

# Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to NATO's Future

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FEW OBSERVERS CHALLENGE the proposition that a tightly coupled security community exists today among the nations of North America, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). No country within this transatlantic region expects to go to war with any other. Apart from Greece and Turkey, none devotes financial or organizational resources to the possibility of war with any other—or, as far as we know, even has military contingency plans for such an eventuality. Observers do differ, however, on whether this security community can be sustained in the new era, let alone expanded, in the absence of the cohesive bond that the Soviet threat once exerted.<sup>1</sup>

NATO is central to all “what now?” considerations concerning the transatlantic security community. In U.S. political circles, especially on Capitol Hill, attention has focused almost entirely on NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe as “the key security question facing the West.”<sup>2</sup> This preoccupation is largely driven by three factors: a widely held belief that expansion is the most effective means of sustaining NATO and, thereby, of maintaining a vital U.S. role in European security relations; a genuine desire to reduce security anxieties of Central and East European states by including them in a broader security community; and, perversely on the part of some in Congress, the belief that, no matter how it is packaged, current scenarios for NATO expansion entail an anti-Russian element.

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In contrast, I argue that deepening the relationship between NATO and the EU is more critical to the long-term future of the transatlantic security community than immediate NATO expansion; that pushing ahead with current plans to admit new NATO members, far from sustaining the transatlantic security community, potentially undermines it; that current expansion plans permit EU members to postpone adjusting their own institutions and practices to accommodate their Eastern neighbors; that a European-led eastward expansion delivers greater promise, poses fewer risks and is more equitable *vis-à-vis* the United States; and that such an overall strategic package is closely in keeping with the initial plans for NATO that its U.S. founders had in mind.

The adoption by NATO's foreign ministers of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept at their Berlin meeting in June 1996 marked an important step in the right direction, as we shall see. But it was just that: one step. It left many pressing questions unanswered and the momentum for at least partial early expansion unimpeded.

The concept of security communities is largely alien to the standard logic of strategic analysis, the conceptual lens through which the future of NATO is typically considered. Hence, I begin by briefly summarizing the main attributes of security communities. I then go on to explore their relationship to the future structure of NATO.

### Security Communities

In the 1950s, when the original six in Europe—France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg—were creating the European Common Market, students of regional integration devised the concept of security community to describe a state of affairs toward which Europe seemed to be heading.<sup>3</sup> A security community was defined as a group of political units whose relationships exhibit “dependable expectations of peaceful change,” that is, the “assurance that members will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”<sup>4</sup> Expectations of peaceful change tended to be most dependable, historical research suggested, the more they reflected cognitive bonds of “we-feeling, trust, and mutual consideration” among the constituent units—a *sense* of community, in short.<sup>5</sup> The development of such bonds, in turn, is aided by a number of background conditions, in particular a “compatibility of the main values” as to the political, economic, and legal institutions and practices.<sup>6</sup>

Historically, security communities have tended to form around “core areas”: at the national level, around Prussia during nineteenth-century

German unification, and around Piedmont during Italian unification; internationally, Sweden was the core of the pluralistic Scandinavian security community that began to take hold in the early years of this century, and the United States has been central to the more tightly coupled transatlantic security community since the 1950s.<sup>7</sup> These core areas take initiatives, act as stabilizers, and provide the potential for mutual economic rewards as well as the high levels and diverse flows of social communications that facilitate the growth of we-feeling and trust.

Security commitments typically follow and complement economic and cultural ties in the formation of security communities. Indeed, military alliances have turned out to be “a relatively poor pathway” unless they have been embedded in a broader project of political, economic, and social integration.<sup>8</sup> The creation of NATO itself followed the Marshall Plan by two years. U.S. policymakers saw the Marshall Plan as the primary vehicle for European postwar reconstruction—its necessary condition, as it were—and only gradually moved toward NATO as a reinforcing security mechanism—the sufficient condition. Similarly, Spain's admission into NATO in 1982 was meant to complement its entry into the European Community (now European Union).

In explaining the existence of the transatlantic security community today, it is difficult to determine precisely the relative causal weights that are attributable to the Soviet threat; transatlantic security commitments; West European economic integration; and common bonds of civil society, market economy, and constitutional democracy. But without the first—the Soviet threat—NATO itself almost certainly would not have been established. Accordingly, it would be astonishing if the significant decline of the external threat were not reflected in demands, on both sides of the Atlantic, for new forms of transatlantic security ties. At the same time, the EU has emerged as a “core area” in its own right, far more capable than in the past to assume roles and generate benefits by which core areas sustain security communities. In short, no issue is more critical to the future viability of the transatlantic security community than realigning the division of responsibilities within NATO between the United States and Western Europe.

### **Strengthening the European Pillar**

As noted above, in the 1950s the United States served as the core area around which a transatlantic security community was constructed. There was no alternative. The United States accounted for roughly half of the world's total economic output, and it was the only nation capable, politically and militarily, of pulling together a Western alliance. Today,

however, with a larger population and economic size than the United States, the EU offers the potential for establishing a more balanced relationship.

Moreover, as François Heisbourg correctly notes, continued success of European unification is *the* critical factor in determining whether Western Europe itself will remain a functioning security community or revert to a pre-1914 balance-of-power system, with all the potential sources of instability that would entail.<sup>9</sup> Outside a successful EU, there is no guarantee that the Franco-German partnership would hold, for example, or that Germany would not pose heightened security concerns in the Eastern half of the continent, including Russia. At best, Western Europe without a successful EU would be fragmented and inward-looking, and it would likely cast doubt on the future of NATO itself.

In addition, the EU is better equipped than NATO to deal with many of the non-military tasks that the United States, in particular, has sought to place on NATO's shoulders *vis-à-vis* Central and Eastern Europe. The benefits of associate status and, even more so, membership—from lower entry barriers for exports to transfer payments—provide the EU with far greater day-to-day leverage over the states in its orbit to reinforce economic and democratic reforms and to encourage the protection of minority rights. And the desire to sustain European integration is by far the most effective deterrent against EU members' being drawn into opposing sides of ethnic or any other kinds of conflicts on the EU's periphery.<sup>10</sup> NATO lacks concrete leverage for such tasks. Indeed, it has shown itself to be incapable of resolving the most serious ethnic conflict among its members (Cyprus), while accommodating member states that have, at one time or another, been decidedly non-democratic in character (Greece and Portugal).

Finally, the quest for NATO membership by Central and East European countries is not driven primarily by specific threats to their security. Poland and Hungary have shortened the terms of military conscription, and the Polish and Czech armies have reduced some divisions and disbanded others—hardly actions of states that feel militarily threatened.<sup>11</sup> Rather, as Czech President Václav Havel has eloquently described it, these countries are asking for affirmation that they belong to the West: "If we in 'postcommunist countries' call for a new order, if we appeal to the West not to close itself off to us, and if we demand a radical reevaluation of the new situation, then this is not because we are concerned about our own security and stability. . . . We are concerned about the destiny [in our countries] of the values and principles that communism denied, and in whose name we resisted communism and ultimately brought it down."<sup>12</sup> But that desire is far more effectively met

by practical economic, social, and political ties with their West European neighbors in the EU than by the mere extension of NATO security guarantees.

In short, these are compelling reasons why policymakers should attend to the challenge of recalibrating the division of responsibilities within NATO between North America and Europe. This challenge is more critical to the future of the transatlantic security community than is NATO enlargement. NATO's European pillar must be strengthened and its relationship with the EU better articulated. What might a new organizing concept look like?

An indivisible transatlantic security link remains essential, for reasons Henry Kissinger puts well: "Without America, Europe turns into a peninsula at the tip of Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium much less unity. . . . Without Europe, America will become an island off the shores of Eurasia condemned to a kind of pure balance-of-power politics that does not reflect its national genius."<sup>13</sup> In addition, the United States possesses military capabilities that even a fully united Europe needs but would be hard pressed to match.<sup>14</sup>

These considerations suggest the desirability of NATO moving toward a division of labor whereby the United States provides security guarantees, strategic systems, limited ground troops, and logistical and intelligence capabilities to a more balanced collective defense and peacekeeping effort, one in which Europe is obliged—and also permitted—to organize itself to play a larger role than is now the case. The June 1996 Berlin meeting of NATO foreign ministers marked real progress in this direction.

Most significantly, the foreign ministers adopted provisions for a new command-and-control concept known as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), first accepted in principle at NATO's January 1994 Brussels summit.<sup>15</sup> The CJTF arrangement is intended to give NATO headquarters structures that are more flexible and forces that are more mobile for contingency operations beyond NATO's traditional collective defense role, inscribed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nucleus staffs for CJTFs will be established by "dual hatting" selected personnel within existing NATO commands.

By facilitating the use of NATO military capabilities and assets in a manner that is "separable but not separate" from NATO's integrated command, CJTFs make it possible for the Western European Union (WEU), the EU's designated defense component, to lead NATO-supported crisis-management and peacekeeping missions, and for these missions to include as participants countries that are neither NATO nor EU member states. (The CJTF arrangement technically is in place in

NATO's Bosnian Peace Implementation Force [IFOR], though the overall operation remains under U.S. command.) Such operations will require unanimous approval by the North Atlantic Council, but not actual participation of all NATO members. At one and the same time, then, CJTFs contribute to diversifying NATO's mission, building a European security and defense identity within NATO, enhancing NATO's Partnership for Peace with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet republics—and, as a result, CJTFs have been a key factor in France's military *rapprochement* with NATO. Small wonder that Robert Hunter, U.S. envoy to NATO, hailed this as “the alliance's most significant modernization.”<sup>16</sup>

Several complex issues remain to be worked out, however, among them the elaboration of European command arrangements within NATO for WEU-led operations and the provision for the identification and release of the “separable but not separate” capabilities and assets to such operations. The most vexing aspect of these issues concerns the role of the United States in WEU-led operations in which the United States plays either a limited or no direct role, and it arises in at least three ways, each more problematic than the previous.

First, many of the assets the WEU would utilize are U.S. assets, including aircraft, communications equipment, and intelligence systems. Acceptable methods for allocating costs and liability will have to be devised but should not prove inordinately difficult. The United States will also want to monitor the use of its assets, however, and the line between monitoring and exacting operational approval is murky. Second, although the United States may not otherwise participate in a mission, the operation of many of these assets will require U.S. personnel. Such differential involvement in missions is bound to generate differences in perceptions of threats and preferences for action—as was the case in the United Nations' Bosnia operation, in which France and Britain, but not the United States, had forces on the ground. Resolving these differences is hardly a trivial task. Third, because any WEU-led contingency operation could escalate and pose a threat to NATO territory, the lines of command of such non-Article 5 operations must lead back seamlessly to NATO's command structure, at the top of which sits a U.S. general whose superiors are in Washington, D.C. It is not clear how far down into WEU-led operations fears about potential escalation will reach.

These potential sources of tension will exist if the United States *supports* a WEU-led contingency operation but elects not to participate in it; a NATO Policy Coordination Group has been established to manage them in actual cases. But what if the United States were *opposed*? In that event, said by the United States to be unlikely, presum-

ably there would be no operation. This arrangement is generally acceptable today because Europe lacks some of the requisite military capabilities and assets for undertaking such operations. But it is difficult to imagine a U.S. veto being part of a permanent solution for the EU's Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) if and as Europe comes to acquire a greater capacity to act.

Moreover, keep in mind that these institutional innovations in NATO concern only non-Article 5 operations—that is, crisis management and peacekeeping, but not the collective defense of NATO's core territory. Two latent issues concerning the scope of ESDI lurk down the road, however, and if they emerge into the open they will implicate Article 5 as well.

As matters now stand, ESDI does not exist in any practical terms apart from the possibility of WEU-led CJTFs, presumably using Eurocorps and other Euro-designated NATO forces.<sup>17</sup> Hence, ESDI is limited to non-Article 5 operations. All EU member states, including France, accept this minimalist ESDI concept at this time. But will they remain satisfied with it when serious anomalies arise? For example, under this concept the EU will remain unable to promise benefits of collective defense to its members who are not also members of NATO—even if they have associated themselves with the WEU, which has its own Article 5 provision and which the Maastricht Treaty designated the EU's defense component.<sup>18</sup> And yet, should NATO expand as planned, EU member states that are also members of NATO will be required to defend new non-EU states. That eventuality poses an acute dilemma: If ESDI remains permanently subordinate to NATO and the EU is obliged to accommodate differential zones of security within it while helping to protect non-members, the EU's own evolution as a political union would be severely truncated. But if the EU were to activate its own collective defense commitments through the WEU it would compete with and threaten to undermine NATO and the transatlantic security ties. NATO planners and policymakers prefer to think of these issues as being premature, so there has been little public discussion of the Herculean task of devising a solution that avoids either extreme.<sup>19</sup>

The other fundamental ESDI-related issue that enters the collective peripheral vision of NATO officialdom from time to time, only to disappear again without much discussion, concerns the role within ESDI of British and French nuclear forces. For example, in January 1992, then-French President François Mitterrand, feeling expansive about the prospects of European security cooperation, mused aloud about a European doctrine for a joint nuclear deterrent.<sup>20</sup> Understandably, in view of conflicted interests in Europe, including in Britain and France, as well

as across the Atlantic, the status quo prevails. If ESDI were to become a greater reality, however, Mitterrand's musings might have to be revisited. But the issue could surface even before then. U.S. analysts in the tradition of *realpolitik* are persuaded that Germany, as part of the process of becoming a "normal" great power, will seek to acquire "the full spectrum of great power capabilities, including nuclear weapons."<sup>21</sup> Germany today shows no such inclination. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine that it could become desirable all around to devise a joint nuclear deterrent as part of ESDI to lock in Germany's present posture. Any movement in that direction would deeply implicate NATO's Article 5.

The issues concerning the relationship between NATO and the EU, then, go to the very heart of both organizations and are truly among the most intellectually complex and politically charged the alliance has ever faced. Serious missteps in any direction could undermine the transatlantic security community. Accordingly, they deserve far more attention than they have received, especially in the United States. Moreover, none of these issues is made easier by NATO expansion, on which U.S. attention has been riveted. In fact, expansion makes several of them all the more difficult to resolve.

### **The Perils of Premature Expansion**

The idea of NATO expansion to include, in the near future, at least Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic enjoys broad bipartisan support in Washington. It is seen as a less pressing issue in most allied capitals in Europe but no NATO member is opposed. The standard arguments, pro and con, are well-rehearsed by now and require only capsule summaries.<sup>22</sup>

Three main arguments have been advanced in favor of expansion. The first contends that it will deter any residual or future threats of Russian aggression in Central and Eastern Europe, and reassure the countries of that region that they will be defended from it. Skeptics counter that this move has all the makings of a self-*un*fulfilling prophecy, potentially creating the very condition it is intended to hedge against. As Philip Zelikow, a former Bush administration official, explains describing one of the three likely early admits: "There are no acute areas of political tension between Poland and Russia, other than those created by the NATO enlargement issue itself."<sup>23</sup>

The second argument in support holds that expansion is necessary to avoid the existence of a security vacuum between Germany and Russia—an area Kissinger has described as a strategic "no-man's land."<sup>24</sup> Skeptics respond that the notion of a security vacuum is a metaphor,

not a well-tested hypothesis, and thus is a dubious guide to policy. Moreover, by including a small number of new states within its defense perimeter, NATO would specifically exclude and, thereby, possibly degrade the security of others that have greater reason to be worried to start with—notably the Baltic states and Ukraine. No current scenario for NATO expansion includes these countries. The term “Koreanization” has gained currency to depict this result, referring to Dean Acheson’s failure, in his January 1950 National Press Club speech, explicitly to include South Korea within the U.S. defensive perimeter.

The third argument has to do with locking in democratic gains and economic reforms as well as containing ethnic conflicts. We have already noted that NATO lacks instruments to accomplish these tasks whereas the promise of EU membership offers considerable leverage. Skeptics add that Russians left behind in the former Soviet republics constitute by far the strategically most significant ethnic minority in the entire region—again, most notably in the Baltics and Ukraine. Current plans for NATO expansion would do nothing to relieve that problem and, on the contrary, could worsen it by encouraging nationalist factions in Moscow to demand greater protection for ethnic Russians in the “near abroad” as NATO advances toward them.

Faced with these not insubstantial rejoinders, proponents of NATO expansion have begun to think seriously about, and propose solutions for, the second-order problems their recommended expansion would create. These proposals consist largely of special arrangements, programs, and promises for the excluded areas, the security of which NATO expansion might worsen. Some proposals also consider an agreement or even a treaty with Russia to attenuate the domestic political problems NATO expansion is bound to pose there.<sup>25</sup> These proposals would merit consideration if the security rationale for immediate NATO expansion were compelling. On balance, however, it is difficult to reach that conclusion. In addition, whereas promises to the Baltic states and possibly to Ukraine might gain congressional support, any meaningful agreement with Russia is more problematic precisely because NATO expansion appeals to some in Congress on anti-Russian grounds.

Further, NATO’s Partnership for Peace, which began as an expedient, has become a permanent fixture of considerable practical utility. It comprises all Central and East European states as well as the former Soviet republics, including Russia; it carries out joint military planning and exercises and has developed other means to adapt the national military forces and equipment of interested partner states to NATO standards; it encourages civilian control over militaries; and several part-

ner states, including Russia, participate in IFOR. NATO's June 1996 Berlin meeting agreed to further enhance the partnership. Early NATO expansion to include a few of the partners could jeopardize these gains for many. That risk might be worth taking if the rationale in favor of admitting the few were compelling, but it is not.

It should be noted that few of the risks attending the projection of Western security guarantees eastward—in particular, the danger of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy with regard to Russia, and potentially worsening the security situation of excluded states—are posed by a European-led process: via the WEU, or by EU enlargement coupled with simultaneous NATO expansion. It is the centrality of the U.S. component of a NATO-only expansion that creates the problems. Clearly, a WEU-led process would require that further progress first be made on some of the unresolved ESDI issues discussed above. And EU enlargement would require the West Europeans to pay the greater price. But the ESDI changes are desirable in their own right, as we have seen. And there is every reason to expect Western Europe to take responsibility for integrating the East, just as the United States did for Western Europe in the postwar years.

This last point suggests the next. All the attention that the possibility of NATO expansion has attracted has let the EU off the hook. Opening up EU markets to the exports of Central and East European countries would do more to support their economic and political transitions than any act or utterance by NATO. No single external measure would do more to sustain reforms in Poland than reform of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy. Yet U.S. policymakers as well as leaders in Central and Eastern Europe have blandly accepted the EU's contention that its enlargement is so complex and so costly that, *ipso facto*, it cannot take place for some years. As Zelikow shrewdly observes: "It is hard to avoid the impression that NATO membership is valued [by East and West Europeans alike] mainly as an alternative, largely symbolic gesture of inclusion . . ." <sup>26</sup> Washington's bipartisan triumphalist attitude toward NATO expansion permits Europe to get away with this.

Finally, as currently planned, NATO expansion would pose a potential threat to NATO's most distinctive feature, historically unprecedented for any alliance: the credibility of its Article 5 commitment that an attack against one will be viewed as an attack against all, triggering the appropriate collective response. Recall that even during the cold war, facing a common enemy, and with five U.S. divisions on the central front backed by a vast and lethal arsenal of nuclear weapons, NATO witnessed a running debate about the extent of the U.S. commitment to

Europe—whether the United States would risk New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles for Paris, Rome, or London. Why should anyone believe that the United States would do so now for Warsaw, Budapest, or Prague?

NATO has five options to deal with this problem. First, it can suspend or eliminate Article 5 obligations altogether, as recommended recently by a former Clinton administration official.<sup>27</sup> Doing so would be a radical step because it would deprive NATO of the very feature that makes it unique—and of the indivisible security link between the United States and Europe. Second, NATO can ignore the problem and knowingly accept the fact that Article 5 commitments to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not credible. But doing that would undermine the indivisibility of Article 5 guarantees throughout the alliance. Third, NATO can extend partial commitments to Central and East European states that would not include Article 5 guarantees. It is unclear what the East would be getting, though, that it does not already have through the Partnership for Peace. Fourth, NATO can extend full commitments and undertake measures to enhance their credibility. But most advocates of NATO expansion are not prepared to recommend the most credible means of accomplishing that end—the physical coupling provided by placing NATO troops, including U.S. personnel, on the new frontlines—because that, clearly, would be too provocative toward Russia, and too costly, besides.

That leaves the European option. If extending NATO's Article 5 obligations lacks credibility in part because there is no common enemy to defend *against*, an EU-led expansion would redirect the focus onto what its member states should be prepared to defend one another *for*: a European community not merely in a metaphorical sense, and no longer strictly in an aspirational sense, but increasingly in terms of the grubby details of everyday existence. A greater capacity for the EU to pursue a broader array of collective security tasks through the WEU—utilizing NATO's CJTFs for the foreseeable future—would become one of those grubby details.

In sum, our examination of the issues attending NATO expansion also points to the desirability of strengthening NATO's European pillar. It suggests an expansion strategy that is West European-driven, tied to EU accession. Such a strategy holds greater practical promise for the East and poses fewer risks, East or West. What is more, as we shall see next, it would also be more consistent with long-standing U.S. objectives in Europe, which have been not to dominate but to transform its international politics.

## **The Past as Prologue**

The fact that the United States came to the defense of Western Europe after World War II, despite its interwar isolationism, was not startling; the United States, too, felt threatened by the prospect of Soviet expansion. But the form of the U.S. initiative was unusual.<sup>28</sup> In responding to West European security needs, President Harry S. Truman had several means available, each of which would have satisfied Europe and served notice on the Soviets: U.S. unilateral security guarantees to one, several, or an organization of European states; U.S. bilateral alliances with the most directly threatened West European states; a “dumbbell” model, whereby a guarantee or treaty would have linked North American and European alliances; or an arrangement that promised equal protection under a common security umbrella for an indivisible grouping of states, including the United States, by far the most demanding form. Truman chose the last. Why? Because together with the impetus of the Marshall Plan, Truman believed, this arrangement would best succeed in transforming the European order: making it economically and militarily better able to take care of itself and rendering it less war-prone—as well as less likely, therefore, to drag the United States into yet another European war.

General Dwight David Eisenhower pursued similar aims. As the first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe he was an early and ardent advocate of a unified European Defense Community (EDC)—indeed, more so than most European leaders—and he helped persuade President Truman of its desirability. As president himself, Eisenhower pushed actively for its establishment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff came to accept EDC, as did Congress, which proposed to make military aid to EDC countries conditional on the adoption of EDC. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the North Atlantic Council in 1953 that if Europe failed to ratify EDC, “grave doubts” would arise in the United States concerning the future of European security, and that the United States would be obliged to undertake an “agonizing reappraisal” of its role in Europe.<sup>29</sup> After EDC’s defeat in the French National Assembly, the allies quickly reached consensus on restoring German sovereignty and rearming it within an institutionally more robust NATO. But Eisenhower did not abandon his earlier aspirations. He turned to nuclear energy as a vehicle for European security integration, facilitating the creation of EURATOM, the European Union’s atomic energy community. He also planned ways of sharing nuclear weapons with the NATO allies, and toward the end of his second term he apparently explored

ways of providing an independent nuclear force to a NATO consortium of France, Britain, and West Germany.<sup>30</sup>

It was John F. Kennedy's administration that coined the phrase "strengthening NATO's European pillar"—ironically, *after* reversing its predecessors' policies that had been aimed at precisely that objective. The reversal had to do largely with the strategic management of nuclear weapons. The Kennedy team devised doctrines that were very different from Eisenhower's "massive retaliation"—"to blow hell out of them in a hurry if they start anything," as Eisenhower once explained it.<sup>31</sup> The new doctrine of "flexible response" was far more complex and subtle, and required far greater centralization of control over nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara criticized independent European nuclear deterrents in a major policy statement delivered at Ann Arbor, Mich., in 1962, on the grounds that they were incompatible with the requirements of fighting "restrained" nuclear wars.<sup>32</sup> This new nuclear policy generated corresponding institutional shifts in NATO's command arrangements. Further U.S.-induced moves toward what is today called a European security and defense identity stopped. And France subsequently pulled out of NATO's military structure.

But that chapter in strategic history ended in 1989. European security no longer hinges on the centralized management of a balance of terror. Many of its dictates, therefore, have lost their meaning, many of its mindsets their relevance. Accordingly, the United States can now safely move in the direction of a new Truman–Eisenhower–style posture toward European security and the Atlantic alliance. The key is to build up NATO's European pillar—both for its own sake and to help project stability into Central and Eastern Europe.

## Conclusion

NATO is expected to announce a process for accession negotiations sometime in 1997—with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic being the countries most likely to be admitted in a first round. One hopes that a serious policy debate in Washington will take place before then. With but very few exceptions—retiring Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) being one—broad bipartisan euphoria perversely coupled with a lingering anti-Russian sentiment seems to have built an irresistible momentum in favor of expansion, without first asking the kinds of fundamental questions raised here. NATO is no minor agency, like some in the United Nations system. It's the real thing. It concerns issues of war and peace like no other institution before it. Its future shape is of

monumental importance to the future of the transatlantic security community, itself historically unique.

The U.S. Congress may yet become seized by the projected price-tag of membership by the three proposed early admits: \$42 billion over 10 years, according to a RAND study.<sup>33</sup> But other dimensions of NATO's future are even more serious, as I have attempted to show. Simply put, the cart now is before the horse. Further steps toward enhancing the EU's capacity to act in its own defense is the more important proximate task, and expansion should be more of a European-led process. That approach is strategically wiser and more equitable to the United States, and is better positioned, therefore, to sustain the transatlantic security community in the long run.

### Notes

1. Hyper-realists hold that collapse is inevitable: "The political 'West' is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile 'East' to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy." Owen Harries, "The Collapse of the West," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993), p. 42; also see John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (Fall 1990). For less extreme but equally doubtful realist views, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Emerge," *International Security* 17 (Spring 1993), and Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18 (Fall 1993).
2. Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe," *International Security* 18 (Summer 1993), p. 10.
3. The classic study is Karl W. Deutsch et. al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). For a suggestive update of the framework, see Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, "Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities," *Ethics & International Affairs* 10 (1996).
4. Deutsch et. al., *Political Community*, p. 5.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 46 and 66.
7. Deutsch and his colleagues distinguished between "amalgamated" and "pluralistic" security communities: those that become one single entity, and those that maintain the separate identities of their constituent units. NATO's Article 5 commitments and integrated military command structure do not fit neatly into this typology. NATO goes well beyond the normal pluralistic security community though it is not intended to comprise the amalgamated form. Hence I use the term "tightly coupled."
8. Deutsch et. al., p. 190.
9. François Heisbourg, "The Future of the Atlantic Alliance: Whither NATO, Whether NATO?" *The Washington Quarterly* 15, no. 2 (Spring 1992).
10. When the Yugoslav crisis broke out in 1991, Germany supported Slovenia and Croatia, France the Yugoslav federation and, thus, Serbia. After Germany's precipitous recognition of Croatia, which led Bosnia-Herzegovina to seek immediate recognition, Germany and France, as described by a Danish observer, "spent half

a year talking each other into a joint position, which was not very impressive and not of much help to the Yugoslav peoples, but it had the one big merit of encapsulating the conflict, of preventing it from spreading and pulling in more powers." Ole Waeber, "The European Security Triangle" working paper (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1995), pp. 8–9.

11. See Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," *Survival* 37 (Spring 1995), p. 37.
12. Václav Havel, "A Call for Sacrifice," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994), p. 4.
13. Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now," *Washington Post*, December 19, 1994, p. A27.
14. These include, as John Duffield enumerates, "satellite surveillance; command, control, communication, and intelligence; logistics; long-range airlift and sealift; all-weather aviation; amphibious capabilities; large-deck aircraft carriers; and missile defenses." John S. Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 109 (Winter 1994–95), p. 781.
15. "Final Communiqué," Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-1 (96) 63, June 3, 1996. For a technical summary of the CJTF concept, see Charles Barry, "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," *Survival* 38 (Spring 1996).
16. Quoted by Joseph Fitchett, "New Look for NATO: A Balance of Strategic Aims," *International Herald Tribune*, June 4, 1996, p. 7.
17. The Eurocorps originated as a Franco-German brigade in 1990; it has since been joined by Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain. Eurocorps is now 50,000-strong and held its first maneuvers in November 1994. Also in 1994, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain agreed to form a Mediterranean air and sea contingent called Euroforce; and Britain and France agreed to establish a joint airborne command.
18. Once NATO was established, the original WEU members also became members of NATO and delegated to NATO the task of collective defense. New EU members are eligible for WEU membership whether or not they are NATO members. But to avoid the chain-reaction effect of NATO obligations being triggered by its members' WEU commitments to non-NATO states, the two organizations have agreed to operate on the understanding that no eligible state will seek full membership in the WEU unless it is also prepared to join NATO. The newest EU members (Austria, Finland and Sweden) are not NATO members, and so remain WEU observers.
19. Not surprisingly, the most trenchant questions have been raised by French security specialists; see, for instance, Nicole Gnesotto, "Common European Defence and Transatlantic Relations," *Survival* 38 (Spring 1996).
20. See "La force d'Euro-frappe?" *Economist*, January 18, 1992, p. 48.
21. Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," p. 37; Waltz, in "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," concurs that this is likely.
22. The most thorough case for immediate expansion has been made by the RAND team of Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993), and "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," *Survival* 37 (Spring 1995); the most incisive case against, arguing that possible future expansion should be strictly contingent on future Russian actions, by Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion."
23. Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions," *Survival* 38 (Spring 1996), p. 13.
24. Henry Kissinger, "Not This Partnership," *Washington Post*, November 24, 1993, p. A17.
25. For proposals concerning the excluded areas, see Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C.

- Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," *Survival* 38 (Summer 1996); and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine's Balancing Act," in the same volume. For Russia, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Bigger—and Safer—Europe," *New York Times*, December 1, 1993, p. A23, and Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now."
26. Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions," p. 15.
  27. Charles A. Kupchan, "Reviving the West," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 3 (May/June 1996).
  28. For a fuller discussion of U.S. postwar objectives and their relevance to current international security relations, see John Gerard Ruggie, *Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), chaps. 3–4.
  29. See Brian R. Duchin, "The 'Agonizing Reappraisal': Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community," *Diplomatic History* 16 (Spring 1992).
  30. Based on new archival material, Steve Weber argues that Eisenhower "intended that [a NATO nuclear] consortium evolve into an integrated and independent nuclear force for the European NATO allies." Weber, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 258.
  31. Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 150.
  32. For a good discussion of these and related strategic innovations, see Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
  33. Quoted in "A New Kind of Alliance?" *Economist*, June 1, 1996, p. 21.