

**ONLINE APPENDIX**  
**“REARRANGING ATTRIBUTES IN NETWORKED ECONOMIES”**

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**APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL PROOFS**

**APPENDIX B: REFERENCES**

## APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL PROOFS

### *Proof of Theorem 3*

Dropping the “ $N$ ” subscripts, we first prove the following lemma:

#### **Lemma 4**

$$EZ^2 = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (a(j))^2 + \frac{N^3}{N-1} \bar{w}^2 \bar{a}^2 - \frac{N}{N-1} \bar{w}^2 \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^2 - \frac{N}{N-1} \bar{a}^2 \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^2.$$

**Proof.**

$$\begin{aligned} EZ^2 &= E \left( \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N w(i) a(X_i) \right] \left[ \sum_{j=1}^N w(j) a(X_j) \right] \right) \\ &= E \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^2 (a(X_i))^2 \right] + E \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N w(i) w(j) a(X_i) a(X_j) \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N (a(j))^2 \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^2 + \left[ \frac{1}{N(N-1)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N a(i) a(j) \right] \\ &\quad \times \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N w(i) w(j) - \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^2 \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (a(j))^2 + \frac{1}{N(N-1)} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N a(i) a(j) - \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^2 \right] \\ &\quad \times \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N w(i) \sum_{j=1}^N w(j) - \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^2 \right] \end{aligned}$$

and Lemma 4 follows. ■

We next prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 5**

$$\begin{aligned}
EZ^3 &= \frac{N}{(N-1)(N-2)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (a(i))^3 (w(j))^3 \\
&\quad + \frac{3N(N+1)}{(N-1)(N-2)} \bar{a}\bar{w} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (a(i))^2 (w(j))^2 \\
&\quad - \frac{3N}{(N-1)(N-2)} \bar{a} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (a(i))^2 (w(j))^3 \\
&\quad - \frac{3N}{(N-1)(N-2)} \bar{w} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (a(i))^3 (w(j))^2 \\
&\quad + \frac{N^5}{(N-1)(N-2)} \bar{a}^3 \bar{w}^3 + \frac{2N^2}{(N-1)(N-2)} \bar{a}^3 \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^3 \\
&\quad - \frac{3N^3}{(N-1)(N-2)} \bar{a}^3 \bar{w} \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^2 \\
&\quad + \frac{2N^2}{(N-1)(N-2)} \bar{w}^3 \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^3 - \frac{3N^3}{(N-1)(N-2)} \bar{a}\bar{w}^3 \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^2.
\end{aligned}$$

**Proof.**

$$\begin{aligned}
EZ^3 &= E \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N w(i) a(X_i) \right]^3 = E \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N w(i) w(j) w(k) a(X_i) a(X_j) a(X_k) \right] \\
&= E \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i) a(X_i))^3 + 3 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N (w(i) a(X_i))^2 w(j) a(X_j) \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N \sum_{\substack{k=1 \\ i \neq j \neq k}}^N w(i) a(X_i) w(j) a(X_j) w(k) a(X_k) \right]
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 (a(j))^3 + \frac{3}{N(N-1)} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N (a(i))^2 a(j) \right] \\
&\quad \times \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N (w(i))^2 w(j) \right] + \frac{1}{N(N-1)(N-2)} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j \neq k}}^N \sum_{k=1}^N a(i) a(j) a(k) \right] \\
&\quad \quad \quad \times \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j \neq k}}^N \sum_{k=1}^N w(i) w(j) w(k) \right]
\end{aligned}$$

To obtain Lemma 5, note the following decomposition:

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N (a(i))^2 a(j) = \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (a(i))^2 a(j) - \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^3,$$

and note the additional decomposition:

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j \neq k}}^N \sum_{k=1}^N a(i) a(j) a(k) &= \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N a(i) a(j) a(k) - \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^3 \\
&\quad - 3 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N (a(i))^2 a(j) \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N a(i) a(j) a(k) - \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^3 - 3 \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (a(i))^2 a(j) - \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^3 \right].
\end{aligned}$$

■

Now,

$$E(Z - EZ)^3 = EZ^3 - 3(EZ)(EZ^2) + 2(EZ)^3.$$

Plugging in the expressions from Lemma 4, Lemma 5, and Theorem 1, we have:

$$E(Z - EZ)^3 = \frac{N}{(N-1)(N-2)} NE[W - EW]^3 NE[A - EA]^3.$$

Lastly, solving for Skew  $Z$ :

$$\text{Skew } Z = \frac{E[Z - EZ]^3}{(\text{Var } Z)^{3/2}} = \frac{(N-1)^{1/2}}{N-2} \text{Skew } W \text{Skew } A. \quad \square$$

### ***Proof of Theorem 4***

Dropping the “ $N$ ” subscripts, we first prove a couple of lemmata:

#### **Lemma 6**

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq j \neq k}}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 w(j) w(k) &= \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 w(j) w(k) + 2 \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 \\ &\quad - 2 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 w(j) - \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2. \end{aligned}$$

**Proof.** We have

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 w(j) w(k) &= \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 + 2 \sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 w(j) \\ &\quad + \sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 + \sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq j \neq k}}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 w(j) w(k). \end{aligned}$$

With

$$\sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 w(j) = \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 w(j) - \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 \text{ and}$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 = \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 - \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4,$$

Lemma 6 follows. ■

**Lemma 7**

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\substack{\ell=1 \\ k \neq \ell}}^N w(i) w(j) w(k) w(\ell) &= \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\ell=1}^N w(i) w(j) w(k) w(\ell) \\ &- 6 \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 + 8 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 w(j) + 3 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 \\ &- 6 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 w(j) w(k). \end{aligned}$$

**Proof.**

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\substack{\ell=1 \\ k \neq \ell}}^N w(i) w(j) w(k) w(\ell) &= \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\ell=1}^N w(i) w(j) w(k) w(\ell) \\ &- \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 - 4 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N (w(i))^3 w(j) - 3 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 \\ &- 6 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 w(j) w(k). \end{aligned}$$

Given Lemma 6, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq j \neq k \neq \ell}}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\ell=1}^N w(i) w(j) w(k) w(\ell) &= \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\ell=1}^N w(i) w(j) w(k) w(\ell) \\
&- \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 - 4 \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 w(j) - \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 \right] \\
&- 3 \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 - \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 \right] \\
&- 6 \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 w(j) w(k) + 2 \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 \right. \\
&\quad \left. - 2 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 w(j) - \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 \right]
\end{aligned}$$

and Lemma 7 follows. ■

### Lemma 8

$$\begin{aligned}
EZ^4 &= \frac{N(N+1)}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^4 (a(j))^4 \\
&+ 4N\bar{w}\bar{a} \left[ \frac{N^2 + N + 4}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \right] \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 (a(j))^3 \\
&- \frac{4\bar{a}N(N+1)}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^4 (a(j))^3 \\
&- \frac{4\bar{w}N(N+1)}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 (a(j))^4 \\
&+ \frac{3(N^2 - 3N + 3)}{N(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\ell=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 (a(k))^2 (a(\ell))^2
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& - \frac{3}{(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 (a(k))^4 \\
& - \frac{3}{(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^4 (a(j))^2 (a(k))^2 \\
& + \frac{6N^3 \bar{w}^2 \bar{a}^2 (N+3)}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (a(j))^2 \\
& + \frac{12N^2 \bar{a}^2}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^4 (a(j))^2 \\
& - \frac{12N^2 \bar{w} \bar{a}^2 (N+1)}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 (a(j))^2 \\
& - \frac{6N^2 \bar{a}^2}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 (a(k))^2 \\
& + \frac{12N^2 \bar{w}^2}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (a(j))^4 \\
& - \frac{12N^2 \bar{w}^2 \bar{a} (N+1)}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (a(j))^3 \\
& + \frac{12\bar{a}}{(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 (a(k))^3 \\
& - \frac{6N^2 \bar{w}^2}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 (a(j))^2 (a(k))^2 \\
& + \frac{12\bar{w}}{(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^3 (a(j))^2 (a(k))^2 + \frac{N^7 \bar{w}^4 \bar{a}^4}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \\
& - \frac{6N^3 \bar{a}^4}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 + \frac{8N^4 \bar{w} \bar{a}^4}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^3 \\
& + \frac{3N^3 \bar{a}^4}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 \\
& - \frac{6N^5 \bar{w}^2 \bar{a}^4}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^2
\end{aligned}$$



$$\begin{aligned}
& - \frac{6N^3\bar{w}^4}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^4 + \frac{8N^4\bar{w}^4\bar{a}}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^3 \\
& + \frac{3N^3\bar{w}^4}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (a(i))^2 (a(j))^2 \\
& - \frac{6N^5\bar{w}^4\bar{a}^2}{(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^2.
\end{aligned}$$

**Proof.** Solving for  $EZ^4$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
EZ^4 &= E \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N w(i) a(X_i) \right]^4 \\
&= E \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\ell=1}^N w(i) w(j) w(k) w(\ell) a(X_i) a(X_j) a(X_k) a(X_\ell) \right].
\end{aligned}$$

We have the following decomposition:

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\ell=1}^N y(i) y(j) y(k) y(\ell) &= \sum_{i=1}^N (y(i))^4 + 4 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N (y(i))^3 y(j) \\
&+ 3 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N (y(i))^2 (y(j))^2 + 6 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N \sum_{\substack{k=1 \\ i \neq j \neq k}}^N (y(i))^2 y(j) y(k) \\
&+ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N \sum_{\substack{k=1 \\ i \neq j \neq k}}^N \sum_{\substack{\ell=1 \\ i \neq j \neq k \neq \ell}}^N y(i) y(j) y(k) y(\ell).
\end{aligned}$$

Then:

$$\begin{aligned}
EZ^4 = E & \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i) a(X_i))^4 + 4 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N (w(i) a(X_i))^3 (w(j) a(X_j)) \right. \\
& + 3 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N (w(i) a(X_i))^2 (w(j) a(X_j))^2 \\
& + 6 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i) a(X_i))^2 (w(j) a(X_j)) (w(k) a(X_k)) \\
& \left. + \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N \sum_{\substack{k=1 \\ i \neq j}}^N \sum_{\substack{\ell=1 \\ i \neq j, k \neq \ell}}^N (w(i) a(X_i)) (w(j) a(X_j)) (w(k) a(X_k)) (w(\ell) a(X_\ell)) \right]
\end{aligned}$$

Given Lemmata 6 and 7, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
EZ^4 = & \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^4 (a(j))^4 + \frac{4}{N(N-1)} \left[ \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\ell=1}^N (a(k))^3 a(\ell) - \sum_{k=1}^N (a(k))^4 \right] \\
& \times \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 w(j) - \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 \right] \\
& + \frac{3}{N(N-1)} \left[ \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\ell=1}^N (a(k))^2 (a(\ell))^2 - \sum_{k=1}^N (a(k))^4 \right] \\
& \times \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 - \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 \right] \\
& + \frac{6}{N(N-1)(N-2)} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (a(i))^2 a(j) a(k) + 2 \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^4 \right. \\
& \left. - 2 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (a(i))^3 a(j) - \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (a(i))^2 (a(j))^2 \right]
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \times \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 w(j) w(k) + 2 \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 - 2 \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^3 w(j) \right. \\
& \quad \left. - \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 \right] \\
& + \frac{1}{N(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\ell=1}^N a(i) a(j) a(k) a(\ell) \right. \\
& \quad - 6 \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i))^4 + 8 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (a(i))^3 a(j) + 3 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (a(i))^2 (a(j))^2 \\
& \quad \left. - 6 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (a(i))^2 a(j) a(k) \right] \\
& \times \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{\ell=1}^N w(i) w(j) w(k) w(\ell) - 6 \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i))^4 + 8 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^3 w(j) \right. \\
& \quad \left. + 3 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (w(i))^2 (w(j))^2 - 6 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^N (w(i))^2 w(j) w(k) \right]
\end{aligned}$$

Lemma 8 follows. ■

Now,

$$E(Z - EZ)^4 = EZ^4 - 4(EZ^3)(EZ) + 6(EZ^2)(EZ)^2 - 3(EZ)^4.$$

Plugging in the expressions from Theorem 1 and Lemmata 4, 5, and 8, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
E(Z - EZ)^4 &= \frac{3}{(N+1)(N-1)} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i) - \bar{w})^2 \right]^2 \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i) - \bar{a})^2 \right]^2 \\
&+ \frac{1}{(N+1)N(N-1)(N-2)(N-3)} \left( N(N+1) \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i) - \bar{w})^4 \right. \\
&\quad \left. - 3(N-1) \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N (w(i) - \bar{w})^2 \right]^2 \right) \left( N(N+1) \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i) - \bar{a})^4 \right. \\
&\quad \left. - 3(N-1) \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N (a(i) - \bar{a})^2 \right]^2 \right).
\end{aligned}$$

Given the expression for  $\text{Var } Z$  in Theorem 2, we solve for Kurt  $Z$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Kurt } Z &= \frac{E(Z - EZ)^4}{(\text{Var } Z)^2} \\
&= \frac{3(N-1)}{N+1} + \frac{(N+1)(N-1)}{N(N-2)(N-3)} \left[ \text{Kurt } W - \frac{3(N-1)}{(N+1)} \right] \left[ \text{Kurt } A - \frac{3(N-1)}{N+1} \right].
\end{aligned}$$

□

### ***Proof of Theorem 9***

This theorem follows immediately from the work of Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009). These authors, in their Appendix A, build on the work of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006). They consider a network game with the following payoffs (line A3 of their paper with notation modified for the present work):

$$u_i(\mathbf{e}_N, \mathbf{G}) = \alpha(i)e_N(i) - \frac{1}{2}(\delta - \gamma)(e_N(i))^2 - \gamma \sum_{k=1}^N e_N(i)e_N(k) + \lambda \sum_{k=1}^N [\mathbf{G}]_{ik} e_N(i)e_N(k).$$

The model of peer influence in the present text is the same as the one above, but with the following parameter substitutions:  $\alpha(i) = \mu n_i + a_N(\chi_{Ni})$ ,  $\delta = 1$ ,  $\gamma = 0$ ,

and  $\lambda = \phi$ . Given these parameter substitutions, we re-write Theorem 1 Part (b) of Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009) as the following lemma:

**Lemma 9 (Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009), Theorem 1(b))**  
*If  $\phi\rho(\mathbf{G}) < 1$ , then this game has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies  $\mathbf{e}_N^*$ , which is interior and given by*

$$\mathbf{e}_N^* = (\mathbf{I} - \phi\mathbf{G})^{-1} \boldsymbol{\alpha},$$

where  $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = \mu\mathbf{G}\mathbf{1} + \boldsymbol{\alpha}_N(\boldsymbol{\chi}_N)$ .

We derive this Nash equilibrium through utility maximization:

$$\max_{e_N(i)} u_i(\mathbf{e}_N, \mathbf{G}) = \max_{e_N(i)} [\mu n_i + a_N(\chi_{Ni})] e_N(i) - \frac{1}{2} (e_N(i))^2 + \phi \sum_{k=1}^N [\mathbf{G}]_{ik} e_N(i) e_N(k).$$

The first-order condition is:

$$e_N^*(i) = \mu n_i + a_N(\chi_{Ni}) + \phi \sum_{k=1}^N [\mathbf{G}]_{ik} e_N^*(k).$$

At the population level,

$$\mathbf{e}_N^* = \mu\mathbf{G}\mathbf{1} + \mathbf{a}_N(\boldsymbol{\chi}_N) + \phi\mathbf{G}\mathbf{e}_N^*,$$

which yields

$$\mathbf{e}_N^* = (\mathbf{I} - \phi\mathbf{G})^{-1} (\mu\mathbf{G}\mathbf{1} + \mathbf{a}_N(\boldsymbol{\chi}_N)).$$

Theorem 9 then immediately follows from Lemma 9.  $\square$

### ***Proof of Theorem 10***

The optimization problem for consumer  $j$  is:

$$\max_{x_{Nj}, y_{Nj}} u_j \left( x_{Nj}, \Phi_j \left( y_{Nj}, \{y_{Nk}\}_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} \right) \right) \text{ s.t. } x_{Nj} + p(1+T)y_{Nj} = a_{Nj}.$$

With

$$u_j \left( x_{Nj}, \Phi_j \left( y_{Nj}, \{y_{Nk}\}_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} \right) \right) = x_{Nj}^\sigma \left( \Phi_j \left( y_{Nj}, \{y_{Nk}\}_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} \right) \right)^{1-\sigma}$$

and

$$\Phi_j \left( y_{Nj}, \{y_{Nk}\}_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} \right) = y_{Nj} + \alpha n_j \left[ y_{Nj} - \frac{1}{n_j} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right],$$

the optimization problem becomes:

$$\max_{x_{Nj}, y_{Nj}} x_{Nj}^\sigma \left( y_{Nj} + \alpha n_j \left[ y_{Nj} - \frac{1}{n_j} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right] \right)^{1-\sigma} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad x_{Nj} + p(1+T)y_{Nj} = a_{Nj}.$$

Dropping the asterisks in  $x_{Nj}^*$  and  $y_{Nj}^*$ , the three first-order conditions are:

$$\sigma x_{Nj}^{\sigma-1} \left( y_{Nj} + \alpha n_j \left[ y_{Nj} - \frac{1}{n_j} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right] \right)^{1-\sigma} = \lambda \quad (1)$$

$$x_{Nj}^\sigma (1-\sigma) \left( y_{Nj} + \alpha n_j \left[ y_{Nj} - \frac{1}{n_j} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right] \right)^{-\sigma} (1 + \alpha n_j) = \lambda p(1+T) \quad (2)$$

$$x_{Nj} + p(1+T)y_{Nj} = a_{Nj} \quad (3)$$

Now,

$$\begin{aligned} & \sigma x_{Nj}^{\sigma-1} \left( y_{Nj} + \alpha n_j \left[ y_{Nj} - \frac{1}{n_j} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right] \right)^{1-\sigma} \\ &= \frac{1}{p(1+T)} (1-\sigma) x_{Nj}^\sigma \left( y_{Nj} + \alpha n_j \left[ y_{Nj} - \frac{1}{n_j} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right] \right)^{-\sigma} (1 + \alpha n_j) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \sigma x_{Nj}^{\sigma-1} \left( y_{Nj} (1 + \alpha n_j) - \alpha \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right)^{1-\sigma} \\
&= \frac{1 - \sigma}{p(1 + T)} x_{Nj}^\sigma \left( y_{Nj} (1 + \alpha n_j) - \alpha \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right)^{-\sigma} (1 + \alpha n_j) \\
& \sigma \left( y_{Nj} (1 + \alpha n_j) - \alpha \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right) = \frac{1 - \sigma}{p(1 + T)} (1 + \alpha n_j) x_{Nj} \\
& x_{Nj} = \frac{\sigma p(1 + T)}{1 - \sigma} \frac{y_{Nj} (1 + \alpha n_j) - \alpha \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk}}{1 + \alpha n_j} \\
& x_{Nj} = \frac{\sigma p(1 + T)}{1 - \sigma} \left( y_{Nj} - \frac{\alpha}{1 + \alpha n_j} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right) \tag{4}
\end{aligned}$$

Plugging (4) into the budget constraint and solving for  $y_{Nj}^*$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
& x_{Nj} + p(1 + T) y_{Nj} = a_{Nj} \\
& \frac{\sigma p(1 + T)}{1 - \sigma} \left( y_{Nj} - \frac{\alpha}{1 + \alpha n_j} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right) + p(1 + T) y_{Nj} = a_{Nj} \\
& \frac{\sigma p(1 + T)}{1 - \sigma} y_{Nj} + p(1 + T) y_{Nj} - \frac{\sigma p(1 + T)}{1 - \sigma} \frac{\alpha}{1 + \alpha n_j} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} = a_{Nj} \\
& \frac{p(1 + T)}{1 - \sigma} y_{Nj} - \frac{\sigma p(1 + T)}{1 - \sigma} \frac{\alpha}{1 + \alpha n_j} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} = a_{Nj} \\
& \frac{p(1 + T)}{1 - \sigma} y_{Nj} = a_{Nj} + \frac{\sigma p(1 + T)}{1 - \sigma} \frac{\alpha}{1 + \alpha n_j} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \\
& y_{Nj}^* = \frac{1 - \sigma}{p(1 + T)} \left[ a_{Nj} + \frac{\sigma}{1 - \sigma} \frac{\alpha}{1 + \alpha n_j} p(1 + T) \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk}^* \right] \tag{5}
\end{aligned}$$

Plugging (5) into the budget constraint and solving for  $x_{Nj}^*$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
x_{Nj} + p(1+T)y_{Nj} &= a_{Nj} \\
x_{Nj} + p(1+T) \frac{1-\sigma}{p(1+T)} \left[ a_{Nj} + \frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma} \frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha n_j} p(1+T) \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right] &= a_{Nj} \\
x_{Nj} + (1-\sigma) \left[ a_{Nj} + \frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma} \frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha n_j} p(1+T) \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right] &= a_{Nj} \\
x_{Nj} = a_{Nj} - (1-\sigma) \left[ a_{Nj} + \frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma} \frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha n_j} p(1+T) \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk} \right] \\
x_{Nj}^* = \sigma \left[ a_{Nj} - \frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha n_j} p(1+T) \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk}^* \right] & \tag{6}
\end{aligned}$$

Solving for  $\mathbf{y}_N^*$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
y_{Nj}^* &= \frac{1-\sigma}{p(1+T)} \left( a_{Nj} + \frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma} \frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha n_j} p(1+T) \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{Nk}^* \right) \\
\mathbf{y}_N^* &= \frac{1-\sigma}{p(1+T)} \mathbf{a}_N + \alpha \sigma \mathbf{P} \mathbf{G}^N \mathbf{P}^T \mathbf{y}_N^* \\
(\mathbf{I} - \alpha \sigma \mathbf{P} \mathbf{G}^N \mathbf{P}^T) \mathbf{y}_N^* &= \frac{1-\sigma}{p(1+T)} \mathbf{a}_N \\
\mathbf{P} (\mathbf{I} - \alpha \sigma \mathbf{G}^N) \mathbf{P}^T \mathbf{y}_N^* &= \frac{1-\sigma}{p(1+T)} \mathbf{a}_N \\
\mathbf{y}_N^* &= \frac{1-\sigma}{p(1+T)} \mathbf{P} (\mathbf{I} - \alpha \sigma \mathbf{G}^N)^{-1} \mathbf{P}^T \mathbf{a}_N \tag{7}
\end{aligned}$$

Solving for  $z_N^*$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
z_N^* &= T p \mathbf{1}^T \mathbf{y}_N^* \\
z_N^* &= T p \mathbf{1}^T \left[ \frac{1-\sigma}{p(1+T)} \mathbf{P} (\mathbf{I} - \alpha \sigma \mathbf{G}^N)^{-1} \mathbf{P}^T \mathbf{a}_N \right]
\end{aligned}$$



$$z_N^* = \frac{T(1-\sigma)}{1+T} \mathbf{1}^T (\mathbf{I} - \alpha\sigma\mathbf{G}^N)^{-1} \mathbf{P}^T \mathbf{a}_N \quad (8)$$

The matrix,  $\mathbf{I} - \alpha\sigma\mathbf{G}^N$ , is invertible if  $\alpha\sigma$  is smaller than the inverse of the modulus of the largest eigenvalue of  $\mathbf{G}^N$ . By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, the largest eigenvalue of  $\mathbf{G}^N$  is less than the maximum sum across all rows of  $\mathbf{G}^N$ . The sum of row  $j$  for matrix  $\mathbf{G}^N$  is:  $\frac{[\mathbf{G}]_{j*} \mathbf{1}}{1 + \alpha[\mathbf{G}]_{j*} \mathbf{1}}$ , which monotonically increases with  $[\mathbf{G}]_{j*} \mathbf{1}$  and tends to  $\frac{1}{\alpha}$  as  $[\mathbf{G}]_{j*} \mathbf{1} \rightarrow \infty$ . The modulus of the largest eigenvalue of  $\mathbf{G}^N$  is then less than  $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ . With  $\sigma < 1$  by assumption, the condition for invertibility of  $\mathbf{I} - \alpha\sigma\mathbf{G}^N$  holds.  $\square$

### ***Proof of Theorem 11***

The proof of Theorem 11 is identical to the proof of Theorem 9, except that we make the following parameter substitutions:  $\alpha(j) = \pi + \xi - p_N(j)f$ ,  $\delta = 1$ ,  $\gamma = 0$ , and  $\lambda = \phi$ , and the relevant matrix is  $\mathbf{PGP}^T$ , not  $\mathbf{G}$ . We derive the Nash equilibrium through utility maximization.

Individual  $j$  chooses effort  $e_N(j)$  to maximize the following utility function:

$$\max_{e_N(j)} (\pi + \xi - p_N(j)f) e_N(j) - \frac{1}{2} (e_N(j))^2 + \phi \sum_{k=1}^N [\mathbf{PGP}^T]_{jk} e_N(j) e_N(k).$$

The first-order condition for individual  $j$  is:

$$e_N^*(j) = (\pi + \xi - p_N(j)f) + \phi \sum_{k=1}^N [\mathbf{PGP}^T]_{jk} e_N^*(k).$$

At the population level:

$$\mathbf{e}_N^* = (\pi + \xi) \mathbf{1} - \mathbf{p}_N f + \phi \mathbf{PGP}^T \mathbf{e}_N^*.$$

Solving for  $\mathbf{e}_N^*$ :

$$(\mathbf{I} - \phi \mathbf{PGP}^T) \mathbf{e}_N^* = (\pi + \xi) \mathbf{1} - \mathbf{p}_N f$$

$$\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{I} - \phi \mathbf{G}) \mathbf{P}^T \mathbf{e}_N^* = (\pi + \xi) \mathbf{1} - \mathbf{p}_N f$$

$$\mathbf{e}_N^* = \mathbf{P} (\mathbf{I} - \phi \mathbf{G})^{-1} \mathbf{P}^T [(\pi + \xi) \mathbf{1} - \mathbf{p}_N f].$$

Finally, solving for  $e_{agg}^*$ :

$$e_{agg}^* = \mathbf{1}^T \mathbf{e}_N^* = \mathbf{1}^T (\mathbf{I} - \phi \mathbf{G})^{-1} \mathbf{P}^T [(\pi + \xi) \mathbf{1} - \mathbf{p}_N f].$$

□

## APPENDIX B: REFERENCES

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