

# Peacekeeping and U.S. Interests

*John Gerard Ruggie*

DO UNITED NATIONS (UN) peace operations serve the interests of the United States? When, where, and how? Only a few short years after the Bush administration basked in "new world order" euphoria, President Bill Clinton's decision directive on peacekeeping (PDD-25) has evoked a mixture of dispirited disappointment from those who had hoped for more, and dismissive criticism from those who want still less.<sup>1</sup> This steep downward slope suggests that the remaining political base for redefining the UN's role in U.S. thinking about post-cold war international security policy is shrinking fast. The present article frames these issues within a broader historical and conceptual context, in the hope that doing so will deepen and sharpen current policy discourse.

The language of interests is an instrumental language. The views of U.S. policymakers about the UN, in contrast, are all too often shaped by preset postures. One of these is liberal internationalism, which originated with Woodrow Wilson and currently includes the self-styled "pragmatic Wilsonianism" of Anthony Lake, Pres-

ident Clinton's national security adviser. This view tends instinctively to favor international organization, based ultimately on the belief that it expresses the essential interdependence of humankind. A second is conservative unilateralism, the position of Henry Cabot Lodge, Wilson's nemesis in the League of Nations ratification fight, as well as of the current Senate minority leader Robert Dole (R-Kan.), author of the highly restrictive "peace powers act." They view international organization as inevitably constraining rather than enabling the pursuit of U.S. interests. Finally, practitioners of realpolitik, such as former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, who are normally a natural constituency for instrumentalism in international politics, typically reject out of hand the idea that international organization can make any significant difference in a world driven by self-seeking power politics.

If the subject of possible U.S. interests in UN peace operations is to be discussed fruitfully, therefore, it must first be rescued from the orthodoxies that frequently capture it, wherein answers are given before questions are asked. Although it may look like a bit of a stretch, I begin by describing briefly the views on this subject held by Franklin Roosevelt. Why? Because Roosevelt was chiefly responsible for the creation of the UN, because his views stayed clear of pre-

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vailing orthodoxies, and because he was the last U.S. president who had to devise an overall framework for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, including a role for the UN, before the Cold War became its animating force. With Roosevelt's pre-cold war heterodoxy as a backdrop, I then address more specifically the relationship between current U.S. interests and the peace operations of the UN.

### **Roosevelt and the Founding Rationale**

Historians have found it extraordinarily difficult to accurately capture Roosevelt's views about the United Nations he helped to create. Some have depicted him as a closet Wilsonian, others as pursuing traditional power politics in liberal internationalist disguise. In fact, neither interpretation does him justice. Here as elsewhere, Roosevelt was a tinkerer—"the juggler," as he once described himself.<sup>2</sup> Three elements of Roosevelt's thinking about the UN were especially critical and remain instructive even today.

First, Roosevelt did not value the creation of the UN as an end in itself, nor primarily as a means to transform the traditional conduct of international relations, which is how Wilson had viewed the League. Roosevelt felt that a universal security organization in which the United States was the leading member was needed to ensure the timely, active, and sustained engagement by the United States in postwar international security affairs. He deeply appreciated how the country's geographic isolation and abundance of natural wealth had fostered its traditional aversion to "entangling alliances." He sensed, therefore, that a case-by-case interest calculus of whether or not the United States should get involved in any particular

threat to international peace and security was unlikely in most instances to prove persuasive to the U.S. Congress and the public—until it was too late and the United States faced a far more difficult situation than it would have at an earlier stage or, even worse, was dragged yet again into a major war that it had done little to prevent. Needless to say, the origins of World War II were foremost in his mind. Thus, Roosevelt above all else saw in the UN an institutional trip wire, as it were, that would force U.S. foreign policy makers to take a position on potential threats to the peace and then justify their actions or inaction to the body politic.

Although Roosevelt had originally favored a regional spheres-of-influence approach to organizing postwar security relations, he came to fear that this "four policemen" scheme, as it was known, might be used by Congress and the public as a pretext for the United States to shirk involvement beyond its own hemisphere, especially in Europe. Consequently, Roosevelt reached the conclusion, as he explained to Anthony Eden in 1943, that "the only appeal which would be likely to carry weight with the United States public . . . would be one based upon a world-wide conception."<sup>3</sup>

Second, Roosevelt believed that a stable postwar international security order also required, in the words of John Lewis Gaddis, the eminent cold war historian, "offering Moscow a prominent place in it; by making it, so to speak, a member of the club."<sup>4</sup> Gaddis calls this the strategy of "containment by integration"—in contrast to the subsequent U.S. strategy of containing the Soviets by exclusion and exhaustion. But this strategy required a club to which both Washington and Moscow belonged. Roosevelt hoped that the UN Security Council

would perform that function. Thus, Roosevelt envisioned a hybrid design for the UN: a universal security organization grafted onto a concert of power. In effect, he was trying to reconcile Wilson at Versailles with Metetrnich at the Congress of Vienna.

Finally, Roosevelt believed that the UN had to have "teeth" and be able to enforce its decisions by military means if others failed. Without teeth, it would neither provide deterrent value vis-à-vis potential aggressors nor would it possess the credibility required for the geopolitical objectives of engaging the United States while constraining the Soviet Union. At the same time, Roosevelt assured the American people, "we are not thinking of a superstate with its own police force and other paraphernalia of coercive power." Instead, the United States and the other major powers, he said, planned to devise a mechanism for "joint action" by national forces.<sup>5</sup> Roosevelt's proposal enjoyed strong approval in public opinion polls and had overwhelming support in the Congress.<sup>6</sup>

Contrary to subsequent criticism, Roosevelt did not assume that the great powers would maintain their unity after the war. He did assume, as historian William Widenor has put it, "that the U.N. plan would work if, and only if, they did."<sup>7</sup> When it did not work other means would simply have to be fashioned. Moreover, the basic parameters of the postwar security order were placed well beyond the writ of the UN in the first place, by the permanent member veto and by explicit provisions for the direct occupation of the Axis powers. Finally, the Security Council veto also ensured that the United States could not be compelled to commit forces or funds to international security objectives it did not support.

That Roosevelt's views were heterodox is clear. But do they shed any light on the situation today?

### Contemporary Relevance

U.S.-instigated, UN-based negotiations concerning the levels of, and the means by which to coordinate, possible joint national forces were abandoned in 1947, victims of the Cold War.<sup>8</sup> Today, the issue of UN forces has resurfaced and is the source of great controversy in the United States. Proponents are accused of seeking to subcontract U.S. foreign policy to the UN; opponents are dismissed as neo-isolationists. Both sides exaggerate and distort. Both sides also treat the issue almost entirely as a favor that the United States should or should not bestow upon the rest of the world. This is an impoverished view when compared with Roosevelt's conception, wherein the issue of joint military forces and action was informed by a larger vision of the United States' own geopolitical objectives. Are there any such links today between the United States' broader geopolitical aims and possible roles for the UN?

Surely the most central need today is to redefine the fundamentals of the international security order, now that the overriding impulses of the Soviet military threat and Communist ideological challenge have dissolved. When the Cold War marginalized the security role of the UN, and with it Roosevelt's strategy for ensuring sustained U.S. engagement in international security affairs, Harry Truman discovered that it also provided an even more effective substitute. By invoking the Communist menace, *Newsweek* wrote at the time, the Truman Doctrine "had clearly put America into power politics to stay."<sup>9</sup> And so it did for the duration of the Cold War. But

where does the United States go from here? What puts it into power politics to stay today? *À la carte* interest calculations are no more likely to suffice today than they have in the past. But what are the “grander” alternatives? Fears of a Russia gone mad? The clash of civilizations? The doctrine of “enlargement”? Jobs, jobs, jobs? In the absence of a compelling alternative, it may be worth pondering what a Rooseveltian strategy of institutionalized engagement would look like.

Let us assume that the United States remains leery of entangling alliances and weary of foreign quagmires. Let us also assume, however, that sooner or later the United States will be drawn into seeking to counter particularly egregious acts of aggression or violations of civility—which, if the first premise holds, it will have done little to prevent or contain. This was Roosevelt’s dilemma in a nutshell. Avoiding it suggests, at a minimum, that the United States should try to build on past institutional successes and promising institutional models.

The most important institutional success story in postwar U.S. security policy is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Today, the United States can either endeavor to extend the security framework of NATO to include key East European countries in a meaningful way—or watch them renationalize their defense efforts and rebuild independent military capabilities, thereby detracting from economic reforms while posing the danger of future regional instability and conflict. Similarly, the United States can either help to deepen the West European pillar of NATO and thus facilitate the emergence of a greater political and security component in the European Union—or watch Western Europe continue to flounder, flail, and fail on international

security issues, worsening unstable situations for all concerned, including the United States. In both contexts, possible links between the military arm of NATO and the political apparatus of the UN, haphazardly operationalized in Bosnia, need to be more clearly articulated and more effectively rationalized.

The most promising institutional model from the past is that of a concert of power—or perhaps overlapping concerts of powers—performed, at least in part, through the UN. Take the case of Russia. The outbreak of the Cold War rendered irrelevant Roosevelt’s attempt to contain the Soviets by integration. But what of the post-cold war world? The United States has been trying to define a viable Russia policy, thus far without striking success. The policy preferences of Washington officials and Beltway mavens have oscillated between the close embrace of “partnership,” which Russia as an independent great power is obliged to resist, and isolation, which is likely to produce self-fulfilling prophecies of uncooperative behavior by Russia. For its part, Russia has been most consistently constructive when it has been “a member of the club”—which, after some false starts, is now the case with regard to Bosnia.

It may be worth thinking along analogous lines with regard to parts of what Russia calls its “near abroad.” The West would like to see Russia’s behavior constrained. But neither the United States nor anyone else is likely to undertake direct action to prevent Russia from doing pretty well as it pleases in the Caucasus and the former Central Asian republics—as well as in Moldova and possibly even Crimea. The Russians, in turn, want to protect their local interests while containing regional conflicts, yet would prefer to do so in a manner that does not seri-

ously jeopardize their relations with the West. How can these diverse objectives be reconciled? Although far from ideal, one of the few practical means available is to transform Russia's ongoing military involvement in Georgia and Tajikistan, for example, into a broader UN peacekeeping framework—requiring Security Council authorization and review, including troops from out-of-area countries, and coupled with an internationally supervised process of political negotiations.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the central longer-term task of post-cold war reconstruction in the security arena is to achieve the “normalization” of Japan's security policy and forces without, at the same time, deepening regional rivalries and amplifying the already rapid pace of arms acquisition—even as the United States gradually scales down its own military presence there. This task is inherently difficult. Moreover, European models of regional community formation have little appeal in Asia-Pacific. And even though measures to enhance transparency and otherwise build mutual confidence have been proposed by Australia, among others, their significance is likely to remain relatively modest. Under these circumstances, it may be worth also exploring an unorthodox UN angle: for example, permanent membership on the Security Council for Japan as part of a broader initiative by Japan to multilateralize its security relations, perhaps going so far as to sign an article 43 agreement with the UN, which would put some of Japan's defense forces at the disposal of the Security Council.

These are but a few illustrations of a contemporary strategy of institutionalized engagement. Other prospects could be explored, including possible links between effective mechanisms of international conflict resolution and

reductions in weapons proliferation. Obviously, such a strategy would not constitute the totality of U.S. security policy, or even its primary thrust. But it would be linked directly to core U.S. foreign policy interests. Admittedly, a presidential decision directive on the subject of improving UN peace operations is not the place to discuss in detail the potential broader geopolitical roles of the UN in U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, one would expect the document to reflect such concerns. PDD-25 does not. As the *Washington Post* noted editorially, the strategy paper portrays UN peace operations strictly as “a sometime tool for third-level American interests.”<sup>10</sup>

### UN Peace Operations Today

UN peace operations will lack credibility unless the mechanisms themselves deliver. That is why Roosevelt insisted that the UN have teeth. Some of the newer, more “assertive” forms of UN peace operations, however, have not functioned at all well. Writing in the *International Herald Tribune* in September 1992, I observed that “it is a miracle of no small magnitude that disaster has not yet befallen one of these peacekeeping missions.”<sup>11</sup> Since then, alas, the UN has run out of miracles. The setbacks in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti are, in fact, the key drivers behind the Clinton initiative for more “selective,” “effective,” and “less expensive” UN peace operations.

Oddly, the administration's strategy paper ignores one, and only touches on the other, of the two fundamental defects that have afflicted these UN missions: a complete doctrinal void and nightmarish command and control arrangements.

*Doctrine.* The most basic problem with the recent, more muscular peace operations is that neither the UN, nor its member states, strictly speaking know what they are doing or how to do it. Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter, having been invented at the time of the 1956 Suez crisis.<sup>12</sup> But in its classical form, peacekeeping has evolved a rationale, and training manuals have been written describing it in detail. It is premised on the consent of the parties. Given the interpositionary or "umpire" role peacekeepers play, they fight against neither side in a dispute but remain impartial. They are a device to create transparency, to assure each side that the other is carrying out its promises. To that end, they observe and report. They carry only light arms and shoot only in self-defense. Unlike fighting units, then, peacekeeping forces are not designed to create on the ground the conditions for their own success; those conditions must preexist for them to be able to perform their task. In short, theirs is essentially a noncombatant mission carried out by military personnel. Accordingly, the combat effectiveness of such units and the adequacy of UN headquarters and field support operations have not had to be major issues of concern in the past.

To this classical peacekeeping portfolio the UN, starting in the late 1980s, began to add monitoring and sometimes conducting elections, supporting and sometimes performing tasks of civil administration as well as related services facilitating transitions to stable government. To ensure the future viability of these activities, the UN requires increased levels and more timely provision of financial resources, better trained personnel, and more sophisticated logistical support and communication systems. But neither the classical peacekeeping portfolio nor its

civilian offshoots require any fundamental doctrinal or institutional innovations.

Enforcement is also well understood. An aggressor is identified by the Security Council and subjected to an escalating ladder of coercive measures until its aggression is reversed. Ultimately, enforcement involves flat-out war-fighting—the "all necessary means" of resolution 678, authorizing what became Operation Desert Storm. War-fighting of that sort is everything that peacekeeping is not: the decisive, comprehensive, and synchronized application of preponderant military force to shock, disrupt, demoralize, and defeat opponents. Military enforcement will remain the province of a small number of countries that have the requisite capabilities, with the UN performing, at most, political legitimation and some coordination functions.

It is in the gray area of conflict between classical peacekeeping and all-out war-fighting that the UN has gotten into trouble. The trouble stems from the fact that the UN—the secretariat and Security Council alike—has tried simply to ratchet up and project a perfectly good instrument into highly unstable and potentially lethal environments for which it was not designed and in which it cannot succeed. Inevitable failure has produced inevitable backlash.

There is no agreed doctrine to inform operational planning and common training for missions in this gray area.<sup>13</sup> The most extensive doctrinal work seems to have been done by the British army.<sup>14</sup> But after exploring all known options with the aim of devising a comprehensive formulation that makes sense on the ground, the British team concluded that the endeavor was doomed, that—other than outright military enforcement—there was

no viable alternative to consent-based, impartial, interpositional UN intervention, involving minimum force. Because nearly half of all ongoing UN peace operations find themselves in this gray area between classical peacekeeping and enforcement, however, they are currently condemned to making things up as they go along. PDD-25 is silent on this critical issue.

*Command and Control.* According to the UN Charter, under article 47(3) a Military Staff Committee, comprising the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council, was to have been responsible "for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council." The drafters could not resolve questions related to the actual command of such forces, however, leaving them to be "worked out subsequently." These charter provisions have never been operative. UN-authorized military enforcement in Korea and in Desert Storm delegated command to the United States. In classical peacekeeping, governments vest operational control for employing and deploying military personnel in the secretary general. Because no peacekeeping mission other than the Congo operation ever saw extensive combat, this arrangement has posed few problems.

The in-between gray area, however, does pose serious problems. Because consent is sporadic, as in Bosnia, or civil authority has collapsed altogether, as in Somalia, such UN operations have much greater requirements than their antecedents for force protection, force mobility, possibly armed deterrence, and some capacity for neutralizing the use of force by local combatants. Quite apart from equipment and logistical needs, which the UN can ill afford to meet, the

existing command and control arrangements of these operations become progressively more problematical the more they are called upon to perform these tasks. The UN secretariat has made major strides in reorganizing itself, centralizing and rationalizing functions within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. But the problems run deeper. Civil-military relations are poorly defined in the UN, the political objectives and military missions of operations are unreliably linked, force commanders control too few of the assets that are ostensibly under their command, and tactical intelligence is episodic at best.<sup>15</sup>

PDD-25 exhibits some awareness of these problems, promising to assist the UN in augmenting its communication, logistics, and management capabilities. Its proposed solution to the underlying structural defects of UN command and control arrangements, however, is simply to opt out. That is to say, U.S. troops are less likely to be placed under UN operational control, the document states, the higher the probability that a mission will encounter combat, and the greater the anticipated U.S. role in the mission. On close inspection, however, this is no solution at all. It approximates what was actual U.S. policy in Somalia. And any objective telling of that story will conclude that the policy made matters worse for everyone affected by it, including U.S. troops.<sup>16</sup>

The only U.S. forces that were ever under direct operational control of the UN in Somalia comprised a roughly 3,000-strong logistics component. The U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) remained under the command of US-CINCCENT, the U.S. commander in chief, Central Command, although for each of a series of raids on Mohamed Farah Aideed's clan the QRF came under the temporary tactical control of

Maj. Gen. Thomas Montgomery of the U.S. Army. General Montgomery also served as UN deputy force commander, in which capacity he reported to the UN force commander, Lt. Gen. Cevik Bir, a Turk. Finally, the U.S. Army Rangers remained entirely under the direct command of Special Operations Command in Florida, bypassing both the UN command and control structure and General Montgomery, even in his U.S. role.

The Rangers who were ambushed in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, then, operated fully under U.S. command and control. Retired U.S. admiral Jonathan Howe, who, as special representative of the secretary general in Somalia, was responsible for overall coordination of all in-theater activities, did not learn of the Rangers' raid until after it began. General Bir and General Montgomery were not informed until shortly before it got under way. With no advance warning, let alone joint planning, and lacking interoperable communications equipment, it took Malaysian and Pakistani UN forces several hours to come to the Rangers' assistance.<sup>17</sup> In short, having U.S. troops in Somalia serve under U.S. command amid a UN operation whose own command and control structure was already cumbersome and tangled manifestly contributed to the problem.

The October 3 tragedy in Mogadishu, more than any other factor, turned the Clinton administration away sharply from its earlier declaratory commitment to "assertive multilateralism." Hence, it is singularly perplexing that the presidential directive proposes one of the causes of failure in Somalia that day as the solution governing future U.S. participation in combat-prone UN peace operations. More viable options will have to be considered: either working with the

UN and other countries to create effective UN command and control arrangements, or altogether excluding U.S. ground troops from potential combatant roles in UN gray area peace operations.

The two most serious shortcomings of the recent UN peace operations in semipermissive contexts, characterized by sporadic consent and greater likelihood of violence, are a doctrinal void and erratic command and control arrangements. The Clinton strategy paper does not address the first, and its proposed solution to the second threatens to compound the problem. When coupled with the fact that its analysis is largely detached from core U.S. geopolitical objectives, it is not surprising that the document elicited little enthusiasm from across a broad spectrum of political and editorial opinion.

### A Concluding Word about Interests

The United States is not now and has never been a relative equal on a continent densely populated by potential adversaries—the European context for which balance-of-power theory and the principle of *raison d'état* were first invented. For a power so great as the United States, interests, therefore, are rarely determined by external exigencies alone. More often than not, it enjoys the luxury of defining the content of its interests and choosing how best to pursue them. In the post-cold war world as before, the Americans' sense of who they are as a people and what kind of world they aspire to must inform the United States' choice of ends and means.

This ideational and aspirational dimension is missing almost entirely from foreign policy discourse in the United States today. It will be hard to



redefine the nation's interests for the post-cold war world without it. One might think that an administration of self-proclaimed multilateralists and pragmatic Wilsonians would draw on that tradition to give it a try. But in its peace operations directive, the Clinton team failed to take the opportunity. Ironically, Henry Kissinger—the canonical U.S. figure in the pantheon of *realpolitik*—has risen to the challenge. He concludes in his recent *magnum opus*,

In traveling along the road to world order for the third time in the modern era, American idealism remains as essential as ever, perhaps even more so. But in the new world order . . . [t]raditional American idealism must combine with a thoughtful assessment of contemporary realities to bring about a usable definition of American interests.<sup>18</sup>

Roosevelt could not have put it better.

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## Notes

1. The unclassified text of the presidential decision directive has been released as "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" (The White House, Washington, D.C., May 1994). For a sampling of initial reactions, see Ann Devroy, "Clinton Signs New Guidelines for U.N. Peacekeeping Operations," *Washington Post*, May 6, 1994, p. A-30, and Elaine Sciolino, "New U.S. Peacekeeping Policy De-emphasizes Role of the U.N.," *New York Times*, May 6, 1994, p. A-1.
2. The term is used as the title of Warren F. Kimball's study, *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).
3. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 96.
4. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 9.
5. Cited in Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 65.
6. For evidence, see Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II* (New York, N.Y.: Atheneum, 1967), chaps. 9-10.
7. William C. Widenor, "American Planning for the United Nations: Have We Been Asking the Right Questions?" *Diplomatic History* 6 (Spring 1982), p. 251.
8. To put some perspective on current debates, it is worth recalling the final U.S. and Soviet positions on the proposed size and composition of joint forces. The United States favored a combined total of 20 ground divisions or around 200,000 men, 1,250 bombers, 2,250 fighters, 3 battleships, 6 carriers, 15 cruisers, 84 destroyers, and 90 submarines. The Soviets advocated a smaller combined force, consisting of 12 ground divisions, 600 bombers, 300 fighters, 5 to 6 cruisers, 24 destroyers, and 12 submarines. By the time negotiations were formally discontinued, however, these differences reflected political jockeying more than technical assessments of collective security needs. See D. W. Bowett, *United Nations Forces: A Legal Study* (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1964), pp. 12-18.
9. Cited in David McCullough, *Truman* (New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 549.
10. "Peace-Keeping Guidelines," *Washington Post*, May 8, 1994, p. C-6.
11. John Gerard Ruggie, "No, the World Doesn't Need a United Nations Army," *International Herald Tribune*, September 26-27, 1992.
12. Once the concept of peacekeeping was articulated, the UN discovered that, like Molière's Monsieur Gentilhomme, it had been speaking prose all along. The true supervisory organization established in

- Palestine in 1948 as well as the observer team stationed on the Kashmir border of India and Pakistan in 1949 thereafter came to be seen as antecedents to peacekeeping.
13. For one attempt to sketch out a possible logic behind such a doctrine, see John Gerard Ruggie, "Wandering in the Void: Charting the U.N.'s New Strategic Role," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (November/December 1993). Also see John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, *Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations* (Providence, R.I.: Watson Institute, Brown University, 1993).
  14. I base this judgment on, among other sources, the papers presented at the symposium on "Military Coalitions and the United Nations: Implications for the U.S. Military," National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., November 2-3, 1993. See, in particular, Maj. Gen. M. A. Willcocks, "Peace Operations: What the United Kingdom Is Doing." A complete British army field manual, entitled "Wider Peacekeeping," has since been circulated in draft form.
  15. For useful surveys, see Mats R. Berdal, "Whither UN Peacekeeping?" *Adelphi Papers* 281 (London: Brassey's for IISS, 1993), and William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
  16. A good account may be found in Mats R. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36 (Spring 1994). I have supplemented it with interviews in New York and Washington.
  17. A U.S. Marine colonel with Somalia experience subsequently commented at a Washington meeting I attended how glad he was that the UN forces that finally came to the Rangers' assistance did not invoke any right to disobey orders from their UN commander that they viewed as subjecting them to "needless risk" or simply being "imprudent"—a right an earlier draft of PDD-25 claimed for U.S. troops—because the rescue order might well have been so regarded.
  18. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 834.

# Religion and Peace: An Argument Complexified

*George Weigel*

BEIRUT, AND INDEED all of Lebanon, the Golden Temple of Amritsar, Kashmir, Belfast, Tehran, the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. These being the typical reference points for most discussions of "religion and peace," it is little wonder that Western elites—our academic institutions, the prestige press, our governments—tend to think of religion, in its impact on international public life, as a source of, rather than a remedy for, violent conflict.

But the fact that these are taken to be the primary reference points, however, is not itself an accident, because it reflects the broader inclination of elite Western opinion to view religion as an irrational, premodern phenomenon, a throwback to the dark centuries before the Enlightenment taught the virtues of rationality and decency and bent human energies to constructive, rather than destructive, purposes. Nor should it be considered a secret that this elite Western suspicion of religion frequently involves a caricature of religious conviction.

It would be foolish for people of faith to deny that religion can be a source of violent conflict. It has been; it is today; it will be in the future. But it would be imprudent, unwise, and just plain wrongheaded for both religious skeptics and statesmen to ignore

the fact that religious conviction has also functioned as a powerful warrant for social tolerance, for democratic pluralism, and for nonviolent conflict resolution. This essay will explore the latter, often uncharted, territory in the conviction that, as religion is not going to fade from the human landscape, it is important to understand how religious faith, and the personal and social values that derive from it, can serve the cause of peace.

## The Unsecularization of the World

Although rarely recognized, the "unsecularization" of the world is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twentieth century.

This is true of the United States which, despite the predictions of two generations of secularization theorists, remains an incorrigibly religious society.<sup>1</sup>

It is true of central and eastern Europe; indeed, the revolution of 1989 would not have taken the form it did, and might possibly never have happened at all, without the efforts of the Roman Catholic church in Poland and Czechoslovakia and the Evangelischekirche in the late German Democratic Republic.<sup>2</sup> One could also mention in this regard the roles played by various Orthodox churches in Romania, Bulgaria, and throughout the republics of the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup>

"Unsecularization" aptly describes

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
# Order and Disorder after the Cold War

*edited by*

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