international conflict resolution, to conformity and obedience, to authority, to research ethics and broader questions of human values, and to methods of conflict resolution including reconciliation, the tapestry has been woven over decades of countless hours with focus and precision in a way that provides both an explanation of phenomena and direction for action. Throughout the time of weaving this tapestry of accomplishment, Herb increasingly came to see his central focus as the understanding and resolution of international conflict with a primary application to the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular.

My own connections with Herb have been both indirect and direct, and consistently beneficial and enjoyable. As a beginning graduate student in social psychology, I read some of his early work, and when I was accepted to the University of Michigan for doctoral study, I was enthusiastic about the chance to work with him. However, the Fall I arrived in 1969 was the same one that he decided to return to Harvard University to take up the Cabot Chair of Social Ethics in the Department of Social Relations. My disappointment was lessened by the opportunity to work with one of his mentors, the wise and erudite Daniel Katz, and one of Herb's research collaborators, the free and fascinating Raphael Ezekiel. In fact, under Rafe's democratic supervision style, I had full responsibility to teach the same senior undergraduate course in Social Attitudes and Behavior that Herb had taught during his time at Michigan. In a rare graduate course on the social psychology of international relations taught by Dan Katz, we used *International Behavior* (Kelman, 1965), and I saw at first hand, the insightful and systematic comprehensiveness of Herb's thinking. The book has been a bible ever since. After some correspondence, which was somewhat one-sided on my part, we first met at the American Psychological Association convention in 1986 and began to forge a working relationship and friendship that have grown ever stronger throughout the two plus decades since. At one of his retirement events at Harvard, where I spoke on one of the panels, he was kind enough to note that, although we met only in 1986, he felt like he had known me all his life. This is a testament to how close our minds and hearts are in pursuing the goal of peace through applied social science. Since 1986, we have occasionally worked as fellow panel members facilitating problem-solving workshops (PSWs), presented on the same panels at conferences, and collaborated as co-authors on a number of publications related to the role of social-psychological factors and methods in the domain of international conflict resolution. It has always been a pleasure and a positive learning experience, and so you can understand that I approach a commentary on Herb's work on interactive problem solving (IPS) with a high degree of positive bias.

The decades-long development and application of Herb's particular method of IPS, of which the PSW is the central element, demonstrates the weaving of the tapestry mentioned earlier. With deftness and care, the tapestry is further articulated, in part, by repeating original patterns, elaborating and deepening the analysis, connecting elements within the tapestry, and integrating parts with wider bodies of knowledge and practice. Herb once joked with me that he had developed three rules for academic and scholarly success, the primary one being "To write a good article and keep publishing it!" There is, of course, some repetition in any good scholar's work, as initial and original creations are elaborated, refined, tested, and connected to other creations. What transpires over time, as with the development of IPS, is a carefully developed and refined theory of practice, which is linked to theories of understanding relevant to intergroup relations, violent ethnopolitical conflict, and international relations more generally. Herb has always been careful and gracious in crediting his connection with John Burton in bringing the PSW to his attention. In the genesis of the method, Burton and his colleagues creatively forged a combination of the academic seminar with small-group problem solving as much through experimentation and adaptation as through careful design and implementation (see Fisher, 1997). Kelman's disciplined work has gone beyond the original articulation by Burton and his colleagues by creating a comprehensive and organized description of the major components of the PSW and its connections to the wider scene of international diplomacy and conflict management.

In particular, Herb has articulated the social–psychological approach and assumptions that he sees as underlying the IPS method. At base, he considers the PSW as a uniquely social–psychological approach because the social interaction between the parties in the causeration, escalation, and resolution of conflict is, for him, the prime focus. His approach is that of a comprehensive and relevant social psychology, rather than the individualized, manipulated study of social cognition that has come to characterize the mainstream of the discipline since the 1950s. In the recent article on IPS, Kelman (this issue) articulated another hallmark of the social–psychological approach in the linking of micro- and macro-processes, which occur through the connections of individuals to the social institutions and environments in which they interact with others. The linkage he articulates is between the changes that individuals experience as a result of the social
interaction in PSWs and the changes that they are able to help bring about in the political culture and systems that are engaged in the conflict. In doing so, IPS offers a complementary analysis and avenue to those provided by the traditional political route in that individual and group psychological factors such as misperceptions, mistrust, and contentious norms are analyzed and addressed along with the substantive and objective factors that are typically the initial sources of the conflict.

Based on 40 years of thoughtful analysis and constant practice, Herb has articulated, elaborated, and refined the social—psychological rationale and the social technology of the PSW within the action research context of IPS. Much like Sigmund Freud or Carl Rogers at the level of individual clinical practice, he has reflected on his experience and compared it to his evolving theory of practice to improve his understanding of destructive intergroup conflict and the capacity of the PSW method to effectively address it. Based initially on the work of John Burton, with some reference to the applications of human relations training to intergroup conflict by Leonard Doob, Herb has never lost sight of the basic characteristics of the PSW and the immense challenge of transferring changes in individuals to the social system of the conflict in terms of policy making; political discourse; and, ultimately, political culture. In identifying the purpose of IPS as changing the political cultures of the conflicting societies in his second article in this issue, he has raised the bar for the method to a higher level, which may also be related to some of the failures and frustrations that the PSW has garnered in some quarters.

Although the field lacks a complex and sophisticated model of the transfer process (for a simple schematic, see Fisher 1997), the personal connections of influential participants with societal decision makers have always been seen as the essential pathway to influencing policy making. Added to that, Herb and his colleagues have talked about influencing the political discourses in the conflicting societies through the targeted communication efforts (briefings, speeches, and writings) of respected participants who are opinion leaders in their societies. When we come to the goal of influencing political culture to resolve the conflict, we come face to face with the awesome challenge of changing the “culture of conflict” (as articulated by Mark Ross, 1993, and others), which includes how a society defines, perceives, and experiences conflict, as well as the approaches and methods it regards as appropriate and effective to address it. If we have learned one thing in decades of social science research and practice, it is that culture does not easily or quickly change, especially when it is linked to defending the identity and existence of a society under extreme threat. The intractability of protracted ethnopolitical conflict is linked to the national identity and culture of both parties. Each one is so locked into its culture of conflict in reaction to an existential threat that alternative analyses and different options as illuminated by the PSW have faint hope of coming to expression in the wider society. Nonetheless, accumulated experience indicates that carefully designed and well-executed programs of continuing workshops can make positive and, in some cases, essential contributions to peace processes (Fisher, 2005).

In articulating the social technology of the PSW, usually in the form of a “typical workshop,” Herb has carefully evolved his comprehensive description of the method while maintaining its essential core. In articulating the components of a conflict resolution process, he places the PSW squarely in the alternative context that the field has offered to the world since its inception, some would say with the seminal work of Mary Parker Follett in the early part of the last century (Metcalfe & Urwick, 1942). The founders of the field carried forward Follett’s vision for a creative and collaborative (and, at times, a compromising) way of handling destructive conflict. Burton and Kelman are in the mainstream of that tradition—both are trailblazers who have been influenced by the ethos of their formative times and their personal experiences. One place where they differ is Kelman’s acknowledgment and respect for the centrality of the negotiation process in conflict resolution and the importance of planning PSWs in relation to the state or phase of negotiations. In contrast, Burton came to see the PSW as the primary vehicle for conflict resolution, with negotiation simply managing secondary administrative arrangements to implement the solution provided by the PSW method. Needless to say, Kelman’s approach has almost always been more acceptable to traditional theorists and practitioners of conflict management operating more in the realist paradigm.

Each element of a typical PSW comes with a rationale that can be linked back to the qualities of the wider conflict resolution process, which offers an alternative to the participants and, ultimately, their societies to shift away from an adversarial, unilateral, and coercive approach to prosecuting their conflict. Participants are carefully chosen and invited, often with the tacit approval of their leaderships, and carry the personal characteristics (e.g., open minded) and social standing (e.g., respected in both societies) necessary to both engage in the problem-solving process and effectively transmit its outcomes to policy makers and political constituencies. In terms of the social situation of the workshop, Herb’s choice of the academic setting (or sponsor) is compatible with the Burton group’s intention of injecting the norms of the academic seminar into the PSW, so that participants can feel free to play with ideas in a noncommittal, creative fashion, and to do so across the lines of the conflict. As Herb noted, this aspect also means that the third-party team “owns” the setting and can prescribe appropriate behaviors and agenda items that the participants are likely to accept.
The facilitative role of the third party sounds simple, but not so when you consider that knowledge and skills from different levels of analysis are required for its execution (for a list, see Fisher, 2006).

Over his professional career, Herb developed a repertoire of skills that have rendered him a master of his craft in facilitating PSWs. Through the study of psychotherapy, a personal psychoanalysis, and participation in research on group therapy, he developed personal and interpersonal sensitivities and skills to relate well with other individuals. His experience with the early days of human relations training in sensitivity or T groups provided insights and abilities at the level of group process. His training as a social psychologist yielded expertise in intergroup relations while his groundbreaking work on the social psychology of international relations built a bridge to carry the insights of his discipline and the potential of IPS to the global system. To the demanding role of the third-party facilitator, Herb also, by necessity of his interest in the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, generated the creative idea of an ethnically balanced team to allow for his involvement as a Jew along with Arab co-facilitators. Rather than seeing this as some kind of compromise to achieve adequate impartiality, he pointed out that such a team likely has a higher degree of engagement in the conflict and also sensitivities to aspects of the parties' identities and behaviors that a truly impartial third party would not have. Again, this is a masterful way of adapting the PSW method to the realities of the situation.

The ground rules for the PSW that Herb presents have shown some constructive evolution over time, but the central elements of confidentiality and non-attribution (now often referred to as Chatham House rules as if invented there) have remained consistent over the decades, as has the call for an analytic stance and an appreciation for the facilitative role of the third party. Other ground rules, such as focusing on each other directly and providing equality in the setting, have likely been added in the light of experience in dealing with a highly escalated conflict exhibiting power asymmetry on the ground (i.e., the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), which should not be allowed to pervade the workshop interaction. Likewise, the typical agenda for a Kelman PSW has shown some evolution over time, but the progression from analysis to problem solving and the unstructured and flexible nature remain central.

Flexibility is more than a catch-phrase in Herb’s work, as I experienced directly when I invited him to be a member of the third-party team that facilitated an PSW between Greek and Turkish Cypriots some years ago. We began with each party sharing its perspectives on the current state of the conflict, and then went into underlying concerns—that is, the basic needs and fears driving the conflict. At that point, in one of our debriefing sessions, Herb identified an imbalance in the level of apparent concern of the two parties—essentially, that the Turkish Cypriots seemed satisfied with the status quo, whereas the Greek Cypriots were more motivated to find a way out of the impasse. Thus, when we reconvened, we did not move on to the next item in the agenda as planned, but confronted the Turkish Cypriots with this apparent discrepancy. This led to a rich discussion of what human needs were not being satisfied in the Turkish Cypriot community and, thus, a clear sense of motivation to contribute to the resolution of the conflict. This example also illustrates the sensitivity to group process that Herb’s group dynamics training brought to the sessions, almost like a third eye to see what is beneath the surface of the interaction, and the ability to constructively raise it with participants.

A second example of flexibility came from a later Cyprus workshop in which the Turkish Cypriots seemed reluctant to move into a discussion of possible joint peace-building activities, although it appeared that the mutual conflict analysis had been carried out to a satisfactory degree. Again, based on the sensitivity of the third eye, Herb deduced that the Turkish Cypriots appeared to be hesitating due to an inadequate sense of confidence that the traumatic events of the past would not be repeated. Thus, we called for each side to discuss the acknowledgments it wished to give the other side about unacceptable behaviors that it had committed in the past, and its assurances that this type of behavior would never occur again. With this partial sense of reconciliation, the participants were then able to move into the discussion of possible cooperative activities.

John Burton (1987) had rather concrete and directive prescriptions about organizing and facilitating PSWs, as shown, for example, in his “handbook” spelling out a comprehensive set of rules for this purpose. Herb, on the other hand, has always seen the dialectic nature of the method, realizing that many of the realities of the conflict situation require design decisions that are essentially trade-offs. Thus, the dual purpose of workshops as both educational (bringing about changes in individuals) and political (bringing about change in decision-making systems) involves a number of contradictions around which design and implementation decisions need to be made. The primary route for moving out of these contradictions is to achieve balance appropriate to the goals of the workshop (e.g., in the selection of participants who are free to change while at the same time able to influence policy). Needless to say, the skillful work of a master's hand is necessary to adjust the balances for maximum applicability and utility of the PSW in relation to the current expression of the conflict.

The applicability and utility of IPS have been amply demonstrated over a 40-year period by its consistent and creative application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, of which Herb identifies four phases in his article
In conclusion, the creative and comprehensive approach to IPS developed and implemented by Herb is a significant contribution to the wider domain of conflict resolution through its unique combination of process interventions with substantive policy analyses. He has taken the issues of applicability and utility that exist for the field of interactive conflict resolution and addressed these consistently and effectively as a trailblazer and model for others. In terms of our work together, I have been affirmed by his willingness to share the third-party consultant role with me, and flattered that he has invited me to serve as a co-author on important publications. He has been very gratifying for me to share both collegial collaboration and a warm friendship with him and his loving wife, Rose, over the years.

BIOGRAphICAL NOTE

Ronald J. Fisher (BA [Honors], MA, Saskatchewan; PhD, Michigan) focuses on the theory, research, and practice of interactive conflict resolution, which involves informal third-party interventions in protracted and violent ethnopolitical conflict. His publications include The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution (1990), Interactive Conflict Resolution (1997), and Paving the Way: Contributions of Interactive Conflict Resolution to Peacemaking (2005). He has been elected as a fellow in both the American and Canadian Psychological Associations.

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"World peace is an elusive phenomenon—this we all know. It has proven elusive not only in the practical realities of international politics but in abstract conceptualization as well. Part of the reason for its elusiveness lies in our penchant for defining peace in the context of war. But there is a simple truth: peace is not merely the absence of war."


So Long, and Thanks for All the ...

Richard V. Wagner
Department of Psychology
Bates College

Ten years ago, when I assumed the editorship of Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, I had it easy. In six short years, founding editor, Milton Schwebel, had placed the journal on the soundest footing imaginable. Thanks to founding contributor, Luella Gubrud Buros, and Milt’s fiscal acumen, the journal was about to pay off its debt to our very supportive publisher, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. As I noted at the time (Wagner, 2001), the journal had “truly become a reflection of the best values and goals of the Division of Peace Psychology” (p. 199). I like to think that that reflection persists in 2010.

During my decade as editor, peace and conflict in the international arena has intensified and diversified, at least for the West. The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center brought violence home to the United States, the world’s military superpower, in a way it had never experienced before. Palestine and Israel appeared to be moving toward grudging coexistence before hopes of peace seemingly evaporated. The United States invaded Iraq, the United States and its allies moved into Afghanistan, Pakistan and India rattled a few sabers, and Russia lent its troops to a province in Georgia; the list seems endless. Top it all off with the West’s financial woes and the ashes from Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull volcano, and we had quite a decade.

The journal responded to some of these crises. In mid-2002 I asked, “September 11, 2001: How Can Peace Psychologists Be Most Helpful?”

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studies, interviews, historical and archival research, content analyses galore, drama, story-telling, and television scenarios. Some of these were presented as "brief reports" given the looseness of the methodology or the single-case nature of the research because they presented intriguing, promising approaches to issues that do not lend themselves to tight methodology.

Although *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* is the official publication of the American Psychological Association’s Division of Peace Psychology, it has truly become an international journal. During my tenure, we have published articles submitted by authors from 34 different countries on 6 continents. I am particularly proud of our championing articles from non-U.S. and European psychologists, for many of whom publishing in a U.S. professional psychological journal was a first-time event. These included psychologists from Colombia, Azerbaijan, Sri Lanka, Iran, Brazil, Portugal, and the People’s Republic of China. We have been fortunate, also, to have enlisted the assistance of reviewers from South Africa, Australia, Hong Kong, Sweden, Finland, Northern Ireland, Germany, Israel, Palestine, Canada, Denmark, Chile, and, of course, the United States.

Now the time has come for thanks to the many, many people who have supported the journal over the past 10 years. So I say, with apologies to Douglas Adams, “So long, and thanks for all the…”

**Manuscripts:** We received an average of 50 manuscripts each year. All were thoughtful. Some were appropriate for a professional psychology journal, others belonged in other professional journals, and some needed extensive revision or additional data collection, which sometimes occurred. However, to all those who submitted during the decade, I found your articles worthwhile reading, whether or not they ultimately appeared in our pages.

**Reviews:** As editor, I could handle the mechanics of grammar and clarity, but never presumed to be sufficiently knowledgeable to make unilateral decisions about the content of most of the articles we received. Fortunately, I was able to call on 35 to 40 superb reviewers, each of whom evaluated 3 or 4 manuscripts annually. The reviewers are the critical determiners of the quality of this publication. To the extent that we have achieved excellence, it is largely due to their efforts.

**Advice:** My three associate editors were Cristina Montiel, Michael Wessells, and Susan Opotow. They provided a needed perspective from across the seas; I still remember her responding to a query, signing off from Manila with, “and now I am needed in the streets.” Mike Wessells has been a friend and valued consultant for over 20 years. He represents the continuing, evolving perspective of peace psychology from its emergence as a distinct discipline in the late 1980s to the present day. Susan Opotow
and I grew up professionally at the end of the classic, post-World War II period of social psychology, when the major social issue confronting the discipline was racial equality. I daresay we both found the emerging field of peace psychology a logical next step in our concern about social justice in contemporary society. I am so pleased that she agreed to become the third editor of Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology. Herb Blumberg has been the tireless review editor of the journal for its entire run (i.e., from Volume 1, Issue 1 on). He alone is responsible for the high quality of the reviews we have published. He receives the requests, he solicits the reviews, he edits them, and he submits them. I never had to worry about the process: Herb handled it all. Our journal advisory board, all distinguished professionals knowledgeable in psychology and peace studies, were critical at the outset of my tenure. I was much comforted by their advice and support.

Assistance: Nancy MacLean and I, and our respective spouses, Garvey and Lois, have known each other for 40 years. When I knew I would need a superior assistant for the journal, I remembered that Nancy had edited the memoirs and articles of a long-time Bates College senior staff member, so she was a logical choice to help this long-time Bates faculty member. She kept me focused on the work of editorship, reminded me of the many chores I might otherwise have neglected, and prepared the ultimate versions of most of the articles published in the journal. Bates College professor and colleague, Amy Bradford Douglass, held my statistical hand for the past 7 years. I passed stats at the University of Michigan about 50 years ago; it was a struggle for me back then, so you can imagine how confident I was evaluating the adequacy of statistical testing reported in manuscripts. Bates College has provided essential staff assistance as well: the secretarial support, the library, and the accounting office staff have been crucial in the publication of our journal. I must also thank Bates College the institution, and especially Dean of the Faculty, Jill Reich, for providing support for supplies and a portion of my professional travel. Bates College has been blessed with four excellent production editors provided, first, by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., and subsequently by Taylor & Francis/Routledge Publishers. They have been patient recipients of the articles that—at times—were submitted by the quarterly deadline. They have been true presences in the publication process, not mere cogs in a bureaucratic publishing machine.

Tolerant, emotional support: When contemplating retirement 8 or 9 years ago, I was “advised” by a wise woman to be sure I had something to retire to. She knew the journal provided the needed cushion for my

jump from the classroom to the living room. In the process, she, Lois, had to tolerate late hours and inattention while I reviewed, corrected, and revised multiple manuscripts, and a curtailment of the travels we both love.

So to all I say, along with the dolphins, “So long, and thanks for all the… manuscripts, reviews, advice, assistance, tolerance, and emotional support. The decade has been the most exhilarating of my life.”

| BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE |

Richard V. Wagner is Professor Emeritus of Psychology, Bates College. He is a past president of the Peace Psychology Division (48) of the American Psychological Association and of Psychologists for Social Responsibility. He has been Editor of this journal from 2001 to 2010. He currently is serving his second term as a state representative in the Maine legislature and has been a court mediator for Maine since 1980.

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Instructions for Authors

Aims and Scope. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology welcomes scholarly manuscripts from authors all over the world on a wide array of subjects concerning peace, conflict processes and resolution; post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, and the causes, consequences, and prevention of war and other forms of destructive conflicts. These other forms of conflict may be within nations, communities, or families. Possible topics are reflected by the titles of the task forces of the American Psychological Association's Division of Peace Psychology: Children, Families, and War; Continuing Nuclear Threat; Ethnicity and Peace; Feminism and Peace; Peace and Education; Peace and Sustainable Development; Public Policy and Action. The journal publishes a mixture of empirical, theoretical, clinical, and historical work, as well as policy analysis, case studies, interpretive essays, interviews, and book reviews. Integrative, interdisciplinary work that connects psychology with different disciplines and issues concerning peace and conflict is also welcome. Finally, the journal invites papers that reflect diverse cultural perspectives.

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