

court's jurisprudence—its legal reasoning, its balancing techniques, its principled application of expertise in both the law and the substance of the issue area being regulated—in turn enables, but also constrains, by channeling future litigation activity. The result is a diffusion of legal norms throughout the regime and the gradual accommodation of the language of law with the language of policy.

A third component of our framework is more speculative: to map what a supranational rule of law community might look like. We are particularly interested in how links between supranational and national levels of governance are forged and tightened. Vertically, we already see highly structured interjudicial dialogues between supranational and national courts, and the beginnings of a kind of mutual recognition of each level's authority. We also see that governments and legislators participate in the embedding of the regime's norms within the national legal system, for example, by transposing these norms into national law. Horizontally, we see that as the regime's legal norms diffuse and take on more formalization and clarity, a move to harmonize law and administration is occurring in the interest of reciprocity and—with respect to transnational society—in the interest of equality before the law.

When we have reached the stage (and we are moving in that direction) where political and judicial authorities at both the national and supranational levels begin to coordinate their behavior and become concerned with guaranteeing what is in effect equal protection under the regime's laws across the regime's territory, we are in the presence of a supranational rule-of-law community.

PEACE IN OUR TIME? CAUSALITY, SOCIAL FACTS AND NARRATIVE KNOWING

*By John Gerard Ruggie**

Introduction

In one form or another, a rivalry between realism and institutionalism has been an enduring feature of systematic thinking about international politics since the eighteenth century. Over the past decade or so, realism has taken a decisive turn away from the practical reasoning that had characterized its epistemology for the better part of two centuries, toward a narrowly construed positivism.¹ This development has substantially compounded the differences between the two intellectual traditions. John Mearsheimer, in a recent neorealist revival of the rivalry, subjected institutionalism to the standards of that positivism and found it wanting.² By imputing “causal logics” to various institutionalist theories and adducing contrary “empirical evidence,” he claims to have shown that international institutions are not a significant factor in promoting peace, and that neorealism, by implication, offers a better guide to foreign policy in the new era.

For neorealists even the existence of a West European “security community”—a geopolitical formation in which war is highly improbable if not unthinkable³—illustrates, rather than challenges, their argument. They understand peace in that part of Europe to be simply an unproblematic by-product of America's response to the Soviet threat. Now

* Dean, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University.

¹ This shift was inaugurated by KENNETH N. WALTZ, *THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS* (1979).

² John J. Mearsheimer, *The False Promise of International Institutions*, *INT'L SEC.*, Winter 1994/95, 5–49. I have commented on the substance of Mearsheimer's argument in John Gerard Ruggie, *The False Promise of Realism*, *INT'L SEC.*, Summer 95, 62; here I focus on epistemological differences between the two positions.

³ The concept of “pluralistic security community” is due to KARL W. DEUTSCH ET AL., *POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA* (1957). Western Europe is, if anything, more institutionalized than the ideal-type that Deutsch and his colleagues envisioned.

that bipolarity has ended, however, and the efficacy of nuclear deterrence is on the decline, Mearsheimer predicts that instability, crises and wars are likely to become more frequent, including in the heart of Europe. Indeed, “scenarios in which Germany uses force against Poland, Czechoslovakia or even Austria enter the realm of the possible. . . .”⁴ Institutionalists, in contrast, look to the possible expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the deepening of security ties among European Union (EU) states, and in some measure the evolving Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as helping to sustain the existing security community.

In principle, therefore, an exceedingly important “test” of these two intellectual traditions is in the offing. In practice, however, any such test is likely to perpetuate rather than resolve long-standing disagreements, unless the theories’ logical protocols for “testing” are rendered more commensurate than they are now or the effects of their differences are made more transparent and are compensated for. In this brief paper, I sketch out the understanding of causality, social facts and explanation held by the two approaches, and I argue that the newly-acquired epistemological stance of realism is especially vulnerable when it comes to the study of international systems and the roles of institutions within them.

Causality

An aspiration for and reliance on causal laws—or at least law-like generalizations—occupies a central place in neorealist discourse.⁵ This is so despite the tumultuous history of the concept of causality in this century—of having been declared a “fetish” by Karl Pearson, the “relic of a bygone age” by Bertrand Russell, a “superstition” by Ludwig Wittgenstein, and a “myth” by Stephen Toulmin.⁶ Cook and Campbell, in a 1979 survey, observed that “the epistemology of causation . . . is at present in a productive state of near chaos.”⁷ Neorealism indicates no awareness of this turmoil.

The fundamental problem, first explicated by Hume, is that causality per se is unobservable and must be inferred.⁸ Building on the work of Hume, John Stuart Mill provided a set of procedures by which, through a process of successive elimination, a cause could be identified as the necessary and sufficient condition for an effect. But Mill, like Hume and virtually all other pre-twentieth-century philosophers of science, assumed that relations among empirical phenomena were fully determined.

This deterministic view started to come under increasing pressure at the turn of this century, and by the 1930s it had been replaced in physics by the understanding that subatomic relationships were inherently stochastic. For example, an electron has only a probability of being at a specific location. “[T]he stochastic subatomic world was *not* a product of measurement error or incomplete knowledge. Indeterminacy was an essential feature of the subatomic physical world.”⁹

In recent decades, an entirely new view of uncertainty or chance has emerged under the rubric of chaos theory. Berk explains:

⁴ See John J. Mearsheimer, *Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War*, INT’L SEC., Summer 90, 5–56; and *Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War*, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, August 1990, 40.

⁵ Much the same holds for the branch of institutionalism Keohane has labeled “rationalist.” Robert O. Keohane, INT’L STUD. Q, December 88, 376–379. Keohane grouped all other institutionalist approaches, from neo-Weberian to neo-Marxian to post-modern, under the category of “reflectivist.”

⁶ Christopher Bernert, *The Career of Causal Analysis in American Sociology*, 34 BRIT. J. OF SOC. 231.

⁷ THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, *QUASIXPERIMENTATION* 10.

⁸ This discussion draws on Richard A. Berk, *Causal Inference for Sociological Data*, HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY, (Neil J. Smelser, ed., 1988).

⁹ *Id.*, at 157, emphasis in original.

Consider the opening break in a game of eightball. All of the billiard balls obey the usual deterministic laws of Newtonian mechanics. However, because of the curvature of each ball, small differences in where the balls make contact with one another translate into big differences in trajectory. With each collision, the importance of earlier small differences in points of collision are amplified so that after several collisions, the trajectories are effectively unpredictable. In other words, relationships that begin as effectively deterministic become effectively random.¹⁰

By now, it is generally accepted that the social world is inherently indeterminate. Two types of techniques are widely employed, therefore, in the attempt to enhance the credibility of causal inferences: (1) various statistical operations that reduce selection or estimation biases as well as spurious or confounding relationships, and (2) randomized experiments or quasi-experimental designs. However, the first of these requires reasonably large and robust sets of observational data, and the second requires that causal variables be subject to manipulation, at least in principle. Typically, neither condition holds for the study of international systems *as a whole*, the chosen level of realist analysis. As a result, neorealist causal inferences drawing on alleged systemic “laws” possess a dubious epistemological status.

In most institutionalist accounts, causality is not defined in terms of a “constant antecedent” (gravity, for instance), but conforms to its ordinary-language meaning: whatever antecedent conditions, events, or actions are significant in producing or influencing an effect, result, or consequence. This may be termed narrative, as opposed to formal, causality.¹¹

Social Facts

The linguistic philosopher John Searle has expressed well a central and recurrent philosophical problem of the social sciences: “We have a certain common-sense picture of ourselves as human beings, which is very hard to square with our overall ‘scientific’ conception of the physical world.”¹² We understand the physical world to contain unconscious particles in mechanical interaction, but we view ourselves as intentionalistic human beings capable of representing the world meaningfully to one another. Can these two views be reconciled in the social sciences? In the desire to emulate the physical sciences, Searle notes, many fashionable conceptions of social science—such as behaviorism, functionalism and physicalism—often deny or misconstrue the social efficacy of subjective and intersubjective “mental phenomena.”¹³

Neorealism is an archetype of physicalist social science, and institutions (along with ideas and norms) are among the phenomena it does not fully grasp and whose roles, therefore, it downgrades or distorts. Neorealism fails to appreciate that the social effects of ideas, norms and institutions are simply not like that of one billiard ball hitting another and causing it to move—even if unpredictably, as in the eightball example described above—because their quality or state of being differs. To understand the social effects of such intersubjective phenomena requires that they be placed within appropriate epistemological frames of reference.

Elaborating on Searle’s basic distinction between physical and mental states, Kratochwil differentiates three worlds of social facticity in international politics: the worlds, respectively, of observational or brute facts, of intentionality and meaning, and of institutional

¹⁰ *Id.*, at 158.

¹¹ For a thorough analysis of the differences between logico-scientific and narrative approaches to the social sciences, see DONALD E. POLKINGHORNE, *NARRATIVE KNOWING AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES* (1988).

¹² JOHN SEARLE; *MINDS, BRAINS AND SCIENCE* 13 (1984).

¹³ *Id.*, at 15.

facts.¹⁴ Neorealism trades largely in the first of these, above all in the coinage of power (im)balances, their determinants and imputed consequences. This is a world of separate and distinct actors, with palpable properties, engaged in discrete events.

The second world of social facticity comprises intentionality and meaning. "Intentionality," Searle indicates, "doesn't just refer to intentions, but also to beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, love, hate, lust, disgust, shame, pride, irritation, amusement, and all of those mental states (whether conscious or unconscious) that refer to, or are about, the [external] world."¹⁵ As long as neorealism *derives* intentionality (threats, for example) from structural factors (such as power configurations, or rising and declining hegemonies), it is on safe grounds within its physicalist epistemological framework, though its empirical scope is limited because many expressions of intentionality cannot be reduced to structural (physicalist) factors. Once intentionality is granted a degree of autonomy from structure, however, a nonphysicalist epistemological framework is required because the mind, unlike the material world, can bring about, in Searle's words, "the very state of affairs that it has been *thinking* about."¹⁶ In short, social facts in the world of intentionality and meaning make intelligible the grounded reasoning behind actions.

Take a concrete illustration. As noted earlier, neorealism attributes the existence of a West European security community to the structurally based Soviet threat in the postwar period, which it was in the American interest to counter. The brute or observational fact of bipolarity is the relevant social fact. But the American response to the Soviet threat could have taken many forms, institutionalists would note, ranging from unilateral security guarantees to one, several, or an organization of European states; one or several bilateral alliances; the so-called "dumbbell model" linking North American and European alliances; or the multilateralized Marshall Plan and indivisible NATO security commitments. Each would have served America's interests as determined by bipolarity, yet bipolarity alone predicts none. In actuality, the United States chose the last option, and it went on to become a more ardent champion of a European defense community than most Europeans, as well as a driving force behind the creation of EURATOM. These policy choices suggest that, whereas some American response no doubt was triggered by the Soviet threat, the *form* of that response was animated by certain American ideas about the desirable shape of a future European order.¹⁷ Furthermore, there are no signs that those ideas would have figured in the thinking of Nazi or Soviet policy makers had either of those countries come to occupy the structural role of leading postwar power. Finally, since not all policy options available to the United States would have produced the same consequences for the prospects of an European security community, the reasoning that led to the choice of the one over its alternatives can be ignored or taken for granted only at considerable cost in understanding the ultimate outcome. The issue at stake here is not parsimony versus a more detailed factual description; it is to make sure that the appropriate *types* of facts are included in any such description.

The world of institutional facts is perhaps the most complex of the three and, within the neorealist epistemology, the least comprehensible. This world consists in the first instance of constitutive or enabling rules, and only secondarily of specialized regulative and enforcement rules. That is to say, institutions, before they do anything else, make

¹⁴ FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 22–28 (1989).

¹⁵ Searle, at 16.

¹⁶ *Id.*, at 61, emphasis added.

¹⁷ I explore the bases of these world order ideas in John Gerard Ruggie, *Third Try at World Order? America and Multilateralism after the Cold War*, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 553–570.

routine social interaction possible. That, in turn, can take place only “within an intersubjectively understood context.”¹⁸

Turning to Europe again, predictions of calamity resulting from re-emerging multipolarity and related factors must either ignore or otherwise dispose of the efficacy of the European Union, among other institutional facts. It is true that regulative and enforcement rules in European security relations remain weakly institutionalized and closely tied to NATO, though the 50,000-strong Eurocorps is scheduled to become operational in the autumn of 1995 and the Western European Union is being revived to play a more central security role. At the same time, regulative and enforcement rules are strong in economic and in some social realms. Moreover, even in security relations, constitutive or enabling rules shape outcomes among EU members in a manner that is poorly understood, especially within the neorealist model. It is increasingly difficult to visualize the conduct of international politics within the EU, and in some measure its members’ domestic politics, as though it took place from a starting point of fifteen completely separate and disjoint individual units. Nor do models of strategic interaction do justice to this particular intersubjective feature of the European Union, because the collectivity of members as an entity in its own right, in addition to the formal institutional apparatus of the European Union, participate in the strategic interaction game. To put it differently, the constitutive processes whereby each EU member defines its own *identity*—which is surely a core element in determining its sense of *security*—increasingly endogenize the existence of the others.¹⁹ There is little in the neorealist discourse that speaks to this world of institutional facts.

In sum, not only does neorealism employ a notion of causality that is difficult to live up to in the study of international systems, the neorealist epistemology has trouble accommodating precisely those dimensions of social facticity that are most relevant to understanding the role of ideas, norms and institutions in international politics.

Narrative Knowing

There is yet a third epistemological difference between neorealism and institutionalism. Even though the neorealist concept of explanation fails to meet the formal criteria of the Hempelian ideal, nevertheless in essence it embraces the deductive-nomological, or covering-law, model. In this schema, an event is explained when it can be formally deduced from a general law and a set of initial conditions.²⁰ Mearsheimer, for example, acknowledges that his scenarios of future instability in Europe rest “chiefly on deduction”—the law-like generalization being that multipolar systems are more unstable than bipolar systems, and the initial condition that the European security context is becoming multipolar.²¹ According to Hempel, the “methodological unity of empirical science” demands that the deductive-nomological construction is the only acceptable logical protocol for scientific explanations. Fields of inquiry that may fall short, such as history, are not fundamentally different, he contends, merely less well developed.²² And yet, even a philosopher of science so firmly committed to the “unity of science” premise as Ernest Nagel conceded long

¹⁸ KRATOCHWIL, at 24.

¹⁹ Some of the everyday mechanisms whereby this phenomenon is instituted in the legal realm are discussed by Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, *Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration*, INT’L ORG., Winter 93, 41–76. The relationship between other elements of civil society and prospects for peace in Eastern and Western Europe are discussed by Jack Snyder, *Averting Anarchy in the New Europe*, INT’L SEC., Spring 90, 5–42; and Stephen Van Evera, *Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War*, INT’L SEC., Winter 90/91, 11.

²⁰ CARL G. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION, Chap. 12 (1965).

²¹ Mearsheimer, *Back to the Future*, at 18.

²² See Hempel’s classic statement, *The Function of General Laws in History*, in ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 243.

ago that the covering-law model is inappropriate in explaining “aggregative historical events” or structures; there are too few of them, they are highly complex, and there are bound to be important differences among them, all of which renders problematical the necessary condition that they be instances of recurring “types.”²³ Neorealists, however, remain undeterred.²⁴

Institutionalists, in contrast, are more likely to employ narrative explanatory protocols, though, in Jerome Bruner’s words, social scientists have paid “precious little” attention to how they function.²⁵ Polkinghorne’s discussion is by far the most comprehensive.²⁶ In the narrative mode, he states, significance is attributed to antecedent events and actions by virtue of their role in some “human project” as a whole. This mode of explanation comprises two “orders” of information: the descriptive and the configurative. The first simply links occurrences along a temporal dimension and seeks to identify the effect one had on another. The second organizes these descriptive statements into an intersubjective gestalt or “coherence structure.” These gestalt operations rest on a method of interrogative reasoning that Charles Peirce called “abduction:” the successive adjusting of a conjectured ordering scheme to the available facts, until the conjecture provides as full an account of the facts as possible.²⁷ Polkinghorne describes the literary equivalent as “emplotment.”²⁸ The aim is to produce results that are believable and verisimilar.

To illustrate, let us return to the Truman Administration’s policy choice of instituting indivisible security commitments as the basis for NATO: the idea, as Michael Howard has written, “that now at last all were for one and one was for all.”²⁹ Neorealists, as noted above, exhibit little interest in this institutional fact; what matters is that there was a U.S. response to the Soviet threat.³⁰ In an institutionalist explanation, however, this fact assumes considerable importance. For here it is part of a collective security “story,” a willful endeavor by the United States to transform the traditional conduct of European interstate politics—the instituting of which the Soviet threat made possible. Otherwise stray facts or odd beliefs become meaningful within this story: the central role of Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the North Atlantic Treaty’s legislative author, who insisted on an arrangement that would allow the United States to act “within the [UN] Charter, but outside the [Soviet] veto”;³¹ the opposition to NATO’s indivisible security

²³ ERNEST NAGEL, *THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION* 568–575 (1961).

²⁴ Nagel argued that it is necessary to “analyze”—that is, reduce—such aggregative phenomena “into a number of constituent ‘parts’ or ‘aspects’.” *Id.*, at 571. But that procedure is rejected flat out by Waltz and his followers; see WALTZ, *THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS*, especially Chaps 2 and 4.

²⁵ JEROME BRUNER, *ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS* 11 (1986).

²⁶ POLKINGHORNE, *NARRATIVE KNOWING AND HUMAN SCIENCES*.

²⁷ “I call all such inference by the peculiar name, *abduction*, because its legitimacy depends upon altogether different principles from those of other kinds of inference.” CHARLES S. PIERCE, *PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS*, 150–156 (Justus Buchler, ed., 1955).

²⁸ “Thus emplotment is not the imposition of a ready-made plot structure on an independent set of events; instead, it is a dialectic process that takes place between the events themselves and a theme which discloses their significance and allows them to be grasped together as parts of one story.” POLKINGHORNE, *NARRATIVE KNOWING AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES* at 19–20.

²⁹ Michael Howard, *Introduction*, in *WESTERN SECURITY: THE FORMATIVE YEARS* 16 (Olav Riste, ed., 1985).

³⁰ If they address this issue at all, neorealists remain content to repeat the distinction made by Wolfers a generation ago between collective defense and fully-fledged collective security systems. See Arnold Wolfers, *Collective Defense versus Collective Security*, *DISCORD AND COLLABORATION* 181–204 (1962).

³¹ Daryl J. Hudson, *Vandenberg Reconsidered: Senate Resolution 239 and American Foreign Policy*, *DIP. HIST.*, Winter 77, 63. The reference to the UN Charter concerns Article 51, permitting “collective self-defense” arrangements, which Vandenberg helped draft at San Francisco. Vandenberg, it should be remembered, was a former isolationist who, in Kaplan’s words, “had been converted to internationalism on the strength of the United Nations providing collective security for all.” LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, *NATO AND THE UNITED STATES: THE ENDURING ALLIANCE* 36 (1988).

commitments by the celebrated realist practitioner George Kennan, director of State Department policy planning at the time, in favor of more traditional alliances—specific in nature, limited in time, and contingent on discrete exigencies;³² and the vote against the Treaty by Republican Robert Taft of Ohio, the Senate's leading anti-Communist, on the grounds that, "I do not like the obligation written into the pact which binds us for twenty years to come to the defense of any country, no matter by whom it is attacked and even though the aggressor may be another member of the pact."³³ Similarly, Eisenhower's subsequent support of indigenous multilateralized European security efforts fits well within the collective security "coherence structure."³⁴

What is more, there are good reasons to believe that it is precisely the nondiscriminatory security commitments of NATO that "explain" its continued attraction in Europe today, both as a pull to East European states and as a means to deepen West European security cooperation. Finally, the collective security "emplotment" requires none of the "auxiliary hypotheses" neorealism would have to invoke to account for this same range of facts (personality quirks, political exigencies, rhetorical windowdressing, bureaucratic inertia), so that it even constitutes a more parsimonious explanation.³⁵

But is not this explanatory mode arbitrary, subjective and soft? It can be made less so by devising logical protocols to increase the verisimilitude of its accounts. Noteworthy examples range from Max Weber's use of ideal-types and historical counterfactuals,³⁶ to Alexander George's method of structured, focused comparison.³⁷ Arthur Danto and Paul Ricoeur have firmed the philosophical foundations of narrative historiography.³⁸ Ronald Dworkin's work illustrates a complementary mode of legal reasoning.³⁹ Moreover, the narrative explanatory mode is not limited to events but can encompass human projects on a Braudelean scale.⁴⁰ Nor does it exclude the possibility of clarifying certain characteristic patterns of behavior by means of formal models.⁴¹ Finally, as Richard Ashley has noted,

³² See ANDERS STEPHANSON, *KENNAN AND THE ART OF FOREIGN POLICY*, 152–155 (1988); and GEIR LUNDESTAD; AMERICA, SCANDINAVIA, AND THE COLD WAR, 1945–1949; 172–173, 188–189 (1980). Kennan later recalled favoring a "dumbbell" arrangement, with the European countries cooperating on one side, the United States and Canada on the other, but in which they would have been linked, not by treaty and a permanent U.S. troop presence in Europe, merely by a U.S.–Canadian guarantee of assistance in case of Soviet attack. GEORGE F. KENNAN, *MEMOIRS: 1925–1950*, 406–407 (1967).

³³ ROBERT A. TAFT, *A FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICANS* 88–89 (1951).

³⁴ See Brian R. Duchin, *The 'Agonizing Reappraisal': Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community*, *DIP. HIST.*, Spring 92, 201–221; and Jonathan E. Helmreich, *The United States and the Formation of EURATOM*, *DIP. HIST.*, Summer 91, 387–410.

³⁵ In an eloquent passage, Peirce remarks that parsimony refers to the empirical, not logical, simplicity of hypotheses; *PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS*, at 156.

³⁶ See e.g., MAX WEBER, *THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES* 113–188 (Edward Shils and Henry A. Finch, trans., 1949).

³⁷ Alexander L. George, *Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison*, in *DIPLOMACY: NEW APPROACHES IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND POLICY* (Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., 1979).

³⁸ Arthur C. Danto, *NARRATION AND KNOWLEDGE* 1985, and VOL. 1 PAUL RICOEUR, *TIME AND NARRATIVE* (Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer, trans., 1984).

³⁹ See RONALD DWORIN, *LAW'S EMPIRE* (1986).

⁴⁰ Braudel's unit of analysis is what he terms "civilizations" in their "ecodemographic context." The general approach is discussed in FERNAND BRAUDEL, *ON HISTORY* (Sarah Matthews, trans., 1980); the original empirical study was 1 & 2 *THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN THE AGE OF PHILIP II*, (Sian Reynolds, trans., 1972). I was loosely inspired by Braudel's approach in drawing a configurative explanation sketch of emergence and potential future transformation of the modern international system: see John Gerard Ruggie, *Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations*, *INT'L. ORG.*, Winter 1993, 139–174.

⁴¹ Sophisticated forms of game theory, for example, have enhanced our understanding of generic forms of strategic behavior.

classical realism, in contrast to neorealism, utilized the narrative explanatory scheme, though it remained relatively unself-conscious about epistemological issues.⁴²

Conclusion

As noted at the outset, a test of neorealism and institutionalism may soon take place in Western Europe. But the critical outcome that hangs in the balance is the future of European security relations, not two bodies of theory. Accordingly, policy makers will hardly permit this to be a "test" in the strict sense, where scientists stand back and observe results dispassionately, but will try to shape the results to their liking (which is, of course, another major factor confounding the neorealist epistemology). In doing so, policy makers may draw, explicitly or implicitly, on these two intellectual traditions to guide or justify their actions. Hence, while epistemological issues remain of interest primarily to scholars, their effects can seep deeply into the policy process.

Neorealists are correct to warn that institutionalism can induce false promises; the failure of the Wilsonian design surely taught us that. By the same token, neorealism, as we have seen, embodies dubious epistemological premises. The neorealist enterprise lives up poorly to its own logico-scientific standards, and it is especially ill-equipped to function in the world of intersubjective facts where ideas, norms and institutions reside. Perhaps a greater degree of complementarity, if not accommodation, between the two approaches lies in the direction of reasonable promises and premises alike.

DISCUSSION

MICHAEL BYERS:* I would like to make two points. First, the development of judicial review depends greatly on the nature and closeness of the states subject to that review. I question Professor Stone's assumption that liberal states and democratic processes are necessarily favorable to judicial review when I look at those states that are currently coming voluntarily before the ICJ, not trapped by an optional clause or treaty with a provision. Those states include Bosnia, Libya, Hungary, Chad, Slovakia, Qatar and Bahrain, and soon Botswana, Namibia, Malaysia and Singapore. These are not liberal states, and yet they are going to the ICJ.

Second, I find it quite striking that Professor Alvarez did not mention the ICJ's decision on jurisdiction in *Qatar v. Bahrain*¹ last summer. In that decision, for the first time ever, the Court did not restrict itself to answering the question that was put before it by the parties concerned. Instead of answering a rather difficult jurisdictional question, it asked the parties to resubmit the case jointly through a joint special agreement. The Court was active in asserting what could be considered jurisdiction over the states without actually answering a jurisdictional question. It would seem to me that this radical move of judicial activism would suggest fairly strongly that the Court is not necessarily hesitant with respect to questions like judicial review. That it is prepared to do this with respect to *Qatar/Bahrain* suggests that it might surprise us with what it might do with *Libya* and *Bosnia*.

Professor SLAUGHTER: I want to make clear that our proposition about the effectiveness of supranational tribunals is qualified with respect to our definition of effectiveness. This is not to say that a supranational tribunal cannot work unless you have liberal states. That clearly is not true. The claim here is that there is a particular kind of effectiveness or a

⁴² Richard K. Ashley, *The Poverty of Neorealism*, INT'L. ORG., Spring 1984, 225-261. For an excellent and epistemologically sensitive account of the end of the Cold War, utilizing the classical realist narrative structure, see William C. Wohlforth, *Realism and the End of the Cold War*, Winter 1994/1995, 91-129.

* Queens's College, University of Cambridge.

¹ 33 ILM 1461 (1994).