We are delighted to provide an introduction to this reissue of Beyond the Nation State (BNS). BNS is widely regarded as a classic, and is worthy of republication. Its reissue also has a profoundly personal dimension for the authors of this introduction. This introduction describes BNS and locates it in its broader impact. It is written, unavoidably, with a strong sense of hindsight, and even deja-vu. The authors cannot escape presenting their interpretations of BNS in light of their own experiences, and their own understandings of the evolution of work on European integration, comparative politics and IR more generally.

We four represent successive generations who have been influenced by the work of Ernst B. Haas and are delighted to provide collectively an introduction to this reissue of Beyond the Nation State. Of all of the books produced by Haas during his career, this one contains the most complete and definitive statement of "neo-functionalism," the theory of trans-national integration for which he is best known in the profession of political science. Ironically, it is not about European integration – the case to which his theory has been most applied – but about the role and contribution of the International Labor Organization (ILO). This may explain why so many scholars working on the European Union (EU) have referred exclusively to his earlier work, The Uniting of Europe, despite the fact that BNS provides a much clearer version of the neo-functional approach.

For all of us writing this introduction, the occasion has a profoundly personal dimension. In different ways, our contact with Haas – whether supervised by him at the University of California in Berkeley (Schmitter and Ruggie), whether reared by him and his wife, Hildegarde, as their son (Haas) or whether influenced indirectly by his approach to European integration (Wiener) – was unforgettable. We are all transformed as persons and scholars by his presence.

Philippe C. Schmitter is the eldest of the group. He arrived in Berkeley in 1961 from the University of Geneva. Stanley Hoffman, a visiting professor in Geneva in 1959, had concluded that Schmitter was temperamentally unsuited for Harvard where Hoffman usually taught and suggested that Schmitter might do better at Berkeley with Haas. After arriving without the proverbial cent and having started by taking Haas’ nationalism course, Haas quite unexpectedly offered Schmitter a job as his research assistant. This had nothing to do with Schmitter’s substantive
qualifications (which were nil), but with the fact that Haas had learned somewhere that Schmitter spoke Spanish. Haas had the strange idea of trying to apply neo-functionalism to the recently formed Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), which Schmitter did not even know existed! Schmitter can still remember coming out of his office elated at his new status (and relative affluence) and being greeted by a fellow graduate student with horror. He was immediately informed that Haas was well known as a very demanding scholar and mentor — and that few students managed to meet his standards.

One of Schmitter’s first tasks, in addition to doing interviews in Mexico and Central America, was to do the index for BNS. In those days, this was a painstaking job, but it did have the side-effect of making him excruciatingly familiar with the text. It influenced his entire academic career, even though it was not until thirty years later when he took a position at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence that he applied it to an effort to understand the process of European integration. To this day — and despite a virtual avalanche of criticism from competing approaches — Schmitter considers himself a “neo-functionalist” (or, better, a “neo-neo-functionalist”) and has done what he can to defend the legacy of Haas.

Ruggie arrived in Berkeley in the fall of 1967 from then tiny McMaster University in Canada, which had never before sent a political science student on to a major U.S. graduate school. Like Schmitter, he arrived penniless, supported for the moment by his wife, Mary, who delayed her own studies in order to do so (they are still married, and she also now teaches at Harvard). It was an auspicious time — and not only because of the Bay area “summer of love” scene in 1967. Of more immediate relevance to Ruggie was the fact that Haas was in a post-BNS exploratory mode, looking for his “newest new thing.” At the global level, it would not be integration but a looser form of “systems change” or “transformation.” And the possible drivers of such change that had begun to interest Haas were the arrival of science, technology, and ecology on the international policy agenda.

Ruggie encountered this probing (though still intimidating) Haas in his famed “220” class, a brutally rigorous introduction to IR theory. Things happened in quick succession thereafter. Ruggie excelled at theorizing (which his wife only half-jokingly explains by his having had few toys as an impoverished child, and therefore needing to use his imagination), and he had been exposed to Marshall McLuhan as an undergraduate and began to speculate about the relationship between the respective impact of print and electronic media on prevailing forms of political organization.² By the end of the first term, Haas had arranged a five-year fellowship for Ruggie, and within a year they co-taught an experimental course on science, technology and world order. Eventually Ruggie became an Assistant Professor at Berkeley, where they co-edited a special issue of International Organization (Ruggie and Haas, 1975), in which Ruggie introduced the concepts of international regimes, epistemic communities, and non-hierarchical authority relations in international governance, laying the groundwork for them both subsequently to go on and “discover” that they were doing social constructivism.
The irony is that Ruggie came to fully appreciate the earlier Haas only after 1997, when the newly elected United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked him to join his executive staff as Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning, a position Annan created specifically for him. It was a wide-ranging portfolio, but one core challenge stood out: to design initiatives that would reflect Annan’s vision for the United Nations and find ways to gain support for them by discordant member states. Almost reflexively, Ruggie found himself drawing on Haasian maxims about upgrading the common interest, delinking and re-linking the technical dimensions of issues from their power-political and distributional effects, engaging different stakeholders in the policy process at different stages, utilizing the best available knowledge base to constrain the range of policy options, and strategically deploying the normative resources of the position of Secretary-General. Among the most noteworthy results were the adoption by a UN summit in 2000 of the Millennium Development goals, which brought renewed focus and energy to the global fight against poverty; and the creation of the UN Global Compact, now the world’s largest corporate responsibility initiative, engaging more than 3,500 corporations and civil society organizations in nearly 70 countries to promote UN principles in the areas of human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption (Ruggie 2002). It was a moment of pride for Haas when Annan was awarded the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize for “bringing new life to the organization.” Although he and Annan never met, Haas conveyed to Ruggie his pleasure and satisfaction at having seen a familiar strategic approach to inducing progressive international change.

Peter M. Haas (PMH) is the son of Ernst Haas. While never studying with him, and in fact never having understood much of his father’s publications until after graduate school and after having read many of the original material from which both have derived their insights, he considers himself much of a fellow traveler down the roads of constructivism and social science more generally. He played an off stage role in BNS: BNS was originally designed to be a comparative study of the ILO and the FAO, but because Peter developed persistent bronchitis in the Geneva winter during Ernie’s sabbatical conducting field research, they had to return home prematurely and the FAO research was never completed, perhaps to the delight of those who worked their way through the difficult 595 pages of BNS.

Wiener had been introduced to Ernie Haas twice, so to speak. The first meeting was coincidental, a meeting at Berkeley as a student of Philippe Schmitter’s in the early 1990s. The second meeting was a decade later and virtual. It was initiated by Ernie’s reaction to the emergence of The Social Construction of Europe (Christiansen, Joergensen and Wiener 1999). He had been discussing this constructivist approach to integration with his students and subsequently claimed a part in the constructivist project. His intervention led to a contribution (Haas 2001) to the extended reprint of the Social Construction of Europe (Christiansen et al. 2001). And it is indeed the shared interest in empirical research to study social facts, applying insights from political sociology and sociological political thought while using political theory to test and scrutinise other theoretical claims
out there, as well as the rejection of systems theories, and neorealist beliefs in the predominance of material resources which did create an interface between the constructivist research programme in the 1990s and the neofunctionalist approach to international organizations that had been pioneered by Haas and others in the 1960s. The republication of *BNS* is therefore a timely contribution to today’s debate about international relations theory.

This new introduction to *BNS* is also an extended family effort in a way which Ernie would have appreciated. The original cover art to the 1964 Stanford University Press volume, reproduced here on the inside of the front cover, was designed by Ernie’s wife Hildegarde, a professional artist. Introduction co-authors Ruggie and Schmitter are among Ernie’s most prominent students, and were regarded by Ernie as being part of his extended intellectual family. Schmitter, Ruggie and Peter Haas all collaborated with Haas in various efforts. (Haas and Schmitter 1964; Haas and Ruggie 1975, 1982; Haas and Haas 1995; Haas 2001; Haas and Haas 2002; Haas and Haas 2002; Haas 2004; Ruggie 2005; Schmitter 2005). Thus the introduction combines an emotional and intellectual community which he came to regard as being the appropriate model for conducting meaningful social science.

Figure 1: *Beyond the Nation State* Citation Count

BNS has been and is again regarded as a classic in comparative politics, international relations and studies of European Integration. Though interest fell off in the 1980s as European integration seemed to have foundered, it enjoyed a renaissance with the end of the cold war, reinvigorated European integration, resumed interest in communitarian theorizing, and efforts to theorize about forms of global governance which relied on a heightened role for international institutions and their associated policy communities. The graph of citations on the previous page demonstrates its lasting significance.

WHAT WAS BEYOND THE NATION STATE?

BNS was published in 1964, but it was also part of larger project which animated Haas throughout his career. This project has been called by others: “neofunctionalism,” “regional integration,” and “soft constructivism.” (Schmitter et al 2005; Ruggie 2005; Haas 2001, 2004 pp xiii-lvi). It anticipates much of what is currently studied under the rubric of “global governance.”

The specific focus of BNS was the International Labor Organization (ILO). BNS was one of the first efforts to analyze systematically the dynamics of and effects of a global international institution. Haas explicitly asked “is the functional activity of international organizations leading the world towards a system in which the nation-states will have been superseded, how the “normal aims and expectations of nations can be related to a process of growing international integration” and what kind of organization is best suited to “maximize” this process.” He chose the ILO, because it had a lengthy history and because its mission focused on the functional area which was most closely aligned with social forces involved in European integration: workers rights, the relationship between labor and capital, and how the welfare state would compensate labor for economic adjustments occurring through the broader process of trans-national economic integration. His analysis focussed on the consensus developed about the ILO’s mission prevailing among its member states and its staff. He also considered the independence of the organization’s international secretariat and executive head, in light of the exercise of interests and control by national governments. He concluded that the ILO was able to develop a meaningful body of labor law by coordinating the interaction of these actors.

While he chose his case for its potential generalizability, in retrospect, the ILO seems more sui generis, both in terms of its multi-actor governance structure and its tumultuous (even revolutionary) origins in the post-World War I period. Still, with the benefit of hindsight, we can recognize that analyzing the ILO constituted a plausibility probe of exploiting public-private cooperation in “global governance“ – something that was virtually unimaginable in the world of 1964.

Yet, Haas concluded that, despite some successes, the ILO was unable to transcend the politics of its national governments and broader political and historical environment. Creative leadership by its Executive and Secretariat was limited,
because the member constituencies of labor, management and government lacked a common set of ideological and material preferences and interests. Consequently, consensus within it was based, in Robert Cox's words, on the "lowest common denominator of neutral technical services" rather than the formation of goals that transcended national politics. Thus he cautioned against the unqualified faith of many students of international organizations (IOs) in their capacity to promote progress, and advocated paying stricter attention to the conflicting objective of national polities within such organizations.

Granted, the ILO seemed especially favored by its distinctive membership structure that included non-state actors from organized labor and capital. In many ways, BNS captured the beginnings of the effort in the 1990s to draft and enforce global labor standards. Subsequently, some other IOs have borrowed this novel approach to membership. The United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) (with standing observers from labor and capital and academia), and the World Conservation Union (formerly the International Union for the Conservation of Nature: (IUCN) with voting members from states, NGOs and the scientific community) are two cases in point, although they remain to be studied by IO specialists.

Throughout his career, Haas was a rationalist – even if he had little sympathy with those who later would attempt to formalize this engagement. He urged rigor and reasoned argument in political analysis, although he never believed in the rational choice enterprise which ascribed a narrow form of rationality to the interests of political actors. He believed normatively in the promise of the Enlightenment – that collective reason and learning could replace narrow calculations of national interest, political passion, and nationalist prejudice as a means for improving decision making. He was obviously aware that this would not always happen, but he aspired to identify conditions under which such shifts in collective human behavior could occur "beyond the nation-state." In BNS he focused on the generic role of international organizations in this broader historical project and in his subsequent work he shifted more and more to the national and intergovernmental levels – perhaps, because of the limitations he observed not only in the ILO, but also in the EEC.

His project looked at the cumulation of social forces across levels of analysis, leading, ultimately and under highly specified conditions, to human betterment and peace. Trans-national economic and political forces could change individual and collective understandings and lead to better cooperative outcomes – what he called "upgrading the common interest". These were very unlikely in the context of orthodox international relations – whether bilateral or multilateral. The 1958 Uniting of Europe had already looked at the social and economic ("functionalist") forces behind regional integration, and captured the emergent political motivations that led leaders to dismantle barriers to exchange and construct supra-national institutions to govern their effects. He thought that though increased commerce and communication aided the intercession of IOs, to administer the processes of exchange and to apply pressure on national elites (and, occasionally on publics)
more secular and comprehensive solutions could be found that would benefit a larger number of people across previously impervious national borders.

At the heart of his project was his appreciation that politicians in post-World War II Europe had engaged in an unprecedented experiment by designing laws and focusing expectations on increasing the flow of goods, services and peoples across borders, as well as to pool their political resources in regulating markets and governing joint initiatives. He then looked more broadly at the role of global IOs and their respective secretariats in crafting these grand ideas and selling them to national political elites. This framework included careful attention to actors below the level of the state. The overall process of transcending the nation-state had multiple non-deterministic steps. Haas was reluctant to call it irreversible, because he was acutely aware of the contingent role of choice, and the continuing possibility of unpleasant surprises and unanticipated consequences. Despite his attachment to the notion of “spillover” from one issue areas to another, he eschewed the language of “lock-in.” However, there were identifiable steps:

1) Development of new goals, such as through Jean Monnet’s project to create formal structures linking post-war Germany and France.

2) Emergence of new processes to activate, mobilize or consolidate political elites, not just to the original project but also to “functionally adjacent” ones.

3) The role of IO secretariats and leadership in promoting the initial ideas, monitoring subsequent performance and generating further collective commitments.

4) The role of non-state actors, as well as IO secretariats, in exploiting unanticipated political constituencies behind the project.

While this dynamic of “spill-over” may seem to be a “lock-in” process through social psychological, legal and political mechanisms, Haas was even more aware in BNS than in his Uniting of Europe that the project of “rational transcendence” could be subject to exogenous shocks, leadership changes and nationalistic eruptions. Moreover, not all unanticipated consequences can be exploited for integrative purposes.

In his project, Haas benefited from having several high profile interlocutors. They helped him to hone his arguments, and provided him with more extensive attention within the academy. First and foremost, he challenged Karl Deutsch about the dynamics behind regional integration. Haas focused on collective political agency and the regional institutions to which trans-national economic and social forces were being directed; whereas Deutsch took a more strictly structuralist view of the forces of “social communication.” Haas also took on orthodox “realists” in the discipline of international relations, especially through an ongoing debate with Stanley Hoffman. Hoffmann argued that the Gaullist insistence on national sovereignty was no fluke and that, regardless of success in the “low politics” of economic and social coordination, this would have little or no impact on the “high politics” defended by nation states. Haas denied the clarity of the separation of domains and predicted that it could (and would) be overcome in the case of European integration. Haas had a distinctive and self-effacing approach to the
task of theorizing. He always denied having an explicit grand theory and was sus-
picious of all such efforts, both because they were overly systemic and because
they tended to deny any role for strategic calculation and human agency. His work
may have constituted a sort of "prolegomenon" to an eventual grand theory, but
this was more evident to some of his readers than to him. He did espouse a coher-
ent set of assumptions and concepts from which he drew powerful (and potential-
ly falsifiable) hypotheses. He did expect to see recurrent patterns of behavior
when specified conditions were satisfied – although like most social and political
scientists he was not very explicit about the timeframe within which they were
expected to produce their effects. Haas was unusually attentive to the role played
by unanticipated consequences – perhaps because he was so conscious of the
experimental and unprecedented nature of transnational integration. He also
emphasized the impact that organizations deliberately crafted and circumscribed
by nation states could have upon non-governmental associations, movements and
unions representing self-interested classes, sectors and professionals within them.
In BNS, he documents how the ILO was able to catalyze a network of non-state
organizations around issues of labor in Europe and beyond.

Haas's oeuvre rests on five recurrent themes, especially when viewed through IR
lenses. Combining these themes provides the foundations for his cosmology that
extend beyond his self-consciously limited efforts to develop middle-range theories
restricted to specific domains of global and regional international relations.

Haas' Cosmology
1. Actors construct
2. IR theorists, working within research programs, construct mod-
els/explanations of actors' constructions
3. IR theorists, engaging in inter-paradigm debates, find ways of reconciling
disagreements within their ranks
4. IR theorists circulate their understanding to policy makers
5. Human betterment occurs

Fitting his writings into their underlying framework – his macro construction –
suggests that when similar processes of forming consensual knowledge by com-
munities of experts and also by communities of IR theorists (keeping these social
groupings separate), steps 1–4 may actually cumulate to that Holy Grail of #5.
Guidelines for how cumulative knowledge may and should emerge in both these
realms is suggestively described and advocated in the works of such writers as
Stephen Toulmin, Donald Campbell, and Larry Laudan.

Contra IR realism, he had faith that it is possible to avoid war and improve
social welfare, in terms of prosperity, justice and ecological sustainability,
through the collective exercise of reason. He regarded the form of reasoning
embodied in technical activities, and the activity of those involved in technical
policy-making as important mechanisms in modern political societies by which
such construction occurs. This view is akin, it seems, to Albert Hirschman's work
on the early advocates of capitalism as reformers who were trying to harness aggressive human impulses. International institutions that are porous and open to epistemic communities, among other things, are more likely to come to frame issues in a rational mode with which he was comfortable and preferred. He believed that if epistemic community members and policy advocates follow these injunctions, the potential exists for better policies, in the sense that they are technically warranted and will achieve their putative goals, as well as being politically attractive and likely to be applied. If decision-making institutions are designed in ways that allow for the provision of new consensual understanding then new consensual knowledge can contribute to human betterment. (Hirschman 1997)

*BNS* fit into two parts of this broad cosmology: studying how actors construct policy and how IOs may help IR theorists circulate their understandings to policy makers. Counter to the standard liberal and realist approaches, and the administrative and legal studies of IOs, Haas made several moves in *BNS*: 1) he separated the pursuit of power from the pursuit of welfare, 2) he separated various governmental tasks into discrete functional elements (military-defense vs. economic-abundance tasks), 3) he established a crucial distinction between the political and the technical domains (now collapsed in many circles out of a recognition of the political consequence of technical decisions and practices), 4) he treated loyalties as being created by functions, and thus shifts in loyalty could result from transfer of functions.

The national interest is never given objectively to decision makers or to analysts. He used to say that “the national interest doesn’t grow on trees.” The ‘national interest’ can be treated as a discursive trope which is used by politicians to justify executive decisions to a democratic electorate, and thus subject to critical treatment. (Wolfers 1962 ch 10) This stance problematizes state interests, challenging notions that state preferences can be defined by mechanical derivation from unchanging state interests, and providing room for mechanisms of broader social change through learning (and other means of aspirational change). By specifying the roles of different groups (sectors, firms, and later experts) he is better able to specify state interests, and the political processes by which they are formulated.³

THE ENDURING CONTRIBUTIONS OF *BNS*

*BNS* made a number of contributions to social science. It brought a novel and progressive research program that was more scientifically rigorous than others at the time in the study of international organization, although it was not widely understood. It provided core assumptions, fruitful hypotheses, guidelines for subsequent research, and some surprising findings which have continued to shape the field. Its only competitor, David Mitrany’s 1943 *A Working Peace System* paid much less attention to the political interactions between the national and supra-national levels and was much less explicit about the predicted outcome.

*BNS* reflected an early appreciation of the role of IOs as actors or agents in
their own right. This insight came to inform many subsequent studies of international organizations, most notably Cox and Jacobson’s *Anatomy of Influence* (1973). The study of IOs as independent actors exercising agency partially independently of member states was further developed by Haas later in his career (Haas 1990) in which he identified the organizational properties which facilitated learning and expansion beyond the initial missions and endowments conferred by member states. He considered the role of the executive head, the extent of budgetary autonomy from member states, the absence of major political cleavages among the member states, the professionalism of secretariat staff (i.e. relevant degrees and recruitment based on merit), and the porousness of institutional boundaries that allowed them to quickly draw lessons and advice from broader policy networks. Patterns of learning would also clearly vary based on the political and technical capabilities of the targets. Peter M. Haas later elaborated a taxonomy of the organizational methods by IOs to promote diffusion of learning along the dimensions of democratic vs. non democratic and strong vs. weak states. (Haas 2003 pp 263–267)

From the BNS perspective, what John Ruggie calls the neo-utilitarian turn in institutionalist analysis marks a retrograde development in the study of international organization. The political economy assumptions underpinning the rational design of international institutions study (Koremenos, Lipson *et al* 2001) and the application of Principal Agency (P-A) theory to the study of international organizations (Hawkins 2006; Hawkins, Lake *et al* 2006) deny IOs any autonomy by assuming that all institutions are strategically controlled by their members. The resulting tendency to assert that every change in the dependent variable is driven by strategic choices by member states makes the P-A approach nonfalsifiable. Additionally, the origins of those state preferences are never specified or significantly theorized. Thus the recent efforts to see IOs as mere extensions of states’ preferences neglects the transformational roles of the IOs as well as rejecting years of theoretical advances in establishing the roots of state preferences.

*BNS* provided an epistemology for understanding and studying meaningful change in international organizations. It began with fundamental assumptions that individuals often operate under conditions of uncertainty, and pursue their goals through a process of bounded rationality akin to what Herbert Simon called “satisficing.” Interests are not given, they are constructed subject to partial prior beliefs, political pressures, and material circumstances. Analysts must look at what actors think, and believe, and then theorize about influences and consequences. In general the category of factors influencing actor beliefs are sociological and political, rather than psychological and anthropological, according to Haas. This epistemological standpoint was clarified later as “pragmatic constructivism.” (Haas and Haas, 2002) He also insisted on the separation of facts and norms. His own norms were kept separate from those of the actors and from the effects of the social forces he was studying – although no one reading *BNS* can doubt what Haas wished the outcome to be.

His epistemology borrowed from a Weberian blending of understanding and
explanation. Haas believed in the need to separate both actors' beliefs and analyst's beliefs from broader social *Zeitgeists*. He used extensively Weberian-like ideal types. The ILO approximated an ideal (if unusual) type, but an ideal type grounded on empirical observation, with deductive theory applied to explain the circumstances under which those features were likely to be obtained and their implications.

The methods for creating such ideal types were based on access to empirical reality, largely rooted in interviews with principal actors. These provided a means to assess interests/preferences and choices. The sequence of research proceeded from deduction to induction back to revisiting the deductive beliefs through a larger process of abduction.

Second is an argument about knowledge accumulation by IR theorists about the activity of international relations. If IR theorists engage in research that is empirical to the extent that it is subject to Popperian falsification, and potentially commensurate, then, intersubjective consensus amongst communities of social scientists should generate clearer concepts and better policy guidance to decision makers. He believed that it is possible to differentiate good constructivism from bad constructivism based on an external judgement of whether the analysis was developed according to consistent assumptions and through a process of deliberative discourse. He also believed that the application of constructivism, in its various forms, can potentially lead to human betterment. Thus, serious interparadigm analyses in the social sciences about common subjects, such as regimes or the role of science and technology in decision-making, can contribute to better social science knowledge as well. His idiosyncratic, and ignored, contribution to the 1983 international regimes literature focused precisely on how different theoretical approaches to a common concept – international regimes – could provide meaningful interparadigm discussions and middle-level agreement on robust variables associated with political practices.

*BNS* established an early focus on the ontology of the international political system. It recognized at an early point the importance of non-traditional issues in international relations, and also expressed an early appreciation of non state actors.

*BNS* foreshadowed subsequent constructivist theorizing in IR. The conceptual link between Haas's approach and constructivism was actually pointed out by Haas himself as a reaction to the publication of 'The Social Construction of Europe' when he claimed to be a constructivist as well (Haas 2001). This link is well documented. For example, the long term social pattern he analyzes is a form of learning, driven by the role of ideas and agency in changing state, and elite interests (Checkel 1999; Johnston 2001). He was a constructivist because he took seriously the proposition that interests aren't given but constituted by interaction within a specific environment, that states respond to multiple influences, and, most importantly for our purposes, that ideas matter both as a source of state and elite interests and for understanding robust patterns of international behavior. In short, he was trying to endogenize ideas into a synthetic theory of international politics.
Later, the reception of BNS, and his *Learning to Learn*, led him to think more about the role of the theorist in constructivism more generally. What role and responsibility exists for the conscientious, activist scholar? He published a study of institutional design for the US Government in 1975, and a study on international information systems. (Ruggie and Haas 1975; Haas and Ruggie 1982) He was invited to contribute a background paper to the Commission on Global Governance on learning in international organizations (Haas and Haas 1995; Haas and Haas 1995). Although there was little discernible policy effect of this work, it led him to appreciate the role of the IR theorist in seeking to influence the system which the theorist studied (the subject feeding back onto the object of study). Thus BNS led to some heuristics for decision makers about IOs which could contribute to broader social change, and thus ultimately reinforce the process which he had previously studied from afar.

*BNS* has had enduring utility for shaping the study of a new generation of IOs. The approach exemplified by BNS has been applied to understand the role of UNDP in developing and disseminating economic development policies in the third world (Murphy 2006), the World Bank’s evolving development agenda (Haas 1990), NAFTA’s dispute resolution board’s intentional independence from the member states (Goldstein 1996), and UNEP’s contribution to sustainable development (Haas and Haas 1995, 2002). It also facilitated influential analyses on the European integration process, especially with a view to the influential agenda-setting role of the European Commission in the process of European integration especially its strategic use of First Pillar policies under Jacques Delors’s leadership (Ross 1995; Wiener 1998; Hooghe 1999) and the role of COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives) (Lewis 2000). More generally, neo-functionalism has been influential as a reference theory for European integration studies across the board (Rosamond 2000; Wiener and Diez 2003) especially, for analyses of the emergence and work of – soft and hard – legal institutions of the EU (Stone Sweet 2000), and recently, for analyses of politicization in the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005).

**CONCLUSION: BEYOND BNS**

If Haas ventured where few analysts had yet gone, what lies beyond the nation state and, therefore, beyond *BNS*?

It is possible (but neither easy nor inevitable) to transcend the existing world order based on (allegedly) sovereign nation states and to produce a new system that will be more peaceful, orderly and productive. This can be accomplished by negotiation and compromise and, therefore, does not depend on the eventual emergence of an (allegedly) benevolent hegemonic or imperial power.

Two sets of actors – neither of whom are included in orthodox theories of IR – are likely to play a key role in this transformation: supra-national civil servants and expert groups, and infra-national interest associations and social movements.
The influence of these actors will be enhanced, gradually and fitfully, by increases in the magnitude and variety of economic and social interdependencies across national borders. This process of transcendence (incidentally the term is Mitrany’s) is likely to proceed not just incrementally but segmentally, i.e. by first integrating specific and relatively less controversial sectors of production or arenas of policy, but these efforts will tend to "spillover" into adjacent sectors or arenas due to functional relations or learning experiences.

The process may proceed more effectively if it is pursued first at the regional rather than the global level where it can initially draw upon such distinctive factors as geographic propinquity, cultural affinity and historical experience. Scholars bear a special responsibility with regard to this process of transcendent integration since their research is better suited to identifying such emergence patterns and the dissemination of their findings is less likely to be interpreted by wider publics as motivated by national or self-regarding interests.

Even if it doesn’t lead to the elimination of the nation-state as the most important juridical unit in comparative and international politics, these forces may yet lead to novel political forms. Normatively speaking losing the nation-state would be a bad thing as there would no replacement source with meaningful accountability to citizens. An imminent form of international governance may be emerging from these political forces. An alternative to the dichotomy between hierarchy and anarchy in the relations between nation states has been described by Marks and Hooghe as multi-level networked governance, and by Deudney as negarchy (Deudney 2006). Haas had developed Weber’s notion of bureaucracy as an alternative to the hierarchy/anarchy dichotomy, or even continuum. This notion of an imminent form combines a mixture of regional and international IOs as the basis for a less violent and more progressive world order, through which multiple sets of non-state actors interact. Governance is possible in distinct issue areas where the networks of actors and set of interactions are most intense.

*BNs* continues to provide valuable guidelines for describing and understanding contemporary IR. Contemporary international politics may best be described in terms of complexity and uncertainty. Actors formulate their interests and foreign policy through various forms of social construction, involving modes of thought and identity, deference to authoritative groups such as epistemic communities, and the leverage by international organizations. The appropriate level of analysis varies by issue, and the actors involved. The systemic level is seldom particularly illuminating. Lastly, the processes of collective action and social betterment can be rigorously understood using the language of social science, appropriately applied.

NOTES

1. We thank Chris Ansell, Craig Murphy, M. J. Peterson, Wayne Sandholtz and Susan Sell for comments on previous drafts. We are grateful to Kurt Roderick for research assistance in collecting
the citation counts of BNS.

2. Ruggie (1993) returned to this theme many years later.
3. He tended to be materialistic at this level and disdainful of symbolism and discursive arguments.

REFERENCES


Haas, Ernst B. (2000) *Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress: The Dismal Fate of


